ISLAM AND POLITICS IN KUMASI · islam andpolitics in kumasi ananalysisofdisputes...

ISLAM AND POLITICS IN KUMASI

AN ANALYSIS OF DISPUTESOVER THE KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE

ENID SCHILDKROUT

VOLUME 52: PART 2ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS OF

THE AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORYNEW YORK :1974

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ISLAM AND POLITICS IN KUMASI0

AN ANALYSIS OF DISPUTESOVER THE KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE

ENID SCHILDKROUTAssistant Curator, Department ofAnthropology

The American Museum of Natural History

VOLUME 52: PART 2

ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS OF

THE AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY

NEW YORK: 1974

ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORYVolume 52, part 2, pages 11 1-138, figures 1-3

Issued October 2, 1974Price. $2.00 a copy

ISSN 0065-9452

Copyright © The American Museum of Natural History 1974

ABSTRACT

The analysis of a dispute over leadership of reflects the changing position of northern Muslimthe Central Mosque in Kumasi, Ghana, demon- strangers in a southern Ghanaian city and thestrates how local and national politics are related. changing political significance of ethnicity andThe actual dispute began in the 1 940s, more than nationality. I argue that the position of strangersa decade before Ghanaian independence, and and local political events must be viewed in thecontinued until the early 1 970s. The controversy context of national economic systems.

INTRODUCTIONThe object of the present paper is to show

through a particular case study' how national is-sues are reflected in local events. This wouldhardly seem to require demonstration, were it notthat often national politics are believed to be di-vorced from local, apparently parochial, disputes.The very complexity of many local disputes maybe one reason for this situation: with every majorissue, minor tangential problems arise; the com-plex relationships uniting and dividing the partic-ipants can obscure the issues and their significantlinks with events taking place outside the localcommunity.A purely local interpretation could plausibly

be given to the specific phases of the dispute overthe control of the Central Mosque in the city ofKumasi which is described here. But this wouldobscure why certain issues, such as party affiliationand ethnic identity or citizenship, became impor-tant precisely when they did. To demonstrate thesignificant relationships between local and na-

'The research for the present paper was conducted inGhana between 1965 and 1967 with subsequent visits in1968, 1969, 1970, and 1974. The research on theMosque was supported by the United States NationalInstitute of Mental Health and the Wenner GrenFoundation for Anthropological Research. The 1974visit was supported by the American Museum of NaturalHistory. This paper was originally prepared for aseminar at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies,University of London, in 1969. I have revised andupdated it with details up to June, 1971; in 1974 theMosque was open, and the controversy over theImimate had died down. Muslim affairs in the countryas whole were then supervised by a governmentsponsored council.

I am very grateful to Dr. Barbara Callaway, Dr.Phyllis Ferguson, Dr. Jon Kraus, Dr. Charles Stewart,Ms. Elizabeth Stewart, and Dr. Ivor Wilks for readingearlier drafts and for their numerous and valuablecriticisms and suggestions. Two members of the KumasiZongo community have read this paper, Mr. IbrahimAbu and Mr. Yusuf Ibrahim, and I am most grateful fortheir encouragement and criticism.

tional issues underlying the events in Kumasi, itis necessary to sort out a considerable body ofdetailed and complicated data, and it is impor-tant to bear in mind that this data makes senseonly when the linkages between events on differ-ent political levels are understood.

In ethnically heterogeneous communities,such as the immigrant community in Kumasi, thetraditional capital of the pre-colonial Asantekingdom and the administrative and commercialcenter of the modern Ashanti Region,2 it is com-mon for local politics to involve conflict betweenfactions competing for overall power and for sig-nificant symbols demonstrating the consensus ofthe entire community. Among the Muslim immi-grants in Kumasi, who come from many differentareas of northern Ghana and the surroundingcountries, control over the Central Mosque, likepossession of royal and sacred regalia in sometraditional African kingdoms, has come tosymbolize the attainment of overall politicalpower. From the time construction of theMosque was started in the early 1950s disputeshave been continuous. Yet the Mosque remains asymbol of the integration (in Islamic terms ofthe brotherhood) of the Muslim community.This is one reason why disputes over it have beenso important to the participants. Those who con-trol the Mosque are able to proclaim themselvesrepresentatives of the will of the whole commu-nity, symbols of communal and religious har-mony. Opponents are chastised for bringingdisintegration, "politics," and "tribalism" uponthe polity.

The complicated historical background ofthese disputes could easily bury from analysis the

21 have used the spelling Asante to refer to both theAsante people and the area of the country knowntraditionally as Asante. The administrative area knownas the Ashanti Region is referred to as it appears onGhanaian maps and documents.

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ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY

important links between the local and nationalpolitical levels. Yet through all the phases of theMosque dispute the issues that arose at particulartimes (for example political parties, ethnic loyal-ties, changing economic opportunities, citizen-ship) were important in a larger context thanthat of Kumasi alone. Alliances and factions haveshifted in a kaleidoscopic fashion but there hasalways been a pattern, sometimes reflectingmainly local arguments, and at other times, oreven simultaneously, reflecting the participants'involvement in movements extending far beyondactivities in Kumasi. Personalities as well as issueslink the two political levels in such a way thatthe distinction between local and national levelsis hard to maintain, except in an analytic sense.Factions in this dispute have always attempted tolegitimize their claims to power by gaining sup-port from authorities outside the local communi-ty. These authorities, including govemment offi-cials, regard such disputes as purely local issues,yet the factions continually accuse each other,not without reason, of more or less successfullyobtaining external aid. To the extent that theseaccusations are justified they reflect the partici-pation, often covert, of nationally oriented poli-ticians in local events.

Although this paper focuses on a limited seriesof disputes beginning in 1952, it is necessary to

GROWTH OF KUMASI MUSLIM COMMUNITY

Today the Muslim community in Kumasi isdivided into two main sections, reflecting the his-torical pattern of the settlement in Asante ofimmigrants from northern Ghana and the sur-rounding countries. The oldest section of thecommunity, known as the Asante Nkramo (liter-ally, Asante Muslim), consists mainly of descen-dants of Muslims from north of Kumasi who set-tled in the town from the mid-eighteenth cen-tury, after the beginning of Asante expansioninto the north, until the British conquest in1896. The origins of the second section, knownby the Hausa term Zongo (literally, stranger'squarter), can be traced to the beginning of thecolonial period. The northerners in the earliestMuslim settlement came from the area that is

set this material in the historical context of thegrowth of the immigrant community in Kumasi.The first section describes this growth and at-tempts to set out the main actors and factions inthe various phases of the dispute. It also attemptsto explain the historical background behind ma-jor cleavages in Kumasi between different immi-grant groups, between factions within the localAsante population (a branch of the Akan lin-guistic group, the largest group in southernGhana), between members of different politicalparties, and between Ghanaians and aliens. Thesealliances and divisions change and cut across oneanother, but are related to developments in theGhanaian political scene as a whole.

The next section of this study deals brieflywith Islam and culture in the immigrant commu-nity and is meant to give some of the ethno-graphic background to the disputes. It showswhy the Muslims regard unity over the Mosque asso important, yet why disputes can still occur.This section also describes the cultural and ideo-logical orientation of the Muslim associations,which were the main protagonists in the laterphases of the dispute. A chronological account ofthe dispute follows and leads to a conclusion thatdeals with the links between the local disputesand major themes in contemporary and pastGhanaian politics.

now northern Ghana, from the northwestern areaof Bandal and from the kingdoms of Gonja,Dagomba, and Mamprusi, with a scattering of im-migrants from what is now Nigeria (mainlyHausas) and Upper Volta (mainly Mossis). Mostof the Asante Muslims trace their origins toMande (now commonly called by the Hausaterm, Wangara) Muslims and today occasionallyrefer to their northern origins. But the group as awhole has been socially and politically incorpo-rated into Asante society. Within the context ofAsante society, however, they form a distinctgrouping on the basis of their religion, along withmany Asante converts to Islam who do not claimnorthern, origin (see Wilks, 1966).

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenthcenturies the Asante Nkramo were an ethnicallydistinct "stranger" group in Kumasi (Asante)

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SCHILDKROUT: KUMASI CENTRAL MOSQUE

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society. During this period the Muslim commu-nity consisted of an undifferentiated group ofstrangers, that is, people from territories beyondthe limits of Asante authority, and provincials,people from Asante's northern hinterland. Theycame to Kumasi as traders, religious men, andfarmers (there was a community of yam growersoutside Kumasi) and remained in the area underthe patronage of the king, the Asantehene, forwhom they performed religious, economic, andpolitical services. By the early nineteenth centurysome of the original group of northern provin-cials had been incorporated to the extent thatthey identified themselves as Asantes, not as

strangers. Once this happened conflict developedbetween these Asante Muslims and the strangerMuslims (mainly Hausas) from outlying areas,some of whom experienced conflicts of loyaltyas Muslims and as clients of the Asante rulers.'As a result, in or about 1844, limitations were

'For example, when asked to give military service tothe king to fight against Muslims in the Northwest

placed on the movements of strangers, in metro-politan Asante coastal traders were expelled, andnorthern traders were forbidden to come farthersouth than Salaga, Asante's important northerntrading town.2 In the aftermath of these prob-lems an institutional answer to the "strangerproblem" was sought. The Muslims were placedunder the authority of the Nsumankwahene, theAsantehene's medical advisor (for want of abetter translation: his responsibilities includedboth the physical and spiritual health of theking), and the Imamate was set up, giving theAsante Muslims their own religious leader, theAsante Nkramo Imam, who was also an advisorto the king.

The next influx of northern Muslims into Ku-masi occurred from the late 1870s to the early

hinterland (for description see Dupuis, 1824, p. 98 andWilks, 1966, p. 335f; 1971, p. 391).

21 am indebted to Dr. Ivor Wilks for much of thisinformation, most of which has been published in Wilks,1971.

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1880s when Asante sought recruits to her army.These recruits were of varied ethnic origin, butHausa was the lingua franca and most wereidentified as Hausas even though they were infact Mossi, Yoruba, and members of other north-ern groups. Like the northern traders in Kumasiin the early nineteenth century, these northern-ers lived in Asante under the control and pa-tronage of the Asante government. Throughoutthe nineteenth century, but particularly after1844, control of trade, together with control ofimmigration, was largely in the hands of Asanteauthorities. The rise of an indigenous Asantemerchant class was discouraged but a controlledstranger group was allowed limited privileges intrade and religious, political, and even militaryaffairs (see Wilks, 1966). Consequently, duringthe latter part of the nineteenth century north-ern strangers continued to be incorporated intoAsante society, so that during the British-Asantewars at the end of the last century some of themallied with the Asantes and later identified withthe Asante Nkramo community.

Despite their assimilation into Asante societyfor some purposes, for example in situations inwhich religious identification is of primaryimportance, the Asante Nkramo identify them-selves with the second, more recently establishedMuslim community described below. And, asGhanaian citizens, some of the Asante Nkramofeel an identification with the northern Ghanaianimmigrants who form one part of this morerecent community. On Fridays and during specialMuslim festivals both the Asante Nkramo and theZongo residents worship together, after theAsante Nkramo Im-am performs religious servicesfor the king. The Asante Nkramo Imam alsoplays an important part in some Muslim associa-tions that include both northern Ghanaians andnon-Ghanaian immigrants who are part of themore recent Muslim community (the Zongo).Since 1935, when the Asantehene was restoredto office after nearly 40 years of exile, theAsante Nkramo Imam has resumed his pre-colo-nial role as intermediary between the king andthe stranger Zongo Muslims.

The origins of the second section of the Ku-masi Muslim community (the Zongo) coincidewith the next significant influx of northernersinto Asante, at the turn of the century when

Asante-British conflict reached its peak. At thistime northerners came to Asante under the aegisof the British as soldiers recruited to fight againstthe Asante, as camp followers, and later, afterthe British conquest, as traders and laborers. Thiscommunity, although internally complex in itsethnic composition, has remained distinct fromthe local Asante population in terms of thepersistence of "stranger" status in Kumasi, theuse of Hausa as a lingua franca, and thepreservation of customs associated with northerncultures. Politically these strangers, those fromnorthern Ghana and those from more distantterritories, were under the patronage of theBritish who tended to encourage the growth ofthe Zongo community for several reasons. First,the strangers, having no traditional rulers inKumasi, were directly under the authority of thegovernment; while the British were intent uponsubduing the powers of traditional Asante chiefs,they had little hesitation in supporting strongleaders in the Zongo. Second, the rapid growthof the Zongo was a sign that trade was prosper-ing; while these immigrants in Asante regniiiedand expanded their control over almost all itemsof long-distance trade, including cattle, kola nuts,manufactured goods, and other items, the Britishderived substantial revenue in the form of taxesand tolls. Third, the strangers performed usefulservices for the colonial authorities; the immi-grant leaders, in return for political recognition,promised to find jobs for new migrants whilethey offered their services to the government."Voluntary" labor of this type was largelyresponsible for sanitation, road building, andmuch construction in Kumasi (see Schildkrout,MS, 1970b). With the development of industryand commercial cocoa farming in Asante (afterthe introduction of cocoa in 1907), northernersmigrated south in large numbers. Many came asseasonal farm workers to rural areas, but otherssettled in towns such as Kumasi, provided laborand in some cases eventually became brokers forAsante and government employers seeking labor.

According to the 1960 Ghana census, lessthan half (42%) of the population in Kumasi atthe time were Asante, and no more than 26 per-cent were "strangers," that is, non-Asantes, fromsouthern Ghana. At least one-third of the popula-tion of Kumasi consisted of northerners, this

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being a composite category used to describe bothpeople from northern Ghana including the Da-gomba, Mamprusi, Frafra (Tallensi), Dagati, Ku-sasi and others, and those from the northern sa-

vanna areas of the surrounding countries, includ-ing the Mossi, Hausa, Yoruba, Zabarama, andothers. According to the census classification, 20percent of the Kumasi population in 1960 were

of "foreign origin." This included people definedlegally as aliens because they or one or both oftheir parents were born outside of Ghana.'

Although the citizenship laws have changedseveral times during the greatest part of the post-independence period, Ghanaian citizenship couldonly be conferred on people with Ghanaian par-ents. This meant that many second and thirdgeneration immigrants were ineligible for citizen-ship, were controlled by laws governing aliens,and were subject to all the pressures affectingaliens during the rise of nationalism.

Within the immigrant Zongo communitynorthern Ghanaians and aliens are united by Is-lam and by their common status as strangers vis-a-vis the Asante; but recently, with the growingimportance of national identity, a cleavage hasemerged between these two sections. This hasbeen important on a number of occasions sinceindependence, but it was particularly accentu-ated in 1969 when the Busia government, in an

attempt to "Ghanaianize" small capital enter-prises, enforced measures designed to rid thecountry of alien competitors. Aliens were

required to register and to obtain temporary resi-dence and work permits. With these regulationsthe government intended to selectively issue per-

mits only to immigrants in "useful" occupations;alien traders, of whom there were tens of thou-sands, were not generally issued permits.2 These

'That is, if the parent born outside was the one

through whom a person traces ethnic affiliation.According to the 1960 Ghana census persons of"foreign origin" were not necessarily aliens, butaccording to the law of 1957 and the law written intothe 1969 Ghana constitution the two categories are inmost cases identical. Although there is a later (1970)Ghana census, it is unreliable with respect to aliens, asenumeration was undertaken very soon after the 1969decree requiring aliens to either register or leave thecountry.

2According to the 1960 census 12.3 percent of thetotal population were of foreign origin. More than

measures drastically affected the demographicdistribution of alien groups in Kumasi, becausemany immigrants, particularly the Gao and Zaba-rama (from Mali and Niger mainly) and the Yoru-ba (from Nigeria) fled the country in large num-bers. Citizenship and the official policy towardaliens have direct relevance to local politics inareas like Kumasi having large immigrant popula-tions. These issues are discussed below in refer-ence to the Mosque dispute.

Brief Political History of the Zongo

Throughout the history of the Zongo commu-

nity, internal political life has been characterizedby tensions created by opposing pulls of centrali-zation and decentralization. This has involvedcontinuous debate between the different ethniccommunities over the question of Hausa politicalhegemony. Hausa dominance became an issuevery soon after the Zongo was founded, that is,after the British in 1902 made special provisionsfor the immigrants by allotting them a section ofthe town (which they have long since outgrown)known today as the "Old Zongo." Hausa hege-mony, established in this early period, remains a

source of periodic conflict, even today. As I havealready described this (Schildkrout, 1970b) I willsimply recapitulate the major issues here.

The basis of Hausa dominance in the Zongo inthe early part of the century was largely econom-ic. Hausas controlled much of the long-distancetrade in kola and cattle, and the first importantleaders in the Hausa community were successfultraders and landlords (maigida; pl. masugida).This led to their political recognition by the colo-nial authorities, and between 1896 and 1919 theBritish informally recognized a succession ofHausa businessmen and religious leaders as headsof the heterogeneous Zongo community.Although the Hausas have high prestige in theZongo, as so many are successful in business andrelatively well educated in Arabic and Islamiclaw, this has not prevented resentment fromdeveloping over Hausa political authority. Asearly as 1910 members of other ethnic groups,

which were also expanding numerically and eco-

one-third (35.2%) of these were born in Ghana. SeeGhana, 1964, volume III; and Addo, 1968.

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nomically, protested against the government's in-stitutionalization of Hausa dominance. Conse-quently, after this date the leaders of other eth-nic groups were informally recognized as head-men with jurisdiction to solve disputes and helpmigrants within their own communities. Theirauthority derived directly from the British andwas theoretically equal to that of the Hausaheadman.

In the 1920s the British became interested inapplying the principles of Indirect Rule, as de-fined by Lord Lugard in northern Nigeria, to theadministration of local government in Ghana. In-direct Rule meant, in theory, that the Britishwould rule through "natural" leaders. In KumasiZongo, with its Islamic, Hausaized culture, thismeant to the British that the principles devel-oped by Lugard could be applied as if the Zongowere a miniature emirate and could be adminis-tered through a hierarchy of rulers, in this casethe tribal headmen. The Hausa headman knownas the Sarkin Zongo, or Chief of Zongo, was thenrecognized as the apex of the "traditional"Zongo system and was given authority over allnon-Hausa immigrants. In 1927 an amendmentto the 1924 Ashanti Administrative Ordinanceformally defined the Sarkin Zongo's powers andgranted him a tribunal with jurisdiction overMuslims in the Zongo. The other headmen wereordered to disband their own unofficial courtsand to serve as a jury on the Sarkin Zongo's tri-bunal.

This policy failed in the Zongo for the follow-ing reasons: many of the headmen resented thediminution of their authority and the loss of rev-enue from court fees and fines; non-Hausa head-men resented being relegated to the lower ranksof a formalized hierarchy; and opportunities foradvancement in prestige and power for non-Hausa headmen were blocked by the govern-ment's attempts at applying Indirect Rule. In1932 a series of riots marked the culmination ofprotests against the government's policy. Theoffice of Sarkin Zongo was formally abolishedand each headman was again allowed to hold hisown unofficial court.

These developments reflected changes in theadministration of Kumasi as a whole (see Schild-krout 1970a). Until the 1920s the British hadattempted to break the power of traditional

Asante leaders. To this end the Asantehene hadbeen exiled in 1896 and leaders without tradi-tional claims to office, including leaders in theimmigrant community, were given greater au-thority. But with the acceptance of the idea ofIndirect Rule, the British began to heed Asantedemands for the restoration of the power of theAsantehene. Prempeh I returned from exile in1924 and was made Kumasihene in 1926. Hissuccessor, Prempeh II, was recognized asAsantehene in 1935, when the British version ofthe precolonial "confederacy" was set up.

By this time it was apparent that in theZongo, centralization of political authority in thehands of the Hausa headman could not work,and the British were relieved to transfer some ofthe burden for Zongo affairs back to theAsantehene, who then became an intermediarybetween the various headmen and the govern-ment. While the Asantehene maintained a strictpolicy of noninterference in Zongo affairs, heconsistently opposed re-centralizing power in theoffice of any one headman. The Asantehene wasthus able to keep peace for many years-untilparty politics began in the late 1940s.

Immediately prior to independence in 1957,while the Convention People's Party (CPP) wasconsolidating its rise to power, the relationshipbetween the central government and the Zongoseemed to repeat the pattern of the 1920s and1930s. The Asantehene found himself in opposi-tion to a strong national political force, this timenot the British but rather Nkrumah and the CPP.After independence, as after the British take-overof Asante, the national government attempted todiminish the Asantehene's authority while pro-moting the rise of a strong leader in the Zongo.

This strategy coincided with an importantsplit within the Zongo between two rising Hausaleaders: Ahmadu Baba and Mutawakilu. TheHausa headman Ahmadu Baba, supported bymost of the other headmen in the Zongo,strongly supported the Asantehene in oppositionto the CPP. The Asantehene in 1954 had becomea leader in a predominantly Asante party, theNational Liberation Movement (NLM), whichopposed Nkrumah's party. Ahmadu Baba andmany of the other Zongo headmen had alsobecome involved with a party that opposed theCPP, the Muslim Association Party (MAP),

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formed in 1953, and closely aligned with theNLM. In 1958 after regional, tribal, and religiousparties were banned by the CPP government,these two parties joined with others to form theUnited Party (UP).'

Mutawakilu, after unsuccessfully contestingAhmadu Baba for the office of headman, joinedforces with the CPP. Therefore, while the Nkru-mah government was determined to oppose theAsantehene, the NLM, and its support in theZongo, that is, the MAP, it supported the ambi-tions of Mutawakilu, recognized him as joint con-stituency chairman of the Kumasi CPP, and sup-ported his attempts to obtain Ahmadu Baba'soffice in the Hausa community.

By independence in 1957 Mutawakilu's powerin the CPP was strong enough to enable him torun local affairs in Kumasi Zongo with the back-ing of important leaders in the national partyorganization. His power was directly rooted inAccra, and therefore he was able to remove fromoffice, or recommend for deportation or deten-tion, many Zongo leaders who still had supportbut who refused to support the CPp.2 The mostimportant case of this kind was the deportationof the Hausa headman, Ahmadu Baba, and a Yo-ruba leader, Alfa Lardan. Both were prominentreligious and political leaders in the Zongo andboth were powerful organizers of the MAP.

After these deportations early in 1958, Muta-wakilu was proclaimed Sarkin Zongo of Kumasiby a Cabinet ruling from Accra. With such a di-rect line to the highest echelons of the CPP,Mutawakilu's powers were almost unlimited for ashort time. In his capacity as a CPP official andas Sarkin Zongo, he placed CPP supporters in allZongo headmanships and suppressed the activi-ties of all anti-CPP associations.

Mutawakilu's rise to power and his intenseeffort to combine party office and chieftainshipdid not last long. In little more than two years hehad provoked so much opposition in the Zongo,even among Hausa CPP supporters, that the

'The regional, tribal, and religious parties wereformally banned with the passage of the Avoidance ofDiscrimination Act of December, 1957. See Austin,1964, p. 377. The rise of the MAP is described in Austin,1964, passim; Jon Kraus, MS; and Price, 1956.

2He was in close contact with the Minister of Interiorwho issued these orders.

government intervened. Other Muslim leaders inKumasi, members of the Muslim Council, a na-tionally organized CPP association, began to pushfor Mutawakilu's removal as Sarkin Zongo on thespecific grounds that he was governing the Ku-masi Muslims autocratically. Many were alsoangered at Mutawakilu's self-protective denial ofNigerian identity, demonstrated by his refusal toparticipate in celebrations of Nigeria's indepen-dence, and his refusal to cooperate with the newlyformed Nigerian Community, an organizationwhich many Muslim Council leaders joined.Under pressure from this powerful faction, Nkru-mah and his cabinet agreed to abolish the officeof Sarkin Zongo once again. Mutawakilu was stillrecognized as the Hausa headman (after muchopposition from a powerful faction within theMuslim Council) and as joint constituency chair-man of the CPP, but once his powers as SarkinZongo were removed his blank check to rule theZongo disappeared.

The abolition in the 1930s of the office ofSarkin Zongo had given greater autonomy andpower to each headman, whereas in 1961 whenthe office was abolished for the second time avery powerful Muslim association, the MuslimCouncil, controlled mainly but not entirely byHausas rose to prominence. This group, likeother Muslim associations which preceded andfollowed it, was composed largely of second andthird generation immigrants who had consider-able wealth, Islamic education, and influence inthe Zongo. The rise of the Muslim Council inKumasi Zongo marked a shift in the locus ofpolitical authority from individual headmen, whowere mainly first generation immigrants repre-senting ethnic groups, to Kumasi-born immi-grants whose status and prestige were based moreon wealth and Islamic education than on ethnicidentity. From 1961 until the coup that over-threw Nkrumah in 1966, the Muslim Council,under the aegis of the CPP, was in control ofpolitics in Kumasi Zongo, and consistentlyattempted to diminish the political influence ofthe headmen whom Mutawakilu until 1961 hadused for support.

It is important to note that in the years pre-ceding and immediately after independence theCPP/MAP and later the CPP/UP factions in theZongo did not form primarily on the basis of

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ethnic cleavages. Ethnic categories were oftenused to describe the factions,' but these were notdescriptively accurate stereotypes. All ethnicgroups were in actuality split along party lines.2In the late 1950s it was common for dis-appointed contestants for Zongo offices, includ-ing the headmanships, to join the CPP withhopes, usually justified, of ousting their earlieropponents through party support.

There was also a tendency in the Zongo, as

elsewhere in Ghana, for people to stereotype theMAP/CPP struggle as "generational" associating"youth" with the CPP. In the ideology of theCPP this appeal to youth went along with a

strong anti-chief orientation. In the Zongo, thisdid not accurately reflect the reality of politicalcleavages. Mutawakilu did attempt to mobilizeyoung men and the urban unemployed3 into a

pro-CPP organization called the Muslim YouthCongress,4 but the MAP also had a section of

'For example, some Mossi MAP supporters claimedin the late 1960s that the only Mossi to support the CPPwere those who had been "influenced" by Hausas.These individuars were well aware that major MAPleaders were Hausa, but they were able to ignore this forthe sake of argument.

2One may, nevertheless, note two "ethnic"tendencies, although to these generalizations veryimportant exceptions must be cited. The first is thatstrongly Islamized, centralized groups tended to supportthe MAP in the early 19 50s. Groups that were lesscentralized, less Islamized, tended to be moreenthusiastic about the CPP. This split reflected, perhaps,prior economic and political competition within theimmigrant community between these two sectors. It isworth noting that Mutawakilu, a key exception to thisgeneralization, drew much of his support fromnon-Hausas, including Frafras, Grusis, Kusasis, andothers who were often not Muslims and who had notbeen successfully integrated into Zongo political andreligious organizations.

The second generalization is that the CPP drewsupport from itinerant migrants who tended to belongto certain ethnic categories (Gao, for example). Shortterm migrants were also less well integrated into Zongopolitical and religious organizations, including the MAP.But here too there are exceptions: in all these groupsthere were some long settled immigrants who took a

prominent role in the MAP. The Gao headman, forexample, was deported by the CPP government in 1958,and settled Gaos tended to support the MAP. Thusmigration patterns were really more significant variablesthan ethnicity.

3School leavers were less of an issue in Zongo wherefew immigrants had attended any but Arabic schools.

4The CPP first created an organization called the

''young men," or "action troopers," as theyouths on both sides were called. Both partieshad significant support from young men, many

of whom were willing to take to the streets tofight party battles with intense religious fervor.Although the MAP did ideologically stand for"chiefs" and traditional authorities in general,Mutawakilu was unable to link his appeal toyouth to an anti-chief stance, as was done byCPP leaders in other areas of the country. Hedrew heavily on aspirant Zongo headmen for sup-

port and he was deeply committed to becomingSarkin Zongo.

In the Zongo, then, generation, age, ethnicidentity, and even party ideology were not soimportant in drawing lines of cleavage as were

struggles for power based on contests betweenopposed personalities within ethnic communitiesand within the Zongo community as a whole.Most of these conflicts began earlier but con-

tinued into the CPP period (1952-1966), becom-ing elaborated and intensified with the additionof party organization and resources.

Despite all the moves toward centralizationthat took place under the CPP, first in the officeof Sarkin Zongo under Mutawakilu and later inthe Muslim Council, the overthrow of Nkrumahin 1966 by the military and police marked thereturn to a period of decentralization that resem-

bled the situation in the years after Prempeh II

resumed the office of Asantehene in 1935. In1966 the Asantehene again began to act as an

intermediary between the Zongo leaders and offi-cials of the military/police government, the Na-tional Liberation Council (NLC). Each ethniccommunity appointed its own headman and as-serted its autonomy and its intention to governits own internal affairs. Ahmadu Baba and manyother deported and detained MAP leadersreturned to Kumasi and resumed their traditionaloffices as headmen and elders. Although theMAP no longer existed and no organization for-mally incorporated all these Muslim leaders, a

strong anti-CPP sentiment united the Zongoleaders and their supporters for several monthsafter the 1966 coup.

Muslim Youth Association in 1949 (Kraus, MS, p. 759).This seems to have been absorbed into the MAP, and thelater youth organization, led by Mutawakilu, was calledthe Muslim Youth Congress.

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The ethnic communities, which emerged afterthe coup, based both on traditional polities (suchas the Mossi, Hausa, and Yoruba groups, for ex-ample) or on nationality (such as the UpperVolta Union, or the Nigerian Community) pro-claimed themselves to be a-political, complyingwith the NCLs ban on political activities and thegeneral disgust with "politics"-an activity identi-fied with disunity and factionalism. These com-munities performed two main functions. First, inmany of them as soon as the most unpopularleaders were ousted, numerous "civil" disputessuch as marriage and divorce cases, inheritancedisputes and so forth, were brought to the rein-stated headman for settlement. Second, ethnicassociations became forums where the needs ofthe membership were expressed. A-political asthese ethnic communities were, it was not longbefore politicians outside the Zongo, anticipatingthe return to civilan rule, began to seek supportfrom various groups in the Zongo.

The ethnic communities which became activeafter the 1966 coup also had economic aspira-tions. Because these issues enter into the Mosquedispute it is necessary to mention them here. Theeconomic and political goals of the various asso-ciations involved in general terms "making thegroup strong." This meant securing jobs, marketstalls, and sectors of trade for their members.Soon after the coup a government official sug-gested to some of the headmen of northernGhanaian groups that they form a cooperativetrade association on the basis of their Ghanaianidentity. It was suggested that such an associ-ation would consolidate the transport, kola, cat-tle, and livestock trade in northern Ghanaianhands, to the disadvantage of the Hausa, Mossi,and other groups composed mainly of aliens.Although this trade association never material-ized, the show of interest in northern Ghanaiandemands, or the stimulus to these demands, frompoliticians outside the Zongo encouraged theGhanaians to see their own interests as opposedto those of the aliens in the Zongo, with whomthey had previously cooperated. This division be-came increasingly important in the years afterthe coup and was clearly expressed in the 1969phase of the Mosque dispute.

The reassertion of ethnic identity after thecoup, and the formation of groupings on an eth-nic basis, did not stop many of the same individ-

uals in the Zongo from uniting into larger, multi-ethnic associations for other purposes. A numberof important, formally constituted, national asso-ciations organized local branches after the coup,although all of them had originated in an earlierperiod. These associations were seen as religiousgroups by their members, yet all were in factactively engaged in secular politics, on the localand national levels. The profusion of thesegroups both expressed underlying conflicts anddivisions in the Zongo and contributed to theseconflicts.

The first important Muslim association, whichwas active in the period relevant to a discussionof the Mosque (1952 onward), was the MAP.Later, when the CPP was firmly in power, theMAP was officially disbanded (in 1958),1although for some time it was merged with otherminority parties in the UP. The CPP also hadsupport from a nationally organized Muslim asso-ciation, the Muslim Council, which, with CPPbacking, controlled local Muslim affairs during theearly 1 960s. The leadership of the Muslim Coun-cil, like that of the MAP, was predominantly ofnon-Ghanaian origin, and the Council's primaryrole, as far as the government was concerned,seemed to be to keep political control in Muslimareas. This association was disbanded by the mili-tary government in 1966, as it was affiliated withthe CPP. Its prominent position was then con-tested by two other groups, the Muslim Com-munity and the Muslim Mission, both of whichtraced their history back to the years before thecoup but which had remained inactive while theMAP and the council were in control.

The Muslim Community, like the council, waslargely composed of non-Ghanaians of "foreignorigin,"2 including second, third, and fourthgeneration Hausa, Yoruba, Mossi, and other im-migrants but also included some important indis-putably Ghanaian citizens, in particular theAsante Nkramo Im-am. It claimed to have beenformed in the early 1930s,3 and after 1966 was

'With the passage of the Avoidance ofDiscrimination Act. Also, by this time the MAP'svote-getting ability had suffered nationally, due to thefact that other parties were putting up Muslim candi-dates and getting Muslim votes (see Price, 1956).

2This is the Ghana census categorization and doesnot always coincide with citizenship.

3Price (1954, p. 108), mentioned an organization

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reconstituted as a national organization with itsmain office in Accra. It included former mem-bers of both the MAP and the Muslim Council.

The Muslim Mission was formed after inde-pendence (in 1958) specifically as an organiza-tion of Ghanaian Muslims. It opposed first theMuslim Council and later the Muslim Communityon a number of grounds, among them citizenshipand education. The Mission claimed that boththe Council and the Community were organiza-tions of aliens, and that they permitted and evenencouraged superstition and ignorance as well asilliteracy (in English) among their followers. TheCommunity in turn claimed that the morewesternized Mission leaders were simply politicalopportunists who represented a very smallpower-hungry clique in Kumasi and perhaps inthe national arena as well. Although this studydeals mainly with events up to early spring of1970, it is necessary to add that in an effort toreconcile these factions, the Busia governmentproposed, in May, 1970, to form a national coun-cil of Islamic affairs which was to take over theassets of the disbanded Muslim Council' andwhich, it was hoped, would reconcile the Missionand the Community. After the overthrow of theBusia government, the National RedemptionCouncil set up another Muslim advisory councilwhich was still functioning in 1974. It includedmembers of both communities: Glhanaian Mus-lims and those of non-Ghanaian origin.

I believe it useful at this time to review someof the points that I have made in this summarythat are relevant to the Mosque controversy.

(1) There is a division between the AsanteNkramo community and the Zongo community,and the Asante Nkramo Imam plays an impor-tant role as intermediary between the strangersand the traditional Asante authorities.

(2) The Zongo community consists of north-ern Ghanaians and aliens, and many of the aliens

called the Gold Coast Muslim Association which wasformed in 1932 and became active in politics in 1939when it allied itself with the Mambii party in the AccraTown Council elections. Price stated that this organiza-tion later became the MAP. In the late 1960s, whenMuslim Community members traced the origin of theirassociation, some mentioned 1938 as the date of itsinception. It is likely they were referring either to thesame Muslim Association or to a Kumasi branch.'Ghanaian Times, May 29, 1970, p. 5.

were actually born in Kumasi, although this doesnot necessarily confer citizenship upon them.

(3) There has been a progression of nationallyorganized Muslim associations which played ma-jor roles in Kumasi politics in different periods.The MAP was most important in the 1950s whenfactions, formed in Kumasi around two Hausaleaders-Ahmadu Baba and Mutawakilu, asso-ciated with the MAP and CPP, respectively-fought for local power and national influence.The MAP was superseded by the Muslim Councilas the dominant organization in the Zongo, whenthe CPP's position was secure nationally; butMutawakilu, in emphasizing his role as "chief"and in failing to support the Nigerian Communi-ty, had failed to secure his position in the localbranch of the Muslim Council, and played only aminor role in CPP affairs once the Council hadtaken control. When the Council was disbandedby the NLC in 1966, two other national associ-ations with Kumasi branches became active-theMission and the Community.2 While the Missionhad tried to supersede the Council during theCPP period on the plea of nationalism, the Nkru-mah government had been tolerant of Ghanaiansof "foreign origin" as long as they served the CPPand controlled the dissident Muslims. After the1966 coup the government's policy toward thesepeople became more consistently xenophobicand the Mission was given a chance to assert it-self. Finally, it is useful to remember that thefactions which formed in the Zongo in the periodof party conflict in the 1950s cut across ethniccleavages; after the coup, when formal politicalparties were banned, ethnic and national identitybecame more significant as bases for associationand political action.

Cultural Background:The Importance of Islam in Kumasi

The importance of Islam in the Zongo isrelated to a pattern of Islamization that predatesthe colonial period in West Africa (see Wilks,1968). Some of the early migrants in Kumasiwere Muslims before they left their homelands.These include the Hausa, Zabarama, and Fulani,

2Another group of Muslims in Kumasi were the Ah-madiyya, but they never took an active role in politicsand are therefore not relevant to this discussion.

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and others from Muslim groups of Dioula originwhich had been incorporated into the Voltaicstates of Mossi, Mamprusi, and Dagomba severalcenturies earlier. Many other migrants convertedto Islam when they settled in Kumasi. Amongother things conversion facilitated the establish-ment of business relationships among traders inthe Zongo; it made it easier for migrants to findspouses and accommodation; and, when one wasable to acquire sufficient Islamic education toprove one's orthodoxy, it conferred considerableprestige.

Kumasi today is one of the most importantcenters of Islamic education in Ghana. Manyorthodox Muslims run Arabic schools and untilrecently very few immigrants were willing tosend their children to government or missionschools. Many immigrants regard English school-ing as a first step toward conversion to Christian-ity and, as many Asante have become Christians,the immigrants fear that education in suchschools will lead to assimilation into Asante soci-ety and to a relative weakness in the Zongo com-munity. In contrast, conversion to Islam isregarded as a positive, even an upward, move bymany migrants who abandon their traditionalcultural patterns as they become incorporatedinto the ethnically heterogeneous Zongo. Inadopting Islam, migrants facilitate theirassimilation into this community, for Islamicvalues, albeit a Hausa version, provide a highlyvalued cultural model for Muslim immigrantsfrom many ethnic groups.

Islam has been so important as an integratingforce in Kumasi Zongo that may of the immi-grants feel that they are united by a commonbody of law and custom that is distinctive to thiscommunity. The immigrants claim that KumasiZongo has its own "constitution," referring to abody of laws and norms that govern the behaviorof the immigrants. For some years a group ofMuslim leaders in the Zongo formed a committeewhich specifically publicized and determinedthose rules of Maliki Muslim law which theyagreed should be regarded as "Kumasi custom."

In many respects the version of Islam that isfound in the Zongo is a Hausa one; traditionalHausa customs are often described as Muslim cus-toms by the immigrants. This is due to the earlynumerical, economic, political, and religious

dominance of the Hausa as indicated above. Mostsecond generation immigrants speak only Hausa,and many immigrants of non-Hausa origin havebeen assimilated into the Hausa group. It is diffi-cult to say whether the Hausa have retained theirprestige and pre-eminence in some fields, Islamiceducation for example, by admitting into theirgroup non-Hausas who gradually assume Hausaidentity, or by excluding outsiders. In any case,second and third generation immigrants of differ-ent ethnic groups are culturally indistinguishable;their customs and values are no longer associatedwith particular ethnic categories, they know littleabout their parents' traditional culture, and eth-nic differences do not often affect daily socialinteraction. Although their way of life is similarin many respects to that associated with Hausaculture, it is preferable to speak of Zongo cultureto indicate that the emerging way of life in Ku-masi Zongo is the result of the social and culturalintegration of immigrants from many groups andnot simply the persistence of any one culturaltradition (see Schildkrout, 1974).

Despite extensive social and cultural inte-gration, an ideology of patrilineal descent contin-ues to segment the Zongo population into dis-tinct ethnic communities based not upon persist-ing cultural differences, but upon the differentplaces of origin of tribal and national groups.These differences are transmitted over genera-tions through patrifiliation.1 They are only rele-vant in certain situations, but they are poten-tially of great political importance because theycan provide the basis for the formation of politi-cal factions or economic interest groups, andbecause they are regarded as status categories bymost of the Muslims.

There is some economic specialization in theZongo, but no single group has been able tomonopolize any one sector of the economy. TheYoruba provided most of the traders in manufac-tured goods until the 1969 government decreerequired them to obtain residence and work per-mits, but they have always faced seriouscompetition from the Zabarama and others.Many of the cattle traders are Hausa, but theycompete with the Fulani, the Mossi, and certain

'Rights to membership in a social unit (category orgroup) through the father.

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northern Ghanaian immigrant groups, particu-larly the Gonja and the Dagomba. The domina-tion of most economic activities by several differ-ent groups at the same time has, on the one

hand, intensified economic competition withinthe Zongo and, on the other, made it advanta-geous for traders to form alliances, partnerships,and patron-client relationships across ethniclines. Only in recent years have such alliancesformed on the basis of national identity, withGhanaians attempting to limit competition byousting aliens.

Leadership patterns in the Zongo to some ex-

tent follow those of ethnic differentiation, inthat each ethnic community has a headman and a

group of titled elders. Each headman alsoappoints an Imam, or Chief Priest, who officiatesat "life-crisis" ceremonies, such as naming cere-

monies, marriages, and funerals, advises the head-man on points of Islamic law, and leads prayers

on certain occasions. The headmen and their offi-cials perform many services for their communi-ties. They arbitrate internal disputes, help mi-grants adjust to urban life and perform the ritualservices mentioned above. To some extent theyrepresent their communities to outsiders, that is,to government officials or to non-immigrants.The Ghanaian government, the traditional Asanteauthorities, and many others usually passthrough the headman in order to communicatewith members of particular groups. The headmenhave never been officially recognized as chiefs butthey have been informally recognized by govern-

ment officials as representatives of their respec-tive communities.'

With the exception of the Hausa headmanother headmen are first generation, that is, ruralborn immigrants. In recent years these leadershave been challenged by the growing number ofeducated urban born Muslim leaders who do notidentify primarily with their ethnic groups. Theseleaders claim to speak for the Zongo as a whole,and regardless of ethnic identity, they cooperatein the multi-ethnic associations mentioned ear-

lier. This shift in the leadership pattern in the

'Chiefs had to be recognized by the Governor of theGold Coast in the colonial period and, according to the1969 constitution, must be recognized by the NationalHouse of Chiefs. The headman's position is more fullydescribed in Schildkrout, 1970a.

Zongo has meant that politics is rarely a matterof simple interethnic competition. Leaders in theZongo are united and divided on issues of reli-gious, economic, and political policy and do notnecessarily act as representives of ethnic com-munities. In a sense we are dealing with twosystems of leadership, one based on the patternof ethnic segmentation and symbolized by thetribal headmen, their officials, and their Imams,another based on more universalistic criteria ofrecruitment to leadership roles, including Islamiceducation, wealth, and length of residence in thetown.2 A few leaders are able to work in bothsystems, at times as representatives of the inter-ests of a particular ethnic community, at othertimes as leaders of the Zongo Muslims.

The focal point of communal life among Ku-masi Muslims is the Central Mosque. There arealso many neighborhood mosques which serve lo-cal, ethnically heterogeneous congregations, andthere are two mosques known respectively asMossi and Yoruba mosques. These also serve eth-nically mixed congregations but derive theirnames from the identities of their founders.When the Central Mosque is not closed, due tofrequent disputes over its control, it stands as asymbol of the unity of the entire heterogeneousMuslim community (in Arabic, the 'umma) inKumasi. It is used for Friday prayer, for Rama-dan celebrations, and for other Muslim festivaloccasions, and it is meant to be used by all Ku-masi Muslims, not only those of the Zongo.A distinction must be made here between the

Friday Imam, the Imam al-Jum'a, who is theImam of the 'umma, the Muslim community as awhole, and the Imam al-Bilad, the king's Im-m,who in this case is the Asante Nkramo Imam.Until the 1968-1969 phase of the CentralMosque dispute, which was over the successionto the Friday Imamate, both the Friday Imamand the Na'ib, his assistant, have always beenHausas. The Hausa Imam has been recognizedover the years as Imam al-Jum'a, that is as ritualleader of the whole Zongo, even though he hasno authority to intervene directly in the religiousaffairs of non-Hausa. In a sense he has two sepa-

2Because of their Islamic education, wealth, and per-sonalities, some of the Muslim leaders are believed tohave considerable mystical power, a belief supported bya strong tradition of Islamic mysticism in West Africa.

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FIG. 2. The Kumasi Central Mosque under repair in 1968.

rate roles, that of Friday Im-am and that of HausaIm-am, just as the political head of the Hausacommunity is known both as Hausa headmanand as Sarkin Zongo. Even after the office ofSarkin Zongo was officially abolished the Hausaheadman continued to play certain ritual rolesthat expressed his position as a leader of the en-tire Zongo. On the main Muslim festival days heleads a procession of Muslims, including theother headmen, to greet the Asantehene and therepresentatives of the national administration. Heacts as an intermediary between the nationalgovernment and the other headmen, and is oftenasked to arbitrate disputes between non-Hausagroups in the Zongo. Non-Hausa headmen arepresented to him for recognition when they as-sume office even though he has no authority intheir election. The Hausa Im-am in his capacity asIm-am al-Jum'a and the Hausa headman in hiscapacity as Sarkin Zongo are then symbolic

leaders of the immigrant (Zongo) community asa whole. However, as the Central Mosque wasbuilt for all Muslims in Kumasi, not only for theZongo Muslims, the Friday Im-am's congregationis much more inclusive than the stranger com-munity alone.

The Central Mosque Controversy: 1952-1966

It should be apparent that the Mosque disputewas in fact many disputes, or to express it differ-ently, many phases in a single dispute. The issuesin each phase have varied but all have reflectedcontinuous struggles for power within theMuslim community which were in one way oranother indicative of changing issues in theGhanaian national political scene. Nationalevents gave different leaders at different timesopportunities to compete for power locally andto express their success by demonstrating control

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of the one symbol of consensus in the Muslimcommunity-the Central Mosque. In the accountthat follows, I describe the changing personali-ties, events, and issues.

Soon after he was elected Hausa headman in1948, Ahmadu Baba sucessfully appealed to theAsantehene for a plot of land on which to build aMosque for all Muslims in Kumasi. Ahmadu Babawas a wealthy transport-owner and landlord, andhe contributed a sizable portion of the funds tobuild the Mosque, but most of the money wasraised in a public campaign. In the next few yearsparty politics came into play and Ahmadu Baba'sopponents from earlier years, now aligned withthe CPP, began to use the Mosque fund to attackhis leadership.

Significantly, Ahmadu Baba's former rival forthe office of Hausa headman, Mutawakilu, ledthe campaign against him. By 1953 Mutawakiluwas persistently accusing Ahmadu Baba of em-bezzling Mosque funds. After the MAP wasfounded in 1953, the dispute over the funds wasexpressed as one between the MAP faction led byAhmadu Baba and others and the CPP faction ledby Mutawakilu. By the spring of 1953 the MAPfaction decided to take action against the slanderthey believed the accusations to be. AhmaduBaba sued a Hausa CPP member for slander andsucceeded in winning £200 in damages and costsin the Kumasi Divisional Court. The magistrateruled that no misappropriation of funds had oc-curred.'

This was hardly the end of the controversy.Mutawakilu, dissatisfied with the court's deci-sion, decided to take the case to the Asantehene,whose opposition to the CPP was not yet clear.Under the auspices of the Muslim Youth Con-gress, a CPP organization he was leading, Muta-wakilu brought a complaint against AhmaduBaba to the Asantehene's court. The Asanteheneset up a commission of inquiry (the KyidomheneCommission) to investigate, but it too ruled thatno misappropriation had been demonstrated. TheMuslim Youth Congress appealed this judgmentand requested a further investigation. On Octo-ber 9, 1953, The Ashanti Pioneer, a Kumasinewspaper, reported2 that the Commission's

'Ashanti Pioneer, June 17, 195 3.2"Four Wounded in Muslim Clash."

hearing had been postponed for a week. On thisday, the paper said, as the parties were leavingthe Asantehene's palace "some sort of guerillafighting started." Four people were wounded, 10were arrested.

During the Commission's recess Ahmadu Bababrought evidence showing that Mutawakilu hadaltered the Mosque accounts. The Ashanti Pio-neer reported on November 253 that the KumasiState Council had said that "owing to doubt es-tablished about the genuineness of the minutebook tendered in evidence by Mutawakilu onbehalf of the Muslim Youth Congress, it did notdesire to pursue any longer investigations of theobjections raised by the Youth to the findings ofthe Kyidomhene Commission of Enquiry."

Fighting between the two factions occurredfrequently, yet in January, 1954, Ahmadu Babaand the Hausa Imam, Malam Chorumah, brokeground for the Mosque. There was little pretenseabout the "a-political" nature of the undertakingby this time. By June, MAP activities were orga-nized at the Mosque site. The Ashanti Pioneerreported on June 14 that: "one hundred andthirty five members of the Kumasi Zongo CPPwho had resigned to join the MAP were admittedat a ceremony held yesterday at the site of thenew Mosque near the Labour office, in the pres-ense of Alhaji Amadu Baba, Sarkin Zongo, andthe tribal heads, including the Imam MalamChorumah. Fifty-five of the resigned CPP mem-bers squatted before the Chiefs and made someconfessions.... Alhaji Amadu Baba urged thepeople not to call the young ones who had nowcome to them as converts 'tubas'. It was only amisunderstanding that had made them stay awayfor a while . . . Prayers were said and the new con-verts were given a voluntary gift of £5.11.0 bythe gathering."4

Ghanaian independence in March, 1957, solid-ified the leadership of the CPP and gave Muta-wakilu confidence and support in his local cam-paign. The CPP had begun to use its nationalpower to eliminate opposition from religious andregional factions, and in August, 1957, deporta-tion orders were issued on the two major MAP

3"Youth vs. Amadu Baba Case Closed."4"Tuba" is an expression describing converts to the

faith. It probably derives from the Arabic talib (pI.tulba), student or disciple.

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leaders in Kumasi, Ahmadu Baba and Alfa Lar-dan. Although they appealed against the orderson the grounds that they were citizens of Ghanaby birth, an act of parliament was passed (Act 1of 1957) during the court proceedings legalizingthe deportations. Citizenship was thenceforth de-fined so that birth alone did not confer Ghanaiannationality, and the two MAP leaders weredeported to Nigeria before their case was con-cluded in court. Although these measures wereultimately intended to keep peace in the mosttroubled areas, the government declared a stateof emergency in Kumasi immediately after thedeportations.

By this time the Mosque had been opened,but hostility between the MAP and CPP factionsin the Zongo was so great that they refused toworship together. Whenever the two sides met atthe Mosque, fighting broke out. The MAP factionfelt that the Mosque had been built largely withtheir money and labor, and they were bitterabout the deportations and accusations of mis-appropriation of funds. The CPP faction on theother hand claimed that the Mosque was theirrightful place of worship, for no matter whichside had started the project the Mosque had beenbuilt for all Muslims in the town.

The question of which side had the right toworship in the Mosque became academic whenMutawakilu was made Sarkin Zongo in 1958. Assoon as his accession to office was announced,the government declared the Mosque a "pro-tected place" (under the state of emergency regu-lations). All gatherings, for prayer or other pur-poses, were prohibited and individuals performedtheir Friday prayers at the old Yoruba Mosqueand at neighborhood Mosques, each faction tak-ing care to avoid gathering where the "enemy"could be found.

To the Muslims in Kumasi it is a matter ofgreat importance that Friday prayers be held andalso that all Muslims in one town worshiptogether on this day. The disunity provoked bythese political disputes was regarded as a seriousreligious matter, for although there are no specif-ic Qur'anic sanctions against communities thatdo not worship together, there is a general feelingthat this bodes ill for the whole community, andalso that any leader who claims legitimate au-thority over the entire community should be able

to unify his congregation so that they can praytogether in peace.

Given these attitudes Mutawakilu could notvery well pretend to be a legitimate politicalleader in the Zongo while the Mosque remainedclosed. He began to apply for weekly police per-mits to use the Mosque. Such permits were issuedfor several months in 1958, and the Hausa Im-am(the Imam al-Jum'a), Malam Chorumah, switchedhis allegiance from Ahmadu Baba to Mutawakilu,joined the CPP, and continued to lead Fridayprayers. Although the police and the adminis-tration in Kumasi seemed to believe that unityhad been achieved, as violence had become lessfrequent, many former supporters of the MAP,now members of the UP, refused to worship withthe CPP faction at the Central Mosque and usedother small mosques. Occasional fighting oc-curred at these sites, and by 1959 the most ar-dent opponents of the CPP prayed only in theirhomes.

By the end of the 1950s open conflict be-tween the CPP and its opponents had lessenedbecause the CPP was firmly in control nationallyand locally. In his capacity as Sarkin Zongo,Mutawakilu had replaced those MAP headmenwho had refused to support the CPP.' Some MAPsupporters switched allegiances and actively sup-ported the CPP, whereas others attempted to beas a-political as possible. As all open oppositionhad been eliminated, the next phase of theMosque dispute involved factions within the CPPand reflected the growing shift in the Zongofrom the leadership of single headmen to that ofmembers of associations, in particular to the lo-cal party members and to the local branch of theMuslim Council. The first dispute to develop

'Among the deported headmen were the leaders ofthe Mossi and Gao communities. The Busansi headmanwas served with a local deportation order; and the Mam-prusi, Dagomba, Kusasi, Zabarama, and other headmenwere removed from office and replaced by CPP sup-porters. Some, including the Yoruba and Fulani head-men, eventually agreed to support Mutawakilu andretained their offices. The only other period when aSarkin Zongo had claimed the right to appoint headmenwas between 1927 and 1932, when the British pursued astrong policy of centralization in the Zongo. Then toothe policy failed, as each community claimed that aHausa leader had no authority to make these appoint-ments. (See Schildkrout, 1970b.)

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after 1958 stemmed from a growing conflict be-tween Mutawakilu and other Muslim leaders inKumasi. Mutawakilu's opponents within theHausa group attempted to oppose the powerwhich chiefly office conferred on him by joiningand working through the Muslim Council. Themembers of the Council in Kumasi opposedMutawakilu's "iron rule" in the Zongo anddemanded his dismissal as Sarkin Zongo and theabolition of the office.' They were successful in1961: the office was abolished and Mutawakiluwas therefore no longer Sarkin Zongo. Althoughhe tried in many ways to reassert his power, firstby becoming Hausa headman and later by tryingto take over leadership of the Kumasi branch ofthe Council, Mutawakilu was never able to regainhis former position of authority. From 1961until 1966, leadership shifted among differentmembers of the Muslim Council, and it was thisgroup that obtained weekly permits to use theCentral Mosque. It also controlled a committeeknown as the Mosque Building Committee,which handled the collection of funds for build-ing and maintaining the Mosque.

The Muslim Council faced opposition fromanother quarter, which, although it did not pro-voke a large dispute over the Mosque before 1966,pointed to the main cleavage that was to occurafter Nkrumah's fall. In 1958 the Muslim Missionwas formed, including in its membership onlyMuslims of Ghanaian nationality, both northern-ers and southerners. The Mission disagreed withother Muslim groups, including the Muslim Coun-cil, on a number of ideological issues such as theneed for more Western-type education and theneed to purge Islam of numerous magicalpractices and superstitions, but its main opposi-tion was based on nationalist sentiment. In 1962some "indigenous Muslims of Ghana," as theycalled themselves, sent a petition to the Govern-ment objecting to what they regarded as thedomination of the Council by "alien" Hausas.They maintained that independence had beengained to free the people of Ghana "from allforms of foreign yoke and domination, including

'Letter dated March 10, 1960, from Secretary,Ghana Muslim Council, Kumasi, to Regional Com-missioner, Kumasi. Kumasi Regional Office, File 2268,p. 100.

the domination of religious groups by for-eigners."2 Their plea to obtain control of the"responsible positions" in the Muslim Councilwas unsuccessful, for Nkrumah was still preparedto support non-Ghanaians in key positions, butthe sentiment that inspired the petition remainedand reappeared in 1966 after Nkrumah was over-thrown.

The Mosque Dispute: 1966-1970

The main cleavage to emerge after the coup,once the Muslim Council was dissolved, was be-tween the two Muslim associations-the MuslimMission and the Muslim Community. The argu-ment between these two factions goes back tothe early years of independence and involvesmany issues, all of which were later expressed inthe dispute over the succession to the FridayImamate. I have mentioned the question of citi-zenship and the way in which the Mission hadattacked the Council before 1966 for being anorganization of aliens. Later the Mission hadattacked the Muslim Community on the samegrounds, but its claim was weakened by the factthat there was a split in the Asante community.The Asante Nkramo Imam not only supportedthe Community, but was its vice president,3 andmany of the so-called aliens were actually able toclaim Ghanaian citizenship by virtue of ma-ternal ties.

The significance of the Asante NkramoImam's position opposing the Ghanaian domi-nated Mission becomes clear in light of an on-going dispute within the Asante community. TheAsante regional branch of the Mission was ledmainly by Akans from the Brong (western) areaof the Ashanti region who had a long tradition ofopposition to Asantes from the Kumasi region.In the period of party conflict, the Brong peoplestrongly supported the CPP, whereas the Kumasipeople on the whole supported the NLM andlater the UP. This dispute can be traced farther

2Petition by Head Representatives of GhanaianMuslims, dated May 3, 1962, Kumasi Regional Office,File 2268.

3In August, 1970, he was elected president, replacingAhmadu Baba who died -in September, 1968. TheGhanaian Times, August 5, 1970.

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FIG. 3. Men and women from Kumasi Zongo working as volunteers to repair the Central Mosque.The work is done on Sundays, to the accompaniment of drumming.

back in the history of Asante; it goes back to thepre-colonial period, when Kumasi asserted con-trol over the northwest, which continued rightthrough to the post-independence period (see dis-cussion in Austin, 1964, p. 293f; Tordoff, 1965;and Busia, 1951). Although it is difficult toclaim that the Brong/Kumasi split among the

Muslims was directly continued from the pre-colonial to the CPP to the post-coup periods,many Asantes actually did perceive a continuingpattern of fission along these lines. The disagree-ment between the factions was brought into theopen in the late 1950s when the Asantehene arbi-trated a case between a leader of the Asante re-

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gional branch of the mission and the AsanteNkramo Im-m over the fees, ostensibly too high,charged in a Mission school in Kumasi. In bring-ing this case before the Asantehene the AsanteNkramo Imam implicitly asserted his right to con-trol the Muslims in the Mission. The Asanteheneruled that he could not compel the leaders of theMission (who were predominantly Brongs) to fol-low the Imam's leadership. It was felt that theAsantehene tacitly gave his assent to the splitwithin the Asante Muslims at this time.

If the Asante Nkramo Imam was unable toassert his control over all Muslims in Asante, hewas, on the other hand, still able to maintain thatthe aliens in the Muslim Community and in theZongo were "his strangers." At various times hehas stated that these strangers should be regardedas "Kumasi people" (Kumasifo), who had along-standing right to live in Kumasi under theauspices of the traditional Kumasi authorities. Inthe role of a patron, the Imam supported thealiens in the Zongo and took their side in theMosque dispute, thereby weakening the Mission'smajor claim against the Community.

The present Muslim Community was orga-nized in 1966 although it claims to be the sameorganization as one with the same name startedin 1938. This is a matter of some controversybecause the lease to the land on which theMosque is built is also in the name of the MuslimCommunity. The Mission claimed that the earlieruse of the term "community" did not refer to acorporate body in any legal sense. In any case theCommunity that claimed control of the Mosqueafter the 1966 coup was formally organized inAccra in 1966 and its Kumasi branch withAhmadu Baba as President and the Asante Nkra-mo Imalm as Vice-President, was founded soonafter. Muslims in Kumasi who had formerly beenallied with the CPP and the UP (MAP) factionsunited in the new association abandoning theirformer party differences. In the months follow-ing the coup the Community drew support fromalmost all Muslims in the Zongo, at least to theextent that the leaders faced no opposition there.Northern Ghanaians and aliens in the Zongo wereunited in support of the Community, althoughlater, when the Muslim Mission became active inthe Mosque dispute, many of the Ghanaians,particularly Dagombas and Gonjas, left the Mus-

lim Community and opposed it in hopes of gain-ing economic and political power from groups ofalien origin.

Disputes around the Mosque started againvery soon after the coup. The first one related tothe Mosque Building Committee. This committeecontinued through the early 1960s under theleadership of the Muslim Council but after the1966 coup its composition was questioned.Ahmadu Baba, who returned from Nigeria a fewmonths after the coup, had been reinstated asHausa headman and began accusing MalamChorumah of trying to maintain a committee ofCPP sympathizers although the Party had beendisbanded. Ahmadu Baba brought this case tothe Asantehene, who ordered that the committeebe disbanded and a new one appointed to includemembers of both the CPP and UP factions. Thiswas done, and differences between Ahmadu Babaand the former CPP members seemed to beresolved. As the Mission had not yet becomeactive in the Mosque dispute, it appeared thatpeace had finally been restored.

It was not long before this newly constitutedMosque Building Committee became the focus ofa new wave of discontent, this time on an ethnicbasis. The headmen of some of the More-Dagbanespeaking groups complained that they were notsufficiently represented on a mainly Hausa body.The committee then asked them to send repre-sentatives to it, and each group elected two mem-bers. The campaign to raise funds for the Mosquecontinued, and labor (paid and voluntary) wasrecruited to begin repairs and additions to theMosque.

This was a minor dispute over the constitutionof a committee determined to repair and use theMosque; it was an internal dispute involving dif-ferent ethnic groups within the Zongo, alldemanding an equal voice in Zongo affairs. Thisconflict was soon eclipsed by the much largerconflict between the Muslim Mission and theMuslim Community. The Mission brought a for-mal complaint against the Community to theNLC Political Committee. It claimed that leader-ship of Muslims in Ghana should be in the handsof citizens and that the Muslim Communitydeviated from the teachings of the Qur'an andencouraged superstition. An attempt at reconcili-ation was made on the national level and the two

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sides were asked to form a single Muslim council.Unable to agree on the name of the new body orthe proportion of each side's representation, nocompromise was reached and the NLC wasforced to recognize two independent organiza-tions, with the provision that both stay out ofpolitics.

These events occurred on the national level.Leaders of the Kumasi branch of the MuslimCommunity went to Accra to meet with the NLCleaders and with the delegates from the Mission,and they spoke with confidence as leaders of theZongo community as a whole. The Mission hadnot yet become a factor in internal Zongo poli-tics in Kumasi, as there had been no occasion todivide the immigrant community.

On August 1, 1968, this occasion arose withthe death of Im-am Chorumah, the Friday Im-am.One-and-a-half years had passed since the coup,and aspiring politicians throughout the countrywere beginning to mobilize support whereverthey could. It is not possible to state preciselywhat role outsiders, that is, nationally orientedpoliticians who were not members of the KumasiZongo Community, played in this phase of theMosque controversy. In some instances inter-vention was clear, but in others it was covert. Itis well to point out again, however, that the Mis-sion's more westernized manner found favor withpoliticians and administrators and that severalMuslims serving in the military government werealso members of the Mission. The attempt toGhanaianize the economy was also a crucial ele-ment in this phase of the dispute, because thisgenerated hostility to aliens and raised Gha-naians' hopes of gaining economic and polit-ical power, in the Zongo and in the country as awhole. National politicians are known to havesuggested to several leaders of Ghanaian groupsin the Zongo that a cooperative trading associ-ation excluding aliens might be formed to ad-vance the position of northern Ghanaians, partic-ularly in long distance trade, an area where com-petition was still keen. Soon after the ban onpolitics was lifted there were suggestions that apolitical party of northerners might be formed,although the subsequent ban on regional or eth-nic parties by the NLC prevented this from devel-oping.

When Im-am Chorumah died the Zongo com-

munity followed its customary practice of elect-ing a new Im-m. The Hausa community, in con-sultation with the main Muslim "ulama" and thetribal headmen elected a successor to both theoffices of Friday Im-am and N-a'ib. The formerNa'ib was elected to the Im-mate and a newNa'ib was appointed. There was no apparent op-position within the Zongo to the appointment ofa Hausa, or to the promotion of the formerNa-'ib. For more than 50 years the FridayImamate of Kumasi had been vested in a Hausaand although there must be an election and theoffice cannot be the property of a descent group,there had never been any objection to the elec-tion of a Hausa who served both as Hausa Imamand as Friday Imam. In this instance, however,the succession took place in a political climatewhich was increasingly xenophobic; politiciansand the public were particularly sensitive to out-cries against aliens because the press and certainpoliticians were intent upon blaming them forthe country's ills. It is significant that oppositionto the appointment of Hausas as Imam and N-a'ibdid not generate in the Zongo even though iteventually gathered support there.

On the day the Asantehene was about to for-mally recognize the new Imam, the Chairman ofthe Regional Committee of Administration inKumasi intervened to stop the ceremony. Ac-cording to the accounts of the Chairman and theMission, the Mission had sent a letter to the Ad-ministration stating that they had their own can-didate for the office and that they had not beenconsulted about the decision to appoint a Hausaas Friday Im-am. At the same time, a member ofthe NLC government, reputedly a Mission mem-ber himself, advised the Regional Chairman todelay the ceremony so that the Mission's objec-tions could be investigated.

The Mission had been preparing to make a bidfor the Im-amate even before Malam Chorumahdied. They had appealed to the Asante NkramoImam to take the office himself but he refused.According to the Chairman of the Regional Com-mittee of Administration the Asante NkramoIm-am was "selling his birthright to aliens." TheAsante Nkramo Im-am, on the other hand,claimed that the two offices were distinct andthat the Friday Im-amate had traditionally beengiven to a Hausa (interview, February, 1969). He

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disagreed on the significance of nationality andcited passages of the Qur'an to show that Islamdid not recognize the validity of such qualifica-tions.

When the Regional Administrative Officerintervened to stop the Asantehene from recogniz-ing the Hausa Im-am, he also closed the Mosquesupposedly to maintain peace. As the end ofRamadan approached, the Chairman attemptedto find a neutral outsider to lead the prayers.Unable to find such a person in Kumasi he sum-moned the Imam of the Ghana army, a prom-inent Muslim in Ghana. When this man arrived tolead the prayers, the Community protested andrefused to pray under his leadership because,they claimed, he was a member of the Mission.

At this point the Regional Committee recog-nized that an investigation into the dispute wasin order. The Administration agreed to examinethe Community's claim that the Hausas they hadnominated were, in fact, Ghanaian citizens. Afterconsiderable investigation they were convincedthat by virtue of these men's maternal ethnicaffiliations, they were qualified for citizenship.The Mission counterclaimed that they were nottrue citizens in the same way that Asantes orDagombas were, but as this had become a legalquestion they were unable to win their case.Nevertheless, during this period many articlesappeared in the Ghanaian press erroneously de-scribing the Community as an organization ofaliens. The prevalent view was that all membersof certain ethnic groups, regardless of their placeof birth, were aliens.

While the Administration was attempting toarbitrate the dispute, the Muslim Communityurged that the case be taken to the Asantehene.The Chairman of the Regional Committee of Ad-ministration refused to allow this and theAsantehene, known to be the traditional patronof strangers in Kumasi was strongly urged to stayout of the matter. The Community then calledfor an election to determine the succession butthe Mission, whose membership was com-paratively small, refused on the grounds thattheir case rested on a question of principle. Asthe dispute became a matter of national debate,two NLC members alleged to be members of theMission and both northern Ghanaians, came toKumasi to arbitrate. A compromise solution was

then proposed and accepted by the Mission, butnot by the Community. The solution was thatthe Mission concede its claims to the Im-amate tothe Hausa candidate, and their candidate, aDagomba, would become the Na'ib. In proposingthis solution the chairman of the Regional Com-mittee maintained that the Community had fol-lowed a principle of succession from N-a'ib toImam (interview February, 1969). The Commu-nity denied that such a principle existed andclaimed that it was only a coincidence that sucha pattern had obtained in the past. The Commu-nity suspected that the Administration was at-tempting to formalize such a pattern in suggestingthat the Mission appoint the Na-'ib, and theyfeared that such a solution would be unstableand even personally dangerous for the HausaIm-m. It did seem to be the case that the Ad-ministration and the Mission were attempting toformalize a principle of succession: the Chairmanof the Regional Administration explicitly notedthat many traditional kingdoms in West Africahad principles of rotating succession (interviewFebruary, 1969).

After this arbitration the Administration againattempted to open the Mosque, but hostilitieswere still too great to avoid the violent quarrelsthat followed. On one occasion many peoplewere arrested and several were injured.

The Muslim Community then decided to fightthe case in court and based their suit against theMission on their claim to ownership of theMosque. The case centered around the distinc-tion between the notion of community, as anunbounded, unincorporated-in the legal sense-group, and the notion of a corporate body. Thefact that a distinction between informal and for-mal organizations had not always been cleardetermined the outcome of the case.

The Community sued the Mission for interfer-ing with their property and maintained that theMission had caused them a serious loss of revenuein the form of Friday contributions. Theydemanded a court order for possession of theMosque and an injunction restraining the Missionmembers from entering or interfering with theMosque. The defense rested its case on the claimthat the Community did not exist as a corporatebody until 1966 and that before then the Missionand the Community were members of a general

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community of Muslims in Kumasi who were col-lectively referred to as the Muslim or Moham-madan community. The defense claimed that thetwo groups, the Mission and the Community,were formally constituted in 1958 and 1966,respectively.

The question of the ownership of the Mosquerested on the interpretation of the meaning ofthe word community-whether or not theMuslim Community in whose name the lease ofthe Mosque ground was issued was the samegroup as the association that existed at the timeof the trial. The question of the ownership of theMosque plot first came up in the early 1960swhen the Muslim Council was in competitionwith Malam Mutawakilu. Each had applied for alease to the Mosque, and in 1965 a lease wasexecuted between the government and the "Mus-lim Community acting by Mohammad Chiroma(chief Im-m) and Mohammad Mutawakilu as itsregistered Trustee (sic) of the Community."'However, the judge found that there was no evi-dence that the plaintiffs were a corporate body, asthis was legally defined by the Trustees (Incorpo-ration) Act of 1962. The judge ruled that title tothe Central Mosque was in the Muslim Communi-ty, Kumasi, which comprised both parties in thedispute, because when the Mosque was startedthe two factions in the Zongo had not been sepa-rated.

At the end of the court proceedings, in Febru-ary, 1970, the dispute was still unresolved. Thecourt had clearly recognized that it was a politi-cal rather than a legal matter and that a solutionwould have to be found out of court. The Ad-ministration continued to urge acceptance of thecompromise solution they had proposed, but forsome time the Community refused to accept theDagomba candidate as N-a'ib.

During the long court case many changes oc-curred on the national political scene and theseeventually affected the behavior of the parties inthe Mosque dispute. Political parties were formed

"'Judgement: Suit No. L.C. 73/68. Muslim com-munity Kumasi per Alhaji Alhasan Melafia, Plaintiffs, v.Muslim Mission Kumasi as represented by 1. ChiefGonja, 2. Chief Dagomba, 3. Secretary of MuslimMission. Defendants, in the High Court of Ghana held atKumasi on Wednesday, the 18th day of February 1970before Annan, J."

in the early part of 1969 and elections were heldin August, giving Busia's Progress Party (PP) aclear victory. Although many of the Muslimswere aliens and as such were not eligible to vote,no questions about citizenship were asked duringvoter registration and politicians encouragedMuslims to participate in the elections. Cam-paigning was active in the Zongo, and the Prog-ress Party, still identified with opposition to theCPP, won a clear majority there.

At the end of 1969, however, the Busiagovernment began its campaign against aliens andmany of the immigrants who had worked for thevictory of the PP believed that they had beenbetrayed. Many Zongo residents experienced aloss of faith in the government in this periodbecause the protection and assistance they ex-pected their votes would bring was not forth-coming. They felt that the general attitude in thecountry and the government favored the Missionwith its policy of Ghanaianization, and that giventhese circumstances they were fighting a losingbattle.

As a result of these developments, in the springof 1970 a new dispute developed within theranks of the Muslim Community of Kumasi.Many of the younger men and a few of the eldersbegan to think that they should give in to theMission and the Administration on the issue ofthe M'ib. For some time a faction within theCommunity held out against this position andclaimed that the events of the CPP years wererepeating themselves, that the same people whohad feared to oppose the CPP were giving way topressure on this issue.

Eventually most of the Community membersbecame convinced that given the government'sattitude toward strangers they could not wintheir case. They accepted the compromise oncondition that the Mission appoint another indi-vidual as N-a'ib.2 It seemed, then, that as the Prog-ress Party government stabilized itself, peacewas at least temporarily restored in Kumasi. Withpower indisputably in the hands of one group onthe national level, the open expression of deeplocal conflicts ceased. As in the pre-colonial peri-

2 This is indeed what occurred. On a revisit to Ghanain 1974 I noted that the Mosque was being used under aHausa Imam and a Dagomba Na'ib, but not the sameindividual who had been involved in the original dispute.

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od after 1844 when the Asantehene took firmcontrol over the Muslim stranger community,and as in the CPP period when the Nkrumahgovernment did the same thing through theMuslim Council, the Progress Party governmentattempted to create a single national body tosupervise Muslim affairs. The govemment thatfollowed the Progress Party, the NationalRedemption Council, maintained this control at

the national level, again appointing a Muslimcouncil, including members of both the Ghanaianand non-Ghanaian communities. Thus, while ad-ministration is solidified and political activity isminimized at the national level, local disputeslike those symbolized by the controversy overThe Kumasi Central Mosque probably can beexpected to remain dormant.

CONCLUSIONS

What factors emerge in all these disputes asthe main reason for recurring factionalism in theMuslim community? The dispute over theMosque has continued for almost 20 years, andalthough the factions have changed and the spe-cific issues have varied, it may be possible to findsome general themes underlying all these con-flicts. Certainly, it is not the Mosque itself thathas caused conflict, but deeper issues that pre-vent the realization of the ideal of unity which isexpressed in the Mosque.

The first point to emerge is the most obvi-ous-that the Mosque, as a symbol of unity forthe entire Muslim community, is a meansthrough which competition between groups maybe expressed. It is accepted as a symbol of com-munal unity, but precisely because of this, con-flicts about authority, power, and leadership,which actually divide the community, can be fo-cused on it. Studies in other towns in West Africaand elsewhere have revealed similar conflicts overMosques (see for example Proudfoot, 1959; andBehrman, 1970). This is, of course, nothing pe-culiar to Islam, but is similar to the problemssurrounding chieftaincy or central authority inmany societies. It may be, however, that in eth-nically heterogeneous communities such disputestake a very special form, in that symbols ofgeneralized authority may be dissociated fromany specific group. Thus the Mosque is supposedto represent the general community, not anysingle ethnic group; its congregation is supposedto be one in which consideration of ethnic iden-tity and nationality are subordinated to the prin-ciples of brotherhood and unity explicit inIslamic ideology. Yet, when subordinate ethnicidentities both "tribal" and national persist, evenin very restricted areas of social life, they maylead to the formation of factions and pressure

groups that can challenge Islamic ideals. Individ-uals have multiple identities, and identificationwith the most inclusive community may notalways seem advantageous. In times of stressmore particularistic loyalties emerge, even whenthese directly contradict the most valued reli-gious precepts.

It would be wrong, however, to maintain thatconflicts over the Mosque have been entirelybased upon different ethnic groups' competitionfor political power. Economic factors also havebeen important, both in determining lines ofcleavage between ethnic groups within theMuslim community and in determining the rela-tionship between national policy and local events.Most of the people involved in this dispute are,ethnically, strangers in Kumasi and some arealiens in Ghana. At least part of the dispute,particularly the 1968-1969 phase of it, was amatter of competition between Ghanaians andaliens for scarce economic and politicalresources. Why is it that the issue of citizenshipwas so important in this phase of the dispute, andhow do economic and political factors interrelatein earlier periods?

In the pre-colonial period, Muslims from thenorth were accepted in Kumasi as traders and reli-gious leaders, even though they were not Asantecitizens. They remained in the capital under thepatronage and control of the king, who saw it inAsante interest to encourage an alien and de-pendent merchant class, while he thought itunwise to encourage the growth of a strong, inde-pendent trading community among Asantes.

To some extent the Asante Nkramo Imam'sposition in the dispute described here reflectedthis traditional attitude. He did not see the ques-tion in terms of opposed nationalities but ratherin terms of the local relationship between the

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strangers and the Asantes. He recognized that theHausa candidate for the Imamate had beenshown legally to be a Ghanaian, but he main-tained that even if this had not been the case, theImamate of the Kumasi Mosque should havegone to the Hausa candidate, because Islam specif-ically disallowed considerations of nationality ordescent in the selection of an Im7am.' The AsanteNkramo Im-am said that the Hausa candidate wasa "Kumasi person"; he had been born in thetown and his people had a definite status there asstrangers. The Dagomba candidate was also astranger as far as the Asante Nkramo Imam wasconcerned, but he was not even born in Kumasiand moreover was denying his position as a Ku-masi stranger in basing his claim for the FridayIm-amate on Ghanaian nationality. The Hausacandidate, on the other hand, recognized that hehad a right to this office as a stranger in Kumasi,and he deferred to the Asante Nkramo Imam foradvice and protection. The Hausas were notdenying this traditional status relationship, butthe Dagombas were.

During the colonial period, virtually norestrictions were placed on the activities of strang-ers, and crucial sectors of the economy were inalien (European) hands. The economic base ofthe African stranger community also developedwithout restriction in this period. Although com-petition between Ghanaians and aliens occurred,the government did nothing to restrict alienactivity in favor of Ghanaians.

In some ways the rise of nationalism in the1950s could have been expected to lead to theimposition of controls on alien activity, for oncethe economy was theoretically in Ghanaianhands, one could expect competition for limitedresources to begin. However, as Nkrumah's eco-nomic policy was aimed at placing crucial sectorsof the economy under public, or state, control(see Callaway and Card, 1971) he was able toallow alien economic participation. Like theAsantehene in the late nineteenth century, Nkru-mah's policy encouraged the participation ofaliens, both European and African, in the econo-my. Because they were aliens they were, theoreti-

'The contradiction here is clear, because there can beno rule that the new Imrm must be a Hausa. This, how-ever, was regarded as part of custom, a category of lawspeciflcally allowed by Islam, i.e., ijma.

cally at least, amenable to control; aliens couldeasily be deported when they overstepped theprivileges the government allowed them. Like theAsantehene in the previous century, Nkrumah tosome extent discouraged the rise of an indige-nous trading community while he developedstate enterprises with the assistance of outsiders.2

After the 1966 coup the Government's eco-nomic policy changed abruptly and so did theposition of strangers. While large-scale outside in-vestments still occurred, with fewer state con-trols placed on these investments, foreign eco-nomic competition to small-scale Ghanaian busi-ness was discouraged. The emphasis of the NLCand of the Progress Party government was pre-cisely to encourage the rise of a Ghanaian middleclass. This meant that African aliens, who con-trolled many small-scale business enterprises,were seen as a threat to the expansion ofGhanaian economic interests. Aliens increasinglybecame scapegoats for the "common man's" eco-nomic plight. In this period, then, the recogni-tion of Ghanaian demands for a more equitabledistribution of economic opportunities, led to arejection of the contribution of strangers.

This new political climate created divisionsand alliances with the Zongo community thatwere absent before nationality became a basis forpolitical action. Competition between individualethnic groups within the Zongo existed, but nobasis for an alliance among Ghanaian groups wasperceived before independence. This nationalisticidiom merely made it possible for certain aspectsof economic competition to express themselvespolitically. It is highly significant that theGhanaian groups that supported the Mission inthe Zongo in the late 1 960s were precisely thosegroups that included a significant number of cat-tle and kola traders, namely the Gonja and Da-gomba. These groups had the most to gain fromthe elimination of the competition of the Hausa,Mossi, and other predominantly alien groups.3

2In the pre-colonial period, state enterprises includedgold mining, some farming, and the control of long-distance trade.

3For a discussion of the participation of differentethnic groups in the Kumasi cattle trade, see Hill 1970,pp. 109-121. Although the proportion of Mamprusitraders is high, few reside permanently in Kumasi, andas a result few were personally involved in the Mosquedispute.

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The Mamprusi, also northern Ghanaians, arepoorly represented in Kumasi (there were only500 according to the 1960 census, as comparedwith 2100 Gonjas and 3830 Dagombas) and theyhave fewer traders permanently resident there.The Mamprusi seemed to see no advantage inbreaking with Hausa ritual leadership in theZongo, and they rejected the overtures of theMission.

It can be argued that the same sort of issueswere present in pre-colonial Asante. We know ofa dispute in the late nineteenth century in whichnorthern Muslims, long resident in Kumasi, op-posed the Hausas on the grounds that the latterwere strangers, whereas the northerners hadalready become politically incorporated into theAsante state (Wilks, 1966, p. 323; Bowdich,

1819, pp. 92, 403). In the recent dispute weagain see immigrants from northern Ghanabecoming aware of their national identity, andattempting to separate themselves from alienMuslims on this basis. Northemers living insouthern Ghana, and in Asante, at times have feltdisadvantaged in relation to the indigenouspeoples, and it is not surprising that they shouldrespond to suggestions that they improve theirposition through their claims to citizenship. Thisis perhaps an inevitable consequence of na-tionalism in whatever period it occurs. As thehistory of strangers in Kumasi and more specif-ically the history of the Mosque dispute shows,local conflicts are deeply affected by expandingand contracting opportunities in the largestpolity to which the participants belong.

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