1. : , , 2008

2. . . , . , . . , , , , . , . . , . . , . . . 3. , . . . 2008 11 4. 1 5 10 1 11 2 12 1. 12 2. 21 3. 24 4. 30 5. 41 6. 48 3 50 1. 50 2. 51 3. 53 4. 56 4 56 1. 56 2. 59 5. 3. 63 4. 68 5. 72 6. 84 7. 94 8. 113 5 114 1. 114 2. 117 3. 125 4. 131 5. 141 142 1 143 2 145 1. 145 2. (strong state) 148 3. 150 4. 151 5. 153 3 1950 155 1. 155 2. 157 3. 159 4. 162 6. 5. 165 6. 1950 169 4 1960~70 172 1. 172 2. 179 3. 190 4. 194 5. 200 6. 217 7. 225 5 1980 229 1. 229 2. 243 3. 248 4. 259 5. 265 6 274 1. 274 2. 280 3. 288 296 1 297 1. 297 2. 300 3. 321 7. 4. 326 5. 334 2 335 1. 335 2. 342 3 357 1. 357 2. 359 3. 363 4. 371 5. 375 379 383 405 8. < 2- 1> 27 < 2- 2> 28 < 2- 3> 31 < 2- 4> 34 < 2- 5> 46 < 2- 6> 58 < 2- 7> G7 59 < 2- 8> 60 < 2- 9> OECD (2003) 61 < 2-10> 75 < 2-11> 78 < 2-12> 83 < 2-13> G7 85 < 2-14> G7 94 < 2-15> OECD 96 < 2-16> 97 < 2-17> 1 1 GDP 97 < 2-18> 1 98 < 2-19> OECD GDP 103 < 2-20> 105 < 2-21> 123 < 2-22> 125 < 2-23> 140 < 3- 1> (194658) 156 < 3- 2> 5() 160 9. < 3- 3> 163 < 3- 4> 166 < 3- 5> 167 < 3- 6> 167 < 3- 7> 170 < 3- 8> 170 < 3- 9> 175 < 3-10> 10 178 < 3-11> 6 182 < 3-12> 184 < 3-13> 185 < 3-14> 188 < 3-15> 188 < 3-16> 191 < 3-17> 194 < 3-18> 204 < 3-19> 83 208 < 3-20> 213 < 3-21> 214 < 3-22> 217 < 3-23> 218 < 3-24> 219 < 3-25> 220 < 3-26> 1975~90 232 < 3-27> M2 243 < 3-28> 246 < 3-29> 1991 249 < 3-30> 251 < 3-31> 252 < 3-32> (1994. 3. 15) 254 < 3-33> 255 10. < 3-34> 1991~96 257 < 3-35> 257 < 3-36> 257 < 3-37> 261 < 3-38> 267 < 3-39> 267 < 3-40> 269 < 3-41> 100 272 < 3-42> 275 < 3-43> 1990 276 < 3-44> 276 < 3-45> 30 (ROA) 277 < 3-46> 30 1997 278 < 3-47> 283 < 3-48> 287 < 3-49> 289 < 3-50> (2007 5 ) 290 < 3-51> (1980~2005) 293 < 3-52> (1961~2004) 295 < 4- 1> World Bank Governance Indicator 298 < 4- 2> 299 < 4- 3> 301 < 4- 4> 305 < 4- 5> 306 < 4- 6> 308 < 4- 7> : OECD 309 < 4- 8> 310 < 4- 9> 310 < 4-10> 312 < 4-11> 312 11. < 4-12> R&D 314 < 4-13> 316 < 4-14> OECD 317 < 4-15> 318 < 4-16> 2004 318 < 4-17> 322 < 4-18> 323 < 4-19> 327 < 4-20> 333 < 4-21> GDP 339 < 4-22> 5 342 < 4-23> 352 < 4-24> (2006) 355 < 4-25> 356 < 4-26> 360 < 4-27> (2005) 364 < 1> 406 < 2> 408 < 3> 410 < 4> () 412 < 5> (1) 414 < 6> (2) 416 < 7> 418 < 8> : 420 < 9> 422 < 10> 424 < 11> (1) 426 < 12> (2) 428 < 13> 429 < 14> 430 12. < 15> (1) 432 < 16> (2) 434 < 17> 436 < 18> (1) 438 < 19> (2) 439 < 20> 440 < 21> , , 442 < 22> 443 < 23> 443 < 24> 444 13. [ 2- 1] 13 [ 2- 2] 15 [ 2- 3] 17 [ 2- 4] 20 [ 2- 5] (PMR) 32 [ 2- 6] (EPL) 38 [ 2- 7] (2003) 39 [ 2- 8] 40 [ 2- 9] 62 [ 2-10] 75 [ 2-11] 76 [ 2-12] 1 (GNI) 80 [ 2-13] 1 GDP(1970) 1 GDP (1970~2005) 81 [ 2-14] (1984) (1984~2005) 81 [ 2-15] (15~64) 86 [ 2-16] (15~64) 87 [ 2-17] (55~64) 87 [ 2-18] G7 90 [ 2-19] OECD (2006 ) 90 [ 2-20] OECD 91 [ 2-21] (65 ) 91 [ 2-22] (1264=100) 118 [ 2-23] OECD 120 [ 2-24] 122 [ 2-25] 126 [ 2-26] 128 14. [ 2-27] 128 [ 2-28] 129 [ 2-29] OECD 130 [ 2-30] 132 [ 3- 1] (1965~89) 144 [ 3- 2] 174 [ 3- 3] 177 [ 3- 4] 185 [ 3- 5] 193 [ 3- 6] () 196 [ 3- 7] 197 [ 3- 8] M2 198 [ 3- 9] 198 [ 3-10] 199 [ 3-11] 200 [ 3-12] 203 [ 3-13] 205 [ 3-14] 209 [ 3-15] 210 [ 3-16] 212 [ 3-17] 215 [ 3-18] 219 [ 3-19] 220 [ 3-20] 227 [ 3-21] 228 [ 3-22] 230 [ 3-23] 234 [ 3-24] Hodrick-Prescott 235 [ 3-25] 236 [ 3-26] 237 15. [ 3-27] 238 [ 3-28] 239 [ 3-29] 240 [ 3-30] () 240 [ 3-31] () 241 [ 3-32] (1960. 12008. 5) 262 [ 3-33] 264 [ 3-34] , , 266 [ 3-35] (1997. 7~1998. 3) 278 [ 4- 1] OECD 299 [ 4- 2] The Times 200 310 [ 4- 3] OECD (2003) 311 [ 4- 4] 311 [ 4- 5] R&D 313 [ 4- 6] R&D 314 [ 4- 7] 316 [ 4- 8] (2005) 319 [ 4- 9] (2004) 320 [ 4-10] 324 [ 4-11] 324 [ 4-12] (2004. 1~2008. 6) 329 [ 4-13] 331 [ 4-14] 332 [ 4-15] 338 [ 4-16] ( ) 339 [ 4-17] (liveability) 342 [ 4-18] 345 [ 4-19] 345 [ 4-20] (, 3, ) 346 [ 4-21] () 348 16. [ 4-22] (2003) 349 [ 4-23] 350 [ 4-24] 350 [ 4-25] 351 [ 4-26] 353 [ 4-27] 362 [ 4-28] 362 [ 4-29] OECD (2007) 367 [ 4-30] (2006) 370 17. < 1> 25 < 2> 98 < 3> 103 < 4> 108 < 5> 115 18. 1960 . . . . , .1) 1. , , , , . (market failure) . . 1) (2007a) . 19. 2 : , , . . , . , . , , , . . , . . 2. 1960 . (financial repression), , . . , , , . , , . , , , . . . 20. 3 . . . . . 100 . . 3. . , , . , , . , . . . , . . , . , , ( 21. 4 : , , ) , () , . , . R&D . . . , . . . . . 22. 1960 . 1 2007 1960 138 2007 1,863 13.5 , 1970 16% 2006 52% . 1960 52.4 2006 79.2 1.5 , 196065 1,000 70.0 200005 4.7 . .2) (World Bank[1993]). . . (sustained growth) . . , World Bank(1993) 2) . 1 (http://ecos. bok.or.kr), 1 OECD(http://www.oecd.org), OECD() (http://kosis.go.kr), (). 23. 6 : , , , , , () . , . (market-friendly view) . Amsden (1989), Wade(1990) (developmental-state view) . Rodrik(2006) . . . 1980 . 1997 . IMF .3) . . . . (government of the people, by the people, for the people) 19 . . 20 3) , Stiglitz ([2008. 12. 8]) . 24. 1 7 . 19 . 20 . 1970 . 2 , , , , . , . , , . , , , . . , . . . , . . 3 25. 8 : , , . , , . . , (financial repression) , (co-insurance) , , , . 1997 . , , , , . . , , . . . . . . 4 , , , . . 26. 1 9 . 2 . , , , . 3 . . 4 . . , . . . , . 27. 4) . . , . (tautology) . , ([2008]). . . , , , , .5) .6) 4) ([1997, 1998a], [2006], [2007]) . 5) Musgrave(1959) (allocation), (distribution), (stabilization) . . (Inman[1985]). Musgrave(1959) . 6) 28. 2 11 1 , . . , . . . , (Aron[2000]; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson[2001, 2004]; Beck, Demirg-Kunt, and Levine[2003]; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi[2004]; Acemoglu and Johnson[2005]). . , .7) . Nozick(1974) (libertarian) . . . . () . 7) , 1894 , (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote[2001], p.221). 29. 12 : , , . , . .8) 2 (market failure) . . , (Pareto improvement) . . , , , . 1. . (public goods) . (Samuelson[1954, 1955]). (non-rivalry) . , 8) . . 30. 2 13 [ 2-1] MB(4) MB MB MB(4) MB(3) 0 3 4 N MC (MB) (MC) , .9) . . , . [ 2-1] 1 MC . MB . . 3 (MB(3)=MC) . 1 (MB(4)MC). 1 . [ 2-1] N . N .10) . (non-excludability) (free-rider) . . , . . . . . .11) 10) [ 2-1] (MB) (MB) . . 11) , . , . , ( ) , , . . 32. 2 15 . . . , , (economies of scale) . . . . [ 2-2] . (AC) (Q) . (MC) (AC) . (MR) (MC) (qm) (pm) . (AR) (MC) (qc) (pc) . [ 2-2] C,PC,P qm qc pm pc ACAC ARAR MCMC MRMR QQ 33. 16 : , , (qm) (qc) (pm) (pc) . , . (network industry) . ( , , , ) . , . (open access) . . (externalities) . (, external economies) ( , external diseconomies) . (R&D) . . , . . . .12) 12) . . 34. 2 17 [ 2-3] S2 S1 D q2 q1 p2 p1 Q P ( ) . . . . . . , . . [ 2-3] . q1 p1 , q2 p2 . , . 35. 18 : , , (green tax) . , . , . (: ) , . (: ) , . (Liebowitz and Margolis[1994]). . (asymmetric information). , , .13) . , , . (adverse selection) . , . . . 13) . 36. 2 19 . , . (moral hazard) . , . . . . (incomplete markets). . , , . . , . . 3 . (industrial policy) ( , , ) ,14) . 14) 41 . 37. 20 : , , . . (prisoners dilemma) (Inman[1985]). , 6 8 . (C) (N) . C 4 2 (=6-4) . C N C -2 (=6-8) N 6 (=6-0) . N 0 . [ 2-4] . . , 2 C , 1 C 2 N 6 . 1 N . 2 N , 1 C -2 N [ 2-4] 1 C N 2 C 2 2 6 -2 N -2 6 0 0 : 1 , 2 . 38. 2 21 0 . 1 N . 1 2 N . N 0 . 1 2 (free-riding) 2 .15) (coordination) . Inman(1985) , . , . . . (p.672).16) 2. . . , 1980 . , (government failure) 15) , , , . (Pareto efficiency) . , . 16) Markets fail. They fail for the fundamental reason that the institution of market trading cannot enforce cooperative behavior on self-seeking, utility-maximizing agents, and cooperative behavior between agents is often required for beneficial trading. Only by externally enforcing cooperative behavior upon individuals can the non-cooperative, market failure outcome be avoided. Government is one institution which has the potential to enforce the preferred outcome. 39. 22 : , , , , . . , , . , (accountability) . . (public choice theory) , . , (internal inefficiency) . . . .17) , . . . . 17) . 40. 2 23 . . . , . . . , , . , . (network industry) ( ) . . , , (internalization) . , . (Coase Theorem) (Coase[1960]). , . , . (/GDP) 1990 . . 41. 24 : , , . . . WTO . WTO , ( ), , , , , , . . . , . 3. . 1960 . 1930 1940 (Shleifer[1998]).18) , , , . 18) . Adam Smith 20 . 42. 2 25 1960 Volks- wagen(1961) VEBA(1965) . 1979 Thatcher . (privatization) (denationalization) . , 1984 (initial public offering) British Telecom . 1980 1990 GDP 10% 1997 . , , , , , . . Jacque Chirac (198688 ) 120 22 , . 1993 Balladur , Jospin . Jospin France Telecom (1997 71, 1998 105) . 1990 , . 1980 , 1987 2 1988 10 NTT(Nippon Telegraph and Telephone) (Megginson and Netter[2001]). 1960 1980 , . ( 1). < 1> 43. 26 : , , 800 . 1970 . 1991 . . , . 1992 1,200 361 , 1982 GDP 12.7% . . . , . : Megginson and Netter(2001). . / (purchaser/provider split) . ( 2-1). , (: ) (: ) . , . , ( ) . BTO(Build-Transfer- Operate) BTL(Build-Transfer-Lease) . . , , . , 44. 2 27 < 2-1> - (: ) - (: ) - (: BTO BTL ) - (: ) - (: ) - (: ) - (: BTL ) - (: BTO ) - (: ) . (competitive tendering) . (voucher) .19) , . , BTO 20) BTL .21) , . . . 19) (2006) . 20) : . 21) : . 45. 28 : , , < 2-2> (agency costs) . : Gnen, Maher, and Nicoletti(2001) Shleifer(1998). ( 2-2). . . . , . . . , (agency costs) . . , 46. 2 29 . . (arms length) . . , . . , .22) , . , , . (reputation) . . , , . , . (public choice theory) 22) Schick(1998) . (government by contract), . 47. 30 : , , . . (, , , ) . , (Shleifer[1998]). 4. . . , . , . (capture theory of regulation) (Stigler[1971]). , . ( ) .23) 1960 .24) 23) (capture theory of deregulation) . . 24) Mancini and Morrall(2006) . Derthick and Quirk(1985) 48. 2 31 < 2-3> (arms length regulation) : Gnen, Maher, and Nicoletti(2001). 1970 . , , ( 2-3). , . . , (universal service) . . , , . 49. 32 : , , , , 1998 . (Gnen, Maher, and Nicoletti[2001]). , . , . , . OECD (product market regulation: PMR) . PMR 0( ) 6( ) , [ 2-5] 1998 OECD 19982003 . 1998 , , , . 19982003 , [ 2-5] (PMR) : Conway, Janod, and Nicoletti(2005). 50. 2 33 . . . 1970 (Edey and Hviding[1995]). . 1970 . . ( , , ). (, , ). 1970 , , , . ( ) . OECD , , . . , , , , 1980 ( 2-4). 51. 34 : , , < 2-4> 1960 1980 1987 1990 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X - X X X - X X X - X - X X X X X X - X X - X X - - X X - X X - - X - - - X - - X X - X - - X* - - - X* - X* X - - X - - - X - - - - - X* : X = . - = . * = . : Edey and Hviding(1995). ( ) . . , 52. 2 35 , . . . (financial safety net) (lender of last resort), , .25) 19 20 , 197080 . (Bank for International Settlements: BIS) 1988 . . , .26) . , . (The Economist[2008. 10. 11]). , , 27) Fannie Mae Freddie Mac (sub-prime mortgage) , (off-balance sheet transaction) 25) (2007) 3 . 26) , (hedge fund) , (The Economist[2008. 10. 11]; [2008]). 27) (government-sponsored enterprise) . . Fannie Mae Freddie Mac . 53. 36 : , , . ( ) . . , , , (IMF[2008], p.39). (macro-prudential regulation) , . . , , . . . . . . . . , , , . , , 54. 2 37 , (OECD [2003], chapter 4). (Blanchard and Giavazzi[2003]). , . . , . (employment protection legislation: EPL) . EPL - (insider-outsider) . . . OECD EPL 0( ) 6( ) , 1980 [ 2-6] . (-) (, ), (+) (, ) . EPL , 1994 . . (+) . [ 2-7] EPL (PMR) . 55. 38 : , , [ 2-6] (EPL) 1) : 1) 1980 EPL . : OECD(2006a). 56. 2 39 [ 2-7] (2003) : Conway, Janod, and Nicoletti(2005). Blanchard and Giavazzi(2003) (economic rent) . , , . . . (generosity) . [ 2-8] , . EPL . 57. 40 : , , [ 2-8] (EPL) (%) : 1) EPL(employment protection legislation) OECD . 2) (north), (cont), (south), Anglo-Saxon(anglo) Sapir(2005) . : Boeri(2002). Sapir(2005) . EPL . , . . . , (workfare) (activation) .28) 28) (flexicurity) (OECD[2004a], pp.9798). 58. 2 41 5. 3 1960 . , . (industrial policy) (Chang[2003]). 1980 . . , . . (dynamic scale economies), (coordination failure), (informational externalities) (Pack and Saggi [2006]). 1) (learning by doing) . . , . . 59. 42 : , , . . . . . , , , . 3 . , 1980 3 1970 , . . , . . .29) . , 29) Pack and Saggi(2006) (p.284). (microwave oven) . 60. 2 43 , , , , . . . (catch-up) . (Eichengreen and Chung[2004], Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti[2002]). . , . . 2) . , . , , , , . (Rodrik[2004]). (coordination problem) . (Pack and Saggi[2006], p.276). 61. 44 : , , , , , . , , . . (backward linkage effect) . (supply chain) .30) . , . , , . , . 3) . , (Rodrik[2004]). , . 30) (cluster) . (Silicon Valley) (Bangalore) . 62. 2 45 . (free-rider problem) . , . , . . . , . , . , . . . , . .31) . Rodrik(2004) < 2-5> . 31) (deadweight loss) . 63. 46 : , , < 2-5> . . (sunset clause) . . . . , . . . . : Rodrik(2004). , . . , . . () . , . . . , . 64. 2 47 , 1960 , . . , (sunset clause) . , . . , . , . . , , , , , . . , . . . . , . R&D . . , , , 65. 48 : , , . , . , . , . . , . 6. (: ), (: ), (: ), (: ), (: ) . , , , , . . , 1980 . , , , . . . 66. 2 49 . . , , . . , . . . . . , , . . . , , . . . , , , . 67. 50 : , , 3 1. (merit goods) . . (merit bads) . . , , , . . (public choice theory) .32) , . , . . (median voter) . . , . 32) . Black(1948, 1958), Arrow(1950), Downs(1957), Buchanan and Tullock(1962), Stigler(1971), Niskanen(1971), Krueger (1974) . 68. 2 51 (log-rolling) . (pork-barrel politics) . . , . , . , , , . . . (capture theory of regulation) . , . Arrow(1950) (impossibility theorem) , . . . . . 2. (Besley[1988]). (individual freedom) (consumer sovereignty) 69. 52 : , , ([1994], p.102). , (totalitarianism) . . , . , (Fullerton[1991]). , . . . . .33) . . . . 4 . . 33) . 70. 2 53 (paternalism) . (soft paternalism) (The Economist[2006. 4. 8]).34) . . . . , .35)36) 3. , . ( 34) , , . . , (strong paternalism) . 35) Mulligan and Philipson(2000) . . . 36) (benefit/cost analysis) , (The Economist[2005. 4. 2], Deighton-Smith[2007]). ? ? . (social discount rate) . (Weitzman[2001]). , (environmental good) . 71. 54 : , , [2004]). , . , , . . , (acquired taste) (cultivated taste). , . (addiction) . . , . , ( ) . , . Baumol and Bowen(1965) (cost disease) . , . , , . . , . , (Fullerton[1991]). , ( [2004]). , 72. 2 55 . , . . , . , . . , . , , . . . , . , (Throsby[1994], p.15). , . , , , (Throsby[1994], p.8). Fullerton(1991) . 73. 56 : , , , . . . . (rent-seeking) (Throsby[1994], p.22). 4. . , . (individual freedom) (consumer sovereignty) . . . , , , . , . . 4 1. . , 74. 2 57 . , . . Boadway and Keen(2000) , , . , , . , , . . , (altruism) , , (dynamic inefficiency) , ( 2-6). . .37) , . . . . 20 37) . 75. 58 : , , < 2-6> . () , . . . (, ) (Aaron[1996] social insurance paradox). . . , . 1980 , . G7 GDP 20 20% 40% . ( 2-7). . , , . . , 76. 2 59 < 2-7> G7 (: GDP , %) 1) 1920 1960 1980 1990 1995 2000 7.0 27.0 31.8 33.3 33.2 30.1 14.8 17.5 32.0 31.7 35.4 36.8 25.0 32.4 47.9 45.1 49.5 43.3 27.6 34.6 46.1 49.8 53.7 48.7 22.5 30.1 41.9 53.2 51.8 44.8 26.2 32.2 43.0 39.9 43.3 34.7 13.3 28.6 38.8 46.0 46.5 46.7 19.5 28.9 40.2 42.7 44.8 40.7 2) 1960 1980 1990 7.3 14.1 14.6 4.1 10.5 11.6 18.1 25.4 23.5 13.4 23.9 26.5 13.1 19.8 24.5 10.2 21.3 22.3 9.1 14.4 18.8 10.8 18.5 20.3 : 1) . 2) , . : (2005). . , , , , , . 2. . (social insurance) (public assistance) . , . .38) , 38) . 77. 60 : , , , . . , . . . . OECD (social expenditure) , < 2-8> . 2003 < 2-9> . OECD , < 2-8> , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ( ) : OECD(2007a). 78. 2 61 < 2-9> OECD (2003) (: GDP , %) 4.4 0.2 3.2 6.2 3.3 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.3 19.1 12.8 0.4 3.5 5.1 3.1 0.6 1.0 0.1 0.4 27.0 7.2 2.1 2.3 7.2 2.7 1.2 3.3 0.0 0.5 26.5 4.0 0.4 1.0 6.8 1.1 0.4 0.8 0.5 2.3 17.3 8.0 0.2 2.9 6.8 1.9 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.6 21.4 7.2 0.0 4.5 5.6 3.9 1.6 3.3 0.7 1.0 27.8 8.4 0.9 3.9 5.7 3.0 0.9 2.2 0.3 0.6 25.9 10.5 1.9 1.9 7.6 3.0 1.1 1.9 0.8 0.3 29.1 11.3 0.4 3.1 8.0 2.0 1.1 1.8 0.2 0.5 28.4 11.5 0.8 1.0 5.0 1.3 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 21.3 7.5 1.1 3.0 6.0 3.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.1 22.7 6.5 0.6 5.0 7.2 3.2 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.5 23.8 2.9 0.8 1.5 5.6 2.5 0.7 1.0 0.5 0.5 15.9 12.6 2.5 2.3 6.2 1.3 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 26.0 8.6 1.3 0.8 6.1 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2 18.4 3.2 0.2 0.6 2.9 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.5 7.9 6.1 2.6 4.0 6.2 4.1 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.5 24.8 1.0 0.3 0.1 2.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.5 6.8 5.4 0.4 4.6 5.8 1.6 1.1 1.6 0.3 0.6 21.4 4.4 0.1 2.9 6.3 2.3 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.1 18.0 7.0 0.3 7.0 6.5 3.4 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.6 26.7 11.4 1.0 3.4 4.5 1.5 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.0 22.9 8.8 1.6 3.0 6.7 1.6 0.7 1.1 0.0 0.3 23.9 6.5 0.2 2.2 5.2 2.0 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.8 17.5 7.9 0.6 2.4 5.2 1.0 0.7 2.2 0.2 0.2 20.3 10.1 0.7 6.6 7.1 3.5 1.3 1.2 0.6 0.7 31.9 11.3 1.5 4.7 6.0 1.5 0.7 1.0 0.2 0.7 27.7 6.4 0.2 2.5 6.7 2.9 0.5 0.5 1.4 0.2 21.4 5.5 0.8 1.5 6.9 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.5 16.6 7.5 0.9 2.9 5.9 2.1 0.6 1.1 0.3 0.5 21.8 : (public) (mandatory private) . : OECD(http://stats.oecd.org). 79. 62 : , , [ 2-9] . . ([2004], [2005]). . (progressive), (proportional), (regressive) . (tax base) . . , . . . .39) 39) . . , . . 80. 2 63 . . . , . . . , . . 3. . .40) . . , . . . (liquidity constraint) 40) (2005) . 81. 64 : , , , . . , . , (Barr[1992]). (Garca-Pealosa and Wen[2008]). . , . , , , . . , . . , (social integration) . . , , , .41) , . 41) 2005 (The Economist[2005. 11. 12]). 82. 2 65 . 1990 . (misspecification) (simultaneity) . . . . . . . , , (deadweight loss) . , , . , . ( ). ( tax wedge) . (Lindbeck and Persson[2003], Disney[2004]). . 83. 66 : , , . (Leibfritz, Thornton, and Bibbee [1997]). Daveri and Tabellini(2000) . , (welfare dependency) . , . , . 100% (Carone, Immervoll, Paturot, and Salomki[2004]). , . . , (OECD[2006a], chapter 3; Henrekson and Persson[2004]; Red and Zhang[2003]; Carling, Holmlund, and Vejsiu[2001]; Johansson and Palme[1996]; [1993]). (Duval[2003], Gruber and Wise[1997]). (unemploy- ment trap) (poverty trap) .42) , 42) 84. 2 67 , . , . . , , (crowding-out) . , . , . Kohl and OBrien (1998) , (funding gap) 30% . . Miller and Russek(1997) Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell(1999) , . Arjona, Ladaique, and Pearson(2001) , . , (active spending) . . . . 85. 68 : , , , . . . 4. Heclo(1981) (welfare state) . 18701920 (experimentation), 1950 (consolidation), 1950 1960 (expansion), 1970 (reformulation) . . . (poor law) 1870 1920 . , , . . , . 86. 2 69 . . . . . . 2 . . . , , Keynes . , . . . (Stephens[1996]). . , . 87. 70 : , , .43) . . , , , . . , . . . 1940 1950 . 1950 . . 1 , . 1950 1960 . . . , 43) . (Castles[1996]). 88. 2 71 . . , . , . . . , . , . . . , , . , . . 1970 . , . , . , . . , 89. 72 : , , . . . (class conflict). (demand push). , (supply pull). 1970 . . 1970 . . . 5. . . . . Alesina, 90. 2 73 Glaeser, and Sacerdote(2001) . . , , (skewness), , . . , . , , . 18 , . , ( ) . , . , . . . Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote(2001) (positive) Esping-Andersen(1990) (normative) . Sapir(2005) (social model) . , Anglo-Saxon, , . 91. 74 : , , , (, , , ) , . (active labor market policy) , , , . , Anglo-Saxon( ) . , . , , . . , (, , , , ) (, , ) . 2025 . . (, , , ) . . , . . < 2-10> ( ), ( ), , . Anglo-Saxon . . , , . 92. 2 75 < 2-10> (: %) Anglo-Saxon GDP GDP GDP GDP 1.67 2.36 11.14 12.87 5.97 8.41 39.72 45.91 1.73 2.26 11.31 9.67 6.93 9.07 45.28 38.73 0.95 2.88 12.33 12.29 3.32 10.14 43.32 43.23 0.18 0.82 12.92 8.60 0.79 3.65 57.36 38.19 28.05 100.00 24.98 100.00 28.45 100.00 22.52 100.00 : Boeri(undated). . : . Sapir(2005) ( 2-10). , Anglo-Saxon . Sapir(2005) . [ 2-11] 15 [ 2-10] Anglo-Saxon : Sapir(2005). 93. 76 : , , [ 2-11] 1(%) (%) : Sapir(2005). (Nord) 1/4 , (Cont) 2/4, (Med) 3/4, Anglo- Saxon (Anglo) 4/4 . Sapir(2005) . (-) ( 2-8). , , , . . . . . Sapir(2005) 94. 2 77 . , . , Anglo-Saxon . OECD(2006a) Sapir(2005) , , ( 2-11). (71.91%) (4.79%) , (25.58) . (2.13) (1.28) . , (1.28) (1.20) (1.55) (1.97) . . : (social service) . , , , , , . (cash transfer) , demogrant,44) . ([2006] ). , , . , 44) demogrant . 95. 78 : , , < 2-11> OECD 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) (tax wedge)7) 8) 9) 2.01 27.81 29.25 27.10 59.96 1.42 67.11 7.47 29.35 9.64 1.38 18.23 15.76 18.54 30.75 1.20 70.92 5.30 31.50 11.78 2.13 39.86 64.14 27.42 83.33 1.28 71.91 4.79 25.58 7.77 2.71 36.17 25.84 34.33 82.57 1.55 62.54 8.97 29.85 9.86 1.83 9.69 3.46 32.43 38.33 1.97 58.00 15.12 31.35 7.05 : 1) , , , , , , , . 2) , , , , , . 3) , , , , , , . 4) , , . 5) ( 100% 67%) (, , ) 5 . 6) 1 GDP 1 . 7) ( 100% 2 ) . 8) . . 9) 50% . . : OECD(2006a), p.191. , . , . , . , . , 96. 2 79 . . . . . . , Sapir(2005) , (OECD[2006a], chapter 3). .45) Sapir(2005) . . . , , . 1800 1900 (Thakur, Keen, Horvth, and Cerra[2003], pp.2122), 45) . 97. 80 : , , [ 2-12] 1 (GNI) 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 (OECD = 100) (3) (6) (6) (11) (24) (24) (24) (24) (10) (23) : 1 (GNI) PPP . OECD , , , , , 24 . ( ) 24 . : OECD(2008). 1970 1 OECD 3 OECD 25% ( 2-12). 1970 2004 14 OECD . 1966 71.0% 1990 83.1% 2005 73.9% . Lindbeck(1997) . 1970 . , . [ 2-13] [ 2-14] . . McKinsey , 98. 2 81 [ 2-13] 1 GDP(1970) 1 GDP (1970~2005) : 2000 OECD 1 GDP 100 1970 1 GDP . : OECD(2008). [ 2-14] (1984) (1984~2005) : OECD(2008). 99. 82 : , , (McKinsey Global Institute[2006]). 2004 23 9 10 6 34 5 44% . , 83 2 . 30% .46) 1997 288 114 402 243 1.65 ( 2-12). 1970 0.84 1997 1.65 . . . , . , . .47) 46) 2/3 . . 196393 20% , , (Rosen[1996]). 47) , (formal care service) . . (informal carer) . . (Aust and Bnker[2004], p.40). , . 100. 2 83 < 2-12> (: ) 1970 1980 1990 1997 . 947 1,362 1,533 1,592 . a) b) c) d) e) 606 188 59 69 262 28 835 281 84 121 274 75 1,009 354 69 140 289 157 1,286 423 342 269 129 123 . a) b) 3,529 766 2,763 3,736 1,183 2,553 3,968 1,298 2,670 3,567 1,139 2,428 (++) 5,082 5,933 6,510 6,445 [(+)/] [/] [(++a)/b] 0.44 0.17 0.84 0.59 0.22 1.32 0.64 0.25 1.44 0.81 0.36 1.65 : OECD(1999), p.109. .48) , . . , . (voucher) . , . , 48) . 101. 84 : , , , (Calmfors, Forslund, and Hemstrm[2001]). , (OECD[2006a], pp.7172). , , . , . . . . . , . . 6. . . 1970 . 102. 2 85 , . . . , 1 ( 2-13). OECD 196073 5.2% 197482 2.2% 23% . 1990 . 1970 G7 , . 1980 1990 2.9%, 2.5% 1% . . , 1970 (1564) ( 2-15). 1980 < 2-13> G7 (: %) OECD 196073 197482 198390 19912001 200106 4.0 1.6 3.4 2.9 2.9 9.6 3.6 4.3 1.3 1.9 4.3 1.6 2.9 1.8 0.8 5.4 2.5 2.5 1.9 1.5 5.2 3.0 2.7 1.6 0.6 3.2 0.9 3.3 2.3 2.5 5.5 3.0 3.6 2.7 2.8 5.2 2.2 3.4 2.5 2.5 : OECD, Economic Outlook, . 103. 86 : , , [ 2-15] (15~64) : Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote(2005). 85% 5%p() 10%p() . , ( 2-16). (5564) 20%p ( 2-17). 1980 . (growth accounting) , (proximate causes) . , , .49) 49) Maddison(1987) 104. 2 87 [ 2-16] (15~64) : Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote(2005). [ 2-17] (55~64) : Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote(2005). , , , , , , (p.681). 105. 88 : , , (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson[2001, 2004], Acemoglu and Johnson [2005], Beck, Demirg-Kunt, and Levine[2003], Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi[2004]) . . 1970 1980 . OECD(2003) . , , (R&D) , , . , (knowledge-based economy) . 1980 , . ( , ) ( ) (OECD[2006a], chapter 3; Calmfors and Driffill [1988]). 1980 . .50) ( ) . 50) Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote(2005) . , . 106. 2 89 . , , , . , , . . , ( 2-17) . . . [ 2-18] G7 1970 1 . . , 1970 . 2006 OECD /GDP 77% ( 2-19). . . . 1990 EU GDP 40% ( 2-20). 25% . 107. 90 : , , [ 2-18] G7 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 (GDP , %) : OECD, Economic Outlook, . [ 2-19] OECD (2006 ) 0 50 100 150 200 (GDP , %) (OECD ) : OECD(2008). 108. 2 91 [ 2-20] OECD 0 10 20 30 40 53 56 59 62 65 68 71 74 77 80 83 86 89 92 95 98 01 04 (GDP , %) EU : OECD(http://stats.oecd.org). [ 2-21] (65 ) : United Nations(http://esa.un.org). 109. 92 : , , . , EU ( 2-21). , . . 1980 . . . . 1990 Jessop(1993) (Schum- peterian workfare state) . , (p.9). (post-industrial society) (Keynesian welfare state) . Jessop(1993) (p.29) . (new risks, new welfare) (Taylor-Gooby[2004], [2006] ). , , 110. 2 93 , , . , . , . , . . . , (2006) (welfare), (workfare), (learnfare) 3 . (social investment state) . . , . . , . ([2006], [2006] ) . , , . . (modus operandi) , . 111. 94 : , , 7. , , , , , , . . . 1986 50% 1990 28% ,51) 46% 34% . 14 2 ( 2-14). < 2-14> G7 (: %) 1986 1990 1995 2000 2005 50(14) 28 (2) 39.6(5) 39.6(5) 35 (6) 70(15) 50 (5) 50 (5) 37 (4) 56(..) 53(..) 53(..) 51(2) 42(2) 65(12) 57(12) 56.8(6) 62(9) 50(7) 51(7) 45(5) 43(3) 60(6) 40(2) 40(3) 40(3) 40(3) 34(10) 29 (3) 31.3(4) 29 (3) 29 (4) 55(16) 50 (8) 45 (6) 40 (4) 35 (4) 1986 1990 1995 2000 2005 46 34 35 35 35 43 38 38 30 30 56 50 45 40 25 45 42 33 33.33 33.33 36 36 36 37 33 35 34 33 30 30 36 29 29 28 21 30 34 28 28 25 : ( ) (0) . : (2005). 51) . OECD 2000 . 112. 2 95 (tax base) . . . (Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm[2002], Griffith and Klemm[2004]). 1980 , . 1980 1990 . 1980 1990 . 2000 (European Commission[2000]). . , .52) . GDP 1985 10.2% 2005 9.2% ( 2-15). , 1955 3.3% 2005 9.2% . . 196873 14 , OECD 52) . Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote(2005), Freeman and Schettkat(2005) . 113. 96 : , , < 2-15> OECD (: GDP , %) OECD 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2005 1) 6.1 2.7 3.3 0.2 2.0 2.9 6.1 0.7 7.0 2.2 4.6 0.3 1.9 3.8 5.7 0.0 9.4 2.2 6.5 0.4 1.7 4.5 4.7 0.0 10.2 2.6 7.6 0.4 1.6 5.4 4.8 0.1 9.8 2.8 8.9 0.3 1.8 6.2 4.3 0.8 9.2 3.7 9.2 0.3 1.9 6.9 3.9 0.9 4.1 3.8 5.6 0.1 3.5 4.5 4.0 1.2 24.0 25.5 29.5 32.7 34.9 36.2 26.8 : 1) Payroll taxes. : OECD(http://stats.oecd.org). . , OECD 12.5% 2006 17.6% . 1980 1011% . . . 1 . < 2-16> 1970 . 1 1 GDP ( 2-17). 1 1980 ( 2-18). < 2> . 114. 2 97 < 2-16> 1) (: %, %p) 48.4 62.9 74.7 56.3 84.7 57.5 77.4 63.4 - 99.2 91.9 55.7 100.0 68.1 68.9 86.1 55.0 90.3 -10.1 2) -15.4 2) -21.4 3) -33.5 4) -14.7 3) -34.7 4) 0.0 -43.1 2) - -4.6 4) -9.3 2) -6.8 2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 -10.3 5) 0.0 -13.8 4) - - 74.7 64.0 84.7 94.3 80.3 71.6 - 100.0 100.0 66.8 100.0 74.1 68.9 100.0 55.0 92.6 - - -21.4 3) -31.5 4) -14.7 3) -16.0 2) 0.0 -51.3 2) - -3.4 4) -3.7 2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -21.8 4) 48.4 72.7 81.9 56.3 81.6 57.5 55.7 63.4 59.8 47.4 76.0 41.1 74.3 66.8 67.1 59.1 73.5 77.1 -10.1 2) -13.1 2) -24.5 2) -34.9 4) -13.2 3) -25.0 2) 0.0 -39.9 2) -12.8 2) -10.1 4) -28.1 3) -7.2 4) -6.4 2) -23.8 3) -1.0 4) -5.0 5) -10.0 2) -7.3 5) : 1) 1975 , 1995 . 2) 1975, 3) 1980, 4) 1985, 5) 1990. : Korpi and Palme(2003). (2006) . < 2-17> 1 1 GDP (: %) 1 1 GDP (198192) (197889) (197991) (197991) 0.66 0.87 1.63 0.81 1.02 2.11 1.87 1.23 : 40% . : Clayton and Pontusson(1998). (2006) . 115. 98 : , , 1950 1950 (ATP) 1960: : (1962), (1963), 4 1 80% (1967) : 130 150 (1964) (supplement) (1969) 1970: 1970 - ( 63 60 ) (1970), (1972) - 55 150 300 55 450 , (KAS) (1974) - 60 (part-time pension) (1976), 65%(198187 50% ) - 67 65 (1976) < 2-18> 1 (: %) 196080 198093 5.68 2.65 3.08 4.30 0.79 0.53 2.48 2.09 : Clayton and Pontusson(1998). (2006) . < 2> 116. 2 99 - (1974), (1976), (1977) ( ) - 90% . 1980: 1980 - (1980), 3 (1982) (own-account risk) - , (1987), 90% (1989), 5 1990: 1990/91 - 3 65%, 6 80%, 90% (1991), (1992), 1 1 70% (1993) - 1991 , 1997 - 80% 6 (1993 ), - 55% 61 (1994) 1996 75% , 1998 80% : OECD(1999). 117. 100 : , , . (workfare) 10 OECD (activation) (OECD[2006a], chapter 3). (Dingeldey [2005]). , , . , . . , . . , . , . , . . . , . , . , 118. 2 101 . . . EITC(Earned Income Tax Credit) , EITC 1975 1990 (Pearson and Scarpetta[2000]). (1988) (1990 ) , , , , , , . , , (Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez[2005]). . (profiling) , . , . . . , , . , . , . (work-focused interviews) . 119. 102 : , , . . . . . . . NHS(National Health Service) . . ( 2-19). , (multi-pillar system) . . 2001 . (basic support system) . (defined contribution: DC) . , 1998 120. 2 103 1950 ATP(allmntillggspension) DB 1994 1999 DC 2 (pillar) . - 86% (notional individual account) - 14% DC . < 2-19> OECD GDP (: %) GDP GDP GDP 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 4.97 6.50 6.88 7.01 7.33 8.07 8.40 9.50 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 3.54 5.02 5.27 5.14 5.33 5.83 6.05 6.97 71.2 77.2 76.6 73.4 72.7 72.2 72.0 73.4 1.43 1.48 1.61 1.87 2.00 2.24 2.35 2.53 28.8 22.8 23.4 26.6 27.3 27.8 28.0 26.6 : OECD(.http://stats.oecd.org). (defined benefit: DB) (notional defined contribution: NDC) . < 3> . < 3> 121. 104 : , , - , - - , , - - ( 125% ) . 61 . - 1954 193853 ATP . - 2001 18% 2035 20~22% - , - , 10 GDP 1.5% - AP ( GDP 75%) (generational accounting) . - 1990 ( ) : OECD(1999); (2005). 122. 2 105 DC (1982). DC , ( 2-20). . DC (Lindbeck and Persson[2003]). DB , DC . < 2-20> 1980 (1982), (1985), (1988) 1990 , , , 2000 : Palmer(2006). . , . . , . . (voucher). . , . 123. 106 : , , , . (competitive tendering and contracting) . , . . , . (benchmarking) . (market-type mechanism) (Lundsgaard[2002]). . 2 (Blomqvist[2004]). 1932 1976 . .53) , .54) . , 1970 25% 1980 5% . 53) (Henrekson and Jakobsson[2001]). 54) ([2006]). 124. 2 107 1980 0.2% . 1970 . 1980 SAF(Svenska arbetsgivarefreningen, ) . 1980 . , . , (Stephens[1996]). 1980 . (quasi-market) , 1980 . 1991 1994 . . , 198690 . , 199094 . , 1994 ( ) . , .55) < 4> . 55) The Economist(2008. 6. 14) . 125. 108 : , , 1990 (Ln) , / (purchaser/provider split) - , . - 2000 25% , 1993 4.8% 2000 7.2% , 15% - 1990 - 1993 (Primary Doctor Reform) , . - , 2002 - 1980 90% 1990 80% , (1993 97 30% ) - 1990 2 3 2000 11 5 - - < 4> 126. 2 109 - 1988 (kommun) , - 1992 , (The Swedish National Agency for Education) , 1 - - 1991 60 2000 475 , 2002 5%, 6% - , 2030% - , 1990 - (stratification) - , , 1990 / - ( ) 127. 110 : , , - 2002 288 92 - ( , .) - 1990 - 2001 12% 8% . - 1993 2% 2000 13% , - (70%, 1999) - . - - . 1980 - 1984 ( ) 1992 1990 - 1990 - 1990 1999 5% 15% , 1% 47% 128. 2 111 - , . - 1990 10% 2000 18% , . - 1999 - 1999 (parental cooperatives) - , - 1990 - 1999 15 75% . : Blomqvist(2004). 515% . Blomqvist(2004) . . , , . 1990 , . 129. 112 : , , . 1980 90 . Blomqvist(2004) . , . . . (EU) . . . . Pearson and Martin (2005) . , . , . . , , , , (: ) . , . . 130. 2 113 8. . . . . . , . . , , . . . . , . . . . . , , , , 131. 114 : , , . . , , . , , , . 1997 . . , . 5 1. . . . , . . , . (automatic stabilizer) . 132. 2 115 (potential output) (, , ) . ( ) (full-employment output) , . (discretionary fiscal policy) . . , , , . . . . . . . ( 5). < 5> 133. 116 : , , . , (total factor productivity: TFP). TFP , , . (: ) TFP . . TFP . . . 1960 56) . , . 134. 2 117 (structural policy), . 2. , . [ 2-22] 1300 1900 , 1900 600 10 50 50 . , 1900 .57)58) (Briault[1995]). , .59) (risk premium) .60) 56) Arthur M. Okun . 57) [ 2-22] 1300 1500 1500 5 . 58) McKinnon(1993) . 59) IMF(1996), p.121 . 60) 1970 1980 (mortgage) (IMF[1996], p.116). 135. 118 : , , [ 2-22] (1264=100) : Reserve Bank of Australia(1997). . . .61) (0) . , . . .62) 61) Feldstein(1996) 4% 2% GDP 1% . 62) The Economist(1996. 8. 31) Krugman . 136. 2 119 (0) . (0) (0) . 1990 , (Bernanke and Reinhart[2004]). 10 [ 2-23] . , (+) . . . 63) . , , . OECD(2003) (p.82). (The Economist[1996. 9. 7]). , . . (fringe benefit) . 63) 1%p 0.020.08% (IMF[1996], p.120). 137. 120 : , , [ 2-23] OECD : 10 (1970 1980, 19801990, 19902000) . : OECD(2008). .64) 10% 1, 2 70% . , , . . . , . , . 64) The Economist(1995. 5. 13). Shiller(1996) . 138. 2 121 . , . . . Schinasi and Hargraves(1993) 1990 .65) (The Economist[2008. 10. 11]). , 1, 2 (IMF[1996], pp.100104). 1 2 . 1980 2 1980 13.5% 1983 3.2% ( 2-24). 7.2% 9.5% , 1982 GDP 2.1% . . 1, 2 . 1980 , 1985 3% . 65) Schinasi and Hargraves(1993) , 1980 ( ) , 1990 . 139. 122 : , , [ 2-24] : OECD(2008). (inflation targeting) .66) . . < 2-21> 66) . , , . , 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 1%p . 2.5% 2.51% (The Economist[1997. 6. 14, 1997. 7. 19]). 140. 1990 3 (CPI). 1999 . , ,, 19903~5%, 19912.5~4.5%, 19921.5~3.5%, 1993~960~2%, 19970~3% 1990~921, 1993~96, 1997 , ( ) . . , 1991 2 (CoreCPI). 19913~5%, 19922~4%, 199461.5~3.5%, 1995~20011~3% 199122, 1992 (: ,) ,(1 ) 1992 10 (RPIX). 1992~951~4%, 19962.5% 1995, 1996 ., ( ) , (2 ), 1993 1 (CPI)19952%(1%)1995, 1996 .. , :IMF(1996),p.110;MishkinandSchmidt-Hebbel(2001). 141. 124 : , , . . , . (Bernanke and Mishkin[1997]). (Inflation Report) .67) .68) . (Ball and Sheridan[2003], Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel[2001]). ( 2-22). . 67) , (Bank of England) (Inflation Report) . 68) , (Reserve Bank of New Zealand) , (Governor) . 1990 . , (Monetary Policy Committee) , (The Economist[1997. 5. 10]). 142. 2 125 < 2-22> OECD , , , , , , , , , , , , , , OECD , , , , , , , , , : 2006 7 31 . : IMF(2006a). 3. . [ 2-25] 199199 16% 24% 23% 42% . 62% 34% . 2006 .69) [ 2-25] (hard peg) (currency board) . (: , ) (IMF[2006a]). , . . (EMU) , 69) 19 1990 McKinnon(1993) . 143. 126 : , , [ 2-25] : 2006 6 31 . : Fischer(2001); IMF(2006a). (dollarization) . . [ 2-25] (float) . , . , . [ 2-25] (bipolar view) (Obstfeld[1995], Fischer[2001]). (trilemma) (impossible trinity) . , , 144. 2 127 (Obstfeld and Taylor[2003]). , . , . . . . 1970 1990 . ( 2-26). ( 2-27). , GDP 2.5 , 0.7 ( 2-28). , , . . . ( 2-29). . . . . . 145. 128 : , , [ 2-26] : IMF(2005), chapter 3. [ 2-27] ( , %) (1990 , ) : IMF(2005), chapter 3. 146. 2 129 [ 2-28] : IMF(2005), chapter 3. . 1994 12 . 1970 Bretton Woods 1990 ERM(Exchange Rate Mechanism) . : : : : 147. 130 : , , [ 2-29] OECD -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 -10 10 30 50 ( , %) ( , %) (45) : 19602006 . , 19912006, 19672006, 19802006, 1976 2006, 19632006, 19612006, 1989 2006, 19932006, 19862006. : OECD(2008). . , (economic fundamentals) . . . Fischer(2001) . . . 148. 2 131 4. . . , . , (de Long[1996], Schultze[1996], Feldstein[1997], Taylor[2000]). 1970 . . , Friedman(1948) 1940 (long and variable lag) . , , , . . . , . . OECD 1970 1 . , . , (adverse debt dynamics) 149. 132 : , , . 1990 . 1990 , . ( 2-30). GDP 170% . [ 2-30] : OECD, OECD Economic Outlook, . (irreversibility). . . (political constraints) . . 150. 2 133 . (long-run neutrality). , . , (potential output) . . (permanent income hypothesis) (life-cycle hypothesis) (rational expectation) . . , . . , (Alesina and Perotti[1995] ). . 20 Romer(1992) , 1942 , . Bartlett(1993) , . Romer and Romer(1994) , . , . Auerbach(2002) , 151. 134 : , , , . . Fats and Mihov (2003) 91 , . Hemming, Kell, and Mahfouz(2002) (fiscal multiplier)70) . (macroeconomic model) (vector autoregressive model) . 0.61.4 0.30.8 . . . (-) , .71) IMF(2008, Chapter 4) . GDP 0.1 , 3 (-) (p.181, Table 5.4). . 70) GDP 1% GDP . 71) 0.10.9 . (-) . 15 EU (-) , (+) . 152. 2 135 (p.167, Figure 5.1). IMF . . . , (2007) (2007) . (2006) , .72) , . IMF(2008) 0.1 , 1%p GDP 10%(2009 100) . 0.5 GDP 2%( 20), 1.0 1%( 10) . . . , . , . , . .73) , 72) (2006) (2007) . 73) , . 153. 136 : , , (political business cycle) . , (Nordhaus[1975]).74) , Mundell-Fleming (Boughton[2003]) . , , . (crowding-out effect) , . .75) 1980 () , .76) . (Balanced Budget Act) 74) (Gruen[2001]). . , . , . , . 75) (Blinder[1991], pp.219220) . 76) , 1983 . 154. 2 137 , . .77) (automatic stabilization) . . . . . . . , . . 77) . . , . (, ) , . . , , , . . , . , , , . , . 155. 138 : , , , . (monetization) , . (Sargent and Wallace[1981]). 1 (hyper-inflation) , (Sargent[1982]). 2 . . . . , (Ball and Mankiw [1995]). . Y = C + I + G + NX. (1) Y = C + S + T. (2) Y , C , I , G , NX , S , T .78) (1) (2) . 78) Y , C , I , G , NX , S , T , (T-G) . 156. 2 139 S + (T - G) = I + NX. (3) (T-G) (I) (NX) .79) . . , . , . . . . 2001 (Mishkin[2005], p.21). . , , . . 1990 . 79) (T-G) (S) (I) (NX) . (Ricardian equivalence) . , (, ) ([2000a]). , . 157. 140 : , , (fiscal rule) ( 2-23). (structural balance) . . . < 2-23> (EMU) (Stability and Growth Pact) - - GDP 3% , GDP 60% . (golden rule) - (current balance) . (sustainable investment rule) - GDP (stable and prudent) GDP 40% 2% - GDP 2% - : (2004). 158. 2 141 . . , , . , (Code for Fiscal Stability), (Charter of Budget Honesty), (Public Finance Act) . 5. . . . , . , , , , . 159. 2 . , . . . . 1960 . , 1980 . 1990 . . , 2 , , .80) . 80) 4 . 160. 3 143 1 1960 . . ( 3-1). (miracle) . (Aoki, Kim, and Okuno-Fujiwara[1997]). , (market-friendly view) . . . World Bank(1993) .81) , (developmental-state view) , , . (getting the prices wrong, Amsden[1989]) . Wade(1990) . (Perkins[1994]). (laissez-faire) . 81) World Bank(1993) Rodrik(1994) . 161. 144 : , , [ 3-1] (1965~89) 1 GDP (, %) 20% / 20% : World Bank(1993). . . , World Bank(1993) 162. 3 145 . 1960 1970 (financial repression) . , , . , , ( ) . . 2 1960 . 1960 . 1960 1950 . 82) . . 1. , ([2006]). (1931) (1937) 82) (2001), (2005), (2006) . Mason etl. al(1980) 2 3 . 163. 146 : , , . , .83) (pattern of growth) . , , , . , . (strong state) .84) (2005a) , GDP , . , , . . . , , , . . , 1960 83) Haggard, Kang, and Moon(1997) . 84) Kohli(1994, 1997) . 164. 3 147 . . , (1995, p.192) 194560 . . . Woo(1991, p.29) 1960 . 2 , 1/3 . , 1960 . , . (2006) (ideologue) (technocrat) , . . (2006) , , . , 196070 . . , 196070 , , 1951 , . . 165. 148 : , , . , , . ([2006], p.71). . . . 2. (strong state) 500 19 . .85) . . . , , . , , . 85) Kohli(1994) . 166. 3 149 ( [2007], p.39). . 1937 87,552 , (52,770) . 3,000 . . 1941 60,000 , . .86) . . . , . (Mason et. al[1980], p.91). , . , . , . , ([2007], pp.4144). 86) , 1/10 . 167. 150 : , , 3. . .87) . Isabella Bird Bishop . , 19 . (2005) 191040 1 (GDP) 2.4% ,88) (2005) , . , . , . . 1912 4 1940 . 20 . . , . , 1912 3 . 1910 87) (2005) . 88) GDP . (2005b) Kim and Roemer(1979) 1 . 168. 3 151 .89) 1910 8 . 2 1912 8 . 1918 , , . , .90)91) . 4. . 1930 . . 1936 226 . 1937 89) (1997) . 90) . . , . 91) (Kohli[1994], p.12761277). 169. 152 : , , 1938 . 1933 , ([2003], pp.9596). , , , ([2006], pp.221222). 1940 . , . , 1940 . , , , , ( [2003], p.96). . (1937) , , . () . , ([2006], pp.204205). . (, , , , ) 170. 3 153 . . 1930 . . 1910 12% , 1920 14% 1930 10% . . , 1910 90% 50% 1930 40% , ([2005]).92) , . (2003) 1940 (, ), , , , (pp.99107). . . 5. . (Kohli[1994], p.1284). . 92) (1996, p.170, 3) 1930 . 171. 154 : , , , . ([2001], p.295). 30 20 . . . , ([2006], pp.622629). . , , . ([1995], p.526). , . 1920 , , . , . . 172. 3 155 . 3 1950 1945 . , , (hyper-inflation) ( [1995], pp.3031). 1948 (195053) 1953 . . 1. . . ([1997a], p.170). 1947 5 , . . 1948 8 173. 156 : , , 11 , .93) . , 33 . 33 . . . . ( 3-1). . < 3-1> (194658) (: , %) (194648) (194858) 2,716 288,394 3,067 (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 513 839 916 (18.9) (0.3) (29.9) 2,029 259,639 2,106 (74.7) (90.0) (68.7) 174 27,916 45 (6.4) (9.7) (1.5) : (1997a). . 195153 , 1958 . 93) . , 3 . 174. 3 157 , 1950 300 40% . 1948 .94) 1951 50 . 1954 11 , . ([1997a], p.182). 2. . ([2001], p.334). . , , , . 1949 6 1950 2 . 3 4 . . 94) 85: , , , . 87: . 88: . 175. 158 : , , . (1997b) 1.5 . .95) , . . , ( 3 ), . ([2001], p.345). . (state building) . , . , ([2001], p.345). . 95) 1.5 . 5 , . 1955 . . 176. 3 159 , , , ([1997b], p.139). 1960 . . ( ) . . ([1995], p.487). , 1960 . . , ([2001], p.351). 3. . 5(1949), (1951), (1954), 5(1956), 3(1960) 5 . 2 (Yergin and Stanislaw [1998]). (1948) (1955) (1961) . 177. 160 : , , ( 3-2). , . 1949 , 1954 1960 , , , . , . , . , 2 . 1949 , ([2005], pp.358359). < 3-2> 5() 1 (A) 2 3 4 5 (B) B/A() (, ) (, ) , 1,000Kw M/T M/T 1,000M/T 1,000M/T 1,000 1,000M/T 1,000M/T 1,000M/T 239 6,500 3,500 1,500 35 26 400 10.8 20 70 5.4 50 8.6 265 13,800 9,000 2,500 70 70 800 13.3 28 180 20.9 75 11.2 356 25,000 33,000 4,000 100 80 1,200 14.6 39 180 58.9 150 13.5 354 45,000 62,500 6,000 120 100 1,600 21.8 43 180 71.7 200 15.3 374 50,000 88,000 8,000 - - 1,860 52.8 51 180 71.7 300 16.9 1.56 7.69 25.14 5.33 3.43 3.85 4.65 4.89 2.55 2.57 13.28 6.00 1.97 : (2005). 178. 3 161 . . (Woo[1991]). , , . . , .96) . .97) (project assistance) (non-project assistance) . . ,98) 96) (Woo[1991], p.52). 97) 1954 10% , 1957 23%([2005], p.362). . Woo(1991, p.45) 194676 126, 10 20 150 . 1960 1 600 , . 194678 60 69, 149. 195578 90 32. 98) ([2005], p.364). 179. 162 : , , .99) 1950 ICA(International Cooperation Administration) 73%, 27% . . 77% , . . , , ([2005], p.365). 4. 1950 .100) < 3-3> (counterpart fund) . .101) . 1950 , < 3-3> 1.6 3.0 . 99) Mason et. al(1980) 6 Krueger (1979) . 100) Frank, Kim, and Westphal(1975) 3 . 101) , 3 , 3 3 . 3 . . . () ([2007], pp.302303). 180. 3 163 .102) . , ([2005], p.369). < 3-3> (: /) 1951. 11. 10 1953. 12. 15 1955. 1. 10 1955. 8. 15. 1960. 2. 23 (A) 60 180 350 500 650 (B) 182 387 730 802 1,449 B/A() 3.03 2.15 2.09 1.60 2.23 : (2005). . ICA , 60% 40% . . , 100 125, 148 237( [2005], p.370). . , , ( [2001], p.459). 102) , 1955 8 5.5 ( [2005], p.368). 181. 164 : , , . , . , 1954 12 1955 5 40 1956 . . . . 1949 10% ([1988], p.13). 1950 . ([2001], p.459). 1950 27.4 66.5% ([1988], 5). ([2001], pp.453 454). 1948 2 . , . . 1955 1 5 (, , , , ) , 1956 1961 . 1950 . . 182. 3 165 5. Woo(1991) 1950 (financial repression) (p.60). 48120%( [2001], p.463) 150240%(Woo[1991], p.61) 20% . ([1995], p.188). , 1953 10 . , . , . . , , 1953 6 . 1960 6 . , 1954 1 . 1955 7 . 1954 1 100% . . . (1950 50%), (37%). 183. 166 : , , 70% , 10% 40% ( 3-4). 37%(1954) 64%(1960) , , , ([2001], p.463). < 3-4> (: %) 195561 196271 197281 198286 198789 / / 41.8 77.8 26.5 65.0 18.5 45.0 17.8 41.6 15.8 37.5 : 1) . 2) . 3) . : (1993), < 4-2>. (-) . . , . < 3-5> 1957 . 1957 . . 194653 25%, 391% ( 3-6). (Economic Cooperation Administration: ECA) Arthur Bunce 184. 3 167 < 3-5> (A) (B) B/A(%) 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 193 578 1,541 1,844 3,038 5,403 5,474 6,917 8,508 10,447 71 327 997 830 1,302 2,693 1,364 1,050 1,005 2,667 36.7 56.5 64.7 45.0 42.9 49.9 24.9 15.2 11.8 25.5 : (A) (B) . : Woo(1991). < 3-6> (: %) 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 385.4 73.9 62.9 36.7 - - - 25.3 28.2 81.1 31.6 16.2 -6.2 2.6 10.7 280.4 78.9 58.4 24.9 167.5 390.5 86.6 52.5 37.1 68.3 23.0 23.1 -3.5 3.2 8.0 : (2005a). 185. 168 : , , (Woo[1991], p.51). . Arthur Bloomfield Banking Reform in South Korea . Bloomfield 1949 9 5 . , 1950 5 . Bloomfield . . . . , 7 . ([1995], pp.185186). , . () , , . . 4 1954 8 15 . , 5 , 1957 2 . , ([1995], p.190). , 1961 . 186. 3 169 6. 1950 . . . (economic rent) , (1999) 19551960 GNP 1619% . 1115%, 38%. . (2005) ( ) . , 66% 1956 (p.370). (2007) (p.306). .103) 195360 GDP 9.0% 13.8% 47.3% 36.8% ( 3-7). ( 12.7%) (2.3%) . 78.9% 76.6% 21.1% 23.4% ( 3-8). GDP 3.8% . 1960 , 103) 1950 . 187. 170 : , , < 3-7> (: %, ) GDP 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 - 5.6 4.5 -1.3 7.6 5.5 3.9 1.2 - 8.0 1.5 -6.9 9.4 7.3 -0.3 -2.1 - 11.5 19.9 13.6 9.9 9.1 10.0 10.9 - 18.1 21.3 15.2 7.1 10.3 9.2 8.2 - 2.6 5.6 2.3 6.5 3.1 7.8 2.4 47.3 39.8 44.5 46.9 45.2 40.7 33.8 36.8 10.1 12.7 12.6 12.7 12.7 14.4 15.9 15.9 9.0 11.8 11.6 11.6 11.2 12.8 14.1 13.8 42.6 47.5 42.9 40.4 42.1 44.8 50.3 47.3 3.8 2.3 12.1 12.7 4.3 41.9 13.4 12.0 44.7 : (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). < 3-8> (: %, ) 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 - 18.1 21.3 15.2 7.1 10.3 9.2 8.2 - 17.4 23.6 15.6 7.5 7.7 8.9 5.7 - 20.9 12.9 13.5 5.5 21.0 10.2 17.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 78.9 78.4 79.9 80.2 80.5 78.6 78.4 76.6 21.1 21.6 20.1 19.8 19.5 21.4 21.6 23.4 12.7 12.2 14.3 100.0 78.9 21.1 : . : (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). 188. 3 171 . . , . , , , (quota) , , . . Woo(1991) (political capitalists) (pp.6569). , 1 ([2001], p.469). 1950 .104) 1957 . 1950 . (Woo[1991], pp.6972). (Development Loan Fund) . 1957 . (19571960) . 104) (2006) . , (p.267). . . . 189. 172 : , , (M1) . ([1995], p.187). 195758 1959 . 1957 7.6% 1960 1.2% ( 3-7). 1960 419 ([1995], p.38). 1950 . 4 1960~70 1961 . (industrial policy) . , . 1960 1970 . 1. ([1991], pp.175177). . . 1 190. 3 173 5(196266) 2 . 1962 5 . . 1962 Datsun , 1963 9 . TV 1962 7 . . , , (Woo[1991], pp.8182). ([2005], p.394). 1956 1962 3 , 1962 1 6,700 1961 3,900 . 1963 9 1 700 . 1 5 1961 62 2 . , . 1963 1 1 , . . 1963 . 1 5 , 191. 174 : , , . 196465 . ([2005], p.396). 1964 5 130/ 255/ . 1965 3 280/ , 1967 270/ . (crawling peg) 1965 (Kim[1994], p.322; [1995], p.324). [ 3-2] 19702006 100 80120 . [ 3-2] 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 45 48 51 54 57 60 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84 87 90 93 96 99 02 05 (1970~2006 =100) : 1) . 2) , . : OECD(http://stats.oecd.org); (2005a). 192. 3 175 . . (Kim[1994], pp.322324; [1995], pp.324326). () . . . , < 3-9> 196165 4.5% 196672 7.6%, 197381 13.3% . , (196672) 17%p ( [1993], pp.125126). < 3-9> (: %) 1961 65 1966 72 1973 81 1982 86 1987 91 1992 2001 2002 06 / 4.5 7.6 13.3 10.2 3.1 2.0 1.6 (A) (B) (B-A) 9.3 18.2 8.9 6.1 23.2 17.1 9.7 17.3 7.6 10.0 1011.5 01.5 1011 1013 02.0 : (1993), < 4-3>; (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). 193. 176 : , , , (1973 ), , , , . . , (export targeting) . , , , . , . . (KOTRA) , , . , Woo(1991) . 1960 (, ) , , , (takeoff) (p.76). . 1963 3 . 105) , (p.102). (PL480 106) 194. 3 177 [ 3-3] -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 53 56 59 62 65 68 71 74 77 80 83 86 89 92 95 98 01 04 07 (GDP , %) - + : (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). ) , 1964 1965 . 1960 ( 3-3). GDP ( ) 1960 5% 1965 8.6% 1970 13.6%, 1980 32.1% . 107) 1960 20% 1965 24.6%, 1970 37.4%, 105) Edward Shaw, John Gurley, Hugh Patrick, Irma Adelman, Richard A. Musgrave, Peggy Musgrave, Edward Hollader, Edgar McVoy . 106) PL(Public Law) 480 1954 (Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act) . 1955 1 , 1956 , 1981 . 107) . 195. 178 : , , 1980 72.1% . 1 ( 3-10). 1961 10 1 1970 40.8% . 1980 , , . 2007 91.5%, 6.9%, 1 1.5% ([2008]). < 3-10> 10 (: , %) 1961 1970 1980 1990 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 13.0 12.6 6.7 5.8 5.5 4.5 4.2 3.3 3.3 3.0 40.8 11.0 10.8 5.9 3.5 2.3 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.5 PVC 28.6 11.4 10.6 5.2 3.5 3.3 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.9 PVC 27.4 22.6 6.6 6.5 4.3 3.6 3.3 2.7 2.3 2.0 62.0 77.1 71.0 81.3 : (2003). (2005) . . , , 196. 3 179 (OECD[2007b], p.7). . , ([2001], pp.493495). 1960 . . . Kim(1994) (p.326). Mason et. al(1980) (p.135). 2. 1961 5 . 1 5(196266) 34.0% ([1986], pp.777778). 1964 , . 1 5 . 2 5(196771) , , 197. 180 : , , . , , 1969 ([1986], p.786). (1967), (1967), (1967), (1969), (1970), (1971) ([1995], p.49). , . 1969 1970 . 1967 . 1970 , ([1986], p.794). 1973 1 12 . . 80 100 50% . , , . ([2005], p.406). 1 30 6 . 1,000 , 100 1972 198. 3 181 35% 1981 51% , 1972 27% 1981 65% , 6 ( 3-11). 1973 12 1 4 5(197781) 1979 4 . ([1995], p.329). , 1968 197175 108) . , Pueblo EC-121 , (Woo[1991], pp.122 123). , . . (2005) , , (p.404). , . . , , 108) 1968 , Pueblo , 100 1 , 1969 EC-121 , 1970 , 3 ([2006], pp.385386) . 199. 182 : , , (197381, ) () () 1976 409.2M/T 1,502 674 2,176 (24.6) 1981 1,470M/T 10M/T 222 123 345 (3.9) 8M/T 5M/T 10M/T 1981 48 (GNP 13.6%) 1,049 1,137 2,186 (24.7) 1980 545G/T 416 352 768 (8.7) 1985 920G/T 1980 10 1985 29 1981 25 593 599 1,192 (13.5) 1981 125.5/ 1,523 662 2,185 (24.7) ( ) 1981 60M/T 1986 150M/T 1975 - 5,305 (59.9) 3,547 (40.1) 8,852 (100.0) (100.0) < 3-11> 6 : 1) 6 741 6 100 . 2) , 1978 . : (2005), < 13-1>. 200. 3 183 (Kim[1994], pp.347348; [1995], p.330). , . , 1974 . . (1030 %)109) (4050%) , 110) 90% . 197491 74%, 14%, 12% ([1993], pp.162163). , 810 1982111) 5%p . 197491 7.5, 80% , 17% , 3% . 197481 62% , 57% ( 3-12). 1970 70% ([1993], p.128). 1982 . 109) 20%, 30%, 10%. 110) , , , , , , 13 . 111) 1982 . 201. 184 : , , < 3-12> (: %) / / 197481 198291 197491 18.4 14.4 16.2 56.8 37.0 45.8 : . . : (1993), < 4-4>. . . . . 1970 46% ( [1993], p.129). < 3-13> 1973 (=/ ) . , 197381 0.9%p . (risk premium) 2.8%p ([1993], p.131). 1975 . , 202. 3 185 < 3-13> (: %, %p) 1973 81 1982 86 1987 90 1991 95 1996 2000 2001 06 (A) (B) (A-B) 40.7 39.8 0.9 32.2 30.3 1.9 28.2 27.0 1.2 45.2 46.4 -1.2 47.2 47.9 -0.7 27.1 32.7 -5.6 (C) (D) (C-D) 40.9 32.7 8.2 31.6 31.3 0.3 27.0 31.4 -4.4 46.4 42.2 4.2 49.4 40.8 8.5 26.1 32.4 -6.3 (E) (F) (E-F) 12.1 14.9 -2.8 13.5 14.9 -1.4 12.7 13.5 -0.8 11.6 12.8 -1.2 11.3 12.2 -0.9 7.0 7.2 -0.2 (G) (H) (G-H) 13.0 14.9 -1.9 14.0 14.2 -0.2 12.6 14.3 -1.7 11.7 12.7 -1.0 11.5 11.5 0.0 7.1 6.8 0.3 : 1990 1991 . : 1990 (1993), < 4-6>; 1991 (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). [ 3-4] : (1985). (1991) . 203. 186 : , , . 197581 3035%p ( 3-4). (2005) (pp.412418). , . , . 100 . , . . , . , . .112) . 1977, . , . . 80% . 9 . 112) , 1973 . 204. 3 187 . (2003) . (p.184). . , . (pp.175176). . . . < 3-14> 197580 50% , 70% . . < 3-15> 1970 17.8% 1975 21.6% 3.8%p . 1970 2.8%p . 1980 2.9%p . (1986) (p.813). (1991) 1970 , . Lee(1996) (, ) (-) . 205. 188 : , , < 3-14> (: %) 1975 1977 1979 1980 1 1 70.1 67.1 67.1 52.2 62.6 42.0 70.8 74.7 84.7 81.5 80.2 85.0 66.9 71.8 37.6 58.9 94.3 96.5 81.9 81.1 69.6 60.1 69.4 35.3 82.8 84.3 93.2 71.8 74.8 62.0 42.3 58.6 44.0 79.1 52.6 57.2 : (1986). < 3-15> (: %) 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 31.0 29.0 18.1 15.0 9.8 6.9 5.3 3.8 3.4 17.8 21.6 24.4 27.3 27.3 27.6 29.4 28.4 27.9 (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 10.6 10.9 10.2 9.9 7.9 6.5 6.1 4.3 3.9 (59.4) (50.4) (41.9) (36.3) (29.0) (23.4) (20.7) (15.3) (14.1) 7.2 10.7 14.2 17.4 19.4 21.2 23.3 24.0 24.0 (40.6) (49.6) (58.1) (63.7) (71.0) (76.6) (79.3) (84.7) (85.9) 51.2 49.3 57.4 57.7 63.0 65.4 65.3 67.8 68.7 : (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). . , 206. 3 189 ([1986], p.815). , ([2005], p.423). , ( [1995], p.332). ([2005], p.426). ([1995], p.332; [2005]). 1980 3 1970 , . 1970 (2003) , 70 . . (p.184). . , . (counterfactual) . Radelet, Sachs, and Lee(1997) . , . , . 207. 190 : , , , (p.41, ).113) . . . . , . . 3. . < 3-16> 195284 . 1957 39.9% 1968 39.1% . 1962 113) The major point is that while the promotion of heavy industry may have been beneficial in some identifiable cases, it surely was not the common denominator that accounts for the rapid growth across East and Southeast Asia. Instead, the common denominator was manufactured exports, supported by a regime best characterized as free trade for exporters. The varied experiences of the countries of East and Southeast Asia indicate that both an open market and a more interventionist approach that offsets other distortions can be made to work, as long as manufacturers face the acid test of operating on world markets, both for imported inputs and exports. 208. 3 191 < 3-16> (: %) 1957 1962 1968 1973 1977 1979 1984 1) 30.2 39.9 39.1 31.5 29.7 24.8 21.9 2) 35.4 49.5 56.7 48.1 41.3 34.4 26.7 3) 35.4 49.6 58.9 48.2 41.3 34.4 26.7 4) 73.9 66.8 62.9 67.5 70.8 74.4 78.9 : 1) . 2) 1975 . 3) . 4) = 1 / (1 + ). 5) . : (1988), < 1> < 5>. 35.4% 49.5% 14.1%p . 114) 35.4% 49.6% . 1968 1973 1979 34.4% . (quantitative restriction) . . ( ) , . (positive list) 1967 7 (negative list) .115)116) 114) . 1958 1961 ([1988], pp.1415). 115) 1967 4 GATT(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) . 116) 1964 6 1966 1 (2006) . 1964 6 , 209. 192 : , , , . , 1966 9.3% 1967 52.4% ( 3-5). 1968 1977 . 196877 55% . 1960 , 1970 90% ([1986], p.812) . . < 3-17> 1970 75 .117) ([1991], p.70). , . , , , . , , (pp.150 151). . , (pp.153154). . 600 . 66 . 73 , 353 ( [1982], pp.110111). 117) (1991, < 1>) . , < 3-17> 1 . 210. 3 193 [ 3-5] : , , . . : (1988), < 5>; (2001) < -1>. 1967 196070 . , 1970 . 1960 , . 1978.118) 197980 2 , 1984 ([1995], p.71). 118) 1978 ([1986], p.431), (one-state approach) (multi-state approach) ([1988], pp.1011). 211. 194 : , , < 3-17> (: %) 1966 1970 1975 1980 1985 39.59 50.78 53.25 65.59 78.54 1 41.97 56.20 55.14 58.80 71.22 37.52 47.73 52.64 66.81 79.77 33.67 38.20 43.66 62.27 76.80 44.53 62.51 61.23 70.47 81.74 75.26 71.53 76.22 82.06 86.80 1 82.59 81.15 84.03 86.28 87.63 68.90 66.11 73.72 81.30 86.66 62.10 57.71 64.42 74.22 83.26 81.26 79.12 82.62 87.03 88.92 3.89 30.00 30.23 49.09 70.23 1 1.34 31.24 26.23 31.31 54.70 6.11 29.29 31.51 52.27 72.84 5.19 18.63 22.85 50.28 70.32 7.78 45.83 39.79 53.87 74.52 : . : (1988), < 6>, < 7>, < 8>. 4. . 1960 1 . 1962 7 212. 3 195 . 1966 8 3 . , ( [1995], p.199). . 1940 (Woo[1991], pp.8587). 1960 , . 1965 3 2 3 .119) , . 1965 (Woo [1991], p.104). 120) . ([1986], pp.792793). 1970 ([1986], p.567). [ 3-6] 1960 . 1970 119) 20 12.5 . 120) 196768 10% , 1969 14%, 197071 28% (Woo[1991], Table 4.8). 213. 196 : , , [ 3-6] () 0 5 10 15 20 25 53 56 59 62 65 68 71 74 77 80 83 86 89 92 95 98 01 04 07 (GDP , %) : 1) , , 1984, p.245. , , 1976, p.29. 2) (196265) , 30 , 1978, p.97. 3) (19662007), , GDP (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). . 1990 (debt) ( 3-7). (Woo[1991], p.100) , . . . [ 3-7] 1990 GDP 15% . (liability) .121) 1962 GDP 4% 121) (liability) (debt) , . 214. 3 197 [ 3-7] 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 (GDP , %) : 1) 1962 (1993), < 4-14> . 19631969 Woo(1991), Total Foreign Debt. 196269 . . 2) 1970 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti(2006). 1970 40% , 1980 50% . 1980 3 1990 20% . (debt) , M2 1962 25% 1970 150% ( 3-8). 1980 3 2030% . [ 3-7] 197080 . 197084 15 GDP 4.8% ( 3-9). . 215. 198 : , , [ 3-8] M2 0 50 100 150 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 /M2 / (%) : . : 1) . 2) M2 (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). [ 3-9] -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 53 56 59 62 65 68 71 74 77 80 83 86 89 92 95 98 01 04 07 (%) : , GDP . : (2005a); (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). 216. 3 199 . [ 3-10] 1960 100% 1960 1970 300400% . 100% . [ 3-10] 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 (%) : (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). . 197090 ( 3-10). ( 3-11).122) , 1960 . 1970 , ([1986], p.600). 122) . 217. 200 : , , [ 3-11] -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 (%) : (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). ( [1986], p.783). . 1800 , . 197080 , . 5. . , ( [1995], p.199). . 218. 3 201 , 1950 ( [1986], p.127). . 1950 . (1961. 6. 20), (10. 29) 4 . ([1995], p.194). . 1962 5 24 ([1995], p.195). , . , 2/3 . 1 ( ) , ([1986], p.127). (1962. 5. 24, 1969. 1. 28) . . , ([1995], p.196). . (1954) (196