VENUE OF ACTIONG.R. No. 117650 March 7, 1996SULPICIO LINES, INC.,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JAIME CAGATAN,respondents.KAPUNAN,J.:pPetitioner Sulpicio Lines, Inc., owner of MV Cotabato Princess, on January 15, 1992 dismissed private respondent Jaime Cagatan, a messman of the said vessel, allegedly for being absent without leave for a "prolonged" period of six (6) months.As a result of his dismissal, the private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) through its National Capital Region Arbitration Branch in Manila, docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-06-3163-92.Responding to the said complaint, petitioner, on June 25, 1992, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue, stating, among other things, that the case for illegal dismissal should have been lodged with the NLRC's Regional Branch No. VII (Cebu), as its main office was located in Cebu City.In an Order dated August 21, 1992 Labor Arbiter Arthur L. Amansec of the NLRC-NCR denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, holding that:Considering that the complainant is a ship steward, traveled on board respondent's ship along the Manila-Enstancia-lloilo-Zamboanga-Cotabato vice-versa route, Manila Can be said to be part of the complainant's territorial workplace.The aforequoted Order was seasonably appealed to the NLRC by petitioner. On February 28, 1994, respondent NLRC found petitioner's appeal unmeritorious and sustained the Labor Arbiter's August 21, 1992 ruling, explaining that "under the New NLRC Rules, the Commission or the Labor Arbiter before whom the case is pending may order a change of venue."Finding no grave abuse of discretion in the Labor Arbiter's assailed Order, respondent NLRC emphasized that:[T]he complainant instituted the Action in Manila where he resides. Hence, we see no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor arbiter in denying the respondent's Motion to Dismiss as We find support in the basic principle that the State shall afford protection to labor and that the NLRC is not bound by strict technical rules of procedure.Undaunted, petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above Order, which the public respondent denied in its Resolution dated July 22, 1994.Consequently, petitioner comes to this Court for relief, in the form of a Special Civil Action forCertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, contending that public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued its assailed rulings.It is petitioner's principal contention that a ship or vessel as workplace is an extension of its homeport or principal place of business, and that "being part of the territory of the homeport, (such) vessel is governed to a large extent by the laws and is under the jurisdiction of the homeport.Based on this submission, petitioner avers that its vessel-as-workplace is "under the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Arbitration branch where (its) . . . principal office is located," which is Branch VII, located in Cebu City.We disagree.As early as 1911, this Court held that the question of venue essentially relates to the trial and touches more upon the convenience of the parties, rather than upon the substance and merits of the case.Our permissive rules underlying provisions on venue are intended to assure convenience for the plaintiff and his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. This axiom all the more finds applicability in cases involving labor and management because of the principle, paramount in our jurisdiction, that the State shall afford full protection to labor.Even in cases where venue has been stipulated by the parties by contract, this Court has not hesitated to set aside agreements on venue if the same would lead to a situation so grossly inconvenient to one party as to virtually negate his claim. InSweet Lines vs.Teves,involving a contract of adhesion, we held that:An agreement will not be held valid where it practically negates the action of the claimants, such as the private respondents herein. The philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would most probably decide not to file the action at all. The condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. Upon the other hand, petitioner had branches or offices in the respective ports of call of the vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in the instant case will not cause inconvenience to, much less prejudice petitioner.In the case at bench, it is not denied that while petitioner maintains its principal office in Cebu City, it retains a major booking and shipping office in Manila from which it earns considerable revenue, and from which it hires and trains a significant number of its workforce. Its virulent insistence on holding the proceedings in the NLRC's regional arbitration branch in Cebu City is obviously a ploy to inconvenience the private respondent, a mere steward who resides in Metro Manila, who would obviously not be able to afford the frequent trips to Cebu City in order to follow up his case.Even the provisions cited by petitioner in support of its contention that venue of the illegal dismissal case lodged by private respondent is improperly laid, would not absolutely support his claim that respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the private respondent to file his case with the NCR arbitration branch.Section 1, Rule IV of the NLRC Rules of Procedure on Venue, provides that:Sec. 1. Venue (a) All cases in which Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and decidemaybe filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction the workplace of the complainant/petitioner.This provision is obviously permissive, for the said section uses the word "may," allowing a different venue when the interests of substantial justice demand a different one. In any case, as stated earlier, the Constitutional protection accorded to labor is a paramount and compelling factor, provided the venue chosen is not altogether oppressive to the employer.Moreover, Section Rule IV of the 1990 NLRC Rules additionally provides that, "for purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose." Since the private respondent's regular place of assignment is the vessel MV Cotabato Princess which plies the Manila-Estancia-Iloilo-Zamboanga-Cotabato route, we are of the opinion that Labor Arbiter Arthur L. Amansec was correct in concluding that Manila could be considered part of the complainant's territorial workplace. Respondent NLRC, therefore, committed no grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the labor arbiter's denial of herein petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS FOR DAMAGESG.R. No. L-56431 January 19, 1988NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES, In Its Own Right And In Behalf Of CBTC EMPLOYEES Affiliated With It; CBTC EMPLOYEES UNION, In Its Own Right And Interest And In Behalf Of All CBTC Rank And File Employees Including Its Members, BENJAMIN GABAT, BIENVENIDO MORALEDA, ELICITA GAMBOA, FAUSTINO TEVES, SALVADOR LISING, and NESTOR DE LOS SANTOS,petitioners,vs.THE HON. JUDGE ALFREDO M. LAZARO, CFI-MANILA BRANCH XXXV; COMMERCLKL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES; BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; AYALA CORPORATION; MANUEL J. MARQUEZ; ENRIQUE ZOBEL; ALBERTO VILLA-ABRILLE; VICENTE A. PACIS, JR.; and DEOGRACIAS A. FERNANDO,respondents.SARMIENTO,J.:The sole issue in this special civil action for certiorari is whether or not the courts may take cognizance of claims for damages arising from a labor controversy.The antecedent facts are not disputed.On July 1, 1977, the Commercial Bank and Trust Company, a Philippine banking institution, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Commercial Bank and Trust Company Union, representing the rank and file of the bank with a membership of over one thousand employees, and an affiliated local of the National Union of Bank Employees, a national labor organization.The agreement was effective until June 30, 1980, with an automatic renewal clause until the parties execute a new agreement.On May 20, 1980, the union, together with the National Union of Bank Employees, submitted to the bank management proposals for the renegotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement. The following day, however, the bank suspended negotiations with the union. The bank had meanwhile entered into a merger with the Bank of the Philippine Islands, another Philippine banking institution, which assumed all assets and liabilities thereof.As a consequence, the union went to the then Court of First Instance of Manila, presided over by the respondent Judge, on a complaint for specific performance, damages, and preliminary injunction against the private respondents. Among other things, the complaint charged:xxx xxx xxx51. In entering in to such arrangement for the termination of the CURRENT CBA, and the consequent destruction to existing rights, interests and benefits thereunder,CBTC is liable for wilful injury to the contract and property rights thereunder as provided in Article 2220 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;52. By arranging for the termination of the CURRENT CBA in the manner above described, CBTC committed breach of said contract in bad faith, in that CBTC had taken undue advantage of its own employees, by concealing and hiding the negotiations towards an agreement on the sales and merger, when it was under a statutory duty to disclose and bargain on the effects thereof, according to law;xxx xxx xxx54. In virtually suppressing the collective bargaining rights of plaintiffs under the law and as provided in the CURRENT CBA, through shadow bargaining, calculated delay, suspension of negotiations, concealment of bargainable issues and high-handed dictation, the CBTC and its defendant officials, as well as the BANK OF P.I. and its defendant officials, were all actuated by a dishonest purpose to secure an undue advantage; on the part of the CBTC it was to avoid fresh and additional contractual commitments, which would substantially lessen and diminish the profitability of the sale; and on the part of the BANKOF P.I., it was to avoid having to face higher compensation rates of CBTC employees in the course of integration and merger which could force the upgrading of the benefit package for the personnel of the merged operations, and thereby pushed personnel costs upwards; substantial outlays and costs thereby entailed were all deftly avoided and evaded, through the expedient of deliberate curtailment and suppression of contractual bargaining rights;55. All the other defendants have actively cooperated with and abetted the CBTC and its defendant officers in negotiating, contriving and effecting the above arrangements for the attainment of its dishonest purpose, for abuse of its rights, and for taking undue advantage of its very own employees, through the secret sale and scheduled merger; the collective participation therein evinces machination, deceit, wanton attitude, bad faith, and oppressive intent, wilfully causing loss or injury to plaintiffs in a manner that is contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy, in violation of Articles 21 and 28 of the Civil Code;xxx xxx xxxPredictably, the private respondents moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground, essentially, of lack of jurisdiction of the court.On November 26, 1980, the respondent Judge issued an order, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. According to the court, the complaint partook of an unfair labor practice dispute notwithstanding the incidental claim for damages, jurisdiction over which is vested in the labor arbiter. This order, as well as a subsequent one denying reconsideration, is now alleged as having been issued 'in excess of his jurisdiction amounting to a grave abuse of discretion."We sustain the dismissal of the case, which is, as correctly held by the respondent court, an unfair labor practice controversy within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiters and the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission. The claim against the Bank of Philippine Islands the principal respondent according to the petitioners for allegedly inducing the Commercial Bank and Trust Company to violate the existing collective bargaining agreement in the process of re-negotiation, consists mainly of the civil aspect of the unfair labor practice charge referred to under Article 247of the Labor Code.Under Article 248of the Labor Code, it shall be an unfair labor practice:(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;xxx xxx xxx(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;xxx xxx xxxThe act complained of is broad enough to embrace either provision. Since it involves collective bargaining whether or not it involved an accompanying violation of the Civil Code it may rightly be categorized as an unfair labor practice. The civil implications thereof do not defeat its nature as a fundamental labor offense.As we stated, the damages (allegedly) suffered by the petitioners only form part of the civil component of the injury arising from the unfair labor practice. Under Article 247 of the Code, "the civil aspects of all cases involving unfair labor practices, which may include claims for damages and other affirmative relief, shall be under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiters.The petitioners' claimed injury as a consequence of the tort allegedly committed by the private respondents, specifically, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, under Article 1314 of the Civil Code,does not necessarily give the courts jurisdiction to try the damage suit. Jurisdiction is conferred by lawand not necessarily by the nature of the action. Civil controversies are not the exclusive domain of the courts. In the case at bar, Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended by Batas Blg. 70, has vested such a jurisdiction upon the labor arbiters, a jurisdiction the courts may not assume.Jurisdiction over unfair labor practice cases, moreover, belongs generally to the labor department of the government, never the courts. In Associated Labor Union v. Gomez,we said:A rule buttressed upon statute and reason that is frequently reiterated in jurisprudence is that labor cases involving unfair practice are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIR. By now, this rule has ripened into dogma. It thus commands adherence, not breach.The fact that the Bank of the Philippine Islands is not a party to the collective bargaining agreement, for which it "cannot be sued for unfair labor practice at the time of the action,"cannot bestow on the respondent court the jurisdiction it does not have. In Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Cement Workers' Union,we held:xxx xxx xxxThere is no merit in the allegation. In the first place, it must be remembered that jurisdiction is conferred by law; it is not determined by the existence of an action in another tribunal. In other words, it is not filing of an unfair labor case in the Industrial Court that divests the court of first instance jurisdiction over actions properly belonging to the former. It is the existence of a controversy that properly falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Court and to which the civil action is linked or connected that removes said civil case from the competence of the regular courts. It is for this reason that civil actions found to be intertwined with or arising out of, a dispute exclusively cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations were dismissed, even if the cases were commenced ahead of the unfair labor practice proceeding, and jurisdiction to restrain picketing was decreed to belong to the Court of Industrial Relations although no unfair labor practice case has as yet been instituted. For the court of first instance to lose authority to pass upon a case, therefore, it is enough that unfair labor practice case is in fact involved in or attached to the action, such fact of course being established by sufficient proof.xxx xxx xxxFurthermore, to hold that the alleged tortious act now attributed to the Bank of the Philippine Islands may be the subject of a separate suit is to sanction split jurisdiction long recognized to be an offense against the orderly administration of justice. As stated in Nolganza v. Apostol:xxx xxx xxxAs far back as Associated Labor Union vs. Gomez [L-25999, February 9, 1967, 19 SCRA 304] the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations in disputes of this character was upheld. "To hold otherwise," as succinctly stated by the ponente, Justice Sanchez, "is to sanction split jurisdiction-which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice." Then, in Progressive Labor Association vs. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation [L-27585, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 349] decided three years later, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for the Court, stressed that to rule that such demand for damages is to be passed upon by the regular courts of justice, instead of leaving the matter to the Court of Industrial Relations, 'would be to sanction split jurisdiction, which is prejudicial to the orderly administration of justice'. Thereafter, this Court, in the cases of Leoquinco vs. Canada Dry Bottling Co. [L-28621, February 22, 1971, 37 SCRA 535] and Associated Labor Union v. Cruz ([L-28978, September 22, 1971, 41 SCRA 12], with the opinions coming from the same distinguished jurist, adhered to such a doctrine. The latest case in point, as noted at the outset, is the Goodrich Employees Association decision [L-30211, October 5, 1976, 73 SCRA 297].xxx xxx xxxThe petitioners' reliance upon Calderon v. Court of Appealsis not well-taken. Calderon has since lost its persuasive force, beginning with our ruling in PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY v. MARTINEZ,EBON v. DE GUZMAN,and AGUSAN DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOP., INC. v. SUAREZ,and following the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1691, restoring the jurisdiction to decide money claims unto the labor arbiters.Neither does the fact that the Bank of the Philippine Islands "was not an employer at the time the act was committed' abate a recourse to the labor arbiter. It should be noted indeed that the Bank of the Philippine Islands assumed "all the assets and liabilities"of the Commercial Bank and Trust Company. Moreover, under the Corporation Code:xxx xxx xxx5. The surviving or consolidated corporation shall be responsible and liable for all the liabilities and obligations of each of the constituent corporations in the same manner as if such surviving or consolidated corporation had itself incurred such liabilities or obligations; and any claim, action or proceeding pending by or against any of such constituent corporations may be prosecuted by or against the surviving or consolidated corporation, as the case may be. Neither the rights of creditors nor any lien upon the property of any of such constituent corporations shall be impaired by such merger or consolidation.xxx xxx xxxIn sum, the public respondent has not acted with grave abuse of discretion.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

G.R. No. 163768 March 27, 2007JULIUS KAWACHI and GAYLE KAWACHI,Petitioners,vs.DOMINIE DEL QUERO and HON. JUDGE MANUEL R. TARO, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 43, Quezon City,Respondents.D E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing two resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 226, Quezon City which affirmed the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 42, Quezon City over private respondents action for damages against petitioner.The following factual antecedents are matters of record.1vvphi1.ntIn an Affidavit-Complaint dated 14 August 2002, private respondent Dominie Del Quero charged A/J Raymundo Pawnshop, Inc., Virgilio Kawachi and petitioner Julius Kawachi with illegal dismissal, non-execution of a contract of employment, violation of the minimum wage law, and non-payment of overtime pay. The complaint was filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).The complaint essentially alleged that Virgilio Kawachi hired private respondent as a clerk of the pawnshop and that on certain occasions, she worked beyond the regular working hours but was not paid the corresponding overtime pay.The complaint also narrated an incident on 10 August 2002, wherein petitioner Julius Kawachi scolded private respondent in front of many people about the way she treated the customers of the pawnshop and afterwards terminated private respondents employment without affording her due process.On 7 November 2002, private respondent Dominie Del Quero filed an action for damages against petitioners Julius Kawachi and Gayle Kawachi before the MeTC of Quezon City.The complaint, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 29522, alleged the following:2. That the Plaintiff was employed as a clerk in the pawnshop business office of the Defendants otherwise known as the A/J RAYMUNDO PAWNSHOP, INC. located (sic) and with principal office address at Unit A Virka Bldg. Edsa Corner Roosevelt[,] Quezon City, from May 27, 2002 to August 10, 2002;3. That on August 10, 2002 at or about 11:30 AM, the Plaintiff was admonished by the Defendants Julius Kawachi and Gayle Kawachi who are acting as manager and assistant manager respectively of the pawnshop business and alternately accused her of having committed an act which she had not done and was scolded in a loud voice in front of many employees and customers in their offices;4. That further for no apparent reason the Plaintiff was ordered to get out and leave the pawnshop office and was told to wait for her salary outside the office when she tried to explain that she had no fault in the complaint of the customer, (sic) [H]owever[,] her explanation fell on deaf ears;5. That she was instantly dismissed from her job without due process;6. That the incident happened in front of many people which caused the Plaintiff to suffer serious embarrassment and shame so that she could not do anything but cry because of the shameless way by which she was terminated from the service; x x xThe complaint for damages specifically sought the recovery of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and forum-shopping or splitting causes of action. At first, the MeTC granted petitioners motion and ordered the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction in an Order dated 2 January 2003.Upon private respondents motion, the MeTC reconsidered and set aside the order of dismissal in an Order dated 3 March 2003. It ruled that no causal connection appeared between private respondents cause of action and the employer-employee relations between the parties. The MeTC also rejected petitioners motion for reconsideration in an Order dated 22 April 2003.Thus, petitioners elevated the MeTCs aforesaid two orders to the RTC, Branch 226 of Quezon City,viaa Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction). After due hearing, the RTC declined petitioners prayer for a temporary restraining order. For her part, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition.On 20 October 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Resolution, upholding the jurisdiction of the MeTC over private respondents complaint for damages.The RTC held that private respondents action for damages was based on the alleged tortious acts committed by her employers and did not seek any relief under the Labor Code. The RTC cited the pronouncement inMedina, et al. v. Hon. Castro-Bartolome,etc., et al. where the Court held that the employees action for damages based on the slanderous remarks uttered by the employer was within the regular courts jurisdiction since the complaint did not allege any unfair labor practice on the part of the employer.On 29 March 2004, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the sole issue of jurisdiction over private respondents complaint for damages.Petitioners argue that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the action for damages because the alleged injury is work-related. They also contend that private respondent should not be allowed to split her causes of action by filing the action for damages separately from the labor case.Private respondent maintains that there is no causal connection between her cause of action and the employer-employee relations of the parties.The petition is meritorious.The jurisdictional controversy of the sort presented in this case has long been settled by this Court.Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations in other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code.1In the 1999 case ofSan Miguel Corporation v. Etcuban,the Court noted what was then the current trend, and still is, to refer worker-employer controversies to labor courts, unless unmistakably provided by the law to be otherwise. Because of the trend, the Court noted further, jurisprudence has developed the "reasonable causal connection rule." Under this rule, if there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of our labor courts. In the absence of such nexus, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction.InSan Miguel Corporation,the Court upheld the labor arbiters jurisdiction over the employees separate action for damages, which also sought the nullification of the so-called "contract of termination" and noted that the allegations in the complaint were so carefully formulated as to avoid a semblance of employer-employee relations.In said case, the employees of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) availed of the "Retrenchment to Prevent Loss Program." After their inclusion in the retrenchment program, the employees were given their termination letters and separation pay. In return, the employees executed "receipt and release" documents in favor of the company. Subsequently, the employees learned that the company was never in financial distress and was engaged in hiring new employees. Thus, they filed a complaintbefore the NLRC for the declaration of nullity of the retrenchment program and prayed for reinstatement, backwages and damages. After the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint, the employees filed an action for damages before the RTC, alleging the deception employed upon them by SMC which led to their separation from the company. They sought the declaration of nullity of their so-called collective "contract of termination" and the recovery of actual and compensatory damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.The Court held that the employees claim for damages was intertwined with their having been separated from their employment without just cause and, consequently, had a reasonable causal connection with their employer-employee relations with petitioner. The Court explained in this manner:x x x First, their claim for damages is grounded on their having been deceived into serving their employment due to SMCs concocted financial distress and fraudulent retrenchment programa clear case of illegal dismissal. Second, a comparison of respondents complaint for the declaration of nullity of the retrenchment program before the labor arbiter and the complaint for the declaration of nullity of their "contract of termination" before the RTC reveals that the allegations and prayer of the former are almost identical with those of the latter except that the prayer for reinstatement was no longer included and the claim for backwages and other benefits was replaced with a claim for actual damages. These are telltale signs that respondents claim for damages is intertwined with their having been separated from their employment without just cause and, consequently, has a reasonable causal connection with their employer-employee relations with SMC. Accordingly, it cannot be denied that respondents claim falls under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter as provided in paragraph 4 of Article 217. The "reasonable causal connection rule" emerged in the 1987 case ofPrimero v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where the Court recognized the jurisdiction of the labor arbiters over claims for damages in connection with termination of employment, thus:It is clear that the question of the legality of theact of dismissalis intimately related to the issue of the legality ofthe manner by which that act of dismissal was performed. But while the Labor Code treats of the nature of, and the remedy available asregards the first the employees separation from employment it does not at all deal with the second the manner of that separation which is governed exclusively by the Civil Code. In addressing the first issue, the Labor Arbiter applies the Labor Code; in addressing the second, the Civil Code. And this appears to be the plain and patent intendment of the law. For apart from the reliefs expressly set out in the Labor Code flowing from illegal dismissal from employment, no otherdamagesmay be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee other than those specified by the Civil Code. Hence, the fact that the issueof whether or not moral or other damages were suffered by an employee and in the affirmative, the amount that should properly be awarded to him in the circumstancesis determined under the provisions of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code, obviously was not meant to create a cause of action independent of that for illegal dismissal and thus place the matter beyond the Labor Arbiters jurisdiction.In the instant case, the allegations in private respondents complaint for damages show that her injury was the offshoot of petitioners immediate harsh reaction as her administrative superiors to the supposedly sloppy manner by which she had discharged her duties.Petitioners reaction culminated in private respondents dismissal from work in the very same incident. The incident on 10 August 2002 alleged in the complaint for damages was similarly narrated in private respondents Affidavit-Complaint supporting her action for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Clearly, the alleged injury is directly related to the employer-employee relations of the parties.Where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation, the Court has not hesitated to uphold the jurisdiction of the regularcourts. Where the damages claimed for were based on tort, malicious prosecution, or breach of contract, as when the claimant seeks to recover a debt from a former employee or seeks liquidated damages in the enforcement of a prior employment contract,the jurisdiction of regular courts was upheld. The scenario that obtains in this case is obviously different. The allegations in private respondents complaint unmistakably relate to the manner of her alleged illegal dismissal.For a single cause of action, the dismissed employee cannot be allowed to sue in two forums: one, before the labor arbiter for reinstatement and recovery of back wages or for separation pay, upon the theory that the dismissal was illegal; and two, before a court of justice for recovery of moral and other damages, upon the theory that themanner of dismissal was unduly injurious or tortious. Suing in the manner described is known as "splitting a cause of action," a practice engendering multiplicity of actions. It is considered procedurally unsound and obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.In the instant case, the NLRC has jurisdiction over private respondents complaint for illegal dismissal and damages arising therefrom. She cannot be allowed to file a separate or independent civil action for damages where the alleged injury has a reasonable connection to her termination from employment. Consequently, the action for damages filed before the MeTC must be dismissed.WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The two Resolutions dated 20 October 2003 and 29 March 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against private respondent. SO ORDERED.

RA 6145 AS A CURATIVE STATUTEG.R. No. 110226 June 19, 1997ALBERTO S. SILVA, EDILBERTO VIRAY ANGELES BARON, CEFERINO ROMERO, JAIME ACEVEDO, RODOLFO JUAN, ANDREW DE LA ISLA BAYANI PILAR, ULDARICO GARCIA, ANANIAS HERMOCILLA, WALLY LEONES, PABLO ALULOD, RODOLFO MARIANO, HERNANI ABOROT, CARLITO CHOSAS, VALERIANO MAUBAN, RENAN HALILI, MANOLITO CUSTODIO, NONILON DAWAL, RICARDO ESCUETA, SEVERINO ROSETE, ERNESTO LITADA, ERNESTO BARENG, BONIFACIO URBANO, VICENTE SANTOS, MARIO CREDO BERNABE GERONIMO, ERNESTO BANAY, PASTOR VELUZ, RICARDO CUEVAS, FELOMENO BALLON, ORLANDO MENDOZA, ANICETO ARBAN, GERONIMO ESPLANA, VICENTE CHAVEZ, STEVE VELECINA, and RICARDO B. VENTURA,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILTREAD (FIRESTONE) TIRE AND RUBBER CORPORATION,respondents.ROMERO,J.:Petitioners, all former employees of private respondent Philtread (Firestone) Tire and Rubber Corporation (Philtread, for brevity), impute grave abuse of discretion on the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for issuing two resolutions, dated April 7, 1993, and November 18, 1992, which reconsidered a resolution it rendered on April 15, 1992. They allege that its resolution of April 15, 1992 became final and executory when Philtread failed to seasonably file a motion for reconsideration within the ten-day reglementary period required by Article 223 of the Labor Code.The record unfolds the following facts:Sometime in 1985, petitioners, then rank-and-file employees and members of Philtread Workers Union (PWU), volunteered for, and availed of, the retrenchment program instituted by Philtread with the understanding that they would have priority in re-employment in the event that the company recovers from its financial crisis, in accordance with Section 4, Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement concluded on July 5, 1983.In November 1986, Philtread, apparently having recovered from its financial reverses, expanded its operations and hired new personnel. Upon discovery of this development, petitioners filed their respective applications for employment with Philtread, which however, merely agreed to consider them for future vacancies. Subsequent demands for re-employment made by petitioners were ignored. Even the request of the incumbent union for Philtread to stop hiring new personnel until petitioners were first hired failed to elicit any favorable response.Thus, on December 5, 1988, petitioners lodged a complaintwith the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for unfair labor practice (ULP), damages and attorney's fees against Philtread.Both parties submitted their respective position papers. On its part, Philtread moved for the dismissal of the complaint based on two grounds, namely: (1) that the NLRC lacked jurisdiction, there being no employer-employee relationship between it and petitioners and that the basic issue involved was the interpretation of a contract, the CBA, which was cognizable by the regular courts; and (2) that petitioners had nolocus standi, not being privy to the CBA executed between the union and Philtread.Petitioners, however, challenging Philtread's motion to dismiss, stressed that the complaint was one for unfair labor practice precipitated by the unjust and unreasonable refusal of Philtread to re-employ them, as mandated by the provisions of Section 4, Article III of the 1986 and 1983 CBAs. Being one for unfair labor practice, petitioners concluded that the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Article 217 (a) (1) of the Labor Code.On August 31, 1989, Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga rendered a decision dismissing the complaint but directing Philtread to give petitioners priority in hiring, as well as those former employees similarly situated for available positions provided they meet the necessary current qualifications.In dismissing the complaint, the Labor Arbiter, however, did not tackle the jurisdictional issue posed by Philtread in its position paper. Instead, he dwelt solely on the question whether the petitioners were entitled to priority in re-employment on the basis of the CBA.Petitioners duly appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. Philtread opted not to interpose an appeal despite the Labor Arbiter's failure to rule squarely on the question of jurisdiction.On April 15, 1992, the NLRC issued a resolution reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It directed Philtread to re-employ petitioners and other employees similarly situated, regardless of age qualifications and other pre-employment conditions, subject only to existing vacancies and a finding of good physical condition. This resolution was received by Atty. Abraham B. Borreta of the law firm of Borreta, Gutierrez and Leogardo on May 5, 1992, as shown by the bailiff's return.Subsequently, Atty. Borreta filed with the NLRC on May 20, 1992, anex partemanifestation explaining that he was returning the copy of the resolution rendered on April 15, 1992, which, according to him, was erroneously served on him by the process server of the NLRC. He alleged that in the several conciliation conferences held, it was Atty. Daniel C. Gutierrez who exclusively handled the case on behalf of Philtread and informed the Labor Arbiter and petitioners that the law firm of Borreta, Gutierrez and Leogardo had already been dissolved.Being of the impression that the April 15, 1992 resolution of the NLRC had been properly served at the address of the law firm of Atty. Gutierrez and that no seasonable motion for reconsideration was ever filed by Philtread, petitioners moved for its execution.On November 18, 1992, the NLRC, acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Gutierrez, promulgated one of its challenged resolutions dismissing the complaint of petitioners. It ruled that while petitioners had standing to sue, the complaint should have been filed with the voluntary arbitrator, pursuant to Article 261 of the Labor Code, since the primary issue was the implementation and interpretation of the CBA.Dismayed by the NLRC's sudden change of position, petitioners immediately moved for reconsideration. They pointed out that the NLRC's reliance on Article 261 of the Labor Code was patently erroneous because it was the amended provision which was being cited by the NLRC. They added that the amendment of Article 261 introduced by Republic Act No. 6715 took effect only on March 21, 1989, or after the filing of the complaint on December 5, 1988. This being the case, petitioners argued that the subsequent amendment cannot retroactively divest the Labor Arbiter of the jurisdiction already acquired in accordance with Articles 217 and 248 of the Labor Code. Petitioners further stressed that the resolution of April 15, 1992, had already become final and executory since Philtread's counsel of record did not file any motion for reconsideration within the period of ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution on May 5, 1992.The NLRC, however, was not convinced by petitioners' assertions. In another resolution issued on April 7, 1993, it affirmed its earlier resolution dated November 18, 1992, ruling that even before the amendatory law took effect, matters involving bargaining agreements were already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator, as set forth in Article 262 of the Labor Code. Hence, this petition.As stated at the outset, petitioners fault the NLRC for issuing the assailed resolutions even when the resolution sought to be reconsidered had already attained finality upon Philtread's failure to timely move for its reconsideration. They posit that since the bailiff's return indicated May 5, 1992, as the date of receipt of the April 15, 1992 resolution by the law firm of Borreta, Gutierrez and Leogardo, Philtread's counsel of record, then Philtread only had ten (10) calendar days or until May 15, 1992, within which to file a motion for reconsideration. Since Philtread indisputably failed to file any such motion within said period, petitioners deemed it highly irregular and capricious for the NLRC to still allow reconsideration of its April 15, 1992 resolution.The petition is impressed with merit.Time and again, this Court has been emphatic in ruling that the seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration within the l0-day reglementary period following the receipt by a party of any order, resolution or decision of the NLRC, is a mandatory requirement to forestall the finality of such order, resolution or decision.The statutory bases for this is found in Article 223 of the Labor Codeand Section 14, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission.In the case at bar, it is uncontroverted that Philtread's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the April 15, 1992 resolution only on June 5, 1992,or 31 days after receipt of said resolution.It was thus incumbent upon the NLRC to have dismissed outright Philtread's late motion for reconsideration. By doing exactly the opposite, its actuation was not only whimsical and capricious but also a demonstration of its utter disregard for its very own rules.Certiorari, therefore, lies.To be sure, it is settled doctrine that the NLRC, as an administrative and quasi-judicial body, is not bound by the rigid application of technical rules of procedure in the conduct of its proceedings.However, the filing of a motion for reconsideration and filing it ON TIME are not mere technicalities of procedure. These are jurisdictional and mandatory requirements which must be strictly complied with. Although there are exceptions to said rule, the case at bar presents no peculiar circumstances warranting a departure therefrom.The Court is aware of Philtread's obvious attempt to skirt the requirement for seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration by persuading us that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction over petitioners' complaint. Jurisdiction, Philtread claims, lies instead with the voluntary arbitrator so that when the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC took cognizance of the case, their decisions thereon were null and void and, therefore, incapable of attaining finality. In short, Philtread maintains that the ten-day reglementary period could not have started running and, therefore, its motion could not be considered late.The argument is not tenable. While we agree with thedictumthat a void judgment cannot attain finality, said rule, however, is only relevant if the tribunal or body which takes cognizance of a particular subject matter indeed lacks jurisdiction over the same. In this case, the rule adverted to is misapplied for it is actually the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which possess jurisdiction over petitioners' complaint and NOT the voluntary arbitrator, as erroneously contended by Philtread.In this regard, we observe that there is a confusion in the minds of both Philtread and the NLRC with respect to the proper jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator. They appear to share the view that once the question involved is an interpretation or implementation of CBA provisions, which in this case is the re-employment clause, then the same necessarily falls within the competence of the voluntary arbitrator pursuant to Article 261 of the Labor Code.Respondents' posture is too simplistic and finds no support in law or in jurisprudence. When the issue concerns an interpretation or implementation of the CBA, one cannot immediately jump to the conclusion that jurisdiction is with the voluntary arbitrator. There is an equally important need to inquire further if the disputants involved are the union and the employer; otherwise, the voluntary arbitrator cannot assume jurisdiction. To this effect was the ruling of the Court inSanyo Philippines Workers Union-PSSLU v.Canizares,where we clarified the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator in this manner:In the instant case, however, We hold that the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaints of the private respondents. While it appears that the dismissal of the private respondents was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause provided in the CBA, We are of the opinion that these facts do not come within the phrase "grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of (their) Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies," the jurisdiction of which pertains to the Grievance Machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Article 260 of the Labor Code on grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator states that "(t)hepartiesto a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies." It is further provided in said article that the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is not settled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitrators (or panel of voluntary arbitrators) designated in advance by the parties.It need not be mentioned that the parties to a CBA are the union and the company.Hence, only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators. (Emphasis supplied)Since the contending parties in the instant case are not the union and Philtread, then pursuant to theSanyodoctrine, it is not the voluntary arbitrator who can take cognizance of the complaint, notwithstanding Philtread's claim that the real issue is the interpretation of the CBA provision on re-employment.The Court, however, does not writefinisto the discussion. A more important question arises: If the voluntary arbitrator could not have assumed jurisdiction over the case, did the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC validly acquire jurisdiction when both of them entertained the complaint?A brief review of relevant statutory provisions is in order.We note that at the time petitioners filed their complaint for unfair labor practice, damages and attorney's fees on December 5, 1988, the governing provision of the Labor Code with respect to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC was Article 217 which states:Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:1. Unfair labor practice cases;2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits;4. Cases involving household services; and5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts.(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.Articles 261 and 262, on the other hand, defined the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator,viz.:Art. 261. Grievance machinery. Whenever a grievance arises from the interpretation or implementation of a collective agreement, including disciplinary actions imposed on members of the bargaining unit, the employer and the bargaining representative shall meet to adjust the grievance. Where there is no collective agreement and in cases where the grievance procedure as provided herein does not apply, grievances shall be subject to negotiation, conciliation or arbitration as provided elsewhere in this Code.Art. 262. Voluntary arbitration. All grievances referred to in the immediately preceding Article which are not settled through the grievance procedure provided in the collective agreement shall be referred to voluntary arbitration prescribed in said agreement: Provided, That termination disputes shall be governed by Article 278 of this Code, as amended, unless the parties agree to submit them to voluntary arbitration.Under the above provisions then prevailing, one can understand why petitioners lodged their complaint for ULP with the Labor Arbiter. To their mind, Philtread's refusal to re-employ them was tantamount to a violation of the re-employment clause in the 1983 CBA which was also substantially reproduced in the 1986 CBA. At the time, any violation of the CBA was unqualifiedly treated as ULP of the employer falling within the competence of the Labor Arbiter to hear and decide. Thus:Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:xxx xxx xxx(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.On March 21, 1989, however, Republic Act 6715,or the so-called "Herrera-Veloso Amendments," took effect, amending several provisions of the Labor Code, including the respective jurisdictions of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the voluntary arbitrator. As a result, the present jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC is as follows:Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:1. Unfair labor practice cases;2. Termination disputes;3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.while that of the voluntary arbitrator is defined in this wise:Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingviolations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. . . . (Emphasis supplied)Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.With the amendments introduced by RA 6715, it can be gleaned that the Labor Arbiter still retains jurisdiction over ULP cases. There is, however, a significant change: The unqualified jurisdiction conferred upon the Labor Arbiter prior to the amendment by RA 6715 has been narrowed down so that "violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character,shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice but as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. It is further stated that "gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement." Hence, for a ULP case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC to exercise its appellate jurisdiction, the allegations in the complaint should showprima faciethe concurrence of two things, namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA; AND (2) the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA.In several instances prior to the instant case, the Court already made its pronouncement that RA 6715 is in the nature of a curative statute. As such, we declared that it can be applied retroactively to pending cases. Thus, inBriad Agro Development Corporationv.Dela Cerna,we held:Republic Act No. 6715, like its predecessors, Executive Order No. 111 and Article 217, as amended, has retroactive application. Thus, when this new law divested Regional Directors of the power to hear money claims, the divestment affected pending litigations. It also affected this particular case. (Note that under par 6, where the claim does not exceed P5,000.00, regional directors have jurisdiction).InGarcia v.Martinez, we categorically held that amendments relative to the jurisdiction of labor arbiters (under Presidential Decree No. 1367, divesting the labor arbiter of jurisdiction) partake of the nature of curative statutes, thus:It now appears that at the time this case was decided the lower court had jurisdiction over Velasco's complaint although at the time it was filed said court was not clothed with such jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction was cured by the issuance of the amendatory decree which is in the nature of a curative statute with retrospective application to a pending proceeding, like Civil Case No. 9657 (See 82 C.J.S. 1004).Garcia has since been uniformly applied in subsequent cases. Thus, inCalderonv.Court of Appeals, reiterated that PD No. 1367 [is] curative and retrospective innature.The Decision of this case, finally, acknowledged the retrospective characteristics of Executive Order No. 111. . . .With theBriadruling in place, the implication is that the qualified jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC should have been applied when the ULP complaint was still pending. This means that petitioners should have been required to show in their complaint the gross nature of the CBA violation, as well as the economic provision violated, without which the complaint would be dismissible. Herein lies the problem. The Court's appreciation of petitioners' cause of action is that, while it would make out a case for ULP, under present law, however, the same falls short of the special requirements necessary to make it cognizable by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Unsubstantiated conclusions of bad faith and unjustified refusal to re-employ petitioners, to our mind, do not constitute gross violation of the CBA for purposes of lodging jurisdiction with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Although evidentiary matters are not required (and even discouraged) to be alleged in complaint, still, sufficient details supporting the conclusion of bad faith and unjust refusal to re-employ petitioners must be indicated. Furthermore, it is even doubtful if the CBA provision on re-employment fits into the accepted notion of an economic provision of the CBA. Thus, given the foregoing considerations, may theBriaddoctrine be applied to the instant case and cause its dismissal for want of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC?Upon a careful and meticulous study ofBriad, the Court holds that the rationale behind it does not apply to the present case. We adopt instead the more recent case ofErectors, Inc.v.National Labor Relations Commission,where we refused to give retroactive application to Executive Order No. 797 which created the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Under said law, POEA was vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment,"which jurisdiction was originally conferred upon the Labor Arbiter. As in the instant case, the Labor Arbiter's assumption of jurisdiction therein was likewise questioned in view of the subsequent enactment of E.O. 797. In ruling against the retroactive application of the law, the Court explained its position as follows:The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.E.O. No. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiter's authority to hear and decide the case filed by private respondent prior to its effectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. We fail to perceive in the language of E.O. No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive effect.The case ofBriad Agro Development Corp.vs.Dela Cernacited by the petitioner is not applicable to the case at bar. InBriad, the Court applied the exception rather than the general rule. In this case, Briad Agro Development Corp. and L.M. Camus Engineering Corp. challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment over cases involving workers' money claims, since Article 217 of the Labor Code, the law in force at the time of the filing of the complaint, vested in the Labor Arbiters exclusive jurisdiction over such cases. The Court dismissed the petition in its Decision dated June 29, 1989. It ruled that the enactment of E.O. No. 111, amending Article 217 of the Labor Code, cured the Regional Director's lack of jurisdiction by giving the Labor Arbiter and the Regional Director concurrent jurisdiction over all cases involving money claims. However, on November 9, 1989, the Court, in a Resolution, reconsidered and set aside its June 29 Decision and referred the case to the Labor Arbiter for proper proceedings, in view of the promulgation of Republic Act (R.A.) 6715 which divested the Regional Directors of the power to hear money claims. It bears emphasis that the Court accorded E.O. No. 111 and R.A. 6715 a retroactive application because as curative statutes, they fall under the exceptions to the rule on prospectivity of laws.E.O. No. 111, amended Article 217 of the Labor Code to widen the worker's access to the government for redress of grievances by giving the Regional Directors and Labor Arbiters concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving money claims. This amendment, however, created a situation where the jurisdiction of the Regional Directors and the Labor Arbiters overlapped. As a remedy, R.A. 6715 further amended Article 217 by delineating their respective jurisdictions. Under R.A. 6715, the Regional Director has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving money claims provided: (1) the claim is presented by an employer or person employed in domestic or household service, or househelper under the Code; (2) the claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and (3) the aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed P5,000.00. All other cases within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. E.O. No. 111 and R.A. 6715 are therefore curative statutes. A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public authorities which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal requirements.The law at bar, E.O. No. 797, is not a curative statute. . . .We do not find any reason why the Court should not apply the above ruling to the case at bar, notwithstanding the fact that a different law is involved. Actually, this is not the first time that the Court refused to apply RA 6715 retroactively.Our previous decisions on whether to give it retroactive application or not depended to a great extent on what amended provisions were under consideration, as well as the factual circumstances to which they were made to apply. InBriad, the underlying reason for applying RA 6715 retroactively was the fact that prior to its amendment, Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended by then Executive Order No. 111, created a scenario where the Labor Arbiters and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) had overlapping jurisdiction over money claims. This situation was viewed as a defect in the law so that when RA No. 6715 was passed and delineated the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and Regional Directors, the Court deemed it a rectification of such defect; hence, the conclusion that it was curative in nature and, therefore, must be applied retroactively.The same thing cannot be said of the case at bar. Like inErectors, the instant case presents no defect in the law requiring a remedy insofar as the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the Voluntary Arbitrator is concerned. There is here no overlapping of jurisdiction to speak of because matters involving interpretation and implementation of CBA provisions, as well as interpretation and enforcement of company personnel policies, have always been determined by the Voluntary Arbitrator even prior to RA 6715. Similarly, all ULP cases were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. What RA 6715 merely did was to re-apportion the jurisdiction over ULP cases by conferring exclusive jurisdiction over such ULP cases that do not involve gross violation of a CBA's economic provision upon the voluntary arbitrator. We do not see anything in the act of re-apportioning jurisdiction curative of any defect in the law as it stood prior to the enactment of RA 6715. The Court view it as merely a matter of change in policy of the lawmakers, especially since the 1987 Constitution adheres to the preferential use of voluntary modes of dispute settlement.This, instead of the inherent defect in the law, must be the rationale that prompted the amendment. Hence, we uphold the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter which attached to this case at the time of its filing on December 5, 1988.Finally, the contention that it was Atty. Gutierrez who exclusively represented Philtread and that the law firm of Borreta, Gutierrez and Leogardo had been dissolved, are lame excuses to cast doubt on the propriety of service to Atty. Borreta. It must be noted that the complaint of petitioners was filed on December 5, 1988. Presumably, the preliminary conferences adverted to by Atty. Borreta, where Atty. Gutierrez supposedly declared that he was exclusively representing Philtread, transpired at around that date. The Court, however, is surprised to discover that the record bears a Notice of Change of Address dated March 12, 1990, filed by Atty. Gutierrez, indicating therein that the counsel for respondent (Philtread) was "Borreta, Gutierrez and Leogardo" whose address could be found at the "3rd Floor, Commodore Condominium Arquiza corner M. Guerrero Streets, Ermita, Manila." If, indeed, Atty. Gutierrez declared during the Labor Arbiter's proceedings that he was exclusively representing Philtread, why then did he use the firm's name, and its new address at that, in the aforementioned notice to the NLRC? Moreover, why did Atty. Borreta take fifteen days to file his Manifestation and inform the NLRC of the "improper" service of the resolution to him? Why did he not object immediately to the service by the bailiff? Considering that Atty. Gutierrez and Atty. Borreta were once partners in their law firm, it behooves Atty. Borreta to have at least advised his former partner of the receipt of the resolution. As a lawyer, his receipt of the adverse resolution should have alerted him of the adverse consequences which might follow if the same were not acted upon promptly, as what in fact happened here. As for Atty. Gutierrez, if the law firm of Borreta, Gutierrez, and Leogardo were really dissolved, it was incumbent upon him not to have used the firm's name in the first place, or he should have withdrawn the appearance of the firm and entered his own appearance, in case the dissolution took place midstream. By failing to exercise either option, Atty. Gutierrez cannot now blame the NLRC for serving its resolution at the address of the firm still on record.To our mind, these excuses cannot camouflage the clever ploy of Philtread's counsel to earn a last chance to move for reconsideration. This Court, it bears emphasizing, is not impressed, but looks incredulously at such superficial moves.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolutions of the NLRC dated November 18, 1992, and April 7, 1993, are SET ASIDE, while its resolution dated April 15, 1992, is REINSTATED for immediate execution. SO ORDERED.

JURISDICTION OVER BREACH OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONSG.R. No. 154830 June 8, 2007PIONEER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES, INC., PIONEER PHILIPPINES HOLDINGS, and PHILIP J. KLEPZIG,petitioners,vs.ANTONIO D. TODARO,respondent.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:Before the Court is a Petition for Review onCertiorariseeking to annul and set aside the Decisionof the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54155 and its Resolutionof August 21, 2002 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:On January 16, 1998, herein respondent Antonio D. Todaro (Todaro) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment against Pioneer International Limited (PIL), Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI), John G. McDonald (McDonald) and Philip J. Klepzig (Klepzig). In his complaint, Todaro alleged that PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Australia and is principally engaged in the ready-mix concrete and concrete aggregates business; PPHI is the company established by PIL to own and hold the stocks of its operating company in the Philippines; PCPI is the company established by PIL to undertake its business of ready-mix concrete, concrete aggregates and quarrying operations in the Philippines; McDonald is the Chief Executive of the Hongkong office of PIL; and, Klepzig is the President and Managing Director of PPHI and PCPI; Todaro has been the managing director of Betonval Readyconcrete, Inc. (Betonval), a company engaged in pre-mixed concrete and concrete aggregate production; he resigned from Betonval in February 1996; in May 1996, PIL contacted Todaro and asked him if he was available to join them in connection with their intention to establish a ready-mix concrete plant and other related operations in the Philippines; Todaro informed PIL of his availability and interest to join them; subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein the former consented to engage the services of the latter as a consultant for two to three months, after which, he would be employed as the manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete operations should the company decide to invest in the Philippines; subsequently, PIL started its operations in the Philippines; however, it refused to comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent basis. Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, as the same is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that the complaint should be dismissed on the basis of the doctrine offorum non conveniens. In its Order dated January 4, 1999, the RTC of Makati, Branch 147, denied herein petitioners' respective motions to dismiss.Herein petitioners, as defendants, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motionfor the reconsideration of the trial court's Order of January 4, 1999 but the trial court denied it via its Orderdated June 3, 1999.On August 3, 1999, herein petitioners filed a Petition forCertiorariwith the CA.On October 31, 2000, the CA rendered its presently assailed Decision denying herein petitioners' Petition forCertiorari. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated August 21, 2002.Hence, herein Petition for Review onCertioraribased on the following assignment of errors:A.THE COURT OF APPEALS' CONCLUSION THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONERS IS WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS. THE ANNEXES TO THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY BELIE THE ALLEGATION OF EXISTENCE OF AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND PETITIONERS.B.THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT INDUBITABLY SHOWS THAT IT IS AN ACTION FOR AN ALLEGED BREACH OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, AND HENCE, FALLS WITHIN THE EXLCUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.CTHE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED AND FAILED TO CONSIDER THE PRINCIPLE OF "FORUM NON CONVENIENS" AS A VALID GROUND FOR DISMISSING A COMPLAINT. In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that there was no perfected employment contract between PIL and herein respondent. Petitioners assert that the annexes to respondent's complaint show that PIL's offer was for respondent to be employed as the manager only of its pre-mixed concrete operations and not as the company's managing director or CEO. Petitioners argue that when respondent reiterated his intention to become the manager of PIL's overall business venture in the Philippines, he, in effect did not accept PIL's offer of employment and instead made a counter-offer, which, however, was not accepted by PIL. Petitioners also contend that under Article 1318 of the Civil Code, one of the requisites for a contract to be perfected is the consent of the contracting parties; that under Article 1319 of the same Code, consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract; that the offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute; that a qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer. Petitioners assert that since PIL did not accept respondent's counter-offer, there never was any employment contract that was perfected between them.Petitioners further argue that respondent's claim for damages based on the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code is baseless because it was shown that there was no perfected employment contract.Assuming, for the sake of argument, that PIL may be held liable for breach of employment contract, petitioners contend that PCPI and PPHI, may not also be held liable because they are juridical entities with personalities which are separate and distinct from PIL, even if they are subsidiary corporations of the latter. Petitioners also aver that the annexes to respondent's complaint show that the negotiations on the alleged employment contract took place between respondent and PIL through its office in Hongkong. In other words, PCPI and PPHI were not privy to the negotiations between PIL and respondent for the possible employment of the latter; and under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, a contract is not binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who was not a party to it even if he be aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof.Petitioners further assert that petitioner Klepzig may not be held liable because he is simply acting in his capacity as president of PCPI and PPHI and settled is the rule that an officer of a corporation is not personally liable for acts done in the performance of his duties and within the bounds of the authority conferred on him. Furthermore, petitioners argue that even if PCPI and PPHI are held liable, respondent still has no cause of action against Klepzig because PCPI and PPHI have personalities which are separate and distinct from those acting in their behalf, such as Klepzig.As to their second assigned error, petitioners contend that since herein respondent's claims for actual, moral and exemplary damages are solely premised on the alleged breach of employment contract, the present case should be considered as falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC.With respect to the third assigned error, petitioners assert that the principle offorum non conveniensdictates that even where exercise of jurisidiction is authorized by law, courts may refuse to entertain a case involving a foreign element where the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there and the plaintiff sought the forum merely to secure procedural advantage or to annoy or harass the defendant. Petitioners also argue that one of the factors in determining the most convenient forum for conflicts problem is the power of the court to enforce its decision. Petitioners contend that since the majority of the defendants in the present case are not residents of the Philippines, they are not subject to compulsory processes of the Philippine court handling the case for purposes of requiring their attendance during trial. Even assuming that they can be summoned, their appearance would entail excessive costs. Petitioners further assert that there is no allegation in the complaint from which one can conclude that the evidence to be presented during the trial can be better obtained in the Philippines. Moreover, the events which led to the present controversy occurred outside the Philippines. Petitioners conclude that based on the foregoing factual circumstances, the case should be dismissed under the principle offorum non conveniens.In his Comment, respondent extensively quoted the assailed CA Decision maintaining that the factual allegations in the complaint determine whether or not the complaint states a cause of action.As to the question of jurisdiction, respondent contends that the complaint he filed was not based on a contract of employment. Rather, it was based on petitioners' unwarranted breach of their contractual obligation to employ respondent. This breach, respondent argues, gave rise to an action for damages which is cognizable by the regular courts.Even assuming that there was an employment contract, respondent asserts that for the NLRC to acquire jurisdiction, the claim for damages must have a reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship of petitioners and respondent.Respondent further argues that there is a perfected contract between him and petitioners as they both agreed that the latter shall employ him to manage and operate their ready-mix concrete operations in the Philippines. Even assuming that there was no perfected contract, respondent contends that his complaint alleges an alternative cause of action which is based on the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.As to the applicability of the doctrine offorum non conveniens, respondent avers that the question of whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the principle offorum non conveniensdepends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who is in the best position to determine whether special circumstances require that the court desist from assuming jurisdiction over the suit.The petition lacks merit.Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and, (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. InHongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited v. Catalan,this Court held:The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendants. Moreover, the complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case.To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. Hence, in resolving whether or not the Complaint in the present case states a cause of action, the trial court correctly limited itself to examining the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint as well as the annexes thereto. It is proscribed from inquiring into the truth of the allegations in the Complaint or the authenticity of any of the documents referred or attached to the Complaint, since these are deemed hypothetically admitted by the respondent.This Court has reviewed respondents allegations in its Complaint. In a nutshell, respondent alleged that herein petitioners reneged on their contractual obligation to employ him on a permanent basis. This allegation is sufficient to constitute a cause of action for damages.The issue as to whether or not there was a perfected contract between petitioners and respondent is a matter which is not ripe for determination in the present case; rather, this issue must be taken up during trial, considering that its resolution would necessarily entail an examination of the veracity of the allegations not only of herein respondent as plaintiff but also of petitioners as defendants.The Court does not agree with petitioners' contention that they were not privy to the negotiations for respondent's possible employment. It is evident from paragraphs 24 to 28 of the Complaintthat, on various occasions, Klepzig conducted negotiations with respondent regarding the latter's possible employment. In fact, Annex "H" of the complaint shows that it was Klepzig who informed respondent that his company was no longer interested in employing respondent. Hence, based on the allegations in the Complaint and the annexes attached thereto, respondent has a cause of action against herein petitioners.As to the question of jurisdiction, this Court has consistently held that where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction.In the present case, no employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and respondent. In fact, in his complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code, but seeks payment of damages on account of petitioners' alleged breach of their obligation under their agreement to employ him. It is settled that an action for breach of contractualobligation is intrinsically a civil dispute.In the alternative, respondent seeks redress on the basis of the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Hence, it is clear that the present action is within the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular courts. With respect to the applicability of the principle offorum non conveniensin the present case, this Court's ruling inBank of America NT & SA v. Court of Appealsis instructive, to wit:The doctrine offorum non conveniens, literally meaning the forum is inconvenient, emerged in private international law to deter the practice of global forum shopping, that is to prevent non-resident litigants from choosing the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for malicious reasons, such as to secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the case ofCommunication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that "xxx [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision."Moreover, this Court enunciated inPhilsec. Investment Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, thatthe doctrine offorum non conveniensshould not be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a ground. This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle offorum non conveniensrequires a factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of defense.(emphasis supplied)In the present case, the factual circumstances cited by petitioners which would allegedly justify the application of the doctrine offorum non conveniensare matters of defense, the merits of which should properly be threshed out during trial.WHEREFORE, the instant petition isDENIEDand the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals areAFFIRMED.Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

WHO ARE CORPORATE OFFICERS FOR THE PURPOSES OF JURISDICTION OVER THE DISPUTEG.R. No. 171993 December 12, 2011MARC II MARKETING, INC. and LUCILA V. JOSON,Petitioners,vs.ALFREDO M. JOSON,Respondent.D E C I S I O NPEREZ,J.:In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioners Marc II Marketing, Inc. and Lucila V. Joson assailed the Decisiondated 20 June 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76624 for reversing and setting aside the Resolutionof the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 15 October 2002, thereby affirming the Labor Arbiters Decisiondated 1 October 2001 finding herein respondent Alfredo M. Josons dismissal from employment as illegal. In the questioned Decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the Labor Arbiters jurisdiction over the case on the basis that respondent was not an officer but a mere employee of petitioner Marc II Marketing, Inc., thus, totally disregarding the latters allegation of intra-corporate controversy. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the NLRC for further proceedings to determine the proper amount of monetary awards that should be given to respondent.Assailed as well is the Court of Appeals Resolution4dated 7 March 2006 denying their Motion for Reconsideration.Petitioner Marc II Marketing, Inc. (petitioner corporation) is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines. It is primarily engaged in buying, marketing, selling and distributing in retail or wholesale for export or import household appliances and products and other items.It took over the business operations of Marc Marketing, Inc. which was made non-operational following its incorporation and registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Petitioner Lucila V. Joson (Lucila) is the President and majority stockholder of petitioner corporation. She was also the former President and majority stockholder of the defunct Marc Marketing, Inc.Respondent Alfredo M. Joson (Alfredo), on the other hand, was the General Manager, incorporator, director and stockholder of petitioner corporation.The controversy of this case arose from the following factual milieu:Before petitioner corporation was officially incorporated,respondent has already been engaged by petitioner Lucila, in her capacity as President of Marc Marketing, Inc., to work as the General Manager of petitioner corporation. It was formalized through the execution of a Management Contractdated 16 January 1994 under the letterhead of Marc Marketing, Inc.as petitioner corporation is yet to be incorporated at the time of its execution. It was explicitly provided therein that respondent shall be entitled to 30% of its net income for his work as General Manager. Respondent will also be granted 30% of its net profit to compensate for the possible loss of opportunity to work overseas. Pending incorporation of petitioner corporation, respondent was designated as the General Manager of Marc Marketing, Inc., which was then in the process of winding up its business. For occupying the said position, respondent was among its corporate officers by the express provision of Section 1, Article IVof its by-laws. On 15 August 1994, petitioner corporation was officially incorporated and registered with the SEC. Accordingly, Marc Marketing, Inc. was made non-operational. Respondent continued to discharge his duties as General Manager but this time under petitioner corporation.Pursuant to Section 1, Article IVof petitioner corporations by-laws,its corporate officers are as follows: Chairman, President, one or more Vice-President(s), Treasurer and Secretary. Its Board of Directors, however, may, from time to time, appoint such other officers as it may determine to be necessary or proper.Per an undated Secretarys Certificate,petitioner corporations Board of Directors conducted a meeting on 29 August 1994 where respondent was appointed as one of its corporate officers with the designation or title of General Manager to function as a managing director with other duties and responsibilities that the Board of Directors may provide and authorized. Nevertheless, on 30 June 1997, petitioner corporation decided to stop and cease its operations, as evidenced by an Affidavit of Non-Operationdated 31