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JOURNAL OF

THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

VOLUME 1 NOVEMBER, 1975 NUMBER 2

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

1. The Australian Naval Institute has been formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory.The main objects of the Institute are:-

a. to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and theMaritime profession.

b. to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy andthe Maritime profession.

c. to publish a journal.

2. The Institute is self supporting and non-profit making. The aim is to encourage freedom of dis-cussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professionalknowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

3. Membership of the Institute is open to:—

a. Regular Members—Members of the Permanent Naval Forces of Australia.

b. Associate Members-' 1) Members of the Reserve Naval Forces of Australia.

(2) Members of the Australian Military Forces and the RoyalAustralian Air Force both permanent and reserve.

(3) Ex-members of the Australian Defence Forces, both permanentand reserve components, provided that they have been honourablydischarged from that force.

(4) Other persons having and professing a special interest in navaland maritime affairs.

c. Honorary Members—A person who has fade a distinguished contribution to the Naval ormaritime profession or who has rendered distinguished service to theInstitute may be elected by the Council to Honorary Membership.

4. Joining fee for Regular and Associate Member is $5. Annual Subscription for both is $10.

5. Inquiries and application for membership should be directed to:-

The Secretary,Australian Naval Institute,P.O. Box 18,DEAKIN, A.C.T. 2600.

CONTRIBUTIONS

As the Australian Naval Institute exists for the promotion and advancement of knowledgerelating to the Naval and maritime profession, all members are strongly encouraged to submitarticles for publication. Only in this way will our aims be achieved.

DISCLAIMER

In writing for the Institute it must be borne in mind that the views expressed are those of theauthor and not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Naval Board or the Institute.

JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE (INC)

CONTENTS

Title PagePresident's Annual Report 2

Chapter News 2Correspondence 3

financial Statement 3

The Future Role of the Women's Services - by Capt. B. D. Macleod, AM, WRANS 4Letter from the United States Naval Institute 8

Reply to the United States Naval Institute 9

Naval Air Power and the RAN - by Cmdr. H. J. Donohue, RAN 10

From the President 22

Editor's Note 22

Software at Sea - by Lcdr. C. J. Skinner, RAN 23

Ship Handling Corner 28

Australia's Long-Term Defence Requirements - by Cmdr. G. W. Furlong, RAN .. 29

Technical Topics 36Classic Signals 37Book Review... 38

Articles or condensations of articles are not to be reprinted or reproduced without the permissionof the Institute. Extracts may be quoted for the purposes of research, review or comment providedthe source is acknowledged.

SUBS! SUBS!! SUBS!!!(No, not that sort, this sort)

Literary. To keep the Journal a viable proposition we need literary subscriptions - articles - itemsfor the regular feature columns - letters to the editor. THERE IS NO PARTY LINE therefore anybudding scribe who desires to air a view or is bursting to get something off his chest is invited tosubmit an appropriate item.

Financial. Members are reminded that renewal of membership subscriptions for the year commencing1 October 1975 are due by 31 December 1975.

OUR COVER

The front cover picture is a reproduction of a painting by Dennis Hardy, by courtesy of Mr. A. E.Stephen of Surfers Paradise.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute-Page 1

President's Report presented at the Annual GeneralMeeting held on 7 November 1975

Members of the Australian Naval Institute. Thisis the first, I hope, of many annual President'sReports. It gives me great pleasure to report to youthe activities of the Australian Naval Institute andthe Council since we were formed.

You will recall that a Special Meeting was heldin this room on 4 April this year at which 35attended. On the books at that time were 57foundation members. Since then a total of 95 newmembers have joined and our membership at today'sdate is 91 regular, 61 associate and 3 honorary mem-bers. Our honorary members are Admiral Sir VictorSmith AC, KBE, DSC, Vice Admiral H. D. StevensonCBEand His Honour, Judge T. G. Rapke QC.

Since election of office bearers the Council hasmet monthly, in all 7 times. At these meetings theCouncil has dealt with applications for membership,formed sub-committees to draft By-Laws (now inthe hands of the printer), Journal (first issue was inAugust) and publicity /membership. Additionallythe Council is investigating the feasibility of build-ing a National headquarters. A site has been tenta-tively reserved in Deakin ACT for this purpose. Itmust be realised that it would be a mammoth pro-ject and well beyond current resources. To gaugewhat assistance we could obtain letters have beenwritten to the Naval Association, Naval HistoricalSociety, the Navy League and the Canberra NavalWives' Association. The idea is to see if a jointventure would be feasible. Negotiations are stillin progress with these organisations.

I would like now to briefly mention our Journalpolicy. I think you will agree that onr first publish-ing venture was most successful and a credit to thosewho worked so hard to put it together. It is pro-posed to issue the second number later this monthand then quarterly. To sustain this programme weneed two things. Firstly, constant and vigorousaction in the form of contributions, articles andletters. This is your Journal. It requires your activesupport. A high quality production will also attractsuitable advertisers whose backing will improveboth the standard and frequency of issues. Secondly,and more importantly we need many more members.I exhort you to recruit as many as possible.Page 2 - Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

The Crest competition has attracted some highquality entries. The Council thinks that perhapssome members are diffident about their drawingability and are therefore reluctant to submit designs.It is intended to co-opt a skilled artist who willtranslate any suggestion, no matter how rough,into a presentable format for judging. The Councilhas decided to extend the competition until 31December 1975 in the hope that more memberswill forward their ideas.

Our financial position and record of income andexpenditure up to the end of our financial year (30September) have been distributed separately andwill be printed in the next issue of the Journal.

To summarise, a most promising start; one whichaugurs well for the future and one of which we allmay be proud.

CHAPTER NEWS

CanberraThe Canberra Chapter has had three well-

attended meetings this quarter. On 30 July Com-mander H. J. Donohue RAN read a paper on "NavalAirpower and the RAN". This subject is probablyuppermost in our minds at the present and shouldspark off some lively debate. On the 22 OctoberCaptain B. D. MacLeod AM, WRANS, delivered aprovocative paper on "The Future Role of Womenin the Services". This was a most interesting talkand stimulated considerable interest and questions.

On 7 November (after the AGM) Captain T. R.Fisher RAN spoke on "The Indian Armed Services— an Overview". This was a wide ranging and in-formative address.

Convener: Captain L. G. Fox RAN - DNEP

SydneyThe Sydney Chapter had its first meeting at RAN

House on 22 October. This was a very successfulfirst. A film "Rise of the Red Navy" was shownand two papers "The Battleship Mentality Part 1"(Captain J. A. Robertson) and "Software at Sea"(Lcdr C. J. Skinner) were delivered and invokedconsiderable interest.

The next meeting is scheduled for Wednesday 10December at RAN House starting at 2000. A paperon "Naval aspects of the Defence of Australia" willbe delivered by RADM N. E. McDonald. CaptainRobertson will then follow with "Battleship Men-tality Part 2".

Convener: Captain J. A. Robertson RANHMAS Stalwart

Secretary: Lieutenant S. P. Lemon RAN -HMAS Stalwart

WANTED: Conveners for other centres, pleaseinform the Secretary.

CorrespondenceDear Sir,

Perhaps I have read something into the editorial inVolume I of the Journal which was not really intended.However there seemed to be just a hint of a politicalstance in the fairly explicit suggestion that approval ofthe incorporation of the Institute had been delayed bythe Attorney-General for fear that another Naval pressure-group was being created along the same lines as the NavyLeague. At the risk however of being accused of beinghypercritical I must throw discretion to the winds andwrite to say that it would be deplorable if there was anytendency by the Australian Naval Institute to become amedium for the implicit or explicit expression of criti-cism of government defence policy. We have the 'PacificDefence Reporter' and surely that is enough - its credi-bility as an objective authoritative journal having beendestroyed completely by its unashamed alignment withright-wing lobbying militarists.

Whilst I would be the first to say that our Journalshould not be a facsimile of the 'United States Naval In-stitute Proceedings', nevertheless that journal does pro-vide a fine example of how a professional military journalcan adopt an apolitical stance. Let there be articlesdeploring any tendency towards liberalism in the ArmedForces and let there be articles putting a professional viewdifferent to what is current government policy but let notour editorial (presidential) comment take an alignedposition, either explicitly or by implication.

The initiative to write this letter also leads me to reflecton a deeper and rather more philosophical issue. Whilst Ido not wish to engage in a lyrical discussion of loyalty. Imust refer however, to the increasing trend among servingmilitary officers to take a political position virtually inpublic. Conversation hi Army messes at the time of the1974 General elections was blatantly anti-government.Two Army officers have recently joined the Oppositionbenches in the Australian Parliament. An Army friendphoned me after the Bass by-election to say that Bass isanother step in the direction of the 'bloodless coup'. I

thought at the time that such attitudes were restrictedto our khaki bretheren but now I wonder .. . Navalofficers are entitled to their personal political views, evento the extent of standing up and being counted byresigning and standing for election (even though re-instatement is always possible if unsuccessful), but let uskeep such views personal... or reserved for our friendslate at night.

The division between bona fide professional commentand non-objective biased policy criticism should not behard to draw, and indeed it must be drawn if the Austra-lian Naval Institute is to survive to work towards itsobjectives. They are worthy objectives for Australia isa maritime nation and there is much to be said of relevanceto the Navy and the Maritime profession. A reactionaryviewpoint on Naval matters is valid but nonetheless, beingsuch conservative animals, it is probably more necessarythat we should be exposed to the radical viewpoint.

The main thrust of this letter has I hope been apparent.We live in times of quite dramatic social and technologicalchange and we must be prepared to accept change in allits dimensions. In political terms, there is a cold chill inthe air when conversation among personnel of the ArmedForces turns to matters political and rational conversationgives way to extreme reaction expressed in narrow-minded,bigoted and ill-informed terms. I trust that the Journal ofthe Australian Naval Institute never serves to add to thischill.

Yours sincerely,

W. S. G. BatemanCommander, R.A.N.

40 Longerenong Street,Farrer, A.C.T. 2607

21st October 1975

Editorial CommentCommander Bateman has read into the article "The

Australian Naval Institute - How it Began" somethingwhich does not exist. The references to the Registrar andthe Attorney-General are factual. That is how it happened.The whole purpose of "How it Began" was to place onrecord for posterity the problems and frustrations ofstarting the Australian Naval Institute. The remainder ofCommander Bateman's letter is best judged by memberson its own merits.

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE FINANCIAL STATEMENT 1974/75Income and Expenditure Account for the year ended 30th September 1975

Advertising 25.60Bank Charges 2.50Legal Fees 57.40PO Box Rental 11.00Postage 28.61Printing and Stationery 841.98Surplus for the year 1361.84

Subscriptions ReceivableBank Interest ReceivedAdvertising Space Sold

1940.008.93

380.00

S2328.93

Statement of Receipts and Payments for the year ended 30th September 1975Subscriptions ReceivedBank Interest Received

1940.OO8.93

$1948.93

Advertising 25.60Bank Charges 2.50Legal Fees re Incorporation 57.40PO Box Rental 11.00Postage 28.61Printing and Stationery 841.98Cash on Hand 309.31Cash at Bank 672.53

Accumulated FundSurplus for the year

Balance Sheet as at 30th September 1975Current Assets

1361.84 Sundry Debtors 380.00Cash at Bank 672.53Cash on Hand 309.31

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute - Page 3

The Future Role of the Women'sServices

An address to the Australian Naval Institute, Canberra, Wednesday, 22nd October 1975,

by Captain B. D. MacLeod. AM, WRANS

INTRODUCTION

The year 1975 will undoubtedly be seen infuture years as a landmark for womankind. TheUnited Nations Organisation's proclamation that1975 was to be termed International Women'sYear (IWY), and that the member nations of theOrganisation were to focus their energies andefforts towards women's roles and rights in alllevels of society, has been the catalyst for a kindof female revolution.

As was to be expected, concentration uponwomen's rights, duties and responsibilities has gen-erated close scrutiny of political, legal, judicial andsocial mores, particularly in the more developednations. In turn, this has resulted in internationalconferences and commissions, national boards andsurveys, and industrial, commercial, and socialinvestigations, all stimulated by enormous mediainterest and coverage.

Every activity, from world forums to local actiongroups, and embracing every possible view andattitude from the conservative to the radical, thelunatic to the rational, has brought about someform of change. The effects are largely those ofidentification - the crystallising of positions, thedevelopment of aspirations and on the more prac-tical level, the recognition of the right of womento parity with men in equal contributions to anation's future.

In Australia, the wealth of material arising fromFWY activities is staggering. Almost daily morematerial becomes available about the changing roleof Australian women. Most reports concerningoccupational equality are disappointing. Recentresearch by the Senior Tutor in Economics atSydney University discloses that employmentequality lor women has not progressed at all overthe last sixty years, that the emphasis in employ-ment is simply a form of segregation from domesticservice and factory work to sales and clerical jobs.Statistics from the Public Service Board AnnualReports support this contention. In 1973, therewas one female permanent member and 850 malepermanent members of the Second Division of thePage 4 - Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Australian Public Service; in 1974 the numbersincreased to four and 1122 respectively, and in1975 to seven and 1243. Women comprise approx-imately 25% of the total permanent members of thePublic Service.

In one area, however, an employment review hasbeen undertaken which not only identifies occupa-tional inequalities pertaining to a small segment ofthe female work force, but which also makes real-istic recommendations regarding the effective andefficient use of these women in the future. For thefirst time in the history of the Australian DefenceForce, the Women's Services of that Force havebeen subjected to a fairly extensive enquiry con-cerning the employment and conditions of service oftheir members. Should (he recommendations of theReport on Employment of Women in the AustralianDefence Force be adopted, then the Defence Forceitself will be utilizing its manpower resources to thebest advantage, and the Women's Services will betaking a giant step forward.

THE ORIGIN OF THE WOMEN'S SERVICESThe Women's Services were formed and developed

during the- Second World War 1939^1945, and wereinstituted for obvious manpower reasons. Initially,the paternal belief that war was for men only gavethe military hierarchy a ready-made opportunity to

THE AUTHOR

Captain Barbara Denise MacLeod, AM, WRANS,was born in 1929 in Bunbury and educated atPerth Girls and Bunbury High Schools. She grad-uated from the W.A. Teachers' College in 1950and spent three years as a primary school teacherbefore joining the WRANS in November 1953.She has held all administrative,appointmentsavailable to WRANS Officers and has served inall States except, to her regret, Western Australia.She was appointed to the staff of Director ofOperations early in 1970, became the firstCommand WRANS Officer to FOCEA mid 1971and took over as Director, WRANS in April 1973.Her main leisure interests are golf, live theatre,gardening and talking, often to herself.

limit the employment of servicewomen to ladylikelabour such as house-keeping, cooking and typing.As the war escalated, women were employed invirtually every job for which they were physicallycapable, including the more technical and highlyskilled tasks peculiar to defence needs. Not inclu-ding the Nursing Corps, the Services reached a peakstrength of 40,000 in 1944. With the exception ofArmy Nursing sisters and a small number of Armygirl", who served with the First Army Headquartersin Lae from mid 1945, Australian servicewomendid not serve beyond Australia.

Apart from the Army and Air Force NursingServices, the other Services were disbanded in thelate 1940's. The advent of the Korean conflictand the usual male manpower shortages called forthe re-institution of the Services in the early 1950's,with the stated role of providing a nucleus of trainedpersonnel which could be rapidly expanded in emer-gencies.

The re-introduction of the Women's Services waseffected much the same as in 1941. All the oldshibboleths were resurrected and the first "peace-time" servicewomen were restricted to very smallestablishments, ,to serve in ' Australia only, to con-ventional domestic and clerical employments whichrequired minimal initial training, and to centralisa-tion of accommodation and administration. A greatmany of the benefits and entitlements enjoyed byservicemen, such as permanency of employmenttenure, Defence Forces Retirement and DeathBenefits Fund (DFRDB) and advanced training,were denied servicewomen.

THE INTERVENING YEARS - 1952 to 1975

The Women's Services of the Australian DefenceForce comprise the Women's Royal Australian NavalService (WRANS), the Women's Royal AustralianArmy Corps (WRAAC), the Women's Royal Austra-lian Air Force (WRAAF), the Royal AustralianNaval Nursing Service (RANNS), the Royal Aus-tralian Army Nursing Corps (RAANC) and theRoyal Australian Air Force Nursing Service(RAAFNS). Aditionally, there are of course,Reserve Services which are in the main, inactive.The permanent Services comprise some 4,000women which approximates to nearly 5% ofDefence uniformed personnel.

Between 1952 and 1975 significant advances weremade in establishing the Women's Services as integralparts of their parent bodies. The establishmentceilings gradually increased to the current 5% of malenumbers. In 1959, Cabinet approved permanentstatus for servicewomen which enabled them to con-tribute to the DFRDB Fund and led the way to thegranting of permanent commissions for selected

officers. Over the years, discipline for women slowlybecame almost the same as for males. Retention inthe service after marriage was introduced in 1969and controversial maternity leave benefits in 1975.Other rank servicewomen began the long haul to-wards pay parity with their male counterparts.

Whilst conditions of service improved, the em-ployment restrictions continued. College entryand training and Staff College courses for femaleofficers, and technical training and apprenticeentry for other ranks remained non-existent.Minimum training was the fundamental basis foremployment, and only in the Army did the rangeof female employments broaden to any degree.Except for a handful of service women posted toSingapore between 1967 and 1974 (and fiveWrans who enjoyed the excitement of EXPO's inCanada and Japan), only officers of the ArmyNursing Corps recieved the very rare overseasposting.

PREVIEW OF COMING ATTRACTIONS

On the 22nd May 1974, the Convention on Dis-crimination in Employment and Occupation adoptedby the International Labour Conference in 1954 wasratified by the Australian Government, thus effect-ively abolishing in Australia discrimination in em-ployment and occupation. The Convention defineddiscrimination as "any distinction, exclusion orpreference made on the basis of race, colour, sex,religion, political opinion, national extraction orsocial origin, which has the effect of nullifying orimpairing equality of opportunity or treatment inemployment or occupation". The terms "employ-ment" and "occupation" include access to voca-tional training, access to employment and particularoccupations and terms and conditions of employ-ment.

In July 1974, the Australian Prime Minister in-vited the Minister for Defence to assess the natureof servicewomen's present and future roles in theDefence Force. He stressed the objectives of IWYas improving the status of women by, amongst


other things, achieving equality of opportunitybetween women and men, and ensuring the inte-gration of women in society by emphasising theirresponsibility and role in the economic, social andcultural development of Australia and in inter-national spheres.

Later in 1974, the Prime Minister advised theMinister for Defence that it was his Government'sintention to accede to the 1955 Convention on thePolitical Rights of Women, and that this wouldextend to women the basic right to accept and holdpublic office on equal terms with men. In his letter,the Prime Minister stated his concern that "thereare at present certain aspects of the organisationand establishment of the Australian Defence Forcewhich would bring Australia into breach of theConvention". He mentioned in particular theexclusively male orientation of the Service Colleges(which prevents women from receiving trainingappropriate to the top positions within the Services),and the different pay and employment categoriesallocated to men and women.

In replying to the Prime Minister, the Ministerfor Defence stated that he was opposed to dis-crimination against women in the Defence Force.However, he considered that Australia should entera reservation to the Convention in relation to theDefence Force regarding military tasks whichrequire the physical capacities of men and theemployment of women in occupations for possibleaction in a combat area. In supporting his viewthat his reservation to the 1955 Convention couldnot be regarded as discrimination, the Ministerquoted from Article 1 of the Convention on Dis-crimination in Employment and Occupation, whichstates that "any distinction, exclusion or preferencein respect of a particular job based on the inherentrequirements thereof shall not be deemed to bediscrimination".

Against this background, two Defence WorkingParties were formed. Their reports have now beenrendered and the outcome of both will have amajor effect on the Women's Services.

One Working Party was charged with examiningthe basis of female pay fixation, using the principleof equal pay for work of equal value as the over-riding guideline. As yet, no decisions have beenreached regarding the completed report.

The second Working Party was required to developa co-ordinated policy on all aspects of the employ-ment of servicewomen. It is on this subject I wouldlike to concentrate because the future role of service-women will be determined by the employmentreview.

Page 6 - Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

THE FUTURE - A HOPEFUL SCENE

The Australian Government is resolved that itsactions and philosophies, which are, in essence, theelimination of discrimination against women in em-ployment and occupation will apply in the DefenceForce. In setting about its task therefore, the Work-ing Party was bound on the one hand by the necess-ity to pursue as far as possible the Government's em-ployment policies, and on the other, by the Australianreservation to the Convention on Discrimination inEmployment and Occupation. As a consequence ofthis, Defence policy is that servicewomen will not beallowed combat roles in combat areas, and at leastfor the immediate future, women will not be en-rolled in the Service Colleges at Duntroon, PointCook and Jervis Bay.

Both these constraints could inhibit to a signif-icant degree the full and effective utilization offemale manpower. Contradiction can be seen inpolicies of occupational equality when women areprevented from gaining the experience and expertiseessential to the implementation of such equality.

Common sense dictates that a direct combat rolefor women is not yet acceptable to Australian societyor to the Australian Defence Force, but argumentsdenying female officers a military education similarto that of male officers are difficult to find. However,partial reconciliation of the somewhat confusing prin-ciples is relatively easy. The view could be taken thatselectivity is not only justified in the Defence Forcebecause of the nature and purpose of the Force, butis also the sensible approach in limiting the pressuresof a changing external social environment, thusalleviating but not ignoring the need of the militaryto recognise, incorporate and apply these changes.

That there is discrimination against women inthe Australian Defence Force is undeniable, butthere are realistic steps which could be taken toachieve equality of employment opportunity whilstmaintaining the basic premise that it is not accept-able for servicewomen to engage in combat duties.

Government policy could be altered to allow:

a. employment of servicewomen on active servicein Australia and overseas,

b. abolition of the current female establishmentceilings (leaving the single Services control ofindividual manning requirements),

c. recruitment of men and women against a com-mon establishment in each Service, and compet-itive and common promotional bases,

d. expansion of both officers and other ranks'career structures for servicewomen by:(i) permitting female officers to undertake

specified career training, specialist training,advanced specialist training, and staff courses,and be employed in duties commensuratewith that training, and

(ii) opening the range of employments to otherranks' servicewomen, particularly in theNavy and Air Force, and

e. adoption of a common approach to training offemale officer trainees.Any examination of service employments is im-

possible to conduct without consideration of con-ditions of service which affect employment. Handin hand therefore, with an employment review,must go a study of major differences in conditionsof service which currently exist between servicemenand servicewomen. Some of these matters arefemale officer rank titles in the Navy and Air Force,retirement ages for female officers viz-a-viz theirmale counterparts, retirement ages for other ranks'servicewomen, consideration of the entry of marriedwomen, periods of appointment (officers) and en-gagement periods (other ranks) and investigation ofservicewomen's benefits and entitlements such asremovals, gratuities, housing, accommodation andso on.

If all this comes about, it will go a long way to-wards removing discrimination against servicewomen.Reasoned and realistic implementation is essentialto avoid managerial headaches, because regardlessof the altruistic motives aimed at achieving employ-ment equality, inherent differences between thesexes are not overcome by Governmental decreeor executive decision.

Acute problems, particularly in the career andpromotion patterns for female officers, are boundto arise. The dominant male atmosphere of theServices and the sometimes parochial attitudes ofservicemen1 towards intruders, in this case service-women, will need to change if equitable occupa-tional opportunities for servicewomen are pro-gressed. Servicewomen will need to become moreprofessional in their service knowledge, outlookand attitude and will need to accept that equalopportunity will carry no privileges. The DefenceForce itself will need to be satisfied that the con-

siderable investment required to implement itspolicies will be in the best interests of the purposeof the Force.

This is an appropriate point for briefly statingmy thoughts regarding the future, because I feelthat in my present appointment, my professionaladvice and action influenced by my personalopinions, will have some bearing on what happens.

I believe that we cannot disregard the changesthat are occurring in society and that must inevit-ably be reflected in the Defence Force. I am optim-istic that servicewomen will be allowed to make aproper contribution to service manpower require-ments, and they will be given every opportunity todemonstrate their undoubted abilities. I am hope-ful that management has the strength of purpose tocapitalize on the capacities of all personnel, andthat equality for servicewomen will be willinglyaccepted. I predict that the moves made in Inter-national Women's Year to eliminate discriminationagainst servicewomen are the first of many, andthat, in the long term, there will be no reason forthe Women's Services to exist as entities withintheir parent Services.

Women now have a recognised and permanentplace in the Armed Forces and over the years, theirloyalty and hard work have earned the Women'sServices a deservedly high reputation. After anapprenticeship of 25 years, the opening of a Pan-dora's box of occupational opportunity for service-women can only mean that they will achieve theirfull potential in contributing to the manpowerrequirements of the Defence Force.

"The first point to remember about the Australian island-continent is not that it is a continent but that it is anisland " - T. B. Millar

"He that Commands the sea is at great liberty and maytake as much and as little of the war as he will" -

Francis Bacon


30 September

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute-Page 9

Naval Air Power and the R.A.N.by

COMMANDER H. J. DONOHUE RAN

'The whole aspect of sea war is so utterly changed by the prodigious and daily development of aircraft-Admiral Lord Fisher, 1919

INTRODUCTION

At the review of the Royal Navy at Spitheadin July 1914, five flights, totalling eighteen seaplanesflew past in formation. The air arm then was onlyjust noticed beside the huge fleet of Dreadnoughtsand other types of warships and was not really takenseriously. A few, notably Lord Fisher, believed thataircraft and submarines would revolutionize navalwarfare, but the general opinion was that sea powerdepended completely on the Dreadnought battle-ship with its attendant warships. The rate of devel-opment of aircraft during the First World War hadbeen rapid and by the encj of the War, although thebattleship remained the unit of sea power, theNavy generally accepted that the aircraft 's influencewould increase substantially in the years to come.

Air power came into its own during theSecond World War. The Japanese were the first tounderstand that it was now aircraft not ships thatcame first in the war at sea. To the Japanese, andthen the Allies, command of the sea automaticallymeant air superiority over it. The great carrierbattles of the Pacific confirmed that carrier-borneaircraft had replaced battleships as the units of seapower.

Although they were the new capital ship,there was a great shortage of carriers and hence afear of losing them. This fear was justified as thecarrier was also proving very vulnerable not only toair but also to submarine attack. Forty-one aircraftcarriers were sunk during the war; aircraft and sub-marines disposed of nineteen each, while ships wereresponsible for three.* However aircraft carriershad played a dominant part in the Second WorldWar. The role of ships became one of carrying airpower to sea, of co-operating with aircraft in theexercise of sea power and finally of exploiting theuse of sea when command of it had been won.

What is the place of naval air in the future?Any discussion on this subject generally becomes

•Donal Macintyre, 'Aircraft Carrier the Majestic Weapon'.P 152.


emotive, varying from one extreme to the other.Opponents may say the role of the carrier is out-moded; it has outlived its usefulness and has becomea financial, manpower and logistic burden. Thepattern of warfare has changed and so must thenature of the vehicles required to combat the newthreat. Those in favour note that the navy's primaryweapons for strike, reconnaissance and defence areprovided by 'built in' air power - everything dependson it. Maritime aggression cannot be met withoutship-borne combat and early warning aircraft. What-ever the military justification for carriers, in thepresent economic climate, the majority of naviesneed to examine any requirement tor naval air verycarefully before committing funds.

What then is the place of naval air-power in aNavy like the RAN? To address this problem it isintended to examine the role of naval air since 1945;look at the threats to stability in the Australian areaof interest and the likely use of naval forces; andfinally, examine the requirement for an AircraftCarrier. The need to operate aircraft at sea'mustdepend on the individual country's national policyand hence its military strategy. Although the general

THE AUTHORCommander Hector Donohue RAN was born

in 1939 at Devonport in Tasmania. He joined theRAN as a Cadet Midshipman in 1959, graduatingtwo years later. Commander Donohue sub-special-ised as a Clearance Diving Officer in 1969 and alsosub-specialised in Torpedo—Anti Submarine in 1964.Following three years exchange service in the RoyalNavy including service in the Londonderry Squadronas TASO of HMS Hardv and as Long Course Officerfor the RN MCD Officers' Course he returned toAustralia and service in Navy Office on the staft ofthe Director of Underwater Weapons. He served asExecutive Officer of HMAS Swan during her firstcommission and after a short period when he wasQIC of the RAN Diving School, he returned to UKin 1971 to serve as Staff Weapons Officer to A N R U KCommander Donohue completed the RN Staff Course,Greenwich 1974-75 and is currently serving inDefence Central, Canberra.

aspects of the operation of naval air by the twomajor users since the Second World War, USA andBritain, will be discussed to put the subject in focus,the requirement for an aircraft carrier will be lookedat from the Australian point of view. Considerationwill be given to a possible option of carrier open toa country such as Australia and its capability will bediscussed to determine whether it has a place inAustralia's defence inventory.

NAVAL AIR SINCE 1945

Initial Policies

The British ended the war with seven fleetcarriers, five light fleet carriers and thirty-eightescort carriers; they had twenty new carriers build-ing. The United States ended the war with twentyfleet carriers, eight light fleet carriers and seventy-one escort carriers.! Both navies consequently hadadequate resources to continue developing the art.

By 1950, on the eve of the Korean War, theaircraft carrier was accepted in the Royal Navy asthe backbone of the fleet. British naval air policy,with USSR as almost the only potential enemy, wasto put anti-submarine warfare first followed by the

TIbidp 153.

air defence of the fleet and convoys, and finally airstrike against land or ship targets. New aircraft werebeing developed and the Commander-in-Chief HomeFleet flew his flag from an aircraft carrier.

The ownership of the atomic bomb changed theconcept of war in the USA. The United States wastrying to maintain a military posture, assimilate thelessons of the Second World War, accommodate thefacts of the atomic age and reduce mil i tary forces.There were two very different a t t i tudes to air power.The strategic bombing advocates saw li t t le need for astrike carrier and, with the cancellation of the USSUnited States in 1949. it was rumoured the navy wasto be reduced to a convoy-and-escort force.

The US Air Force considered tha t warfare inan atomic age gave over riding importance to airpower. Ground and naval forces were subsidiary;the only way to prevent a war was to concentrategreat strength in atomic weapons and the superlativeaircraft to fly them. The navy held the view thatwhilst air power held the key to victory, the enemyheld the initiative and could choose the time andplace for a future war. The military forces shouldtherefore be mobile, balanced and flexible, capableof handling a variety of threats.

'

WORLD WAR II ESCORT CARRIER


The Korean War

The war in Korea was the factor which decidedthe fu tu re of the carrier in the US. When the fightingbroke out in 1950. the aircraft carriers USS ValleyForge and HMS Triumph were in the Far East. Theywere used on both coasts of Korea to strike at shoretargets. This was maintained by relays of aircraftcarriers for the three years u n t i l the armistice.

Ai rc ra f t carriers in Korea were used almostent i re ly to support operations on shore and to helpkeep air superiority. They also maintained a block-ade and prevented any enemy movement by sea. Theenemy's few ships never seriously challenged theUnited Nations' complete command of the sea andthis was largely due to the cover provided by thecarriers. By 1953 the USN had eighteen carriers incommission of which eleven had seen service in Korea.

By this time four more countries had acquiredaircraft carriers. Australia, whose HMAS Sydneyserved in Korea, Canada, France and the Netherlands.Considerable research and development had gone onduring the war to allow jet aircraft to land and threeBritish developments: the angle deck, mirror landingaid and steam catapult solved most of the problems.

Post KoreaBy the mid 1950's the B52 strategic bomber

with inflight refuelling could reach any target inthe world. The concept of strategic bombing bycarrier planes was therefore out of date before itcould be put into practice. However, with the^ sign-ing of the North At lant ic Treaty, the sea commun-ications across the North Atlantic became of incr-eased importance to the US. The strategy wasdevised of commanding the sea by making a dev-astating carrier-borne at tack on the enemy's bases.The task of the US Navy was to ensure the 'strikefleet' could successfully complete its mission.

British progress during and after the KoreanWar was substant ial but on a much reduced scalecompared to the US. In 1956 the RN fleet ofthree carriers combined with two French carrierswas used in the Anglo-French intervention againstEgypt to gain air superiority and to support thelandings. This powerful carrier force showed itsvalue not only for the aircraft but also for thecommand and control facilities. A carrier rightlywas the centre of the complete task force.

The British decided the mobility of a carriercould he exploited to deliver their nuclear weapons.Whilst not considering an attack on the scale of theUS, the British concept of operations was for thecarrier to approach the coast unannounced, launchits aircraft under the radar coverage and deliver theattack using toss-bombing. This technique was alsoto be used for anti surface shipping.Page 12 - Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

The helicopter had also come into its own atsea. It was used to carry a dipping sonar for antisubmarine tasks and the idea of ferrying troopsashore was proven at Suez. The US developedcarrier based 'hunter-killer ' anti submarine taskgroups, using fixed wing ASW aircraft as well ashelicopters.

The USN in the early 1960's,based on thelarge super carrier, was a most powerful force. Thiscarrier had a devastating nuclear strike capabi l i ty ;with replenishment at sea, it had world wide en-durance and could strike any place on earth whichwas within one thousand miles of the sea. It hadsubstantial conventional weapon strike power andhad the capacity to defend itself from air attack. Itwas a flexible force able to carry out many roles.

The Role of the Carrier To-dayBy the mid I9b0's a number of doubts on the

role of the carriers were beginning to come to a head.Firstly the nuclear deterrent role was queried. Theincreasing number of ICBM's and the Polaris sub-marine force, both being relatively invulnerable, madethem greatly superior to a carrier-borne aircraft as ameans of delivering the deterrent. The role ofnuclear deterrence was therefore deleted from thecarrier force. The commanding of the sea by pre-emptive strikes on Soviet Territory also was in doubtas the Russians gained a nuclear capability. Themounting of such an attack could cause retaliationand an escalation to all-out nuclear war and was nolonger a valid strategy. The number of Soviet sub-marines at sea, especially the tactical cruise missiletypes, the new air to surface missiles and long rangesurface missiles re-inforced the vulnerability of sucha large asset as a carrier.

The carriers could stil l give air support to NATOforces ashore but in 1962 they became involved inlimited action which can now be considered theirprincipal role. The first was the blockade or'quarantine' of Cuba and the second was the Viet-nam war where carriers were used as in Korea.Again the flexibility of this force was demonstratedand today remains as the centre of the USN fleet.

The British carrier force by the mid 1960's.although much smaller than its American counter-part, was still a powerful force. The nuclear strikerole was not really talcen seriously and their rolebecame more and more one of limited war. Kuwait,the East African mutinies, the evacuation of Aden,and the Indonesian confrontation, all utilised togood effect the aircraft carrier. The RN saw therole of the carrier as reconnaissance, tactical strike,close support and air defence for amphibious oper-ations. The rising cost, the ending of the Britishpresence East of Suez and the doubts about the

...at seaMiniature mobile airfields—even as small as helicopter pads.Positioned within striking distance of any future emergency or threat.On almost any kind of Navy ship. A basing capability for the world's onlyoperational jet V/STOL fixed-wing combat aircraft—Harrier. Soon tobecome Sea Harrier.

Independent of carrier launching and recovery aids (and conventionalairfields). Sea Harrier can be off the deck in two minutes of the initialcommand.

The complete Naval aircraft. For reconnaissance with radar and camera. . . air-to-surface strikes with missile, rocket, bomb or cannon . . .anti-submarine hunting with sonobuoys . . . air defence . . . electroniccounter-measure . . . and close air support for amphibious operations.In a fast changing world, it's the way ahead by making today's vesselsmore operationally effective, and tomorrow's new-generationreplacements possible.

HARRIERHelicopter deck versatility . . . fixed-wing strike aircraft potency.

HAWKER SIDDELEY AVIATIONRichmond Road. Kngston upon Thames. EnglandHawker Siddeley Group supplies mechanical.electncal and aerospace equipment with world wide sales and service

Represented in Australia by:

Hawker de HavillandHead Office: Birnle Avenue, Lidcombe, N.S.W. 2141.


effectiveness of one carrier with about thirty air-craft to support a landing caused the British Govern-ment to decide not to replace its carrier force. Theyhave commenced building a 'through deck carrier'or 'anti submarine cruiser' to provide a platform forSea King helicopters. The ship is also capable ofoperating Harrier fixed wing aircraft.

The Platform

The high cost of a modern carrier and the in-troduction of the vertical/short lake off and landing(VSTOL) aircraft has given rise to considerations ofa cheaper hull known generally as a seaborne air-craft platform. The USN called the concept a seacontrol ship and had a preliminary design for one.It was to be an austere ship of about 14,000 tonscapable of operating VSTOL aircraft and helicopters.It would not require catapults or arresting gear. Thenumber of aircraft was intended to give limited airdefence and permit limited strikes against surfacetargets. The ship would be employed in complement-ary and supplementary roles to that of the attackcarrier in low air threat areas. Although $29.4 millionwas made available for the design and developmentof a mini-carrier (The Navy asked for $ 143 million),*the concept has now been abandoned.

This basic concept of a cheap carrier has attractedattention from many navies and of course was therationale behind the conversion of merchant ships i.e.the escort carrier, in the Second World War. Beforeexamining its possibilities in detail, the role of navalforces in future warfare will be considered.

FUTURE NAVAL WARFARE

The Possibility of War

In the nuclear age, neither the US nor theUSSR can win a general war; their massive nucleararsenals have guaranteed mutual destruction. Al-though in basic ideology and principles the twocountries are opposed and therefore likely to bealigned on opposite sides, they have a mutual in-terest to prevent major conflict. If a limited warinvolving their allies or proteges did occur, such asthe Arab-Israeli October 1973 War, it should be intheir mutual interest to keep it to as low intensityas possible. The super powers can eventually beexpected to join forces to stop any war for fear ofinvolvement if it looks to be escalating dangerously.

War as an instrument of policy therefore canonly be used at a very low level to ensure a levelrelatively safe from nuclear escalation. Wars ofmore dangerous levels can only have a short time toachieve their aim because the super powers will in-

* Aviation Week & Space Technology. 26 August 1974.

fluence the antagonists, for their own safety, tobring it to an end.

Over the past thirty years Western powershave been involved in a number of conflicts involvinginternal security operations, counter insurgency andlimited war. A distinctive pattern emerges from astudy of these. Operations of a low intensity whereescalation to a dangerous level was avoided havegenerally been drawn-out affairs e.g. the IndonesianConfrontation. International clashes where limitedwar is involved have tended to be over quickly e.g.Pakistan-Indian War 1971. The Korean War andVietnam War are exceptions but these may be con-sidered as special examples of low intensity opera-tions as only one super power was directly involved.These operations were also intensified in a verycautious manner to prevent escalation.

The possibility of a general war in the currentpolitical climate remains remote. However, limitedwar and lesser conflicts continue to occur in thischanging world; the lower the intensity, the longerit will last.

South East Asian Stability

The turbulent history of South-East Asiasince the Second World War provides little supportfor a view that the region will be free fromtrouble. The internal conflicts and internationalclashes of interest which have been responsiblefor the distrubances over the past thirty years cannot be expected to cease immediately. Whethertrouble in the area will cause great power conflictwill depend on how and to what extent the greatpowers will permit themselves to become involved.

The 'Nixon Doctrine' emphasising primaryAsian responsibility for coping with insurgencyand the strong view held by most Americans thatthere should be 'no more Vietnams', greatly reducesthe possibility that US forces will be drawn intofighting insurgency in South-East Asia. Even ifthe insurgents receive substantial support fromoutside, the only likely way to cause US mili taryground forces to be committed would be overtmilitary aggression by USSR or China.

A possible scenario could be conceived inwhich the People's Republic of China would commitits forces outside its borders, say in Thailand, butthere is little evidence that such action is probable.Whilst China may be happy to support 'people'swars' covertly, the country is most unlikely tocommit its forces which are primarily defenceoriented and not equipped, at present, to conductlarge scale warfare at any distance from China'sborders. The Soviet threat to the Northernborder would also inhibit military moves to thesouth of China.


The Soviet Union, although keen to expandher influence in the area, does not have a largeenough interest to risk a major war. (The Sino-Soviet confrontation is not considered in thiscontext). Japan has established a rapprochementwith China and increased her diplomatic linkswith the USSR. She is unlikely to increase hermilitary role, especially when the general pacifistinclination of the country is considered. However,Japan's requirement to secure the sea-lanes ifIndonesia should go ahead with its 'ArchipelagoDoctrine' may influence their non-military posture.

Although there is little prospect for a majorwar in the region, the countries in South-EastAsia are faced with threats to their orderly growthas independent nations. In Indochina, a lastingpeace has yet to be achieved. A new outbreak ofhostilities could be envisaged in Korea; furtherstrife between India and Pakistan, and f u r t h e rdisputes between the Philippines and Malaysia.These events are possible rather than probable butincrease the chance of turbulence in the region.The communist inspired/nationalist insurgencyproblems in Burma, Thailand, Philippines andMalaysia are also potential sources of instabilityin the region.

Maritime Threats

The claims that there can be no direct threatto the Australian mainland would appear to bewell founded. However, the sea-lanes used by ship-ping to and from Australia and vital to thenation's economy are not necessarily free from in-te r rup t ion of their innocent passage. The vast ex-pansion of the Soviet Navy and its influence worldwide must be remembered in this context. If theSoviets wish they could initiate a deliberate policyof naval interference at sea for political or economicreasons.

Act iv i ty at sea throughout the world is in-creasing and the whole maritime environment isbecoming busier and more competitive, more sur-veyed and more regulated. With the changes in tech-nology and increasing sizes of ships and their density,pollution, if a VLCC founders, is a very real consid-eration for states owning narrow stiaits . Fishing isbecoming more intensive; oil and minerals are beingfound at the bottom of the sea. The requirementslor free passage and the question ol ownership otresources is a probable cause of future Inc t ion inthe South China Sea and East Indies. The Chineseinvasion of the Paracel Islands because of the oil isthe first example of this. As a major owner of sea-bed and sea resources, their protection is of vi ta linterest to Austra l ia .

The problem is exacerbated both by inter-national pressures to own or control resources andthe proliferation of national naval forces under thecontrol of perhaps unstable or unpredictable govern-ments near the areas ol interest and trade routes.These smaller navies are obtaining sophisticatedequipment and weapons. Backed by land air forcesthey can pose a potential threat to shipping. Theoceans were thought of as infinite but most nationsnow realize their finite nature. There are newpolitics on the seas: extension of territorial waters,fishing zones, national sovereignty have dividedcountries. The considered right to deny access tolarge merchant ships, naval forces, submarines areall sources of potential dispute.

Australia's Defence Policy

Australia's current foreign policy is difficultto summarise but basically aims to retain nationalsecurity, strengthen collective defence treaties,promote peace and prosperity in the neighbourhood,and help in the defence of South-East Asian coun-tries. 'On the assumption that there will be nomajor international conflict involving Australia inthe next ten years, Australia's resources will be usedto ease tension'.* This will entail increased econ-omic and mili tary aid to try and prevent the causesof conflict and discontent in the region.!

The Australian Government considers thatAustralian mineral resources will provide an ever-increasing influence in the shaping of foreign policiesof other countries, especially in a world sufferingfrom a shortage of minerals. Also, the AustralianGovernment considers that 'Australia the richest,most powerful and most advanced country in apart of the world that is otherwise empty ofin f luen t i a l states'**, is in a strong position tobring stability to South-East Asia. Therefore,Austra l ian foreign and defence policies will concen-t r a t e on diplomacy before defence.

This emphasis on diplomacy has concen-trated Austral ia 's defence forces wi th in mainlandAustral ia . Isolationism is not the intent ot thispolicy, although the v i r tua l wi thdrawal of Austral ianarmed forces from South-East Asia has resulted.Australia must re ta in the abi l i ty to act alone forbrief periods and defend the mainland as well asthe shipping lanes which are v i t a l to her survival.

•Mr. K. G. Whitlam. Prime Minister and Minister forForeign Affairs. Canberra. 24th May 1973.tMr. L. H. Barnard. Minister for Defence. Canberra.23rd May 1973.**Mr. E. G. Whitlam. Prime Minister and Minister forForeign Affairs. Canberra. 27th January 1973.

Journal o)'the Australian Naval Institute - Page 15

As the current Government's policies drawAustralia more and more away from the West, andtowards a more individual approach and greateralignment with the Third World its defence forcescan expect to be employed: in coping with intrusionsinto territorial waters and fishing and resource zones;providing support to civil authorities; providing acredible deterrent to harassment or interference withassets under Australian sovereign control; and in thelast resort, protecting Australia and its immediateenvironment.

The Role of Sea Power for Australia

Arguments to support the need for Sea Powerin Australia must be general ones. The area ofAustralia's prime interest is a turbulent one and asthe power base changes, so can the threat to Aus-tralia's interests. The need for a strong navy in anation which has some influence in the area maynot always be obvious. However, apart from theprovision of security of the country, the contrib-ution to foreign policy and the security of trademust be noted. In the final case it is the insuranceagainst the failure of policies to solve problemspeacefully'.

Australia will always rely heavily on sea linesof communication. The last decade saw a treblingin the volume of Australia's goods shipped overseas,and a doubling in the volume of trade shipped inter-state. The security of the Pacific and Indian Oceansand coastal trade routes is essential to the nation'seconomic wealth. The role of the Royal AustralianNavy must be to provide the sea power which pro-tects Australia's trade at sea and to deter any aggres-sion and should there be an attack, to respondeffectively. Up till now the navy has had an aircraftcarrier, HMAS Melbourne, and is used to havingnaval air power to assist in its roles.

THE REQUIREMENT FOR ASEABORNE AIRCRAFT PLATFORM

The Role of the Aircraft Platform

The problem of the place of naval air inAustralia assumes some urgency, as HM AS Melbournewill be at the end of its active life in the early 1980'sand a decision on a replacement will have to bemade very soon. In a country which spends some2.6% of its Gross National Product on defence,amounting to $1200 million in 1974/75, the acqui-sition of modern carriers is beyond its even wildestdreams. The current British equivalent, the Anti-Submarine Cruiser is rumoured to cost in the orderof $170 million, discounting aircraft costs. Judgingfrom the US Navy estimates of $143 million, the USconcept of Sea Control Ship is beyond Australia'sresources.Page 16 - Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

However, naval air power is important to acountry such as Australia with long sea routes andvast coastlines. Given a suitable platform, mannedaircraft may be deployed wherever active interventionof tactical air power or the threat requires. Navalaircraft can make long range reconnaissance ot aland base and can provide quick reaction close airsupport. They can also provide all means to 'hack'the shadowing enemy aircraft on reconnaissance inpassing vital fire control information to a cruisemissile fitted ship or submarine.

The aircraft carrier is the most complete pro-jection of maritime power yet devised. It has anexcellent strategic value and as well as reconnai-ssance, early warning and fighter defence, it canprovide a flexible anti-submarine force; it also hasthe capability to support land forces. The value ofair power (although not carrier borne) was wellillustrated in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.The considerable number ot submarines possessedby USSR threaten the continuing function of mari-time activity both commercial and naval. The antisubmarine helicopter provides a major contributionto combatting this threat. To maintain credibilityas a deterrent a navy must be able to deploy heli-copters on as wide a basis as the submarines whichthey seek to destroy.

History has shown that there is nothing staticin international relations. Although the AustralianGovernment's emphasis is on diplomacy, if thecountry's point of view is to be considered in anyregional or world forum it must be negotiated froma position of strength. Only the mobility andstriking reach of a floating airfield in the shape ofa carrier can swiftly and effectively deal with anemergency or situation requiring a show of strength.Australia may not be able to afford the full spectrumof defence capabilities and therefore some rational-isation is required. With the isolationist type ofpolicies being pursued by the Government and thevirtual disappearance of an effective defence alliancein the area, this rationalisation must take part withinthe individual Australian services.

Air power is one area for such rat ional isat ionand given suitable aircraft , the roles of air defence,fighter ground support, reconnaissance and navaloffensive air power could be combined. Apart fromthe operational aspects, logistics, maintenance andtraining costs could be much reduced A discussionof whether the air-force or navy should provide thepilots for such aircraft is not the purpose ot thispaper and will not be considered. Australia's econ-omic situation makes it obvious that she cannotafford to build or buy a conventional a i rc ra f t carrierlike HM AS Melbourne. If seaborne air power is tobe maintained in the RAN, another type of plat-

form must be utilised. Before discussing the plat-form, the capabilities of the aircraft which can betlown from a deck without catapult and arrestergear facilities will be considered.

The Harrier Type Aircraft

The design concept of the Harrier arose in1957 during studies undertaken by Hawker SiddeleyGroup Ltd (now Hawker Siddeley Aviation Ltd)aimed at evolving a lightweight Vertical and ShortTake Off and Landing (V/STOL) strike/reconn-aissance aircraft. By 1962 protoype aircraft hadflown and the UK, US and West German Govern-ments agreed to fund the procurement of nine air-craft to assess the practical merits of jet V/STOLoperation By 1963 no problems of an insurmount-able nature had emerged and when the joint eval-uation-squadron disbanded, the concept of V/STOLby vectored thrust jet aircraft was proven.

In considering the concept and effectivenessof the Harrier type of aircraft for use by a 'ration-alised' Australian defence force, the ground based,as well as the seaborne, aspects must be taken intoaccount. There are systems and features in the air-craft arising from V/STOL that lead to increases incost and weight which are indisputably additionalto the corresponding numbers appropriate to anequivalent conventional aircraft. However thereare features and applications which make this typeof aircraft superior to an equivalent contemporarywhich may require in excess of 5,000 feet of hardrunway.

In normal peacetime operation, the Harriertype aircraft can enjoy the benefits of operatingfrom the standard air stations already in existence.Excursions into the field, operating from unpre-pared strips at VTOL sites would only be done asan exercise. In a time of tension the force couldbe disposed at minimum notice. Disposed sitescan be supported, pre-stocked or unsupported.This is of particular value in a large continent suchas Australia although the unsupported sites wouldneed to be near a maintenance area (seaborne air-craft platform?).

Once dispersed, the force is almost completelyhidden. Missile air defence of the sites is both un-necessary and undesirable. Experience in Europehas shown that detection of such sites has beenextremely difficult and presents the enemy with anenormously increased surveillance and detectioneffort. Similarly, the parent main base of a Harrierforce need not be defended to the extent necessaryto ensure survival of a conventional force.

Its ability to operate away from standardbases can place the V/STOL aircraft much closer tothe area of interest. The choice of operational area

in Australia (and Papua New Guinea) is thus verywide and as the aircraft should be deployed nearthe operational area it should have a much morerapid response time than the conventional equiv-alent. Given short take off (STO) conditions, theweapon load/flight time is not degraded and couldbe considered better if the aircraft is deployed. Thecarrier could be used to deploy and support theaircraft ashore, much in the way a commandocarrier operates it helicopters.

This aircraft is probably the first trulycommon multi-service aircraft. It is certainly theonly tactical jet aircraft which can operate, withouta single design change being necessary, from bothland bases and ships at sea. The aircrew and maint-enance personnel do not require any further exten-sive training to operate in either role and, of course,the seaborne platform does not need to be as largeas a conventional carrier nor does it need the cata-pult and arresting facilities. For long-term operationsat sea there are some modifications needed: elimin-ation of magnesium components in the engine andair frame; provision of rapid tie down arrangementsand hold back facility. The aircraft would also needa modification to avionics to delete the inertialnavigation system and incorporate in lieu a forwardlooking radar and navigation system.

The Harrier is applicable to a wide range ofships and to date has operated successfully from 10different ships ranging from 75,000 to 6,500 tonswith flight decks varying from 1,000 ft length (USSIndependence) to 98 x 56 ft (Andrea Dona). Trialshave shown that the aircraft is capable of operatingfrom a moving deck to approximately the samelimits as naval helicopters. A flight deck length ofabout 600 ft. in the free take off or STO mode, willallow the aircraft to achieve maximum mission per-formance capability with full capacity ordnance load.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute - Page 1 7

The US Navy purchased about 100 of the air-craft and have operated them from USS Guam toprove the concept of the Sea Control Ship. Their ex-perience has proved the aircraft 's remarkable reliabilityand two aircraft airborne continuously and one atimmediate stand by out of a total of five aircraft ismost realistic. One other interesting factor from theirexperience has been the use of the vectored thrust inforward flight to give the aircraf t vastly improved per-formance in an aircraft versus aircraft role.

The aircraft's overall performance could possiblybe compared in conventional terms to the Skyhawk.However, the advanced Harrier with uprated engineand increased range and weapon capability wouldprobably be more sui table for a multi-role aircraft.Although the aircraft would not perhaps meet allthe air-force or naval r equ i r emen t s in European orNorth Atlantic environments, it has many attractionsfor a country such as Australia.

A variety of armament and operational equip-ment, including cannon, bombs, air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles and reconnaissance passive equipmentcould be carried. The low level speed of the advancedHarrier is over 640 knots with a Mach 1.3 number ina dive. Ceiling is more than 50,000 ft with range andendurance with one in-flight refuelling of more than3,000 miles and seven hours.*

Since the advent of the first operational jetfighters some 25 years ago, technical progress in theoffensive power of tactical aircraft has been formidable. Technology can now provide a literally awe-some capability in attack, even with conventionalweaponry. But the price of this has been paid ingreatly increased complexity and the consequentdependence on sophisticated maintenance equipment.For a country laced with only a conventional threatand a wish to provide a credible capability amongstrelatively unsophisticated nations, this type of air-craft cannot be ignored.

Anti-Submarine Warfare

A significant aspect of Soviet naval strengthlies in its submarine fleet comprising about 380 sub-marines, of which three-quarters are long range oceangoing types, capable of operation almost anywhere inthe Atlantic or Pacific. This impressive Soviet sub-marine force, like the rest of the fleet, has been under-going extensive modernisation and has rapidly in-creased in recent years. Older submarine types can beexpected to be given to smaller nations and the poten-tial threat posed by the USSR or nations under its in-fluence cannot be ignored by Australia.

As well as long range maritime patrol aircraft(two RAAF squadrons of P3B Orions and SP2H•Jane's 'All the World's Aircraft'. 1 973/74. p 208.


Neptunes) the RAN operate the S2E Tracker ASWaircraft and Mk31B Wessex helicopters. Sea KingASW helicopters are currently being delivered. Mari-time patrol aircraft can provide an effective contri-bution to the detection and destruction of submarinesbut are limited by range. As was found in the SecondWorld War and proven in exercises since, carrier basedaircraft are an essential component of the forcesrequired to combat the submarine.

With the ranges and areas involved the activesonar of helicopters has a limited role in area sur-veillance and must be complemented by fixed wingaircraft. The passive sensors controlled and operatedfrom the Tracker and its follow-on aircraft arepossibly more suited to the future ASW battle.They are also most suitable for any surface sur-veillance operation which is an equally probabletask in the Australian area of interest.

An aircraft which has potential for operatingfrom a basic deck at sea fo fulfil these roles is theCanadian CL84. This is a twin engined tilt wingV/STOL aircraft which first flew in 1970. TheCanadian Armed Forces have now successfullyevaluated the concept. Their programme includedgun firing trials in the hover, conventional andslow-speed-tilt-wing flight. The aircraft conducteda series of trials form USS Guam, first flying onsome 17 miles off the Norfolk coast. A secondaircraft has undergone joint UK, US and Canadiantrials concerning terminal area guidance and controland the evaluation of design parameters as theymight apply to shipboard use.

In terms of a potential production model ofthe CL 84, emphasis has shifted to an advancedaircraft using two turboprop engines. This version,known as the SCS CL84 has been designed to meetship-based ASW and radar surveillance requirements,operating from a short deck where mission profilesrequire STOL or VTOL operating modes. Thedimensions of the aircraft with wings folded isestimated as 27 ft. wide x 51 ft. long x 19 ft. high.(The Sea King stowed is 16 ft. wide x 57 ft. longx 15 ft. high). It has an empty operating aircraftweight of 16,500 Ib. and a maximum weight forshort take off (250 ft. deck, zero wind or 20 kts)is 36,000 Ib. It will be designed for a maximumlevel speed of 375 kts. and best endurance speed of220 kts. Ceiling will be 30,000 ft. and range with7,000 Ib pay load is in the order of 1,400 miles or6 hours endurance.t

This type of aircraft would be ideal for ASWsurface surveillance, and electronic countermeasures(ECM) operations from a simple base such as theSeaborne Aircraft Platform and would be an appro-priate follow-on aircraft to the Tracker as well as

tlbid p 19.

CANADAIR CL84

complementing the Sea King helicopter. As ahelicopter is only efficient in the hover, the CL84concept may well replace helicopters for seaborneASW and surveillance operations.

The Platform

A study of past and recent naval historyshows that no matter how much theorizing is doneon scenarios or concepts of operations, it is nearlyalways the unexpected which happens. Ships lasta long time and the strategic background againstwhich they were conceived, designed and built hasusually changed by the time their mid-life isreached. Therefore, flexibility in outlook andpurpose is necessary when considering future ships.

One of the vital roles the carrier played inthe Second World War was the victory over theGerman U—Boats in the Battle of the Atlantic.These carriers were not the fast, lavishly-equippedmobile airfields which operated with the fleets,substituting their aircraft's striking power for thatof the battleships' guns; they were the small utilitycarriers. These carriers, later designated escortcarriers, were converted initially from merchantships with a primarily defensive role. The Britishconverted a number of merchant ships to this role

and a large programme of such ships was institutedin the US. Initially the US similarly convertedfreighters or tankers but, as the demand grew, special-purpose ships using pre-fabrication and 'productionline' techniques were built. Although originally con-ceived for convoy escort duties, the ships were usedin a number of roles, including supporting landingsin the Mediterranean, because of the overall shortageof aircraft carriers.

To date, helicopters are the only aircraft tohave been deployed continuously from other thanspecially designed aircraft carriers. Helicopters werefirst embarked in small ships in the early 1950'swhen HM$Vidal embarked a Bell 47. Since thenpurpose built facilities have been provided in mostRN destroyers and frigates as well as RFA's. Con-siderable experience in their operation has beengained and the helicopter in this time scale hasevolved as an essential integrated force weaponsystem for ASW and surface surveillance.

The main aim of deploying helicopters toRFA's was to find an alternative platform for shortperiods as the number of aircraft carriers in the RNdecreased. The RFA's design complies to normalcommercial standards and in the first ships onlyarrangements for short duration deployments were


provided. Since then they have been improved bythe addition of permanent facilit ies tor al l weatherflying. However, the flight deck on the fleet oilersand supply ships is aft, and flying operations arelimited by weather conditions

RFA Engadine was accepted in to RN servicein 1967 and provides greater a i rcraf t facilities. I twas introduced to provide a platform for t raininghelicopter crews in deep water ASW operations.Sustained operations may be conducted for manydays from Engadine and she can take four Sea Kinghelicopters with a deck area of about 180 f t . x50 ft. (two spots). First and second line maintenanceare able to be provided. However, the flight decktakes up the after third of the ship and weatherlimits flying operations or res t r ic ts ship movementduring these operations.

The centre of movement in a ship is its centreand hence this area is the best for a i rc raf t operation.Given a suitable ship with sufficient wid th , V/STOLas well a helicopters could approach from eitherside. This would allow operations in poor weaiherconditions and place the least restrictions on shipmovements. The flight deck for an A i r c r a f t Carrierwould, with the advent of V/STOL, be best placedin the centre of the ship.

To provide a relatively cheap hu l l for an Air-craft Carrier, if the high design costs are to beavoided, an existing design must be used; ideally ahull which is in current series production or is easilymade. To find such a ship, the merchant navy fleetmust be examined. Whilst appreciating such shipsare not built to naval standards, if the high costsare to be avoided and a ship procured at all, a lower-ing of these standards must be accepted.

The rationale behind this, apart from the allimportant cost aspect, is the concept of operations.i.e. countering intrusions into Australian territorialwaters and fishing and resource zones; providingsupport to civil authorities; providing a credibledeterrent to harassment or interference with assetsunder Australian sovereign control; and, in thelast resort, engaging in offensive/defensive operations.When the potential capability of weapons which canbe deployed by even minor navies is considered, thevulnerability of this platform is hardly lessened toany great degree by increased ship-building standards.This is not to say that these standards are notnecessary, and if we lived in an ideal world theywould, of course, be advocated. But the cost pen-alty is so great that if Australia is to ever have areplacement for HMAS Melbourne in the currenteconomic climate, a much lower s tandard must beaccepted.

General purpose merchant ships are clut teredwith equipment on the upper deck and would


require considerable modification to make themsuitable for aircraft operations. The VLCC oil andgrain do carry helicopters for communicationspurposes. However, they have derricks and craneswhich would require to be removed as they wouldobstruct aircraft approach paths; iheir lower free-board gives them poor manoeuvrability and wouldnot be suitable for aircraft operations; the internalconstruction would also require extensive modif-ications.

There is one ship which is heini> bu i l t m in-creasing numbers and in classes: the containership. This type of ship has a large deck space treeof superstructure, derricks or cranes. It has ahigh tree-board, is stabilized, has ;i high cruisingspeed and normally has mul t i - shaf ts . The bridgedesign is large and space is available in tha t areafor communications, radar, and command andcontrol equipment necessary to control navalaircraft . The major i ty of these ships have thebridge, accommodation and engine room a f t ,leaving a vast area forward to fill w i th containers.As the area forward of the bridge is necessarilyempty, l i t t l e problem would be found inc lud ingthe necessary facilities to make the ship a sea-borne aircraft p la t form. These would include:the extra fuel; generating capacity; weaponmagazines; storerooms; workshop, test andmaintenance areas; hangar space; and addit ional ,accommodation.

The diagram shows a conceptual arrange-ment in a typical container ship of about 23,000tons deadweight, about 71)0 ft. long. ^5 ft. beamand 32 ft. draught speed approx. 25 knots.

TYPICAL CONTAINER SHIP

IN IOAMO PHOFIL (

o f53

'OOF FLIGHT DECK

t - T - •

Cost in 1974 prices before conversion wouldbe in the order of $24 million.

The cost of purchasing and converting amodern con ta ine r ship of 20.000 tons plus tomake it an aircraft carrier would be less than thecost of a modern fr igate ( a i r c ra f t costs excluded).A s imi lar hu l l could also be su i tab le for the am-phibious role as an amphibious heavy left shipand an LPD ( the Japanese AC L class has a roll-on, ro l l -of f faci l i ty a f t ) . This aspect will not bediscussed f u r t h e r but is mentioned to show thepoten t ia l of th is type of ship lo i Australiandefence use.

A con ta ine r ship of about 24,000 tons wouldal low a deck length in the ordei of 600 ft. which isadequate for jet and turboprop STO mode operations.Given the advances in av ia t ion technology it is nowfeasible to operate an advanced Har r ie r type aircraft ,helicopters and the C A N A D A I R CL84 type aircraf ttioir such a 'lasic f l igh t deck. The numbers of thesea n c i a l i co ined w o u l d he t y p i c a l l y l ive Harriers ,live ( I.X4\ and tour six Sea Kings. These numbersmay he small compared to the US carriers butcompare l a v o u i a h l y to HMAS Melbourne andwould he adequate if A u s t r a l i a had to operate aloneand would contribute in piopoition to the RAN'ssi/e i t incorporated in a larger all ied force.

Such a conversion would allow the RAN tom a i n t a m naval air power and hence m a i n t a i n the

flexibility and effectiveness of its fleet, giving i t LIcredible deterrent am) the ab i l i t y to act if necessaryThis is a viable solution to the problem facing theRAN when HMAS Melbourm reaches the end ofher life and perhaps the only one w i t h i n thediminishing A u s t r a l i a n defence budget

CONCLUSION

Naval air power came into its own during theSecond World War and replaced the b a t t l e ship asthe major un i t of sea power. By 1^50. the a i rcraf tcarrier was accepted in the RoyaJ Navy as the hack-bone of the fleet.. The aircraft became accepted inthe West as the most complete project ion of mar i -time power yet devised. I t had a s t r a t e g i c c a p a b i l i t yas well as giving complete conven t iona l defence ' re-connaissance, a i rborne early warn ing , f ighte i defence ,flexible ASW. long range tac t ica l s t r ike and land forcessupport .

In l%7 the rising costs, the end ing ol the B r i t i s hpresence East of Sue/ and the doubts of t h e e f f ec t i ve -ness of only one ca r r i e r caused B r i t a i n to cancel p lansto con t inue with a earner force Since t h e n the ASWcruiser concept was horn and the RN w i l l c o n t i n u eto main ta in hel icopters .it sea lor ASW puiposes Thecont inuing L'SN c a r n e i b u i l d i n g programme wouldindica te they con t inue to have no doub t s on theva l id i ty of these type of operations today.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Page 21

Although the possibility of general war remainsremote, limited war and other conflicts continue tooccur. The turbulent history of South-East Asia sincethe Second World War provides little support for aview that the region will be free from trouble. Theremay be no direct threat to Australia in the foreseeablefuture but, despite a policy of diplomacy before de-fence, this country needs a credible defence force ifonly to back her diplomatic efforts.

Australia depends on sea trade for her econ-omic strength. The task of protection and surveill-ance of the sea routes and sovereign areas is com-plicated by the vast distances involved. To carry outits role of protecting Australia's interests at seaeffectively the RAN needs to retain a naval aircapability. The speed of response, ability to operateover wide areas and the flexibility offered by navalair will continue to remain important, especially ascountries to the north of Australia improve theirnavies.

The problem of replacing HMAS Melbourneassumes some urgency as the end of her life approach-es. The RN ASW cruiser and the US Sea ConirolShip are both beyond the economic capabilities ofAustralia. If high design costs are to be avoided anexisting design must be utilized. To achieve this, amerchant navy hull should be used, accepting thelower build standards.

The advances in technology in the aircraftindustry have made V/STOL aircraft a viable optionfor use on land as well as at sea. The advancedHarrier jet V/STOL has a good overall capabilityand is most suitable for operations at sea. This is amost reliable aircraft and has good capabilities infighter ground support, reconnaissance and airdefence. A rationalization of Australia's aircraftrequirements involving a realistic assessment of thethreat and concept of operations would suggest that

* * *From the President

Early comment on the first issue of the Journalof the Australian Naval Institute has been mostfavourable. As mentioned elsewhere there were afew teething troubles but as we gain more exper-ience we hope these will be eliminated. From theremarks I have heard, the Institute is filling a realneed. The only way to meet this need is for all ofus to take an active part in the affairs of the Instituteby writing articles, commenting on articles printedand attending meetings. Only by vigorous andsustained support will we grow in strength andinfluence and provide the forurn so obviouslyneeded. I also take this opportunity to wish allmembers and their families a Merry Xmas and ahappy and prosperous 1976.


an advanced Harrier type aircraft has a role in theRAAF as well as the RAN.

Another V/STOL aircraft, the CANADAIR CL84, a twin engined tilt-wing aircraft, is showingconsiderable potential as an ASW surface surveillanceand ECM aircraft. This aircraft is being developed forshipborne use, being similar in size to a Sea Kinghelicopter with better overall performance.

Experience in operating helicopters in the RNfrom a number of platforms, including.RFA's, hasshown how susceptible they are to deck movementcaused by weather. The centre of movement of aship is its centre and hence this area is the best foraircraft operations. Given a suitable ship withsufficient width, V/STOL aircraft as well as heli-copters could approach from either side thusavoiding the main limitation caused by a flight deckbeing situated aft.

The container ship with its large free spaceforward of the bridge and machinery spaces aft, lendsitself to conversion as a seaborne aircraft platform.It has a high free-board, is stabilized, has a highcruising speed and normally has multi-shafts. Theirunit cost is small and conversion to the seaborne air-craft platform role would probably be less than thecost of a modern frigate (excluding aircraft costs).A container ship of about 15,000 tons would belarge enough to operate Harrier and CL84 type air-craft as well as helicopters comparable in numbersto HMAS Melbourne.

A sea control ship would allow the RAN tomaintain naval air power and hence maintain theflexibility and effectiveness of its fleet, giving ita credible deterrent and the ability to act ifnecessary. A converted container ship is a viablesolution to the problem facing the RAN whenHMAS Melbourne reaches the end of her life.

Editors' Note

The article, "The Australian Naval Institute -How it Began", in the inaugural issue of the Journaldescribed in some detail our very enjoyable andmildly intemperate conception, our prolongedgestation and our somewhat painful birth. It seemsthat in our hurried efforts to make the world awareof our presence so soon after parturition - by pro-ducing an early issue of the Journal, we committedsome editorial blunders. Not only did we reduceone of our Councillors in rank, Captain B. G. Gibbs,but we eliminated one, Captain E. V. Stevens,entirely from the list of Councillors. Our apologiesto both gentlemen.

Seapower is a necessary factor in the generalprogress of a nation. ALFRED MAHAN

Software at SeaAN ESS A YBY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER C. J. SKINNER, RAN

Summary: three classes of software are defined and examined. Certain problems in dealing withthe third class, newly introduced to the RAN, are discussed. Throughout, software is treated asan entity in its own right.

SOFTWARE AT SEA

The amount of software at sea in the RAN hasrecently taken a quantum increase with the returnof a modernised DDG, newly fitted with the NavalCombat Data System (NCDS) and the complement-ary Digital Tartar Missile System. That this is butanother milestone in a continuing trend wouldperhaps be obvious to most people. Inevitably thefuture will see an exponential trend towards what-ever balance between hardware and software isconsidered best at the time.

However, the everyday dealings with softwareat sea in the RAN have until recently involvedlittle more than loading an operational program(op. program) or diagnostic (program) and usingthem without real knowledge of their content, andwith no attempt at optimisation of their perform-ance; the assumption being that if it works* seem-ingly correctly then all is well. This assumptionhas been based, to a large part soundly, on exten-sive proving ashore of the particular program eitherin the equipment for which it is intended, or if thisis not possible then in as close a facsimile as ispossible using simulation programs to make up dis-crepancies in the test rig. In addition a large pro-portion of RAN software has been imported fromother countries who themselves carried out allapparently-needed optimisation at sea.

For many reasons, not least the variety oftactical scenarios with which a ship must deal, thispolicy may no longer be adequate.

WHAT IS SOFTWARE?

Before enlarging on the broad subject of manage-ment of software at sea, we must first establish whatthe expression 'software' means. The ChambersDictionary of Science and Technology defines soft-ware as: 'programming or compiling accessoriesused for computing or data-processing systems.' Inmore specific terms, in the RAN this has come tomean the programs themselves in whatever medium,the working documents of the analyst and pro-

grammers who developed the program, and otherdocuments written describing aspects of the pro-grams. However the term is loosely and variouslyused as evidenced by use of other terms like 'firm-ware' in some civilian applications. The most im-portant and most difficult attribute of software forthe initiate to grasp is that the actual product is thewritten word rather than the latter being merely anecessary adjunct of some hardware development.There has been what one may call a concentrationof knowledge (and power) in software areas bycomparison with hardware areas, caused entirelyby the designer of software being so much theproducer of the software. It is against this back-ground that all the following matters are discussed.

Computer OrganisationWhile it is quite possible to consider software

without reference to the computer in which it willreside or even to the operation of computers ingeneral, a few points relating to hardware will not

THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Commander Christopher JohnSkinner RAN was born in Birmingham, Englandin 1943. His family emigrated to Australia in1951 and settled in South Australia where heattended the Adelaide Boys High School. Lieu-tenant Commander Skinner joined the RAN asa normal-entry cadet midshipman to RANC,Jervis Bay. He graduated in 1962 and after ayear's service as a midshipman in HMAS Mel-bourne and HMAS Anzac, proceeded to RNEC,Manadon for electrical engineering studies. Hegraduated in 1966 remaining in the UK for afurther 15 months of WF application training.After a year in HMAS Parramalta he went to theUSA for training preparatory to serving in HMASHobart for two and a half years until early 1972.Then for two years until 1974 he was secondedto the Department of Supply for service at theWeapons Research Establishment, Salisbury,where he was part of a design team developingan advanced sonar project. In 1974 he returnedto the USA for courses relating to DDG modern-isation and is now serving in HMAS Perth as theCombat Systems Engineer Officer.


go astray in the following discussion. In essencethere will be in most cases at least the following:

- a central processing unit (CPU) in which thecontrol and manipulation of data is performed,

- an Input/Output (10) section that allows com-munication with the outside world, in particularwith people via peripheral equipment, and

- a memory unit that permits the retention of dataand program from one point in time or spaceuntil needed again (often termed core).

In the simplest machines there will be one of each,however in any practical machine the division ofareas would be much less distinct than the threegiven above were it not also clearly defined by tradi-tion or descriptive documentation. As an example of

• what I mean: a register in a calculator may be calleda memory but in any computer the CPU will inevit-ably contain many registers, not to be confused withthe computer memory; with larger computer systemsdue to differing data rates the design may call for asmaller i.e. less capable, computer, with its ownmemory etc., to perform the task of 10 controllerfor the larger machine. Further more complicatedexamples do exist where several CPU's and 10sections share each other and a common memory.

Programming LanguagesAll computers work actually in binary numbers,

however binary is cumbersome and is usually abbrev-iated by using octal or in some cases hexadecimal(base 16) numbers. This level is called machinelanguage since it directly corresponds to the machineoperation and can be observed on indicator lights.

The great drawback of machine language is thatreading it is so wearisome, the moreso the larger theword size. (The size of a word is the number of bitsthat are processed in parallel, that is simultaneously,in the machine and will range from 8 bits for amicroprocessor up to 128 or even 256 bits for thelargest machines. At sea one is unlikely to meetmore than 32 bits with 16 bits being more common).

The immediate solution is to use assemblerlanguage. An assembler program translates instruct-ions written in alphanumeric mnemonics (calledsource code) on a one-for-one basis into machinelanguage instructions (called object code). Themnemonics are readable given suitable training andallow much easier editing of a written program, usinga side-by-side listing which gives both assembler andmachine code. At sea the program listing providesan essential aid for software diagnosis; modifications(called patches) to the program will normally bewritten in machine language since few assemblersoperate on-line (that is concurrently with the op.program).Page 24 - Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Two further levels of programming languageexist. The first called compiler language generatesseveral object code instructions from a single sourcecode statement; a good example is the ubiquitousFORTRAN language. Other even higher-levellanguages are called simulation languages; here theprogrammer is hardly aware he is actually writinga program. Compiler and moreso simulation lang-uages suffer severely from a problem that increaseswith the level ot the language - modifications tothe program at the machine level become increas-ingly difficult with compiler language-level to theextent that any modifications must be done insource language and then recompiled each time.The penalty for this is the vast increase in memorycapacity required to hold the compiler. For theimmediate future the RAN software at sea is un-likely to extend much past low-level compilerlanguage so that available core can be used formore productive purposes.

A highly useful aspect of assembler and higherlevel languages is the facility to document what isbeing done in descriptive terms line-by-line as theprogram is written. Without this any involvedprogram is virtually unreadable with only the sourcecode, especially if, as is normally the case, great useis made of subroutines and logical decision-making.A diagnostic advantage of assembler language withrespect to compiler language, is that documentaryremarks called comments relate directly to singlelines of both object and source code.

THE PROGRAMS THEMSELVES

Thus far the language in which programs arewritten, and the machines in which they will residehave been discussed. What of the programs them-selves?

Program DesignThe first step toward a program is to define a

need, and then a plan to meet the need. Withoutdwelling on the intricacies of the design process,suffice to say that a very careful examination isrequired of peripheral hardware available, computerhardware capabilities and perhaps most importantinterfaces with other hardware and software. Theinitial design of a new program will only be asgood as the accuracy of the specification of theexisting elements. In its turn the accuracy ofspecification of the new program will determinethe initial success of the next program and so on.

In general the two following statements relateto the design process:

- to design a program that interfaces only withhardware is easier than for a program thatinterfaces with software as well as/instead ofhardware, and

- to design a program that interfaces with othersoftware (in another computer of perhapsdifferent type) via hardware is more difficultthan with software in the same machine.

Some generalised reasons of why these are true aregiven later in this discussion. In the meanwhile letit be said that what is difficult to design or specifywill be difficult to diagnose and manage.

Program QualityThe writer has pondered the reasons why the

latest additions to the RAN software inventory areapparently different from that existing before andhas come to the following conclusion: the qualityof a program is determined by the qua l i ty of theassumptions made in the design of the program.

In some programs especially those interfacingonly with well-specified hardware, the requirementis only for a giant calculator and any assumptionsand approximations lend themselves to individualvalidation. This might be the case in a simplesensor system, or in a display system containingmicro-processors. Call this category I.

In more advanced and complex systems, certainparameters are no longer deterministic in that theyare either subjective (human) assessments or ran-domly determined. Provided the time rate-of-changeof the parameters is sufficiently low, then a trainedoperator can be permitted to vary control settingsto counteract unwanted tendencies. ASW systemsexhibit this comparatively slow rate of change. Callthese category I I .

Unt i l the recent increase in the RAN inventory,the writer believes that all existing software fell inone of these two categories. However the latestacquisitions do not, on two counts: f irst ly exten-sive software interfaces exist leading to problemsof design in the first place, and secondly the appli-cation to AAW drastically curtails the opportunitiesfor operator intervention.

Rapid Reaction SoftwareThe new programs working with sensor, process-

ing and display, and weapon hardware, and wi theach other form what has been called a CombatSystem (CS). CS software is such tha t : firstly it ismodular, that is broken up into discrete subprograms:these were designed by different groups of peopleto reduce the task to manageable proportions; thecorollary however is that extensive software inter-faces are immediately invoked wi th a t t endan t pro-blems of accurate specification Secondly, separatecomputers are employed communica t ing via hard-ware by so-called intercomputei communicat ion.Call these category I I I .

Diagnostic AccessIn order to verify the correct operation of soft-

ware interfaces, further programs are necessary dueto the speed of operation of the interface. Howevera further and poten t ia l ly more d i f f icu l t problemarises wi th programs of the th i rd category. If asstated above the quality of a program is judged bythe quality of the assumptions bui l t into the pro-gram, then let us consider the sort of assumptionstha t wil l appear in the third category.

The Dilemma of AssumptionsLet us take an over-simplified example: which

is the more threatening; the high fast closing aircraftat long range or the low slow aircraft at short range9

You may well say the one or the othet or perhapssay that you need more information. N a t u r a l l y asmuch relevant informat ion as is available will be fedinto the algorithm that controls the program decis-ion to deal wi th the one or the other, but inevitablythe decision wi l l depend on a lot of i nbu i l t designassumptions. In addit ion the computer may onlyneed to monitor the information for microsecondsto make its decision but have no time to informful ly the operator of exac t ly why it decided whatit decided, thereby giving rise to two corollaries:firstly the operator w i l l he work ing by power ofveto ra ther t h a n conscious decisive ac t ions , undsecondly the means by which the d iagnos t ic ian con-firms t ha t the a l g o r i t h m is working conec l ly is farfrom complete The l a t i e i l eads ux logical ly to dis-cuss the whole are;i ol progiam v e i i f i c a l i o n .

PROGRAM Vt K l l | ( A N O N

Ideal ly a program used on ly lo d e a l w i t h i n p u t sof known langes > l va lues and lo produce prescribedo u t p u t s a t i c l d i i v e l y slow l a t e s is best v e r i f i e d s t a -t i ca l ly by i n s e r t i n g a known problem and conf i rmingthe expected solut ion However in many crises \ \hcn

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Page 25

the same problem is solved dynamically differentresults will be obtained due to inbu i l t delays andother timing differences.

How much more difficult then is the situationwhere the solution to any normal complex situationis not known, and where dynamically timing effectsof all sorts render the diagnostician able only tojudge subjectively that all is well. Unfortunatelythis seems to be the case with category III software.A limited aid in this respect is the ability built-in torecord masses of relevant data for analysis at anothertime. This in itself does not record the reasons foroperator actions, nor the environmental conditions,nor many other aspects that must rightly be consid-ered in evaluation of performance. In general thereis just too much happening in too short a time to beable to say that operation is correct. Furthermorein an environment where the same situation pre-cisely may never again be duplicated, the task ofverification becomes more difficult even to thepoint of impossible if full verification is required.

The Practical Approach to Verification

Because the difficulty of exhaustive verificationespecially at sea has been recognised, a practicalapproach to verification has been formulated bythe countries employing such software. This appro-ach is fundamentally to verify as much as can be inthe initial stages and then to correct problems thatoccur thereafter as they are perceived. This method-ology has been adopted by the RAN also (there wasnot much choice).

Perhaps because those people involved in soft-ware development gain greater satisfaction from thedevelopment itself rather than the writing of ex-planations of how the software works, the standardof software operating and descriptive documenta-tion leaves something to be desired. The RAN maywell be forced to learn the hard way the analogouslesson to hardware acquisition, that with inadequatedocumentation the performance of the acquisitionwill likewise be degraded. Certainly there appearsa need for a Defence Standard«covering softwaredescription.

An Alternative Approach

An alternative approach in the fu ture might beto define in the program the measures of effective-ness (MOE's) that will be used to verify the pro-gram and then make the software adaptive, thatis, able to vary certain parameters itself in a searchfor an improvement in MOE's. Unfortunately thisapproach, although intrinsically desirable, is stillnot the full answer because inherent in the MOE'swill be further assumptions that bear heavily onthe results.


The Problem of Core Size

The next problem of program verification isthat of lack of memory available. In order to testa dynamic entity like a program, especially of thethird category I have mentioned, the program mustbe monitored in many ways and at a rate compar-able to that of program execution. The latter moreor less eliminates any other method except a fur-ther (diagnostic) program. This diagnostic pro-gram has its own requirements: time for execution,core space for the program to be placed andabove all a method of verifying the diagnostic(and so on ad infinitum).

The provision of time and space for the diagnos-tic may be approached in differing ways; non-essen-tial sub-program modules may be removed fromcore and replaced by diagnostic modules; pure datamay be recorded and the diagnosis performed laterwhen the diagnostic may replace the op. program;or both time and space may be made in one com-puter at the expense of other functions, thatcomputer then being used to monitor the softwarein another.

The Ultimate Problem of Program Verification

The catch to the above is that verification usingdiagnostic programs has only thus far been appliedto the mechanistic features of programs ( tha t isthose features akin to category I ) . The verificationof the qualitative aspects is left in the final analysisto the knowledgeable observer who is presentedwith much data but l i t t le on which to judge accept-ance tests of qualitative software, save suck-it-and-see (and if the observer notes what he considers isa deficiency, the means to propose changes).

I do not mean to sound negative in my remarks;improvements fall oil exponentially - oncethe bulk of the software has been examined andaccepted this then leaves time to improve theremainder. The point being made above is thathowever good (or bad) a qualitative program is ad-judged, the judgment is not based on any mechan-istic yard-stick, but rather on the subjectiveopinions of observers experienced w i t h the environ-ment in which the program has been called upon tooperate. And who shall say that this is not theproper means of judgment?

The People Problem

On first consideration, people should not be aproblem. Naturally extensive training and educationis required; the quality of this t ra in ing will relied inpart the quality of the software documentation, andthe general level of software experience. This is nota long-term problem given sufficient effort to whi t t ledown the knowledge-gap. The philosophical grasp

of software is fortuitously not limited to super-in-telligent people and thus with the whole area ofcomputers becoming an increasingly familiar matter,the level of community-wide experience with soft-ware is growing every day, as once did the familiar-ity with electricity or the telephone.

What then is the problem? The answer lies in twoinherent features of software. Firstly it is precise,that is, exact, and very unforgiving of mistakes;people are not so precise and can cause huge prob-lems by 'finger-trouble'. Where software was mech-anistic this did not matter so much - overall theprogram either worked or it didn't. As we haveseen though, with qualitative software we are neverquite sure if it is working properly, or rather we aresure that it is not working completely correctly butmay adjudge the present status to be satisfactory orat least preferable to the prolonged setbacks in-volved in improving the software. Thus errors maygo unnoticed.

Setbacks? The second aspect of the people pro-blem is that they may never ever come to knowfully any representative piece of software, or atleast never be able to visualise all the implicationsof their actions in modifying software, all at once.Hardly surprising you might say. Unfortunately itleads to a further axiom of software that: the in-corporation of improvements always results in aninitial degradation (catastrophic at times) untilthe improvement is tailored to fit properly; unhappilythe degradation may only be noticeable (in qualita-tive software) at the time one first tries to use theprogram exhaustively.

THE VAST GAINS

On balance even with the philosophical pro-blems already described, vast gains have been madeby the acquisition of qualitative software systems.Much that I have called problematical will be accept-ed in the near future as nothing more than unavoid-able limitations for which due consideration mustbe given. At present however there may be somewho might not have expected such complication,and for whom hopefully a more meaningful view-point has been provided.

The gains may be summarised as three: super-human powers, flexibility and reliability. Sincepossibly the 'good' side of software is better knownthan the other, 1 will not dwell so long on thesethree. The super-human powers are those powersthat: enable mathematical and logical problems tobe solved to better than human mental accuracy inmilliseconds or less; provide tireless operation overlong periods; provide the ability to detect evenUbelow the threshold of human perception; and

above all provide the long-term continuity that isotherwise precluded by the mobility and change-ability of human operators.

Reliability is a related attribute, but is here in-tended to imply that once an acceptable standardof software performance is attained (remember theperformance of qualitative software will never beperfect) it will then be repeatable time and again.There will be some changes in both people andperipheral hardware that will affect the software,however the reliability of software then providesa useful means of verifying that corrections toreturn the peripherals to their previous operatingstandard have been effective.

The Flexibility of SoftwareUndoubtedly the greatest asset is the immense

flexibility inherent in software. A change in en-vironment whether tactical or natural can be quick-ly compensated for by a change in software. Valuesof parameters can be varied rapidly until optimised.The whole posture of the combat system can bealtered in minutes or less, to reflect a change inconditions.

The possibilities of such flexibility have barelybeen addressed in present-day software. At presentthe flexibility is offered by macro-changes in pro-gram modules and by micro-changes at the press ofa button. For the future the flexibility will beoffered in a manner less obvious to the operator; hewill merely have to specify to the software what itis he wishes to achieve and the program will carryout its own metamorphisis to achieve this. A fur-ther possibility is the adaptive change of postureunder operator-aided program control, in a similarway to the adaptive program optimisation alreadymentioned. Thus the posture might reflect theactivity of the last few hours projected to providethe features the operators most need. Operator-override capability would naturally be required.

The Penalties of FlexibilityNever something for nothing! There are several

penalties that will be incurred increasingly withgreater flexibility; perhaps this is the reason forsome obvious caution in the process so far.

The first penalty relates to the most importantelement of the system, the operator; he will becomeconfused to a greater or less extent with changes ofposture and needs a stabilisation period to regainhis normal efficiency. This time constant of opera-tor adjustment could be of the order of 20 minutes.If changes are made more rapidly he will be cons-tantly below his most efficient.

A related penalty is the difficulty of keepingprogram documentation in step with the program,


in such a manner that the operator has a useablepublication he can turn to at any time. Verificationof software will become an even more difficult tasksince the range of discrete states to be verified willbe greater.

A further aspect has been mentioned before inanother context - that of core size; to provide flex-ibility requires software itself. On the other handif the design for flexibility uses some alternativeslow memory, such as magnetic tape, there is in facta reduction in the required core, thus this does nothave to be a problem.

Finally a problem not previously addressed isaggravated; the configuration management of whatprogram one really has is made greatly more difficultwith greater flexibility. One of the people problemsincluded under the collective heading of softwarecomprehension is that of controlling the improve-ments to software so all due processes of consulta-tion and approval are carried out. If the software isless easily described then it will less easily be knownand thus less easily managed; this is likely with in-creased flexibility.

CONCLUSION

My intention is to conclude on an optimistic note;there is certainly no reason not to do so.

Software has existed in the RAN for some timein mechanistic and slow-reaction forms, but thererecently has been added fast-reaction software thatshows many different attributes to the previous twoforms; a large part of the recently-added software isnon-mechanistic and is based on in-built designassumptions that can not be verified practically.This form of software has been termed 'qualitative'.

Some of the problems inherent in dealing withqualitative software have been described, in parti-cular that of verifying satisfactory performance.The proposition has been made ihat such softwarewill never work 'correctly'; rather it must be eval-uated over a period by experienced operators, whoshould then propose improvements; by irm meanssufficiently satisfactory software will result.

Finally the many important benef i t^ > i t software,and some further allied problemx have been described.

In conclusion, the reader hopetully will see thatfew if any of the problems mentioned are .likely stillto exist in the long term, whereas the desirableattributes gained, while beneficial and tangible now,will be of even greater advantage in the future.

* * * X *

MEMBERSHIP

Although our numbers are steadily increasing me stillneed to extend our membership. Therefore members areexhorted to invite the attention of friends and acquaint-ances, both Service and civilian, to the existence of theInstitute. Remember it pays to advertise.


ShiphandlingCorner

Possibly the RAN's most wayward-handlingvessel is the oiler Supply. She can behave beauti-fully, but the constant variations in her draughtand the consequent varying windage on her enor-mous sides, can occasionally combine with herclassical single-screw characteristics to make herinto a real "bucking bronco" of a ship.

Creeping slowly (always a wise precaution inher) towards our port-side - to berth at Fitting OutWharf in Sydney one day, the crew of a woodenminesweeper berthed at the extreme outer end ofthe wharf - all stopped work to watch us slidepast. "Ooh, ain't she big!" seemed to be the feelingbehind the admiring looks on their faces.

But these looks soon turned to horror as theysuddenly realised that Supply was moving sidewaystowards them at an alarming rate. A wooden mine-sweeper; would crack like an egg if pressed toofirmly by 26,000 tons, and the bigger ship hadpicked on that moment to start a crab-wise sheertowards the smaller vessel.

To go astern would only throw the stern moreviolently to port. The tug secured aft was alreadytrying its hardest to hold the stern off, but seem-ingly to no avail. Ahead of Supply's berth, atWoolloomoolloo, lay a large merchantman,looming alarmingly close.

In retrospect the answer was perhaps obvious, butat the time it seemed a difficult decision to make."Full ahead, hard aport"; and almost immediately,as we lunged at the ship ahead, the sheer was stoppedand the minesweeper was saved. Then "Full astern,stand-by both anchors", (and hope that thosefenders over the bow won't be needed).

In fact, she settled very neatly into her berth,without having to use the anchors as a brake.

A simple enough story, but one that supports asoftly-softly approach for big ships. Furthermore,although we didn't on that occasion use an anchor,there were many times when, in Supply, we indeedfound that an anchor was "as good as anotherengine". D. H. D. S.

Australia's Long-Term DefenceRequirements

by

COMMANDER GEOFFREY W. FURLONG RAN

An essay awarded the Admiral Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize at the Naval War College,Newport, USA - May 5, 1975

The Australian armed forces need to be re-structured to accord with the changing circum-stances of the late 20th century. A long-term pro-gram should be initiated which will provide strongmaritime forces to back a new strategy of deterrence.

The roles and priorities of the armed servicesmust reflect this national strategy and a new forcestructure must be created to carry them out.Value criteria should be applied with some firmness.

Balanced force considerations should notenter the equation. What is required is that ourforces should be armed with equipments whichwill enhance the primary aim of deterrence.Forces tor this role can carry out secondary rolesin conjunction with a few special units, but ifthey are not suitable for such secondary purposestheir limits ought to be accepted. Equipment forsecondary roles should take second place.

The new force development plan should bebased on a realistic estimate of the future allocationof resources for defence and should take accountof those trends in technology which are likely topay dividends in the long term as well as in theimmediate future.

• These objectives can be met by building amaritime strike force of low-cost a t t a c k sub-marines, vertical-take-off attack aircraft, shorttake-off patrol aircraft and mobile-coastal defencebatteries. All these elements should be armedwith anti-ship missiles of the Harpoon type.

1

The determinants of Australia's present"balanced force" defence capability are easily under-stood, and logically they provide a point of depart-ure for any analysis of "what ought to be."

The first element which has helped mouldtoday's force structure is historical precedent. Sincethe beginning of this century, Australia has beeninvolved in four overseas wars: two world wars,Korea, and Vietnam. Each time Australia contrib-uted conventional naval, army and air forces. These

forces have fought in Europe, in the Middle East,and in Southeast Asia. Historically our militarycommitment has been global, with recent concernfor the Pacific. The armed services have alwayshad broad roles (missions) and feel at home withWestern attitudes towards technology, mechanizedwar, and conservative politico-military environ-ments. Thus history and tradition have fosteredthe maintenance of balanced forces.

The second determinant of Australia'spresent force structure has been organizationalprocess, for the interactions of the military, bureau-cratic and political organizations have affectedpolicy in a predictable way. Each service producesforce requirements in response to possible threatsor deficiencies in capability, based on the currentstrategic assessment. Thereafter a bargaining process

THE AUTHOR

Commander Geoffrey Furlong, RAN, was bornin 1936 at Melbourne. He joined the RAN Collegein 1952, graduating two years later. Then followedMidshipman's training in HMS Triumph and HMASSydney. After completing Sub Lieutenant's coursesin the UK, Commander Furlong joined HMASQuickmatch as a Sub Lieutenant in 1959. He qual-ified as a Gunnery specialist at Whale Island in 1961and after two years in HMS Agincourt, returned toAustralia in 1963 as the Gunnery Trials officer. In1966 he joined HMAS Perth after training in theUSA and deployed to Vietnam in 1967. This tourof duty was followed by a posting as Officer inCharge Jervis Bay missile range and Gunnery officerHMAS Albatross until 1970. Commander Furlongstood by HMAS Torrens during her construction atCockatoo Island Dockyard and commissioned thatship as Executive Officer. He was promoted toCommander in 1971 and served in Navy Office onthe DDL project and as the Director of Surface andAir Weapons. In August 1974, he attended the USNWar College at Newport, R.I. where he was awardedthe Admiral Colbert prize for his essay on "Australia'sLong lerm Defence Requirements". CommanderFurlong returned to Australia in September 1975and is currently serving as the Commanding Officerof HMAS Parramatta.


takes place in which each service seeks to obtain afair share of the defence budget. In consequence,the program which the Minister for Defence receivestends to have the expenditure apportioned betweenthe services and it attempts to rectify as many defic-iencies as possible within each service, given the fundsavailable.

During development of individual service pro-posals or as a result of inter-service disagreement, thebureaucratic organization of the Department ofDefence imposes budgetary and effectiveness criteria.Committees flourish in this environment and theresultant smoothing process tends to favor compromiseand balanced forces.

The Government, in the form of House reviewcommittees and ultimately the Cabinet, then examinesthe program. In addition to legitimate political con-cerns such as resource allocation priorities, other con-siderations such as ministerial rivalries and individualpreferences influence the debate, so that there arefurther compromises. Moreover, balanced forcerhetoric is politically appealing because it suggeststhat each service will get something and that thecountry will have "all round" defence.

The annual defence program is therefore acompromise of the concerns of the military, bureau-cratic, and political leaders. It tends to give a shareof the defence dollar to each service and to favorbalanced forces, even though this may not be themost objective solution.

The third determinant of our force structurehas been the economic factor, which has had a sig-nificant influence both on the size and nature of thearmed forces because it has controlled the moneyallocated to defence. People and politicians generallytranslate low-threat perceptions into minimal defencerequirements, so that defence budgets are often thefirst to be reduced in time of economic hardship. Allresponsible governments recognize that a balancemust be struck bet ween national security and othercomponents of national welfare, yet, there is an un-deniable tendency to trade off defence requirementsas a short-term political measure which is unlikelyto arouse public resistance. In recent years there hasbeen a tendency in Australia to reduce defence ex-penditure in real terms and there" has been a corres-ponding reduction in the size of the armed forces.

The final and most important determinantof the present force structure has been the strategicoutlook. Since the Second World War, this factorhas dominated all the others. It is important torealize that since 1945, Australians have never feltdirectly threatened and this fact has been reflectedin strategic assessments. The spread of Communismthroughout southeast Asia has been perceived as aPage 30 - Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

long term danger, but until the collapse of Vietnam,survival has never been an issue.

Australia is a very large country with a verysmall population, an island continent far removedfrom Europe, from America, and from our newindustrial trading partner, Japan. Although basicallyself-sufficient, we depend upon sea lanes for ourpresent high standard of living since most of thecountry's exports, currently about six billiondollars annually, must be carried by sea.* Themajority of the people understand that the mari-time envelope is vital to well being and probably tonational security.

In the past ten years there have been manyeconomic changes in this region of the Pacific.Japan's spectacular economic growth created newmarkets for our raw materials, China stabilizedher economy and all but eliminated starvation, andAustralia's trade has increased with Indonesia,Singapore and Malaysia. Changes in our economicalignment were also brought about by the entryof Britain into the European Common Market whenwe were forced to develop new markets in Asiaand the U.S.A.

Australian observers haye gazed benevolentlyupon this scene from beneath the nuclear umbrella.The balance of fear has been effective for thirtyyears and a war between the maxi-powers stillseems inconceivable. The prospect of conflictbetween midi-powers remains remote, and warsbetween the mini-powers such as in the MiddleEast are regrettable but not of vital concern ifcontrolled. Civil wars and wars of liberation arelikely to break out but are unlikely to affectAustralia's security interests. These reassuringviews have been reinforced by other favorableportents such as detente and strategic armslimitation agreements.

American withdrawal form Asia, followed bythe announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, markedthe end of the containment policy which soughtto prevent the spread of Asian Communism. In1972 the Vietnamese War, rightly or wrongly, wasgenerally perceived to be no longer a Communist-Anticommumst struggle, was named a civil war,and temporarily ceased to be of importance. Detentewas extended to China as it became apparent thatthe Chinese did not intend to pursue expansionistpolicies.

Australia therefore moved towards a moreneutral, independent stance in world and regionalaffairs, reflected in recognition of the People'sRepublic of China, in reduction of forces overseasin Malaysia and Singapore, and in changes in the

* Australian Facts It Figures 1974

SEATO organization to emphasize economic co-operation and reduce the military role. Nationalsecurity policies now emphasize regional stabilityand co-operation combined with military aid toneighbors. Defence policy has tended towardsFortress Australia combined with dependence onthe ANZUS Treaty should its invocation becomenecessary.

The considerations have led the presentgovernment and us defence advisors to the viewthat the prospect for general war is remote andthat local conflicts can be limited. The govern-ment believes that no regional power has the motiveor capability to threaten Australia but that low-level situations such as disputes over maritimeresources could develop. Sudden changes in ourstrategic situation are assessed as unlikely and acadre defence force is regarded as adequate. TheMinister for Defence summarized this view whenhe stated that "the defence force in being shouldbe adequate to indicate our resolution and ourability to defend Australia and Australian interestsand to support others should the need arise. Intimes of low threat probability, as at present, thebasic concept is that of a viable Core Force, ableto handle local situations that may arise and mani-festly capable,of timely expansion, ultimately forthe defence of Australia itself. Our force structureshould be developed at the modest rate now requiredby the assumption of larger national responsibility,by the current strategic assessment and by longerterm uncertainties."*

Thus the interactions of historical precedents,organizational processes, economic pressures, geo-political concerns and favorable strategic assessmentshave led to the evolution of small balanced forceswhich are seen as providing an adequate solutionfor Australian security today.

11

But what of tomorrow? Will the militaryposture of the present work for the future? Thereare good reasons to believe it will not, and to cometo such belief it only is necessary to look at thechanges taking place within Australia now and atimminent developments throughout the Pacificand the world—developments that will surely comewithin the next decade or two.

Consider the many changes taking placetoday that are affecting defence budgets. First andforemost is a severe, world-wide recession. Theexperience of several economic downturns sinceWorld War II indicates that in the absence of

* Australian Defence Report 1974

definable threats, defence cuts are almost inevitable.It is not surprising therefore that Australia andmany other noncommunist countries have recentlyreduced defence expenditure in terms of percentageof G.N.P. This trend is un l ike lv to reverse unlessthreat perceptions change. Moreover, ihe increasingsophistication of national and internat ional econ-omic systems tends to prevent nations with highlystructured budgets from suddenly divert ing expen-diture into the defence category. Other consideration-have also assumed importance in defence thinking:the skyrocketing cost of new fighting equipment, andthe high manpower component of defense budgets.In the Australian defence budget for 1974 only asmall percentage, about 7%, was allocated for newequipment. The balance was required to maintainmanpower and force levels. This situation is likelyto worsen. Our planners face a dilemma. Do theyscrap the old to release funds for the new and therebyreduce current capabilities to some nominal level?The services are fighting a losing battle. So farthey have survived by cutting support costs, sparesand reserves but this process cannot continue in-definitely.

A new public attitude also seems to be devel-oping in Australia towards national security issueswhich paradoxically, is both more sophisticated andmore naive than attitudes of the past. Indeed, in alldeveloped societies there is a new maturity in publiccomprehension of the requirements for internationalpeace. National security needs are now seen as morethan men and machines and treaties. International-ism, the United Nations, international public andprivate diplomacy, world opinion, trade agreements,immigration, tourism, foreign aid, and regional co-operation are now rightly viewed as important newtools for building peace. But acceptance of themargues implicitly against the need for expensive,special-purpose, national defence forces. As thecivilized nations struggle to master these currentproblems, the framework of the world environmentis being remoulded by other evolving phenomena.

The' energy crisis and its consequences hasshaken the stability and confidence of the worldcommunity in a dramatic way. For the first time inhistory, denial of an essential resource was success-fully used as an alternative to war to achieve politicalgoals. This Pandora's box has not been opened com-pletely but it is certain that redistribution ot resourceswill be one of the world's great problems in the next25 years. Australia must be prepared for increasingpressures to share resources and indeed we must co-operate with underprivileged nations to the maxi-mum extent possible. The difficulty arises as towho will decide what is the maximum extent. Theimplication for Austral ia is tha t we must have suffi-

Joumal of the Australian Naval Institute - Page 31

cient military strength to back whatever resourcesharing and trading policy is adopted by the Govern-ment.

Developed countries are striving for zero pop-ulation growth whilst the underdeveloped countrieswho can least afford to increase, are swelling theirpopulations at an alarming rate. By the year 2000,China will have increased her population to over1000 million people, and India will have about700 million. Australia is expected to have onlyabout 20 million people by the turn of the century.

The communications revolution is alreadyaffecting every society. Wider use of communi-cation satellites will revolutionize national andinternational TV broadcasting and provide instantglobal coverage of any event. Education ofmillions of underprivileged is now a certainty,not merely a possibility. With education and abroader view of the world brought into the villagesand towns by transistor radio and TV, clamour forthe better things of life as well as food, clothing,shelter and a sense of security, will echo aroundthe world. No developed nation will be able toisolate itself, but the affluent societies have noteven begun to grasp the magnitude of this problem.

Then there is the possibility of internal revol-ution following economic collapse in the developedcountries. Hitler and Mussolini achieved powerthis way. If Italy collapses again, the Europeaneconomic community may fall with her in a chainreaction. In the ensuing chaos the better-organizedcommunist parties of some European countriesmay succeed in gaining power. Changes in thepolitical alignment of important Free World coun-tries would alter the delicate balance of power thatnow exists and is accepted by both sides. Theultimate effect on world stability^can only beguessed at, but it is possible that a new version ofthe cold war or a new form of confrontationcould be generated.

We have yet to comprehend the consequencesof many other developments: possession of nuclearweapons by many small powers, use of the UnitedNations for political pressure, potential disagree-ments over ownership of the ocean's resources. Allcontain the potential for new misunderstandingsand confrontations.

Finally and most important, we need to reassesspossible developments in the strategic situation.With the fall of Vietnam and Cambodia, the dominotheory has reemerged in Australia. There is a senseof foreboding, a fear that we have witnessed acataclysm in Indochina which will spread acrossthe region. North Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Cam-bodia have gone, and Burma is neutralized. Howlong can Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore with-


stand the pressures of communist insurrection?Communist fires smoulder in the Philippines, andSouth Korea is troubled with increasing unrest. Thespectre of communism may not be real but the chillpersists. These perceptions distort reality but thereis the underlying truth that no border is sacrosanct.On balance, it appears that Australia has little tofear from communism in the short term because thenational liberation element is missing. Asian revolu-tionaries have to rely on popular support as well asexternal aid, and the former seems to be lacking inAustralia. Unfortunately, one cannot be certainthat this will be the case by the end of the century.Any number of developments could generate thenecessary cadre forces to set a terrorist liberationmovement in motion. Volunteers could land inAustralia to overthrow the ruling capitalist cliqueand free their Australian brothers from oppression.No, the possibility of long-term communist inter-vention in Australia cannot be rationalized away.

We just cannot see far enough into the futureto discern the regional situation in the year 2000with any clarity. The dominant feature of life in1975 is uncertainty, and since there is no way toguarantee peace in a Southeast Asia which is movingrapidly towards great power dissociation, Australiamust look to her own capabilities.

China is the key to the destiny of SoutheastAsti and any strategic assessment must be heavilyweighted by our understandings of her motives, .attitudes, and goals, and her potential military capa-bilities. China's concerns now are internal develop-ment and conflict with Russia, but these preoccupa-tions have not limited her involvement in Indochina.World revolution and the establishment of commun-ism are still declared objectives. Once again, uncer-tainty intrudes into any discussion of China's futureactions. So far as military capability is concerned,China will shortly join the USA, Russia and theEuropean community as a maxi-power. She is alreadya nucear power and soon will have an ICBM capability.Her fleet, small by great power standards, is the largestin Asia and consists of 22 destroyers and frigates, 34corvettes, 55 submarines, 30 supply ships and 605patrol boats (some with missiles), together with a largeamphibious force comprising 50 landing ships (LST,LSM and LSL's) and 465 landing craft (mainly LCT s).This fleet is manned by 170,000 officers and sailors.In addition she has 20,000 personnel operating a largefleet air arm of about 450 fighters and bombers. Thefleet air arm is currently land-based but China has thecapability to build and operate carriers. If she doestake this step, her naval forces in the region will besecond only to America and Russia. She has thelargest air force in Asia and the capability of hermulti-million man army needs no discussion.

Recent events have profoundly affected the dis-position of power in the region. Australians feel in-creasingly isolated as the United States withdrawsfrom Southeast Asia and China's sphere of influenceexpands. Free world countries in the Western Pacificare concerned that America will enter a new era ofisolationism and wonder if the experience of Viet-nam will weaken her resolve to come to the aid ofher friends.

Russia has moved steadily to take advantage ofthe changing strategic situation, and fill the mari-time power vacuum in the Indian Ocean. After theCuban missile crisis, the Soviets began to deploy war-ships around the world and sent substantial forcesto the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. As theRussian head of navy, Admiral S. G. Gorshkov putit. "Owing to the high mobility and endurance ofits combatants, the [Soviet] navy possesses thecapability to vividly demonstrate the economic andmilitary power of the country beyond its bordersin peacetime."*

The Indian Ocean is important to the Soviets formany reasons. It is the access to the belly of Russia,and with the Suez Canal reopening it will be thehighway between their Atlantic, Mediterranean, andPacific fleets. The Russians have long desired awarm water port in this region with road and railaccess to the homeland and are thought to have along-range plan to achieve this goal by splitting offBaluchistan from Pakistan as a Russian puppet state.They already have the use of port facilities in Aden,Bangladesh, and Somalia, and they use these basesto support their "presence" operations and promotepolitical influence. The Soviets are currently support-ing allies or revolutionaries in Yemen, Oman, Iraq,Syria, Baluchistan, Eritrea, Somalia, Egypt, Malagasyand Bangladesh. These regional ambitions must also'be viewed in light of the huge Russian investment inmaritime assets operating in the Indian Ocean in-cluding merchant shipping, fishing fleets and whalingfleets. This ocean also provides their shortest andmost natural access to the untapped resources ofthe Antarctic.

It seems inevitable that Russia will one day exertpressure on Australia, by external and internalpolitical agitation, and by naval presence, to removestrategically vital U.S. installations from N.W. Capeand Pine Gap. At the same time they will attemptto weaken the ANZUS Alliance.

What of the other important noncommunistnations in the region? Japan, Indonesia, India,Pakistan and Iran all have a common interest inregional stability. Japan's future well-being isclosely connected with ours. She has the human

* Navies in Wars and in Peacetime (Russian NavalDigest).

resources and technical know-how but possesseslimited natural resources. Australia is her naturaltrading partner because we have plenty of naturalresources and few human resources. Both cauntrieshave signed the nuclear weapons non-proliferationtreaty and rely upon American protection in theevent of nuclear blackmail. Japan currently has amoderately sized self-defence force but in view ofrecent developments nearby, it is very likely thatthe Japanese will be forced to reassess their positionand opt for more capable "self-defence" forcesthan they presently possess. They are dependentupon secure sea lines of communication for theirexistence. Shut off the supply of resources andJapan perishes.

Indonesia is also becoming an important resourcesupplier for Japan, and Australia is concerned withthe well-being and welfare of our nearest neighbor.Strategically, Indonesia controls the three deep-water passages between the Indian Ocean and theWestern Pacific. Southeast Asian regional securitywill be heavily influenced by cooperative policiesand programs between Indonesia, Australia andJapan.

In the western Indian Ocean, India and Pakistanare preoccupied with internal problems and withestablishing new relations after the agony of Bangla-desh. Iran is proceeding rapidly with a militaryexpansion program to fill the vacuum left by thedeparture of Britain from the Persian Gulf, toprotect the flow of her Middle East oil, and toback other national policies of the Shah.

What ought Australians to conclude from thesedevelopments? The first conclusion should be thatthe military posture of today will not be adequatefor tomorrow. The assumption that radical changein Australia's strategic situation is unlikely to occursuddenly cannot be justified. The world scene doesnot change in an orderly, progressive fashion andthere are a great many reasons why we may witnessdramatic changes. Deterioration of the world econ-omic situation, shortages of resources, the Asianpopulation explosion, the communications revolu-tion, mass demand for better living, disagreementsand friction over maritime resources, proliferationof nuclear weapons, ideological revolution: any orall of these factors could initiate dramatic shifts inour situation, and there may not be time to developthe necessary military forces.

We face uncertainty in the long-term future-economic, ideological, political, military andstrategic uncertainty. We should heed the adviceof the U.S. Secretary of Defense, James R.Schlesinger who said recently that "I do not con-sider it wise to bank on all the uncertainties


turning out in our favor."t Australia must providedefence forces that will ensure that we will nothave to yeild to unreasonable demands, threats, orintervention from any quarter.

iveness, and survivability. Important developmentsinclude "smart" bombs, sea-skimming missiles ofthe Harpoon type and long range, homing torpedoes.New defensive systems will greatly improve thedefensive capabilities of some units, but on balancethe advantage will remain with the attacker unlessthe defending unit has sophisticated detection and

lilt/ Kiaiiu uuvai iwi i ilivil irwwi_/llll*3 Tritat auvyuiu I'v . . . . .i - o 11 i *• control systems. Advanced systems will incorporatethe proper defence strategy for Australia? My solution.long-range air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles,

HI

The grand question then becomes what should be

to that question is, use the natural geographic barrierof water that separates the Australian continent fromits neighbors, take advantage of appropriate techno-logical developments, and develop a strong maritimedefence force. These objectives, are best achievedwithin realistic financial limits by the establishmentof a maritime force consisting of attack submarines,aircraft, and coastal batteries which are all equippedwith stand-off, anti-ship missiles.

Since any potential aggressor in our region mustuse the sea, force levels and composition should beselected to provide a high degree of assurance thatany hostile amphibious force could be destroyed.Given this level of capability, the proposed maritimedefence force would provide a powerful deterrentagainst seaborne attack.

As for technological developments, we havealready had a preview of the influence of newtechnology on conventional warfare. In the lastMiddle East conflict, aircraft were unable to pro-vide close support for army units until the battleoutran the protective anti-aircraft missile umbrella.Tanks were knocked out in astounding numbers byman-portable anti-tank weapons. Missile engage-ments dominated the sea battle.

New surveillance systems used in conjunctionwith long-range maritime aircraft will provide acapability to detect and maintain surveillance onany force or large unit, anywhere on the earth'ssurface. It will be very difficult for ships or fleetsto remain "in hiding" at sea for any length of timeif an opposing nation has access to data provided bysurveillance satellites, over-the-horizon-radar (O.T.H.R.), underwater listening arrays, computers anddata links for exchange of information.

Changes in warfare techniques will also emergefrom developments in weapon platforms such asremotely piloted vehicles (R.P.V.) or drones, V.S.T.O.L. attack aircraft, high-speed hydrofoil andhovercraft vessels, and quiet, high-speed, attacksubmarines.

Noteworthy developments in weapon systemsare also taking place. New offensive weapons allhave one thing in common; they can be launchedfrom a stand-off position, providing great advantagesfor the launching vehicle in terms of surprise, effect-

tU.S. Defense Report 1976


automatic (hands off) reaction weapons, automaticdecoys and jammers, and power lasers.

There have been some improvements in detectionsystems, mainly in development of infra-red and low-light-level devices. Unfortunately the advances inradar, sonar, and electronic detection systems haveonly been evolutionary and are unlikely to changewarfare in any substantial way.

So far as Australia is concerned, the most import-ant development is that the modern attack submarine,with either conventional or nuclear propulsion, willhave marked advantages over surface vessels for atleast 25 years and possibly longer. Small, dieselelectric boats of about 1,200 tons manned by about30 men will be able to remain at sea for about fourweeks. Submarines are likely to dominate seacontrol missions of the future.

In the Pacific campaign of the Second WorldWar, 333 Allied submarines sank 1,000 Japanesemerchant ships, 1 battleship, 8 carriers, 14 cruisers,45 destroyers and 25 submarines, for a loss of 50boats. This result was achieved without the bene-fit of modern location devices and long-rangeweapons. Since then, there have been some ad-vances in anti-submarine warfare capabilitiesbrought about by the use of improved sonars,better weapons and delivery systems, helicopters,and improved aircraft systems such as sono buoys.But these marginal gains have not matched thedevelopment of submarine capabilities.

The submarine has much in its favor. With newsurveillance systems providing continuous data onall surface contacts, the submarine can position it-self quietly and at leisure, and then locate the sur-face contacts of interest at long range with lowfrequency passive sonar and E.S.M. gear. Stand-off missiles can be fired from any position withina 50-mile radius, possibly after the surface force hasgone past the submarine. Moreover, modern con-ventional boats are much quieter and can achieveunderwater speeds in excess of 20 knots. In pract-ical terms, this means that future surface forces arelikely to be decimated by unrelenting and^repeatedattacks from any reasonable number of opposingsubmarines, and that even a massive anti-submarineeffort is unlikely to achieve results because there isno requirement for the attackers to close the sur-

face force. Surface forces will therefore be reluct-ant to conduct operations in submarine concen-tration areas and nations with a strong submarineforce will be able to control vital sea areas.

In addition to these tactical advantages, theseplatforms are comparatively inexpensive to buildand to operate. This operational and economiccombination appears to be a matchwinner.

One comes finally to defence policy and forcestructure considerations. Deterrence is the firstof the stated "functions" of the armed forces andI believe that deterrence should be central to ourthinking. There is a need to develop criteria tomeasure the deterrent value of each element ofthe force structure. One might ask, "Will thepresence and disposition of this element of ourforces in realistic and achievable numbers dissuadea potential aggressor from attempting to land troopsin Australia, assuming he is unable to neutralize theelement?" If the answer is clearly yes or no, thevalue of the element is plain. If the answer is notclear-cut, one might ask the further question, "Willthe lack of this element mean that Australia's in-tegrity is unlikely to survive an attack by thoseforces which the element would have helped tocounter?" A negative response would indicate thatthe element involved is not essential for strategicdefence, though it may be useful for other reasons.

To be credible, a deterrent force must be im-mune from attack. Component elements must becapable of rapid deployment. They should also beable to disperse or concentrate quickly. Theserequirements are not presently given the attentionthey deserve and our future policy should at leastindicate what measures are required to prevent sur-prise destruction . Those force elements which can-not meet the immunity criteria should be suspect.

Australia's current defence policy requires thatthe core force be capable of timely expansion butthere is good reasoato thing that this objective maynot be realistic. Core force expansion is limitedby time, money, training, experience, overseassupply, and above all by the physical constraintsof local building and maintenance facilities andskills. The only sensible alternative is to createthe necessary forces as soon as possible. Our goalshould be to build up our strength to the requiredlevel, concentrating on the deterrent elements.

We should build in Australia those cheaper, non-complex equipments, or those required in large num-bers. Patrol boats, corvettes, training ships, submar-ines, helicopters, training aircraft, MRMP aircraft, andsome weapons and missiles spring to mind as appro-priate to this category. At the other end of the scalethere would appear to be sound economic reasonswhy expensive or complex or small numbers of equip-

ments should be bought overseas. The vertical supportship, air-to-air missiles, LRMP, and heavy transportaircraft are representative of this group.

At present, the roles of the Australian armedforces are not allocated priorities, It is held thatroles do not change but that capabilities to performthem can be developed against periodic reassess-ments of the strategic situation. The trouble withthis approach is that the emphasis is on meansrather than the end. Policy should state whichroles are to be given priority, both at the jointand single-service level. In the absence of such role-oriented policy, each service is free to translate thestrategic assessment to serve its own designs. Theprocess generally involves a bureaucratic wranglebetween the services and the central office of thedepartment of defence, and the result is typicallya compromise which may not be the best objectiveanswer. This problem would be eliminated ifnational defence requirements were translated intoa priority list of common and single service rolesand issued as part of the defence policy statement.

The primary common role of the three servicesshould be to provide deterrent forces capable ofpreventing an invasion of Australia by any aggressor.The forces thus generated should be augmented asnecessary by special purpose equipments, to pro-vide the means of carrying out secondary roles:intelligence gathering, maritime surveillance, anti-infiltration, counterinsurgency, and general purposemissions. Maritime resource protection and nationaldisaster assistance also need to be included.

As mentioned, the armed forces should be recon-structed to create a strong, mobile, maritime forcewhich will provide a credible deterrent. A detailedanalysis would be required to establish the optimumnumbers, but as a starting point, the forces describedbelow could be provided within present financialand manpower limits over a 25 year period. Themajor elements of the proposed reconstruction planare, for the navy, initiation of a long-term submarinebuilding program to create a force of about 50 sub-marines and construction of about 10 coast guardcorvettes. These additions should be offset by areduction in escorts from 13 to 6 to be achieved bynot replacing destroyers as they reach end of life.Sufficient escorts would remain in service to createa general purpose task force centered on a carrier orsea control ship. Lower-level tasks can be under-taken by the coast guard corvettes.

As far as a submarine construction program isconcerned, there are several designs from which aselection could be made with the object of buildingunder license in Australia. Candidate submarinesappear to be the German 209 class, the Swedishtype 43, the Italian Sauro, and the French Agosta


class. A building program of about 2 boats per yearwould provide a force of 50 by the end of thecentury. Given a three-month warning, about 40of these boats could be sent to sea to provide thesubmarine element of the deterrent force.

For the army it is proposed that the task forcesbe re-equipped and trained to specialize in anti-infil-tration missions. Twelve mobile surface-to-surfacemissile batteries, each with 8 launchers, should becreated for coastal defence. Mobile radar and E.S.M. stations should be procured and a seaward-surveillance system established.

The air force should initiate a building programto provide about 72 VSTOL strike aircraft and 24STOL patrol aircraft designed for surface surveill-ance and strike. R.P.V.'s may be relevant for thesetasks in the future. All of these aircraft should bearmed with Harpoon type missiles, and in times oftension they should be dispersed .to forward basestogether with mobile support units. All three typescould be built in Australia and it may even be possi-ble to develop a maritime version of the STOL"Nomad" aircraft which is being purchased for thearmy. The rationale for this programme is that thepresent strike force of F- l l l ' s and the LRMPmari-time squadrons can only operate from a handful ofbases throughout Australia, particularly in WesternAustralia, and are thereby liable to be destroyed bysurprise attack or sabotage. Proposed additionsshould be offset by reducing the fighter inventoryfrom about 120 to 48 aircraft based on the valuecriteria mentioned earlier.

In addition to these changes, select commercialships and aircraft should be provided with a missilefiring capability. This reserve force could be armedat short notice by embarking the missiles and oper-ators.

A joint maritime reporting and control centershould be constructed udnerground near Canberraclose to senior military commanders and politicalleaders. It should receive data transmitted fromsatellites and other tracking centers covering thePacific and Indian Oceans. Other sources of in-formation should be ships, submarines, and air-craft, and in due course the center would be linkedto coastal surveillance systems operated by thearmy. It would need to be linked to communi-cation faculties so as to rebroadcast information(and in some cases directions) to deployed forces.In peacetime this center could be used by thenational disaster and maritime search and rescueagencies.

Current planning for other elements of thegeneral purpose forces should not be affected bythe abovementioned changes, as there will be a

Page 36 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

continuing need for replacements of conventionalforce hardware.

The deterrent potential of the restructuredforce would be impressive. Approximately 40 sub-marines, 12 shore missile batteries, 150 aircraft and45 ships, including the reserve forces, could deploywith their anti-ship missiles in times of tension.

To sum up, one must say that Australia's presentdefence posture seems unrealistic in light of theforces and factors operating upon world andregional politics now, and that are likely to beoperating during the remaining years of the presentcentury. Any careful analysis shows that ourpresent forces, even if expanded, would not deteror be able to prevent an aggressor from landing inAustralia. The world turns to new problems andseeks new solutions, and the remedies of the lastdecades are passing or have passed into history.Australia must look to the challenges to come,and respond with as much realism and foresightas the nation can manage. Only by this meanscan we be sure that Australia will survive intothe next century.

Technical Topics

PLUMBERS' PROBLEMSThe scenario was Malacca Strait with four destroy-

ers in single column steaming at standard distance(2& cables) at 15 knots with one of the older andbetter known RAN two-stack destroyers as last ofthe line. Two black balls, hoots from sirens andclouds of black smoke announced the fact that theship ahead, an RN destroyer of the C A class, hadcome to an involuntary halt. "Stop both enginesstarboard 35" but D123 continued to forge aheadas the E.O., who was on the bridge at the time,beat a hasty and tactical retreat to his personaldomain.

At the time one boiler was connected, cruisingthrottles in use and closed exhaust opened to theport L.P. turbine. The port throttle had seized inthe all but full open position and despite a liberalapplication of astern steam to this engine, consis-tent with the boiler power available, the ship forgedahead to the complete chagrin of both the Captain(most irate) and the E.O. (most perturbed).

The ERA on watch did the right thing. Gettinghis priorities correct he left the manoeuvring plat-form E.O., the then Leading Engineering Mechanicbeating the telegraph reply gong repeatedly andcarefully getting as much astern power to theengines as possible. Of course, the bridge phonewas wailing.

The ERA hastily shut the nozzle group controlvalve thus depriving the HP turbine of steam, butthe exhaust steam on the L.P. was good for revsfor eight knots. Next he shut the exhaust to mainengines. With Captain D. now abeam the situationwas under control if one ignored the fact that theClosed Exhaust relief valve had lifted with itsattendant roar from the forward funnel. This allbut matched the bull-like roar from the Captain!

Having completed his involuntary tour of theengine room the ERA answered the phone, par-tially appeased the Command and got the situationwell under control.

HMAS Warramunga proceeded to S.N.B. incompany without further ado.

The sequej1. No more closed exhaust to main engines.2. No further use was to be made of cruising

throttles when in company.3. The CO never did believe the E.O.'s explanation

for the fracas - he'd never had a ship whichcould not stop - 'twas always the opposite!Lessons:

1. The use of exhaust on main engines seriouslyinhibits the ability to obey telegraphs.

2. The cause of the throttle jambing led to a re-think on the method used to re-claim wornshafts.

3. All engine controls should be located centrallyand not dispersed about the engine room.

4. Be prepared! L T S

FACTS & FIGURESSources T. B. Millar and Defence Reports

Over the past 29 years the nation has spent on eacharm of Defence:

ARMY $M 6316.9AIR FORCE $M 5123.0NAVY $M 4144.4

Actual figures for 75-6 are not available because of thenew method of expressing Defence expenditure and esti-mates.

» * *

COMMENTSJournal articles are intended to get you thinking. You mayviolently disagree with views expressed or you may wish toexpand on arguments propounded. We look forward tohearing your views in letters to the editor, In other wordswrite, don't fume.

Two destroyers engaged on blockade duty in theMediterranean were alerted by higher authority tothe likelihood of a gun-running attempt by a smallcraft. Details of the planned operation, said to havecome from a reliable intelligence source, includedthe date and place of the expected landing.

Suitable patrols were instituted and sure enough,at the predicted time and position a small craft wasdetected. For some hours it was tracked in dark-ness as it steadily closed the coast, with the des-troyers converging on it expectantly. Soon afterdawn the intruder reached territorial waters andwas quickly intercepted and ordered to heave to.A boarding party was sent to search her and re-ceived a very pleasant surprise. In place of theexpected gun-runner they found a harmless luxuryyacht skippered by an elderly male with an attract-ive and scantily clad female crew.

Destroyer A signalled destroyer B: "SO PERISHALL OUR FOES".

(Reflecting on the incident one wonders just howgenuine was that intelligence source, how innocentthat glamorous crew and if any gun-runners slippedashore undetected on other parts of the coast thatnight?!)

A destroyer working up some years ago waspractising dummy torpedo attacks. The targetvessel was a DE with the Squadron Commander incommand. An earlier dummy attack had not comeoff very well as the attack had ended with whatwould have been a fairly long range shot, so theCaptain of the destroyer decided to press the nextone right home. As a result the ships got fairlyclose and the destroyer made a very tight hardturn to break away. It was not dangerous but thewhole business had some excitement. As soon asthe attack was over the target vessel started to makea signal:Target vessel: "You gave me a nasty turn".Destroyer: "ENOVID takes the worry out of being

close".Target vessel: (Disappearing over the horizon) "I

prefer MUM".Journal of the Australian Naval Institute - Page 3 7

BOOKREVIEW

"AUSTRALIA'S SHIPS OF WAR"by John Bastock

"Australia's Ships of War" is a survey of the ships thathave helped to shape Australia's naval history for a centuryor more. Compiled from a collection of facts, figures andphotographs assembled by the author over a period ofmany years, it sets out to provide, between one pair ofcovers, a complete illustrated source of reference coveringall the vessels that have served in the navies of the Austra-lian Colonies, the Commonwealth Naval Forces and theR.A.N.

The work follows a broad chronological pattern, rang-ing from the establishment of the Australia Station in 1859,through the period of the Colonial and the CommonwealthNaval Forces to the birth of the Royal Australian Navy andits growth up to the present day.

Class by class, and ship by ship, there is a well illustratedrecord, as complete as can be ascertained by diligent studyand research, of every vessel known to have served theAustralian Colonies and the Commonwealth at sea from the1850s to the 1970s, including numerous auxiliary vesselsand obscure craft, pictures of which have never betorebeen published.

Each class of ship is described in basic technical detail,and generally accompanied by a plan, diagram or silhouette,after which an illustrated history of each vessel of the classis presented. Most of the photographs bear a date, and themore important vessels, where possible, are depicted invarious stages of their careers covering, for example, launch-ing, alterations in appearance, paying off or sinking, etc.

The comprehensive nature of the book is exemplifiedby the coverage of such types as the R.A.N. Corvettes ofWorld War II, every one of which 56 vessels is presented bya photograph and accompanied by a history of its careerfrom building to disposal or loss. Similar treatment isaccorded the 12 frigates, the 36 auxiliary minesweepers,the boom-working vessels and the many other types ofminor craft of that period, The illustrated account of thepresent-day R.A.N. ranges through the complete spectrumof major warships, down to Diving Tenders, TRVs andDockyard Tugs.

Assembly of the material in this book represents aquarter of a century's research on the part of the author.The purpose behind the work is to fill what has been longrecognised as a gap in the annals of Austral ia 's naval his-tory by providing both details and pictures of the ships,many of which have either been completely overlooked or,through sheer lack of space, have received but scant men-tion even in the several monumental histories and otherexcellent books already published.

Readers of The Australian Naval Insitute Journal whouse the coloured AUSTRALIA'S SHIPS OF WAR orderform inserted within this issue to obtain their copy willbe directly assisting the funds of the Institute.


Author John Bastock, a member of the SydneyChapter of the Institute, has persuaded his publishers tocontribute a "commission" to the Institute for every copysold on this special order form. All orders should be sentdirect to Angus & Robertson Publishers at the addressshown.

This is an excellent way to acquire an outstandinghistorical reference book of Australian naval ships - onethat's likely to increase in value because it's available onlya? ? limited edition - and assist our fledgling Institute atthe same time.

John Bastock trained as a boy seaman in HMASTingira. On leaving the Navy after 10 years service he wasa Leading Seaman Torpedo Gunners Mate, one of 3 at thattime to wear the right and left arm badges simultaneously.Since then he has been an active member of many naval,nautical and historical societies both in Australia andoverseas.

"THE CONTINENTAL COMMITMENT"by Michael Howard

Pelican Books $1.35

Michael Howard is the Professor of War Studies atOxford and previously occupied a similar chair at theUniversity of London. In this new Pelican, he sets out toshow how it was that Britain became a land power on thecontinental model in World War One, and now. after WorldWar Two, has accepted that her eastern border is noi theNorth Sea but the Rhine, where, under her NATOobligations, she maintains a permanent garrison force, theBritish Army of the Rhine. The author argues that thiswas all inevitable from the beginning, and he suggeststhat military commentators, such as Sir Basil Liddell Hart,who, in the 20's and 30's, advocated that Britain shouldnever again engage in a continental war and should rely infuture on a maritime strategy, were, at best, unrealistic,emotionally driven by their memories of the four years ofslaughter in France.

In developing his thesis Professor Howard givesrevealing glimpses into the workings of the Committee ofImperial Defence, the British Defence Committee, variousBritish Cabinets, and the interactions between a greatmany prominent men in British public life over the last70 years. He quotes liberally from official records andcites many references. The thoroughness of his research isimpressive and he generously acknowledges the part playedby his students' work. The book is well written, and Ifound it as compulsively readable as a novel.

The author puts forward the proposition that, whenBritain had finally decided before 1914 that her most likelyenemy was Germany and that she would be allied withFrance, there really was no other choice but to send anExpeditionary Force to France to fight at the main front.The reasons, he claims, were both military and political.Militarily, how could an outnumbered France be expectedto fight Germany alone on land? And, the hard facts oflogistics dictated the shortest line of communications back

to Britain. Politically, how could Fiance trust Britain asan ally if it would not make a commitment of men to helpredress the imbalance on the continent? He also quotesSchlieffen as having considered the prospect of a Britishamphibious diversion and welcoming it, as it would makehis plan even more effective. It is all very plausible but Ibelieve there is a much more fundamental reason whyBritain engaged in this "act of suicidal idiocy".

From my reading of the evidence I believe that astrong case can be made that it was not so much thepolitical and military necessities which drove Britain to"seize the glittering sword of continental manufacture"2

but quite simply better staff work from the newly formedBritish General Staff and the glaring deficiencies of theAdmiralty in this regard. Perhaps this assertion needssome amplification.

The remarkable Jackie Fisher had been only tooglad /almost malevolently so) to accept a seat on the EsherCommittee which had been charged with re-organizing theArmy after its apparent failings in the Boer War. As aresult of the Committee's recommendations, the old officeof Commander in Chief of the Army was abolished and apost of Chief of the General Staff, and an Army Council(on the lines of the Board of Admiralty) were established.As well, the country was divided into military areas and anorganisation was created for a reserve on a territorial basis,the Territorial Army, to allow expansion of the small corpsof regulars. The new Army Council in turn quickly estab-lished the General Staff. The War Office then had theplanning staff, it had a potentially sizeable army to planfor, and it developed a well thought out argument as to howit could best be used. Fisher, on the other hand, refusedto have a Naval Staff at all, and kept all such functions tohimself. Although he got a small group together at RNCGreenwich (including Hankey and Corbett) they had noofficial status. So, despite Fisher's messianic pronounce-ments "the army is a projectile to be fired by the Navy",and "there was a stretch of hard sand ninety miles fromBerlin. Were the British Army to seize and entrench thatstrip a million Germans would find occupation", whenthe decisive moment came in 1911, the Navy and noconcrete altenative to offer. A vague Admiralty plan fora landing on German soil was no match for the Army'sproposals which could be explained in detailed practicalterms to the politicians who had the responsibility forthe decision. One naval historian describes the differenceat the fateful meeting of the Committee of ImperialDefence in 1911 like this, . . . "when Sir Arthur Wilson(1st Sea Lord) was faced with explaining the Navy'sstrategic role . . . he cor-ld only stutter out salty inanities,while Sir Henry Wilson, for the Army, ran verbalrings around him". In this light British acquescence tofighting World War One on German and French contin-ental terms was inevitable, but not, I suggest, simply onthe basis claimed by Professor Howard. If Fisher, andlater Wilson, had backed up the publicly professedphilosophy of maritime strategy with a demonstrablypractical plan for an amphibious assault on Germany itmight well have been possible to convince, first the Army,then the French, that this was the best course militarily.4

In turn this could have swayed the political argument.No doubt those who support Britain's strategic choice in1914 would say that the later fiasco at Gallipoli is furtherevidence that an amphibious operation against Germanywould have ended in disaster; it would be, and it has beenargued that the Franco-British alliance would then havebeen defeated in detail.

My contention is that if Fisher, in the first instance,had tackled the problem with the vigour, ruthless deter-mination and disregard of convention he showed in the"Dreadnought" project the Admiralty could well haveproduced a workable solution and there is little doubt inmy mind that the lack ol a Naval Staff to help define theissues played a big part in this disastrous omission.

Professor Howard does not dwell on this sort ofhypothesis; he has an opinion that it would not have workedanyway, and gives some supporting reasons, but he does notfind it necessary to build to his conclusion form a closely fromreasoned argument In disagreeing with him I must admitthat I am luxuriating in opinon just as much as I considerhim to be, and I make no claim to being unbiassed. Ihemindless stupidity of slogging it out for four years in Franceis more than I can accept with equanimity. If onlyGallipoli had succeeded! Perhaps this subject should begiven more detailed examination and, using war gamingtechniques, we might all get closer to the truth.

After Germany's early successes in World War Two ibrought about an undeniable need for Britain to revert towhat was, effectively, a maritime strategy, (call it what youwill), Professor Howard stretches my belief in his objectivityagain when he suggests that it all came back to a continentalstrategy in the end anyway. Well, of course, who wouldargue with the self-evident fact that eventually Europehad to be fought over, the land won and held? But, surely,the comparatively swift war of movement following theJune '44 amphibious landings was a totally differentmatter frpjn "eating barbed wire" (in Churchill's phrase)in a grinding continental war of attrition? I cannot resistthe observation, perhaps very unfairly, that Michael Howardserved in the British Army in World War Two and won aMilitary Cross, which may go some way to explaining hisapparent desire to justify Britain*;' choice of a continentalstrategy in World War One, and again, initially, in WorldWar Two. Despite his eminence, it seems to me that hereally does not understand maritime strategy. Either that,or he has allowed some of seapower's more euphoricpublic propagandists to rattle him ".. . seapower could not,of itself, produce a clear military decision", he writeselsewhere.6 Who has ever suggested seriously that seapower,"of itself, could produce all the answers? What he seemsunable to accept is that without I t there was, and is, hofoundation for any kind of victory at all. And his maskslips right off when he describes post-Mahan theories ofseapower as "sinking into naval minds, there to ossifyinto impenetrable orthodoxy." Such peevishness!

The book covers a great many other matters ofpolitico-military importance from World War One to theend of World War Two and it is surprising how thereverberations from so many of these matters still findechoes in Canberra to bedevil us to this day. In addition,as we have now entered a period of history which is sooften reminiscent of the 20's and 30's, present daypractitioners at Russell Hill might find some useful cluesas to how they could avoid some of the booby trapswhich caught them in Whitehall in those days. There isprecious little new under the sun. Without asserting anarrow parallelism at all, the book has a relevance to whatwe are doing today and is worth reading on that accountalone, apart from its intrinsic interest as history.

Do not let my quarrel with the author put you off;on the contrary, I strongly urge you to buy the book andread it. You will learn a lot. Did you know, for instancethat the three British arms between the wars were allpreparing for different wars with different countries? Wewon't make that sort of mistake again, will we? But thissort of revelation makes one wonder how some of'ouragonizing over Australian Defence problems today willlook tu some historian in the future.

J. A. R.

1. Admiral Sir John Fisher.2. Liddell Hart "The British Way of Warfare".3. D. M. Schurman.4. Theodore Ropp's "War in the Modern World" p 232

implies that such an alternative could have been•cceptable to some Army opinion.

5. "Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War".Michael Howard (Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, London)


A ship far all reasons.Simplicity, economy,endurance and effect-iveness .. . these arethe factors whichcount in warshipdesign today.

Designed by theVickers ShipbuildingGroup in the UnitedKingdom, theVickers Vedettemeets these criteria,and stands as a shipfor all reasons andall Navies. This versatile small war-ship represents a cost effectivesolution to many Navies' problems.

With CODOG or all Dieselpropulsion, the Vedette can carry avariety of armaments to suit par-ticular requirements. The Vedette iscapable of long range patrol in openocean or coastal conditions. This isfurther enhanced by a helicopterwhilst retaining a significant surfaceto surface, anti-aircraft and gunfiresupport capability in a ship muchsmaller (about 1200 tonnes) than

today's destroyers and frigates.An entirely new hull form improvesperformance; the design cuts thecost of construction and mainten-ance ; together with a big saving inmanpower — all this is the outcomeof many decades of shipbuildingexperience and leadership in navaltechnology.Vickers Shipbuilding GroupVickers Ltd Shipbuilding Group Barrow-in-FurnessCumbriavickersVickers Cockatoo Dockyard Pty LimitedCockatoo Island, NSW 2000 Telephone 82 0661Telex AA21833A subsidiary of Vickers Holdings Pty Ltd


THE COUNCIL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE1974-75

OFFICE BEARERSPresident

Commodore V. A. ParkerSenior Vice President

Captain J. A. RobertsonJunior Vice President

Captain L. G. FoxSecretary

Lieutenant A. G. BorwickTreasurer

Commander D. York

COUNCILLORSCommodore G. A. Bennett QBELieutenant Commander A. H. R. BrechtCommodore J. DavidsonCaptain B. G. GibbsChief Petty Officer R. KimeCommander W. B. LoftusCaptain B. D. Macleod AMCaptain D. J. MartinCaptain W. R. SharpLieutenant Commander K. Stephen

+Adamik, F. H. C.t Anderson, G. C.+Bantock, D. G.+ Bartlett, I. G.fBastock, J.Bateman, W. S. G.

+Becher, O. H.•Bennett, G. A.•Berlyn, N. R. B.•Bonnett, V. W. L.Borwick, A. G.

+Boyd, G. L.•Brecht, A. H. R.•Broben, I. W.+Browne, R. K.

Bruce-Walker, P.+*Ca(del-wood, G. C.

• Campbell, O. J.+Castto, B. J.

Caton, O. A.t Clarke, C. D. A.Clinch, D. E.Cocking, R. J.Cody, R. J.

•Cole, S. E. W.Coles, C. R. J.

+Cooper, J.+Crabb, G. J.•Cummings, A. R.•Cutts, G.Dadswell, T. A.

•Dalrymple, H. H. G.* David ton, J.

Densten, F. G.•Dickie, D. D.

Dickson, J.f Dillon, H. W. C.Duchetne, T. R.

+Duncan, J. A.Elsmore, C. J.

HONORARY LIFE MEMBERS

Admiral Sir Victor Smith AC KBE CB DSCVice Admiral H. D. Stevenson CBEJudge T. G. Rapke QC (JAG)

MEMBERSHIP

^Fielder-Gill, W.•Fith«r,T. R.+Fogarty, M. J.•Fox, L. G.»Frizell, B. P.Cashier, P. B.

^Gatacre, G. G.•George, J.•Gibbs, B. G.

•(••Goddard, F. C.Gorringe, B. K.

*Gould, A. J.+Grazebrook, A. W.t Green, R. J.•Grin-ton, K. W.•Hall, I. W.

Halley, G.+Hazdl, J. H.•Herman, B. J.Hewitt, R. E.

+*Hi*ted, G.Holden. T. J.

+Hope, K.J.Hudson, M. W.

+Humbley, R. R. W.•James, I. B.Jamei, P. H.

t Jenningi, D. B.t Jeremy. J. C.•Jervis, G. E.Jonas, D. A.Jones, R. M.

+ -Josselyn, I. K.Kelly, J. M.

•Kemp, W. A.Kime, R.King, J. N.

t Knight. L. S.•Knox, I. W.•Lae, N. E.

Le Flay, S.Lemon, S. P.

+ Levine, D. D.Littlewood, V. R.

•Loftuj, W. B.•Lootli, R.G.+ Low, R. D.Lynam, O. F.McConnochie, I. P.

•McDonald, N. E.•Mactood, B. D.

Markham, J. K.•Martin, D. J.

+*Martin, P. C. S.-t-Martin, P. R.

+ 'Mayson, J. H.• Mftslsy, J. o.•HMills, B. L.Mora, J. St. B.Murdoch, G. J.

+Murph»e. K. D.Murray. B. S.

•Nattay, R. J.Nakraeov, G.

+• Nicholson, B. M.•Nicholson. I. H.Noble, I. A.

+Noble, J. A.•KJ'Connor, T. J.Oner, D. E.

•Orr, D. J.Otter, M. D.

•Parker, V. A.••••Patterson, D. R.

Pennock, R. J. R.Parry man, R. J.

+Pietor, E. J.+Purves, F. W.•H»yke, L. H.•Ralph, N.

+Ramsay, G. L.+Hattray, D.*Re«d. B. J.

+*Reynolds, I.*Rice, P. J.•Robertson, J. A.^Robertson, J. S.^Rodriguez, R. P.^Rogers, P. E.

Rosser, M. A.^Rowlands, A. R. O.

+•Scott, B.+Sen, D. J.•Sharp, W. R.+Shearer. I. A.•Shearing, J. A.Siabert, J. A.Skinner, C. J.

•Smyth, D. H. D.+*Sna4l, K. E.

+Stead, J. J.•Stephen, K. C.•Steven*. E. V.•Steven., J. D.•Summers, A. M. F.+Swain, L. A.•Swan, R. C.

+*Swan, W. N.Synnot, A. M.

••Tanner, J. R. C.Thompson, D. H.

^Thompson, G. M. M.+Tumengol, E.Wasay, T. R.

Weekley, I. W.+Wast, D. H.Weston, M. P.

•Williams. K. A.•Wood, A. S.•fWoodgar, J. A.•York. D.

•Foundation ^Associate

LOWES-printer, Garran, A.C.T.

Plessey—A Name Synonymous with TotalElectronic Systems Capability

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Plessey companies in Australia employ some 4,000people in research, development and manufacturingprojects vital to the industrial progress and defence ofthe Commonwealth.

PLESSEYPlessey Australia Pty LimitedRailway Road, Faraday Park, MeadowbankNSW 2114. Telephone Sydney 80 0111

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Illustration of nuclear-powered submarine withacknowledgement to MOD (Royal Navy)

Plessey defends thedefenders

• - .

PT131/R1

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