Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 145867               April 7, 2009

ESTATE OF SOLEDAD MANANTAN, herein represented by GILBERT MANANTAN, Petitioner, vs.ANICETO SOMERA, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse the Decision2 dated 10 May 2000 and Resolution3 dated 18 October 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55891.

The facts gathered from the records are as follows:

On 10 March 1998, Soledad Manantan filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City, Branch 1, a Complaint for ejectment and damages against respondent Aniceto Somera and a certain Presentacion Tavera (Tavera),4 docketed as Civil Case No. 10467.

Manantan alleged in her Complaint that she was the owner of a 214- square meter parcel of land located in Fairview Subdivision, Baguio City (subject property), as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54672, issued in her name by the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City. After causing a relocation survey of the subject property, she discovered that respondent and Tavera occupied certain portions thereof [disputed portions]. Manantan advised respondent and Tavera to vacate the disputed portions as soon as she would decide to sell the subject property to an interested buyer. Later, a prospective buyer approached Manantan about the subject property. However, upon learning that respondent and Tavera occupied some portions of the subject property, the prospective buyer decided not to proceed with the sale until after respondent and Tavera vacated the same. Manantan repeatedly requested respondent and Tavera to abandon the disputed portions of the subject property, but the two refused. Hence, Manantan hired the services of a lawyer who immediately sent a formal letter of demand to respondent and Tavera requesting them to leave the disputed portions. Respondent and Tavera, however, ignored the demand letter. Manantan submitted the matter before the barangay justice system of Fairview Subdivision, Baguio City, but the parties failed to reach a settlement. Upon issuance by the barangay secretary of a Certificate to File Action, Manantan instituted Civil Case No. 10467.

In her Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467, Manantan prayed that respondent, Tavera, and all persons claiming rights under them, be ordered to vacate the portions of the subject property they were occupying; that respondent and Tavera be directed to pay her P600.00 and P400.00, respectively, every month, as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the disputed portions of the subject property, computed from the filing of the Complaint until possession of the said portions has been restored to her; that respondent and Tavera be instructed to pay her P30,000.00 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.5

Respondent and Tavera filed a Joint Answer to Manantan’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467. In their Joint Answer, respondent and Tavera averred that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 10467, because it was neither an action for forcible entry nor for unlawful detainer. The Complaint did not allege that Manantan was deprived of possession of the disputed portions by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, which would make a case for forcible entry. It also did not state that respondent and Tavera withheld possession of the disputed portions from Manantan after expiration or termination of the right to hold possession of the same by virtue of an express or implied contract, which would build a case for unlawful detainer. Respondent and Tavera argued that even if there was dispossession, it was evident from the face of the Complaint that it was not committed through any of the means enumerated under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and, thus, forcible entry or unlawful detainer could not be the proper remedy for Manantan.6

Respondent claimed in the Joint Answer that he and his family had been using one of the disputed portions of the subject property as driveway since the latter part of 1970. The said portion was the only means by which he and his family could gain access to their residence. He even caused the improvement and cementing of the same a long time ago. Tavera also explained in the Joint Answer that she had been utilizing the other disputed portion of the subject property as an access road to her residence. Her tenement, which consisted of concrete and permanent structures, bore witness to the fact that her occupancy of the portion in dispute was continuous and uninterrupted.7

Respondent and Tavera additionally asseverated in their Joint Answer that it would be unjust to prohibit them from using the disputed portions which serve as their only means of ingress or egress to or from their respective residences from or to the main road. Their use of said portions had been recognized by the Bayot family, Manantan’s predecessors-in-interest. It was only in 1997, after Manantan bought the subject property from the Bayot family, that Manantan started to claim ownership even of the portions they had been using. Respondent and Tavera contended that they could not just relinquish their right to the disputed portions and yield to Manantan’s demand, considering that the latter’s claim was based merely on a relocation survey. "[J]ust to buy peace of mind and maintain cordial relations" with Mananatan, respondent and Tavera alleged that they "walked the proverbial mile and show[ed] their interest to pay" Manantan the equivalent amount of the disputed portions, but Manantan ignored their proposal and insisted that they buy the whole of the subject property.

Respondent and Tavera alternatively argued in their Joint Answer that in case Manantan would be declared as the lawful owner of the subject property, the MTCC should not disregard the fact that they were "builders in good faith." As builders in good faith, they should be allowed to pay a reasonable price for the portions of the subject property on which their driveway/access road, and other improvements were situated.

At the end of their Joint Answer, respondent and Tavera asked the MTCC to dismiss Manantan’s Complaint; or in case their driveway/access road and other improvements were found to be encroaching on Manantan’s property, to declare them builders in good faith who should be allowed to purchase the portions on which their driveway/access road and other improvements were located and to award them their counterclaims for moral damages and P35,000.00 attorney’s fees.8

After submission of the parties’ respective position papers and other pleadings, the MTCC rendered a Decision9 in Civil Case No. 10467 on 21 May 1999, favoring Manantan. The MTCC ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case and that respondent and Tavera were not builders in good faith. It ordered respondent and Tavera to pay Manantan the amount of P600.00 and P400.00, respectively, per month, as reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the disputed portions of the subject property, counted from the date of the filing of the Complaint up to the time respondent and

Tavera would actually vacate the same. It further ordered respondent and Tavera to jointly and severally pay Manantan the amount of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

Respondent and Tavera appealed the MTCC Decision before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, Branch 5. Their appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. 4435-R. On 29 October 1999, the RTC promulgated its Decision10 affirming in toto the appealed MTCC Decision. Only respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals since Tavera opted not to appeal anymore.

Respondent’s appeal before the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55891. During its pendency, Manantan died on 20 January 2000.11 Almost four months later, on 10 May 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision setting aside the Decisions of both the RTC and the MTCC and dismissing Manantan’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467. The appellate court held that Manantan’s Complaint before the MTCC failed to allege facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer. The allegations in the Complaint merely presented a controversy arising from a boundary dispute, in which case, the appropriate remedy available to Manantan should have been the plenary action for recovery of possession within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Consequently, the Court of Appeals concluded that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467.12

The fallo of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing disquisition, the petition for review is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. The assailed Decision dated October 29, 1999 which was rendered by Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, in Civil Case No. 4435-R, affirming in toto the other assailed Decision dated May 21, 1999 rendered by the First Branch of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Baguio City in Civil Case No. 10467, entitled "SOLEDAD MANANTAN v. ANICETO SOMERA and PRESENTACION TAVERA, and all persons claiming rights under them," are hereby both REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING said Civil Case No. 10467.

Accordingly, let a writ of injunction issue permanently enjoining public respondent Judge Antonio M. Esteves and all persons acting in his behalf or orders to cease and desist from further enforcing the assailed decisions.

Manantan’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 of the afore-mentioned Decision of the Court of Appeals but it was denied by the same court in the Resolution dated 18 October 2000.

Hence, herein petitioner, Gilbert Manantan, representing the Estate of the late Soledad Manantan, filed the instant Petition for Review14 before us raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BAGUIO CITY, BRANCH 1, HAD THE JURISDICTION OVER THE ACTION - EJECTMENT AND DAMAGES ENTITLED "SOLEDAD MANANTAN, PLAINTIFF, V. ANICETA SOMERA AND PRESENTACION TAVERA, AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, DEFENDANTS;

II.

WHETHER A PORTION OF PETITIONER’S LAND ENCROACHED BY RESPONDENT CAN BE RECOVERED THROUGH AN ACTION [FOR] EJECTMENT.

In the main, petitioner argues that the Complaint is in the nature of an action for unlawful detainer over which the MTCC had jurisdiction.15

An action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is governed by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which provides:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. (Emphasis ours.)

Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property.16 This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.17

In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them. However, defendant’s possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under their contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand.18

A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted before the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court within one year from unlawful withholding of possession. Such one year period should be counted from the date of plaintiff’s last demand on defendant to vacate the real property, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.19

Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the action, are determined by the allegations in the complaint.20 To vest the court with the jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant from the land in an action for unlawful detainer, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts clearly showing attributes of unlawful detainer cases, as this proceeding is summary in nature.21 The complaint must show on its face enough ground to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.22

Thus, in order that a municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court may acquire jurisdiction in an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the complaint specifically allege the facts constitutive of unlawful detainer.23 The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of unlawful detainer, an action for unlawful detainer is not a proper remedy and, thus, the municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court has no jurisdiction over the case.24

The pertinent allegations in Manantan’s Complaint before the MTCC are faithfully reproduced below:

3. That [Manantan] is the owner in fee simple of that parcel of land, situated in Res. Section "K," Baguio City, with an area of 214 square meters, designated as Lot 7, Pcs-CAR-000062, and which may be more particularly described in and evidenced

by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-54672 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Baguio;

4. That when she caused the relocation survey of her said property above-mentioned, she discovered that the [herein respondent and Tavera] had occupied portions thereof, by reason of which she called their attention with a request that they vacate their respective areas as soon as she would have need of the same, or when she decides to sell the same to any interested buyer;

5. That only recently, she wanted to sell her property above-mentioned to an interested buyer, but that upon knowing of the [respondent and Tavera’s] encroachments, the prospective buyer decided not to proceed with the sale until after the property shall have been first vacated by the [respondent and Tavera];

6. That she asked the [respondent and Tavera] to vacate her property, but that they refused to do so, and that after making more demands which were all ignored by the [respondent and Tavera], [Manantan] was forced to consult her lawyer, who immediately wrote them a final formal demand to vacate her land, but to no avail;

7. That [Manantan] also brought her problem to the attention of the Barangay Captain of Fairview Subdivision Barangay, by way of a letter, dated January 21 1998, copy of which is attached hereto and made part hereof as Annex "A," the same being self-explanatory;

8. That despite efforts at the Barangay level of justice, no amicable settlement or compromise agreement was arrived at, as may be evidenced by a Certification to File Action, dated February 8, 1998, signed and issued by the Pangkat Secretary Shirley Pagkangan and duly attested by the Pangkat Chairman Rogelio Laygo, copy of which is hereto attached and made part hereof as Annex "B."25

Noticeably, the Complaint does not allege facts showing compliance with the prescribed one year period to file an action for unlawful detainer. It does not state the material dates that would have established that it was filed within one year from the date of Manantan’s last demand upon respondent to vacate the disputed portion of land. Such allegations are jurisdictional and crucial, because if the complaint was filed beyond the prescribed one year period, then it cannot properly qualify as an action for unlawful detainer over which the MTCC can exercise jurisdiction. It may be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession, which should be brought before the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one year has lapsed since defendant unlawfully withheld possession from plaintiff, the action will not be for illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. Accion reivindicatoria, meanwhile, is an action to recover ownership, as well as possession, which should also be brought before the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.26

Further, it appears from the allegations in the Complaint that the respondent was already in possession of the disputed portion at the time Manantan bought the subject property from the Bayot family, and it was only after the conduct of a relocation survey, which supposedly showed that respondent was encroaching on the subject property, did Manantan begin asserting her claim of ownership over the portion occupied and used by respondent. Clearly, respondent’s possession of

the disputed portion was not pursuant to any contract, express or implied, with Manantan, and, resultantly, respondent’s right of possession over the disputed portion is not subject to expiration or termination. At no point can it be said that respondent’s possession of the disputed portion ceased to be legal and became an unlawful withholding of the property from Manantan.27

1avvphi1

Since the Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467 failed to satisfy on its face the jurisdictional requirements for an action for unlawful detainer, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the said Complaint and should have dismissed the same. There is no possible argument around the lack of jurisdiction of MTCC over Civil Case No. 10467. In Laresma v. Abellana,28 the Court pronounced:

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio. A decision of the court without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it could never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally.

Petitioner raises a second issue before us: whether petitioner Estate of the late Soledad Manantan can recover the portion of the subject property by an action for ejectment.29 It bears to stress that Manantan’s Complaint is dismissed herein for its defects, i.e., its failure to allege vital facts in an action for unlawful detainer over which the MTCC has jurisdiction. Since Civil Case No. 10467 is already dismissible upon this ground, it is no longer necessary to discuss whether petitioner availed itself of the proper remedy to recover the disputed portion of land from respondent. Resolving the second issue shall be a mere surplusage and obiter dictum. If petitioner seeks an answer to said issue as reference for its future action, suffice it to say that we do not render advisory opinions. The determination of the remedy to avail itself of must be done by petitioner with the guidance of its counsel, they being fully cognizant of the facts giving rise to the controversy and the evidence on hand.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 10 May 2000 and Resolution dated 18 October 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55891 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No cost.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate Justice

Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES*

Associate JusticeANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate JusticeChairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

Footnotes

* Per Special Order No. 602, dated 20 March 2009, signed by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, designating Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales to replace Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, who is on official leave.

1 Rollo, pp. 10-25.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate Justices Romeo J. Callejo Sr. (retired member of this Court) and Renato C. Dacudao, concurring; rollo, pp. 29-33.

3 Id. at 27.

4 Id. at 48-51.

5 Id.

6 Id. at 52-56.

7 Id.

8 Id.

9 Records, pp. 127-131.

10 Id. at 190-196.

11 Rollo, p. 10.

12 Id. at 33.

13 CA rollo, pp. 219-226.

14 Rollo, p. 14.

15 Id. at 14-18.

16 Valdez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132424, 4 May 2006, 489 SCRA 369, 377-378.

17 Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.

18 Valdez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 16 at 378; Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116192, 16 November 1995, 250 SCRA 108, 114; Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 669, 674-675 (1999).

19 Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, id. at 115; Lopez v. David, Jr., G.R. No. 152145, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA 535, 542; Varona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124148, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 577, 583-584.

20 Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, id. at 114; Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, supra note 18 at 675; Lopez v. David, Jr., id. at 540.

21 Valdez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 16 at 378; Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, id. at 116; Lopez v. David, Jr., id. at 542.

22 Id.

23 Sarona v. Villegas, 131 Phil. 365, 373 (1968); Munoz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102693, 23 September 1992, 214 SCRA 216, 223-224.

24 Valdez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 16 at 379; Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, supra note 18 at 117.

25 Records, pp. 1-2.

26 Valdez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 16 at 376-377; Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, supra note 18 at 117; Lopez v. David, Jr., supra note 19 at 543.

27 Dela Paz v. Panis, 315 Phil. 238, 245-246 (1995).

28 G.R. No. 140973, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 156, 169.

29 The two forms of ejectment suit are actions for forcible entry and actions for unlawful detainer. (See Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., G.R. No. 155110, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 653, 670-671.)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 137013.  May 6, 2005]

RUBEN SANTOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES TONY AYON and MERCY AYON, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated October 5, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 4735 and its Resolution [2]

dated December 11, 1998 denying the motion for reconsideration.

The petition alleges that on November 6, 1996, Ruben Santos, petitioner, filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao City a complaint for illegal detainer against spouses Tony and Mercy Ayon, respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 3506-B-96.

In his complaint, petitioner averred that he is the registered owner of three lots situated at Lanzona Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 108174, 108175, and 108176.  Respondent spouses are the registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-247792.  The previous occupant of this property built a building which straddled both the lots of the herein parties.  Respondents have been using the building as a warehouse.

Petitioner further alleged in his complaint that in 1985, when he bought the three lots, he informed respondents that the building occupies a portion of his land.  However, he allowed them to continue using the building.  But in 1996, he needed the entire portion of his lot, hence, he demanded that respondents demolish and remove the part of the building encroaching his property and turn over to him their possession.  But they refused.  Instead, they continued occupying the contested portion and even made improvements on the building.  The dispute was then referred to the barangay lupon, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.  Accordingly, on March 27, 1996, a certification to file action was issued.

In their answer, respondents sought a dismissal of this case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over it since there is no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties.  Respondents denied they were occupying petitioner’s property by mere tolerance, claiming they own the contested portion and have been occupying the same long before petitioner acquired his lots in 1985.

On July 31, 1997, the MTCC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioner, thus:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter, their successors-in-interest and other persons acting in their behalf to vacate the portion of the subject properties and peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiff as well as dismantle/remove the structures found thereon.

Defendants are further ordered to pay reasonable value for the use and occupation of the encroached area in the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) a month beginning September 1996 and the subsequent months thereafter until premises are vacated; to pay attorney’s fees of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00); and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.”[3]

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Davao City, in its Decision dated February 12, 1998 in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97, affirmed in toto the MTCC judgment.[4] The RTC upheld the finding of the MTCC that respondents’ occupation of the contested portion was by mere tolerance.  Hence, when petitioner needed the same, he has the right to eject them through court action.

Respondents then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review.  In its Decision dated October 5, 1988 now being challenged by petitioner, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner’s proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana before the RTC, not an action for unlawful detainer, thus:

“In this case, petitioners were already in possession of the premises in question at the time private respondent bought three (3) lots at the Lanzona Subdivision in 1985, a portion of which is occupied by a building being used by the former as a bodega.  Apart from private respondent’s bare claim, no evidence was alluded to show that petitioners’ possession was tolerated by (his) predecessor-in-interest.  The fact that respondent might have tolerated petitioners’ possession is not decisive.  What matters for purposes of determining the proper cause of action is the nature of petitioners’ possession from its inception.  And in this regard, the Court notes that the complaint itself merely alleges that defendants-petitioners have been ‘occupying a portion of the above properties of the plaintiff for the past several years by virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff.’ Nowhere is it alleged that his predecessor likewise tolerated petitioners’ possession of the premises. x x x.

Consequently, x x x, respondent should present his claim before the Regional Trial Court in an accion publiciana and not before the Municipal Trial Court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  Accordingly, the complaint for unlawful detainer is ordered DISMISSED.”[5]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated December 11, 1998.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following errors:

“I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASE ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER SHOULD PRESENT HIS CLAIM BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN AN ACCION PUBLICIANA.

II

THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.”

The sole issue here is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in holding that petitioner’s complaint is within the competence of the RTC, not the MTCC.

Petitioner contends that it is not necessary that he has prior physical possession of the questioned property before he could file an action for unlawful detainer.  He stresses that he tolerated respondents’ occupancy of the portion in controversy until he needed it.  After his demand that they vacate, their continued possession became illegal.  Hence, his action for unlawful detainer before the MTCC is proper.

Respondents, in their comment, insisted that they have been in possession of the disputed property even before petitioner purchased the same on April 10, 1985.  Hence, he cannot claim that they were occupying the property by mere tolerance because they were ahead in time in physical possession.

We sustain the petition.

It is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. [6] This rule is no different in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. [7] All actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed with the proper Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, which actions shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising therefrom.[8] The said courts are not divested of jurisdiction over such cases even if the defendants therein raises the question of ownership over the litigated property in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.[9]

Section 1, Rule 70 on forcible entry and unlawful detainer of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, reads:

“Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.”

Under the above provision, there are two entirely distinct and different causes of action, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for

unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of possession from defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.[10]

Petitioner’s complaint for unlawful detainer in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96 is properly within the competence of the MTCC.  His pertinent allegations in the complaint read:

“4.     That defendants (spouses) have constructed an extension of their residential house as well as other structures and have been occupying a portion of the above PROPERTIES of the plaintiff for the past several years by virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff since at the time he has no need of the property;

5.       That plaintiff needed the property in the early part of 1996 and made demands to the defendants to vacate and turn over the premises as well as the removal (of) their structures found inside the PROPERTIES of plaintiff; that without any justifiable reasons, defendants refused to vacate the portion of the PROPERTIES occupied by them to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.

6.       Hence, plaintiff referred the matter to the Office of the Barangay Captain of Matina Crossing 74-A, Davao City for a possible settlement sometime in the latter part of February 1996.  The barangay case reached the Pangkat but no settlement was had.  Thereafter, a ‘Certification To File Action’ dated March 27, 1996 was issued x x x;

x x x.”[11] (underscoring ours)

Verily, petitioner’s allegations in his complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful detainer.  We find no error in the MTCC assuming jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint.  A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.[12] Here, there is an allegation in petitioner’s complaint that respondents occupancy on the portion of his property is by virtue of his tolerance.  Petitioner’s cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from respondents’ failure to vacate the questioned premises upon his demand sometime in 1996.  Within one (1) year therefrom, or on November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint.

It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner.  Our ruling in Roxas vs. Court of Appeals[13] is applicable in this case: “A person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.”

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47435 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The Decision dated February 12, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97, affirming the Decision dated July 31, 1997 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Davao City in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96, is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 55-59.  Penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero, retired, and concurred in by Associate Justice Arturo B. Buena, now retired Justice of this Court, and Associate Justice Eubolo G. Verzola (deceased).

[2] Rollo at 60.

[3] Id. at 50.

[4] Id. at 53.

[5] Rollo at 59.

[6] Rozas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138955, October 29, 2002, 391 SCRA 351, citing Vda. de Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 197 (1999).

[7] Lavido vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123462, April 10, 1997, 271 SCRA 143.

[8] Progressive Development Corp., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123555, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 637.

[9] Hilario vs. Court of Appeakls, 260 SCRA 420 (1996); Caniza vs Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 640 (1997); Heirs of Placido Miranda vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 368 (1996).

[10] Dikit vs. Ycasiano, 89 Phil. 44, 48 (1951); Medel vs. Militante, 41 Phil. 526, 530 (1921).

[11] Rollo at 80.

[12] Jimenez vs. Patricia, Inc., G.R. No. 134651, September 18, 2000, 340 SCRA 525; Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108817, May 10, 1994, 232 SCRA 372; Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136.

[13] Supra; Jimenez vs. Patricia, Inc., id.; Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 464, 469 (1990); Dacudao vs. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877, 883 (1983); Vda. de Catchuela vs. Francisco, 98 SCRA 172, 177 (1980); Calubayan vs. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146, 148 (1967); Munoz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102693, September 23, 1992, 214 SCRA 216.

PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE – FULL TEXT The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation G.R. No. 155713             May 5, 2006 MILAGROS G. LUMBUAN VS. ALFREDO A. RONQUILLO

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 155713             May 5, 2006

MILAGROS G. LUMBUAN,* Petitioner, vs.ALFREDO A. RONQUILLO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated April 12, 2002, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52436 and its Resolution2 dated October 14, 2002, denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The salient facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,3 are as follows:

Petitioner Milagros G. Lumbuan is the registered owner of Lot 19-A, Block 2844 with Transfer Certificate of Title No. 193264, located in Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila. On February 20, 1995, she leased it to respondent Alfredo A. Ronquillo for a period of three years with a monthly rental of P5,000. The parties also agreed that there will be a 10% annual increase in rent for the succeeding two years, i.e., 1996 and 1997,4 and the leased premises will be used exclusively for the respondent’s fastfood business, unless any other use is given, with the petitioner’s prior written consent.5

While the respondent at the start operated a fastfood business, he later used the premises as residence without the petitioner’s prior written consent. He also failed to pay the 10% annual increase in rent of P500/month starting 1996 and P1,000/month in 1997 to the present. Despite repeated verbal and written demands, the respondent refused to pay the arrears and vacate the leased premises.

On November 15, 1997, the petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay Chairman’s office but the parties failed to arrive at a settlement. The Barangay Chairman then issued a Certificate to File Action.6

On December 8, 1997, the petitioner filed against the respondent an action for Unlawful Detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 157922-CV. It was raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 6. On December 15, 1997, the respondent received the summons and copy of the complaint. On December 24, 1997, he filed his Answer by mail. Before the MeTC could receive the respondent’s Answer, the petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dated January 7, 1998.7 Acting upon this motion, the MeTC rendered a decision8 on January 15, 1998, ordering the respondent to vacate and surrender possession of the leased premises; to pay the petitioner the amount of P46,000 as unpaid rentals with legal interest until fully paid; and to pay the petitioner P5,000 as attorney’s

fees plus cost of the suit.

The respondent then filed a Manifestation calling the attention of the MeTC to the fact that his Answer was filed on time and praying that the decision be set aside. The MeTC denied the prayer, ruling that the Manifestation was in the nature of a motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading under the Rules on Summary Procedure.

Upon appeal, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, and docketed as Civil Case No. 98-87311. On July 8, 1998, the RTC rendered its decision9 setting aside the MeTC decision. The RTC directed the parties to go back to the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for further proceedings and to comply strictly with the condition that should the parties fail to reach an amicable settlement, the entire records of the case will be remanded to MeTC of Manila, Branch 6, for it to decide the case anew.

The respondent sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the motion in an Order dated March 15, 1999. Thus, he sought relief from the Court of Appeals through a petition for review.10 On April 12, 2002, the appellate court promulgated a decision, reversing the decision of the RTC and ordering the dismissal of the ejectment case. The appellate court ruled that when a complaint is prematurely instituted, as when the mandatory mediation and conciliation in the barangay level had not been complied with, the court should dismiss the case and not just remand the records to the court of origin so that the parties may go through the prerequisite proceedings.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate court. Hence, this present petition.

In the meantime, while this petition was pending before this Court, the parties went through barangay conciliation proceedings as directed by the RTC of Manila, Branch 38. Again, they failed to arrive at an amicable settlement prompting the RTC to issue an Order11 remanding the case to the MeTC of Manila, Branch 6, where the proceedings took place anew. On April 25, 2000, the MeTC rendered a second decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment on the merits is hereby rendered for the plaintiff as follows:

1. Ordering defendant and all persons claiming right of possession under him to voluntarily vacate the property located at Lot 19-A Block 2844, Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff;

2. Ordering defendant to pay to plaintiff the amount of P387,512.00 as actual damages in the form of unpaid rentals and its agreed increase up to January 2000 and to pay the amount of P6,500.00 a month thereafter until the same is actually vacated;

3. Ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees plus cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED.12

The respondent appealed the foregoing decision. 1avvphil.net The case was raffled to RTC of Manila, Branch 22, and docketed as Civil Case No. 00-98173. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner and dismissed the appeal. The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, where it is now pending.

The sole issue for our resolution is:

[WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR THE ALLEGED FAILURE OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IN THE BARANGAY LEVEL.13

With the parties’ subsequent meeting with the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for further conciliation proceedings, the procedural defect was cured. Nevertheless, if only to clear any lingering doubt why the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint, we shall delve on the issue.

The petitioner alleges that the parties have gone through barangay conciliation proceedings to settle their dispute as shown by the Certificate to File Action issued by the Lupon/Pangkat Secretary and attested by the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman. The respondent, on the other hand, contends that whether there was defective compliance or no compliance at all with the required conciliation, the case should have been dismissed.

The primordial objective of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules,14 is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To attain this objective, Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 716015 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a precondition to filing a complaint in court,16 thus:

SECTION 412. Conciliation. – (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. – No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman….

Here, the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman and Lupon/Pangkat Secretary signed the Certificate to File Action stating that no settlement was reached by the parties. While admittedly no pangkat was constituted, it was not denied that the parties met at the office of the Barangay Chairman for possible settlement. The efforts of the Barangay Chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was reached. Although no pangkat was formed, in our mind, there was substantial compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that under the aforequoted provision, the confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court.17 This is true notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410(b) of the same law that the Barangay Chairman shall constitute a pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts. Section 410(b) should be construed together with Section 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in

and peculiar to the case. On this score, it is significant that the Barangay Chairman or Punong Barangay is herself the Chairman of the Lupon under the Local Government Code.18

Finally, this Court is aware that the resolution of the substantial issues in this case is pending with the Court of Appeals. While ordinarily, we would have determined the validity of the parties’ substantial claims since to await the appellate court’s decision will only frustrate speedy justice and, in any event, would be a futile exercise, as in all probability the case would end up with this Court, we find that we cannot do so in the instant case.

It must be underscored that supervening events have taken place before the lower courts where the parties have been adequately heard, and all the issues have been ventilated. Since the records of those proceedings are with the Court of Appeals, it is in a better position to fully adjudicate the rights of the parties. To rely on the records before this Court would prevent us from rendering a sound judgment in this case. Thus, we are left with no alternative but to leave the matter of ruling on the merits to the appellate court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52436 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, in Civil Case No. 98-87311 is AFFIRMED.

The Court of Appeals is ordered to proceed with the appeal in CA – G.R. No. 73453 and decide the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAsscociate Justice

DANTE O. TINGAAssociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGAssociate JusticeChairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBANChief Justice

Footnotes

* Also referred to as "Lambuan" in some parts of the records.

1 Rollo, pp. 54-58. Penned by Associate Justice Hilarion L. Aquino, with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz, and Amelita G. Tolentino concurring.

2 Id. at 60.

3 With editorial changes.

4 Rollo, pp. 35-36.

5 Id. at 36.

6 Id. at 38.

7 Id. at 87.

8 CA rollo, pp. 30-32.

9 Id. at 22-28.

10 Id. at 8-21.

11 Id. at 50.

12 Id. at 78.

13 Rollo, p. 118.

14 Codified in Sections 399 to 422, Chapter 7, Title One, Book III and Section 515, Title One, Book IV of Republic Act No. 7160, shall be known as the Pambarangay Law and these implementing rules and regulations shall be known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules.

15 Otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

16 Zamora v. Heirs of Carmen Izquierdo, G.R. No. 146195, November 18, 2004, 443 SCRA 24, 31.

17 Diu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115213, December 19, 1995, 251 SCRA 472, 479-480.

18 Id.; SECTION 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa. – (a) There is hereby created in each barangay a lupong tagapamayapa, hereinafter referred to as the lupon, composed of the punong barangay as chairman….

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION 

 ESTELA L. BERBA, G.R. No. 160032

Petitioner,Present:

' PUNO, J., Chairman,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

- versus - CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and

CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.  JOSEPHINE PABLO and THE Promulgated:HEIRS OF CARLOS PALANCA,

Respondents.November 11, 2005x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x D E C I S I O N  

CALLEJO, SR., J.:  

Assailed before the Court on a petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] of

the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73531, affirming the Decision[2] of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 170639.

 Estela L. Berba, a resident of 978 Maligaya Street, Malate, Manila, was the owner of

a parcel of land located at No. 2338 M. Roxas Street, Sta. Ana, Manila covered by

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 63726. A house was constructed on the lot,

which she leased to Josephine Pablo* and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca sometime in

1976. The lease was covered by a lease contract. Upon its expiration, the lessees

continued leasing the house on a month-to-month basis.

 By 1999, the monthly rental on the property was P3,450.00. The lessees failed to

pay the rentals due, and by May 1999, their arrears amounted to P81,818.00. Berba

then filed a complaint for eviction and collection of unpaid rentals only against

Pablo in the Office of the Punong Barangay. On June 5, 1999, Berba and Pablo

executed an Agreement approved by the pangkat, as follows:

 Ako si Josephine Pablo, naninirahan sa 2338 M. Roxas St., Sta. Ana, Manila, na nasasakop ng Barangay 873, Zone 96, ay nangangako kay GG Robert Berba na nagmamay-ari ng aking tinitirahan ay maghuhulog ng halagang Tatlong Libong Piso P3,000.00 kada ika-sampu ng buwan bilang hulog sa aking pagkakautang kay GG Berba na umaabot sa halagang P81,818.00 na ang nasabing halagang ito ay aking huhulugan hanggang aking mabayaran ng buo ang aking pagkakautang. Ako rin, si Josephine Pablo, ay nangangako na ang hindi ko pagsunod o pagbayad ng buwanang hulog, ako ay kusang aalis sa aking tinitirahan. Bukod pa sa hulog sa aking pagkakautang, ako rin ay magbabayad ng halagang P3,450.00 bilang aking upa sa aking tinitirahan.[3]

 

By May 2000, Pablo and the lessees still had a balance of P71,716.00. As of May 1,

2001, the total arrearages of the lessees amounted to P135,115.63.[4] On May 2,

2001, Berba, through counsel, wrote the lessees, demanding payment of the said

amount and to vacate the house within 30 days from notice, otherwise she will sue

them.[5] The lessees ignored the demand. On June 21, 2001, Berba filed a

complaint[6] against Josephine Pablo and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca in the

Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila for unlawful detainer. She prayed that, after

due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed for that judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff ordering defendant (sic) ' 

a) to vacate the premises situated at 2338 M. Roxas Street, Sta. Ana, City of Manila;

b) to pay plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand One Hundred Fifteen and 63/100 Pesos (P135,115.63) representing monthly rentals in arrears to the present;

c) to pay plaintiff the amount of Four Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-Two and 63/100 Pesos (P4,562.63) per month representing monthly rent on the premises for the year 2001 until finality of the judgment;

d) to pay plaintiff the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) by way of attorney's fees;

e) to reimburse plaintiff all expenses for litigation estimated in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos;

f) to pay costs of suit. Other reliefs just and equitable are, likewise, prayed for under the premises.[7] 

 Berba, however, failed to append to her complaint a certification from the Lupon ng

Tagapamayapa that no conciliation or settlement had been reached.

 In their answer to the complaint, the defendants admitted to have stopped paying

rentals because of financial distress. They also alleged that they were not certain if

the plaintiff was the owner of the property. By way of special and affirmative

defenses, they averred that the plaintiff had no cause of action against them as she

failed to secure a Certificate to File Action from the Lupon.[8]

 

During the pre-trial conference, the parties manifested to the court that, despite

earnest efforts, no amicable settlement was reached. They defined the main issue

as whether or not the plaintiff had a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer

against the defendants.[9]

 

In her position paper, Berba appended an Agreement dated June 5, 1999 between

her and Pablo, which appeared to have been approved by Punong Barangay

Cayetano L. Gonzales of Barangay 873, as well as other members of the Lupon,[10]

duly approved by the Pangkat. She also appended a Statement of Account

indicating that the defendants' back rentals amounted to P135,115.63.[11]

 

In their position paper, the defendants insisted that the dispute did not go through

the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa prior to the filing of the complaint; hence, Berba's

complaint was premature. They also averred that the increase in the rental rates

imposed by the plaintiff was unjustified and illegal.

 

In her reply, the plaintiff alleged that there was no more need for her to secure a

Certificate to File Action because she was a resident of No. 978 Maligaya Street,

Malate, Manila, while the defendants were residing in Barangay '873, Zone 6 in Sta.

Ana, Manila.

 On March 14, 2002, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of Berba. The fallo of the

decision reads:

 

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the premises at 2338 M. Roxas St., Sta. Ana, Manila and restore possession thereof to the plaintiff. Ordering the defendant to pay the amount of P135,115.63 representing monthly rentals since 1999 until December 2000. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P4,562.63 per month beginning January 2001 and for the succeeding

months until finally vacated. Ordering the defendant to pay the reduced amount of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees plus the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.[12]

 

The defendants appealed the decision to the RTC. On motion of the plaintiff, the

RTC issued an order for the execution of the decision pending appeal.[13] The

defendants filed a motion for the recall of the Order,[14] but before the court could

resolve the motion, the Sheriff turned over the physical possession of the property

to Berba on May 20, 2002.[15]

 In their Appeal Memorandum, Pablo and the heirs of Palanca insisted that Berba's

action in the MTC was premature because of the absence of Certificate to File

Action issued by the Lupon. They also claimed that Berba unlawfully increased the

rentals for the house.[16] Berba, on the other hand, averred that there was no need

of a prior referral to the Lupon before filing her complaint. The petitioner cited

Section 408(f) of the Local Government Code, pointing out that she resided in a

Barangay in Malate, 8 kilometers away from Barangay 873 in Sta. Ana, where Pablo

and the Palanca heirs resided.[17]

 

On August 20, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting the appeal and setting

aside the appealed decision. The fallo of the decision reads:

 

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court a quo is ordered set aside. The complaint is also ordered DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Writ of Execution issued by the Court a quo pending appeal is also set aside. SO ORDERED.[18]

 

The RTC ruled that under Section 408 of the Local Government Code, parties who

reside in the same city or municipality although in different barangays are

mandated to go through conciliation proceedings in the Lupon.[19] The court cited

the rulings of this Court in Morata v. Go,[20] and Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy.[21]

 Berba filed a motion for the reconsideration[22] of the decision, which the RTC

denied in its Order[23] dated October 2, 2002. She then elevated the case to the CA

via petition for review, where she averred:

 a) The raising of other affirmative defenses apart from the non-referral

to the Barangay Court by the respondents constitute a waiver of such requirement; and

 b) There was substantial compliance on the part of the petitioner with

respect to referring her complaint before the Barangay Court.[24] 

Citing the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of Appeals,[25] Berba claimed that

Section 408 of the Local Government Code should be construed liberally together

with Section 412. She further averred that she had complied substantially with the

requisites of the law, and recalls that conciliation proceedings before the Lupon

resulted in the execution of an Agreement on June 5, 1999. Upon failure to comply

with the agreement, all chances of amicable settlement were effectively foreclosed.

Hence, Pablo and the Heirs of Palanca were estopped from claiming that she failed

to comply with the Local Government Code's requirement of prior referral of their

dispute to the Lupon.

 After due proceedings, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and

affirming the RTC decision. Berba moved for a reconsideration of the decision,

which proved futile.

 In the instant petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner alleges that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN

THE CASE OF DIU VS. COURT OF APPEALS (251 SCRA 478) AND IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF PD 1508 (NOW R.A. 7160) WITH RESPECT TO PRIOR REFERRAL TO THE BARANGAY COURT, THEREBY DECIDING THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE COURT.[26]

The petitioner avers that she is a sickly widow, in the twilight of her years, and

whose only source of income are the rentals generated from the property, which

she also uses to pay her medical expenses. She avers that the continued denial of

her right to the fruits of the subject property is highly unjust and contrary to the

spirit behind the enactment of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1508.[27]

 The petitioner also points out that, for her to pay obeisance to the decision of the

CA, she would have to go through the tedious, not to mention horrendous, process

of going back to square one; that is, referring the dispute to the barangay which, in

all likelihood, would be rendered useless considering that respondents had already

been validly and effectively ejected from the leased premises. She would then have

to go through the rungs of the judicial ladder a second time to vindicate her

trampled rights. She further claims that the CA's affirmation of the RTC decision is

equivalent to sanctioning a 'legal anomaly. She points out that the very purpose of

barangay conciliation is to abbreviate disputes between members of the same or

adjacent barangays to the end that their disputes will not reach the doors of the

courts. Clearly, it does not contemplate a protracted process as suggested by the

RTC ruling and affirmed by the CA.[28]

 In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petitioner was

estopped from relying on the June 5, 1999 Agreement between her and respondent

Josephine Pablo before the Lupon because the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca

were not parties thereto. The respondents maintained that the petitioner must bear

the blame for her failure to comply with the Local Government Code. At first, she

insisted that there was no need for prior referral of the dispute to the Lupon,

claiming that she resided in a barangay other than where the respondents resided.

Thereafter, she made a volte face and invoked the June 5, 1999 Agreement

between her and respondent Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the respondents aver, the

MTC had no jurisdiction over the petitioner's action for unlawful detainer because it

was filed only on June 21, 2001, or more than one year from June 5, 1999 when the

petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed the agreement. As such, the

action should be one for recovery of possession of property (accion publiciana).

 On June 2, 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required

the parties to file their respective memoranda.[29] The parties complied.

 The Court rules that the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the decision of the RTC

reversing the decision of the MTC and ordering the dismissal of the complaint for

unlawful detainer without prejudice.

 The records show that petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed an

Agreement on June 5, 1999, which was approved by the Lupon. Respondent

Josephine Pablo did not repudiate the agreement; hence, such agreement of the

parties settling the case had the force and effect of a final judgment. As the Court

declared in Vidal v. Escueta,[30] the settlement of the parties may be enforced by

the Lupon, through the punong barangay, within

six months; and if the settlement is not enforced after the lapse of said period, it

may be enforced by an action in the proper city or municipal court, as provided in

Section 417 of the Local Government Code:

 

We also agree that the Secretary of the Lupon is mandated to transmit the settlement to the appropriate city or municipal court within the time frame under Section 418 of the LGC and to furnish the parties and the Lupon Chairman with copies thereof. The amicable settlement which is not repudiated within the period therefor may be enforced by execution by the Lupon through the Punong Barangay within a time line of six months, and if the settlement is not so enforced by the Lupon after the lapse of said period, it may be enforced only by an action in the proper city or municipal court as provided for in Section 417 of the LGC of 1991, as amended, which reads: 

SEC. 417. Execution. ' The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the proper city or municipal court. (Italics supplied).

 Section 417 of the Local Government Code provides a mechanism for the enforcement of a settlement of the parties before the Lupon. It provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement executed by the parties before the Lupon, namely, (a) by execution of the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party/parties entitled thereto; and (b) by an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial. Under the first remedy, the proceedings are covered by the LGC and the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Punong Barangay is called upon during the hearing to determine solely the fact of non-compliance of the terms of the settlement and to give the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily complying with his obligation under the settlement. Under the second remedy, the proceedings are governed by the Rules of Court, as amended. The cause of action is the amicable settlement itself, which, by operation of law, has the force and effect of a final judgment. Section 417 of the LGC grants a period of six months to enforce the amicable settlement by the Lupon through the Punong Barangay before such party may resort to filing an action with the MTC to enforce the settlement. The raison detre of the law is to afford the parties during the six-month time line, a simple, speedy and less expensive enforcement of their settlement before the Lupon.[31]  

In the present case, respondent Josephine Pablo failed to comply with her obligation

of repaying the back rentals of P81,818.00 and the current rentals for the house.

Hence, the petitioner had the right to enforce the Agreement against her and move

for her eviction from the premises. However, instead of filing a motion before the

Lupon for the enforcement of the agreement, or (after six months), an action in the

Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) for the enforcement of the settlement, the petitioner

filed an action against respondent Josephine Pablo for unlawful detainer and the

collection of unpaid rentals, inclusive of those already due before the June 5, 1999

Agreement was executed. The action of the petitioner against respondent Pablo was

barred by the Agreement of June 5, 1999.

 The Court notes that the petitioner even submitted with the MTC a copy of her June

5, 1999 Agreement with respondent Josephine Pablo. Instead of dismissing the

complaint as against such respondent, the MTC rendered judgment against her and

ordered her eviction from the leased premises.

The Court thus rules that the petitioner's complaint against respondent Heirs of

Carlos Palanca was premature. It bears stressing that they were not impleaded by

the petitioner as parties-respondents before the Lupon. The petitioner filed her

complaint solely against respondent Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the said respondent

heirs were not privy to the said agreement, and, as such, were not bound by it.

Section 412 of the Local Government Code, sets forth the precondition to filing of

complaints in court, to wit:

 

SEC. 412 Conciliation.- (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. ' No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached

as' certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.  (b) Where parties may go directly to court. ' The parties may go directly to court in the following instances: (1) Where the accused is under detention; (2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings; (3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property, and support pendente lite; and (4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. (c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities. ' The customs and traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members of the cultural communities.

  

Under Sec. 408 of the same Code, parties actually residing in the same city or

municipality are bound to submit their disputes to the Lupon for

conciliation/amicable settlement, unless otherwise provided therein:

 

SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. ' The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: (a)    Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; (b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;  (c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);  (d) Offenses where there is no private offended party; (e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

 (f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; (g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.  

If the complainant/plaintiff fails to comply with the requirements of the Local

Government Code, such complaint filed with the court may be dismissed for failure

to exhaust all administrative remedies.[32]

The petitioner's reliance on the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of Appeals[33] is

misplaced. In that case, there was a confrontation by the parties before the

Barangay Chairman and no agreement was reached. Although no pangkat was

formed, the Court held in that instance that there was substantial compliance with

the law. In any event, the issue in that case was whether the failure to specifically

allege that there was no compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure

constitutes a waiver of that defense. Moreover, no such confrontation before the

Lupon occurred with respect to the unlawful detainer suit against Josephine Pablo

before the MTC.[34]

 In this case, the petitioner and the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca resided in the

City of Manila, albeit in different barangays. The dispute between the petitioner and

the respondent heirs was thus a matter within the authority of the Lupon. Hence,

the petitioner's complaint for unlawful detainer and the collection of back rentals

should have been first filed before

the Lupon for mandatory conciliation, to afford the parties an opportunity to settle

the case amicably. However, the petitioner filed her complaint against the

respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca directly with the MTC. Clearly then, her

complaint was premature. The execution of the June 5, 1999 Agreement between

petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo does not amount to substantial

compliance to the requirements of the Local Government Code on mandatory

barangay conciliation proceedings.

 Indeed, considering that the MTC had already rendered a decision on the merits of

the case, it is not without reluctance that the Court reaches this conclusion which

would require the petitioner to start again from the beginning. The facts of the

present case, however, do not leave us any choice. To grant the petition under

these circumstances would amount to refusal to give effect to the Local

Government Code and to wiping it off the statute books insofar as ejectment and

other cases governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure are concerned. This Court

has no authority to do that.[35]

 IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED.

 SO ORDERED.

 ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice WE CONCUR:  REYNATO S. PUNOAssociate JusticeChairman  

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ DANTE O. TINGAAssociate Justice Associate Justice   On leaveMINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

  A T T E S T A T I O N  I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.   REYNATO S. PUNO' Associate JusticeChairman, Second Division     C E R T I F I C A T I O N   Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.    HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.Chief Justice

Endnotes: * On leave.cralaw

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Mariano C. del Castillo, concurring; Rollo, pp. 29-35.cralaw

[2] Penned by Judge Reynaldo G. Ros; Id. at 144-146.cralaw

* Also 'Josie Pablo.cralaw

[3] Rollo, p. 78.cralaw

[4] Id. at 80.cralaw

[5] Id. at 79.cralaw

[6] Rollo, pp. 52-57.cralaw

[7] Id. at 53-54.cralaw

[8] Rollo, pp. 59-63.cralaw

[9] Id. at 65.cralaw

[10] The other signatories include Jose Pedrero, Antonio Lim, Reynaldo Chavez and Edgardo Calma.cralaw

[11] Rollo, pp. 67-84.cralaw

[12] Rollo, p. 103.cralaw

[13] Id. at 115-116.cralaw

[14] CA Rollo, p. 106.cralaw

[15] Rollo, p. 117.cralaw

[16] Id. at 118-129.cralaw

[17] Rollo, pp. 130-143.cralaw

[18] Id. at 146.cralaw

[19] Id. at 144-146.cralaw

[20] G.R. No. L-62339, 27 October 1983, 125 SCRA 444. cralaw

[21] G.R. No. L-63277. 29 November 1983, 126 SCRA 217.cralaw

[22] Rollo, pp. 147-154.cralaw

[23] Id. at 159.cralaw

[24] Id. at 40.cralaw

[25] G.R. No. 115213, 19 December 1995, 251 SCRA 472.cralaw

[26] Rollo, p. 13.cralaw

[27] Rollo, p. 18.cralaw

[28] Id. at 19.cralaw

[29] Rollo, pp. 235-236.cralaw

[30] G.R. No. 156228, 10 December 2003, 417 SCRA 617.cralaw

[31] Vidal v. Escueta, supra, at 628-630.cralaw

[32] Garces v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-76836, 23 June 1988, 162 SCRA 504.cralaw

[33] Supra.cralaw

[34] Supra.cralaw

[35] Garces v. Court of Appeals, supra.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ANITA MONASTERIO-PE and

the

SPOUSES ROMULO TAN and

EDITHA PE-TAN,

G.R. No. 151369

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

Petitioners,

- versus -

JOSE JUAN TONG, herein

represented by his

Attorney-in-Fact, JOSE Y.

ONG,

Respondent.

NACHURA,

BRION,*

PERALTA, and

ABAD, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 23, 2011

x - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

seeking the reversal and nullification of the Decision1 and Order,2 respectively dated

October 24, 2001 and January 18, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City,

Branch 24.

The instant petition stemmed from an action for ejectment filed by herein respondent

Jose Juan Tong (Tong) through his representative Jose Y. Ong (Ong) against herein

petitioners Anita Monasterio-Pe (Anita) and the spouses Romulo Tan and Editha Pe-Tan

(Spouses Tan). The suit was filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch

3, Iloilo City and docketed as Civil Case No. 2000(92).

In the Complaint, it was alleged that Tong is the registered owner of two parcels of land

known as Lot Nos. 40 and 41 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-

9699 and T-9161, together with the improvements thereon, located at Barangay

Kauswagan, City Proper, Iloilo City; herein petitioners are occupying the house standing

on the said parcels of land without any contract of lease nor are they paying any kind of

rental and that their occupation thereof is simply by mere tolerance of Tong; that in a

letter dated December 1, 1999, Tong demanded that respondents vacate the house

they are occupying, but despite their receipt of the said letter they failed and refused to

vacate the same; Tong referred his complaint to the Lupon of Barangay Kauswagan, to

no avail.3

In their Answer with Defenses and Counterclaim, herein petitioners alleged that Tong is

not the real owner of the disputed property, but is only a dummy of a certain alien

named Ong Se Fu, who is not qualified to own the said lot and, as such, Tong's

ownership is null and void; petitioners are the true and lawful owners of the property in

question and by reason thereof they need not lease nor pay rentals to anybody; a case

docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52676 (RTC Civil Case No. 20181) involving herein

petitioner Pe and respondent is pending before the Court of Appeals (CA) where the

ownership of the subject property is being litigated; respondent should wait for the

resolution of the said action instead of filing the ejectment case; petitioners also

claimed that there was, in fact, no proper barangay conciliation as Tong was bent on

filing the ejectment case before conciliation proceedings could be validly made.4

On March 19, 2001, the MTCC rendered judgment in favor of herein respondent, the

dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, finding the defendants Anita Monasterio-Pe, and

Spouses Romulo Tan and Editha Pe-Tan to be unlawfully withholding the property in

litigation, i.e., Lot. Nos. 40 and 41 covered by TCT Nos. T-9699 and 9161, respectively,

together with the buildings thereon, located at Brgy. Kauswagan, Iloilo City Proper, and

they are hereby ordered together with their families and privies, to vacate the premises

and deliver possession to the plaintiff and/or his representative.

The defendants are likewise ordered to pay plaintiff reasonable compensation for the

use and occupancy of the premises in the amount of P15,000.00 per month starting

January, 2000 until they actually vacate and deliver possession to the plaintiff and

attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.

Costs against the defendants.

SO DECIDED.5

Aggrieved by the above-quoted judgment, petitioners appealed the decision of the

MTCC with the RTC of Iloilo City.

In its presently assailed Decision, the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 24 affirmed in its entirety

the appealed decision of the MTCC.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

At the outset, it bears emphasis that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed

upon by this Court.6 It is a settled rule that in the exercise of this Court's power of

review, it does not inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence presented, consistent

with the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.7 In the instant case, a perusal of the

errors assigned by petitioners would readily show that they are raising factual issues

the resolution of which requires the examination of evidence. Certainly, issues which

are being raised in the present petition, such as the questions of whether the issue of

physical possession is already included as one of the issues in a case earlier filed by

petitioner Anita and her husband, as well as whether respondent complied with the law

and rules on barangay conciliation, are factual in nature.

Moreover, the appeal under Rule 45 of the said Rules contemplates that the RTC

rendered the judgment, final order or resolution acting in its original jurisdiction.8 In the

present case, the assailed Decision and Order of the RTC were issued in the exercise of

its appellate jurisdiction.

Thus, petitioners pursued the wrong mode of appeal when they filed the present

petition for review on certiorari with this Court. Instead, they should have filed a petition

for review with the CA pursuant to the provisions of Section 1,9 Rule 42 of the Rules of

Court.

On the foregoing bases alone, the instant petition should be denied.

In any case, the instant petition would still be denied for lack of merit, as discussed

below.

In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that the RTC erred in holding that the

law authorizes an attorney-in-fact to execute the required certificate against forum

shopping in behalf of his or her principal. Petitioners argue that Tong himself, as the

principal, and not Ong, should have executed the certificate against forum shopping.

The Court is not persuaded.

It is true that the first paragraph of Section 5,10 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, requires

that the certification should be signed by the “petitioner or principal party” himself. The

rationale behind this is because only the petitioner himself has actual knowledge of

whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or

agencies.11 However, the rationale does not apply where, as in this case, it is the

attorney-in-fact who instituted the action.12 Such circumstance constitutes reasonable

cause to allow the attorney-in-fact to personally sign the Certificate of Non-Forum

Shopping. Indeed, the settled rule is that the execution of the certification against forum

shopping by the attorney-in-fact is not a violation of the requirement that the parties

must personally sign the same.13 The attorney-in-fact, who has authority to file, and who

actually filed the complaint as the representative of the plaintiff, is a party to the

ejectment suit.14 In fact, Section 1,15 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court includes the

representative of the owner in an ejectment suit as one of the parties authorized to

institute the proceedings. In the present case, there is no dispute that Ong is

respondent's attorney-in-fact. Hence, the Court finds that there has been substantial

compliance with the rules proscribing forum shopping.

Petitioners also aver that the certificate against forum shopping attached to the

complaint in Civil Case No. 2000(92) falsely stated that there is no other case pending

before any other tribunal involving the same issues as those raised therein, because at

the time the said complaint was filed, Civil Case No. 20181 was, in fact, still pending

with the CA (CA-G.R. CV No. 52676), where the very same issues of ejectment and

physical possession were already included.

Corollarily, petitioners claim that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No.

2000(92) on the ground that the issue of physical possession raised therein was already

included by agreement of the parties in Civil Case No. 20181. As such, petitioners assert

that respondent is barred from filing the ejectment case, because in doing so he splits

his cause of action and indirectly engages in forum shopping.

The Court does not agree.

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the disputed properties, along with three

other parcels of land, had been the subject of two earlier cases filed by herein petitioner

Anita and her husband Francisco against herein respondent and some other persons.

The first case is for specific performance and/or rescission of contract and reconveyance

of property with damages. It was filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo

City and docketed as Civil Case No. 10853. The case was dismissed by the CFI. On

appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) upheld the decision of the trial court.

When the case was brought to this Court,16 the decision of the IAC was affirmed.

Subsequently, the Court's judgment in this case became final and executory per Entry

of Judgment issued on May 27, 1991.

Subsequently, in 1992, the Spouses Pe filed a case for nullification of contract,

cancellation of titles, reconveyance and damages with the RTC of Iloilo City. This is the

case presently cited by petitioners. Eventually, the case, docketed as Civil Case No.

20181, was dismissed by the lower court on the ground of res judicata. The RTC held

that Civil Case No. 10853 serves as a bar to the filing of Civil Case No. 20181, because

both cases involve the same parties, the same subject matter and the same cause of

action. On appeal, the CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 20181. Herein

petitioner Anita assailed the judgment of the CA before this Court, but her petition for

review on certiorari was denied via a Resolution17 dated January 22, 2003. On June 25,

2003, the said Resolution became final and executory. The Court notes that the case

was disposed with finality without any showing that the issue of ejectment was ever

raised. Hence, respondent is not barred from filing the instant action for ejectment.

In any case, it can be inferred from the judgments of this Court in the two

aforementioned cases that respondent, as owner of the subject lots, is entitled to the

possession thereof. Settled is the rule that the right of possession is a necessary

incident of ownership.18 Petitioners, on the other hand, are consequently barred from

claiming that they have the right to possess the disputed parcels of land, because their

alleged right is predicated solely on their claim of ownership, which is already

effectively debunked by the decisions of this Court affirming the validity of the deeds of

sale transferring ownership of the subject properties to respondent.

Petitioners also contend that respondent should have filed an accion publiciana and not

an unlawful detainer case, because the one-year period to file a case for unlawful

detainer has already lapsed.

The Court does not agree.

Sections 1 and 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provide:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings and when. – Subject to the provisions of the

next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by

force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other

person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after

the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,

express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,

vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful

deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial

Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession,

or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,

together with damages and costs.

Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. – Unless otherwise

stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or

comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by

serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by

posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails

to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the

case of buildings.

Respondent alleged in his complaint that petitioners occupied the subject property by

his mere tolerance. While tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes illegal upon

demand to vacate by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with

such demand.19 Respondent sent petitioners a demand letter dated December 1, 1999

to vacate the subject property, but petitioners did not comply with the demand. A

person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without

any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will

vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper

remedy against him.20 Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the one-year

period within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted

from the date of demand, because only upon the lapse of that period does the

possession become unlawful.21 Respondent filed the ejectment case against petitioners

on March 29, 2000, which was less than a year from December 1, 1999, the date of

formal demand. Hence, it is clear that the action was filed within the one-year period

prescribed for filing an ejectment or unlawful detainer case.

Neither is the Court persuaded by petitioners' argument that respondent has no cause

of action to recover physical possession of the subject properties on the basis of a

contract of sale because the thing sold was never delivered to the latter.

It has been established that petitioners validly executed a deed of sale covering the

subject parcels of land in favor of respondent after the latter paid the outstanding

account of the former with the Philippine Veterans Bank.

Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides that when the sale is made through a public

instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which

is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot

clearly be inferred. In the instant case, petitioners failed to present any evidence to

show that they had no intention of delivering the subject lots to respondent when they

executed the said deed of sale. Hence, petitioners' execution of the deed of sale is

tantamount to a delivery of the subject lots to respondent. The fact that petitioners

remained in possession of the disputed properties does not prove that there was no

delivery, because as found by the lower courts, such possession is only by respondent's

mere tolerance.

Lastly, the Court does not agree with petitioners' assertion that the filing of the unlawful

detainer case was premature, because respondent failed to comply with the provisions

of the law on barangay conciliation. As held by the RTC, Barangay Kauswagan City

Proper, through its Pangkat Secretary and Chairman, issued not one but two certificates

to file action after herein petitioners and respondent failed to arrive at an amicable

settlement. The Court finds no error in the pronouncement of both the MTCC and the

RTC that any error in the previous conciliation proceedings leading to the issuance of

the first certificate to file action, which was alleged to be defective, has already been

cured by the MTCC's act of referring back the case to the Pangkat Tagapagkasundo of

Barangay Kauswagan for proper conciliation and mediation proceedings. These

subsequent proceedings led to the issuance anew of a certificate to file action.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Order of the

Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 24, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B.

NACHURA

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation

before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Second Division, Chairperson

1.     CERTIFICATION

1.     Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer

of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

1.

1.

1.

1.

1.

3.     RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza,

per Special Order No. 975, dated March 21, 2011.

1Penned by Judge Danilo P. Galvez; rollo, pp. 85-92.

2Rollo, pp. 93-95.

3Id. at 59-62.

4Id. at 64-70.

5Id. at 83-84.

6Federico Jarantilla, Jr. v. Antonieta Jarantilla, Buenaventura Remotigue, substituted by

Cynthia Remotigue, Doroteo Jarantilla and Tomas Jarantilla, G.R. No. 154486, December

1, 2010.

7Emcor Incorporated v. Sienes, G.R. No. 152101, September 8, 2009, 598 SCRA 617,

632.

8Sevilleno v. Carilo, G.R. No. 146454, September 14, 2007, 533 SCRA 385, 388, citing

Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 602

(1998); see Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Sixth Revised Edition, p. 540.

9Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. – A party desiring to appeal from a decision of

the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a

verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the

clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the

amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse

party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served with fifteen (15)

days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's

motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper

motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the

deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals

may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition

for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason

and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

10Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall

certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for

relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a)

that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same

issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,

no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending

action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should

thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he

shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid

complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

11Wee v. De Castro, G.R. No. 176405, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 695, 712, citing

Mendoza v. Coronel, 482 SCRA 353, 359 (2006).

12Id.

13Id.

14Id.

15Sec. 1. Who may institute proceedings and when. – Subject to the provisions of the

next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by

force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other

person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after

the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,

express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,

vendee, or other person, may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful

deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial

Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession,

or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,

together with damages and costs.

16See Pe v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74781, March 13, 1991, 195 SCRA

137.

17Per G.R. No. 155908.

18Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. D.M. Consortium, Inc., G.R. No. 147594, March 7,

2007, 517 SCRA 632, 640.

19Canlas v. Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, September 25, 2009, 601 SCRA 147, 159.

20Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E. Concepcion, G.R. No. 160239, November 25,

2009, 605 SCRA 315, 329.

21Id.

No unlawful withholding

A LAW EACH DAY (Keeps Trouble Away) By Jose C. Sison (The Philippine Star) Updated May 06, 2009

12:00 AM Comments (0)

Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This action may

be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or any person against whom the possession of any land or

building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by

virtue of any contract, express or implied. It may be filed in the proper Municipal Trial Court (MTC)

within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. To vest the MTC with

jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of the occupant of the land in an action for unlawful detainer, the

complaint should embody such allegations clearly showing facts constitutive of unlawful detainer as

this proceeding is summary in nature. When the complaint fails to aver such facts, an action for

unlawful detainer is not a proper remedy and thus the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case. This case

is an example of such complaint where the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction.

The case was filed by Marisa who was the owner of a 214 square meter parcel of land covered by TCT

No. 54672 against Cito and Precy who occupied certain portions of said property as driveway to gain

access to their residence. Marisa filed the complaint for ejectment before the MTC on March 10, 1998.

In her complaint, Marisa alleged that: when she bought the said property, she caused a relocation

survey thereof and discovered that Cito and Precy had occupied portions thereof by reason of which

she called their attention with a request that they vacate their respective areas as soon as she would

have need of the same or when she decides to sell it; that only recently, she wanted to sell her

property to an interested buyer but that upon knowing of the encroachments by Cito and Precy, the

buyer decided not to proceed with the sale until after the property shall have first been vacated; that

she asked Cito and Precy to vacate the property but they refused to do so; that after making more

demands which were all ignored, she was forced to consult a lawyer who immediately wrote them a

final formal demand to vacate but to no avail; that she also brought her problem to the attention of the

Barangay Captain on January 21, 1998 but no settlement was reached for which reason the Barangay

already issued a certification to file action on February 8, 1998.

In their answer Cito and Precy alleged that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case because it was

neither an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. It did not allege that Marisa was deprived of

possession of the disputed portion by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It also did not

state that they withheld possession of the disputed portions from Marisa after expiration or termination

of the right to hold possession of the same by virtue of an express or implied contract. Were they

correct?

Yes. Noticeably, the complaint does not allege facts showing compliance with the prescribed period of

one year to file an action for unlawful detainer. It does not state the material dates that would have

established that it was filed within one year from the date of Marisa’s last demand upon Cito and Precy

to vacate the disputed portions of land. Such allegations are jurisdictional and crucial because if

complaint was filed beyond the one year period from last demand to vacate, then it cannot properly

qualify as an action for unlawful detainer over which the MTC can exercise jurisdiction. It may already

be an accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria.

Further, it appears from the allegations of the complaint that Cito and Precy were already in

possession of the disputed portion at the time Marisa bought the subject property, and it was only

after the conduct of a relocation survey when Marisa began asserting her claim of ownership over the

said portion because the survey showed that they were encroaching on the subject property. Clearly

the possession of Cito and Precy over the disputed portion was not pursuant to any express or implied

contract with Marisa. Resultantly, their right of possession over the disputed portion is not subject to

expiration or termination. At no point can it be said that Cito and Precy’s possession of the disputed

portion ceased to be legal and became unlawful withholding of the property from Marisa (Estate of

Manantan etc. vs. Somera, G.R. 145867, April 7, 2009). 

Note: Books containing compilation of my articles on Labor Law and Criminal Law (Vols. I and II) are

now available. Call tel. 7249445.

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E-mail at: jcson@pldtdsl.net