Pontus Poysti

Bachelor Thesis, 15 credits.

Eastern Christian Studies

Stockholm School of Theology, Spring term 2020

Supervisor: Michael Hjälm

Examiner: Cyril Hovorun

Theory and praxis John Zizioulas and Andrew Louth compared

Abstract This thesis is a critical study of John Zizioulas’ use of the inner Trinitarian relations as a model and ontological foundation for ecclesial praxis. It compares Zizioulas to Andrew Louth, who, based on his understanding of the Incarnation as recapitulating creation, begins in the economy. The purpose is to explicate how the two approaches could affect the role of theology in the realization of praxis. Zizioulas is criticized in his attempt to create a holistic structure, as it implies that his reading of the fathers and his understanding of praxis must be congruous with his Trinitarian logic. Louth, on the other hand, differentiates between God and creation, which enables him to describe how we can transcend ourselves by relating to God, without the risk of confusing revelation or our experience of Him with His essence, which is beyond words. The ontological difference between God and creation means, in Louth’s implicit criticism of Zizioulas, that the task of the theologian is to enable communication about what the shared experience of God could mean in a particular time and place – to which there could be a diversity of ideas – not to dictate principles from an idea of totality, or a realm that transcends existence as we know it. It also implies that encountering God in and through creation, enables communication with the world and other fields of study. Keywords: John Zizioulas, Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor, social trinitarianism, ontology, apophatic and kataphatic theology, theory and practice.

Table of contents Part one: Introduction ................................................................................................................. 4

1.1. Background ..................................................................................................................... 4

1.2. Purpose and problem statement ...................................................................................... 5

1.3. Method ............................................................................................................................ 5

1.3.1. Comparative method ................................................................................................. 5

1.3.2. Limitations ................................................................................................................. 5

1.4. Literature ......................................................................................................................... 6

1.4.1. John Zizioulas ........................................................................................................... 6

1.4.2. Andrew Louth ............................................................................................................ 8

1.5. Questions ........................................................................................................................ 9

Part two: Theory ......................................................................................................................... 9

2.1. John Zizioulas.................................................................................................................. 9

2.1.1. The Patristic synthesis: Ontological personhood ......................................................10

2.1.2. Creator and creation: The ontological difference ......................................................15

2.1.3. Theology as the truth of existence ............................................................................23

2.2. Andrew Louth .................................................................................................................29

2.2.1. Patristic reflections on mediation between God and creation....................................30

2.2.2. The ontological difference ........................................................................................35

2.2.4. Theology: Man’s response to the experience of God ................................................39

Part three: Analysis and discussion ...........................................................................................43

3.1. Comparative analysis .....................................................................................................44

3.1.1. The Patristic witness ................................................................................................44

3.1.2. The relationship between God and creation: Adoption or relation? ...........................45

3.1.3. The Church and the world ........................................................................................47

3.2. Discussion and conclusion .............................................................................................51

3.2.1. Zizioulas: The lack of differentiation and the totalitarian harmony .............................51

3.2.2. Andrew Louth: Solutions and unexplored possibilities ..............................................53

3.2.3 Final conclusion and suggestions for further research ...............................................55

Sources.....................................................................................................................................57

4

Part one: Introduction

1.1. Background

Metropolitan John Zizioulas has attempted to make human personhood a matter of ontology, by

using the inner Trinitarian relationships as normative for ecclesiology and anthropology. As an

important figure representing Orthodox theology in ecumenical settings, he has argued that we

must be willing to debate the “…cultural consequences of doctrine.”1 He uses the term ethos to

describe how a Christian mode of being, modelled after the Trinity, transcends ethics or any

notion of truth as external to human beings. One of his critics, Andrew Louth – an important

representative of Orthodox theology in the English-speaking world – similarly suggests that

dogmatics and spirituality are integrally united in the life of the Church. In contrast to Zizioulas,

however, Louth's anthropology and ecclesiology begin at the crossroads between the created and

the divine, where the Church recapitulates creation and transcends it through union with God.

This thesis will investigate the problems of Zizioulas’ method in the realization of praxis in actual

communities, and compare it to Louth’s implicit attempt to create an alternative. It was motivated

by the realization that in my parish, we experience difficulties knowing how to effectuate our

explicit ideal to celebrate the ‘Liturgy after the Liturgy’ as a community; to provide love and regard

for those in need. I especially remember my wife and I having coffee with a newcomer to our

Sunday Liturgy, let us call him Issa. He told us he was homeless, and asked how long we could

keep the Church open, for him to stay warm from the winter cold. Unfortunately, we soon had to

close up, and he went to a protestant Church a few blocks down, where he knew he would be

provided shelter.

Issa celebrated the Eucharist with our community, but the Liturgy after the Liturgy was celebrated

elsewhere. This left me with unanswered questions: could our theology impact how we as a

community respond to his request and presence here and now, and if so, how?

This thesis is dedicated to Issa.

1 See for example John Zizioulas, “Faith and Order Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,” Ecumenical Patriarchate Permanent Delegation to the World Council of Churches, October 20, 2017, https://www.ecupatria.org/articles/748-2/.

https://www.ecupatria.org/articles/748-2/https://www.ecupatria.org/articles/748-2/https://www.ecupatria.org/articles/748-2/

5

1.2. Purpose and problem statement

This thesis will address problems arising from Zizioulas’ method of using the inner Trinitarian

relations as a model for the realization of praxis in the economy. The purpose is to compare

Zizioulas to Andrew Louth who – based on his understanding of the Incarnation as Christ

recapitulating creation – begins in the economy, to see if and how the two could be useful in the

realization of praxis in actual communities.

1.3. Method

1.3.1. Comparative method

The method is comparative and will be based on a literature study of Zizioulas and Louth. The

thesis will begin by presenting a background of Zizioulas: 1. his use of patristic writers to describe

his understanding of personhood, and 2. his understanding of the difference between God and

creation, and 3. how these points affect his understanding of ecclesiology and praxis. Criticism by

a selection of theologians (Cf. 1.4. Literature) will be presented as part of each larger section about

Zizioulas to highlight problems relevant to the research questions. The chapter about Zizioulas is

followed by a presentation of Louth: 1. his reading of the fathers used by Zizioulas – with a

particular focus on St. Maximus the Confessor – and their understanding of God’s acting in the

economy, 2. the difference between God and creation in his reading of these fathers, and 3. how

these points affect his understanding of anthropology, ecclesiology and praxis. The sections about

Louth will not include criticism of his conclusions; rather, the aim is to highlight the consequences

of taking the criticism posed against Zizioulas seriously (Cf. 1.3.2. Limitations). The final chapter

will compare Louth’s and Zizioulas’ methods and make a conclusive remark on the consequences

of using them in the realization of praxis in actual ecclesial communities.

1.3.2. Limitations

Zizioulas works with historical material to develop his ideas as a systematic theologian; he is

trying to create a unified theory and present it to the contemporary world. Louth, on the other

hand, allows for ambiguity and contradiction in his use of historical material. His ambition is to

describe what is possible, not to create a unified theory or make conclusive statements, which

sometimes makes it difficult to discern what he considers normative and not. This also makes him

hard to criticize; his ideas rarely stand or fall with one particular item of study. Even if Louth and

6

Zizioulas often rely on the same authorities, what is compared in this thesis are “observations of

observations”. Their different interpretations of particular patristic writers serve as examples of

two different approaches; the focus of this thesis is not to compare details on particular items of

study, but to compare two ways of approaching theology.

1.4. Literature

1.4.1. John Zizioulas

1.4.1.1. Primary sources

Three collections of articles serve as primary sources to understand Zizioulas’ thinking. The first,

Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church was first published in 1985 and

presents a summary of Zizioulas’ theology.2 The second, Communion and Otherness: Further

Studies in Personhood and the Church was published in 2007 and includes old material together

with responses to criticism posed against it, as well as new material reflecting on the idea of

otherness as an ontological category.3 The third collection, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics,

published in 2009, is here used to understand Zizioulas’ account of Christian doctrine and its

relationship to freedom.4

1.4.1.2. Considerations

It is difficult to present a complete overview of Zizioulas’ work. Firstly, because a large portion of

it remains scattered throughout journals and lectures, published throughout an approximately

50-year time span. Secondly, because much of it is addressed to an audience unfamiliar with

Orthodox approaches, resulting in Zizioulas quite often repeating himself, and sometimes trying

to offer clarifications after being the target of criticism.5 In addition to the primary sources, other

articles and materials, most available online and published in dialogue with a broader audience,

2 John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2004). 3 Jean Zizioulas and Paul McPartlan, Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church, Reprinted (London: T & T Clark, 2009). 4 Jean Zizioulas and Douglas H. Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics (London ; New York: T & T Clark, 2008). 5 Cf. Andrew Louth, Modern Orthodox Thinkers: From the Philokalia to the Present (London: SPCK, Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2015)., p. 217.

7

have been included to illustrate how Zizioulas addresses contemporary issues in a more concrete

way. The problem of using such material is that it rarely includes developed reflections on how

his conclusions relate to his systematic theology.6

1.4.1.3. Criticism of Zizioulas

A selection of critics have been included based on their relevance for understanding the problems

of Zizioulas’ ideas in themselves, with a particular focus on their anthropological and

ecclesiological consequences. Criticism of Zizioulas’ historical method and use of patristic sources

are included on the same basis.

The first critic, Nicholas Loudovikos, is a psychologist and patristic scholar who studied Maximus

the Confessor under the supervision of Zizioulas. His article Person Instead of Grace and Dictated

Otherness: John Zizioulas’ Final Theological Position is used to highlight the philosophical and

anthropological consequences of Zizioulas’ ideas and use of patristic material.7 The second critic,

Miroslav Volf, is a Protestant scholar. His classical work After Our Likeness: The Church as an

Image of the Triune God is primarily used to point out some of the difficulties and logical

inconsistencies in Zizioulas’ ideas, independently of how they relate to the Orthodox tradition and

patristic material.8 Michael Hjälm’s doctoral dissertation entitled Liberation of the Ecclesia: The

Unfinished Project of Liturgical Theology is used to show how Zizioulas’ point of departure risks

making the created condition irrelevant, and is irreconcilable with a Palamite description of the

human condition being transformed by synergetic relatedness to God.9 Finally, criticism by Louth,

scattered throughout many sources, is used to highlight the differences between the two, and

especially how Zizioulas’ method risks demoting or making knowledge about the human condition

subject to Trinitarian doctrine.

6 Cf. Ibid., 217 ff. 7 Nicholas Loudovikos, “Person Instead of Grace and Dictated Otherness: John Zizioulas’ Final Theological Position,” The Heythrop Journal 52, no. 4 (July 2011): 684–99, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2009.00547.x. 8 Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity, Sacra Doctrina (Grand Rapids, Mich: William B. Eerdmans, 1998). 9 Michael Hjälm, “Liberation of the Ecclesia: The Unfinished Project of Liturgical Theology” (Södertälje, Anastasis media, 2011).

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2009.00547.xhttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2009.00547.xhttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2009.00547.x

8

1.4.2. Andrew Louth

1.4.2.1. Primary sources

Louth’s Introducing Eastern Orthodox theology, published in 2013, is written as an introduction

to the Orthodox faith and used as a point of reference for understanding his approach to theology

as beginning in the human condition.10 Discerning the mystery: an essay on the nature of

theology, published in 1983, is used to describe Louth’s notion of tradition and the role of the tacit

dimension of knowledge, and how theology may learn from other fields of study.11 The origins of

the Christian mystical tradition: from Plato to Denys, first published in 1981, is used to describe

how the tacit [mystical] dimension was understood by the Church fathers as enabling a human

response to God’s movement towards creation, and how they developed a technical vocabulary in

order not to confuse knowledge of God with God Himself.12 St. John Damascene: tradition and

originality in Byzantine theology, published in 2002, and Maximus the Confessor, published in

1996, are used to describe how St. John and St. Maximus, in Louth’s interpretation, began in the

human condition and how they developed slightly different technical language to describe the

same reality; Man as growing in God’s likeness, acting as the bond of the visible-invisible and the

created-uncreated.13 Two articles, Ignatios or Eusebios: two models of patristic ecclesiology,

published in 2010, and The Ecclesiology of Saint Maximos the Confessor, published in 2004, have

been used as primary sources to describe how Louth uses historical sources to reflect on

ecclesiology.14

1.4.2.2. Considerations

Akin to Zizioulas, much of Louth’s work is found in different articles and journals published

throughout several decades. Articles and books, included in the footnotes of Introducing Eastern

10 Andrew Louth, Introducing Eastern Orthodox Theology (Downers Grove, Ill: IVP Academic, 2013). 11 Andrew Louth, Discerning the Mystery: An Essay on the Nature of Theology (Oxford: New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1983). 12 Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys, 2nd ed (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 13 Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor, The Early Church Fathers (London ; New York: Routledge, 1996).; Andrew Louth, St. John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford [England] ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 14 Andrew Louth, “The Ecclesiology of Saint Maximos the Confessor,” International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 4, no. 2 (July 2004): 109–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/1474225042000288920.; Andrew Louth, “Ignatios or Eusebios: Two Models of Patristic Ecclesiology,” International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 10, no. 1 (February 2010): 46–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/14742251003643833.

https://doi.org/10.1080/1474225042000288920https://doi.org/10.1080/1474225042000288920https://doi.org/10.1080/14742251003643833https://doi.org/10.1080/14742251003643833https://doi.org/10.1080/14742251003643833

9

Orthodox theology, are used as secondary sources to gain a deeper understanding of Louth’s take

on his point of departure, anthropology and understanding of revelation. Other sources are

included when considered relevant for comparing him with Zizioulas, but this thesis is still unable

to provide a comprehensive overview of Louth’s works.

1.5. Questions

This thesis will attempt to answer the following questions:

1. How does Zizioulas use the early patristic writers to describe the relationship between

theology, anthropology and ecclesiology, and what are the problems involved?

2. What are the differences between Zizioulas and Louth in how they describe the difference

between God and creation?

3. What are the differences between Zizioulas and Louth in how they describe the

relationship between theology, anthropology and ecclesiology, and how are these

differences affected by their use of the fathers and their respective understandings of the

difference between God and creation?

4. In what ways could Zizioulas and Louth be useful in the realization of praxis in

contemporary ecclesial communities, and how is this affected by the previous questions?

Part two: Theory

2.1. John Zizioulas

Zizioulas explains his notion of praxis using the term ethos, which refers to customs, or patterns

of thinking and acting, in real communities, as opposed to ethics, which are based on abstract

principles or a system of thought. The ethos flows freely from within the members of a community,

not individually, but personally, which also makes it a foundation for unity inherent in the very

being of those who share it. In order to understand its significance in Zizioulas’ thinking, however,

one must first investigate how it relates to the ontology of the person. What does it mean for Man

10

to be created in the image of God? How does the ethos relate to the Fall, Christ's Incarnation and

the Church?

2.1.1. The Patristic synthesis: Ontological personhood

For Zizioulas, what primarily constitutes a person is not nature, but the ability to transcend

nature. The notion of identifying freedom as the capacity to transcend nature and ethics, is

affiliated with philosophical personalism and existentialism.15 For Zizioulas, however, this idea is

integral to the ecclesial understanding of communion, koinonia [κοινωνία], and his

understanding of the created-uncreated condition.16 In the words of Zizioulas:

The doctrine of God is of fundamental importance if we are to understand who we are. Human beings are called

to become persons in the image and likeness of the Holy Trinity, for this is what theosis is. Created nature will

never turn into divine nature, but man can become a person in the image and likeness of the Holy Trinity. Here

we can see the decisive contribution that Patristic theology can make to the world. It can replace the

psychological conception of person and teach us the meaning of the person from the doctrine of the Trinity.17

Zizioulas does not identify with existentialism because, to borrow Loudovikos' epigrammatic

conclusion, existentialism is a “. . . projection of human existence on the divine, while [Zizioulas]

wants to do the opposite.”18 For Zizioulas, it was the development of the doctrine of the Trinity

that offered an ontological foundation for personhood. He describes this foundation by

contrasting it to contemporary humanism, Greek philosophy and Hebrew theology.

2.1.1.2 Personhood in Humanism, Hellenism and Judaism

According to Zizioulas, contemporary humanism pays significant attention to personal freedom,

yet seems “[...]unable to recognize that historically as well as existentially the concept of the

person is indissolubly bound up with theology.”19 After the Enlightenment, Humanism separated

personal freedom from Christian dogmatics.20 The separation, continues Zizioulas, made

humanism unable to address the questions of ontology of being and its relationship to death and

15 Hjälm, “Liberation of the Ecclesia.”, p. 130; Chrēstos Giannaras, The Freedom of Morality, Contemporary Greek Theologians, no. 3 (Crestwood, N.Y: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1984)., p. 10 16 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 15 ff. 17 Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p. 69 18 Loudovikos, “PERSON INSTEAD OF GRACE AND DICTATED OTHERNESS.”, p. 694. Cf. for example Zizioulas, Being as Communion., pp. 100-112/235-236, n. 41. 19 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 27 20 John Zizioulas, “The Task of Orthodox Theology in Today’s Europe,” International Journal of Orthodox Theology 6, no. 3 (2015): 9., pp. 14-15. Cf. Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 18/64

11

createdness, making humanism dependent on ethics to defend human integrity and freedom.21

This reduces the person to an individual who conforms to ethical principles, based on religious

and ideological authorities, social conventions or logically constructed theoretical systems.22

Indifference to personal existence means, for Zizioulas, a decisive step towards thinghood: a

person searching for security in ethical systems is therefore in greater danger of faithlessness than

a person without any security at all.23

The artist is, according to Zizioulas, closer to the truth of personhood than a person of ethics.

Creativity is a form of resistance against the objectification inherent in this world. The artist

usually depicts the world, not as it is, but in a way that transcends it. The art also carries something

of the artist within itself; yet it is materially and psychologically detached from its creator, giving

the artist a presence through absence, by refusing to be circumscribed by a final interpretation.24

It is, argues Zizioulas, an example of genuine personhood, transcending what is comprehensive,

yet “demonic”, since it is a transcendence “. . . tending towards the negation of the given world.”25

Zizioulas suggests that ancient Greek philosophy struggled with problems similar to that of

Humanism, due to what he calls ontological monism: a world of ideas, where truth of being was

understood as the mind perceiving the intelligible beauty and harmony of the Cosmos.26 He

continues that Platonism, in particular, related everything concrete to an abstract idea.27

Aristotelianism, despite its emphasis on the concrete, likewise demoted the person by viewing

individuality as a temporal expression of nature, bound to die with the body; humanity was only

“immortal” through procreation.28 In Zizioulas’ analysis, Platonism and Aristotelianism did not,

as such, think of personhood in ontological terms, but as something added to nature. For Plato,

not even the Creator was free, as he created the world out of pre-existent matter according to

eternal ideas.29 It was primarily in the theatre, and the tragedy in particular, that the Greeks

21 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 46 ff.; John Zizioulas, “Ontology and Ethics,” Sabornost, no. 6 (2012): 1–14, https://doi.org/10.5937/sabornost6-3109., pp. 5-7 22 Giannaras, The Freedom of Morality., p. 22 ff.; Zizioulas, “Ontology and Ethics.”, pp. 5-7 23 J. D. Zizioulas, “Human Capacity and Human Incapacity: A Theological Exploration of Personhood,” Scottish Journal of Theology 28, no. 5 (October 1975): 401–47, https://doi.org/10.1017/S003693060003533X., pp.421-22 24 Ibid., pp. 421-22 25 Ibid., p. 431 26 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 67 f. 27 Ibid., p. 29 ff. 28 Ibid., p. 67 f. 29 Ibid., p. 42 f.; Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p. 85 ff.

https://doi.org/10.5937/sabornost6-3109https://doi.org/10.5937/sabornost6-3109https://doi.org/10.1017/S003693060003533Xhttps://doi.org/10.1017/S003693060003533Xhttps://doi.org/10.1017/S003693060003533X

12

experienced a process similar to the artist, discussed above. The actors rebelled against the gods

and the natural order, tasting the freedom that the natural world denied them. They always found

themselves defeated by destiny, however, and the moral of the story was that humans ought to

adapt to the absolute good.30 Zizioulas argues that this signified, despite its moral implications,

the Hellenistic existential search for meaning beyond the ephemerality of temporal life, in a world

they assumed to be eternal.31

Zizioulas claims that if Hellenism thought of truth and goodness as prefiguring both Creator and

creation, Hebrew theology identified truth as something that “. . . makes itself known historically

as God’s faithfulness towards His people.”32 Zizioulas claims that unlike Nicene Christianity,

however, Hebrew theology lacked ontology. Truth was revealed in part, through God’s will and

commandments, yet remained separated from Man by interruption of time and space by death.

This means, to summarize Zizioulas’ points, that both Hellenism and Judaism considered truth

to be revealed, in part, in creation. Goodness was studied as external to the human person, yet

contemplated and obeyed.33

2.1.1.3. The Trinitarian solution

Zizioulas claims that the Nicene fathers were deeply steeped in both the Hebrew Scriptures and

Greek philosophy, which made them amalgamate the Hebrew notion of truth as personal, and the

Greek notion of truth as eternal.34 Faith in Christ also prompted reflection on the unity of God

and God’s relationship to creation, in a way that was congruent with the Scriptures and

Eucharistic experience. Zizioulas claims that it is from the patristic response to this challenge that

the idea of personhood as an ontological category was born.35 In order to expostulate Tritheism,

Sabellianism and Arianism, the Nicene fathers redefined the term hypostasis [ὑπόστασις] and

distinguished it from ousia [οὐσία].36 According to Zizioulas, both hypostasis and ousia traditionally

referred to essence or substance/nature; now hypostasis referred to a complete and personal

being:

30 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., pp. 31-33 31 Zizioulas, “Ontology and Ethics.”, p. 3 f.; Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p. 91 ff. 32 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 68 33 Ibid., pp. 67-78 34 Ibid., p. 67 ff. 35 Ibid., p. 69 ff.; Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., pp. 47-68 36 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 39 ff./86 ff.

13

The term ‘hypostasis’, which had referred to what was most fundamental and unchanging, was now a synonym for

person, which consequently was understood as an ‘ontological’ category. Person no longer denoted just a

relationship that an entity could take on or the role that an actor would play.37

Zizioulas’ idea is that unlike Greek philosophy, the Nicene fathers did not consider nature or

essence as preceding person. There was no ‘nature-as-such’; nature or essence did not cause a

person, nor was it caused by a person, because they referred to the same thing.38 They identified

God as three Persons with a unique mode, tropos [τρόπος], of being. One is always unique, yet

the divine Persons inhere the fullness of each other in a kind of interpenetration, perichoresis

[περιχώρησις].39 A person is not unique because of division or separation, but because of loving

relationships, in which one embraces the other’s peculiarities, idion [ῐ ̓́δῐον] and discovers the self

in the other.40 Love is, continues Zizioulas, the supreme ontological predicate for a person: “Love

as a mode of existence ‘hypostasizes’ God, constitutes its being.”41 Since the Other is constitutive

of the self, personhood and otherness are incompatible with division.42

According to Zizioulas, the eternal relationships within the Trinity are primary, because God is

love. He continues that love presumes freedom and relationship, and it was in order to safeguard

the freedom and unity of the Trinity that the Cappadocians described the Father as the cause,

aitia [αιτία], and principle, arché [ἀρχή], of God.43 What the Father gave the Son was, in Zizioulas’

understanding, ontological Otherness, not nature-as-such.44 One always constitutes the many,

and Zizioulas claims that “[w]hen we say that ‘God is love,’ we refer to the Father, that is, to that

person which hypostasizes God . . . “45 The Son does not emanate from the Father, He is begotten,

meaning that He is truly Other, with His own peculiarities and properties. The Trinity exists as a

reciprocal movement of ekstasis [ἔκστασις] of the Three persons towards each Other; not

37 Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., pp. 51-52 38 Ibid., p. 52 39 Ibid., p. 63 40 Ibid., p. 54 ff. 41 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 46 42 Ibid., p. 106 f. 43 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 44 ff.; Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., pp.

47-82 44 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 83 ff.; Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness., p.128

f. 45 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 56, n. 40

14

transitory, but eternally, meaning that, in Zizioulas thinking, God’s being is communion in

Otherness.46

For Zizioulas, this also means that equating the immanent Trinity with the Trinity of the economy

would locate and restrict the identities of the divine Persons to the level of properties, at the

expense of freedom, making them bound to relate to creation in a certain way. The how of the

immanent Trinity refers, according to Zizioulas, to their eternal relationships, as revealed by the

liturgical texts.47 The essence-energies distinction thus means, for Zizioulas, that God, in His very

being, is involved in history, but that the divine activities must be understood ad extra and not as

God-in-Himself. In Zizioulas’ system of thought, any encounter with God in the economy is an

encounter with all three Persons, and not the basis for ontology.48

It could, in summary, be said that for Zizioulas, the three persons of the Trinity constitute each

other: The Father being cause, and the Son and the Holy Spirit conditioning the Father’s eternal,

ecstatic love. Nature is thus secondary to communion, and communion is in some sense

secondary to the freedom of the Father, yet the Father is only Father in communion with the Son

and the Holy Spirit.49

2.1.1.4. Criticism

Zizioulas’ attempt to correct and improve Western personalism with Trinitarian theology is not

without both supporters and critics.50 In a foreword to Zizioulas’ Being as Communion, John

Meyendorff praised Zizioulas’ attempt to create a bridge between theology, ecclesiology and

anthropology, since they are “. . . simply meaningless if approached separately.”51 Critics such as

Louth, Loudovikos and Volf have suggested, however, that Zizioulas may have been selective in

his reading of the fathers, to make them compatible with his anthropology and ecclesiology.52

According to Volf and Loudovikos, Zizioulas’ theology sideplays the role of nature, which creates

46 Ibid., p. 89 ff; Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p. 52 ff. 47 Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p. 69 ff.; Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness., pp. 182-204. 48 Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness., p. 201 ff.; Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 111, n. 112. 49 Cf. Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 46. See especially Ibid. n. 41. 50 For an excellent summary, see Hovorun, Meta-Ecclesiology., pp. 129-137/197-198, n. 86, 88, 90, 91,

94. 51 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 11. 52 See for example Louth, Modern Orthodox Thinkers., p. 216 ff.; Louth, St. John Damascene., p. 50 ff.; Loudovikos, “PERSON INSTEAD OF GRACE AND DICTATED OTHERNESS.”; Volf, After Our Likeness., p. 79 f.

15

problems as to how to explicate the difference between causing and conditioning, in a way that

gives priority to the Father while maintaining perfect reciprocity, unity and freedom within the

Trinity.53 For the Cappadocians, argues Loudovikos, the Monarchy was not only based on the

presupposition of the Father causing the Spirit and the Son, but also equality of nature and a

convergence of the two. Convergence and a common nature are also, he continues, what

distinguish God from the rest of creation.54 These points are, as we shall see, important as

Zizioulas fails to make a clear differentiation between God and creation, and thus vulnerable to

the problems of describing the human condition with categories used to approach the inner life

of God, such as the perfect coinherence of the three persons of the Trinity.

2.1.2. Creator and creation: The ontological difference

2.1.2.1. Creation and the Fall

According to Zizioulas, the world owes its existence to the choice of God, who created out of

nothing, ex nihilo. Creation did not emanate from God’s nature; God does not act out of

necessity.55 First there was God, and then creation, and between them an abyss of nothingness,

which means that creation would inevitably relapse into nothingness if it was separated from

God.56 Being created ex nihilo is, however, what makes creation other, and a precondition for

freedom; freedom without otherness would mean emanation, i.e. nothing in itself at all.57

Therefore, according to Zizioulas, Adam being created in the image of God does not imply that he

at one point subsisted of divine nature or shared His properties: omniscience, pre-existence,

immortality etc. Trinitarian theology situates the question of truth within the domain of

personhood, and it is also as such that the truth of creation should be understood.58 Some of

Zizioulas’ critics point out, however, that no created being ever caused its own existence, which

53 Volf, After Our Likeness., p. 79 f.; Loudovikos, “PERSON INSTEAD OF GRACE AND DICTATED OTHERNESS.”, p. 691. 54 Loudovikos, “PERSON INSTEAD OF GRACE AND DICTATED OTHERNESS.”, p. 691 55 Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p. 69 ff. 56 Ibid., p. 88 ff.; John Zizioulas, “Proprietors of Priests of Creation?,” in Toward an Ecology of Transfiguration: Orthodox Christian Perspectives on Environment, Nature, and Creation, Orthodox Christianity and Contemporary Thought (Fordham University Press, 2013), 163–74., p. 167 f. 57 Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness., p. 18 ff. 58 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., pp. 89-93

16

means that creation is conditioned by nature. For God, personhood has priority over nature, but

the same is not true for creation.59

Zizioulas finds a resolution in Man’s vocation to participate in Personhood. Existence out of

nothing means that we exist out of choice, and we are invited to partake in that choice. Adam

received his ontological otherness when God gave him his name. This otherness is imperative for

being, since otherness is imperative for love.60 According to Zizioulas, Adam’s first identity was

that of his relationship to the Father, in a way similar to how the Son is the Son because of His

relationship to the Father, and the Spirit being the Father’s Spirit by proceeding from the Father.

Adam, as the representative of Man, needed to make his relational existence primary through

participation in the life of the Trinity. Zizioulas identifies three aspects that supported Man in this

vocation:61 Firstly, Man was created as a logikon zoon, as a rational being. It meant, in addition

to its modern connotations, the ability to collect what is diversified and bring it into harmony.62

Secondly, Man was created autexousion, meaning that Man was granted some ability to acquire a

universal grasp of reality and a certain extent of freedom from the laws of nature.63 Thirdly, Man

was ‘Prince of the creation’, or a ‘microcosm of creation’. The title refers to God’s original intention

for Adam and Eve; to let them fulfill their desire to unite, by transcending nature and becoming

God’s Priest of creation.64 As a Priest, the human person was to inaugurate the salvation of the

world by being the mediator between God and creation through participation in the life of the

Trinity through a unique and ecstatic relation to both the Father and the created world.65 Zizioulas

explains that for Maximus, communion with God was never static, but a movement in which Man

was invited to participate, metokhḗ [μετοχη], in what God is ontologically: communion, koinonia

[κοινωνία].66

The Trinitarian imprint on Man is, according to Zizioulas, a movement of growth towards

communion. The human hypostasis escapes individuality by forgetting him- or herself, apatheia

[ἀπάθεια], and discovers the self in the other. The Fall was not a creation of something new, but the turning

59 See Hjälm’s summary of Cumin in Hjälm, “Liberation of the Ecclesia.”, p. 131 ff. Cf. Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 49 ff. 60 Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness., p. 40 ff. 61 John Zizioulas, “Proprietors of Priests of Creation?”, p. 166 ff. 62 Ibid., p. 166 63 Ibid., p. 166 64 Ibid., p. 167; Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics, p. 89 ff. 65 Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., pp. 83-119 66 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., pp. 105-107

17

away from communion.67 Zizioulas explains that it was the abruption of the imitation of God’s

relational mode of being, “. . . the refusal to make being dependent on communion.”68 The human

person turned towards nature as its existential reference point, followed by a new mode of being,

tropos [τρόπος], called biological existence. It means, argues Zizioulas, that Man started living

according to nature, kata physin [κατα φυσιν]; what rather than who as a relational being.69 Man

is, as a consequence, inclined to let truth of being take priority over truth of person by habitually

obtaining knowledge of the self and the others and contrasting differences before loving.70 This

movement towards separation is manifested in Man’s bodily existence. In the words of Zizioulas:

Between A and B is space and time, and it is this that gives A and B their individuality and particularity. Space

and time both connect them and separate them: the space between us both makes us separate beings and it

divides us and makes us subject to dissolution. A and B are composites, made up of smaller elements, so when

their dissolution reaches a certain point there is no more connection or communication between them. One

form of separation is when A and B lose touch with each other and their relationship ends. The other is when

the whole person of A disintegrates into composite elements, the unity that time and space gave his body is

dissolved, and he ceases to exist.71

Zizioulas explains that allowing nature to be Man’s existential point of reference pushes him or

her towards individualism, and reaches its climax in death.72 Zizioulas thus recognizes that the

only personal dimension left in Man, after the Fall, is longing for communion, i.e. a position

similar to the actors of the Greek theater.73 As we shall see, however, he argues that this longing

is satisfied in the Church.

2.1.2.2. The Incarnation and the Church

The Incarnation of the Son was, according to Zizioulas, an event of freedom and relationship.

Mary gave her full consent to the Holy Spirit, who exists in perfect relationship with the Father

and the Son.74 Mary was the representative of Man, and her consent was imperative; love

presupposes freedom and reciprocity.75 According to Zizioulas, the Incarnation enabled Christ to

recapitulate the temporal material world in the eternal life of the Trinity. Chalcedon affirmed the

67 Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p. 98 ff. 68 Italics original. Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 102 69 Ibid., p. 46 ff./101 ff. 70 Zizioulas, “Human Capacity and Human Incapacity.”, p. 435 71 Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., pp. 100-101 72 Zizioulas, “Ontology and Ethics.”, p. 10 f. 73 Zizioulas, “Human Capacity and Human Incapacity.”, pp. 428-9 74 Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., pp. 105-109; Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness., p. 106 f. 75 Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p. 106

18

importance of the hypostasis in explaining the relational character of this event; a union of

natures would have made it impossible to differentiate between what the Father did and what the

Son did, leaving no room for personal union with God.76 Unlike the notion of communicatio

idiomatum and the mediation of natural properties, Chalcedon located Christ’s primary identity

as ontological otherness and freedom from the restraints of nature.77 The Chalcedonian

understanding of the Incarnation is also imperative to preserve the otherness of creation. In

Christ, the two natures remain distinct, united in one hypostasis, without separation, revealing

how otherness is not conditioned by distance.78

The hypostatic interpretation of the Incarnation shows how man can escape biological existence

into ecclesial existence; a life in Christ and Christ’s tropos – His how, rather than His what.79

Without Christ, the human body becomes a source of separation: it is, in the words of Zizioulas,

“. . . born as biological hypostasis [and] behaves like the fortress of the ego. . . “80 The Incarnation

means, however, that we are saved as bodily beings, since our bodies are united with Christ's

hypostasis.81 Unlike the biological birth, forced upon Man, the new birth in Christ is conditioned

by consent and participation: it begins with Baptism and is renewed in each celebration of the

Eucharist.82 In the liturgy, the human body becomes an instrument of offering up all of creation

to God.83 Unlike the artist, who secures his or her otherness through absence, the Christian

participates in the ecstatic life of the Trinity through the Church in the synaxis, and is thus able to

escape the confinement of our existence as circumscribed by chronological time, but without

rejecting the world as such.84

Zizioulas’ understanding of time and space must be seen in light of how he describes how the

Trinity operates in the economy. It is only the Son who becomes history, whereas the Holy Spirit

“. . . liberate[s] the Son and the economy from the bondage of history.“85 The Spirit allows for the

Church to participate in a life beyond time, by bringing Christ and the Church into the eschaton

76 Ibid., p.115 f. 77 Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness., p. 109. 78 Ibid., p. 19 ff. 79 Ibid., p. 165 ff.; Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 49 ff. 80 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 52. 81 Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p. 100 ff. 82 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 49 ff. 83 Ibid. Cf. Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness., p. 80 f. 84 Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p. 117 ff. 85 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 130.

19

as the last Adam.86 It is also the Spirit who unites the particular members of the Body of Christ

and enables Him to be “not ‘one’ but ‘many’” as the ‘corporate personality of Christ’.87 Christ/the

Church is polyhypostasized, meaning that the hypostasis of Christ is able to unite the many

hypostatic beings of the Church, not only natures.88 Communion and eschatology are therefore

the two aspects of pneumatology that ontologically constitute ecclesiology.89

Zizioulas elaborates on this with reference to St. Maximus the Confessor. Maximus described

created beings as microcosmos that express the will and action of the Logos through their logoi.

Creation is in movement from Christ [the Logos], towards Christ, who reveals the truth of time.90

God’s telos for creation, its movement towards Christ, does not violate the freedom inherent in

the logoi, because the logoi is an expression of Christ’s will for Man, which is for us to exist

hypostatically and ecstatically within Himself.91 This is not, in other words, to be confused with

the Aristotelian notion of entelechia: All the logoi of creation are united in Christ, hypostatically,

on the level of tropos, where natures are granted a relational mode of being in a unique way.92

Man’s first identity is not what he or she is now, neither is it discovered in our origin, but in who

we are in an event of communion. Maximus’ theology was thus groundbreaking, argues Zizioulas,

since no philosophy ever managed to unite the beginning with the end of existence, without

creating a ‘vicious circle’.93

Zizioulas recognizes that his eschatological understanding of salvation prompts the question of

how we could find meaning in temporal existence.94 The synaxis interrupts history through the

relationship between Christ [the Church] and the Holy Spirit, but without transforming

chronological time as such.95 Zizioulas calls this experience a “. . . dialectic of ‘already but not

yet.’”96 The presence is that of an icon; a vision of the Christian hope in which Christ recapitulates

86 Ibid, p. 130 f/181 ff. 87 Ibid., p. 113 f./130. 88 Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness., pp. 74-75, n. 168. 89 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 131 f. Cf. ch. 2.1.2.1. 90 Ibid., pp. 93-101 91 Ibid., p. 98; Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness., p. 64 ff.; Zizioulas, “Human Capacity and Human Incapacity.”, p. 445 92 Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness., p. 23 ff./64 ff.; Zizioulas, Being as Communion.,

pp. 71-73/p. 94 ff. 93 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 98 94 Ibid., p. 97 ff. 95 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 160 ff. 96 Ibid., p. 62

20

all of creation, including history.97 It is Christ who offers and is offered, but it is made possible

thanks to the gathering, where each subject is Christ's body.98 Each Eucharist, however unique,

continues Zizioulas, allows for the participants to partake in the medicine of immortality, where

they are granted ontological otherness, without the interruption of death.99

2.1.2.3. Criticism

Loudovikos believes that Zizioulas’ interpretation of St. Maximus identifies salvation as an escape

from nature, rather than grace, by falsely attributing to Maximus his own creation of two beings:

‘nature’ and ‘personalized nature’.100 In Loudovikos own interpretation of Maximus, “. . . the

person is not an ecstatic escape from nature to freedom, but precisely that mode of existence that

allows nature to become innovated, by ‘acting or being acted upon’, without changing its ‘logos of

being.’”101 Loudovikos’ point is that, for Maximus, nature is relational and “. . . inextricably

connected with a mode of existence.”102 This means, in other words, that nature – including Man’s

created nature – is naturally seeking communion.

Volf likewise criticizes Zizioulas’ notion of grace and how he is basing his insistence on the full

realization of the Kingdom in the synaxis on “. . . his ontology of person and on his understanding

of salvific grace as the process of becoming a person.”103 Modelling personhood after immanent

Trinity means that the ecclesial being must be separated from the economy in order to avoid

monism, which motivates the question of how human subjects are unique in their relationship to

each other and God. Is it a form of otherness that we can only understand the same way we

understand the Trinity? Or is it the Otherness of the corporate hypostasis of Christ, in which all

ecclesial beings partake?104 The first limits what we can say about ourselves, whereas the latter

reduces the individual to an impersonal being, absorbed and transformed by the Church, leaving

us with a description of personhood simply animated by Christ in the economy.105

97 Ibid., p. 19 ff./134 ff.; Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p. 135. 98 Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p. 150 ff. 99 Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness., pp. 78 ff./291 ff. 100 Loudovikos, “PERSON INSTEAD OF GRACE AND DICTATED OTHERNESS.”, p. 687. 101 Italics in quote mine. Ibid., p. 687. 102 Italics in original quote.Ibid., p. 687. 103 Volf, After Our Likeness., p. 101. 104 Ibid., p.86 ff. Cf. Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., pp. 69-75; Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 113 f./149 ff. 105 Volf, After Our Likeness., p. 86 ff./100 ff. Cf. Loudovikos, “PERSON INSTEAD OF GRACE AND DICTATED OTHERNESS.”, p. 696.; Hjälm, “Liberation of the Ecclesia.”, pp. 131-143.

21

Hjälm comes to a similar conclusion, and develops it with reference to Heidegger’s ‘ontological

difference’ and the Neo-Palamite tradition of beginning in the energetic transformation of Man

(rather than the Godhead).106 According to Hjälm, Heidegger suggested that classical metaphysics

has failed to take into consideration the ontological difference between beings (das Seiende) that

exist in time, and Being/existence itself (das Sein). The human being (Dasein) relates ecstatically

to Being (das Sein), and Hjälm continues that for Heidegger, it is the appearance of beings in time

that brings into effect the awareness of Being (das Sein). This means that our understanding of

Being must begin ‘in time’ as we exist as beings ‘in time’. Keeping Heidegger’s ontological

difference in mind seems to be important for Hjälm for two reasons. Firstly, because it enables us

to move away from the notion of ‘being’ as a self-enclosed subject with an essence at its center,

towards a notion of ‘being’ (Dasein) that can transcend its existence by relating ecstatically to

Being (existence-in-itself), safeguarding the freedom of Man.107 Secondly, because it changes

Man’s point of departure and enables a positive distinction between the ontological and ontic,

without demoting the latter. Hjälm elaborates on this last point with reference to Kristina Stöckl’s

use of Heidegger’s ontological difference, in which she comes to the conclusion that, in the words

of Hjälm, “. . . freedom as a given [characteristic] of the human being is incomprehensible without

the ontic perspective of freedom in time.”108 His point is that we cannot access the ontic from the

perspective of the ontological, only the other way around.

Hjälm continues that Zizioulas, by not taking the differentiation between God and creation

seriously, also loses the sharp distinction between God's essence and God's energies, which

threatens the tradition of beginning in the energetic transformation of Man. For Hjälm, the

benefit of Neo-Palamism is that it safeguards the notion of God as truly Other, allowing Man to

enter into a relationship with God that transcends the givenness of that relationship, similarly to

how Heidegger’s ontological difference enables a notion of ‘being’ (Dasein) that is able to

transcend itself by relating to Being (das Sein). The problem of beginning in the inner Trinitarian

relations, Hjälm continues, is that it is a realm that can only be accessed through revelation and

that this realm must be approached apophatically.109 Hjälm explains the problem using the

following figure:

106 Hjälm, “Liberation of the Ecclesia.”, p. 136. 107 Ibid., p. 117 ff. 108 Ibid., p. 121. 109 Ibid., pp. 119-139.

22

Figure 1. The Ontological difference of Zizioulas110 Source: The Ontological difference of Zizioulas, “Liberation of the Ecclesia: The Unfinished Project of

Liturgical Theology.” Anastasis media, 2011., p. 137, figure 4.

Hjälm’s figure illustrates how Ziziouas’ method of analysing ‘Being-in-the-world’ (right

quadrants) from the perspective of Zizioulas’ understanding of ‘Being’ (left quadrants) makes a

positive/affirmative interpretation of created condition impossible. The bottom left quadrant

illustrates ‘Grace’ and ‘Authentic Relationality’ as the manifestation of ‘Authentic Personhood’

(top left quadrant), modelled after the Trinity and grounded on the understanding of God as

ultimately free. Such existence is, however, only accessed in the eschaton, with the exception of

Christ Incarnate, and cannot be transcended. The top right quadrant illustrates ‘Being-in-the-

world’, which is the ‘Being’ Heidegger claimed that we become aware of thanks to the appearance

of beings in time. Zizioulas’ understanding of ‘Being’ is, however, incommensurable with the

created condition, which means that the manifestations of beings in time evolve into

manifestations of the fall and individualism (bottom right quadrant). Hjälm's point is, in other

words, that Zizioulas’ notion of Being transcends the economy itself, and that the essence-energies

distinction is imperative for explaining how Man can relate to God through God’s manifestations

in time. Without the essence-energies distinction, and the clear differentiation between God and

creation, Zizioulas has no way of moving beyond First Philosophy – relating to the world only

gives access to our Given Nature.111 Zizioulas’ only escape from ‘biological existence’ is therefore

to be absorbed by the de-individualized Christ, which is a mode of existence that can only be

accessed by revelation, and therefore worked out within the same paradigm as apophatic theology.

110 Figure 1. The Ontological difference of Zizioulas in this paper. Referred to as “Figure 4. The

Ontological difference of Zizioulas” in Hjälm, “Liberation of the Ecclesia.”, p. 137. 111 Ibid., p. 136 ff.

23

In effect, any experience of love, companionship or solidarity in creation becomes a negation of

Zizioulas’ notion of authentic relationality. 112

2.1.3. Theology as the truth of existence

2.1.3.1. The ontological hierarchy

Zizioulas makes a distinction between God and the world as we know it, which means that we

cannot expect our created existence to be guided by ontological principles outside the Church. The

Church being the exception means, however, that both its structure and its mode of being should

be guided by ontological principles.

For Zizioulas, the ecclesial hierarchy is inseparable from the Eucharist, which means the Church

structure is modelled after the Trinity: One is first, the other conditioning, meaning that the

Church is constituted by communion and otherness. The Son is the image [εἰκών] of the Father, who

causes the Son, and the Son conditions the Father. The Son is the cause of the Church, and the Church is

conditioned by the synaxis, brought together by the Spirit. The Bishop is the first in the Eucharistic

synaxis, and the image of Christ par excellence, conditioned by the many in his diocese.113 One

cannot be without the other; the constitution of the Church is relational, in a dynamic of the one

and the many.114 The one Eucharist also excludes any dichotomy between christology and

pneumatology, local-universal etc.115

2.1.3.2. The ecclesial ethos

Zizioulas seems to recognize that grace, understood as ontological personhood, reveals

createdness as deprived of grace. He argues, however, that the dialectic between ‘already but not

yet’, i.e. the dialectic between ecclesial existence and biological being, cause an existential change

in the Eucharistic assembly, as it “. . . always make[s] the human person sense that his true home

is not of this world, a perception which is expressed by his [sic] refusal to locate the confirmation

112 Ibid., p. 134 ff. Cf. Volf, After Our Likeness., p. 100. 113 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 132 ff/209 ff.; Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness.,p. 127; Zizioulas, Eucharist, Bishop, Church., pp. 59-68/218-227 114 Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p. 121; Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness.,p. 294 ff.; Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 152 ff. 115 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., pp. 145-169.

24

of the hypostasis of the person in this world. . .”116 This proleptic, eschatological existence is,

according to Zizioulas, characterized by a Eucharistic and Catholic ethos: a desire to partake in

bringing creation into union with God.117 It comes from the conviction that the Kingdom is made

present here and now in the Eucharist, where the Church transcends “. . . all natural, moral and

social divisions in Christ.”118

According to Zizioulas, the Eucharistic ethos recognizes the Bishop as the charismatic leader par

excellence.119 Asceticism, evangelisation, almsgiving etc. is, claims Zizioulas, not constitutive for

the Church, but emanates from the existential realization of not belonging to this world.120 False

asceticism has, at times, challenged the charismatic leadership of the Bishop, by suggesting that

grace operates as a gift of spiritual knowledge, obtained through moral accomplishments.121 Its

ethos operates according to the false presupposition that emotions, psychological dispositions and

spiritual insight affect the presence of grace. This makes parishioners inclined to seek guidance

from charismatic ascetics, as they try to obtain spiritual knowledge or moral patterns of behavior.

The moral charism of a monk or a nun is, argues Zizioulas, given priority over the ontological

priority of the Bishop, introducing a form of individualism that is incompatible with the

Eucharistic ethos.122

For Zizioulas, the true ascetical ethos is signified by a fundamental break with history and the

abandonment of the individual will, kénōsis [κένωσις].123 The ascetics get a taste of the heavenly

Kingdom in the Eucharist, providing them with courage to freely taste the cup of Hell as they unite

with creation.124 They do not search for spiritual knowledge or psychological insights, but willingly

carry the sins of others, trusting that nothing in the world is abandoned or unloved by God.125

Mount Tabor is the final destination, where the ascetics, filled with the hope of the Crucified Son,

share the will of God. Having seen the emptiness of creation, they know that the Eucharist is the

116 Ibid., p. 62. Cf. Hjälm, “Liberation of the Ecclesia.”, p. 137. 117 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 58 ff.; Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p.127 ff. 118 Quote from Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness., p. 88, n. 204. 119 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p.152 ff.; Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p. 124 ff.; Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness.,p. 296 ff. 120 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p.130 ff. 121 Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness., p. 305 f. 122 Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p.124 ff.; Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p.151 ff. 123 Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness. ,p. 301 ff. 124 Ibid., p. 301 ff. 125 Ibid., p. 301 ff./81 ff.

25

quintessence of grace, and they place all their trust in the Church. They are thus not inclined to

challenge the hierarchy of the Church; the hierarchy reflects its essence.126 The way of the Cross

is not at the center of the Church’s ethos – that would cause an obsession with providing relief for

endless suffering and social concerns. Its center is eschatological; it is in the eschaton that the true

remedy for evil is found.127

The Eucharistic ethos must, argues Zizioulas, be personal, in the sense that it is a mode of being

where the person sees nature and self as enemies of otherness.128 Its ascetic dimension rejects

introspection and individualism, and the other is seen as a revelation of the truth of existence.

Everything around us is a gift, including our identities. Faith is not a cognitive or psychological

endeavour, but the existential realization that everything created is a gift from someone.129 By

rejecting the self, claims Zizioulas, the ecclesial being does not distinguish between persons

according to race, gender or other attributes. A person must be loved without categorization: a

Eucharistic body that discriminates has no Eucharist at all.130 Respect for the person also means

that almsgiving and humanitarian work cannot be institutionalized, but must be based on actual

relationships, since love cannot be impersonal.131 All forms of fragmentation must be avoided,

suggests Zizioulas, including how we relate to the environment, each other, knowledge/education

etc.132 Unity should not be understood in sociological terms: the Eucharist allows the eschaton to

break through history, but it cannot identify with it.133

The episcopacy is, for Zizioulas, the Ministry of unity, and incompatible with democratic

ideologies or tendencies to view the Bishop as an administrator. The Bishop is interconnected

with the doctrinal substance of the Church, and the ecclesial body must organize itself with a clear

understanding of the Bishop as ontologically constitutive for the Eucharist and the Church’s

126 Ibid., p. 305 f. 127 Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p.134 f. 128 Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness., p. 88 f. 129 Ibid., p. 96 ff. 130 Cf. Ibid., p. 301 ff. and Ibid. p. 40 f.; Zizioulas, “Communion and Otherness”; Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p.106/158 ff. 131 Zizioulas and Knight, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics., p.127. 132 See for example John Zizioulas, “The Black Sea in Crisis,” Orthodox Research Institute, 1997,

http://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/misc/john_zizioulas_black_sea.html. 133 Zizioulas, Being as Communion., p. 161.

http://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/misc/john_zizioulas_black_sea.htmlhttp://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/misc/john_zizioulas_black_sea.htmlhttp://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/misc/john_zizioulas_black_sea.html

26

catholicity.134 There can be only one Bishop in a region, conditioned by the people, as well as the

Bishops of other regions, leaving no room for schismatic tendencies.135

According to Zizioulas, the Orthodox ethos sees the world as a gift that is willingly offered back to

God; Christ perfects it and gives it back to creation, in a spirit of unity. Creation is the means for

communion with God and each other, and cannot be treated like a dumpsite.136 Sin, which is

sometimes understood in anthropological or sociological terms, should just as much be

understood as affecting ecology.137 Zizioulas continues that this realization begins from within, as

the “. . . ‘liturgical’ use of nature by human beings leads to forms of culture which are deeply

respectful of the material world while keeping the human person at the centre.”138 Fasting is, for

Zizioulas, a didactic process that fosters appreciation for food as a gift from God.139 The Church

promotes a more moderate way of living: “Love of God’s creation and our fellow human beings

would lead us naturally to restrict the consumption of natural resources and share them more

justly with other people.”140 By respecting the otherness of creation, the world becomes sacrificial

in the sense that we are, to quote Zizioulas “. . . ready — like Christ who died for the whole of

creation — to sacrifice our happiness.”141

Zizioulas also argues that the eucharistic and eschatological ethos rejects moralism, since “. . . the

truth of beings is not in the beginning, but in the end, not in what they were, but in what they will

be.”142 A person is seen in the light of the Cross, where the existential failure of nature is

transformed by the resurrection.143 Persons exist because they are loved, not because of what they

do.144 In the future, everyone is a potential saint, which means, for Zizioulas, that “[w]e cannot

134 Jean Zizioulas, Eucharist, Bishop, Church: The Unity of the Church in the Divine Eucharist and the Bishop during the First Three Centuries (Brookline, Mass: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2001)., p. 6 f./ 30 ff. 135 Ibid., pp. 247-263; Zizioulas, “Communion and Otherness”. 136 John Zizioulas, “Orthodoxy and Ecological Problems: A Theological Approach,” Orthodox Research Institute, accessed March 12, 2019, http://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/. 137 John Zizioulas, “Ecological Asceticism: A Cultural Revolution,” http://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/misc/john_zizoulias_ecological_asceticism.html. 138 Ibid. 139 John Zizioulas, “Orthodoxy and Ecological Problems: A Theological Approach.” 140 Zizioulas, “Ecological Asceticism: a Cultural Revolution”. 141 John Zizioulas, “Ethics versus Ethos: An Orthodox Approach to the Relation between Ecology and Ethics,” http://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/ethics/john_pergamon_ethics_vs_ethos.html. 142 Zizioulas, “Ontology and Ethics.”, p. 5 143 Ibid. p. 10 144 Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness., p. 89.

http://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/http://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/http://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/misc/john_zizoulias_ecological_asceticism.htmlhttp://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/misc/john_zizoulias_ecological_asceticism.htmlhttp://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/misc/john_zizoulias_ecological_asceticism.htmlhttp://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/ethics/john_pergamon_ethics_vs_ethos.htmlhttp://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/ethics/john_pergamon_ethics_vs_ethos.html

27

discriminate between those who are worthy of our acceptance and those who are not.”145 Creation

is to be seen from the perspective that Christ, in an event of communion, will be ‘all in all’, and

the dialectic of the Fall is replaced with that of created-uncreated, which is of “. . . difference and

not of division.”146

2.1.3.3. Criticism

Zizioulas is accused of not taking the limitations of the created condition seriously. Loudovikos

suggests that Zizioulas assumes that the Orthodox ethos occurs automatically, which makes him

ignore the practical troubles of temporal existence.147 Volf likewise argues that Zizioulas’

insistence that the Church organisation must be based on the inner Trinitarian relationships,

neglects the fact that the Trinity is love, whereas the Bishop is not, and may abuse his position. It

also prompts the question of how anything but obedience to the Bishop could be appropriate, if

he is the alter Christus?148

Volf also argues that Zizioulas’ rejection of the cognitive and psychological self risks endangering

the very basis for human communication and the kerygmatic mission of the Church. Dogmas,

scriptures etc. must pass through the consciousness of individual human beings, even if they are

understood liturgically, as a community.149 Loudovikos similarly claims that Zizioulas’ description

of personhood as a complete turn towards the other, presupposes an inherent capacity to escape

passions and unconscious motifs. It also excludes any form of reciprocity; a person dictates and

is dictated to.150 Zizioulas’ notion of Otherness is not, continues Loudovikos “. . . my otherness,

since it is the other who decides about it and then dictates it to me.”151 It means, continues

Loudovikos, that love no longer assists otherness, it becomes totalitarian and determines it.152 You

do not exist because you are loved and love, you exist because you are loved.153

145 Quote from Zizioulas, “Communion and Otherness”, . See also Zizioulas, “Ontology and Ethics”, p. 11

f. 146 Zizioulas, “Human Capacity and Human Incapacity.”, p. 440. 147 Loudovikos, “PERSON INSTEAD OF GRACE AND DICTATED OTHERNESS.”, p. 695 ff. 148 Volf, After Our Likeness., p. 112 ff. 149 Ibid., p. 92 ff. 150 Loudovikos, “PERSON INSTEAD OF GRACE AND DICTATED OTHERNESS.”, p. 694 ff. 151 Ibid., p. 694. Cf. Hjälm, “Liberation of the Ecclesia.”, p. 133 f. 152 Loudovikos, “PERSON INSTEAD OF GRACE AND DICTATED OTHERNESS.”, p. 688 ff. Cf. Nicholas Loudovikos, “Eikon and Mimesis Eucharistic Ecclesiology and the Ecclesial Ontology of Dialogical Reciprocity,” International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 11, no. 2–3 (May 2011): 123–36, https://doi.org/10.1080/1474225X.2011.571411., p. 129 f. 153 Loudovikos, “PERSON INSTEAD OF GRACE AND DICTATED OTHERNESS.”, p. 693. Cf. Zizioulas and McPartlan, Communion and Otherness., p. 89.

https://doi.org/10.1080/1474225X.2011.571411https://doi.org/10.1080/1474225X.2011.571411https://doi.org/10.1080/1474225X.2011.571411

28

Louth and Loudovikos also argue that Zizioulas’ system of thought forces other fields investigating

personhood, such as philosophy and psychology, to outline their theories according to his

theological presuppositions. He imposes on them a system of thought that was mapped out by the

fathers for a different, uncreated reality.154 Without mentioning Zizioulas by name, Louth writes

that:

One sometimes gets the impression that the notion of the person . . . was articulated in its final and complete

form by the Cappadocian Fathers, and that all we Orthodox have to do is administer this treasure to the

benighted Christians of the West (and presumably to their secular successors). But there are problems raised

by the conditions of modern society, and the demands of modern thought, not least psychology, that the

Cappadocian Fathers could not have been aware of.155

What, then, would a more fruitful approach look like? Loudovikos suggests that a recovery of the

notion of a reciprocal otherness would enable a synergistic relatedness to God, by which the

human subject and the community is shaped by the eschatological vision and grace, without the

need to escape temporal reality.156 Hjälm comes to a similar conclusion, which he illustrates using

the following figure:

Figure 2. The Ontological difference Reconstructed157 Source: The Ontological difference Reconstructed, “Liberation of the Ecclesia: The Unfinished Project of

Liturgical Theology.” Anastasis media, 2011., p. 138, figure 5.

154 See for example Louth, St. John Damascene., p. 50 ff./113 ff.; Loudovikos, “PERSON INSTEAD OF GRACE AND DICTATED OTHERNESS.”, p. 688. 155 Louth, “Orthodoxy and the Problem of Identity.”, p. 101. 156 Loudovikos, “Eikon and Mimesis Eucharistic Ecclesiology and the Ecclesial Ontology of Dialogical

Reciprocity.”, p. 125 ff. 157 Figure 2 in this paper. Referred to as “Figure 5” in Hjälm, “Liberation of the Ecclesia.”, p. 138.

29

The figure illustrates Hjälm’s suggestion that by accepting the ontological difference – i.e by

accepting that our understanding of existence in the world begins in the world – ‘authentic

relationality’ would no longer be the foundation for the human/ecclesial existence (Cf. Figure 1,

above). If the ecclesial being exists in the world (top right quadrant) and relates to grace –

understood as the Holy Spirit assisting Man’s escape from the trap of individualism by enabling

us to relate to God – Man’s unfinished growth is no longer a problem, but a revelation that we are

not alone in the world. Our understanding of Grace is based on revelation of the freedom and love

granted whenever we accept God’s invitation to exist in ecstatic relatedness, reaching out beyond

ourselves. The ontological difference means, in other words, that we are able to move beyond First

Philosophy (the two top quadrants), since the revelation of Grace (bottom right quadrant) is the

revelation that we may relate to God in this world, and thus become able to transcend our current

condition.158

2.2. Andrew Louth

According to Louth, most religious and philosophical systems have felt the need to mediate

between the world as we know it, and a more ideal realm. He suggests that the Christian doctrine

of creation ex nihilo complicates this, because it means that created beings are completely

dependent on God, without emanating from Him or by sharing His essence. The created-

uncreated chasm could therefore be interpreted in a way that makes it hard for the two realms to

converge. According to Louth, the problem of mediation between the two realms gave rise to a

diversity of opinions and ideas among the patristic writers; a discussion that still continues among

many, with Zizioulas being one prominent figure.159

Louth does not underestimate the diversity of patristic ideas on the subject; he does not try to

synthesize them into one harmonious system of thought. By allowing the Church fathers to speak

for themselves, he makes the boundaries of tradition more explicit, in order to enable dialogue

about what their ideas could mean today, as we face contemporary problems. I will, however,

highlight three aspects of how the problem of mediating between God and creation has been

approached in Louth’s works, as an alternative to Zizioulas’ system of thought.160 Firstly, how it

gave rise to patristic reflection about Providence, the notion of God’s making Himself known

158 Hjälm, “Liberation of the Ecclesia.”, p. 134 ff. 159 Andrew Louth, “Theology of the ‘in-Between,’” Communio Viatorum 55, no. 3 (2013): 223–36., p. 227

ff. 160 Cf. Louth, Introducing Eastern Orthodox Theology., p. 40 ff.

30

through the wisdom/harmony of creation, as well as the presence of God’s energies in creation.

Secondly, how the patristic tradition of making distinctions between God’s essence-energies and

kataphatic-apophatic theology, implicitly presumes a clear understanding of the ontological

difference between God and creation, meaning that the study of theology begins from the

perspective of Man. Thirdly, how the first two aspects affect Louth’s understanding of the

relationship between theology, ecclesiology and the experience of being in the world.

2.2.1. Patristic reflections on mediation between God and creation

2.2.1.1. Providence and the harmony of creation

According to Louth, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo was used by Nicene Christianity, in

opposition to Gnosticism, to describe how the world was created by God in his providential

goodness.161 Similarly to Platonism and Stoicism, the Christian notion of Providence was,

according to Louth, related to logos, otherworldly wisdom. Stoics thought of Providence as a chain

of events, fate, ordered for the good of Mankind, whereas Platonism described it as the impersonal

logos reproducing truth in the realm of material existence, without controlling the results of

human choices or the shaping of our characters. In Louth’s understanding, the Christian notion

of a personal Logos was thus unique, and allowed for an amalgamation of the Stoic notion of

absolute Providence, and the Platonist distinction between logos and necessity.162 Louth refers to

the 4th century writings of the Syrian bishop Nemesios to illustrate the triadic dialectic that

enabled this. Nemesios rejected the Stoic notion of fate, using the Platonist argument of how it

would undermine the moral foundation for law and justice. It was also incongruent with the

Christian belief in the efficiency of prayer. According to Louth’s understanding of Nemesios, God’s

Providence was still absolute; God was described as working through our choices to design His

Providence to meet our needs, both on a universal and on a particular level.163

According to Louth, St. Maximus later synthesized many of Nemesios’ ideas on Providence, with

the Neoplatonist terminology of logos and logoi. Maximus departed from Neoplatonism,

however, argues Louth, by replacing its notion of rest-procession-return with creation-

161 Louth and Maximus, Maximus the Confessor., p. 65. 162 Andrew Louth et al., “Pagans and Christians on Providence,” in Texts and Culture in Late Antiquity, ed. J. H. D. Scourfield, Inheritance, Authority, and Change (Classical Press of Wales, 2007), 279–98, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvvnb1n.16., pp. 280 ff./293.; Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition., p. 75 ff/95 f./190 ff. 163 Louth et al., “PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS ON PROVIDENCE.”, p. 288 f.

https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvvnb1n.16https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvvnb1n.16https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvvnb1n.16

31

movement-rest.164 Creation ex nihilo meant that the Logos did not reproduce goodness in time

and matter; it was not external to it. In the words of Louth:

For Plato, beings participate in the Forms; for Maximus, created beings participate in God through the logoi, but these logoi must also be seen as expressing God’s will and intention for each created being and for the cosmos as a whole. There is a dynamism about Maximus’s understanding of God’s relationship to the cosmos through the logoi, a dynamism lacking in Plato; the cosmos itself is moving toward fulfillment, and that fulfilment is ultimately found in union with God, by whom it had received being. . . . these logoi are inviolable, they may be obscured by the Fall, but they cannot be distorted. . .165

In Louth’s reading of Maximus, God cooperates with the free will of humans, synergia; the logos

of things are unchangebly good, but not static, as they relate to the logoi of Providence.166 What

Man is, our logos or inner principles, is unchangeable, whereas how we are, our tropos or mode

of being, is unique to each person, and not static.167

According to Louth, St. Maximus also used this same terminology to describe how Man is shaped

in the image and likeness of God. All that exists has its own meaning, logos, participating in the

Logos of God. The presence of the logoi in creation is analogous to the presence of the Logos in

Christ Incarnate. The logos of Man are fashioned after the image of the Logos [the Son], meaning

that all the logoi are summed up in the logos of Man. In Louth’s reading of St. Maximus, human

beings are also described as logikos, the adjective from logos, which implies freedom and capacity

to discern – and perhaps confer – meaning in relation to creation. This is largely accomplished by

Man’s natural desire to unite what is divided. The human person contains all the divisions of

creation, and also, to some extent, the created-uncreated division, as Man participates in the

activities of God. The human person is a ‘microcosm’, the bond of Cosmos, and its Priest.168 Louth

illustrates this reading of Maximus as follows:

164 Louth and Maximus, Maximus the Confessor., p. 67. 165 Andrew Louth, “Man and Cosmos in St. Maximus the Confessor,” in Toward an Ecology of Transfiguration: Orthodox Christian Perspectives on Environment, Nature, and Creation, First edition, Orthodox Christianity and Contemporary Thought (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 59–74., p. 63. 166 Andrew Louth, “Man and Cosmos.”, p. 63 ff. 167 Louth and Maximus, Maximus the Confessor., p. 50 f./57 ff. 168 Ibid, p. 63f/72 f.; Andrew Louth, “Man and Cosmos.”, pp. 61-64.

32

Figure 3. Maximus’ Human Person169 Source: Andrew Louth, “Man and Cosmos in St. Maximus the Confessor,” in Toward an Ecology of Transfiguration:

Orthodox Christian Perspectives on Environment, Nature, and Creation, First edition, Orthodox Christianity and

Contemporary Thought (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 59–74., p. 67.

In Louth’s interpretation of Maximus, the meaning of each nature in creation is bound up with

Man’s priestly vocation to embrace and transcend them to become manifestations of the manifold,

rather than divided, nature of the Cosmos. Louth continues that will, energy, virtue etc. are,

according to Louth’s understanding of Maximus’ Chalcedonian logic, natural properties,

providing Man with desire to overcome division and draw near to God. The four divisions within

creation are healed according to nature, kata physin [κατὰ φύσιν], making the human person an

image of God. The final division, between the uncreated and the created, can however only be

healed by love, which is beyond nature, ypér physin [υπέρ φύσιν]. The capacity to participate in

God’s love and transcend the human condition is, in Louth’s reading of Maximus, what makes

Man created in the likeness of God. This understanding of growth is, continues Louth, due to

Maximus’ emphasis on creation-movement-rest, and the assumption that how natures relate to

each other is determined by their tropos. The fulfilling of Man’s priestly vocation is, as such,

determined by the hypostatic activities, when human and divine energies converge.170 Asceticism

means, as Louth reads Maximus, cooperation with God according to nature, enduring suffering

and tribulations, and it prepares man for the gift of love, as the ascetic separates from earthly

inclination, apatheia [ἀπάθεια