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Political Movements and Leverage Points: KurdishActivism in the European DiasporaVera Eccarius-Kelly

To cite this Article: Eccarius-Kelly, Vera , 'Political Movements and Leverage Points:Kurdish Activism in the European Diaspora', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 22:1,91 - 118To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/13602000220124854URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13602000220124854

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Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2002

Political Movements and Leverage Points:Kurdish Activism in the European Diaspora

VERA ECCARIUS-KELLY

Introduction

The 1980 military coup in Turkey proved to be a pivotal event for Kurdish radicaliza-tion in Western Europe. Hundreds of thousands of Turkish citizens entered Germany,France, the Netherlands, and Belgium to escape political, religious, and ethnic per-secution. Reversing the country’s more liberal constitution of 1961, the Turkishmilitary limited civil liberties, curtailed freedom of the press, and reduced the in� uenceof trade unions.1 The regime focused on breaking Kurdish resistance by banningwritten and spoken Kurdish, and prohibited cultural activities that were interpreted asundermining the territorial integrity of the state.2 All expressions of religious, ethnic,and cultural differences became classi� ed as terrorist activities dangerous to theTurkish state. While the military institutionalized its power in Turkey, the levels ofviolence in the southeastern provinces intensi� ed in battles between military units andKurdish combatants.

Criticizing the deterioration of democratic values in Turkey, Europeans acceptedKurdish refugees who claimed cultural and political discrimination in their homeland.Germany in particular noticed a dramatic increase in asylum applications from Turkishcitizens. While it is unknown how many ethnic Kurds entered Germany, some 350,000Turkish citizens � led asylum papers in Germany in the decade following the coup inTurkey.3 Both Turkish and Kurdish asylum applicants transferred clandestine politicalresistance networks to Europe, and thereby changed the composition of the respectiveDiasporas from predominantly apolitical guest worker communities to networked andhomeland-oriented political activist organizations.

Since 1984, Kurdish guerrilla warfare against Turkey and increasing levels of Kur-dish activism abroad has prompted the Turkish state to attempt to monitor politicalnetworks of Kurds in Western Europe. Occasionally, Turkish of� cials have receivedsupport from governments of EU member states that feared a spillover effect from theTurkish–Kurdish con� ict. In 1993, Germany and France, which remain the countrieswith the strongest contingencies of Kurdish immigrants, enacted a ban on Kurdishpolitical and cultural organizations. While law enforcement agencies ranging from theGerman Federal Criminal Police to Interpol have collected and analyzed informationabout the most radical and violent segments of the Kurdish Diaspora, few state of� cialsand scholars have studied changes within the Kurdish Diaspora communities. With thearrest of Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) leader Ocalan in February 1999, Kurdishactivists in exile modi� ed their structural, organizational, and strategic operations toadjust to a new political reality. Abandoning the original goal of an independentKurdistan, activists instead pursued national minority rights in Turkey.

ISSN 1360-2004 print/ISSN 1469-9591 online/02/010091-28 Ó 2002 Institute of Muslim Minority AffairsDOI: 10.1080/13602000220124854

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92 Vera Eccarius-Kelly

Kurdish Activities and the European Platform

Despite the PKK ban in Germany and France, Kurds successfully organized them-selves along political lines in Europe.4 The Diaspora’s tactics showed promise inScandinavia as well since Sweden hosted the largest number of exiled Kurdish intellec-tuals. Hoping to capitalize on the strained relations between Western Europe andTurkey, the Diaspora searched for new in� uential allies in order to intensify pressure onthe Turkish state to grant equal rights to Kurds.

The European system offered new political opportunities to the Diaspora throughsupranational power centers such as the European Parliament, the European Com-mission, the European Court of Justice, the Council of Europe, and the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights. Instead of solely targeting Turkish and select Europeangovernment of� cials with protest activities on the local and national levels, activistssimultaneously pursued Kurdish political, cultural, and human rights on the suprana-tional level. Their strategy was to create friction between the EU and Turkey thatwould ultimately generate social and political reform in the Turkish domestic arena ifTurkey hoped to gain entry into the EU.

Despite the EU’s less in� uential position in terms of its ability to in� uence internalmatters, particularly in a country that merely holds associational status as in the case ofTurkey, the Kurdish Diaspora recognized that the Turkish political elite’s fear ofpermanent exclusion from European institutions presented a leverage point.5 Anincreasingly vigorous accession process in Europe included demands for the implemen-tation of speci� c norms for minority and human rights in exchange for EU member-ship. This stunned the Turkish government. While the Kurdish Diaspora enjoyed onlymarginal access to the EU, its ability to establish connections with in� uential playersand its cooperation with non-governmental organizations that acted on the Kurdishcommunities’ behalf unnerved Turkey. Since Ocalan’s imprisonment and the virtualend of the PKK guerrilla war, the Kurdish Diaspora has reached out successfullyto individual allies within the EU structure, including members of the Party ofEuropean Socialists (PES), the Confederal Group of the European United Left (EUL),and the Green/environmental factions. The Diaspora’s objective, to develop a strongvoice in the parliament, challenges traditional Western European notions of minoritypolitics.

This article focuses on the transformation of the PKK from a militant Turkishguerrilla group to a social movement participant in Western Europe. Of interest are twoelements that characterize this particular social movement: (a) the transnational mem-bership of its support network, and (b) the strong participation by members of theGerman Kurdish Diaspora. The main proposition of this study argues that the EUsystem offers the Kurdish minority the greatest political opportunity as a challengergroup. At the same time, this article maintains that both the Turkish and the Germanpolitical systems constrain the Kurdish Diaspora’s ability to represent the interests ofTurkish Kurds. This author classi� es the Turkish political system as closed to ethni-cally-based demands, and argues that Germany is only partially open to immigrantconstituents, predominantly those with German citizenship.

The PKK as a Social Movement Organization

In 1999, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit suggested, ‘Ocalan’s arrest might be asolution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey’.6 German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder

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Political Movements and Leverage Points 93

agreed with this assessment, rejecting German involvement in the Kurdish issue.7

German Interior Minister Otto Schily warned that foreign criminals would be expelledand that Kurds had to cease illegal actions, because ‘the government will not allowGermany to become a playing � eld for political con� icts that do not belong on Germansoil’.8 With these remarks, both Turkish and German politicians classi� ed Kurdssympathetic to and actively involved with the PKK as criminals and terrorists.

However, the classi� cation of the PKK as a terrorist organization, a guerrillamovement, or a criminal syndicate appears to be super� cial and inaccurate after closerstudy. The core of the Kurdish movement headed by a transforming PKK focuses onDiaspora political activism today, rather than terrorist or guerrilla strategies as in thepast. In particular, the ideological shift away from socialism toward ethnic identityformation, the outreach to human rights and environmental organizations, and itsattempts to broaden the appeal of the PKK to a wider audience, provide insight into thechanging character of the PKK.

In the course of such fundamental changes, radical splinter groups often emerge, asthey have in the case of Northern Ireland. In that con� ict, the so-called Real IRAintended to undermine the IRA’s organizational, tactical, and political shifts. Splintergroups temporarily disrupt, slow down, or reverse progress that is made. Hamas, tomention another prominent example of a splinter group, effectively disrupted negotia-tions between the PLO and the Israeli government. In the post-Ocalan period, theKurdish Diaspora movement has escaped such radicalization patterns because of itsability to offer a new path of action that energizes the Kurdish constituency. So far, themovement is gaining strength in numbers of supporters and through improved connec-tions with international organizations. This reality presents a new challenge to theTurkish and German governments since of� cial attempts to marginalize or ignore theKurdish con� ict have failed to resolve the issue.

Charles Tilly proposed that social movement organizations (SMO) display a numberof typical characteristics.9 He suggested that SMO participants perceive themselves aslegitimate representatives of their constituents, publicly present a uni� ed front, push forrecognition of a political agenda, develop linkages with allied actors, and search for newpolitical opportunities to press for acceptance. The European Kurdish Diaspora underthe leadership of the PKK displays these typical SMO characteristics.

SMOs have a stake in being recognized as mobile blocs by the population, Tillyargued, so that members are considered a ‘worthy, uni� ed, numerous, committed, andaggrieved people’.10 In public demonstrations and protest marches in Germany forexample, the PKK’s rhetoric emphasizes values such as Kurdish unity, commitment tothe Kurdish cause, and just resistance to the Turkish oppressor state. The Germanpublic recognizes the Kurdish bloc as a force quite distinct from the Turkish lobby thatis a result of the PKK’s aggressive public presence. The movement markets itself as thesole political representative organization of a silenced Kurdish Diaspora to Europeangovernments.

According to Tilly, movements attempt to push existing authorities into accepting aportion of their political agendas. Often, SMOs use explicit or implicit threats of actionto disrupt political alliances or arrangements. The European Kurdish movement useswell-organized and heavily attended demonstration marches to temporarily halt inner-city traf� c to send messages. Political allies from both the Green Party and the Party ofDemocratic Socialism (PDS) attend these rallies offering glimpses into the PKK’sgrowing linkages to German mainstream political structures. So far German govern-ment of� cials have not acted directly on behalf of the SMO, yet they demonstrate a

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willingness to review reports on the Kurdish issue by independent human rightsorganizations.

Tilly argued that SMOs transform the shared understanding of political opportuni-ties within the organization’s own structures and in its interactions with the largerpolitical environment. As part of the Kurdish movement’s new political self-under-standing and actualization, the organization’s role and agenda shifted toward a cooper-ative relationship with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These NGOs lobbyon behalf of Kurdish communities and pursue legal action against the Turkish state onthe EU level.11 The PKK managed to establish political connections to broaden itsbase, and consequently, Kurdish political issues matter at the EU today. Without theKurdish Diaspora movement and its relationship with political players in Europe, theprotection of the Kurdish minority in Turkey might not have developed into a topic ofserious debate in Europe. The Kurdish movement bene� ts from emerging opportuni-ties within the EU and these same opportunities are reinforcing and shaping thepolitical transformation of the PKK itself.

Similar to the early stages of the radical environmental movement, the KurdishDiaspora movement operates outside the constitutional framework in Europe. As longas the PKK is considered a terrorist group or criminal organization, the movement isprevented from effectively representing the interests of the Kurdish Diaspora. Unableto directly involve lobbyists or human rights lawyers, the Kurdish movement must relyon linkages with NGOs, political parties, labor unions, and individuals to press forchange. Classi� ed as an illegal organization, the Diaspora cannot organize a pro-fessional fundraising campaign and, therefore, needs to collect operational fundssecretly.

Legal interest groups are formally structured organizations that wield in� uencethrough lobbying efforts that require them to prepare reports, solicit funds in nationallydirected campaigns, and to apply professional fundraising techniques, all in an attemptto shape public opinion.12 Clarence Lo labels SMOs ‘communities of challengers’ sincethey represent narrow groups outside of mainstream society that fail to establish thetypical structures of interest groups. But members of challenger communities demon-strate a strong personal commitment to a speci� c cause that often is deeply emotionalto them.

German-born Kurds, many never having learned to speak the language of theirparents or grandparents, imagine themselves as members of a Kurdish community.Socially marginalized and politically disenfranchised in the country, German-bornKurds feel attracted to the notion of belonging to an ethnic community. Tapping intothis sentiment, the PKK provides information about the ‘homeland’ and reinforces theidea of ethnic membership that bonds Diaspora Kurds to the larger cause of Kurdishpolitical, social, and cultural rights. Using Lo’s terminology, this linkage to a largerKurdish cause encourages communally-based mobilization, deeply rooted in anemotional commitment, to become the central resource for challenging the establishedpolitical system.13

A Theoretical Framework

In order to analyze the political strategies pursued by the Kurdish minority within theEuropean context, both the domestic and the international factors that illustrate thein� uence of the Diaspora must be evaluated. While it is obvious that the Diasporicactivities contribute to the internationalization of the Kurdish con� ict, it is less clear

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how the Kurdish Diaspora will achieve its political goals in the homeland withoutsupporting PKK guerrilla units.

The application of social movement theory to analyze transnational Diaspora politicsoffers new insights into the political behavior of immigrant communities. MostDiaspora communities lack the unity, size, and necessary political allies to exertin� uence on the host country in order to push for changes in the homeland. TheJewish, Greek, and Armenian lobbies present important exceptions. These three ethnicgroups are in� uential in US and French political decision-making, particularly in regardto policies affecting their ethnic homelands.14 The Turkish and Kurdish ethnic com-munities, currently numbering more than 3 million in Europe, will exert similarpressures on European political circles in the near future.15

This article offers a new theoretical approach to analyzing the Kurdish Diaspora’sin� uence on home country politics. The author develops a set of tools that allow for acomprehensive examination of the political strategies used by the Kurdish Diasporawhich itself is categorized as a social movement. This approach is useful in that itreaches beyond the traditional nation-state analysis to discuss the process of Eu-ropeanization of the Kurdish movement.

Social movement theorists developed a so-called political process model that is oftenreferred to as a political opportunity structure (POS). This model studies speci� cdeterminants within a state that either promote or inhibit the mobilization of protestaction. Generally, POS research focuses on economic, legal, and political changes ordevelopments within a nation-state to analyze their effects on social movement behaviorand choices. Applied to the Kurdish social movement, both the structure of theGerman and Turkish state are examined in combination with an analysis of recentchanges in the political, legal, and economic areas. In addition, POS theory is appliedto the EU structure to determine if and how the Kurdish movement might bene� t fromstructural changes and regional developments in European politics. The � ndings willpredict the focus of future political campaigns of the Kurdish Diaspora movement.

Political Opportunity Structure: The Comparative Perspective

POS determinants serve as a measuring device to ascertain the level of state accessgranted to challenger communities or social movement organizations within a givensociety. This article utilizes POS determinants to evaluate structural factors that eitherinhibit or encourage Kurdish mobilization within the distinct democratic systems ofTurkey, Germany, and the European Union. Five basic determinants gauge the level ofstructural and political access Kurdish communities experience in the different politicalenvironments. Based on the measurable political restrictions Kurdish activists experi-ence, one can predict if Kurdish Diaspora communities will strongly pursue mobiliza-tion efforts in one or several of these political systems. The analysis of POS factors alsoproposes a particularly effective sequence or combination of transnational pressurecampaigns for the Kurdish Diaspora.

The following � ve POS determinants are applied in a comparative case-studyapproach to (a) Turkey, (b) Germany, and (c) the European Union. The use ofdescriptive and causal inference allows the author to comment on and evaluatehistorical and social in� uences that determine political relationships with minoritygroups in the three systems.16 Reports published between 1997 and 2001 by the USDepartment of State, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Council ofEurope, the European Commission, and the European Parliament, among other

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sources, provide detailed information about each of the POS determinants in the threecases. A cumulative evaluation of the results will indicate the level of political access thechallenger communities enjoy, providing an indication of Kurdish political opportuni-ties at hand, and these are as follows:

1. democratic rights and rules (underlying reasons for a system of domination andpositions of privilege, polity membership, citizenship, and rules of exclusion);

2. executive (law enforcement, emergency decrees, in� uence of the military);3. judiciary (access to the court system, legal recourse, protection of minorities);4. legislative (ability to represent challenger community in legislative branch, access

to membership in parties, ability to lobby, electoral procedures); and5. structural preconditions (control of economic resources, access to all professions,

availability of communication networks).

Case-Study I: Turkey

Democratic Rights and Rules

In the period following World War I, the newly established Turkish state grantedprotective minority status to non-Muslim populations that were recognized by Westernpowers such as the Greeks, the Armenians, and the Jewish communities.17 Kemalistinterpretations of Turkish nationalism, however, rejected the existence of ethnic andcultural differences among the Muslim groups of the country. Based on a monoculturalde� nition of Turkish nationalism, the leadership classi� ed the mere recognition ofcultural, ethnic, and religious distinctions within Muslim populations as dangerous tothe territorial cohesion and national identity of the young state.18 Fearing that rebelliousKurdish tribal and military leaders could threaten the state’s legitimacy, Kemal in-tended to forcefully assimilate the Kurdish minority into his version of a homogenousnation-state. Following the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1923) and the Treatyof Lausanne (1923), an oppressive Turkish nationalistic campaign intended to absorbthe cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and political identity of the Kurdish population.

Between 1922 and 1923, Kemal Ataturk’s assimilation policies included bans onKurdish education, associations, publications, religious fraternities, and religiousschools in the southeastern provinces.19 In response to the widespread repression by theTurkish state, religious leaders in cooperation with a number of regional sheikhs andseveral high-ranking Kurdish military of� cers who had served loyally in the War ofTurkish Independence established the Committee for Kurdish Independence. Observ-ing the organizing efforts in the eastern provinces, Kemal found an of� cial justi� cationfor the persecution of his Kurdish challengers in Sheik Said’s localized 1925 uprising.20

Defending his version of the Turkish nation-state, Ataturk established the ‘Law forthe Maintenance of Public Order’ that transferred absolute judicial power over regionalpopulations to the so-called Independence Tribunals.21 These tribunals ensured that allresistance by either the tribal, religious, or intellectual leadership was snuffed out in theKurdish provinces. In vicious campaigns of persecution, the highly experienced andfully equipped Turkish military crushed regional uprisings, executed rebels, and de-ported Kurdish populations from their homeland regions to western Anatolia.22 Mixingauthoritarianism with a rigid interpretation of a nationalist state concept, these Turkishpolicies set the tone for another 75 years of marginalization and oppression of Kurdishcommunities in Turkey.

While the structure of the Turkish republic is based on the concept of a consti-

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tutional system, its historical self-understanding as a unitary and homogenous nation-state undermines individual freedoms that are standard in liberal democracies. Kramercharacterized Kemal as an autocratic leader who ‘often spoke of democracy as belong-ing to the republican regime, [yet] he preferred the authoritarian political practice of theold system as the best way for reaching his goals. Consequently, liberalism anddemocracy were not part of the Kemalist principles’.23 The rigid adherence to suchKemalist ideological doctrines continues to undermine the potential for a successfulTurkish democratization process.

Turkey’s multiparty, unicameral parliamentary system is weakened by the military’sstrong in� uence on government policies and the judiciary’s inability to act indepen-dently. Both shortcomings compromise the basic foundation of democracy in thecountry. The Turkish constitution’s preamble indicates that the Kemalist authoritariancharacter continues to permeate the republic’s self-understanding. Reforms have failedto democratize the country since the last military coup in 1980. (This author purpose-fully excluded the 1997 so-called soft or virtual coup in which the military’s thinlyveiled ultimatum caused the civilian government to collapse before the military actuallyleft the barracks). Clearly restricting individual freedoms and rejecting ethnic andreligious claims to differentiation, the preamble of the 1982 constitution declares that‘no protection shall be afforded to thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish nationalinterests, the principle of the existence of Turkey as an indivisible entity with its stateand territory, Turkish historical and moral values, or the nationalism, principles,reforms or modernism of Ataturk’.24

Activist Kurdish communities, namely, those who insist on the right of ethno-na-tional and cultural expressions for Kurds, experience systematic discriminatory treat-ment by the state bureaucracy, and endure repressive emergency regulations in thesoutheastern provinces.25 Disagreement with and open opposition to the Kemalistterritorial claims and the state’s monocultural and nationalist ideology lead to violentclashes between military and police units with Kurdish nationalists, political activists,and armed guerrilla groups in the predominantly Kurdish regions of the country.26

The political structure of Turkey is based on the 1982 constitution that was proposedby the military and con� rmed by national referendum immediately following the coup.Kirisci and Winrow argued, ‘little public debate was permitted and participation in thereferendum was compulsory’.27 This contributed to the approval of the constitution bymore than 91% of the population suggesting that the voters feared further political andeconomic chaos if they refused to support the wishes of the military. In reaction to thereferendum, Western Europe categorized the Turkish constitution as quasi-democratic.Limited constitutional amendments have softened the stringent stipulations that cur-tailed the political activities of trade union members and the formation of politicalparties.28 Reforms in 1995 granted trade union members the right of association andparticipation in political activities.29 In addition, constitutional changes permittedacademic faculty, staff, and their students the right to participate in political activities,and lowered general suffrage from 21 to 18 years of age. According to the First RegularReport from the Commission on Progress towards Turkish Accession, the Turkish govern-ment failed to fully guarantee and enforce these amended rights.30 Trade unionmembers, students, and university faculty and staff continue to face threats andharassment by police or security of� cials for political activities including membership inspeci� c parties and participation in public demonstration marches.31

The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the US State Departmentreleased a highly critical report on Turkish human rights in February 2000.32 The

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State Department’s report revealed that serious human rights offenses were committed,including extra-judicial killings linked to excessive police violence during incommuni-cado interrogations. The report cited a consistent use of torture during detention, partlya result of the fact that the Turkish legal system relies heavily on confessions in orderto convict the accused. Furthermore, the report criticized a pattern of light sentencesfor security of� cials involved in human rights offenses that ‘continued to foster aclimate of impunity’.33

Executive

The National Security Council (NSC), composed of an equal number of senior militaryof� cers and civilian government of� cials, acts as a constitutionally mandated advisoryboard in questions of national defense to the Turkish government. The militarymembers of the NSC are not elected of� cials but appointed by the military establish-ment. Since the military perceives its role as a legitimate protector of the state, it openlymanages politics under the guise of preventing the civilian leadership from causingharm to Turkey.34 Candar, a political columnist for the Turkish daily Sabah, character-ized the role of the NSC’s military members as that of a ‘self-styled guardian ofKemalist values, particularly secularism’.35 He suggested that state bureaucrats and theurban middle class signal the military to intervene on their behalf when economic orpolitical interests appear to be threatened.36 This type of civil–military relationship inTurkey clearly demonstrates the existing discrepancy between practices considereddemocratic in Western democracies and those in place in Turkey.

It appears reasonable for the military to advise the Turkish government on issuesrelated to national defense, but its advisory role is so broadly de� ned that the militaryexerts in� uence on policies ranging from radio and television programming, to nationaleducation, and foreign relations. In August 2000, General Kivrikoglu negatively affec-ted Turkish–EU accession discussions by warning that ‘although the military supportedTurkey’s EU bid, the government should be careful in just what concessions it endedup making to Brussels’.37 The underlying warning suggested that civilians wouldnegotiate no reforms unless approved by the military, in particular in regard to so-calledKurdish separatists and Islamists. Rouleau, France’s Ambassador to Turkey from1988–1992, labeled the NSC ‘a kind of shadow government through which the pashas[military elite] can impose their will on parliament and the government … Its delibera-tions are never made public, and even when decisions are announced, they arerepresented as recommendations to the government’.38

Regularly, the NSC slows down progress during negotiations with the EU overaccession requirements. The military expresses opposition to the implementation of theCopenhagen criteria that sum up the EU accession requirements including humanrights standards.39 Setting clear limits to the implementation of reformative measures,the military establishment represents the � ercest challenge to political change anddemocratization in Turkey today.40 The fear of losing political in� uence contributes tothe exaggerated perception among the armed forces that Kurdish separatists and radicalIslamists threaten the territorial integrity and secular foundation of the country.

The armed forces, the Turkish National Police, and the Jandarma jointly assumeresponsibilities for domestic security. While the National Police focuses on securityissues in the urban areas, the Jandarma oversees and patrols rural provinces. Receivinglogistical and intelligence support from the armed forces that carry out special opera-tions in provinces under emergency regulations, the Jandarma’s mandate allows it to

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investigate political offenses, to carry out arrests, and to interrogate suspected politicaldissidents and Islamist activists.

Various intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations consistently criticizethe Turkish government for failing to commit to the rule of law and impedingintervention on behalf of victims of police violence. The 1999 US State Department’sreport on Turkey pointed out that ‘the rarity of convictions and the light sentencesimposed on police and other security of� cials for killings and torture continued to fostera climate of impunity’.41 International organizations have expressed similar concerns inannual reports including the 1998 report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture,the EU Commission reports on progress toward accession in 1998 and 1999, andHuman Rights Watch and Amnesty International reports on Turkish human rightsdevelopments in 1999 and 2000.

Amnesty International, in its 1999 report Turkey: The Duty to Supervise, Investigateand Prosecute, harshly criticized the Turkish executive by stating that ‘since 1980thousands of Turkish citizens have suffered torture consisting of savage beatings,electric shock, hanging by the arms, sexual assault and rape, hundreds of people havedied of torture, and hundreds more have “disappeared” or were extra judiciallyexecuted. Yet no more than a tiny handful of of� cers have served custodial sentencesof a length appropriate to such serious crimes. Successive Turkish governments havefailed to take even the most simple steps needed to move its judiciary into action’.42

Similarly, the Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Turkey criticized that the‘Turkish government made almost no progress on key human rights reforms in 2000,and failed to take advantage of the opportunity presented by a marked reduction inarmed violence by illegal organizations’.43 The same report states that ‘while thegovernment procrastinated, politicians and writers were prosecuted and imprisoned forexpressing their nonviolent opinions, and detainees in police custody remained at riskof ill-treatment, torture, or death in custody’.44

Ongoing limits to the freedom of speech and the press continue to exacerbate theproblem. The 1991 Anti-Terror Law, despite revisions to Article 8 in 1995, is regularlyinvoked to curtail the dissemination of so-called separatist propaganda.45 Variouscriminal codes serve to arrest political opponents; such codes include Article 159(insults to the parliament, the army, and the judiciary), Article 160 (insults to theRepublic), Article 169 (aiding an illegal organization), and Article 312 (incitement toracial, ethnic, and religious enmity). In general, these articles serve the executive andthe military as a means to curb the freedom of expression, to arrest ‘reactionaries’ (i.e.Islamists) and ‘separatists’ (i.e. Kurdish nationalists), and create a general climate offear among political activists.

Since 1991 communication in the Kurdish language has been legal in Turkey, butremains severely restricted in radio and television broadcasts. It continues to be bannedfrom use in political meetings and by political parties, and is forbidden in publicschools. Anti-terror laws and criminal codes can be invoked arbitrarily to constrain theuse of the Kurdish language. Security forces con� scate materials and publicationsdeemed separatist because of articles addressing Kurdish culture, ethnic identity, andhistory. Kurdish musicians, writers, poets, and singers face interrogations or arrest forsupposedly disseminating ‘separatist propaganda’.46

Judiciary

Article 138 of the Turkish Constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary,

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however, major concerns exist in relation to the structure of the courts, corruptionwithin the courts, and the military’s in� uence on legal proceedings. A separateState Security Court system addresses offenses categorized as political crimes.These security courts consist of a combination of military and civilian judges whoaddress alleged offenses that fall under the anti-terrorism laws. Despite amendmentsthat reduced the in� uence of the military, the EU Commission on Human Rightsfrequently criticizes the close civil–military relations and its impact on the judiciary.The security courts represent the only case in Europe in which civilians face a partialmilitary panel of judges when accused of separatist, anti-Kemalist, or terroristactivities.47

Additional problems that surface in regard to the judiciary system in Turkey includeits over reliance on obtaining confessions rather than pursuing comprehensive inves-tigative measures. The courts may hold defendants in custody for extended periods oftime without having to offer clear justi� cations for the arrest or detention. AmnestyInternational’s Annual Report 2000: Turkey criticized that State Security Courts heldsuspects ‘incommunicado for up to four days, and in practice this period was oftenextended. Procedures laid down in the Criminal Procedures Code for the registrationof detainees and for noti� cation of families were often ignored, facilitating disappear-ances and torture’.48

The courts operate extremely slowly due to understaf� ng and a lack of resources. Incombination, these factors limit the free and open access to the court system and reducethe legal recourse available to the public, particularly in regard to so-called politicalcrimes affecting Kurdish activists, Islamists, and journalists. In 1987 Turkish citizensreceived the right to � le individual complaints with the European Court of HumanRights effectively permitting victims of state repression to circumvent the Turkishcourts. In 1990, Turkey recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Courtof Human Rights.49 However, Turkey also stands convicted as the only country underthe jurisdiction to have interfered with and hindered the submission of complaints tothe European Court.50

Armenian, Jewish, and Greek members of Turkish society have been granted min-ority status in accordance with the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, receiving state protection asnational minorities. The Kurdish population has not been recognized as a national,racial, or ethnic minority. This apparent contradiction contributes to European criti-cism in regard to the treatment of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. Large-scale militaryoperations affecting civilian Kurdish populations have increased European demands forminority rights in Turkey to be monitored by international institutions. Continuedrepressive measures that curtail the political activities of Kurdish citizens, Kurdishparties, and the press intensi� ed such demands.

In October 2000, the EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement, Gunter Verheugen,announced that Turkey ‘had failed to improve its record on human and minorityrights’, which led to an inde� nite postponement of the accession negotiations plannedfor 2001.51 In public brie� ngs, the European Parliament remarked that the situationconcerning civil and political rights in Turkey failed to improve, rebuking the Turkishgovernment for restrictions on the freedom of expression, press freedom, freedom ofassociation and assembly, and minority rights.52 Concurring with the EU’s assessment,Rouleau stated that Turkey needed to restructure and reform all of its institutions to beable to incorporate EU standards if the Turkish government intended to be consideredfor membership.53

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Legislative

Kurdish political activists face severe restrictions in representing their community’sinterests in the legislature. Kurdish citizens of Turkey who insist on speaking Kurdish,publicly assert their Kurdish ethnicity, or support and participate in Kurdish parties aredenied access to parliament. Politically engaged Kurdish constituents encounter ex-clusion on the legislative level, thwarting their ability to lobby for Kurdish cultural orlinguistic rights. Kurdish activists routinely experience political disadvantages resultingfrom national electoral regulations designed to suppress protest efforts.

Kurdish political parties, including the Peoples Labor Party (HEP) and the Democ-racy Party (DEP), are of� cially prohibited by the Turkish Constitutional Court. HEPwas shut down in 1993, and its parliamentarians joined the newly founded DEP, whichthe courts banned in 1994. The most recent Kurdish successor party, HADEP or thePeoples Democracy Party, continues to be threatened with closure, as party leadersstand accused of supporting the PKK. In 1995, a number of DEP members ofparliament including Leyla Zana received 7–15 year prison sentences for offensesranging from ‘spreading hatred, enmity, and separatism’ to af� liation with the PKK.54

Despite strong European protests including the suspension of the Joint ParliamentaryAssembly that had been arranged in the Ankara Treaty to coordinate EU–Turkishpolicies, the sentences were upheld by the Turkish state security courts.55

In response to the Turkish decision to imprison the Kurdish parliamentarians, theEuropean Parliament bestowed the 1995 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought toimprisoned Deputy Zana. In 1997, 153 members of the US Congress sent a signedletter to President Clinton calling for Zana’s release, followed by CongresswomanElizabeth Furse’s condemnation of Turkey for giving Zana additional prison time.56 InMarch 2000, Representative Bob Filner introduced House Resolution 461 to the 106thCongress.57 The resolution called for two actions to be taken by the Turkish govern-ment: ‘(1) the immediate and unconditional release from prison in the Republic ofTurkey of the parliamentarians Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan, and SelimSadak; and (2) the prompt recognition by the Government of the Republic of Turkeyof full cultural and language rights for the Kurdish people’.58 The Turkish governmentengaged in a vigorous public relations campaign in reaction to the congressionalreprimand and signed an arms deal with the Clinton administration shortly thereafter.

Currently HADEP is the only party in Turkey that addresses the Kurdish question.However, stringent electoral regulations curtail HADEP’s ability to represent Kurdishconstituents on a regional and national level. Every party in Turkey must surpass anational threshold of 10% of the national vote to be represented in parliament. WhileHADEP received only 4.17% of the vote on the national level in 1995 and 3.99% in1999, in both elections the party managed to garner close to 70% in heavily Kurdishareas of the southeast.59 Since 1992 the EU has called for reforms to electoralregulations so that a party with a Kurdish agenda could participate on the nationallevel. The European Parliament in particular encouraged the Turkish government toengage in a dialogue with Kurdish leaders in order to search for a peaceful solution andto guarantee electoral rights for the Kurdish population.60 The Turkish governmentrejected the EP’s suggestion since it considered the Kurdish leaders to be linked withterrorist organizations.

Structural Preconditions

Kurdish citizens of Turkey who make no claim to a separate ethnic or national identity

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and live in western Anatolia enjoy the same socioeconomic rights as all Turkish citizens.They experience no restrictions to travel, freely engage in entrepreneurial activities, andare recruited into the state bureaucracy, including the military establishment. However,Kurds who engage in civic and political activities in support of ethno-national, cultural,or minority rights and thereby oppose the state’s founding principles face dif� cultieswith the security forces. Once identi� ed as a nationalist Kurd, socioeconomic freedomsare reduced and even severely restricted. While ethno-national activism in the westernpart of Turkey leads to economic disadvantages and potential harassment by the police,Kurdish communities in regions affected by emergency decrees encounter daily dis-criminatory treatment and broad socioeconomic disadvantages. Heavily Kurdish popu-lated areas remain the least economically developed in Turkey. These provincesconsistently show the highest illiteracy rates, and rank lowest in infrastructure develop-ment, availabilit y of schools, hospital beds, and doctors per inhabitants.61 As a conse-quence of the continuing military presence in predominantly Kurdish regions, stringentemergency law regulations, and minimal educational opportunities for the population,any domestic economic development projects ultimately tend to fail to improve condi-tions in the southeast. For similar reasons, foreign direct investment bypasses theKurdish regions.

Since the 1960s, Kurds have migrated from the impoverished southeastern regionstoward urban, industrial centers such as Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Istanbul, and Izmir.Internal Kurdish migration increased after the 1980 military coup as Kurdish familiesnot only searched for better employment options and educational opportunities fortheir children, but also attempted to escape the increasing levels of violence betweenPKK guerrilla units, village guards, Turkish security forces, and military units.62 The� ow of migrants toward urban centers contributed to the development of squatterareas, so-called gecekondu, which have accelerated the general housing crisis in Turkey.A secondary consequence of the domestic migration pattern is the high unemploymentrate among rural Kurdish migrants in Turkish cities. While the Turkish StatisticalInstitute reports an unemployment rate of 6%, the European Parliament suggests thata more accurate unemployment rate may be closer to 15% due to increases in thepopulation of employable age, urban migration, and high levels of under-employmentin both urban and rural areas.63

Evaluation

The POS determinants indicate that Kurdish challenger communities have little oppor-tunity to access the state system in order to promote their sociopolitical, cultural, andethnic causes. Kurdish activists will face police interrogations, arrests, and prisonsentences as long as the military-dominated NSC determines the country’s securityneeds. Kurdish political parties, human rights organizations, and the press tend toself-censor for fear of being banned as an organization or exposing their employees topolice action. Kurdish communities in Turkey face multiple obstacles in their attemptsto establish linkages with allies in the state bureaucracy and when they cooperate withKurdish organizations that mobilize in Europe. This is partly due to ongoing stateefforts in Turkey to eliminate the political in� uence of the PKK on Kurdish activists inthe southeastern provinces. Kurdish Diaspora activists communicate with Turkishhuman rights organizations but exert little direct pressure on the government. Dis-missed in nationalistic state propaganda as agitators, Marxists, or terrorists, politically

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engaged Kurdish Diaspora members have no credibility within Turkish civil society.The Kurdish minority will not gain equal access to the legislature or the courts untilfundamental questions related to the authoritarian tendencies within the country areproperly addressed. It is therefore necessary to conclude that the Turkish state iscompletely closed to activism by the Kurdish minority, and offers no political opportu-nities or leverage points to the Kurdish Diaspora in Western Europe.

Case-Study II: Germany


The Federal Republic of Germany is a constitutional parliamentary democracy with anindependent judiciary. The Grundgesetz or Basic Law (i.e. the German Constitution)guarantees high levels of regional independence to 16 states or Lander in the areas oflocal law enforcement, local courts, public education and culture, social policies,broadcasting, and the environment. The Basic Law, promulgated by the ParliamentaryCouncil in 1949, marked the temporary nature of the constitution since East Germanswere excluded from participation in its creation. The preamble of the Basic Lawemphasized that its goal was to accomplish the unity and freedom of Germany in aprocess of self-determination.64 After German uni� cation in 1990, the amended BasicLaw became the constitution for all of Germany.

Structurally and philosophically, the German constitution is shaped by the country’slong-standing tradition of federalism and its successive experience with unstable andrepressive governments.65 Constitutional scholar Manfred Schmidt argued that ‘thelegal structure of the Federal Republic is indicative of the extent to which theinstitutional design of the Second German Republic has been shaped by processes of“learning from catastrophes”, such as the breakdown of the Weimar Republic, NationalSocialist rule 1933–1945, and the collapse of the political, economic, and social orderin 1945’.66

Therefore, the Basic Law protects the principles of democracy, civil rights, and therule of law by empowering the Federal Constitutional Court to act as the guardian ofthe Rechtsstaat (constitutional state). This historically grounded defensive role of theConstitutional Court requires its panel of judges to ban political parties, organizations,and groups that endanger the principles of the liberal democracy or intend to overthrowthem. The courts and the government monitor the in� uence of the Bundesverfassungss-chutz, which is the Of� ce for the Protection of the Constitution, and the Bundeskrimi-nalamt or the Federal Of� ce of the Criminal Police. The Of� ce for the Protection of theConstitution collects information about activities and organizations hostile to the liberaldemocratic laws in Germany.67 The role of the Federal Criminal Police is strictlylimited to law enforcement issues of clearly de� ned national consequence such ascounter terrorism, international organized crime, drug-traf� cking, the traf� cking inpersons, the printing and distribution of counterfeit currency, and weapons smuggling.

Another unique feature of the German Basic Law is the German constitutionalprotection of the concept of the ‘social (welfare) state’. It is the responsibility of thegovernment to counteract social inequalities, to provide social security for its members,and to strive for social justice in the country.68 Restrictions on private economicenterprise through market regulations are legal only if the public good is underconsideration.69 In general, the market can be adjusted and re-shaped as an allocationmechanism to ensure that regional disparities will be addressed and that unemploy-

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ment, disability, and retirement insurance provides for speci� c population groups in asocially acceptable way.

In 1997, the federal government enacted laws to protect the cultures and languages ofminority groups that historically live in Germany, such as the Sorbs, Danes, Roma, Sinti,and Friesians. Regional enforcement of the rights of established minorities is guaranteedby individual state governments, such as Saxony’s protection of the Sorb status (a Slavicminority living near the Polish border) and Hesse’s recognition of Romani as a minoritylanguage (the Roma and Sinti peoples are often called gypsy). The federal government’spostwar labor recruitment schemes and extensive refugee-based immigration legislationintroduced additional minority groups to the country. Among the most populousminorities are the Turks and Kurds, ethnic Germans from Poland, Romania, andCentral Asia, and multiple ethnic groups from the former Yugoslavia (Bosnians, Serbs,Croats, and Albanians). The recent immigrant constituencies have no constitutionalguarantee for special state protection or funding for ethnic schooling by state govern-ments. However, in response to the long-term presence of these immigrant communi-ties, the German parliament approved a revised citizenship law that took effect inJanuary 2000.70 The new naturalization regulations grant immigrants the right to applyfor citizenship after eight years of permanent residency in the country.

On the whole, the German government respects and enforces the human rights of itscitizens, yet must address more effectively issues related to police brutality, especiallythose affecting foreign residents and asylum applicants. Amnesty International in itsAnnual Report 1999: Germany stated that police abuse of foreign nationals exceeded ‘afew isolated cases’.71 The report further criticized, referring to the UN Committeeagainst Torture, ‘that the low rate of prosecution and conviction in the alleged incidentsof ill treatment by the police, especially [of] people of foreign descent’, presented aserious problem in Germany.72 In addition, several state governments have been slowto counteract problems of systematic levels of societal discrimination and violencedirected at foreign residents.73 Both federal and state policies have failed to curb thediscriminatory treatment of some ethnic, racial, and religious minorities in the country.

Executive

State governments guarantee civil and political liberties to their citizens includingfreedom of speech, press freedom, the right to peaceful assembly and association, thefreedom of movement and travel, and the right to participate in free elections. Kurdishcommunities have experienced some restrictions to their cultural and political activitiessince 1993. In November of that year, invoking Articles 9, 18, and 21 of the Basic Lawin protection of the liberal democracy, the German government enacted a ban on thePKK as an organization endangering the democratic foundations of the country. Sincelaw enforcement lacked the ability to distinguish between PKK-dominated Kurdishumbrella organizations and unrelated Kurdish activist groups, Kurdish communitiesendured surveillance, suspicion, and questioning by authorities.74 In 1996, the Germangovernment downgraded the ban on the PKK from a terrorist group to that of acriminal syndicate, yet the Of� ce for the Protection of the Constitution continues tocollect detailed information about the structure, membership, and mobilization tech-niques of the organization.

The use of the Kurdish language is legal in Germany as are Kurdish radio andtelevision broadcasts. While Turkish-language education programs receive public fundingfrom state governments, Kurdish-language education does not exist in German public

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schools. Kurdish activists who engage in political mobilization efforts continue to bemonitored by state security agencies. Members of Kurdish cultural clubs and politicalassociations who clearly cooperate with and support the PKK face prosecution by thecourts.75 The law censures public demonstrations organized by or in support of thePKK, and the prominent display of symbols, � ags, colors, and images af� liated with thePKK remain illegal. Kurds in Germany have access to printed materials, video footage,and cassette recordings that address Kurdish culture, ethnic identity, and history. Thedissemination of such information is legal as long as security agencies discover noconnections between the distributed materials at hand and the political messages of thePKK.

In their periodic compliance review of signatory countries to the UN Conventionagainst Torture, the Council of Europe, the US State Department, and AmnestyInternational supported the UN’s � ndings that criticized the ill treatment and abuse offoreign nationals by German police.76 Recommendations to the German governmentincluded the strengthening of judicial measures against offending police of� cers as wellas mandatory human rights courses and con� ict management training for law enforce-ment agencies.77 In addition, the report suggested that a simpli� cation of the complaintmechanisms would improve the legal recourse available to non-citizens in cases ofviolent, inhuman, and degrading behavior by police and border control agencies.

A discernible pattern indicates that law enforcement agencies frequently use violencein cases of arrest, interrogation, and deportation procedures disproportionately affect-ing sub-Saharan and North African immigrants and asylum applicants. Turkish andKurdish long-term residents in Germany experience such police violence less fre-quently. Societal violence, however, affects the quality of life of Turkish/Kurdishimmigrants and ethnic Turkish/Kurdish Germans. As permanent residents and citizens,the minorities experience occasional physical attacks by right-wing groups, neo-Naziorganizations, and militant nationalists from Turkey. Right-wing groups and Kurdishmilitants have targeted privately owned Turkish businesses for political reasons inGermany. The majority of such incidents are linked to disputes within Turkish andKurdish communities, however, and the intensity and frequency of violent acts relatedto PKK activism continues to diminish.

Judiciary

The Basic Law provides for an independent judiciary that is respected by the Germangovernment. The courts offer full legal protection and guarantee various options forjudicial review re� ecting the country’s historical experience with tyranny. Citizens havethe right to appeal decisions by moving from the local court system, to the regionalcourt system, to the higher regional court system, to the Bundesgerichtshof or FederalCourt of Justice for civil and criminal cases. In addition, specialized court proceedingsdeal with grievances related to the responsibilities of the federal administrative court,the federal labor court, the federal social court, and the federal � nancial court. Ineach of these specialized areas appeals to the highest levels offer citizens the optionof judicial review. The judiciary system provides fair access and an ef� cient legalprocess to the citizens and residents of the country. However, immigrants frequentlydemonstrate reluctance in pursuing legal recourse. Their unfamiliarity with the compli-cated court system and its extensive bureaucracy, along with a general distrust of thepolice, creates a sense that the justice system fails to be effective for immigrants andforeigners.

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In 1999, the US State Department reported a drop in the overall number of hatecrimes against non-citizen residents, asylum-seekers, and minorities in Germany, butsuch attacks on foreigners rose again in 2000 according to German governmentalsources.78 The majority of the perpetrators were young males who live in the easternGerman regions, and represent the lower socioeconomic strata of society.79 In responseto the increase in hate crimes, a number of state governments initiated special socialeducation and public anti-hate crime commissions to counteract incidents of racismand anti-foreigner violence.

An opinion poll conducted in 2000 by Germany’s Emnid institute, a private andprestigious market research � rm, indicated that 66% of all Germans believe that toomany foreigners live in Germany. While 64% of western Germans opposed the growingpresence of foreigners in that poll, some 71% of eastern Germans rejected the presenceof foreign residents even though the eastern states are mostly devoid of foreigners, withthe exception of Berlin.80 More than 500,000 Kurds reside in western German cities,and 50,000 Kurds live in Berlin. In response to the results of the poll, the conservativeopposition Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, theChristian Social Union (CSU), announced that the ‘foreigner question’ should becomean integral part of parliamentary election campaigns.81

Legislative

Ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union receive legalresidency papers and citizenship upon petition without experiencing a waiting period.The same regulations apply to Jewish applicants who arrive from the territories ofthe former Soviet Union. Since January 2000, foreign nationals who have lived inGermany for a minimum of eight years may also obtain German citizenship uponapplication. Additional language requirements and criminal background checksare part of this naturalization process. Children born to non-citizens in Germanyretain both their parents’ nationality and receive a German passport until the age of23 when they must choose their citizenship. The most challenging hurdle in theprocess of obtaining German citizenship relates to stringent and speci� c languagerequirements. This is particularly the case in states with more conservative CDU/CSU-dominated governments such as in Bavaria and Baden–Wurttemberg.82 Inaddition, high administrative fees discourage some applicants from � ling the necessarypaperwork.

The rate of naturalization among long-term foreign residents, especially amongpersons of Turkish and Kurdish ethnicity, is on the rise in Germany. While the FederalStatistical Of� ce publishes data on persons holding Turkish citizenship, no separatestatistical information is collected on ethnic Kurdish persons by the German govern-ment, or any European agency for that matter. Castles and Miller suggested that up toone-third of all long-term foreign residents in Germany who carry Turkish passportsconsider themselves ethnically Kurdish.83 The percentage of ethnic Kurds among theseapplicants for naturalization in Germany is at least one-third if not higher since thepossibility of a return migration of the Kurdish minority to Turkey must be consideredless likely. Annually, the Federal Statistical Of� ce publishes data on how many personsreceive German citizenship by country of origin (see data from 1994–2000 below).84

The Zentrum fur Turkeistudien (Center for Turkish Studies in Germany) estimatedthat by the year 2001, the total number of Turkish/Kurdish persons carryingGerman passports, including children born in Germany, will have increased to 650,000

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TABLE 1. Naturalization of foreigners in Germany: 1994–2000

Year Total no. Turkish citizenship % of total

1994 61,709 19,590 31.71995 71,981 31,578 43.91996 86,356 46,294 53.61997 82,913 42,240 50.91998 106,790 59,664 55.91999 143,267 103,900 72.52000 186,700 82,800 44.4

Source: Zentrum fur Turkeistudien (Center for Turkish Studies),Einburgerung turkischstammiger Migranten in Deutschland: Bald einDrittel der erwachsenen Turken in der Bundesrepublik mit deutscherStaatsangehorigkeit (Naturalization of Turkish-Origin Migrants in Ger-many: Close to One-third of the Adult Turkish Population in Germany HoldsGerman Citizenship), Essen: Zentrum fur Turkeistudien, 26 February2001.

persons.85 The number of long-term residents who carried Turkish passports reached1,998,534 in December 2000, which suggests an accurate count for the number forethnic Turkish/Kurdish Germans and Turkish/Kurdish residents in Germany might benearing 2.6 million people in 2001.86


Minority groups and foreign residents in Germany voice concern in regard to societaldiscrimination in general, and employment-related prejudice in particular. Data col-lected by the Federal Institute for Labor indicate that unemployment rates affectforeign residents disproportionately, in part due to discriminatory hiring practices,but also connected to insuf� cient knowledge of the German language, inadequateeducation or training, and a lack of professional skills. Between 1999 and 2001,Germany’s unemployment rate ranged between 10.5 and 11%, but the unemployment� gures for foreigners reached 18.4% in 1999, 17.3% in 2000, and 17.5% in January2001.87 In comparison with other immigrant groups, the Turkish/Kurdish minorityexperiences the highest rate of unemployment with 24.2% reported in December1998, followed by a 19.6% rate among the Italians, and 18.5% for the Greekminority.88 This author suspects that Kurds experience higher unemployment ratesthan Turks in Germany which is related to hierarchies within the immigrant com-munities.89

Both federal and state laws prohibit the discrimination on the basis of race, religion,disability, gender, ethnic background, political opinion, or citizenship. However,long-term residents and non-European immigrants, including German citizens ofTurkish and Kurdish ethnic heritage, continue to face systemic racism in the country.Among the main problems raised by Turkish/Kurdish persons is their limited accessto employment options, dif� culties in obtaining preferred housing, and poor anddisrespectful treatment in health care facilities, and bias within the educationalsystem.90

Since the mid-1990s, increased independent entrepreneurial activity (restaurants,specialty food stores, travel agencies, Islamic funeral homes, etc.) has become a trendamong certain immigrant communities in Germany. This positive development affects

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the economic status of the Turkish/Kurdish, Italian, and Greek communities inparticular. In 1997, Turkish/Kurdish immigrants contributed about 71 billion DM toGermany’s GDP, which represented about 2% of the total GDP.91 Research under-taken by the German Center for Turkish Studies suggested that in 1998 nearly 51,000Turkish/Kurdish owned businesses with a female ownership rate of 20%. They em-ployed 265,000 persons of which 80,000 belonged to ethnic groups other than mem-bers of the Turkish/Kurdish communities, including 52,000 Germans.92 The mainrestrictions minority entrepreneurs encounter in Germany relate to the reluctance ofbanks and government agencies to provide start-up capital and to grant small-businessloans. In addition, stringent legal and educational requirements in certain trades suchas electric, plumbing, and carpentry exclude immigrants from speci� c branches if theylack a German certi� cate of training.

Evaluation

The POS determinants indicate that Kurdish challenger communities in Germanyenjoy partial access to the state system that allows activists to promote selectedsociopolitical, cultural, and ethnic causes. Kurds enjoy an expanding array of politicalopportunities with regard to their minority status in Germany. However, those Kurdishgroups that mobilize in Germany in order to in� uence Turkish politics experiencewidespread ostracism by German mainstream parties. Social gatherings of Kurdishmales raise suspicion, often complicated by prejudice and racism. When suspected ofmembership in the PKK, homeland-oriented activists relinquish their legitimacy in theeyes of the German public.93 The political elite in Germany shows little enthusiasm forinvolvement in the Kurdish homeland agenda. Even among the far left factions of theSocial Democrats, the Green Party, and the Party of Democratic Socialism supportexists mainly for an agenda related to integration policies and multiculturalism, not fortransnational Kurdish politics.94

Kurdish immigrants in Germany control their economic resources, are able to enterall professions, and enjoy the bene� ts of freedom of speech. They access a substantialcultural and political network without having to fear repressive state measures. Therevisions to the German citizenship laws provide limited political opportunities forrepresentation of Kurdish challenger communities in the legislature. As citizens, ethnicKurds have the option of joining established political parties, lobby on behalf ofKurdish interests in Germany, and participate in local and national elections. However,the political voice of Kurds, who number about 600,000, remains marginal in compari-son with the dominating Turkish presence in Germany with up to 1.9 million members.

While ethnic Turkish Germans have made inroads in German parties, it is nosurprise that few citizens of Kurdish ancestry have accessed political positions ofin� uence. Kurdish German politician Feleknas Uca has made a successful career as aparliamentarian in the European Parliament after struggling on the national level. Shefound greater opportunities to speak on behalf of Kurdish human rights at the EU incomparison to her experience in domestic German politics. In Germany, the publicoften equates political efforts by Kurds with the PKK. For the foreseeable future,Kurdish activism will remain on the periphery of the German political scene, partly dueto the fact that the Turkish state often manipulates German fears of Kurdish radicalismin order to bloc the Kurdish Diaspora from gaining access to political circles.95 Kurdshave protested such factors declaring that their treatment has been motivated either byracist attitudes within the establishment or is a consequence of external political

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pressures from Turkey.96 Strong levels of societal rejection will continue to curtail thepolitical agenda that Diaspora Kurds pursue in the country. It is therefore necessary toconclude that the German state is only partially receptive of Kurdish transnationalactivism. The Diaspora bene� ts from a minimal leverage relationship through Germanpolitical channels that rarely seem to in� uence and shape Turkish domestic politics.

Case-Study III: The European Union


The founders of the modern European supranational system envisioned a Europeunited by liberal democratic values in the aftermath of tyranny. Since the end of theSecond World War, these supranational structures have tamed rabid nationalism,reduced the occurrence of inter-state wars, limited the threat of con� ict between thesuperpowers, and created more prosperous societies. An interconnected web of organi-zations consisting of the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,the Organization for European Cooperation and Development, the European Union,and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe serves as the guidingstructure for social, political, and economic unity in Europe.

The European Union represents a central element in this multitude of organizationalstructures. Leaning on essential liberal democratic values, the EU supports the conceptof constitutionalism, the separation of powers, and the establishment of representativegovernments. The preamble of the 1951 Treaty of Paris suggested that the creation ofan economic community would provide a basis for overcoming hostilities among thepeople of Europe.97 While sovereign European states guarantee the rule of law and theexistence of fundamental rights and freedoms, it is the role of the supranationalinstitutions to guarantee a process of economic, monetary, and political union. Thestructure harmonizes policies for EU members, offers oversight, and provides legalrecourse. The EU has a Commission that serves as the bureaucratic arm of the EU, aCouncil of Ministers that holds executive decision-making powers, a Parliament thatacts in an advisory role, and a Court of Justice that guarantees the process of Europeanintegration. The EU’s institutional design encourages intensive bargaining by represen-tatives within and across the institutions. Only the Court of Justice remains completelyindependent from the political bargaining approach.

The Council of Europe, an entirely separate structure from the EU, is anotherintegral part of the larger European system. Founded in 1949, the Council was createdto establish unity among like-minded democratic states of Europe. Its aim today is toprotect human and minority rights, and to encourage political, legislative, and consti-tutional reforms among member states. It derives its central authority from theEuropean Convention of Human Rights, requiring new member states to sign and ratifythe convention and subsequent protocols. Its Committee of Ministers acts as theCouncil’s decision-making body; the Parliamentary Assembly grants deliberative auth-ority to its members; and the European Court of Human Rights adjudicates disputesbetween member states and individual claimants. While all EU member states belongto the Council of Europe, numerous signatory states to the Council of Europe are notpart of the EU. This is the case with Turkey, which has been a member of the Councilof Europe since 1949.98

Since Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe and an applicant country for EUaccession, it is within the legitimate authority of the institutions to propose political

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steps that may contribute to a resolution of the Kurdish question in Turkey. ThisEuropean ability to address democratic values and structures in Turkey offers a politicalopportunity for Kurdish activists. Both institutional structures offer unique mecha-nisms that present Kurdish challenger communities with leverage points in Europe.The Kurdish Diaspora has lobbied representatives at the European Parliament (EP) inorder to push for improvements in Turkish human rights policies. In addition, bothKurds in exile and in Turkey have accessed the Council of Europe’s Court of HumanRights to � le individual human rights complaints against the state of Turkey.

The Kurdish minority also gains leverage from the long-standing economic andpolitical relationships between Turkey, Germany, and the EU. Nearly 5% of allTurkish nationals live in European Union member states, and 75% of persons holdingTurkish passports in Europe reside in Germany.99 In addition to Turkish German laborrelations, the countries also agreed to extensive trading arrangements. In 1998, almost50% of Turkish exports arrived in Europe and more than 50% of Turkish imports camefrom Europe.100 Turkey’s most important trading partner is Germany, followed by theUnited States and Italy.101 For Germany, Turkey ranks 17th among trading partners,con� rming the economic relationship between the two states.102

These multiple connections between the sovereign states and supranational organiza-tions ultimately provide potential access for challenger communities in Western Eu-rope. The political options available to the Kurdish minority include litigation beforethe European Court of Human Rights, political campaigning for seats in the EuropeanParliament, and simultaneous mobilization of protests at the state, federal, and supra-national levels in order to play them off against each other. Since all the Europeanstructures are shaped by similar political, social, ideological, and economic values,challenger groups have potential access to several political opportunities in Europe.

Executive

Sovereign European state governments guarantee civil and political liberties includingfreedom of speech, press freedom, the right to peaceful assembly and association, thefreedom of movement, and the right to participate in free elections. The 1997 Treatyof Amsterdam explicitly stated that the founding values of the EU system must berespected by member states. The European Council has the authority to suspend therights of a state that engages in a consistent breach of these principles.103 Therefore, theKurdish Diaspora enjoys a limited bene� t from the Amsterdam Treaty by publiclyaddressing and juxtaposing the founding principles espoused by the European systemof institutions and the political reality for minorities in Turkey. The obvious discrepan-cies continue to impede Turkey’s accession to the EU.

The European Commission offers few political opportunities to the KurdishDiaspora at this time. The Commission is charged to ensure that the principles agreedupon in treaties are turned into national laws and policies to be guaranteed by each ofthe member states. The individual Commissioners act as the guardians of the Europeansystem by proposing new policy areas, and initiating or amending legislation. Newlydeveloped legislation is passed on to the parliament for discussion, and then on to theCouncil of Ministers for a decision. Member states, private corporations, and interestgroups have the right to exert direct or indirect pressure on the Commission bysupplying information, preparing reports, and challenging decisions in court. TheKurdish Diaspora in Europe has not focused on pressuring the Commission throughpolitical lobbying since the bureaucratic structures require insider knowledge and legal

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expertise. The Kurdish Diaspora lacks the necessary political unity, and highly edu-cated and legally trained members among its leadership to sustain a large-scale insiderlobbying campaign. For the moment, the European Parliament provides a much moreaccessible and politicized target for Kurdish human rights activists in comparison withthe Commission.

Ethnic Kurds holding EU citizenship have the right to run for elected of� ce and canbe nominated by national party leadership for positions within the bureaucracy. Thereare no restrictions on political lobbying for members of the Kurdish Diaspora or onpeaceful Kurdish activism. The use of the Kurdish language for print media, and radioand television broadcasting is permitted in Europe but regulated by individual memberstates. Medya TV in France and METV in Denmark are licensed Kurdish-languagesatellite television stations that undergo periodic review by the European BroadcastingUnion. Neither station has been cause for concern within EU member states. Incontrast, Med-TV lost its license in London in 1999 for inciting violence against theTurkish state.

Judiciary

In 1953, the Council of Europe rati� ed the Convention for the Protection of Human Rightsand Fundamental Freedoms. Today’s newly structured European Court of HumanRights ensures that violations of the Convention are addressed in an adversarial andpublic manner.104 Member states and individuals who feel they are victims of a violationhave the right to � le a claim with the Court in Strasbourg. All � nal judgments by theCourt are binding decisions and the Committee of Ministers veri� es that states takeadequate remedial measures to comply with the Court’s decisions.105

The Kurdish Diaspora in Europe has aggressively pursued legal judgments againstthe Turkish state for violations of articles of the convention and its subsequentprotocols. The ability to � le individual applications before the Court offers the Kurdishminority an effective, authoritative tool to criticize the Turkish state. In addition, thepublic nature of the Court’s hearings and its detailed press releases assist the ethnicgroup’s attempt to mobilize support among European allies. This process legitimizesthe Kurdish minority as a political force in Europe. It is therefore logical to expect thatthe European Court’s caseload with regard to Turkey will remain heavy until theTurkish state incorporates and protects liberal democratic structures within its institu-tions.

The London-based Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) plays a particularlysigni� cant role in this political process by offering legal support to Kurdish victims ofstate-sponsored violence. In January 2001, the KHRP released a press statementcelebrating its 26th successful judgment before the European Court.106 The KHRP’sExecutive Director Kerim Yildiz stated that ‘in light of the 1999 resolution by theCommittee of Ministers of the Council of Europe regarding the need for Turkey toenforce better control of its security forces, the state’s failure to accurately account forits actions in this case points once again to Turkey’s continued failure to live up toEuropean standards’.107

A 1998 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights criticized Turkey’s trialsbefore state security courts since the involvement of military judges was not incompliance with European conventions.108 In response to the European Court’s de-cision, the Turkish parliament amended the Turkish constitution and replaced militaryjudges with civilian judges on state security courts. This change should not be under-

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stood as a substantive reform to the Turkish legal system. The military continues toenjoy a tremendous amount of in� uence over judgments by security courts. It is theintent of the Kurdish Diaspora to expose such cosmetic changes in the Turkish legalsystem by pursuing numerous cases against the Turkish state before the EuropeanCourt. Determined to embarrass the Turkish leadership for its lack of commitment toliberal democratic values, the Kurdish Diaspora intends to force Turkey to reform itsinstitutions. If the Turkish leadership hopes to pursue membership status in the EU, itmust reform without further delay. Every judgment against the Turkish state recon� rmspublic views in Europe that Turkish society abuses minorities and lacks the commit-ment to democratic values that would make the country a respectable member state.

Legislative

The European Parliament is the only directly elected institution in the EU system. Itholds fewer powers than traditional parliaments in liberal democracies. The EP has theauthority to delay, amend, and reject legislation proposed by the Commission. Institu-tional reforms have provided further authority to the EP in the 1990s, indicating thatthe parliament is a rising power structure. Karlheinz Neunreither argued that ‘the EPhas emerged from its former role of junior partner and has � rmly established itself asa co-legislator, a forceful arm of the budget authority, and a body of democraticcontrol’.109

The EP provides the Kurdish Diaspora with another powerful political opportunityto criticize the Turkish government. Kurdish activists attempt to in� uence domesticTurkish policies on human and minority rights by complicating Turkey’s accessionnegotiations with the EU. Kurdish-origin EU citizens may run in EP elections as didFeleknas Uca, the ethnic Kurdish German member of parliament representing theEuropean United Left.110 As a member of the EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Com-mittee, she contributes heavily to the dissemination of information on human rights inTurkey.111 While the Turkish government tries to de-legitimize Uca by accusing her ofsympathizing with the PKK, her voice is only one among a multitude of outspokencritics.

Even though the European structures often appear opaque and inaccessible to theoutside observer, its bureaucratic obfuscation provides ideal conditions under whichthe Kurdish Diaspora can gain access and identify leverage points. Most of the politicalwork of the EU is accomplished in specialized committees. Powerful national orregional interests are negotiated through intensive and often-complicated bargainingprocesses, which provide an entry-point to special interest and challenger groups.Committee chairs set agendas, frame debates, and pursue political goals. Since it iscommon practice to invite regional experts, lobbyists, and interest groups to participatein these political processes, the Kurdish minority is gaining a stronger voice throughrelationships with political allies. Brigid Laffan suggested that an increasing array ofnational and special interest actors mobilize in Brussels to gain a voice or even directrepresentation within the EU system.112

The Council of Europe also provides an opportunity for the Kurdish Diaspora toexpress its concerns over the treatment of Kurds in Turkey. Offering a consultativestatus to hundreds of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), special interests affect-ing European constituents are represented. Through consultative access including theuse of public discussions and colloquies, NGOs contribute heavily to the discourse thattakes place on major social issues central to member states. In effect, the Council’s

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parliamentary assembly regularly sends monitoring rapporteurs to Turkey in order toverify that the government of Turkey complies with the democratic and human rightsstandards expressed by the Council. A visit in May 2001 led the rapporteurs to meetwith government of� cials, the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church, representatives of theJewish community, members of HADEP, the Turkish Human Rights Foundation,journalists, prison of� cials, and many others.113

Kurdish communities in Europe pay close attention to reports published by rappor-teurs on Turkey. Of particular interest to the Diaspora are issues related to free accessto the court system, guarantees of fair trials, freedom of the press, radio, and television,trade union activities, and the suppression of political parties. All of these substantiveareas fall under the responsibilities and authority of the Council, guaranteeing growingattention to the Kurdish question in Europe.


Minority groups and non-European residents continue to experience societal discrimi-nation in the European Union, particularly in member states where unemploymentrates are over 10% as in Germany, France, and Belgium. The European Social Charterof the Council of Europe guarantees the right to non-discrimination in employment,the prohibition of forced labor, trade union rights, the right to collective bargaining,and the right to equal pay. Despite the Council’s attempts to promote social standardsand speci� c labor regulations, it is the national governments that must counteractpatterns of discrimination against foreigners and immigrants.114 They often work inlower-paying sectors such as construction, the textile industry, garbage collection,industrial cleaning, food processing, and other service sectors.115 Many of these workersentered the labor market at the bottom of the hierarchy and encounter dif� culties whenpursuing promotions to management or higher-paying positions.

The Council of Europe is committed to a framework convention for nationalminorities, but it acknowledges that the implementation of new requirements will taketime. Since 1998, member states have been required to report every � ve years on thenewly implemented measures designed to improve the treatment of national minorities.Some states, as in the case of Turkey, may be required to provide additional infor-mation to a panel of experts in the future. Ideally, such a panel would assist theCommittee of Ministers in the evaluation of the information by determining a state’slevel of compliance with the convention. As an additional human rights mechanism itwill provide the Kurdish Diaspora with further leverage in the coming years.

Evaluation

The POS determinants indicate that Kurdish challenger groups enjoy a growing arrayof political opportunities within the European structures. Kurdish activists articulatetheir opposition to state repression, systematic racism, and discrimination by effectivelypromoting Kurdish sociopolitical, cultural, and ethnic demands in Europe. It is increas-ingly noticeable that the Turkish government faces scrutiny from an entire network ofsupranational European agencies with overlapping branches that ensure compliancewith human rights standards. A Turkish refusal to respect Kurdish human rights, a lackof enthusiasm in revising the anti-terrorism legislation, and little interest in guarantee-ing civil and political liberties may cost Turkey in economic and political terms. Thecountry faces rejection by the nations of Europe unless its civil society, business

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community, and political leadership unite to end the military’s dominant in� uence inthe country. Intrusive reforms of Turkey’s institutions constitute a necessity sinceaccession to the EU will be blocked without these revisions. Principally, Turkish societyembraced the concept of democracy in the decades following World War II, but itremains unwilling to break with remnant authoritarian traditions.

The European system’s openness to and interest in the Kurdish minority’s politicaldemands will increase the level of pressure on Turkey. Europe’s network of institutions,particularly the EU Parliament and the European Court of Human Rights, offerextensive political opportunities and leverage points to Kurdish challengers both insideTurkey and in exile. While the Turkish military attempts to wait out the criticism andrelies on its role in NATO, Kurdish communities in Europe understand that theKurdish question will be at the center of EU debates on the inclusion of the Turkishstate. As long as severe socioeconomic and political problems persist, Turkey willremain outside the gates of the EU.

The Kurdish Diaspora’s most immediate challenge is to take full advantage of theconvoluted European bureaucracy. In utilizing the supranational system to encouragereforms in Turkey, the challenger group has gained access to powerful mechanisms.While demonstrations on a local and national level will continue, the leadership of theDiaspora focuses on establishing close relationships with particular member statesthrough their elected parliamentarians. However, Kurds in exile have yet to show thetype of political sophistication that helped the environmental movement attain inter-national recognition.

The Kurdish political strategy for Europe focuses on demanding Kurdish-languageeducation in the southeastern provinces, on establishing independently managed Kur-dish radio and television stations, and pressuring the Turkish government into legaliz-ing pro-Kurdish political parties. Since these demands mirror requirements forTurkey’s membership in the EU, the Kurdish leadership knows that it can play apivotal role in future negotiations over accession. To prepare for a long-term Eu-ropeanization campaign, the Diaspora attempts to reach out to Kurds who are pursuinguniversity degrees in Western Europe. With the participation of younger, highlyeducated Kurds, a long overdue democratization process within Kurdish politicalstructures will take place. An eventual legalization of all peaceful Kurdish politicalactivism in Europe could become the greatest political challenge to in� exible andauthoritarian elements within Turkish society.

NOTES

1. Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds and the Future of Turkey, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997,pp. 3–21.

2. Ibid.3. Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Of� ce), Anerkennung Auslandischer Fluchtlinge (Ac-

ceptance of Foreign Refugees), Wiesbaden: Federal Statistical Of� ce, 1980–1990. See, www.statistik-bund.de . .

4. The Kurdish Institute in Paris suggested that 1 million Kurds live in Western Europe with nearly85% holding Turkish passports.

5. Meltem Muftuler-Bac, Europe in Change: Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe, New York:St. Martin’s Press, 1997, pp. 51–73.

6. ‘CIA unterstutzte Ocalan Festnahme’ (‘CIA Supported Ocalan’s Arrest’), Deutsche Presse Agentur,17 February 1999.

7. ‘Schroeder will gegen kurdische Extremisten vorgehen’ (‘Schroeder Promises to Take Actionagainst Kurdish Extremists), Deutsche Presse Agentur, 17 February 1999.

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8. Ibid.9. Charles Tilly, ‘From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements’, in How Social Movements

Matter, eds Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly, Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1999, pp. 253–270.

10. Ibid.11. One of the most proli� c NGOs to work on behalf of Kurds is the London-based Kurdish Human

Rights Project. For further information, see , www.khrp.org . .12. Clarence Y. H. Lo, ‘Communities of Challengers in Social Movement Theory’, in Frontiers in

Social Movement Theory, eds Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1992, pp. 224–247.

13. Ibid.14. ‘French Parliament Recognizes 1915 Deaths of Armenians at Turks’ Hands as Genocide’, Los

Angeles Times, 18 January 2001.15. Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Of� ce), Auslandische Bevolkerung in Europa (Foreign

Population in Europe), Wiesbaden: Federal Statistical Of� ce, 1998.16. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scienti� c Inference in

Qualitative Research, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.17. The Lausanne Treaty excluded numerous groups from the protected minority status, including

the Assyrians (Nestorian Church), the Kurds, the Laz, the Roma, the Syriacs (Syrian OrthodoxChristians also known as Jacobites), the Bulgarians, the Chaldeans, the Georgians, the Maronites,the Zoroastrian-Shii Yazidis, and many more.

18. Christian Rumpf, Das turkische Verfassungssystem (The Turkish Constitutional System), Wiesbaden:Harrassowitz Verlag, 1996, p. 101.

19. Gerard Chaliand, ed., People without a Country, London: Zed, 1980, p. 61.20. David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, London: I. B. Tauris, 1996, pp. 191–213.21. Feroz Ahmed, The Making of Modern Turkey, New York: Routledge, 1993, pp. 57–59.22. Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, London: Zed, 1992, pp. 281–305.23. Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States, Washington:

Brookings, 2000, p. 7.24. Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds, op. cit., p. 9.25. In 2000, the US Department of State warned travelers that the provinces of Hakkari, Sirnak,

Tunceli, and Diyarbakir were under a state of emergency. Other Kurdish regions became‘sensitive areas’, and Mount Ararat required military permission for access since its classi� cationas a ‘special military zone’.

26. The Anatolian News Agency reported in May 2001 that armed clashes in the southeasternprovinces decreased from 3300 in 1994, to 1436 in 1995, to 488 in 1999, to 18 within the � rst� ve months of 2000. These � gures were reprinted in the Human Rights Watch World Report2001—Turkey: Human Rights Developments, available online at: , www.hrw.org/wr2k1/europe/turkey.html . .

27. Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey, London: Cass, 1997,p. 111.

28. Heinz Kramer, ‘Turkey and the EU: A Multi-Dimensional Relationship with Hazy Perspectives’,in Turkey between East and West, eds Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation, Boulder: WestviewPress, 1996, pp. 131–140.

29. As recently as in May 2001, trade union members marched in Ankara to protest their lack ofpolitical freedoms.

30. For more information, see the European Commission report published 4 November 1998 at, www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/rep . .

31. ‘The Turkish Council of Higher Education (known by its Turkish acronym YOK), created underthe 1982 constitution, has the power to � re any professor suspected of ideological dissidence (whocan also be tried in the courts if considered dangerous to the public order)’. Eric Rouleau,‘Turkey’s Dream of Democracy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6, November–December 2000,p. 106.

32. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 1999 Country Report on Human Rights Practices:Turkey, US Department of State, 25 February 2000.

33. Ibid., pp. 1–6.34. Ilter Turan, ‘The Military in Turkish Politics’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2, Autumn 1997,

pp. 123–135.

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35. Cengiz Candar, ‘Ataturk’s Ambiguous Legacy’, The Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2000, p. 90.36. Ibid., pp. 88–96.37. Jon Gorvett, ‘Witch Hunt or Whitewash?’ The Middle East, October 2000, p. 8.38. Eric Rouleau, ‘Turkey’s Dream’, op. cit., p. 104.39. In June 1993, the Copenhagen European Council required the ful� llment of three criteria for any

country to be considered for accession. The criteria are: (1) the applicant country must haveachieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights andrespect for and protection of minorities; (2) it must have a functioning market economy, as wellas the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; and (3) itmust have the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aimsof political, economic and monetary union.

40. Jon Gorvett, ‘Witch Hunt’, op. cit.41. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 1999 Country Report on Human Rights Practices:

Turkey, US Department of State, 25 February 2000.42. Amnesty International, Turkey: The Duty to Supervise, Investigate and Prosecute, April 1999. Ref:

EUR 44/24/99. Also see , www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1999/EUR . .43. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001: Turkey: Human Rights Developments, Spring 2001. See

, www.hrw.org/wr2k1/europe/turkey.html . .44. Ibid.45. Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law banned written or oral propaganda, meetings, demonstrations,

and other acts that undermined the indivisible integrity of the Turkish state. An amendment toArticle 8 was passed by parliament in October 1995, leading to reduced prison sentences foroffenders of the anti-terror laws.

46. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 1999 Country Report on Human Rights Practices:Turkey, US Department of State, 25 February 2000.

47. See , www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/rep-.?? . .48. Amnesty International, Annual Report 2000: Turkey, October 2000.49. For speci� c updates on Kurdish human rights cases pending before the European Court of

Human Rights, visit the Court’s website at , www.echr.coe.int . .50. For further information, see , www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/rep-.?? . .51. ‘AHI Welcomes European Union’s Decision Not to Open Accession Negotiations with Turkey’,

American Hellenic Institute, 24 October 2000.52. See , www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/brie� ngs/7a2 em.htm . .53. Eric Rouleau, ‘Turkey’s Dream’, op. cit.54. Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds, op. cit., p. 15.55. Meltem Muftuler-Bac, Europe in Change, op. cit., pp. 90–91.56. See , http://hr461.tripod.com . .57. Ibid.58. For more information on House Resolution 461, see , http://hr461.tripod.com/

106th congress.htm . .59. For detailed election data, see , www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/brie� ngs/7a2 em.htm . .60. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security on EC–Turkey relations, EP Session

Documents, DOC-EN/RR/208559, 21 May 1992.61. Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question, op. cit., pp. 119–126.62. Paul B. Henze, ‘Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century’, in Turkey’s New Geopolitics, eds

Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 21–26.63. European Parliament Brie� ng No. 7, Turkey and Relations with the European Union at

, www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement/brie� ngs/7a2 em.htm . .64. Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany),

Bonn: Bundeszentrale fur politische Buildung (Federal Of� ce for Political Education), 1987,p. 21.

65. Klaus Stern, ‘General Assessment of the Basic Law—A German View’, in Germany and Its BasicLaw, eds Paul Kirchhof and Donald P. Kommers, Baden-Baden: Nomosverlagsgesellschaft,1993, pp. 17–36.

66. Manfred G. Schmidt, ‘Germany: The Grand Coalition State’, in Political Institutions in Europe, ed.Josep M. Colomer, New York: Routledge, 1996, p. 85.

67. Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 (Report on the Protection of the Constitution for the Year 2000),Cologne: Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz (Federal Of� ce for the Protection of the Consti-tution), 2001.

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68. Klaus Stern, ‘General Assessment’, op. cit., pp. 17–36.69. Reiner Schmidt, ‘Principles of the Economic System in the Federal Republic of Germany—A

Legal View’, in Germany and Its Basic Law, op. cit., pp. 311–338.70. Das neue Staatsangehorigkeitsrecht (The New Citizenship Law), Berlin: Bundesinnenministerium

(Ministry of the Interior), 1999. Available online at , www.bundesregierung.de . .71. Amnesty International, Annual Report 1999: Germany, 1999.72. Ibid.73. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 1999 Country Report on Human Rights Practices:

Germany, US Department of State, 25 February 2000.74. Vera Eccarius-Kelly, ‘Radical Consequences of Benign Neglect: The Rise of the PKK in

Germany’, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2000, pp. 161–174.75. Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000 (Report on the Protection of the Constitution for the Year 2000),

Cologne: Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz (Federal Of� ce for the Protection of the Consti-tution), 2001.

76. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 1999 Country Report on Human Rights Practices:Germany, US Department of State, 25 February 2000.

77. Ibid.78. ‘Innenminister Schily: Zahl der rechtsextremen Straftaten im Jahre 2000 gestiegen’ (‘Interior

Minister Schily: Number of Rightwing Extremists on the Rise in 2000’), Deutschland Nachrichten,9 February 2001.

79. Ibid.80. ‘Auslanderpolitik als Wahlkampfthema?’ (‘Foreigner Politics as Topic for Electoral Campaign?’),

Deutschland Nachrichten, 20 October 2000.81. Ibid.82. ‘Einburgerungen: Geteiltes Recht’ (‘Naturalizations: Segregated Law’), Focus Magazin, Vol. 47,

22 November 1999, pp. 66–69.83. Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration, New York: Guilford Press, 1998,

pp. 276–277. The authors estimate that one-quarter to one-third of the over 2 million Turkishcitizen residents in Germany are of Kurdish ethnicity.

84. Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Of� ce), Einburgerungen von Auslandern 1999 gegenuber1998 um ein Drittel gestiegen (Naturalization of Foreigners Rose by One-third in 1999 in Comparisonwith 1998), Wiesbaden: Federal Statistical Of� ce, 28 December 2000.

85. Zentrum fur Turkeistudien (Center for Turkish Studies), Einburgerung turkischstammiger Mi-granten in Deutschland: Bald ein Drittel der erwachsenen Turken in der Bundesrepublik mit deutscherStaatsangehorigkeit (Naturalization of Turkish-Origin Migrants in Germany: Close to One-third of theAdult Turkish Population in Germany Holds German Citizenship), Essen: Zentrum fur Turkeistud-ien, 26 February 2001.

86. ‘Auslandische Bevolkerung nach ausgewahlten Nationalitaten’ (‘Foreign Population by SelectedNationalities’), AiD Auslander in Deutschland, Vol. 17, 30 March 2001. It is obvious that thenumber of persons carrying Turkish passports in Germany will decrease with time sincecitizenship has become a viable option for long-term residents. Therefore this author proposesthat ethnic Turkish/Kurdish Germans be included into statistical data sets that research this newGerman minority.

87. ‘Arbeitslose in Deutschland’ (‘Unemployed Persons in Germany’), AiD Auslander in Deutschland,Vol. 17, 30 March 2001.

88. Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (Federal Of� ce for Employment), Arbeitslose Auslander nach ausgewahltenStaatsangehorigkeiten (Unemployed Foreigners by Selected Nationalities), Nurnberg, 1999.

89. Vera Eccarius-Kelly, ‘Radical Consequences’, op. cit., p. 167.90. For a more detailed study on Islam in Germany, see Ministerium fur Arbeit, Gesundheit, und

Soziales des Landes Nordrhein–Westfalen (The Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Questionsin the state of North Rhine–Westphalia), Turkische Muslime in Nordrhein–Westfalen (TurkishMuslims in North Rhine–Westphalia), Duisburg: WAZ–Druck, 1997.

91. ‘Schwerpunkt: Auslandische Selbststandige’ (‘Focus: Foreign Business Owners’), AiD Auslanderin Deutschland, Vol. 16, No. 1, 31 March 2000.

92. Andreas Goldberg and Faruk Sen, Turkische Unternehmer in Deutschland (Turkish Business Ownersin Germany), Essen: Zentrum fur Turkeistudien, 1999, pp. 29–37; and Die okonomische Dimensionder turkischen Selbststandigen in Deutschland (The Economic Dimension of Independent TurkishEntrepreneurs in Germany), Essen: Zentrum fur Turkeistudien, 1999.

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93. This comment is based on interviews with Kurds in Duisburg, Nordrhein–Westfalen, January1999.

94. The SPD is a mass-based, moderate center-left party. Its major stronghold consists of theunionized sections of the blue-collar and white-collar workers, private sector employees, andpublic servants. The Green Party receives high proportional support from young, highly educated,service sector employees and professionals. The PDS is the follow-up party to the former EastGerman Socialist Unity Party, the SED.

95. Georg Mascolo, ‘Rauswurf angedroht’ (‘Expulsion Threatened’), Der Spiegel, Vol. 10, 6 March2000, pp. 48–49.

96. Kurdistan Rundbrief, Vol. 12, No. 13, 1999.97. John McCormick, Understanding the European Union, New York: Palgrave, 1999, pp. 65–69.98. Turkey pursued recognition as a European state by joining all the newly emerging European

structures: Turkey joined OECD in 1948 and NATO in 1952. In 1959, Turkey applied forassociate membership in the European Community.

99. Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey, op. cit., p. 182.100. Ibid., p. 181.101. Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Of� ce), Abwartstrend im Außenhandel mit der Turkei

(Decreasing Trend in External Trade with Turkey), Wiesbaden: Federal Statistical Of� ce, pressrelease, 26 November 1999.

102. Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Of� ce), 9 Prozent des deutschen Außenhandels mit denBeitrittskandidaten zur Europaischen Union (9% of German External Trade with Candidates forMembership in the European Union), Wiesbaden: Federal Statistical Of� ce, press release, 25January 2000.

103. Brigid Laffan, ‘Democracy and the European Union’, in Developments in the European Union, edsLaura Cram, Desmond Dinan and Neill Nugent, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999, pp. 330–349.

104. The Registrar of the Court releases information on a very regular basis at , www.echr.coe.int . .Currently the Court addresses cases that were � led against the Turkish state in 1993, 1994, and1995. One can expect a signi� cant number of judgments against Turkey in the coming years.

105. See European Court of Human Rights web page at , www.echr.coe.int . .106. ‘European Court Declares Turkey Guilty of Intimidation, Inhuman Treatment and Failure to

Protect in Village Destruction Case’, Kurdish Human Rights Project, press release, 31 January2001.

107. ‘Justice Delivered for Kurdish Mother of Disappeared Children—Turkey Held Responsible byEuropean Court and � ned £70,000’, Kurdish Human Rights Project, press release, 28 February,2001.

108. European Court of Human Rights, Incal vs. Turkey, case no. 41/1997/825/1031, Strasbourg, 9June 1998.

109. Karlheinz Neunreither, ‘The European Parliament’, in Developments in the European Union, op.cit., p. 81.

110. For a political pro� le on Uca, see , http://europe.eu.int./idea . .111. ‘Uca Reproaches Turkish Government’, The Kurdish Observer, 9 June 2000. ‘Uca Calls to Action’,

The Kurdish Observer, 26 May 2000. ‘Kurdish Europarliamentarian Scores [sic] Closure ofDiyarbakir Human Rights Association’, The Kurdish Observer, 18 May 2000.

112. Brigid Laffan, ‘Democracy’, op. cit., pp. 330–349.113. See , http://stars.coe.fr/act/compress/CP01/373a(01).htm . .114. Robert Geyer and Beverly Springer, ‘EU Social Policy after Maastricht: The Works Council

Directive and the British Opt-Out’, in The State of the European Union, Vol. 4, eds Pierre-HenriLaurent and Marc Maresceau, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

115. Steven Castels and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration, op. cit., p. 194.

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