PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, INC.,petitioner,vs.PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES' UNION, INC,respondent.G.R. No. 46739 September 23, 1939

Facts : The Court of Industrial Relations issued an order, directing the petitioner herein, Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., to recruit from the respondent, Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc., new employees or laborers it may need to replace members of the union who may be dismissed from the service of the company, with the proviso that, if the union fails to provide employees possessing the necessary qualifications, the company may employ any other persons it may desire. This order, in substance and in effect, compels the company, against its will, to employ preferentially, in its service, the members of the union.Issue:Whether the Court of Industrial Relations has the right to direct the petitioner to recruit employees against its discretionHeld:The order appealed is reversed with costs against the respondent Pambusco Employees Union, Inc.The court has no authority to issue such compulsory order. The general right to make a contract in relation to one's business is an essential part of the liberty of the citizens protected by the due-process clause of the Constitution. The right of the laborer to sell his labor to such person as he may choose is, in its essence, the same as the right of an employer to purchase labor from any person whom it chooses. The employer and the employee have thus an equality of right guaranteed by the Constitution. "If the employer can compel the employee to work against the latter's will, this is servitude. If the employee can compel the employer to give him work against the employer's will, this is oppression." (Millsvs.United States Printing Co., 99 App. Div., 605; 91 N.Y.S., 185, 189-192.).

G.R. No. L-6846 July 20, 1955GREGORIO ARANETA EMPLOYEES UNION, ETC., ET AL.,petitioners,vs.ARSENIO C. ROLDAN, ET AL.,respondents.Facts:The Agricultural Division of the Gregorio Araneta, Inc., took the alternative of retrenchment to reduce the overcapitalization. All these plans required a reduction in the volume of business necessitating likewise a reduction of personnel and caused the laying off of 17 employees.These employees were given one month separation pay.Issue:Whether the retrenchment is justified in order to reduce the overcapitalization and minimize expenses.Held:The petition is denied.The laying off of the 17 employees was due to the retrenchment policy which the Company had to adopt in order to reduce the overcapitalization and minimize expenses. The volume of business was considerably reduced.It should be noted that the retrenchment policy was adopted before even the organization of the petitioning union. It was not, therefore, aimed at the Union or any of its members for union or labor activities. It was not an unfair labor practice.G.R. No. L-2028 April 28, 1949PHILIPPINE SHEET METAL WORKERS' UNION (CLO),petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, PHILIPPINE CAN COMPANY, and LIBERAL LABOR UNION,respondents.Facts:The petitioner tried to prove that the 11 laborers were laid off by the respondent company due to their union activities. As a matter of fact, of the 11 workers laid off, there are included officers and members of the petitioning union, namely, the president, Pablo Sicat; the vice-president, Generoso Villanueva; and the secretary, Marcos Eugenio. The respondent company proved that the laying off of these eleven workers was due to lack of materials. With regard to this contention, the examining division of this Court was ordered to investigate the availability of materials used in connection with the work performed by these eleven laborers, the volume of business and the work performed by these workers during Sundays, legal holidays, and night shift. The court then find no sufficient reason to lay off these workers and ordered the company to pay these workers corresponding wages from the date of their lay-off to the date of their temporary read-mission in the company.Subsequently, nine days before the decision came down, filed a motion in the case, asking for authority to lay off at least 15 workers in its can department on the ground that the installation and operation of nine new labor-saving machines in said department had rendered the services of the said workers unnecessary.The Philippine Sheet Metal Workers' Union (CLO) opposed the motion, alleging that there was more than sufficient work in the company to keep all its workers busy, and, on the further allegation that the company had hired without the authority of the courts some ten new laborers pending resolution of the principal case, it in turn asked that the company be declared guilty of contempt of court. The Philippine Sheet Metal Workers' Union (CLO) opposed the motion, alleging that there was more than sufficient work in the company to keep all its workers busy, and, on the further allegation that the company had hired without the authority of the courts some ten new laborers pending resolution of the principal case, it in turn asked that the company be declared guilty of contempt of court.Issue:Whether the company abused their right to reduce personnelHeld:The petition was denied without costs against the petitioner.The right to reduce personnel should, of course, not be abused. It should not be made a pretext for easing out laborers on account of their union activities. But neither should it be denied when it is shows that they are not discharging their duties in a manner consistent with good discipline and the efficient operation of an industrial enterprise.

G.R. No. L-3587 December 21, 1951TIONG KING,petitioner,vs.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and THE NATIONAL TAILOR'S ASSOCIATION,respondents.Facts:Tiong King took over the ownership of a tailor shop from Gaw Pun So. Subsequently, Tiong King filed a petition in the Court of Industrial Relations Case No. 117-V-3, alleging that since he operated his shop in February, 1948, he had continually suffered losses; that as there remained only very little of the capital originally invested, Tiong King thought it advisable to close the business to avoid further irreparable losses; and that he was definitely closing the shop on May 30, 1948. Tiong King accordingly prayed that he be allowed to close his tailor shop and business from six o'clock in the afternoon of May 29, 1948. On the same date, April 27, 1948, Tiong King gave out a notice of the projected closing of the Army Shirt Factory, with the announcement that his personnel would be paid their salaries and wages on May 29, 1948, at six o'clock in the afternoon. On May 29, 1948, Presiding Judge Arsenio C. Roldan of the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order enjoining Tiong King not to close his factory and not to dismiss, suspend or lay off any laborer or employee without previous authority of said court.

After hearing, Presiding Judge Roldan rendered a decision dated January 13, 1949, dismissing the petition of Tiong King and ordering him to pay his personnel from the last week of May, 1948, up to the date of the decision, at the rates specified therein.Upon petitioner for reconsideration filed by counsel for Tiong King, the Court of Industrial Relations promulgated a resolution date May 27, 1949, allowing Tiong King to close his business and shop, subject to the condition that, upon reopening the same, his former personnel would be taken back.Issue: Whether Tiong King, as owner of the tailor shop, has the right to close the business which will result to termination of its employeesHeld:The decision of Court of Industrial Relations is affirmed.There being no question that Tiong King's capital invested in the Army Shirt Factory was almost exhausted at the time of the filing of his petition to close it, said petition must necessity be granted. It is admitted by all the Judges of the Court of Industrial Relations that an employer may close his business, provided the same is done in good faith and is due beyond his control. To rule otherwise, would be oppressive and inhuman.G.R. No. 73140 May 29, 1987RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR SERGIO CORPUS,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and ROGELIO R. CORIA,respondents.Facts:Private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid,pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time.Issue:Whether petitioners claim that respondent Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in arbitrarily dismissing petitioners' appeal on a technicalityHeld:The petition is dismissed.It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respectG.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.,petitioner,vs.HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,respondents.Facts:The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement,"1challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,". Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;"2that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;"Issue:Whether the assailed order constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power.Held:The petition was dismissedIt is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof. Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor,"26pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code.G.R. No. L-49582 January 7, 1986CBTC EMPLOYEES UNION,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE JACOBO C. CLAVE, Presidential Executive Assistant, and COMMERCIAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.Facts:Petitioner Commercial Bank and Trust Company Employees' Union (Union for short) lodged a complaint with the Regional Office No. IV, Department of Labor, against private respondent bank (Comtrust) for non-payment of the holiday pay benefits provided for under Article 95 of the Labor Code in relation to Rule X, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.Failing to arrive at an amicable settlement at conciliation level, the parties opted to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration. Subsequently, the arbitrator ruled that: All the monthly-paid employees of the Bank herein represented by the Union and as governed by their Collective Bargaining Agreement, are entitled to the holiday pay benefits as provided for in Article 94 of the labor Code and as implemented by Rule IV, Book III, of the corresponding implementing Rules, except for any day or any longer period designated by lawor holding a general election or referendum;The next day, on April 23, 1976, the Department of Labor released Policy Instructions No. 9, hereinbelow quoted:The Rules implementing PD 850 have clarified the policy in the implementation of the ten (10) paid legal holidays. Before PD 850, the number of working days a year in a firm was considered important in determining entitlement to the benefit. Thus, where an employee was working for at least 313 days, he was considered definitely already paid. If he was working for less than 313, there was no certainty whether the ten (10) paid legal holidays were already paid to him or not.The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily employees. In the case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit.Under the rules implementing PD 850, this policy has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies on the entitlement of monthly paid employees. The new determining rule is this: If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P 240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays.

Issue:Whether guided by Policy Instructions No. 9 on the holiday issue can apply the same retrospectively.Held:The questioned decisions of the respondent Presidential Executive Assistant and the Acting Secretary of labor are hereby set aside, and the award of the Arbitrator reinstated.The questioned Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and the Secretary's Policy Instruction No. 9 add another excluded group, namely, 'employees who are uniformly paid by the month'. While the additional exclusion is only in the form of a presumption that all monthly paid employees have already been paid holiday pay, it constitutes a taking away or a deprivation which must be in the law if it is to be valid. An administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires.G.R. No. L-64313 January 17, 1985NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.BENJAMIN JUCO AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,respondents.National Housing Corp. v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985)

Facts:Juco was an employee of the NHA. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ MOLE but his case was dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHA is a govt-owned corp. and jurisdiction over its employees is vested in the CSC. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. NHA in turn appealed to the SC

ISSUE: Are employees of the National Housing Corporation, a GOCC without original charter, covered by the Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service?

HELD: Sec. 11, Art XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides: "The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including every government owned and controlled corporation.The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort at the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full consequences of the civil service system. All offices and firms of the government are covered.This consti provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that personnel of GOCC belong to the civil service and subject to civil service requirements."Every" means each one of a group, without exception. This case refers to a GOCC. It does not cover cases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings.

xxxFor purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt- owned or controlled corps. whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil Service Law, not the Labor Code, and the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlled by the govt may be created by special charter does not mean that such corps. not created by special law are not covered by the Civil Service.xxxThe infirmity of the resp's position lies in its permitting the circumvention or emasculation of Sec. 1, Art. XII-B [now Art IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)] of the Consti. It would be possible for a regular ministry of govt to create a host of subsidiary corps. under the Corp. Code funded by a willing legislature. A govt-owned corp. could create several subsidiary corps. These subsidiary corps. would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Dec. and the regulations of the COA. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restraint in the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all govt-owned or controlled corps. could be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorp. under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such corps. in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowedNational Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988) -- The civil service does not include Government owned or controlledcorporations (GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.Facts: Eugenia Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She claims she was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled ordering her reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as a government corporation by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v JucoISSUE: W/N employees of NASECO, a GOCC without original charter, are governed by the Civil Service Law.HELD: NO. The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases that arose before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Constitution prior to the ruling in NHC v Juco, this court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in GOCC's, among them NASECO. In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Constitution starkly differs from the 1973 constitution where NHC v Juco was based. It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporation with original charter." Therefore by clear implication, the civil service does not include GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.REPUBLIC VS COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No.87676Date:December 20, 1989Petitioner:Republic of the Philippines, represented by the National Parks Development CommitteeRespndents:The Hon. Court of Appeals and the national Parks Development Supervisory Association &their MembersPonente:Grio-Aquino, J. FACTS:The NPDC was originally created in 1963 under Executive Order No. 30, as the ExecutiveCommittee for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks, and laterrenamed as the National Parks Development Committee under Executive Order No. 68, on September21, 1967, it was registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a non-stock and non-profit corporation, known as "The National Parks Development Committee, Inc."However, in August, 1987, the NPDC was ordered by the SEC to show cause why its Certificateof Registration should not be suspended for. The NPDC Chairman, Amado Lansang, Jr., informed SECthat his Office had no objection to the suspension, cancellation, or revocation of the Certificate ofRegistration of NPDC.By virtue of Executive Order No. 120, the NPDC was attached to the Ministry (later Department)of Tourism and provided with a separate budget subject to audit by the Commission on Audit andpursuant to Executive Order No. 120, all appointments and other personnel actions shall be submitted through the Civil Service Commission Commission.Meanwhile, the Rizal Park Supervisory Employees Association, consisting of employees holdingsupervisory positions in the different areas of the parks, was organized and it affiliated with the TradeUnion of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) under Certificate No. 1206. Two collectivebargaining agreements were entered into between NPDC and NPDCEA (TUPAS local Chapter No. 967)and NPDC and NPDCSA (TUPAS Chapter No. 1206), for a period of two years or until June 30, 1989.On March 20, 1988, these unions staged a stake at the Rizal Park, Fort Santiago, Paco Park, andPook ni Mariang Makiling at Los Banos, Laguna, alleging unfair labor practices by NPDC.On March 21, 1988, NPDC filed in the Regional Trial Court in Manila, Branch III, a complaintagainst the union to declare the strike illegal and to restrain it on the ground that the strikers, beinggovernment employees, have no right to strike although they may form a union. The Regional Trial Courtof Manila, Branch III, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 88-44048 praying for a declaration of illegality of the strike of the private respondents and to restrain thesame. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's petition for certiorari, hence, this petition for review.ISSUE:Whether the petitioner, National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), is a governmentagency, or a private corporation, for on this issue depends the right of its employees to strike.HELD:NPDC is a government agency, its employees are covered by civil service rules and regulations(Sec. 2, Article IX, 1987 Constitution). Its employees are civil service employees (Sec. 14, ExecutiveOrder No. 180).While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize and join unions oftheir choice,there is as yet no law permitting them to strike. In case of a labor dispute between theemployees and the government, Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180 dated June 1, 1987 provides thatthe Public Sector Labor- Management Council, not the Department of Labor and Employment, shall hearthe dispute. Clearly, the Court of Appeals and the lower court erred in holding that the labor disputebetween the NPDC and the members of the NPDSA is cognizable by the Department of Labor and Employment. The petition for review is granted. The private respondents' complaint should be filed in the Public SectorLabor-Management Council as provided in Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180.LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, ET AL.G.R. No. 120319October 6, 1995Petitioner:Luzon Development BankRespondent:Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees and Atty. Ester S. Garcia in hercapacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORPonente:J. Romero Facts:From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Associationof Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and theMemorandum of Agreement dated April1994, on promotion. At a conference, the parties agreed on thesubmission of their respective Position Papers on December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia,in hercapacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on theother hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator remindingthem to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB. On May 24, 1995, withoutLDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows:WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the CollectiveBargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion.Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of theVoluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.Issue:Which court has the jurisdiction for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicialentitiesHeld: Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court ofAppeals shall exercise:(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442,as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated tohim under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation ofthe term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powersare provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is aquasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated thereinA fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise beappealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative CircularNo. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 toprovide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities notexpressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or another statute.In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as theArbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the contract orsubmission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial Court for the province or city in which one of theparties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A party tothe controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless the award isvacated, modified or corrected.In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional trialcourt. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, ACCORDINGLY, the Courtresolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.

CASE TITLE: SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSN. VS. CAGR NO.: 85279DATE: JULY 28,1989PETITIONER: SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISIONT. BAYLON,RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DEALDAY,SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN AND VIRGILIO MAGPAYORESPONDENT: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C.PARALEJO,RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITYPONENTE: CORTES, J.:FACTS:On June 11,1987, the SSS filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for awrit of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 09 ,1987, the officers and membersof SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building; that the strike wasreported to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work;that the strikers refused to return to work; and that SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.It appears that the SSSEA went to strike after the SSS failed to act on the union demands on certain jobrelated issues and unfair labor practices. The court a quo, on June 11,1987, issued a temporaryrestraining order pending resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. In the meantime,petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.The SSS filed an opposition, on July 22,1987, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and convertedthe restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding the strike illegal. Aspetitioners motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on August 14,1988,petitioners filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the SC, the SCreferred the case to COA.Upon motion of the SSS on Feb.06,1989, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining thepetitioners from staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the DOLE onJan.25,1989 and to maintain the status quo.The COA dismiss the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by thepetitioners and held that since the strikers are government employees, they are not allowed to strike, andmay be enjoined by the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the SSS complaint for damages, from continuingwith their strike.Issue:Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike and the RTC have jurisdiction?HELD:SSS is one of such GOCC with original charter, having been created under R.A No. 1161, its employeesare part of the civil service and covered by a memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, thestrike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.No reversible error having been committed by the COA, the petition is hereby denied.