FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014

CARMENCITA SUAREZ, Petitioner, v. MR. AND MRS. FELIX E. EMBOY, JR. AND MARILOU P. EMBOY–DELANTAR, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, J.:

For review in the instant Petition1 is the Decision2 rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution3 issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. SP No. 03489.  The CA granted the Petition for Review4 filed by Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy, Jr. (Felix) and Marilou Emboy–Delantar (Marilou) (respondents), seeking to reverse the decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12,5 and Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch  3,6  of  Cebu  City,  rendered  on  February  26,  2008  in  Civil  Case  No.  CEB–33328,7  and  on  September  25,  2006  in  Civil  Case  No. R–49832, respectively.  The RTC affirmed the MTCC in upholding the claims of Carmencita Suarez (Carmencita) in her complaint for unlawful detainer instituted against the respondents.

Antecedents

At the center of the dispute is a 222–square meter parcel of land, designated  as  Lot  No.  1907–A–2  (subject lot)  of  the  subdivision  plan Psd–165686, situated in Barangay Duljo, Cebu City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T–174880 issued in the name of Carmencita on February 9, 2005.  The subject lot used to be a part of Lot No. 1907–A,8 which was partitioned in the following manner among the heirs of Spouses Carlos Padilla (Carlos) and Asuncion Pacres (Asuncion):9

Lot No. TCT No. Heirs1907–A–1 T–54359 Spouses Rogelio and Praxedes Padilla1907–A–2 T–54360 Heirs of Vicente Padilla (Vicente),

namely: (1) Azucena Padilla, married to Felly Carrera; (2) Remedios Padilla (Remedios), married to Oscar Dimay; (3) Veronica Padilla (Veronica);10 and (4) Moreno Padilla (Moreno), married to Teresita Curso (Teresita)

1907–A–3 T–54361 Cresencio Padilla1907–A–4 T–54362 Fructousa Baricuatro1907–A–5 T–54363 Claudia Padilla–Emboy (Claudia)

A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in the subject lot.  The respondents claim that their mother, Claudia, had occupied the subject lot during her lifetime and it was earmarked to become her share in Lot No. 1907–A.  They had thereafter stayed in the subject lot for decades after inheriting the same from Claudia, who had in turn succeeded her own parents, Carlos and Asuncion.11

In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins, who are the Heirs of Vicente, to vacate the subject lot and to transfer to Lot No. 1907–A–5, a landlocked portion sans a right of way.  They refused to comply insisting that Claudia’s inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907–A–2.12

Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencita’s counsel, Atty. Jufelenito R. Pareja (Atty. Pareja), a demand letter, dated February 23, 2004, requiring them to vacate the subject lot.  They were informed that Carmencita had already purchased on February 12, 2004 the subject lot from the former’s relatives.  However, the respondents did not heed the demand.  Instead, they examined the records pertaining to the subject lot and uncovered possible anomalies, i.e., forged signatures and alterations, in the execution of a series of deeds of partition relative to Lot No. 1907–A.  On August 13, 2004, they filed before the RTC of Cebu City a complaint13 for nullification of the partition and for the issuance of new TCTs covering the heirs’ respective portions of Lot No. 1907–A.14

On December 8, 2004, Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the respondents a complaint for unlawful detainer, the origin of the instant petition.  She alleged that she bought the subject lot from Remedios, Moreno, Veronica and Dionesia,15 the registered owners thereof and the persons who allowed the respondents to occupy the same by mere tolerance.  As their successor–in–interest, she claimed her entitlement to possession of the subject lot and the right to demand from the respondents to vacate the same.16

The MTCC upheld Carmencita’s claims in its decision rendered on September 25, 2006.  The respondents were ordered to vacate the subject lot and remove at their expense all the improvements they had built thereon. They were likewise made solidarily liable to pay Carmencita Php 20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.17

In the Decision dated February 26, 2008, the RTC affirmed in its entirety the MTCC ruling.18

The respondents challenged the MTCC and RTC judgments through a Petition for Review19 filed before the CA.

The respondents argued that they have been occupying the subject lot in the concept of owners for several decades.  Carmencita, on the other hand, was a buyer in bad faith for having purchased the property despite the notice of lis pendens clearly annotated on the subject lot’s title.  Even her complaint for unlawful detainer was filed on December 8, 2004 subsequent to the respondents’ institution on August 13, 2004 of a petition for nullification of the partition.  Citing Sarmiento v. CA,20the respondents emphasized that “even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action of ejectment.”21  The respondents also invoked the doctrine enunciated in Amagan v. Marayag22 that the pendency of another action anchored on the issue of ownership justifies the suspension of an ejectment suit involving the same real property.  The foregoing is especially true in the case at bar where the issue of possession is so interwoven with that of ownership.  Besides, the resolution of the question of ownership would necessarily result in the disposition of the issue of possession.

The respondents also stressed that the deed of sale dated April 1, 2004, which was attached to the complaint for unlawful detainer, bore tell–tale signs of being spurious.  First, Atty. Pareja’s demand letter sent to the respondents instead referred to a deed of sale dated February 12, 2004. Secondly, Teresita, who now lives in Luzon and has been estranged from Moreno since the 1980s, was a signatory in the deed of sale.  Thirdly, a certain Veronida Padilla, a fictitious person, also signed the deed of sale as among the vendors, but she, too, was impleaded as a co–defendant in the ejectment suit.  Fourthly, the deed was only registered the following year after its supposed execution.

The respondents insisted that the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold the subject lot to Carmencita, had never physically occupied the same. Hence, there was no basis at all for Carmencita’s claim that the respondents’ possession of the subject lot was by mere tolerance of the alleged owners.

The respondents also presented before the CA a newly discovered evidence, which they found in an old wooden chest in their ancestral home. A duly notarized document captioned as an “Agreement,”23dated February 23, 1957, showed that Vicente and his spouse, Dionesia, had waived their hereditary rights to Lot No. 1907–A.  The document stated that Vicente obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank using Lot No. 1907–A as a collateral.  The loan was paid by Carlos and Asuncion and the waiver must have been executed in order to be fair to Vicente’s siblings.  Prescinding from the above, the Heirs of Vicente no longer had ownership rights over the subject lot to convey to Carmencita.

The respondents also averred that Carmencita’s complaint lacked a cause of action.  The certification to file an action was issued by the officials of Barangay Duljo in the name of James Tan Suarez, Carmencita’s brother, who had no real rights or interests over the subject lot.  Further, while Carmencita based her claim over the subject lot by virtue of a deed of sale executed on April 1, 2004, no demand to vacate was made upon the respondents after that date.  The absence of such demand rendered the complaint fatally defective, as the date of its service should be the reckoning point of the one–year period within which the suit can be filed.

In support of the respondents’ prayer for the issuance of injunctive reliefs, they argued that their loss would be irreparable.  Moreover, the resolution of the respondents’ petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907–A, in which Carmencita was likewise impleaded as a defendant, would be rendered useless in the event that the latter’s complaint for unlawful detainer would be granted and the former’s ancestral house demolished.

The Ruling of the CA

On March 19, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision reversing the disquisitions of the courts a quo and dismissing Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer.  The CA explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person  or  persons  claiming  under  them,  for  the restitution  of  such  possession,  together  with  damages  and  costs.The distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer was lucidly explained inSarmiento vs. Court of Appeals,:Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.  [In] forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.  In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who

has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession.

What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land.  If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder within one (1) year therefrom is forcible entry.  If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one (1) year from the date of the last demand.A close perusal of [Carmencita’s] complaint a quo reveals that the action was neither one of forcible entry nor unlawful detainer but essentially involved an issue of ownership which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria.  It did not characterize [the respondents’] alleged entry into the land: whether the same was legal or illegal.  It did not state how [the respondents] entered the land and constructed a house thereon.  It was also silent on whether [the respondents’] possession became legal before [Carmencita] demanded from them to vacate the land.  The complaint merely averred that their relatives previously owned the lot [the respondents] were occupying and that after [Carmencita] purchased it[,] she, as its new owner, demanded [for the respondents] to vacate the land.  Moreover, it is undisputed that [the respondents] and their ancestors have been occupying the land for several decades already.  There was no averment as to how or when [Carmencita’s] predecessors tolerated [the respondents’] possession of the land.  Consequently, there was no contract to speak of, whether express or implied, between [the respondents], on one hand, and [Carmencita] or her predecessors, on the other, as would qualify [the respondents’] possession of the land as a case of unlawful detainer.  Neither was it alleged that [the respondents] took possession of the land through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to make out a case of forcible entry.  In any event, [Carmencita] cannot legally assert that [the respondents’] possession of the land was by mere tolerance.  This is because [Carmencita’s] predecessors–in–interest did not yet own the property when [Claudia] took possession thereof.  Take note that [Carmencita’s] predecessors–in–interest merely stepped into the shoes of their parents who were also co–heirs of [Claudia].  Finally, to categorize a cause of action as one constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present from the start of the possession which he later seek[s] to recover.  This is clearly wanting in the case at bar.

Indeed, when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accionpubliciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC. 

If [Carmencita] is truly the owner of the subject property and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.

Munoz vs. Court of Appeals enunciated:For even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be wrested from another who had been in possession thereof for more than twelve (12) years through a summary action for ejectment.  Although admittedly[,] petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsibly address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror.   Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by   accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.24 (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied)

In Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration25 filed before the CA, she alleged that the case ofSarmiento cited by the respondents is not applicable to the present controversy since it involves a boundary dispute, which is properly the subject of an accion reivindicatoria and over which the MTCC has no jurisdiction.  She claimed that Rivera v. Rivera26 finds more relevance in the case at bar.  InRivera, the contending parties were each other’s relatives and the Court ruled that in an unlawful detainer case, prior physical possession by the complainant is not necessary.27  Instead, what is required is a better right of possession.  Further, the MTCC cannot be divested of jurisdiction just because the defendants assert ownership over the disputed property.

In the herein assailed Resolution dated May 5, 2009, the CA denied Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration.

In essence, the instant petition presents the following issues:

I

Whether or not Carmencita’s complaint against the respondents had sufficiently alleged and proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.

II

Whether or not the pendency of the respondents’ petition for nullification of

partition of Lot No. 1907–A and for the issuance of new certificates of title can abate Carmencita’s ejectment suit.

Carmencita’s Allegations

In support of the petition, Carmencita reiterates that she purchased the subject lot from the Heirs of Vicente, who were then the registered owners thereof.  At the time of the sale, respondents Felix and Marilou were occupying the subject lot.  Thus, Atty. Pareja, in Carmencita’s behalf, demanded that they vacate the property.  The respondents’ refusal to comply with the demand turned them into deforciants unlawfully withholding the possession of the subject lot from Carmencita, the new owner, whose recourse was to file a complaint for unlawful detainer.

Further, Carmencita insists that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack28 and the issue of ownership cannot be resolved in an action for unlawful detainer.  A pending suit involving the question of ownership of a piece of real property will not abate an ejectment complaint as the two are not based on the same cause of action and are seeking different reliefs.29

Additionally, Carmencita invokes the doctrine in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA30 that the registered owner of a property is entitled to its possession.  In Arcal v. CA,31 the Court also explained that the occupation of a property not by its registered owner but by others depends on the former’s tolerance, and the occupants are bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing at which, a suit for ejectment would be proper.32

The Respondents’ Arguments

In their Comment33 to the instant petition, the respondents stress that Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer was fundamentally inadequate.  There was practically no specific averment as to when and how possession by tolerance of the respondents began.  In the complaint, Carmencita made a general claim that the respondents possessed “the property by mere tolerance ‘with the understanding that they would voluntarily vacate the premises and remove their house(s) thereon upon demand by the owners’.”34  In Spouses Valdez, Jr. v. CA,35 the Court ruled that the failure of the complainants to allege key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal and deprives the MTCC of jurisdiction over the action.

In their rejoinder,36 the respondents likewise argue that the issues of possession and ownership are inseparably linked in the case at bar. Carmencita’s complaint for ejectment was based solely on her spurious title, which is already the subject of the respondents’ petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907–A.

Our Disquisition

The instant petition lacks merit.

Carmencita had not amply alleged and proven that all the requisites for unlawful detainer are present in the case at bar.

“Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession.  However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property.  To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.”37

In Spouses Valdez, Jr.,38 the Court is instructive anent the three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico) [sic].  In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.  The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.  Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.  The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.  It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title.  In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned

plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.  On the other hand,accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.39 (Citations omitted)

In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently established:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.40

In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent.  Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how and when the respondents entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon it.41 Carmencita was likewise conspicuously silent about the details on who specifically permitted the respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about.42  Instead, Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion, sans factual substantiation, that (a) the respondents’ initial occupation of the subject lot was lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the respondents became deforciants unlawfully withholding the subject lot’s possession after Carmencita, as purchaser and new registered owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the property.43  It is worth noting that the absence of the first requisite assumes even more importance in the light of the respondents’ claim that for decades, they have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof.

Again, this Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature.  In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint.  When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.44

As an exception to the general rule, the respondents’ petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907–A can abate

Carmencita’s suit for unlawful detainer.

In Amagan, the Court is emphatic that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings.  “The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved.”

Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil action.  One such exception is Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, wherein the Court declared:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

“x x x.  Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses.  For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership.  It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.”

x x x x

Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the demolition of the house subject of the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of equity require the suspension of the ejectment proceedings.  We note that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent’s suit is one of unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry.  And most certainly, the ejectment of petitioners would mean a demolition of their house, a matter that is likely to create the “confusion, disturbance, inconveniences and expenses” mentioned in the said exceptional case.

Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the

respondent to go through the whole gamut of enforcing it by physically removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to have been occupying since 1937.  (Respondent is claiming ownership only of the land, not of the house.)  Needlessly, the litigants as well as the courts will be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein the outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.

We should stress that respondent’s claim to physical possession is based not on an expired or a violated contract of lease, but allegedly on “mere tolerance.”  Without in any way prejudging the proceedings for the quieting of title, we deem it judicious under the present exceptional circumstances to suspend the ejectment case.45 (Citations omitted)

The Court then quoted with favor the following portion of the Decision dated July 8, 1997, penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in CA–G.R. No. 43611–SP, from which the Amagan case sprang:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

“ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful detainer on the theory that petitioners’ possession of the property in question was by mere tolerance.  However, in answer to his demand letter dated April 13, 1996 x x x, petitioners categorically denied having any agreement with him, verbal or written, asserting that they are ‘owners of the premises we are occupying at 108 J.P. Rizal Street, San Vicente, Silang, Cavite.’  In other words, it is not merely physical possession but ownership as well that is involved in this case.[”]

“TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against private respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. TG–1682 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City.  The issue of ownership is squarely raised in this action. Undoubtedly, the resolution of this issue will be determinative of who is entitled to the possession of the premises in question.[”]

“THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case will include the removal of the petitioners’ house [from] the lot in question.[”]

“To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay inequitable, to allow demolition of petitioners’ house prior to the determination of the question of ownership [of] the lot on which it stands.”46 (Citation omitted)

We find the doctrines enunciated in Amagan squarely applicable to the instant petition for reasons discussed hereunder.

Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the proposition that the respondents have been in possession of the subject lot by mere tolerance of the owners.  The respondents, on the other hand, raise the defense of ownership of the subject lot and point to the pendency of Civil Case  No.  CEB–30548,  a  petition  for  nullification  of  the  partition  of Lot No. 1907–A, in which Carmencita and the Heirs of Vicente were impleaded as parties.  Further, should Carmencita’s complaint be granted, the respondents’ house, which has been standing in the subject lot for decades, would be subject to demolition.  The foregoing circumstances, thus, justify the exclusion of the instant petition from the purview of the general rule.

All told, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer.  As discussed above, the jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere tolerance of the owners had not been amply alleged and proven.  Moreover, circumstances exist which justify the abatement of the ejectment proceedings.  Carmencita can ventilate her ownership claims in an action more suited for the purpose. The respondents, on other hand, need not be exposed to the risk of having their house demolished pending the resolution of their petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907–A, where ownership over the subject lot is likewise presented as an issue.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. SP No. 03489 areAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. P-12-3069               January 20, 2014

ATTY. VIRGILIO P. ALCONERA, Complainant, vs.ALFREDO T. PALLANAN, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before Us is an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct and Making Untruthful Statements filed by Atty. Virgilio P. Alconera against Alfredo Pallanan, Sheriff IV, assigned at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 in General Santos City.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Complainant was the counsel for Morito Rafols, the defendant in Civil Case No. 5967-2, an unlawful detainer case entitled Cua Beng a.k.a. Manuel Sy and Ka Kieng v. Morita Rafols, et al., filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2 in General Santos City, South Cotabato. After trial, the MTCC ruled against Rafols and his co-defendants in a Judgment1dated March 12, 2009, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant MORITO RAFOLS, his privies, assigns, heirs, transferee, sublessee. co-Jessee or agents if any to vacate from the subject lots and deliver possession thereof to the plaintiffs and for defendant to pay back rentals of P5,000.00 per month from June 2008 and every succeeding months thereafter until he vacate the premises and to jointly and severally, together with all other defendants, pay attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 with the other defendants and costs of litigation.

SO ORDERED.

Therefrom, Rafols, through complainant Alconera, appealed the case to the RTC, Branch 36, docketed as Civil Case No. 675. Pending appeal, the court issued an Order dated February 18, 2011 granting Cua Beng’s motion for execution she filed in Civil Case No. 5967-2, the unlawful detainer case. Alconera sought reconsideration but the motion was denied through another Order2 dated March 14, 2011.

On March 17, 2011, a troubled Evelyn Rafols, Rafols’ daughter-in-law, called up Alconera, who at that time was in Manila, to report that the sheriff, respondent Pallanan, was about to implement the adverted writ of execution. Evelyn Rafols informed Alconera that respondent sheriff arrived along with the lawyer of the opposing party and 30 other men to enforce the writ. Respondent sheriff then allegedly demanded payment of PhP 720,000 to settle Rafols’ obligation to which the latter protested on the ground that the amount is too exorbitant when they have been religiously depositing monthly rentals in court to satisfy the judgment.

After explaining the matter to Alconera, Evelyn Rafols passed her phone to respondent sheriff. Over the phone, a verbal disagreement between the two ensued. Alconera claims that he has a pending motion for reconsideration on the issuance of the writ of execution, but the respondent said that the motion has already been denied. And since no Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) has been issued enjoining the implementation, respondent claimed that he is legally mandated to perform his ministerial duty of enforcing the writ. Complainant countered that he has not yet received a copy of the denial of the motion, rendering the execution premature and, at the same time, preventing him from securing a TRO from the higher courts. Nevertheless, respondent still pushed through with the execution of the judgment.

On March 18, 2011, complainant returned to General Santos City and, at his law office, found a copy of the Order denying his Motion for Reconsideration, which was only served that very same day. The RTC ruled that there was no pending Motion to Approve Supersedeas Bond filed with it. Instead, what was filed not with the RTC but with the MTCC was a "NOTICE OF APPEAL – and – MOTION TO APPROVE PROPERTY SUPERSEDEAS BOND," which was not granted.

That afternoon, Alconera went to RTC Br. 36 with his daughter to confront respondent sheriff. The face-off escalated into a heated argument caught on video. It was complainant’s daughter, Shyla Mae Zapanta, who is coincidentally his office clerk, who filmed the incident and transcribed the dialogue during the altercation. As hereunder translated in English, the exchanges went:

ATTY. ALCONERA: Pag hatod nimo didto sa demolition order, kabalo ka na wala pa ko kadawat ug denial? (When you served the demolition order, you know that I did not yet receive a copy of the denial order?)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Denial sa unsa, motion? (Denial of what, motion?)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Oo. (Yes.)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Attorney, ang motion inyoha nang kuan diri sa korte, and akoa sa writ ko. As long as the sheriff did not receive a TRO or any order from the court restraining him to implement the writ, I have to go. So in case, just in case, na may resolution si judge na ireconsider and iyang order after they declare, ideliver na sa area kung asa gi-execute so the sheriff will move out. (Attorney, the motion, that is your… what do you call this, here in court. Mine is the writ. As long as the sheriff did not receive a TRO or any order from the court restraining him to implement the writ, I have to go. So in case, just in case, the judge reconsiders his order, they will declare, deliver it to the area where the writ if executed so the sheriff will move out.)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Mo execute diay ka? Dili diay ka mangutana kung duna pa bay motion for recon ani? (So you will execute? You will not inquire whether a motion for reconsideration has been filed?)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Bisag may motion for recon na, Attorney, I have to go gyud. (Even if there is a motion for reconsideration, I really have to go.)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Uy, di man na ingon ana, uy! Ana imong natun-an as sheriff?

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Oo mao na sya. Mao na sya – sa akoa ha, mao na sya. (Yes, that is it. That is it – to me ha, that is it.)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Kita ra ta sa Supreme Court ani. (Let us see each other in the Supreme Court.)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: …(unintelligible) Ang imoha ana…imong motion ana… and imong motion ana, delaying tactic. (Your motion is a delaying tactic.)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Ah, sige lang, atubang lang ta sa Supreme Court. (Ok, let’s just see each other in the Supreme Court.)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Oo, atubangon nako ko na siya, pero mag-review pud ka.

ATTY. ALCONERA: Unsay mag-review? (What review?)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Motion nang imoha, Dong. (Yours is motion, Dong.) ("Dong" is equivalent to the Filipino term "Totoy"; if used by one to address someone older than him, it is an insult.)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Naunsa man ka, Dong. (What happened to you, Dong?)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Motion na imoha… Dapat diri ka mag file, dili ka didto mag-file. Ayaw ko awaya. (Yours is motion. You should file it here, you do not file it there. Don’t quarrel with me.)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Lahi imong tono sa akoa sa telepono Dong ba. (You were rude in the telephone, Dong.)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Oo, kay lain man pud ka mag sulti. Ang imong venue kay diri, dili sa area. (Yes, because you also talked bad, your venue is here in court, not in the area.)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Ingon nako sa imo nakadawat ka ba.. nakadawat ba ug… (I was just asking you whether you received…)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Dili nako na concern. (That is not my concern.)

ATTY. ALCONERA: O, ngano nag ingon man ka nga "Ayaw ko diktahe, Attorney?" (Why did you say, "Don’t dictate on me, Attorney?")

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Yes, do not dictate me. Kay abogado ka, sheriff ko. Lahi tag venue. Trabaho akoa, magtrabaho pud ka. (Yes, do not dictate me. Because you are a lawyer, and I am a sheriff. I do my job, you do yours.)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Bastos kaayo ka manulti ba. (You are very rude!)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Ikaw ang bastos! (You are the one who is rude!)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Magkita ta sa Supreme Court. (I will see you in the Supreme Court.)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Magkita ta, eh! Ikaw lang akong hadlukan nga wala man ka sa area. (As you wish, I am not afraid of you, you were not in the area.)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Unsa nang inyong style diri, Kempeta? (What is your style here, Kempetai?)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Dili man! Na may order. Why can’t you accept? (No! There is an order. Why can’t you accept?)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Naay proseso, Dong. Mao ning proseso: ang MR, proseso ang MR. (There is a process, Dong. This is the process: MR.)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Oo, proseso pud na ang akong pagimplement. Naa’y writ. (Yes, my implementing the writ is also a process. There is a writ.)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Nabuang, ka Dong? (What is going on with you, Dong?)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Ka dugay na nimo nga abogado, wala ka kabalo! (You have been a lawyer for a long time now, yet you do not know!)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Dugay na bitaw. Ikaw bago ka lang na sheriff. (Yes, I have been a lawyer for a long time now, you, you are new in your job as sheriff).

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Pero kabalo ko. (But I know.)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Susmaryosep!

SHERIFF PALLANAN: O, di ba? Wala sa padugayay. Naa sa kahibalo. (Isn’t that true? It is not the length of time one has spent on his job. It is the knowledge that one possesses.)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Tanawa imong pagka sheriff, Dong. (Know you job as a sheriff, Dong.)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Tanawa pud imong pagka abogado kung sakto. Pilde! Sige mo pangulekta didto ibayad sa imo! (Know your job also as a lawyer, see if you are correct. Loser! You [and the Rafols] are always collecting [from the other defendants] so your fees can be paid!)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Ngano wala man lagi nimo kuhaa ang mga butang didto, Dong? (Why did you not bring with you the things that you had gathered, Dong.)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Oo, kay hulaton ta ka pag demotion. (Yes, because I will wait for you on demotion day.)

ATTY. ALCONERA: Nahadlok ka, Dong. (You were afraid, Dong.)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Wala ko nahadlok, Doy. Sa demotion adto didto, Attorney. Sulayi ko! Sulayan nato imong pagkaabogado! (I’m not afraid of you, Doy. On demotion day, you go there, Attorney. You try me! Let us see how good a lawyer you are.) ("Doy" is the same as "Dong.")

ATTY. ALCONERA: March 22 pa ang hearing sa imong abogado, Dong. (The hearing of the motion of your lawyer, is on March 22 yet, Dong.)

SHERIFF PALLANAN: Asus, Pinobre na imong style, Attorney. Bulok! (Your style is that of an impoverished lawyer, Attorney. Dullard!)

It is against the foregoing backdrop of events that Alconera filed a Complaint-Affidavit3 against the respondent sheriff for grave misconduct before this Court on April 6, 2011. The case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and was docketed as AM No. 11-3634-P. As directed by the OCA, respondent filed his comment.4 In it, he averred that the duty of a court sheriff in enforcing a writ of execution is ministerial, and without a TRO enjoining it, a sheriff is duty bound to implement it.

On July 14, 2011, respondent filed his own Affidavit of Complaint5 against herein complainant for Grave Misconduct and for violating the Code of Ethics. Respondent alleged that during the enforcement of the writ, a second phone conversation took place. Complainant allegedly called up Evelyn Rafols who put him on loudspeaker for the respondent to hear his words. Alconera then allegedly made a threat that there will be bloodshed if respondent’s party pushes through with the implementation of the writ. Respondent likewise claimed that complainant berated him at his office on March 18, 2011 and that the incident was orchestrated by the complainant. His (respondent sheriff’s) complaint affidavit avers:

6. GRAVE MISCONDUCT OF ATTY. VIRGILIO ALCONERA – The planned attack happened in our office on March 18, 2011 in the afternoon, after lunch, in the presence of his lady companion (believed to [be] his daughter), who is so delighted in taking videos. He is so angry and at rage as if he is the boss in our office, yelling and nagging at me with NO RESPECT as a nomad. THE ONLY PERSON AROUND WAS ME, THE GIRL HE BROUGHT THERE (who is taking videos), AND THE NAGGING ATTY. VIRGILIO ALCONERA (JUST THREE OF US), while pointing his finger into his MOTION for Reconsideration that he is holding [sic] almost an inch to my face. Saying "KITA NIMO NI, KITA NIMO NI?" NA INSULTO KO NIMO NGANO WALA KA NI PATOO NAKO PAYLAN TAKA UG KASO HULATA SA SUPREME COURT! (DO YOU SEE THIS? DO YOU SEE THIS? YOU INSULTED ME WHY DID YOU NOT FOLLOW MY ORDER I WILL FILE CHARGES AGAINST YOU WAIT FOR IT IN THE SUPREME COURT!) HE wants me to shiver in scare and expect me to beg.

No, GO I said. I ALWAYS REPEATED THE WORDS "WHERE IS YOUR T.R.O. Just present it." Because he is too loud, Mrs. Nenita Paredes, our stenographer, ARRIVED and middle on us our arguments. On the mid part of the arguments, he recorded the events; he and his companion, cohort in designing the plan of the attack, orchestrated it. IT’S AN ASSAULT TO THE OFFICER OF THE LAW. He told me – SHERIFF KA LANG WALA KAY NABAL AN. NGANON NADAWAT MAN KA DIRI BOGO KA. (YOU ARE JUST A SHERIFF. WHAT DO YOU KNOW? WHY ARE YOU ADMITTED HERE YOU DUMB, WHO TAUGHT YOU THAT?) Ana mo diri IPINATAY! KINSA NAG TUDLO SA IMOHA ANA. While he almost struck his motion papers into my face, I was caught unaware.

In view of respondent’s counter-charge, Alconera supplemented his affidavit-complaint6 to include a charge against the former for False Testimony. Complainant belied the claims of respondent sheriff, and showed that the respondent’s allegations can nowhere be seen in the transcript of the altercation.

On March 2, 2012, this Court, upon the OCA’s recommendation, resolved to re-docket Alconera’s complaint as a regular administrative case with docket No. A.M. No. P-12-3069 and referred the same to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, South Cotabato, for investigation, report, and recommendation.

After due proceedings, the investigating judge submitted a report, styled as Order7 dated August 6, 2013, with the following recommendation:

Based on the findings and evaluation, the herein Executive Judge hereby recommends the respondent Sheriff be ADMONISHED. The respondent must be reminded that as a Court Employee, he must exercise utmost patience and humility in the performance of his duties amidst all the pressures and personal attacks against his person because he carried with him the image of the entire judiciary.

SO ORDERED.

The Executive Judge adopted the transcript of the altercation as appearing in the affidavit of Shyla Mae Zapanta and based his recommendation mainly thereon.

The Issues

The main issue in this case is whether or not respondent can be held administratively liable for grave misconduct and false testimony. In fine, the controversy stems from the propriety of the implementation of the writ of execution, and the altercation between complainant and respondent. While the investigating judge made a recommendation based on how respondent conducted himself as an officer of the court in the afternoon of March 18, 2013, there was no discussion regarding the propriety of the implementation of the writ, which is the main issue in the case for grave misconduct. It then behooves this Court to sift through the arguments and records to rule on this point.

The Court’s Ruling

Grave Misconduct

Misconduct has been defined as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to

disregard established rules, all of which must be established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.8In this case, complainant imputes grave misconduct on the respondent for the following acts:

1. For enforcing the writ despite the fact that complainant has yet to receive the copy of the order denying his motion for reconsideration on the issuance of the writ of execution;

2. For allegedly leaking to the opposing counsel the issuance of the order denying the motion for reconsideration;

3. For allegedly demanding P720,000 from Rafols for a P165,000.00 obligation; and

4. For allegedly being arrogant and disrespectful.

Complainant admits that there is no TRO enjoining the enforcement of the writ, nor allegation in his pleadings that a motion to quash the writ of execution was ever filed. However, complainant asserts that respondent committed grave misconduct when the latter implemented the writ prior to serving the complainant a copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration. According to complainant, said motion stayed the execution, and the writ could not have been validly executed without first informing the parties concerned of the motion’s denial.

We rule against complainant on this point.

It must be borne in mind that the case at bar traces its roots to an unlawful detainer case wherein the MTCC ruled against Rafols, complainant’s client. In ejectment cases, the rulings of the courts are immediately executory and can only be stayed via compliance with Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. — If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.

Clearly then under said Sec. 19, Rule 70, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is made immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor. The defendant in such a case may have such judgment stayed only by (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal.9The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being ministerial and imperative. Hence, if the defendant-appellant has perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.10

In the case at bar, complainant lost his client’s case and appealed to the RTC. His client has also been periodically depositing rental with the court for the use of the property pending appeal. However, as ruled by the RTC, the bond filed did not meet the legal requirements because first and foremost, the bond posted was a property bond, not cash nor surety. Furthermore, Rafols did not own the property he posted as bond and besides, it was also not issued in favour of the plaintiff in the ejectment case. Because of the non-compliance with the requirements under the above-quoted rule, the execution of the judgment was not effectively stayed. The only exceptions to non-compliance are the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which prevented the defendant from posting the supersedeas bond or making the monthly deposit, or the occurrence of supervening events which brought about a material change in the situation of the parties and which would make the execution inequitable.11 But whether or not these obtain in the case at bar is an issue best left to the court that issued the writ of execution.

Given the above circumstances, there was no legal impediment preventing respondent sheriff from performing his responsibility of enforcing the writ of execution. Since Rafols failed to comply with the requirements under the Rules, Cua Beng who prevailed in the unlawful detainer case is entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution of the court’s judgment both as to the restoration of possession and the payment of the accrued rentals or compensation for the use and occupation of the premises.12

Well-settled is that the sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the judgment or not. When the writ is placed in his hands, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance with its mandate. It is only by doing so could he ensure that the order is executed without undue delay.13 This holds especially true herein where the nature of the case requires immediate execution. Absent a TRO, an order of quashal, or compliance with Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, respondent sheriff has no alternative but to enforce the writ.

Immediacy of the execution, however, does not mean instant execution. The sheriff must comply with the Rules of Court in executing a writ. Any act deviating from the procedure laid down in the Rules of Court is a misconduct and warrants disciplinary action. In this case, Sec. 10(c), Rule 39 of the Rules prescribes the procedure in the implementation of the writ. It provides:

Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. —

x x x x

(c) Delivery or restitution of real property. — The officer shall demand of the person against whom the judgment for the delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons claiming rights under him to peaceably vacate the property within three (3) working days, and restore possession thereof to the judgment obligee, otherwise, the officer shall oust all such persons therefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate peace officers, and employing such means as may be reasonably necessary to retake possession, and place the judgment obligee in possession of such property. Any costs, damages, rents or profits awarded by the judgment shall be satisfied in the same manner as a judgment for money.

Based on this provision, enforcement in ejectment cases requires the sheriff to give notice of such writ and to demand from defendant to vacate the property within three days. Only after such period can the sheriff enforce the writ by the bodily removal of the defendant in the ejectment case and his personal belongings.14 Even in cases wherein decisions are immediately executory, the required

three-day notice cannot be dispensed with. A sheriff who enforces the writ without the required notice or before the expiry of the three-day period is running afoul with the Rules.15

In the present controversy, the Order denying the motion for reconsideration was allegedly served, according to the respondent, on the same day the writ was executed on March 17, 2011. Complainant, however, avers that his office was only able to receive the denial the day after the execution or on March 18, 2011. At first blush, one might hastily conclude that the three-day notice rule was apparently not observed. This Court, however, is not prepared to make such a finding. We are mindful of the possibility that a demand to vacate has already been given when complainant and Rafols were first served the Order granting the issuance of a writ of execution, before the motion for reconsideration was filed. More importantly, complainant failed to allege con-compliance with Sec. 10(c) of Rule 39.

Thus far, no deviation from the Rules has been properly ascribed to respondent. 1âwphi1 As an officer of the court, he is accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties. The burden was on complainant to adduce evidence that would prove the respondent’s culpability, if any. Without evidence of any departure from well established rules, any unlawful behaviour, or any gross negligence on his part, the presumption remains applicable and respondent cannot be held administratively liable for the offense of grave misconduct.

Discourtesy in the Performance of Official Duties

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court adopts in part the recommendation of the investigating judge that respondent should nonetheless be penalized for discourtesy in the performance of his official duties.

As a public officer and a trustee for the public, it is the ever existing responsibility of respondent to demonstrate courtesy and civility in his official actuations with the public.16 In Court Personnel of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court – San Carlos City v. Llamas,17 this Court has held that:

Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, they must faithfully adhere to, hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; that all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

x x x x

At all times, employees of the judiciary are expected to accord respect to the person and the rights of another, even a co-employee. Their every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity. Government service is people-oriented; high-strung and belligerent behavior has no place therein.

Rude and hostile behavior often translates a personal conflict into a potent pollutant of an otherwise peaceful work environment; ultimately, it affects the quality of service that the office renders to the public. Letting personal hatred affect public performance is a violation of the principle enshrined in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, a principle that demands that public interest be upheld over personal ones.

Improper behavior especially during office hours exhibits not only a paucity of professionalism at the workplace, but also great disrespect for the court itself. Such demeanor is a failure of circumspection demanded of every public official and employee. Thus, the Court looks "with great disfavor upon any display of animosity by any court employee" and exhorts every court personnel to act with strict propriety and proper decorum to earn public trust for the judiciary. Colleagues in the judiciary, including those occupying the lowliest position, are entitled to basic courtesy and respect.

In discharging its constitutional duty of supervising lower courts and their personnel, this Court cannot ignore the fact that the judiciary is composed essentially of human beings who have differing personalities, outlooks and attitudes; and who are naturally vulnerable to human weaknesses. Nevertheless, the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that court personnel must not only be, but also be perceived to be, free from any impropriety -- with respect not only to their duties in the judicial branch, but also to their behavior anywhere else.

Based on the transcript of the altercation, it is readily apparent that respondent has indeed been remiss in this duty of observing courtesy in serving the public. He should have exercised restraint in dealing with the complainant instead of allowing the quarrel to escalate into a hostile encounter. The balm of a clean conscience should have been sufficient to relieve any hurt or harm respondent felt from complainant's criticisms in the performance of his duties. On the contrary, respondent's demeanour tarnished the image not only of his office but that of the judiciary as a whole, exposing him to disciplinary measure.

Making Untruthful Statements

Lastly, the charge of making untruthful statements must also fail. While the statements mentioned in respondent's complaint-affidavit were not reflected in the transcript submitted by the complainant, this actuality is not conclusive evidence that such event did not take place. As claimed by respondent, complainant's clerk was only able to record a part of the argument. We cannot then discount the probability that there is more to the argument than what was caught on video and there remains the possibility that what respondent narrated and what complainant recorded both actually transpired.

WHEREFORE, respondent Alfredo T. Pallanan is ADMONISHED and WARNED to be always courteous in dealing with the public in the performance of official duties. A repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 189248               February 5, 2014

TEODORO S. TEODORO (Deceased), Substituted by his heirs/sons NELSON TEODORO and ROLANDO TEODORO, Petitioners, vs.DANILO ESPINO, ROSARIO SANTIAGO, JULIANA CASTILLO, PAULINA LITAO, RAQUEL RODRIGUEZ, RUFINA DELA CRUZ, and LEONILA CRUZ, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J.:

We here have what appears to be a cut and dried case for ejectment which has, nonetheless, resulted in three conflicting and varying decisions of the lower courts. We exercise judicial restraint: we simply delineate the possessory rights of the warring parties and refrain from ruling on these squabbling heirs' respective claims of ownership.

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99805 which reversed and set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 81, Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 634-M-06 which, in turn, vacated and set aside the Decision3 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Bulacan, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 1240. The case is for Forcible Entry filed by the predecessor-in-interest of petitioners Nelson and Rolando Teodoro, heirs of Teodoro S. Teodoro (Teodoro Teodoro), against respondents Danilo Espino, Rosario Santiago, Juliana Castillo, Paulina Litao, Raquel Rodriguez, Rufina dela Cruz and Leonila Cruz, a squabble for physical possession of a portion of a real property, the ownership of which is traceable to Genaro Teodoro (Genaro).

The subject property is a portion within Cadastral Lot No. 2476 with a total area of 248 square meters, covered by Tax Declaration No. 99-05003-0246, registered in the name of Genaro, long deceased ascendant of all the parties. The subject property pertains to the vacant lot where the old ancestral house of Genaro stood until its demolition in June 2004, at the instance of Teodoro Teodoro.

Genaro had five children: Santiago; Maria, from whom respondents descended and trace their claim of ownership and right of possession; Petra, Mariano, Teodoro Teodoro’s father; and Ana. Genaro and his children are all deceased.

Respondents’ respective parents are first cousins of Teodoro Teodoro. All parties are collateral relatives of Petra Teodoro: Teodoro Teodoro is her nephew while respondents are her grandnephews and grandnieces, descendants of Petra’s sister, Maria Teodoro.

Of all Genaro’s children, only Petra occupied the subject property, living at the ancestral house. Genaro’s other children, specifically Santiago, Maria and Mariano were bequeathed, and stayed at, a different property within the same locality, still from the estate of their father.

After Petra’s death, her purported will, a holographic will, was probated in Special Proceedings No. 1615-M before RTC, Branch 8, Malolos, Bulacan, which Decision on the will’s extrinsic validity has become final and executory.4In the will, Petra, asserting ownership, devised the subject property to Teodoro Teodoro.

Teodoro Teodoro effected the demolition of the ancestral house, intending to use the subject property for other purposes.

Soon thereafter, respondents, who resided at portions of Lot No. 2476 that surround the subject property on which the ancestral house previously stood, erected a fence on the surrounding portion, barricaded its frontage, and put up a sign thereat, effectively dispossessing Teodoro Teodoro of the property bequeathed to him by Petra.

After Teodoro Teodoro’s demand for respondents to vacate the subject property went unheeded, he filed the complaint for forcible entry against respondents, alleging the following in pertinent part:

3. [Teodoro Teodoro] is a nephew of the deceased Petra Teodoro vda. De Salonga x x x who executed a holographic will designating him therein as administrator of her estate and likewise

devised in his favor a parcel of land located in Purok 2, Bambang, Bulacan, Bulacan and the ancestral house built therein. Other properties of Petra Teodoro were bequeathed in favor of other named heirs. x x x.

4. Aforementioned parcel of land with the ancestral house was in turn inherited by the decedent Petra Teodoro from her father Genaro Teodoro who also gave separate properties to his four other children, who are all dead, namely, Santiago who has eight (8) children, Maria who has six (6) children, Ana who has no child and Mariano who has eight (8) children including herein [Teodoro Teodoro] as the eldest;

5. It is of common knowledge in the locality that the subject property where the ancestral house stood was given by Genaro Teodoro to [his] daughter Petra Teodoro to the exclusion of all others. Petra Teodoro lived in that property all her life. x x x.

x x x x

7. This subject property is declared for taxation purposes in the name of [Teodoro Teodoro’s] grandfather, Genaro Teodoro as shown by the hereto attached photocopy of Tax Declaration of Real Property No. 99-05003-0246 for the year 2000 which is marked as Annex "F";

x x x x

10. [Subject property] having been given to [Teodoro Teodoro] as a devisee in the approved will of Petra Teodoro, it became his absolute property to the exclusion of all others;

11. Sometime in July 2004, [Teodoro Teodoro] as the absolute owner and possessor thereof, decided to demolish the already dilapidated ancestral house in the subject property to clear the same for other available uses/purposes. x x x.

12. By means of force and intimidation, [Teodoro Teodoro] was ousted likewise prevented by [respondents] from entering the subject property. [Respondents] have also onverted/appropriated for themselves the exclusive use of the subject property into their own parking lot and other personal use, to the exclusion and damage of [Teodoro Teodoro];5 (Emphasis supplied).

In their Answer, respondents asserted their own ownership and possession of the subject property, countering that:

5. It is worth to mention that [respondents] Danilo Espino and Rosario Santiago are residing thereat for more than fifty (50) years, while [respondents] Paulina Litao and Rufina dela Cruz are resident of the subject place for more than sixty (60) years, most of them residing thereat since birth, at the time that their grandmother Maria Teodoro is still living and residing thereat.

6. Thus, when siblings Maria Teodoro (grandmother of [respondents]), Petra (to whom the subject property was inherited) and Mariano (father of [Teodoro Teodoro]) died, the heirs, who include [respondents] and [Teodoro Teodoro] extrajudicially, among themselves, partitioned the property left by their ascendants, which are still in the name of the siblings’ father Genaro Teodoro. [Respondents], since they are already residing in the subject property and had built their respective houses therein, had with them the said subject [property]. x x x.

7. [Respondents], through their authorized representative, [respondent] Rosario Santiago, in the exercise of their act of ownership of the subject lot paid for its real property taxes. x x x.

8. x x x [Teodoro Teodoro] deliberately failed to consider and mention in his complaint that there was already a decision rendered by court, declaring the subject property as part of the property left by Petra Teodoro to her legitimate heirs, which include among others [respondents].

9. That however, due to [respondents’] failure as substituted heirs to execute the order, dated May 18, 1994, a Motion for the Revival of Judgment was filed and heard before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The Honorable Court x x x resolved x x x the extent of the allowance and admission to probate the holographic will of the late Petra Teodoro, where a Certificate of Allowance dated February 14, 1990 was subsequently issued, as its Decision dated June 29, 1989 became final and executory, affect the revival of judgment.

x x x x

13. While it is true that the dilapidated ancestral house in the subject property was demolished; however, the said act, as suggested by [Teodoro Teodoro] was allowed by [respondents] (who had their respective houses built in the same lot where the same is constructed) in order to have the same be partitioned among themselves. As [Teodoro Teodoro] was constantly complaining that the property left to him and his siblings is less than the subject property given to the [respondents] in area, they agreed verbally that if the ancestral house will be demolished, a surveyor would be at ease in surveying the same and determine if indeed the area is more than that allotted to [Teodoro Teodoro], which in that case, as per agreement, the excess, if any will suffice the lack in area of [Teodoro Teodoro]. It was however found out that the area of the subject property was less than the area that should be allocated and apportioned as shares of [respondents], hence they [intimated] the same to [Teodoro Teodoro], who got mad and threaten[ed] to get the subject property from them.

14. The putting of signs "No Trespassing" posted at the frontage of the subject property is an allowable act by owners, residing thereat to protect their property against intruders, hence there is nothing wrong for [respondents] to put the same. x x x.

15. There is no truth, as what [Teodoro Teodoro] claimed in paragraph 12 of his complaint that he was ousted and prevented from entering the subject property by [respondents], because in the first place he could not be ousted thereat, as he is not in possession of the said property.6 (Emphasis theirs).

After trial, the MTC dismissed the complaint, ruling on the issue of ownership and ultimately resolving the issue of who between Teodoro Teodoro and respondents had a better right to possess the subject property:

x x x [Teodoro Teodoro’s] claim of ownership over the subject lot stemmed from the approved and duly probated Holographic Will of Petra Teodoro. Although it its undisputed that Petra Teodoro was in actual possession of the subject lot prior to her demise and that she left a Holographic Will wherein the subject lot was bequeathed to [Teodoro Teodoro], the probate of her last will has not finally settled the question of ownership over the subject lot. Clearly, the subject lot still forms part of the estate of the late Genaro Teodoro. In the absence of an actual and approved partition plan among his heirs, the subject lot remains part of the Genaro Teodoro’s estate. Since his children Santiago, Maria, Petra, Maraino and Ana are all deceased, their children or grandchildren by right of representation have the right to inherit from their ancestor.

x x x x

A person who claims that he has a better right to real property must prove his ownership of the same x x x. Clearly, [Teodoro Teodoro] has failed to prove his ownership over the property or that of his

devisee Petra Teodoro. Thus, the court is convinced that the possession of [respondents] over the subject lot should not be disturbed, until and unless the question of ownership over the same shall have been finally resolved before the appropriate court.

x x x x

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim interposed in relation thereto, without pronouncement as to costs.7

The RTC, in its appellate jurisdiction over forcible entry cases, acting on Teodoro Teodoro’s appeal, adopted the factual findings of the MTC, but reversed the ruling, ruled in favor of Teodoro Teodoro and ordered the ejectment of respondents from the subject property. It pithily ruled, thus:

But the bottom line for resolution in this case is who has the prior physical possession of the subject parcel. x x x.

The late Petra Teodoro’s share to the inheritance of his father Genaro is admittedly the old ancestral house and the lot over which it stands. x x x.

[Teodoro Teodoro] claims right to possession only over said portion (now the vacant space x x x not the entire lot 2476 until he was displaced therefrom by the [respondents] through force). [Teodoro Teodoro] does not contest the perimeter area of Lot 2476 where [respondents] are residing. He has acknowledged in clear terms that the rest of the area of Lot 2476 is occupied by [respondents]. The assailed decision recognized that Petra Teodoro was in actual possession of the lot prior to her death. It is [Teodoro Teodoro’s] argument that Petra Teodoro, tacked [from by Teodoro Teodoro], has had prior physical possession of the controverted portion of lot 2476. He went on arguing that regardless of whether or not the duly probated will completely settled the issue of partition of the remaining estate of Genaro Teodoro, he has the prior actual and physical possession of the vacant space where the old ancestral house formerly stands, passed on to him by the late Petra Teodoro, a fact [respondents] deny. [Respondents] even belied that they have ousted and restrained [Teodoro Teodoro] from entering the subject property.

Said pretension is however negated by evidence showing the barricaded vacant space or disputed area consisting of 120 square meters, more or less (approximate width of lot is 7.55 meters, approximate length is 17.9 meters with indented portion measuring 1.5 meters deep x x x), where the cemented portion of the flooring of the bakery near the national road lease by [respondents] is still existing x x x and over which he exercised control and constructive possession. x x x.

x x x x

[Teodoro Teodoro] anchors on the other hand his claim on the Holographic Will of Petra Teodoro dated May 1, 1973 x x x duly probated and approved in a Decision x x x dated June 19, 1989 of Branch 8 of this Court in SP Proceeding No. 1615-M, which Decision has become final and executory as of February 14, 1990 x x x bequeathing the disputed portion of Lot 2476 and the old ancestral house thereon to him, the letters of administration issued to him by Branch 8 of this Court x x x, the Project of Partition submitted to the said court x x x plus his possession of the vacant area or disputed portion of [L]ot 2476. [Respondents] has stressed that he is not contesting the rest of [L]ot 2476 occupied by the houses of [respondents].

Analyzing the facts of the case, the lower [court] concluded that the subject parcel is a part of the estate of the late Genaro Teodoro and in the absence of an approved partition among the heirs,

remains a community property over which the legal heirs of Genaro Teodoro have the right to inherit. All therefore are entitled to exercise the right of dominion including the right of possession.

This Court disagrees with the said ruling applying the plethora of cases decisive of the issue and consistent with the established jurisprudence that the lower court cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership-such issue being inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of possession.

Given the foregoing, [Teodoro Teodoro] has established a valid claim to institute the eviction suit against [respondents] over the disputed area or vacant portion of Lot 2476 and for him to be restored therein.

x x x x

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding reversible error on the appealed judgment, the same is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered as follows:

1. Ordering that [Teodoro Teodoro] be restored in the lawful possession of the disputed area of Lot 2476 and for the eviction therefore of [respondents] on said portion; and

2. [Respondents] to pay the costs of the suit.8

With the reversal of the MTC’s ruling, respondents then appealed the RTC’s decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the RTC, likewise dismissed the complaint as the MTC had done, but did not reach the same result as that of the inferior court. It specifically ruled that Teodoro Teodoro:

(1) never had physical possession of the subject property, not having lived there at anytime, whether while Petra was alive nor after her death;

(2) did not adduce evidence before the lower courts on proof of payment of any real property tax on the disputed vacant lot, portion of Lot No. 2476, or to the whole of Lot No. 2476;

(3) did not solely or unilaterally cause the demolition of the ancestral house such a fact equating to his exclusive ownership of the subject property and complete control and dominion over it; and

(4) cannot tack his alleged possession of the subject property to that of Petra Teodoro simply by virtue of the latter’s holographic will, leading to the issue of ownership which is insignificant in forcible entry cases.

In all, the appellate court found that Teodoro Teodoro (substituted by his heirs Nelson and Rolando Teodoro at that juncture) "failed to discharge the burden of proof that he had prior actual physical possession of the subject [property] before it was barricaded by [respondents] to warrant the institution of the forcible entry suit." The appellate court disposed of the case, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision [dated] 28 February 2007 and Resolution dated 26 June 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 81 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the instant case is DISMISSED for lack of merit.9

Hence, this appeal by certiorari filed by the heirs of Teodoro Teodoro raising the following errors in the appellate court’s dismissal of the complaint:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to take notice of relevant facts such as petitioner Teodoro’s exercise of possessory rights over the subject property, among others, which if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion.

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals misappreciated undisputed facts such as the respondents’ fencing of the vacant area cleared by petitioner Teodoro and their barricading of the frontage thereof, among others, that deprived petitioner Teodoro his possessory rights over the vacant area.

3. The findings of the Honorable Court of Appeals are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures.

4. There is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts in the assailed Decision.10

The assigned errors define the issue for our resolution which is whether or not the act of respondents in barricading the frontage of the portion of Lot No. 2476 on which stood the ancestral house occupied by Petra amounted to Teodoro Teodoro’s unlawful dispossession thereof through the forcible entry of respondents.

The ground rules in forcible entry cases:11

(1) One employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive another of physical possession of real property.

(2) Plaintiff (Teodoro Teodoro) must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by the defendant (herein respondents). This requirement implies that the possession of the disputed land by the latter was unlawful from the beginning.

(3) The sole question for resolution hinges on the physical or material possession (possession de facto) of the property. Neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can, at the outset, preclude the court from taking cognizance of the case.

(4) Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership, and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof. In this case, both parties assert prior and exclusive physical possession in the concept of owner12 acquired through succession13 from the same decedent, their aunt and grand aunt, respectively, Petra. In turn, Petra inherited the property from her father Genaro, in whose name the subject property is still registered.

Teodoro Teodoro’s assertion of physical possession comprises mainly of his claimed ownership of the subject property acquired through testate succession, or via the holographic will of Petra.14 Teodoro Teodoro then points, as an exercise of his ownership and incident of his physical possession of the subject property, to his act of demolition of the ancestral house.

On the other hand, respondents assert possession likewise by virtue of ownership manifested in their residence at Lot No. 2476 spanning more than five (5) decades, reckoned even from the time Maria, respondents’ grandmother and sister of Petra, was alive and resided thereat.15

Respondents trace their possession from the extrajudicial partition of the commingled properties of the siblings Maria, respondents’ direct ascendant, Petra and Mariano, father of Teodoro Teodoro, progeny and heirs of Genaro.16 According to respondents, from the partition, the heirs of all three Genaro children possessed and occupied their respective shares: respondents received Lot No. 2476 which encompasses herein subject property, while Teodoro Teodoro and his siblings received a different property, "a 667 residential lot at Bambang, Bulacan, Bulacan."

Also, respondents aver that, through respondent Rosario Santiago, they paid for Lot No. 2476’s realty taxes. Respondents counter that the subject property was not solely bequeathed to Teodoro Teodoro as it is part of Petra’s estate for disposition to her legitimate heirs, including herein respondents. Lastly, on Teodoro Teodoro’s claim that he had solely effected the demolition of the ancestral house, respondents contend that they had allowed the demolition upon the understanding that the parties would then completely partition the subject property, as that portion is centrally located in Lot No. 2476 where the respondents actually reside.

Given both parties respective claims of ownership over the subject property via succession from their ascendants Maria, Petra and Mariano Teodoro, who are all compulsory heirs of Genaro in whose name the subject property is still registered, the MTC ruled that respondents cannot be disturbed in their possession of the subject property "until and unless the question of ownership over the same [is] finally resolved before the appropriate court."

In contrast, the RTC, without categorically resolving the issue of ownership of Lot No. 2476, ruled that on the portion of Lot No. 2476 where the ancestral house used to stand, Teodoro did establish his prior physical possession over the subject property resulting in his right to institute the ejectment suit against respondents. Significantly, the RTC confirmed respondents’ physical possession of, and residency at, Lot No. 2476.

There would yet be another turn of events. The appellate court, albeit refusing to touch and rule on the issue of ownership, declared that there lacked conclusive evidence of Teodoro Teodoro’s prior actual physical possession over the subject property. Thus, the appellate court dismissed

Teodoro Teodoro’s complaint for lack of merit.

We are now asked for a final ruling.

We grant the petition. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and restore the decision of the RTC on the appeal reversing the MTC.

We affirm the finding of fact by the RTC which is decisive of the issue that has remained unresolved inspite of a summary procedure and two appellate reviews of the forcible entry case filed by Teodoro Teodoro. The RTC said:

Analyzing the facts of the case, the lower [court] concluded that the subject parcel is a part of the estate of the late Genaro Teodoro and in the absence of an approved partition among the heirs, remains a community property over which the legal heirs of Genaro Teodoro have the right to inherit. All therefore are entitled to exercise the right of dominion including the right of possession.17 (Emphasis supplied).

The RTC’s comment that it "disagrees with the said ruling" only meant that "the lower court cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership" since such ownership issue is "inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of possession."18 And so the RTC ruled that Teodoro Teodoro should be restored in the lawful possession of the disputed area of Lot No. 2476 in light of the finding of the MTC that the subject lot still forms part of the estate of the late Genaro Teodoro. It is from this same fact that the MTC reached the contrary conclusion that Teodoro Teodoro’s complaint should be dismissed because he has "failed to prove his ownership."19

In the sense that Teodoro Teodoro has not proven exclusive ownership, the MTC was right. 1âwphi1 But exclusive ownership of Lot No. 2476 or a portion thereof is not in this case required of Teodoro Teodoro for him to be entitled to possession. Co-ownership, the finding of both the MTC at first instance and by the RTC on appeal, is sufficient. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:

Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.

Art. 1078. When there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased.

Certainly, and as found by the trial courts, the whole of Lot No. 2476 including the portion now litigated is, owing to the fact that it has remained registered in the name of Genaro who is the common ancestor of both parties herein, co-owned property. All, or both Teodoro Teodoro and respondents are entitled to exercise the right of possession as co-owners.

Neither party can exclude the other from possession. Although the property remains unpartitioned, the respondents in fact possess specific areas. Teodoro Teodoro can likewise point to a specific area, which is that which was possessed by Petra. Teodoro Teodoro cannot be dispossessed of such area, not only by virtue of Petra's bequeathal in his favor but also because of his own right of possession that comes from his co-ownership of the property. As the RTC concluded, petitioners, as heirs substituting Teodoro

Teodoro in this suit, should be restored in the lawful possession of the disputed area.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99805 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 634-M-06 is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1580               October 6, 2010[Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1608-MTJ]

LOURDES B. FERRER and PROSPERIDAD M. ARANDEZ, Complainants, vs.JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 25, Manila, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

This administrative case charges Hon. Romeo A. Rabaca, then the Presiding Judge of Branch 25 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), with ignorance of the law, disregard of the law, dereliction of duty, knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order, and violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Officials.

The complainants were the President and the Executive Director of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 176394-CV of the MeTC, an ejectment suit entitled Young Women’s Christian Association, Inc. v. Conrado Cano. After trial, Civil Case No. 176394-CV was decided on June 22, 2004 by respondent Judge,1 who disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter as follows:

(a) to vacate the premises located at Ground Floor, YMCA, 1144 Gen. Luna St., Ermita, Manila; and surrender possession thereof to plaintiff;

(b) to pay plaintiff the sum of Php45,211.80 representing his arrears in rentals from February 2003 to July 2003 at Php7,535.30 a month plus the further sum of Php7,535.30 a month as reasonable value for the continued use and occupation of the premises starting August 2003 until the same is finally vacated and possession thereof is turn-over to plaintiff;

(c) to pay the plaintiff the sum of Php20,000 as attorney’s fees; and

(d) to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

On July 12, 2004, the plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion for immediate execution, praying that a writ of execution be issued "for the immediate execution of the aforesaid Judgment." The plaintiff cited Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court as basis for its motion.2

In his order dated July 14, 2004, however, respondent Judge denied the motion for immediate execution,3stating:

A Notice of Appeal dated July 9, 2004, having been seasonably filed by counsel for the defendant, let the records of the above-captioned case be, as it is hereby ordered, elevated to the Regional Trial Court of Manila for appropriate proceedings and disposition.

In view thereof, no more action shall be taken on the Motion for Execution dated July 8, 2004 filed by the plaintiff thru counsel.

SO ORDERED.

According to the complainants, their counsel talked with respondent Judge about the matter. Allegedly, respondent Judge told their counsel that "if you think the court is wrong, file a motion for reconsideration." With that, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent Judge nonetheless denied in his order dated July 28, 2004,4 thuswise:

Considering that the Court has already given due course to the appeal of the defendant which was perfected within the reglementary period, no more action will be taken on the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2004 filed by the plaintiff thru counsel.

The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to immediately forward the records of this case to the Regional Trial Court, Manila.

SO ORDERED.

The complainants averred that respondent Judge’s denial of their motions had rendered their victory inutile, and had unfairly deprived the plaintiff of the possession of the premises. They further averred that respondent Judge’s refusal to perform an act mandated by the Rules of Court had given undue advantage to the defendant to the plaintiff’s damage and prejudice.

The Court required respondent Judge to comment on the administrative complaint against him.

In his comment dated September 16, 2004,5 respondent Judge denied the charges. He explained that he had honestly thought that his court had lost jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the provision of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (which provides that "in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties") once he had given due course to the defendant’s notice of appeal. He claimed that he had issued the orders in good faith and with no malice after a fair and impartial evaluation of the facts, applicable rules, and jurisprudence; and that if he had thereby committed lapses in the issuance of the orders, his doing so should be considered as error of judgment on his part.

He lastly insisted that he did not know personally the parties in Civil Case No. 176394-CV, and had absolutely no reason to give undue favor or advantage to the defendant; that the complainants did not submit evidence to show that the orders had been issued for a consideration, material or otherwise, or that his issuance of the orders had been motivated by ill-will or bad faith.

In their reply dated September 22, 2004,6 the complainants contended that respondent Judge exhibited his ignorance of the law and procedure in relying on Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which referred to appeals from the Regional Trial Court; that Rule 40, which contained provisions on appeal from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts, and which provided in its Section 4 that the perfection of the appeal and the effect of such perfection should be governed by the provisions of Section 9 of Rule 41, concerned appeals by notice of appeal in general; and that instead, the applicable rule should be Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

The complainants pointed out that respondent Judge apparently did not know that appeal in forcible entry and detainer cases was not perfected by the mere filing of a notice of appeal (as in ordinary actions) but by filing of a notice of appeal and a sufficient supersedeas bond approved by the trial judge executed to the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from. They asserted that respondent Judge’s invocation of good faith and error of judgment did not absolve him of liability, because he had grossly neglected his duties mandated by law by failing and refusing to act on their motion for immediate execution and motion for reconsideration and by giving due course to the appeal despite no supersedeas bond having been filed and approved by the trial court.

In his memorandum dated January 13, 2005,7 then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., now Associate Justice of the Court, recommended that the administrative complaint against respondent Judge be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and that respondent Judge be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely, based on an evaluation of the charges, as follows:

EVALUATION: We agree with the complainants that respondent erred when he did not act on complainants’ motion for immediate execution.

Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides:

"SEC. 19. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unlessan appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. XXXX XXXX XXXX."

It is clear from the foregoing that the perfection of an appeal by itself is not sufficient to stay the execution of the judgment in an ejectment case. The losing party should likewise file a supersedeas bond executed in favor of the plaintiff to answer for rents, damages and costs, and, if the judgment of the court requires it, he should likewise deposit the amount of the rent before the appellate court from the time during the pendency of the appeal.Otherwise, execution becomes ministerial and imperative. (Philippine Holding Corporation vs. Valenzuela, 104 SCRA 401 as cited in Hualam Construction and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 612, 626).

In the case at bar, defendant seasonably filed his Notice of Appeal dated 9 July 2004 on 13 July 2004; he however failed to file any supersedeas bond. Prior to the filing of such notice of appeal, more specifically on 12 July 2004, complainants have already filed their Motion for Execution dated 8 July 2004. Instead of acting on the Motion for Execution, respondent Judge Rabaca gave due course to the appeal in an Order dated 14 July 2004 and directed his Branch Clerk of Court to elevate the records of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Branch Clerk of Court however failed to forward the records to the RTC. This fact is clear from Judge Rabaca’s Order dated 28 July 2004 wherein he directed the Branch Clerk of Court to forward the records of the case to the Manila Regional Trial Court immediately.

From the foregoing, it is clear that when the complainant moved for the immediate execution of Judge Rabaca’s decision, the latter still had jurisdiction over the case. He therefore clearly erred when he refused to act on the Motion for Execution. The relevant question that we should resolve however is whether such error is an error of judgment or an error amounting to incompetence that calls for administrative discipline.

Judge Rabaca claims that he refused to act on the complainant’s Motion for execution because he honestly thought that when he gave due course to the defendant’s appeal which was seasonably filed, and ordered the elevation of the records to the appellate court, his court already lost jurisdiction over the case.. In making his ruling, respondent asserts he relied on the provisions of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. This provision reads as follows:

In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

He likewise allegedly relied on the ruling of the Court in Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 03-1513-MTJ: Susana Joaquin Vda. De Agregado vs. Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina, MeTJ wherein the Court said that-

Respondent Judge is correct in saying that she had lost jurisdiction to entertain the motion for execution after the perfection of the appeal and after she issued an order to transmit the records of the case to the appellate court for review.

The facts of the case against Judge Bunyi-Medina are however different from those prevailing in the instant case. In the Medina case, the fifteen (15) day period within which to perfect the appeal had already lapsed before the complainant therein moved for the execution of the execution judgment. Clearly therefore, appeal had already been perfected. In the instant case, although the defendant had filed his appeal, the period to appeal had not yet lapsed since the plaintiff still had his own period to appeal from the judgment and such period had not yet lapsed. The provision relied upon by judge Rabaca, more specifically, Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, clearly states that, "In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon perfection of the appeals filed on due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties." Moreover and more importantly, the herein complainants filed their Motion for Execution even before the defendant had filed his Notice of Appeal. Such motion was therefore still well within the jurisdiction of the lower court.

It is basic rule in ejectment cases that the execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff is a matter of right and mandatory. This has been the consistent ruling of the Court in a number of cases involving the same issue posed before the respondent judge. Respondent Judge is expected to know this and his justification of erroneous application of the law, although mitigating, could not exculpate him from liability.

We agree with and adopt the evaluation of the Court Administrator.

Indeed, respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution considering that the defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas bond despite having appealed. Granting the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution became his ministerial duty upon the defendant’s failure to file the sufficient supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court clearly imposes such duty, viz:

Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. — If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.

xxx

Respondent Judge’s excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the defendant’s appeal, was unacceptable in light of the clear and explicit text of the aforequoted rule. To begin with, the perfection of the appeal by the defendant did not forbid the favorable action on the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution. The execution of the decision could not be stayed by the mere taking of the appeal. Only the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit with the appellate court of the amount of rent due from time to time, coupled with the perfection of the appeal,

could stay the execution. Secondly, he could not also credibly justify his omission to act according to the provision by claiming good faith or honest belief, or by asserting lack of malice or bad faith. 1avvphil A rule as clear and explicit as Section 19 could not be misread or misapplied, but should be implemented without evasion or hesitation. To us, good faith, or honest belief, or lack of malice, or lack of bad faith justifies a non-compliance only when there is an as-yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or applicability of a rule or legal provision. It was not so herein. And, thirdly, given that his court, being vested with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases similar to Civil Case No. 176394-CV, had been assigned many such cases, he was not a trial judge bereft of the pertinent prior experience to act on the issue of immediate execution, a fact that further exposed the abject inanity of his excuses.

We agree with the complainants’ insistence, therefore, that respondent Judge’s omission to apply Section 19 was inexcusable. He had ignored the urging to follow the clear and explicit provision of the rule made in the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution. Had he any genuine doubt about his authority to grant the motion for immediate execution, as he would have us believe, he could have easily and correctly resolved the doubt by a resort to the Rules of Court, which he well knew was the repository of the guidelines he was seeking for his judicial action. Neither was it relevant that he did not know any of the parties, or that he did not corruptly favor the defendant by his omission. His mere failure to perform a duty enjoined by the Rules of Court sufficed to render him administratively accountable.

This case is an opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to adhere always to the mandate under Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court to issue writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs in actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer when the defendant has appealed but has not filed a sufficient supersedeas bond. The summary nature of the special civil action under Rule 70 and the purpose underlying the mandate for an immediate execution, which is to prevent the plaintiffs from being further deprived of their rightful possession, should always be borne in mind.

The recommended penalty of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely is also correct. The Court Administrator rationalized the recommendation of the penalty thuswise:

Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, ‘Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure’ is classified as serious offense for which the imposable penalty ranges from a fine to dismissal. However, we find respondent’s acts not ingrained with malice or bad faith. It is a matter of public policy that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corrupt motive, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. In Domingo vs. Judge Pagayatan, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1751, 10 June 2003, the penalty of fine in the amount of five thousand pesos was deemed sufficient where it was held that respondent’s lack of malice or bad faith frees him from administrative liability but not for gross ignorance of the law.

We concur with the rationalization of the Court Administrator. Verily, even if respondent Judge’s omission would have easily amounted to gross

ignorance of the law and procedure, a serious offense under Section 8,8 Rule 140, of the Rules of Court, as amended, the fact that the complainants did not establish that malice or bad faith impelled his omission to act, or that fraud, dishonesty, or a corrupt motive attended his omission to act demands a downgrading of the liability. In the absence of any showing that he had been held guilty of any other administrative offense,9 and without our attention being called to other circumstances that might demonstrate respondent Judge’s dark motives for his inaction, we should find and consider the recommended penalty of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely to be commensurate to the offense.10

WHEREFORE, we find respondent JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA, Presiding Judge of Branch 25, Metropolitan Trial Court, in Manila guilty of ignorance of the law and procedure, and, accordingly, impose upon him a fine ofP5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION 

CGR CORPORATION herein represented by its President ALBERTO RAMOS, III, HERMAN M. BENEDICTO and ALBERTO R. BENEDICTO,

                                 Petitioners,                    - versus -   ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR.,

Respondent.

G.R. No.    170916 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,CARPIO,CARPIO MORALES,TINGA, andVELASCO, JR., JJ.                                                              Promulgated:

                            

April 27, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 

D E C I S I O N 

CARPIO MORALES, J.:Assailed via petition for review are issuances of the Regional Trial Court

(RTC), Branch 43, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 04-12284, to wit:  Order[1] dated August 26, 2005 which dismissed petitioners’ complaint for damages on the ground ofprematurity, and Order[2] dated January 2, 2006 which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

 In issue is one of law – whether a complainant in a forcible entry case can

file an independent action for damages arising after the act of dispossession had occurred.

 

CGR Corporation, Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto (petitioners) claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of public land in Barangay Bulanon, Sagay City, Negros Occidental even before the notarized separate Fishpond Lease Agreement Nos. 5674,[3] 5694[4] and 5695[5] in their respective favor were approved in October 2000 by the Secretary of Agriculture for a period of twenty-five (25) years or until December 31, 2024.

 On November 18, 2000, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. (respondent) allegedly

forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased properties and once inside barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the road going to petitioners’ fishponds, and harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by petitioners.

 On November 22, 2000, petitioners promptly filed with the Municipal Trial

Court (MTC) in Sagay City separate complaints for Forcible Entry   With   Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction And Damages, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 1331,[6] 1332[7] and 1333,[8] against Ernesto M. Treyes, Sr. and respondent.

 In a separate move, petitioners filed in March 2004 with the Bacolod RTC

a complaint for damages   against respondent, docketed as Civil Case No, 04-12284, alleging, inter alia,

 x x x x

 V 

That prior to the issuance of the fishpond lease agreement in favor of the plaintiffs, they had already been in open and continuous possession of the same parcel of land;

    

VI 

As lessee and in possession of the above[-]described fishpond, plaintiffs have continuously occupied, cultivated and developed the said

fishpond and since then, had been regularly harvesting milkfish, shrimps, mud crabs and other produce of the fishponds;

 VII

 That the yearly income of the fishpond   of the plaintiff corporation

is at least   P 300,000.00  more or less, while the yearly income of the fishpond of plaintiff Herman Benedicto, Sr. is at least   P 100,000.00  more or less, and the yearly income of the fishpond of plaintiff Alberto Benedicto is at least   P 100,000.00  more or less;

 VIII

 That sometime last November 18, 2000 or thereabout, defendant

Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. and his armed men and with the help of the blue guards from the Negros Veterans Security Agency forcibly and unlawfully entered the fishponds of the plaintiffs and once inside barricaded the entrance of the fishpond and set up barb wire fence along the road going to plaintiffs fishpond and harvested the milkfish and carted away several tons of milkfish   owned by the plaintiffs;

 IX

 That on succeeding days, defendant’s men continued their forage

on the fishponds of the plaintiffs by carting and taking away the remaining full grown milkfish, fry and fingerlings and other marine products in the fishponds.  NOT ONLY THAT, even the chapel built by plaintiff CGR Corporation was ransacked and destroyed and the materials taken away by defendant’s men.  Religious icons were also stolen and as an extreme act of sacrilege, even decapitated the heads of some of these icons;

 x x x x

 XIII

 That the unlawful, forcible and illegal intrusion/destruction   of

defendant Ernesto Treyes, Jr. and his men on the fishpond leased and possessed by the plaintiffs is without any authority of law and in violation of Article 539 of the New Civil Code which states:

 

“Art. 539.  Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession;  and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and rules of  the Court.”[9] (Underscoring supplied)

   and praying for the following reliefs:

 1)            Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff CGR Corporation the sum

of at least P900,000.00 and to plaintiffs Herman and AlbertoBenedicto, the sum of at least P300,000.00 each by way of actual damages and such other amounts as proved during the trial;

 2)            Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum

of P100,000.00 each as moral damages; 3)            Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum

of P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages; 4)            Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum

of P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and to reimburse plaintiffs with all such sums paid to their counsel by way of appearance fees.[10]  (Underscoring supplied)

  Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss[11] petitioners’ complaint for damages

on three grounds – litis   pendentia , res   judicata and forum shopping. By the assailed Order[12] of August 26, 2005, Branch 43 of the Bacolod RTC

dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground of prematurity, it holding that a complaint for damages may only be maintained “after a final determination on the forcible entry cases has been made.” 

 Hence, the present petition for review. 

The only issue is whether, during the pendency of their separate complaints for forcible entry, petitioners can independently institute and maintain an action for damages which they claim arose from incidents occurring after the dispossession by respondent of the premises.

 Petitioners meet the issue in the affirmative.  Respondents assert otherwise. The petition is impressed with merit. Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

 SEC. 17. Judgment. – If after trial the court finds that the

allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney’s fees and costs.  If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs.  If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires.  (Emphasis supplied)

  The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to

“rents” or “the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises” or “fair rental value of the property” and attorney’s fees and costs.[13]  

 The 2006 case of Dumo v. Espinas[14] reiterates the long-established rule that

the only form of damages that may be recovered in an action for forcible entry is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property:

 Lastly, we agree with the CA and the RTC that there is no basis

for the MTC to award actual, moral, and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property.  Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained

as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and   not   the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. x x x[15] (Emphasis, underscoring and italics supplied; citations omitted)

  Other damages must thus be claimed in an ordinary action.[16]

 In asserting the negative of the issue, respondent cites the 1999 case

of Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[17]  In this case, Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. (Progressive), as lessor, repossessed the leased premises from the lessee allegedly pursuant to their contract of lease whereby it was authorized to do so if the lessee failed to pay monthly rentals.  The lessee filed a case for forcible entry with damages against Progressive before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ofQuezon City.  During the pendency of the case, the lessee filed an action for damages before the RTC, drawing Progressive to file a motion to dismiss based on litis pendentia.  The RTC denied the motion.

 On appeal by Progressive, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC order

denying the motion to dismiss. Progressive brought the case to this Court.   Citing Section 1, Rule 70 of the

Rules of Court, this Court reversed the lower courts’ ruling, it holding that “all cases for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed before the Municipal Trial Court which shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs therefrom.”  In other words, this Court held that “no claim for damages arising out of forcible entry or unlawful   detainer   may be filed separately and independently of the claim for restoration of possession.”[18]  (Underscoring supplied)

 In thus ruling, this Court in Progressive made a comparative study of the

therein two complaints, thus: 

A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent against petitioner before the two (2) trial courts shows that not only are the elements of res adjudicata present, at least insofar as the

claim for actual and compensatory damages is concerned, but also that the claim for damages–moral and exemplary in addition to actual and compensatory–constitutes   splitting a single cause of action .  Since this runs counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the second action becomes imperative.

 The complaint for forcible entry contains the following pertinent

allegations – 

2.01  On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered into a contract of lease with defendant PDC over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter “Subject Premises”) situated at the corner of EDSA corner MacArthur Street,Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of ten (10) years from 02 January 1989 to 30 April 1998.

 2.02  Immediately after having acquired actual

physical possession of the Subject Premises, plaintiff established and now operates thereon the now famous Seafood Market Restaurant. Since then, plaintiff had been in actual, continuous, and peaceful physical possession of the Subject Premises until 31 October 1992.

 x x x x 3.02  Plaintiff, being the lessee of the Subject

Premises, is entitled to the peaceful occupation and enjoyment of the Subject Premises to the exclusion of all others, including defendants herein.

 3.03  Defendants’ resort to strong arms tactics to

forcibly wrest possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff and maintain possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation by the use of superior number of men and arms amounts to the taking of the law into their own hands.

 3.04  Thus, defendants’ act of unlawfully evicting

out plaintiff from the  Subject Premises it is leasing from defendant PDC and depriving it of possession thereof

through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation should be condemned and declared illegal for being contrary to public order and policy.

 3.05  Consequently, defendants should be enjoined

from continuing with their illegal acts and be ordered to vacate the Subject Premises and restore possession thereof, together with its contents to plaintiff.

 x x x x 4.07  Considering that defendants’ act of forcibly

grabbing possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff is illegal and null and void, defendant should be adjudged liable to plaintiff for all the   aforedescribed   damages which plaintiff incurred as a result thereof. The amended complaint for damages filed by private

respondent alleges basically the same factual circumstances and issues as bases for the relief prayed for, to wit:

 4.  On May 28, 1991, plaintiff and defendant PDC

entered into a Contract of Lease for a period of ten years or fromJanuary 2, 1989 up to April 30, 1998 over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter referred to as Subject Premises) situated at the corner of EDSA corner McArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City.  A copy of the lease contract is attached hereto as Annex “A.”

 5.  Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual

physical possession of Subject Premises, and established thereon the now famous “Seafood Market Restaurant.”

 x x x x 7.  On October 31, 1992 at around 8:30 p.m.,

defendant PDC, without the benefit of any writ of possession or any lawful court order and with the aid of approximately forty (40) armed security guards and policemen under the supervision of defendant Tejam,

forcibly entered the subject premises through force, intimidation, threats and stealth and relying on brute force and in a thunderboltish manner and against plaintiff’s will, unceremoniously drew away all of plaintiffs men out of the subject premises, thereby depriving herein plaintiff of its actual, physical and natural possession of the subject premises.  The illegal high-handed manner of gestapo like take-over by defendants of subject premises is more particularly described as follows:  x x x x

 8.  To date, defendants continue to illegally possess

and hold the Subject Premises, including all the multi-million improvements, fixtures and equipment therein owned by plaintiff, all to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff.  The actuations of defendants constitute an unlawful appropriation, seizure and taking of property against the will and consent of plaintiff.  Worse, defendants are threatening to sell at public auction and without the consent, of plaintiff and without lawful authority, the multi-million fixtures and equipment of plaintiff and at prices way below the market value thereof.  Plaintiff hereby attaches as Annex “B” the letter from defendants dated August 6, 1993 addressed to plaintiff, informing the latter that the former intends to sell at an auction on August 19, 1993 at 2:00 p.m. properties of the plaintiff presently in defendants’ possession.

 x x x x 12.  Defendant’s unlawful takeover of the premises

constitutes a violation of its obligation under Art. 1654 of the New Civil Code requiring the lessor to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract.  Hence, plaintiff has filed the present suit for the recovery of damages under Art. 1659 of the New Civil Code x x x x[19]  (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) 

 Analyzing the two complaints, this Court, still in Progressive, observed: 

Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of action, namely, the alleged unlawful entry by petitioner into the leased premises out of which three (3) reliefs (denominated by private respondent as its causes of action) arose:  (a)  the restoration by the lessor (petitioner herein) of the possession of the leased premises to the lessee, (b) the claim for actual damages due to the losses suffered by private respondent   such as the   deterioration of perishable foodstuffs stored inside the premises   and the deprivation of the use of the premises causing loss of expected profits;  and, (c) the claim for attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

 On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a

monetary award consisting of (a) moral damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of another P500,000.00;  (b) actual damages of P20,000.00 and compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00 representing unrealized profits;  and, (c) P200,000.00 for attorney’s fees and costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of the leased premises by petitioner.  Since actual and compensatory damages were already prayed for in the forcible entry case before the MeTC, it is obvious that this cannot be relitigated in the damage suit before the RTC by reason of res adjudicata.

 The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also

succeed considering that   these sprung from the main incident being heard before the   MeTC . x x x[20]  (Italics in the original;  Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

   It bears noting, however, that as reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations in

the complaint for damages of herein petitioners, their claim for damages have no direct relation to their loss of possession of the premises.  It had to do with respondent’s allegedharvesting and carting away   several tons of milkfish and other marine products in their fishponds, ransacking and destroying   of a chapel built by petitioner CGR Corporation, and stealing religious icons   and even decapitating the heads of some of them, after the act of dispossession had occurred. 

 Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia  that the identity between the

pending actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, is

such that any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is successful, amount tores judicata in the action under consideration  is not present, hence, it may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners’ complaint for damages.[21]

 Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no

jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the use and occupation of the premises and attorney’s fees.[22] 

 Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for

damages, the elements of litis pendentia not being present, or where a final judgment in the forcible entry case will not amount to res judicata in the former.[23]

 Petitioners’ filing of an independent action for damages other than those

sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action. 

 WHEREFORE, the Orders dated August 26, 2005 and January 2,

2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43,Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 04-12284 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 

 The Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, is directed to

REINSTATE Civil Case No. 04-12284 to its docket and to conduct proceedings thereon with dispatch.

 

SO ORDERED.