LABREL Dec1

8/10/2019 LABREL Dec1

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1. Hacienda Fatima vs. National Federation ofSugarcane Workers, (G.R. No 149440, 28 Jan. 2003)

Facts:

When complainant union (respondents) was certified as the

collective bargaining representative, petitioners refused to

sit down w/ the union for the purpose of entering into a

CBA. The workers including complainants were not given

work for more than 1 month. In protest, they staged a strike

w/c was however settled upon the signing of a MOA.

Subsequently, alleging that complainants failed to load some

wagons, petitioners reneged on its commitment to bargain

collectively & employed all means including the use of

private armed guards to prevent the organizers from

entering the premises. No work assignments were given to

complainants w/c forced the union to stage a strike. Due to

conciliation efforts by the DOLE, another MOA was signed by

the parties & they met in a conciliation meeting. When

petitioners again reneged on its commitment, complainants

filed a complaint. Petitioner accused respondents of

refusing to work & being choosy in the kind of work they

have to perform.

The NLRC ruled that petitioners were guilty of ULP & that

the respondents were illegally dismissed. The CA affirmed

that while the work of respondents was seasonal in nature,

they were considered to be merely on leave during the off-season & were therefore still employed by petitioners.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in holding that respondents,

admittedly seasonal workers, were regular employees,

contrary to the clear provisions of Article 280 of the Labor

Code, which categorically state that seasonal employees are

not covered by the definition of regular employees under

paragraph 1, nor covered under paragraph 2 which refers

exclusively to casual employees who have served for at least

one year

Held:

No. For respondents to be excluded from those classified as

regular employees, it is not enough that they perform work

or services that are seasonal in nature. They must have also

been employed only for the duration of one season. The

evidence proves the existence of the first, but not of the

second, condition. The fact that respondents repeatedly

worked as sugarcane workers for petitioners for several

years is not denied by the latter. Evidently, petitioners

employed respondents for more than one season. Therefore,

the general rule of regular employment is applicable.

If the employee has been performing the job for at least a

year, even if the performance is not continuous & merely

intermittent, the law deems the repeated & continuing need

for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if

not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence,the employment is considered regular, but only w/ respect

to such activity & while such activity exists. Seasonal

workers who are called to work from time to time & are

temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from

service in said period, but merely considered on leave until

re-employed (De Leon v. NLRC)

Respondents, having performed the same tasks for

petitioners every season for several years, are considered

the latter's regular employees for their respective tasks.

Petitioners' eventual refusal to use their services even if

they were ready, able and willing to perform their usual

duties whenever these were available and hiring of other

workers to perform the tasks originally assigned to

respondents amounted to illegal dismissal of the latter.

The Court finds no reason to disturb the CA's dismissal o

what petitioners claim was their valid exercise of a

management prerogative. The sudden changes in work

assignments reeked of bad faith. These changes were

implemented immediately after respondents had organized

themselves into a union and started demanding collective

bargaining. Those who were union members were

effectively deprived of their jobs. Petitioners' move actually

amounted to unjustified dismissal of respondents, in

violation of the Labor Code.

2.

Biflex Phils., Inc., Laboar Union [NAFLU] et Al., vsFilflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corp. andBiflex Phils. Inc., (511 SCRA 247 [2006])

Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illega

strike and any worker or union who knowingly participates in

the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared

to have lost his employment status.

Biflex Philippines Inc. Labor Union and Filflex Industrial and

Manufacturing Labor Union are the respective collective

bargaining agents of the employees of the sister companies

Biflex and Filflex which are engaged in the garment business

They are situated in one big compound and they have a

common entrance.

On October 24, 1990, the labor sector staged a welga ng

bayan to protest against oil price hike; the unions staged a

work stoppage which lasted for several days, prompting the

companies to file a petition to declare the work stoppage

illegal for failure to comply with procedural requirements.

The Labor Arbiter held that the strike is illegal and declared

the officers of the union to have lost their employment

status.

ISSUE:Whether or not the staged strike is illegal and a ground for

the lost of employment status of the union officers

HELD:Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code states that any union

officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike andany worker or union who knowingly participates in thecommission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to

have lost his employment status.

Thus, a union officer may be declared to have lost his

employment status if he knowingly participates in an illegal

strike and in this case, the strike is declared illegal by the

court because the means employed by the union are illegal.

Here, the unions blocked the egress and ingress of the

company premises thus, a violation of Article 264 (e) of the

Labor Code which would affect the strike as illegal even if

assuming arguendo that the unions had complied with lega

formalities and thus, the termination of the employees was

valid.

The court said that the legality of a strike is determined not

only by compliance with its legal formalities but also by

means by which it is carried out.


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3. Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Org. vs. PhilippineBlooming Mills, Co., Inc., (51 SCRA 189 [1973])

Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO)decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacaang to

express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig

Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine

Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the

PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was

confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the

demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in

fact an exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to

freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for

petition for redress of grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it

would interrupt the normal course of their business which may

result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat

of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they

pushed through with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their

appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate,

those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent

themselves to participate , otherwise, they would be dismissed.Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and

the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a

violation of the No Strike and No Lockout clause of their

Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers

of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their

motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the

Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.

Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strikeviolated the CBA.

Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights,the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.

Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as

supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions

may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual

application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"

permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity."

Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but

human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil

liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a

preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and

vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority

"gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting

dubious intrusions."

The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful

assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolutewhen directed against public officials or "when exercised in

relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we

shall be governed.

4.

Manila Diamond Hotel and Resort, Inc., vs. ManilaDiamond Hotel Employees Union, (494 SCRA 195[2006])

An ordinary striking worker cannot be dismissed for mere

participation in an illegal strike unless there be a proof that he

committed illegal acts during a strike.

The Diamond Hotel Employee's Union (the union) filed a

petition for Certification Election before the DOLE-National

Capital Region (NCR) seeking certification as the exclusive

bargaining representative of its members. The DOLE-NCR

denied said petition as it failed to comply with the lega

requirements.

The Union later notified petitioner hotel of its intention to

negotiate for collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The

Human Resource Department of Diamond Hotel rejected the

notice and advised the union since it was not certified by the

DOLE as the exclusive bargaining agent, it could not be

recognized as such. Since there was a failure to settle the

dispute regarding the bargaining capability of the union, the

union went on to file a notice of strike due to unfair labor

pracritce (ULP) in that the hotel refused to bargain with it

and the rank-and-file employees were being harassed and

prevented from joining it. In the meantime, Kimpo filed a

complaint for ULP against petitioner hotel.

After several conferences, the union suddenly went on

strike. The following day, the National Union of Workers in

the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN)

joined the strike and openly extended its support to the

union. The some of the entrances were blocked by the

striking employees. The National Labour Relations

Commission (NLRC) representative who conducted an

ocular inspection of the Hotel premises confirmed in hisReport that the strikers obstructed the free ingress to and

egress from the Hotel. The NLRC thus issued a Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO) directing the strikers to

immediately "cease and desist from obstructing the free

ingress and egress from the Hotel premises. During the

implementation of the order, the striking employees resisted

and some of the guards tasked to remove the barricades

were injured. The NLRC declared that the strike was illega

and that the union officers and members who participated

were terminated on the grounds of participating in an illegal

strike.

The union contended that the strike was premised on valid

ground and that it had the capacity to negotiate the CBA as

the representatives of the employees of Diamond Hotel. The

union contended that their dismissal is tantamount to an

unfair labour practice and union busting.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC

Resolution dismissing the complaints of Mary Grace, Agustin

and Rowena and of the union. It modified the NLRC

Resolution, however, by ordering the reinstatement with

back wages of union members.

ISSUE:Whether or not the dismissal of the union members is valid

on the grounds of participating in an illegal strike

HELD:Even if the purpose of a strike is valid, the strike may still be

held illegal where the means employed are illegal. Thus, the

employment of violence, intimidation, restraint or coercion

in carrying out concerted activities which are injurious to

the rights to property renders a strike illegal. And so is

picketing or the obstruction to the free use of property or

the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, when

accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence, and coercion

as to constitute nuisance.

As the appellate court correctly held, the union officers

should be dismissed for staging and participating in the

illegal strike, following paragraph 3, Article 264(a) of the

Labor Code which provides that ". . .any union officer who


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knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or

union officer who knowingly participates in the commission

of illegal acts during strike may be declared to have lost his

employment status . . ."

An ordinary striking worker cannot, thus be dismissed for

mere participation in an illegal strike. There must

be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike, unlike

a union officer who may be dismissed by mere knowingly

participating in an illegal strike and/or committing an illegal

act during a strike.

5.

Grand Boulevard Hotel vs. Genuine LaborOrganizations in Hotel Restaurants and AlliedIndustries, (G.R. No. 153664 [18 July 2003], citingNFL vs. NLRC [283 SCRA 275])

FACTS

- Respondent Genuine Labor Organization of Workers in Hotel,

Restaurant and Allied Industries Silahis International Hotel

Chapter (Union) and the petitioner Grand Boulevard Hotel (then

Silahis International Hotel, Inc.) executed a CBA covering the

period from July 10, 1985 up to July 9, 1988.

- Thereafter, Union filed several notices of strike on account ofalleged violations of CBA, illegal dismissal and suspension of EEs.

In these instances, SOLE issued a status quo ante bellum order

certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory

arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of LC. After notice was

given by Hotel re its decision to implement retrenchment

program, Union informed the DOLE that the union will conduct a

strike vote referendum. The members of the Union voted to stage

a strike. Union informed the DOLE of the results of the strike vote

referendum. SOLE issued another status quo ante bellum order

certifying the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and

enjoining the parties from engaging in any strike or lockout.

Then, another notice of strike was filed by Union on account of

the illegal dismissal of EEs pusrsuant to Hotels act of retrenchingaround 171 EEs. Officers of the respondent union and some

members staged a picket in the premises of the hotel, obstructing

the free ingress and egress thereto. Because of this, they were

terminated.

- Hotel filed a complaint with NLRC for illegal strike against the

union, its members and officers. Petitioner Hotel alleged inter alia

that the union members and officers staged a strike on November

16, 1990 which lasted until November 29, 1990 without

complying with the requirements provided under Articles 263

and 264 of the Labor Code. It further alleged that the officers and

members of the respondent union blocked the main ingress to

and egress from the hotel.

- The respondent Union denied the material allegations of the

complaint and alleged that the petitioner committed ULP prior to

the filing of the Nov. 16, 1990 notice of strike. Hence, there was

no need for the union to comply with A263 and 264 of LC, as the

notice

- LA Linsangans Ruling: Unions failure to comply with therequirements laid down in A263 and 264 of LC, the strike that

was staged was illegal. Considering the admissions of the

individual respondents that they participated in the said strike,

the termination of their employment by the petitioner was legal.

LA noted that if as alleged by the respondent union the petitioner

was guilty of

ULP, it should have filed a complaint therefor against the Hotel

and/or its officials for which the latter could have been meted

penal and administrative sanctions as provided for in A272 of LC.

The Union failed.

- Appeal by Union to NLRC: that it had complied with the

requirements laid down in A263 and 264 of LC because its Nov

16, 1990 notice of strike was a mere reiteration of its Sept 27,1990 notice of strike, which, in turn, complied with all the

requirements of the aforementioned articles, i.e., the cooling-off

period, the strike ban, the strike vote and the strike vote report.

- NLRC affirmed LA Decision. Compliance of the requirements

laid down in A263 and 264 of LC respecting the Sept 27, 1990

notice of strike filed by the union cannot be carried over to the

Nov 16, 1990 notice of strike.

Resultantly, for failure of the union to comply with the

requirements, the strike staged on November 16 up to November

29, 1990 was illegal.

- CA reversed NLRC and LA: It took into account the observation

of the Sol-Gen that the Hotel retrenched EEs pending the

resolution of the certified cases respecting the alleged illegal

suspension and dismissals effected by Hotel during and prior to

the notices of strike filed by Union. Sol-Gen opined that even if

the strike was staged without the proper notice and compliance

with the cooling-off period, resort thereto was simply triggered

by the petitioners' belief in good faith that Hotel was engaged in

ULP. Hence, this petition

ISSUES

1 WON the strike staged by the respondent union on Nov16-29,

1990 is legal

2 WON the dismissals of the officers and some members of the

Union as a consequence of the strike on Nov16-29, 1990 are

valid.

HELD

1. NO

Re: Procedural Requirements

- Under A263 (c) and (f) of LC, the requisites for a valid strike are

as follows: (a) a notice of strike fled with the DOLE 30 daysbefore the intended date thereof or 15 days in case of ULP; (b)

strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership

in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a

meeting called for that purpose; (c) notice given to the DOLE of

the results of the voting at least 7 days before the intended strike.

The requisite 7-day period is intended to give the DOLE an

opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries

the approval of the majority of the union members. The notice of

strike and the cooling-off period were intended to provide an

opportunity for mediation and conciliation. The requirements are

mandatory and failure of a union to comply therewith renders

the strike illegal. A strike simultaneously with or immediately

after a notice of strike will render the requisite periods nugatory.


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- In this case, union filed its notice of strike with the DOLE on Nov

16, 1990 and on the same day, staged a picket on the premises of

the hotel, in violation of the law. Union cannot argue that since

the notice of strike on Nov 16, 1990 were for the same grounds as

those contained in their notice of strike on September 27, 1990

which complied with the requirements of the law on the cooling-

off period, strike ban, strike vote and strike vote report, the strike

staged by them on Nov16, 1990 was lawful. The matters

contained in the notice of strike of Sept 27, 1990 had already

been taken cognizance of by the SOLE when he issued on Oct 31,

1990 a status quo ante bellum order enjoining union from

intending or staging a strike. Despite SOLE order, the union

nevertheless staged a strike on Nov16, 1990 simultaneously with

its notice of strike, thus violating A264(a) LC

Grounds

- A strike that is undertaken, despite the issuance by the SOLE of

an assumption or certification order, becomes a prohibited

activity and, thus, illegal pursuant to A264 of LC: No strike or

lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the

President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of

the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the

pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or

lockout.

- Even if the union acted in good faith in the belief that the

company was committing an unfair labor practice, if no notice of

strike and a strike vote were conducted, the said strike is illegal.

2. YES

Re: Effect of Illegality

Ratio Since a strike that is undertaken, despite the issuance by

the SOLE of an assumption or certification order, becomes a

prohibited activity and, thus, illegal pursuant to A264 of LC, the

union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost

their employment status for having knowingly participated in an

illegal act.

Disposition Petition is GRANTED. LA Decision REINSTATED.

6. Hyatt Enterprises of the Phils., Inc., vs. Samahan ngmga Manggagawa sa Hyatt NUHRAIN (588 SCRA 497[2009])

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

The Constitution affords full protection to labor, but the

policy is not to be blindly followed at the expense of capital.

Always, the interests of both sides must be balanced in light of

the evidence adduced and the peculiar circumstancessurrounding each case.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)

Decision[1] dated July 20, 2004 and the Resolution[2] dated

October 20, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 81153. The appellate court, in

its decision and resolution, reversed the April 3, 2003

Resolution[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC) and reinstated the October 30, 2002 Decision[4] issued

by Labor Arbiter Aliman Mangandog upholding the legality of the

strike staged by the officers and members of respondent

Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-National Union of

Workers in the Hotel Restaurant and Allied Industries (Union).

We trace the antecedent facts below.

Respondent Union is the certified collective bargaining agent of

the rank-and-file employees of Hyatt Regency Manila, a hotel

owned by petitioner Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc.

(HEPI).

In 2001, HEPIs hotel business suffered a slump due to the localand international economic slowdown, aggravated by the events

of September 11, 2001 in theUnited States. An audited financial

report made by Sycip Gorres Velayo (SGV) & Co. on January 28,

2002 indicated that the hotel suffered a gross operating loss

amounting to P16,137,217.00 in 2001,[5] a staggering decline

compared to its P48,608,612.00 gross operating profit[6] in year

2000.[7]

2000

Income from Hotel Operations P 78,43

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Other Deductions

Provision for hotel rehabilitation 20,000,

Provision for replacements of and

additions to furnishings and

equipment 9,825,4

29,825,Gross Operating Profit (Loss) P 48,60

According to petitioner, the management initially decided to cost

cut by implementing energy-saving schemes: prioritizing

acquisitions/purchases; reducing work weeks in some of the

hotels departments; directing the employees to avail of their

vacation leaves; and imposing a moratorium on hiring employees

for the year 2001 whenever practicable.[8]

Meanwhile, on August 31, 2001, the Union filed a notice of strike

due to a bargaining deadlock before the National Conciliation

Mediation Board (NCMB), docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS 08-253-

01.[9] In the course of the proceedings, HEPI submitted its

economic proposals for the rank-and-file employees covering the

years 2001, 2002, and 2003. The proposal included manning and

staffing standards for the 248 regular rank-and-file

employees. The Union accepted the economic proposals. Hence,

a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was signed on

November 21, 2001, adopting the manning standards for the 248

rank-and-file employees.[10]

Then, on December 21, 2001, HEPI issued a memorandum

offering a Special Limited Voluntary Resignation/Retirement

Program (SLVRRP) to its regular employees. Employees whowere qualified to resign or retire were given separation packages

based on the number of years of service.[11] The vacant

positions, as well as the regular positions vacated, were later

filled up with contractual personnel and agency employees.[12]

Subsequently, on January 21, 2002, petitioner decided to

implement a downsizing scheme after studying the operating

costs of its different divisions to determine the areas where it

could obtain significant savings. It found that the hotel could save

on costs if certain jobs, such as engineering services,

messengerial/courier services, janitorial and laundry services,

and operation of the employees cafeteria, which by their naturewere contractable pursuant to existing laws and jurisprudence,

were abolished and contracted out to independent job

contractors. After evaluating the hotels manning guide, the

following positions were identified as redundant or in excess of

what was required for the hotels actual operation given the
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prevailing poor business condition, viz.: a) housekeeping

attendant-linen; b) tailor; c) room attendant; d) messenger/mail

clerk; and e) telephone technician.[13] The effect was to be a

reduction of the hotels rank-and file employees from the agreed

number of 248 down to just 150[14] but it would generate

estimated savings of around P9,981,267.00 per year.[15]

On January 24, 2002, petitioner met with respondent Union to

formally discuss the downsizing

program.[16] The Union opposed the downsizing plan because

no substantial evidence was shown to prove that the hotel was

incurring heavy financial losses, and for being violative of the

CBA, more specifically the manning/staffing standards agreed

upon by both parties in November 2001.[17] In a financial

analysis made by the Union based on Hyatts financial statements

submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), it

noted that the hotel posted a positive profit margin with respect

to its gross operating and net incomes for the years 1998, 1999,

2000, and even in 2001.[18] Moreover, figures comprising the

hotels unappropriated retained earnings showed a consistent

increase from 1998 to 2001, an indication that the company was,

in fact, earning, contrary to petitioners assertion. The net income

from hotel operations slightly dipped fromP78,434,103.00 in

2000 to P12,230,248.00 for the year 2001, but nevertheless

remained positive.[19] With this, the Union, through a letter,

informed the management of its opposition to the scheme andproposed instead several cost-saving measures.[20]

Despite its opposition, a list of the positions declared redundant

and to be contracted out was given by the management to

the Union on March 22, 2002.[21]Notices of termination were,

likewise, sent to 48 employees whose positions were to be

retrenched or declared as redundant. The notices were sent on

April 5, 2002 and were to take effect on May 5, 2002 .[22] A notice

of termination was also submitted by the management to the

Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) indicating the

names, positions, addresses, and salaries of the employees to be

terminated.[23] Thereafter, the hotel management engaged the

services of independent job contractors to perform the following

services: (1) janitorial (previously, stewarding and public area

attendants); (2) laundry; (3) sundry shop; (4) cafeteria;[24] and

(5) engineering.[25] Some employees, including one Union

officer, who were affected by the downsizing plan were

transferred to other positions in order to save their

employment.[26]

On April 12, 2002, the Union filed a notice of strike based on

unfair labor practice (ULP) against HEPI. The case was docketed

as NCMB-NCR-NS-04-139-02.[27] On April 25, 2002, a strike vote

was conducted with majority in the bargaining unit voting in

favor of the strike.[28] The result of the strike vote was sent to

NCMB-NCR Director Leopoldo de Jesus also on April 25,

2002.[29]

On April 29, 2002, HEPI filed a motion to dismiss notice of strikewhich was opposed by the Union. On May 3, 2002, the Union filed

a petition to suspend the effects of termination before the Office

of the Secretary of Labor. On May 5, 2002, the hotel management

began implementing its downsizing plan immediately

terminating seven (7) employees due to redundancy and 41 more

due to retrenchment or abolition of positions.[30] All were given

separation pay equivalent to one (1) months salary for everyyear of service.[31]

On May 8, 2002, conciliation proceedings were held between

petitioner and respondent, but to no avail. On May 10, 2002,

respondent Union went on strike. A petition to declare the strike

illegal was filed by petitioner on May 22, 2002, docketed as

NLRC-NCR Case No. 05-03350-2002.

On June 14, 2002, Acting Labor Secretary Manuel Imson issued an

order in NCM-NCR-NS-04-139-02 (thence, NLRC Certified Case

No. 000220-02), certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for

compulsory arbitration and directing the striking workers, except

the 48 workers earlier terminated, to return to work within 24

hours. On June 16, 2002, after receiving a copy of the order,

members of respondent Union returned to work.[32] On August

1, 2002, HEPI filed a manifestation informing the NLRC of the

pending petition to declare the strike illegal. Because of this, the

NLRC, on November 15, 2002, issued an order directing Labor

Arbiter Aliman Mangandog to immediately suspend the

proceedings in the pending petition to declare the strike illegal

and to elevate the records of the said case for consolidation with

the certified case.[33] However, the labor arbiter had already

issued a Decision[34] dated October 30, 2002 declaring the strike

legal.[35]Aggrieved, HEPI filed an appeal ad cautelam before the

NLRC questioning the October 30, 2002 decision.[36] The Union,

on the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration of the

November 15, 2002 Order on the ground that a decision was

already issued in one of the cases ordered to be consolidated.[37]

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the labor arbiters decision. In a

Resolution[38] dated April 3, 2003, it gave credence to thefinancial report of SGV & Co. that the hotel had incurred huge

financial losses necessitating the adoption of a downsizing

scheme. Thus, NLRC declared the strike illegal, suspended all

Union officers for a period of six (6) months without pay, and

dismissed the ULP charge against HEPI.[39]

Respondent Union moved for reconsideration, while petitioner

HEPI filed its partial motion for reconsideration. Both were

denied in a Resolution[40] dated September 24, 2003.

The Union filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on December

19, 2003[41] questioning in the main the validity of the NLRCs

reversal of the labor arbiters decision.[42] But while the petition

was pending, the hotel management, on December 29, 2003,

issued separate notices of suspension against each of the 12

Union officers involved in the strike in line with the April 3, 2003

resolution of the NLRC.[43]

On July 20, 2004, the CA promulgated the assailed

Decision,[44] reversing the resolution of the NLRC and

reinstating the October 30, 2002 decision of the Labor Arbiter

which declared the strike valid. The CA also ordered the

reinstatement of the 48 terminated employees on account of the

hotel managements illegal redundancy and retrenchment

scheme and the payment of their backwages from the time they

were illegally dismissed until their actual

reinstatement.[45] HEPI moved for reconsideration but the same

was denied for lack of merit.[46]

Hence, this petition.

The issue boils down to whether the CAs decision, reversing the

NLRC ruling, is in accordance with law and established facts.

We answer in the negative.

To resolve the correlative issues (i.e., the validity of the strike; the

charges of ULP against petitioner; the propriety of petitioners actof hiring contractual employees from employment agencies; and

the entitlement of Union officers and terminated employees to

reinstatement, backwages and strike duration pay), we answer
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first the most basic question: Was petitioners downsizingscheme valid?

The pertinent provision of the Labor Code states:

ART. 283. x x x

The employer may also terminate the employment of any

employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices,

redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or

cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless

the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of

this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the

[Department] of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month

before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to

the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker

affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent

to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay

for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of

retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or

cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due

to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation

pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half

(1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A

fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1)

whole year.

Retrenchment is the reduction of work personnel usually due to

poor financial returns, aimed to cut down costs for operation

particularly on salaries and wages.[47] Redundancy, on the other

hand, exists where the number of employees is in excess of what

is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the

enterprise.[48] Both are forms of downsizing and are often

resorted to by the employer during periods of business recession,

industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations, and during lulls in

production occasioned by lack of orders, shortage of materials,

conversion of the plant for a new production program, or

introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery or

automation.[49] Retrenchment and redundancy are valid

management prerogatives, provided they are done in good faith

and the employer faithfully complies with the substantive and

procedural requirements laid down by law and

jurisprudence.[50]

For a valid retrenchment, the following requisites must be

complied with: (1) the retrenchment is necessary to prevent

losses and such losses are proven; (2) written notice to the

employees and to the DOLE at least one month prior to the

intended date of retrenchment; and (3) payment of separation

pay equivalent to one-month pay or at least one-half month pay

for every year of service, whichever is higher.[51]

In case of redundancy, the employer must prove that: (1) a

written notice was served on both the employees and the DOLE

at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment;(2) separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at

least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is

higher, has been paid; (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant

positions; and (4) adoption of fair and reasonable criteria in

ascertaining which positions are to be declared redundant and

accordingly abolished.[52]

It is the employer who bears the onus of proving compliance with

these requirements, retrenchment and redundancy being in the

nature of affirmative defenses.[53] Otherwise, the dismissal is

not justified.[54]

In the case at bar, petitioner justifies the downsizing scheme on

the ground of serious business losses it suffered in 2001. Some

positions had to be declared redundant to cut losses. In this

context, what may technically be considered as redundancy may

verily be considered as a retrenchment measure.[55] To

substantiate its claim, petitioner presented a financial report

covering the years 2000 and 2001 submitted by the SGV & Co., an

independent external auditing firm.[56] From an impressive

gross operating profit of P48,608,612.00 in 2000, it nose-dived to

negative P16,137,217.00 the following year. This was the same

financial report submitted to the SEC and later on examined by

respondent Unions auditor. The only difference is that, in

respondents analysis, Hyatt Regency Manila was still earningbecause its net income from hotel operations in 2001

was P12,230,248.00. However, if provisions for hotel

rehabilitation as well as replacement of and additions to the

hotels furnishings and equipments are included, whichrespondent Union failed to consider, the result is indeed a

staggering deficit of more than P16 million. The hotel was

already operating not only on a slump in income, but on a huge

deficit as well. In short, while the hotel did earn, its earnings were

not enough to cover its expenses and other liabilities; hence, the

deficit. With the local and international economic conditions

equally unstable, belt-tightening measures logically had to be

implemented to forestall eventual cessation of business.

Losses or gains of a business entity cannot be fully and

satisfactorily assessed by isolating or highlighting only a

particular part of its financial report. There are recognized

accounting principles and methods by which a companysperformance can be objectively and thoroughly evaluated at the

end of every fiscal or calendar year. What is important is that the

assessment is accurately reported, free from any manipulation of

figures to suit the companys needs, so that the companys actual

financial condition may be impartially and accurately gauged.

The audit of financial reports by independent external auditors is

strictly governed by national and international standards and

regulations for the accounting profession.[57] It bears emphasis

that the financial statements submitted by petitioner were

audited by a reputable auditing firm and are clear and substantial

enough to prove that the company was in a precarious financial

condition.

In the competitive and highly uncertain world of business, cash

flow is as important as and oftentimes, even more critical than

profitability.[58] So long as the hotel has enough funds to pay its

workers and satisfy costs for operations, maintenance and other

expenses, it may survive and bridge better days for its recovery.

But to ensure a viable cash flow amidst the growing business and

economic uncertainty is the trick of the trade. Definitely, this

cannot be achieved if the cost-saving measures continuously fail

to cap the losses. More drastic, albeit painful, measures have to

be taken.

This Court will not hesitate to strike down a companysredundancy program structured to downsize its personnel, solely

for the purpose of weakening the union leadership.[59] Our labor

laws only allow retrenchment or downsizing as a valid exercise of

management prerogative if all other else fail. But in this case,

petitioner did implement various cost-saving measures and even

transferred some of its employees to other viable positions just to

avoid the premature termination of employment of its affected

workers. It was when the same proved insufficient and the

amount of loss became certain that petitioner had to resort to

drastic measures to stave off P9,981,267.00 in losses, and be able

to survive.
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If we see reason in allowing an employer not to keep all its

employees until after its losses shall have fully

materialized,[60] with more reason should we allow an employer

to let go of some of its employees to prevent further financial

slide.

This, in turn, gives rise to another question: Does the

implementation of the downsizing scheme preclude petitioner

from availing the services of contractual and agency-hired

employees?

In Asian Alcohol Corporation v. National Labor Relations

Commission, [61] we answered in the negative. We said:

In any event, we have held that an employers good faith in

implementing a redundancy program is not necessarily

destroyed by availment of the services of an independent

contractor to replace the services of the terminated

employees. We have previously ruled that the reduction of the

number of workers in a company made necessary by the

introduction of the services of an independent contractor is

justified when the latter is undertaken in order to effectuate

more economic and efficient methods of production. In the case

at bar, private respondent failed to proffer any proof that the

management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner in

engaging the services of an independent contractor to operatethe Laura wells. Absent such proof, the Court has no basis to

interfere with the bona fide decision of management to effect

more economic and efficient methods of production.

With petitioners downsizing scheme being valid, and the

availment of contractual and agency-hired employees legal, the

strike staged by officers and members of respondent Union is,

perforce, illegal.

Given the foregoing finding, the only remaining question that

begs resolution is whether the strike was staged in good faith. On

this issue, we find for the respondent.

Procedurally, a strike to be valid must comply with Article 263 of

the Labor Code, which pertinently reads:

Article 263. x x x

x x x x

(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or

recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the

employer may file a notice of lockout with the [Department] at

least 30 days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair

labor practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the

absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the

notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization

in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal fromemployment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the

union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union

busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-

day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take

action immediately.

(d) The notice must be in accordance with such implementing

rules and regulations as the [Secretary] of Labor and

Employment may promulgate.

(e) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the

[Department] to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to

effect a voluntary settlement. Should the dispute remain

unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from the

mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the

employer may declare a lockout.

(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority

of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned,

obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that

purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a

majority of the board of directors of the corporation or

association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret

ballot in a meeting called for the purpose. The decision shall be

valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the

same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was

taken. The [Department] may at its own initiative or upon the

request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret

balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish

the [Department] the results of the voting at least seven days

before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off

period herein provided.

Accordingly, the requisites for a valid strike are: (a) a notice of

strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date

thereof or 15 days in case of ULP; (b) a strike vote approved by a

majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit

concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for thatpurpose; and (c) a notice to the DOLE of the results of the voting

at least seven (7) days before the intended strike.[62] The

requirements are mandatory and failure of a union to comply

therewith renders the strike illegal.[63]

In this case, respondent fully satisfied the procedural

requirements prescribed by law: a strike notice filed on April 12,

2002; a strike vote reached on April 25, 2002; notification of the

strike vote filed also on April 25, 2002; conciliation proceedings

conducted on May 8, 20002; and the actual strike on May 10,

2002.

Substantively, however, there appears to be a problem. A valid

and legal strike must be based on strikeable grounds, because if

it is based on a non-strikeable ground, it is generally deemed an

illegal strike. Corollarily, a strike grounded on ULP is illegal if no

acts constituting ULP actually exist. As an exception, even if no

such acts are committed by the employer, if the employees

believe in good faith that ULP actually exists, then the strike held

pursuant to such belief may be legal. As a general rule, therefore,

where a union believes that an employer committed ULP and the

surrounding circumstances warranted such belief in good faith,

the resulting strike may be considered legal although,

subsequently, such allegations of unfair labor practices were

found to be groundless.[64]

Here, respondent Union went on strike in the honest belief that

petitioner was committing ULP after the latter decided to

downsize its workforce contrary to the staffing/manningstandards adopted by both parties under a CBA forged only four

(4) short months earlier. The belief was bolstered when the

management hired 100 contractual workers to replace the 48

terminated regular rank-and-file employees who were all Union

members.[65] Indeed, those circumstances showed prima

faciethat the hotel committed ULP. Thus, even if technically there

was no legal ground to stage a strike based on ULP, since the

attendant circumstances support the belief in good faith that

petitioners retrenchment scheme was structured to weaken thebargaining power of the Union, the strike, by exception, may be

considered legal.
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Because of this, we view the NLRCs decision to suspend all theUnion officers for six (6) months without pay to be too harsh a

punishment. A suspension of two (2) months without pay should

have been more reasonable and just. Be it noted that the striking

workers are not entitled to receive strike-duration pay, the ULP

allegation against the employer being unfounded. But since

reinstatement is no longer feasible, the hotel having permanently

ceased operations on July 2, 2007,[66]we hereby order the Labor

Arbiter to instead make the necessary adjustments in the

computation of the separation pay to be received by the Union

officers concerned.

Significantly, the Manifestations[67] filed by petitioner with

respect to the quitclaims executed by members of respondent

Union state that 34 of the 48 employees terminated on account of

the downsizing program have already executed quitclaims on

various dates.[68] We, however, take judicial notice that 33 of

these quitclaims failed to indicate the amounts received by the

terminated employees.[69] Because of this, petitioner leaves us

no choice but to invalidate and set aside these quitclaims.

However, the actual amount received by the employees upon

signing the said documents shall be deducted from whatever

remaining amount is due them to avoid double recovery of

separation pay and other monetary benefits. We hereby order the

Labor Arbiter to effect the necessary computation on this matter.

For this reason, this Court strongly admonishes petitioner and its

counsel for making its former employees sign quitclaim

documents without indicating therein the consideration for the

release and waiver of their employees rights. Such conduct onthe part of petitioner and its counsel is reprehensible and puts in

serious doubt the candor and fairness required of them in their

relations with their hapless employees. They are reminded to

observe common decency and good faith in their dealings with

their unsuspecting employees, particularly in undertakings that

ultimately lead to waiver of workers rights. This Court will not

renege on its duty to protect the weak against the strong, and the

gullible against the wicked, be it for labor or for capital.

However, with respect to the second batch of quitclaims signed

by 85 of the remaining 160 employees who were terminated

following Hyatts permanent closure,[70] we hold that these arevalid and binding undertakings. The said documents indicate that

the amount received by each of the employees represents a

reasonable settlement of their monetary claims against petitioner

and were even signed in the presence of a DOLE representative. A

quitclaim, with clear and unambiguous contents and executed for

a valid consideration received in full by the employee who signed

the same, cannot be later invalidated because its signatory claims

that he was pressured into signing it on account of his dire

financial need. When it is shown that the person executing the

waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was

doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and

reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and

binding undertaking.[71]

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The downsizing

scheme implemented by petitioner is hereby declared a valid

exercise of management prerogative. The penalty of six (6)

months suspension without pay imposed in the April 3, 2003

NLRC Resolution[72] is hereby reduced to two (2) months, to be

considered in the Labor Arbiters computation of the separationpay to be received by the Union officers concerned. The first

batch of quitclaims signed by 33 of the 48 terminated employees

is hereby declared invalid and illegal for failure to state the

proper consideration therefor, but the amount received by the

employees concerned, if any, shall be deducted from their

separation pay and other monetary benefits, subject to the

computation to be made by the Labor Arbiter. The second batch

of quitclaims signed by 85 of the 160 terminated employees,

following Hyatt Regency Manilas permanent closure, is declared

valid and binding.

SO ORDERED.

7. CIRTEC Employees Union- FFW vs CIRTEK Electronics, Inc.,(G. R. No. 190515 [15 Nov., 2010])

R E S O L U T I O N

CARPIO MORALES,J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration and

supplemental motion for reconsideration filed by respondent

Cirtek Electronics, Inc., of the Courts Decision dated November

15, 2010.

Respondent-movant avers that petitioner, in filing the

petition for certiorari under Rule 65, availed of the wrong

remedy, hence, the Court should have dismissed the petition

outright. It goes on to aver that the Court erred in resolving a

factual issue whether the August 24, 2005 Memorandum oAgreement (MOA) was validly entered into , which is not theoffice of a petition for certiorari.

Respondent-movant further avers that the

MOA[1]signed by the remaining officers of petitioner Union and

allegedly ratified by its members should have been given

credence by the Court.

Furthermore, respondent-movant maintains that the

Secretary of Labor cannot insist on a ruling beyond the

compromise agreement entered into by the parties; and that, as

early as February 5, 2010, petitioner Union had already filed with

the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a resolution o

disaffiliation from the Federation of Free Workers resulting in

the latters lack of personality to represent the workers in thepresent case.

The motion is bereft of merit.

Respondent indeed availed of the wrong remedy o

certiorari under Rule 65. Due, however, to the nature of the case

one involving workers wages and benefits, and the fact thatwhether the petition was filed under Rule 65 or appeal by

certiorari under Rule 45 it was filed within 15 days (the

reglementary period under Rule 45) from petitioners receipt o

the resolution of the Court of Appeals Resolution denying its

motion for reconsideration, the Court resolved to give it due

course. AsAlmelor v. RTC of Las Pias, et al.[2]restates:

Generally, an appeal taken eitherto the Supreme Court or the CA by thewrong or inappropriate mode shall bedismissed. This is to prevent the party frombenefiting from ones neglect andmistakes. However, like most rules, itcarries certain exceptions. Afterall, the ultimate purpose of all rules ofprocedures is to achieve substantial justiceas expeditiously as possible. (emphasis andunderscoring supplied)

Respecting the attribution of error to the Court in ruling

on a question of fact, it bears recalling that a QUESTION OF FACT
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arises when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or

falsehood of alleged facts,[3]while a QUESTION OF LAW exists

when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a

certain set of facts.

The present case presents the primordial issue

of whether the Secretary of Labor is empowered to give arbitral

awards in the exercise of his authority to assume jurisdiction over

labor disputes.

Ineluctably, the issue involves a determination and

application of existing law, the provisions of the Labor Code, and

prevailing jurisprudence. Intertwined with the issue, however, is

the question of validity of the MOA and its ratification which, as

movant correctly points out, is a question of fact and one which is

not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule

45. The rule, however, is not without exceptions, viz:

This rule provides that the parties may raise

only questions of law, because the Supreme

Court is not a trier of facts. Generally, we are

not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the

evidence introduced in and considered by the

tribunals below. When supported bysubstantial evidence, the findings of fact of

the CA are conclusive and binding on theparties and are not reviewable by thisCourt, unless the case falls under any of thefollowing recognized exceptions:

(1) When the

conclusion is a finding

grounded entirely on

speculation, surmises and

conjectures;

(2) When the

inference made is

manifestly mistaken,

absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there

is a grave abuse of

discretion;

(4) When thejudgment is based on amisapprehension of facts;

(5) When thefindings of fact areconflicting;

(6) When the

Court of Appeals, in makingits findings, went beyond

the issues of the case and

the same is contrary to the

admissions of both

appellant and appellee;

(7) When thefindings are contrary tothose of the trial court;

(8) When the

findings of fact are

conclusions without

citation of specific evidence

on which they are based;

(9) When the

facts set forth in the

petition as well as in the

petitioners' main and reply

briefs are not disputed by

the respondents; and

(10) When the

findings of fact of the Court

of Appeals are premised on

the supposed absence of

evidence and contradicted

by the evidence on record.

(emphasis and

underscoring supplied)

In the present case, the findings of the Secretary of Labor

and the appellate court on whether the MOA is valid and binding

are conflicting, the former giving scant consideration thereon

and the latter affording it more weight.

As found by the Secretary of Labor, the MOA came aboutas a result of the constitution, at respondents behest, of theLabor-Management Council (LMC) which, he reminded the

parties, should not be used as an avenue for bargaining but for

the purpose of affording workers to participate in policy and

decision-making. Hence, the agreements embodied in the MOA

were not the proper subject of the LMC deliberation or

procedure but of CBA negotiations and, therefore, deserving little

weight.

The appellate court, held, however, that the Secretary

did not have the authority to give an arbitral award higher than

what was stated in the MOA. The conflicting views drew the

Court to re-evaluate the facts as borne by the records, an

exception to the rule that only questions of law may be dealt with

in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.

As discussed in the Decision under reconsideration, the

then Acting Secretary of Labor Manuel G. Imson acted well within

his jurisdiction in ruling that the wage increases to be given

are P10 per day effective January 1, 2004 and P15 per day

effective January 1, 2005, pursuant to his power to assume

jurisdiction under Art. 263 (g)[4]of the Labor Code.

While an arbitral award cannotper sebe categorized as

an agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties because it

requires the interference and imposing power of the State thru

the Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction, the awardcan be considered as an approximation of a collective

bargaining agreement which would otherwise have beenentered into by the parties. Hence, it has the force and effect oa valid contract obligation between the parties.[5]

In determining arbitral awards then, aside from the

MOA, courts considered other factors and documents including

as in this case, the financial documents[6]submitted by

respondent as well as its previous bargaining history and

financial outlook and improvements as stated in its own

website.[7]

The appellate courts ruling that giving credence to the

Pahayag and the minutes of the meeting which were noverified and notarized would violate the rule on parol evidence is
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erroneous. The parol evidence rule, like other rules on evidence,

should not be strictly applied in labor cases. Interphil

Laboratories Employees Union-FFW v. Interphil Laboratories,

Inc.[8]teaches:

[R]eliance on the parol evidence rule ismisplaced. In labor casespending before theCommission or the Labor Arbiter, the rules ofevidence prevailing in courts of law orequity are not controlling. Rules ofprocedure and evidence are not applied in a

very rigid and technical sense in labor cases.

Hence, the Labor Arbiter is not precluded from

accepting and evaluating evidence other

than, and even contrary to, what is stated inthe CBA. (emphasis and underscoring

supplied)

On the contention that the MOA should have been given

credence because it was validly entered into by the parties, the

Court notes that even those who signed it expressed reservations

thereto. A CBA (assuming in this case that the MOA can be

treated as one) is a contract imbued with public interest. It must

thus be given a liberal, practical and realistic, rather than a

narrow and technical construction, with due consideration to the

context in which it is negotiated and the purpose for which it isintended.[9]

As for the contention that the alleged disaffiliation of

the Union from the FFW during the pendency of the case resulted

in the FFW losing its personality to represent the Union, the same

does not affect the Courts upholding of the authority of the

Secretary of Labor to impose arbitral awards higher than what

was supposedly agreed upon in the MOA. Contrary to

respondents assertion, the unavoidable issue of disaffiliationbears no significant legal repercussions to warrant the reversal of

the Courts Decision.

En passant, whether there was a valid disaffiliation is a

factual issue. Besides, the alleged disaffiliation of the Union from

the FFW was by virtue of a Resolution signed on February 23,

2010 and submitted to the DOLE Laguna Field Office on March 5,

2010 two months afterthe present petition was filed on

December 22, 2009, hence, it did not affect FFW and its Legal

Centers standing to file the petition nor this Courts jurisdictionto resolve the same.

At all events, the issue of disaffiliation is an intra-union

dispute which must be resolved in a different forum in an action

at the instance of either or both the FFW and the Union or a rival

labor organization, not the employer.

An intra-union dispute refers to any conflictbetween and among union members,including grievances arising from any

violation of the rights and conditions ofmembership, violation of or disagreementover any provision of the unions

constitution and by-laws, or disputes arisingfrom chartering or disaffiliation of theunion. Sections 1 and 2, Rule XI of DepartmentOrder No. 40-03, Series of 2003 of the DOLE

enumerate the following circumstances as

inter/intra-union disputes, viz:

RULE XI

INTER/INTRA-UNION DISPUTES AND

OTHER RELATED LABOR RELATIONS

DISPUTES

SECTION 1. Coverage. -

Inter/intra-union disputes shall include:

(a) cancellation of registration

of a labor organization

filed by its members or by

another labor

organization;

(b) conduct of election of union

and workers association

officers/nullification ofelection of union and

workers association

officers;

(c) audit/accounts examination

of union or workersassociation funds;

(d) deregistration of collective

bargaining agreements;

(e) validity/invalidity ofunion affiliation ordisaffiliation;

(f) validity/invalidity of

acceptance/non-

acceptance for union

membership;

(g) validity/invalidity of

impeachment/expulsion

of union and workersassociation officers and

members;

(h) validity/invalidity of

voluntary recognition;

(i) opposition to application

for union and CBA

registration;(j) violations of or

disagreements over any

provision in a union or

workers associationconstitution and by-laws;

(k) disagreements over

chartering or registration

of labor organizations and

collective bargaining

agreements;

(l) violations of the rights and

conditions of union or

workers associationmembership;

(m) violations of the rights of

legitimate labor

organizations, except

interpretation of collective

bargaining agreements;

(n) such other disputes or

conflicts involving the

rights to self-organization,

union membership and

collective bargaining
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(1) between and among

legitimate labor

organizations;

(2) between and among

members of a union

or workersassociation.

SECTION 2. Coverage. Other related

labor relations disputes shall include any

conflict between a labor union and theemployer or any individual, entity or group

that is not a labor organization or workersassociation. This includes: (1) cancellation of

registration of unions and workers

associations; and (2) a petition for

interpleader.[10] (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, as respondent-movant itself argues, a localunion may disaffiliate at any time from its motherfederation, absent any showing that the same is prohibitedunder its constitution or rule. Such, however, does not resultin it losing its legal personality altogether. Verily,Anglo-KMU

v. Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa Sa Manila BaySpinning Mills At J.P. Coats[11]enlightens:

A local labor union is a separate anddistinct unitprimarily designed to secure andmaintain an equality of bargaining power

between the employer and their employee-

members.A local union does not owe itsexistence to the federation with which it isaffiliated.It is a separate and distinctvoluntary association owing its creation to the

will of its members. The mere act ofaffiliation does not divest the local union ofits own personality, neither does it give themother federation the license to actindependently of the local union. It onlygives rise to a contract of agency where theformer acts in representation of the latter .(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Whether then, as respondent claims, FFW went against the willand wishes of its principal (the member-employees) by pursuing

the case despite the signing of the MOA, is not for the Court, nor

for respondent to determine, but for the Union and FFW to

resolve on their own pursuant to their principal-agent

relationship.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of thisCourts Decision of November 15, 2010 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Grave Abuse of Discretion

Despite all these clear pieces of evidence of illegal obstruction,

the NLRC looked the other way and chose not to see the

unmistakable violations of the law on strikes by the union and its

respondent officers and members. Needless to say, while the law

protects the rights of the laborer, it authorizes neither the

oppression nor the destruction of the employer. For grossly

ignoring the evidence before it, the NLRC committed grave abuse

of discretion; for supporting these gross NLRC errors, the CA

committed its own reversible error. (PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC.

v. PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR ASSOCIATION (PILA), et al,G.R.

No. 170830, August 11, 2010)

Strike

Dismissal of Union Officers

In the present case, respondents Erlinda Vazquez, Ricardo

Sacristan, Leonida Catalan, Maximo Pedro, Nathaniela

Dimaculangan, Rodolfo Mojico, Romeo Caramanza, Reynaldo

Ganitano, Alberto Basconcillo, and Ramon Falcis stand to be

dismissed as participating union officers, pursuant to Article

264(a), paragraph 3, of the Labor Code. This provision imposes

the penalty of dismissal on any union officer who knowingly

participates in an illegal strike. The law grants the employer the

option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal

strike as having lost his employment. (PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC


No. 170830, August 11, 2010)

We explained in Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc.-

NAFLU v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc. that the effects of illegal strikes,

outlined in Article 264 of the Labor Code, make a distinction

between participating workers and union officers. The services of

an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere

participation in an illegal strike; proof must be adduced showing

that he or she committed illegal acts during the strike. The

services of a participating union officer, on the other hand, may

be terminated, not only when he actually commits an illegal act

during a strike, but also if he knowingly participates in an illegalstrike. (PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC. v. PHIMCO INDUSTRIES

LABOR ASSOCIATION (PILA), et al,G.R. No. 170830, August 11,

2010)

Requisites of a Valid StrikeSince strikes affect not only the relationship between labor and

management but also the general peace and progress of the

community, the law has provided limitations on the right to

strike. Procedurally, for a strike to be valid, it must comply with

Article 263 of the Labor Code, which requires that: (a) a notice of

strike be filed with the Department of Labor and Employment

(DOLE) 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in

case of unfair labor practice; (b) a strike vote be approved by a

majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit

concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that

purpose; and (c) a notice be given to the DOLE of the results of

the voting at least seven days before the intended strike.

(PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC. v. PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR

ASSOCIATION (PILA), et al,G.R. No. 170830, August 11, 2010)

Prohibited Activities

With a virtual human blockade and real physical obstructions

(benches and makeshift structures both outside and inside the

gates), it was pure conjecture on the part of the NLRC to say that

[t]he non-strikers and their vehicles were x x x free to get in and

out of the company compound undisturbed by the picket line.Notably, aside from non-strikers who wished to report for work,

company vehicles likewise could not enter and get out of the

factory because of the picket and the physical obstructions the

respondents installed. The blockade went to the point of causing

the build up of traffic in the immediate vicinity of the strike area,as shown by photographs. This, by itself, renders the picket a

prohibited activity. Pickets may not aggressively interfere with

the right of peaceful ingress to and egress from the employersshop or obstruct public thoroughfares; picketing is not peaceful

where the sidewalk or entrance to a place of business is

obstructed by picketers parading around in a circle or lying on

the sidewalk. (PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC. v. PHIMCO

INDUSTRIES LABOR ASSOCIATION (PILA), et al,G.R. No. 170830,

August 11, 2010)

Grave Abuse of Discretion

Despite all these clear pieces of evidence of illegal obstruction,

the NLRC looked the other way and chose not to see the

unmistakable violations of the law on strikes by the union and its
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respondent officers and members. Needless to say, while the law

protects the rights of the laborer, it authorizes neither the

oppression nor the destruction of the employer. For grossly

ignoring the evidence before it, the NLRC committed grave abuse

of discretion; for supporting these gross NLRC errors, the CA

committed its own reversible error. (PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC.


No. 170830, August 11, 2010)

PHILIPPINE MARINE OFFICERS' GUILD,petitioner,vs.COMPAIA MARITIMA, PHILIPPINE STEAMSHIP NAVIGATIONCO., MADRIGAL SHIPPING CO., COURT OF AGRARIANRELATIONS ASSOCIATE JUDGES ARSENIO MARTINEZ,BALTAZAR VILLANUEVA, and ARMANDOBUGAYONG,respondents.

MAKALINTAL,J.:Petition for certiorari to review the decision dated

December 23, 1961 and the resolution en banc dated May 18,

1962 of the Court of Industrial Relations in Cases Nos. 6-IPA and

617-ULP.

The respondents Compaia Maritima, Philippine Steamship

Navigation Company and Madrigal Shipping Company[hereinafter referred to as MARITIMA, PHILSTEAM, and

MADRIGAL, respectively, and as COMPANIES jointly] are

domestic corpor

LABREL Dec1

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