INZET OVERZEE

OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT

OUT-OF-AREA OPERATIONS BY THE ROYAL NETHERLANDS NAVY, 1945-2001

‘Showing the flag when mine hunting restores image of seafaring nation’, ‘Mine hunters can do more than we think …., ‘Ten thousand miles across the sea’, ‘Alkmaar class can operate worldwide’. It was under these headlines in 1984 that the national press reported the deployment of Dutch minehunters to the Middle East, with the US Navy, among others, on their side. On the one hand, these positive reports are somewhat surprising when one considers that in those days, expeditionary operations by Western armed forces in former colonies were extremely sensitive, nationally and internationally. On the other, these actions by Dutch ships were in line with the Royal Netherlands Navy's endeavours at the time of the Cold War to continue to operate Qua Patet Orbis and to showcase the Netherlands as a maritime nation. For decades, this showing of the flag, always supported by the political powers in The Hague and much valued internationally, helped to determine the face the Netherlands showed to the world. Many people know about the Dutch navy’s contribution to NATO defence in the north Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea, but are virtually unaware of this international form of maritime deployment overseas, outside the NATO treaty area: the out-of-area operations.

Historiography

Most of the studies on the Netherlands’ position in the Cold War have been conducted by political scientists or relate to compilations dominated by a socio-historical approach. Previous studies which looked at the deployment of the Netherlands armed forces outside the North Atlantic Treaty area in the post-war period, focused mainly on the Royal Netherlands Army. Academic literature on the Dutch navy (and also about the Royal NL Air Force and the Royal Netherlands Military Police) in this period is scarce. If any publications did appear that touched on the subject of out-of-area deployment, these were mainly reference works in which scant attention was paid to post-war naval operations outside the NATO treaty area. Only about specific deployments, particularly those relating to overseas activities by the marines, such as the United Nations Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), were any publications issued, while various commemorative books devoted attention to ships and naval personnel involved in out-of-area operations, either as a squadron or individually. The question of how policy in respect of post-war out-of-area operations by military-maritime forces actually took shape and what the determining factors were, has never, just as the course of these operations, been the subject of in-depth historical research. It is for this reason that my research examines the military-political background and execution of large-scale and long-term Dutch naval operations outside the NATO treaty area during the period in question.

In existing historiography, research on out-of-area operations by the Royal NL Navy in Dutch foreign and security policy following the Second World War, concentrates mainly on unilateral power projection by means of showing the flag in the New Guinea affair around 1960 and the impossibility of conducting similar missions after that.

After relinquishing the territory of New Guinea in the autumn of 1962, the Netherlands still had military-maritime out-of-area intentions and deployed such missions, but these were largely part of a multinational effort, usually under the auspices of the UN or sanctioned by the Western European Union (WEU). It is true that the context of the East-West controversy and the inclusion in the North Atlantic treaty made independent enforcement operations by the Royal NL Navy virtually impossible, but that did not apply to participation in numerous multinational overseas operations. Dutch national interests were paramount. Such missions can be placed within the traditional functions of the concept of sea power: diplomacy, police power and military enforcement action. Peacekeeping and peace-enforcement can also be seen as elements of the function of constabulary, as the political scientists and maritime historians M. Pugh, J. Ginifer and E. Grove state in their study entitled Maritime Security and Peacekeeping (1994). Given the approval of organisations such as the UN often associated with this, such multinational military-maritime actions had and have a high degree of legitimacy. This is in contrast to unilateral enforcement actions stemming from a traditional approach such as gunboat diplomacy.

The use of maritime diplomacy and (limited) application of military-maritime force as an instrument of national foreign policy occur almost exclusively in a multinational framework, according to Pugh et al. On the one hand, that was automatically linked to a decline in the importance of traditional gunboat diplomacy, but on the other, gave the use of military-maritime (enforcement) means within diplomacy a more accepted international image. This way of thinking appears to be virtually non-existent in Dutch historiography of foreign and security policy.

What little literature there is adheres broadly to the premise that the Royal NL Navy was after a while geared to operations against Soviet naval forces in the North Atlantic area. This popular opinion is at odds with the promotion as well as the realisation of worldwide naval operations by navy chiefs, who implemented this ambition for the purpose of maintaining a harmonious fleet operating for long periods overseas, consisting of multipurpose surface ships, aircraft, submarines and marines.

This historiographically interesting contradiction between the RNLN's farewell to out-of-area operations post-1962 recorded in the literature and the continued naval ambition to conduct manoeuvres and enforcement outside the NATO area serves as the main theme for this study. The primary reason for this study is to fill the gap that has been identified in the historiography of the Netherlands armed forces during and shortly after the Cold War in relation to out-of-area missions by military-maritime forces. Filling this void is important for various reasons (background analysis of post-war policy making in respect of out-of-area deployment; course of these operations). During the Cold War and in subsequent years, our armed forces were the instrument with which the Netherlands shaped its security policy in respect of the outside world. As one of the main elements of this policy instrument, the Royal Netherlands Navy thus deserves more attention than it has received thus far.

The RNLN and its supporters traditionally envisaged a worldwide task for naval forces within Dutch security policy, but the realisation of this philosophy often came under budgetary pressure. The RNLN and its allies also left no stone unturned in their efforts to realise this deep-rooted aim.

For decades, there have been countless assertions regarding the advantages of naval forces for intervention all over the world and associated references to the Dutch military-maritime tradition overseas that endorse these claims. This concerns not only points of view of naval officers and foreign policy experts, but also remarks by authors with naval connections as well as from unexpected quarters (the army). The import of this is that those involved realised that while the navy was part of the overall, wartime-oriented deterrence force, it could easily fulfil a mobile, flexible function in peacetime, during international crises, unlike the army and air force, which formed a more static deterrent.

To what extent did this famous readiness, worldwide deployability, flexibility and shaping of this tradition by military-maritime forces actually exist? There is no escaping the fact that from 1991, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions shifted the emphasis for naval forces from blue water to brown water, or in other words, from the high seas to the littorals. It was also a fact that while the navy chiefs liked to proclaim that the nation's navy was traditionally at home on all fronts anywhere in the world, most of the materiel and exercise scenarios (and the associated degree of readiness) were in reality geared to deployment in the northeastern part of the Atlantic Ocean. Critics within and outside the navy observed that the Royal Netherlands Navy did not appear to need any sophisticated ocean-going multipurpose frigates, submarines or long-range patrol aircraft for the new main tasks. Another comment that was made, in the same context, was that the deployment of the marine corps for inland missions, such as those in Northern Iraq (1991) and Ethiopia-Eritrea (2000-2001), had involved the non-standard use of our amphibious forces. Marines units previously played a primary role in maritime power projection ashore: the projection of military power ashore from the sea as was the case in the envisaged deployment in Norway on NATO's northern flank before 1991. There are also signs indicating diminished Dutch military-maritime expeditionary readiness and flexibility as a result of the (initial) lack of delivery means as well as equipment and operational shortcomings, which affected both national and allied interests. Together with other, similar incidents during Dutch naval missions overseas, these less than flattering observations sounded a counternote to the earlier song of praise.

Problem definition

These critical remarks cannot be placed directly in an analytical framework, as there are few, if any, academic-historical publications about Dutch out-of-area naval operations available. As stated earlier, this study aims to fill that void. The first of four key questions in this study is to what extent there actually was any military-maritime tradition of out-of-area operations after 1945 as an instrument in Dutch foreign policy.

Another topic in this study concerns the background and motivation of the groups that had a soft spot for that tradition and the associated aims, as well as the ensuing implications. Leaders of the Dutch navy stressed repeatedly that their goal of global deployment was based on the serving of national interests. The sought-after harmonious fleet, which would mean that the Dutch were not necessarily dependent on allies, was only feasible if there were to be a wide range of worldwide tasks. Furthermore, this showcasing of materiel could help to promote the export thereof and potentially reduce our own procurement costs. The Dutch Admiralty found other departments to be in support of its ambitions, in some cases against the will of political leaders in the Ministry of Defence. Naval officers found themselves supported by, for example, Minister of Foreign Affairs J.A.M.H. Luns, who, on the correlation between the naval forces and his ministry, stated that it was also in the interests of foreign policy for a country with so many major maritime and overseas interests as our own to have a decent war fleet. Out-of-area missions and showing the flag also had the support of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, more so because Dutch industry saw the RNLN, because of the structural launch of modern weapon platforms, as a “sale and purchase broker and an asset player in the defence market”. Given this merging of interests, the second key question in this study is to what degree were Dutch naval forces political football or (co-) player in the maritime political-strategic decision making on out-of-area missions?

“Unusually close”, so the British naval historian J.R. Hill describes the collaboration between the Royal Navy and the Royal Netherlands Navy. British naval forces were also "unhappy" about the fact that after 1960 they were forced by decolonisation of overseas territories, budget cuts and strategic considerations (nuclear-strategic submarine fleet under NATO versus worldwide deployability with carrier task forces) to focus on antisubmarine warfare in the northeastern Atlantic Ocean. As far as (multinational) out-of-area missions were concerned, the Royal Navy thus had ambitions similar to those of the RNLN. As both navies also collaborated closely, the third key question relates to the identification and elaboration of the similarities and differences between the two forces in terms of the development of their range of tasks (overseas operations in particular) and the execution of those tasks, as well as the possibly even mutual influences.

Not only the size of an armed force, but also its correspondingly refined weapon systems and the reputation of its personnel can have a political impact in international terms. In the first decades following the Second World War, the Dutch navy had a reputation among its Anglo-Saxon allies of being a reliable partner. The possession of or the ability to construct sophisticated weapon platforms in itself carried political influence. This is because of the power projection capabilities of such weapon systems and the fact that they are regarded as a symbol of the prosperity and technological development of a nation and its global position. Successive generations of advanced warships, military aircraft and weapon systems, including fire control systems, contributed to the image of the Netherlands as a nation at the forefront of military technology.

In this study, the fourth and final key question centres on an analysis of the extent to which the said domestic and foreign perception of the Dutch navy played a role in the decision making in The Hague in respect of overseas deployment of the navy. The study will also look at how much the Royal Netherlands Navy, by participating in (multinational) out-of-area operations, contributed to the policy objectives envisaged by the Netherlands government for these missions.

Demarcation and structure

This study is confined to the period from 1945 to 11 September 2001. This caesura has been applied because the years following this period have seen a change in the (inter)national security perception among political policy makers that has been accompanied by widespread changes for military strategies and tactics. Following the attacks in the United States, international terrorism was globally classified as one of the main threats to (inter)national (peace and) security. Nationally, social and political pressure was mounting to revise the role of the military in operations at home, a process that extended from antiterrorist efforts to the broader phenomenon of national security. Another aspect that influenced the delimitation in time is the fact that the study thus remains outside a period in which the Ministry of Defence was undergoing a far-reaching reorganisation and the RNLN was no longer implementing policy independently.

A decision was also made to leave missions that involve deployment within the Kingdom (Dutch overseas territories in southeast Asia and the Caribbean), given their purely national character, outside the remit of this study.

The Royal Netherlands Navy has been actively deployed in various multinational operations (UN, NATO, WEU), for longer and shorter periods, to serve the national interest. To avoid any duplication with recent and forthcoming studies (studies have been and will be conducted into the armed forces in the Caribbean and in Cambodia 1992-1993), and also to enable in-depth and manageable research, this study focuses on three regional case studies. These relate to mission areas where, in terms of duration, diversity and scale of forces, the greatest demand has been made on the Royal NL Navy since 1945. These are: Korea 1950-1955, the Middle East 1984-2001 and the Balkans 1992-2001. Other operations will be touched upon in two general chapters on Dutch foreign and security policy and the standpoint of naval chiefs, as well as in an annexed list of Royal NL Navy missions since 1945.

The regional case studies form the body of evidence for this study, and will be used to try and answer the key questions. A) The case studies deal with operational and tactical aspects of the missions studied, such as the mandate, expeditionary readiness, size of the units, operational guidelines, command, collaboration with allies and the tactics used. B) Where relevant, there is a (brief) comparison with the other services and international partners such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Belgium. C) As mentioned in terms of the subject matter and the period covered, British naval forces in particular show striking parallels with the Royal NL Navy. The far-reaching cooperation with and emulation of the Royal Navy, for which the Dutch navy strived in the post-war period, will thus be the focus of particular attention.

The research will close with conclusions about the expeditionary nature of the Royal NL Navy in the period in question and about whether or not the overseas deployment of our navy contributed to the realisation of Dutch foreign policy objectives.

For the purpose of the International Conference on Political History, the approach to my research will now be illustrated by means of the partial case study of mine countermeasures in the Middle East in 1984.

Dutch minehunting in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez

Mine explosions, threat to shipping and international reactions

In the months of July and August 1984, international shipping was rocked by reports of explosions in the Gulf of Suez and the southern part of the Red Sea. During those weeks, almost twenty trade vessels ran into sea mines and sustained damage. The Islamic terrorist movement Jihad claimed responsibility for laying the mines. Subsequent investigations revealed that they had been laid by a Libyan ship. The mine threat (Egyptian interests were thought to be Libya's target) put trade shipping between Europe, East Africa, the Middle East and the rest of Asia in danger. Oil supplies from the Persian Gulf that were so vital for Western European economies, as well as the transportation of tens of thousands of pilgrims for the annual journey to Mecca, were suddenly under pressure. The Arab states around the Red Sea were unable to resolve the problem themselves and, at the beginning of August, asked Western nations for help.

Washington sent a number of ships and helicopters to counter the mine threat, and asked what the European allies were thinking of doing. The British sent mine countermeasures vessels to Egypt on 6 August, and France and Italy followed suit soon afterwards. The US Navy and its British and French counterparts arrived in the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea between 4 and 31 August and commenced their search actions.

In the White House, there was concern about reactions at home and abroad to a US military deployment in the Middle East so soon before the presidential elections of 6 November. Advisers to President Ronald Reagan wanted to prevent memories of a recent disastrous deployment of US marines near Beirut in 1982-1983, in which 200 marines were killed. The same applied to possible reactions from France, which had lost dozens of military personnel in Beirut at the time, for which it blamed the US. Any military response to an Egyptian and later Saudi request for naval assistance thus had to be low-profile as well as time-limited. Furthermore, the Americans hoped to involve other countries in the action besides those supplying troops for the peacekeeping force in Beirut (US, France, UK and Italy) as well as using a more multinational context to pre-empt allusions to colonialism and the expansion of spheres of influence in the Cold War.

Dutch input?

Dutch navy chiefs saw in a potential mission in Egypt an opportunity to fulfil their ambition to operate worldwide among the premier league of NATO allies. It was also an opportunity to test the new Alkmaar-class minehunters at long range in tropical conditions, as well as an ideal opportunity to showcase this weapons platform, with a view to export and an upscale of production of this type of vessel. On 2 August 1984, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs was thus faced with both alarm bells among the country’s shipping fraternity and the navy’s question as to whether there was any objection to the deployment of minehunters to Egypt. Over the course of 9-10 August, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially announced that it would support such a mission. The reasons given were that “the Netherlands sets great store by unrestricted shipping in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal", and that this mission sent out a positive signal to Egypt and the United States (burden sharing). Another consideration was that three partners had already promised military assistance in the context of European Political Cooperation. Direct economic motives such as the sale of ships also played a role, but these were not officially cited by the Dutch government.

From Egypt to Saudi Arabia

While the Royal NL Navy was making preparations for the deployment and kitting out the minehunters HNLMS Haarlem and HNLMS Harlingen accordingly, Egypt announced on 15 August that it would not (for the time being) be accepting the Dutch offer. Washington was dumbfounded by this latest stance by Cairo. Earlier, on 9 August, the US State Department had been extremely pleased to hear that the Netherlands intended to respond positively to Egypt's request for support in mine clearance. Following the de facto rejection by Cairo, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the intermediary of its embassies, approached the governments of Saudi Arabia, Sudan and North Yemen with the offer of assistance in the detection and clearance of any mines.

The US State Department and the Pentagon once again stressed that it was “extremely grateful” for the Dutch offer. Both departments also indicated that Washington “underlined” the significance of the Dutch offer in respect of the countries involved on the Red Sea. On 27 August, the Dutch Chargé d’Affaires in Jeddah unexpectedly paid an official call to senior officers in the Saudi armed forces, who announced that their government finally wished to accept the offer of assistance in mine clearance. The military also made it clear that they needed the deployment of a Fokker Maritime patrol aircraft. These reports were confirmed by the Saudi government the following day and were received enthusiastically in the Netherlands.

Deployment and doubt

According to naval officer Van de Beek, the decision to go ahead with the mission, announced on 28 August by Ministers Van den Broek of Foreign Affairs and De Ruiter of Defence in a joint letter to the Permanent Committees for Foreign Affairs of the Second and First Chambers, essentially came down to principles that had already been set out around 10 August. “At the request of the government of Saudi Arabia”, the Dutch government had decided to send the two minehunters referred to earlier to the Red Sea region to ensure the unrestricted passage of shipping vital for the (global) economy. This endeavour was in keeping with the safeguarding of Dutch interests in terms of the protection of shipping lanes as well as the international legal order. The Dutch cabinet was also keeping a particular eye on the "commercial implications". Satisfied, it concluded on 31 August that relations with Saudi Arabia were on an upward curve.

The Royal NL Navy had not been idle in the meantime. On 29 August, Commander D. Th. Notten had flown to Saudi Arabia to take up the function of senior liaison officer. This was quickly followed by the decision to appoint him as commanding liaison officer. This came as a result of the Saudi wish, as well as the implementation of a recommendation by the British defence attaché in Jeddah, to centralise the coordination of the two detection assets (the mine hunters and the Royal NL Air Force’s Fokker Maritime). The joint Netherlands contingent was organised as follows. CMZMNED (Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet of the Royal Netherlands Navy) Vice Admiral R. Krijger was in overall command of the operation from the Netherlands. To this end, he had virtually daily telephone contact with the commander of the task unit (CTU). The local commander of Task Unit (TU) 429.9.1, comprising HNLMS Haarlem, HNLMS Harlingen and the Fokker F27 Maritime, was Commander Notten.

Dutch operations in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez

Organisation

Although the countering of the mine threat in the Red Sea and around the Gulf of Suez had an international flavour, it was not officially registered as a multinational operation. There was no organisation to direct it at that level. Egypt and Saudi Arabia each monitored foreign fleet movements in their waters and the five Western states involved maintained separate formal relations with their respective hosts. Cairo and Jeddah tried to gain a better overview of the situation by setting up a coordinating committee. The Egyptian Coordinating Committee (ECC), based in Adabiyah, officially assigned an area thought to contain mines to each of the participating navies in its waters. The deployment areas themselves were tailored to the type of mine countermeasures capability. Modern (French) MCM units equipped with devices such as underwater robots operated in the southern, wider section of the Gulf of Suez, for example, where they were more suitable than US Navy helicopters with sweeping capacity only. The British were represented in the ECC by their defence attaché in Cairo and they sent a liaison officer to coordinate matters in that body. France and Italy refused to join this committee, however. Senior French and Italian officers stressed, with reference to the Beirut peace force fiasco, that they were operating on a purely bilateral basis and were not part of a multinational force.

The Saudis also set up a coordinating committee in Jeddah, where the bark at higher level proved to be worse than the actual bite. There, Western navies exchanged intelligence and technical and operational information freely and informally. Deployment areas were geared to each other in order to avoid duplication of effort, unless Egypt or Saudi Arabia specifically requested it. Dutch minehunters were operating off the ports of Yanbu’al Bahr and Jeddah, for example, because French units had been deployed near Jizan since 28 August. In a nutshell: although the French and Italians officially refused to commit to a more multinational operation under a committee, participating Western navies were in reality operating within the frameworks set up by the local authorities. The Dutch, who arrived late and who, given the specific wishes of the Saudis, were to search several remaining areas in a purely bilateral context, did not fall under any local coordinating committee. Commander Notten was thus directly accountable to the commander of the local naval base, a situation that also caught on for subsequent Dutch manoeuvres in Egyptian waters. The Dutch did, however, maintain more informal contact with the other Western navies. Shortly after his arrival in Saudi Arabia, for example, Notten paid an official visit to an American helicopter carrier, and the British naval attaché in Saudi Arabia brought him up to speed on the Royal Navy's latest findings in the mission area.

Futile quests for mines and export orders

Saudi Arabia

On 28 August in the Dutch port of Den Helder, the Haarlem and the Harlingen weighed anchor with a total of 90 personnel, as the newly formed Task Unit 429.9.1, reaching the British naval base in Gibraltar for supplies on 3 September. Despite this dynamic start, dark clouds were gathering above the mission. Because of the late decision to proceed to deployment, the four-week-old search actions by other navies and the fact that there had not been any more mine detonations, some felt that the Dutch ships may as well head back home. This was prompted by the US declaration on 5 September that Washington would soon be announcing the cessation of its minesweeping activities in the Red Sea. Minister of Defence J. de Ruiter, not unaware of the American intention, talked to the Defence Council on 12 September about whether the deployment would still be useful. Navy chiefs, who wanted to proceed with the action come what may, pointed out to the minister in no uncertain terms that the US had not yet withdrawn (this was not to be until the end of September), that Saudi Arabia wanted to ensure safe access to Jeddah because of the pilgrims and that our own ships were already in Egypt’s Port Saïd. De Ruiter changed his mind. The (only) discovery of a mine the same day by the Royal Navy, a new mine detonation by a Saudi ferry for Mecca pilgrims (empty at the time), as well as the British doubt that the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea were mine-free appeared to support the Dutch resolve.

In the meantime, the crews of the Haarlem and the Harlingen, unaware of all this political sparring, continued their voyage undaunted. But then again ….. The Harlingen's main engine broke down in the Mediterranean, which meant that the Haarlem had to act as a tug to Port Saïd, a distance of some 640 miles. Not only did this defect delay the Dutch task unit; it was not exactly good publicity for the Alkmaar-class product or the readiness of the Royal NL Navy. The other navies were also struck by similar misfortune. Engine problems on French mine sweepers and problems with steering gear and sonar on British MCM vessels meant that they too had to suspend their operations. The Dutch minehunters eventually reached Saudi Arabia's Jeddah on 16 September. This was used as their base of operations for searching sea zones near this port, as well as off Yanbu and Jizan. The operation covered a sea area of 800 kilometres to the south and 700 kilometres to the north of Jeddah.

The Fokker F-27 arrived in Jeddah on 5 September, and the aircraft performed nine patrol flights that month. The crew found no mines. There were then four flights that were largely classified as VIP transport. The Fokker aircraft returned to its home base in the Netherlands on 8 October. On the subject of the unexciting flights, Commander Notten remarked that they were largely intended by the Saudis as a naval presence, to show the Arab world that the kingdom, as the protector of Islam’s holy sanctuaries, was doing all it could to guarantee a safe return for the pilgrims. Something that, in his view, also applied to the minehunters that had arrived in Jeddah.

The Harlingen and the Haarlem spent two operational periods in Saudi waters. The nautical maps were, however, so unreliable that operations were only conducted by day. The first patrol, from 22 September to 1 October, consisted of visual surveillance of suspect shipping off the ports of Al Wajh and Yanbu. The second patrol took place between 6 and 15 October and consisted of ‘exploratory operations’ in the northern approach route as far as and inside the anchorage area off Jizan (depth less than 50 metres). While some suspect contacts were identified in these waters by the underwater robot or by divers, no mines were found. On 17 October, the Saudi navy announced that it did not foresee any further operations.

Because of an Egyptian request to conduct minehunting operations in the Gulf and the Bay of Suez, there was for the time being no end to the presence of TU 429.9.1 in the Middle East. On 22 October, the Haarlem and the Harlingen thus left Jeddah and headed for Egypt. The Netherlands Embassy in Jeddah was full of praise for the mission after the minehunters had left. There is said to have been an atmosphere of trust with the Saudi partners, resulting, amongst other things, in a courtesy visit by Commander Notten to the influential governor of Mecca and Jeddah, the brother of the Saudi head of state. Although there was talk on more than one occasion of potential Saudi orders for naval equipment from then until 1987, these never actually materialised.

Egypt

On 24 October, the Haarlem and the Harlingen then dropped anchor at the Egyptian naval base of El-Adabiya near Suez. Four operations were conducted from there. The first, from 26 to 20 November, was a minehunting exploratory in an area in the southern part of the Gulf of Suez which, because of the depth, had not yet been swept by the US Navy or the French. The water depth of 85 metres was marginal for the use of the underwater robot. Sonar worked well at that depth, with the trajectory showing some deviation, however. During the operation (as well as in follow-up patrols) Egyptian officers and crew were on board. No mines were found. A second patrol followed on 4-5 November at an anchorage site near El-Adabiya that had been closed for decades. Both ships searched in vain for two old, anchored Egyptian mines. To the great satisfaction of all, shipping was once again permitted there after the area had been cleared. Between 7 and 11 November, the Task Unit once again put out to sea, as it did in the period from 12 to 17 November. In neither exploratory minehunting effort in the Gulf of Suez, respectively to the west and to the north of the main shipping route, were any mines discovered. On 19 November, the Dutch ships sailed along the Suez Canal and berthed in Alexandria for an informal visit. The minehunters began their homeward voyage on 23 November.

Although the Egyptians did not express any preference for Alkmaar-class vessels after the departure of TU 429.9.1, the mission had clearly been appreciated. On his departure, the Egyptian commander in chief of the navy awarded Notten the order of merit second class for services rendered. The Dutch thus felt that, from the point of view of promotion, the visit had been a success.

In summary

With this mission, the government in The Hague had various political goals in mind. As well as a positive signal to the US in a period in which the Netherlands had taken a hesitant position on the stationing of American cruise missiles, the cabinet was seeking orders for the troubled national manufacturing, including shipping, industry. It was also seeking to gain prestige in the context of upholding the international legal order, by participating in the safeguarding of an international shipping route. It was thus serving other national interests too by protecting supplies of raw materials and the country's merchant shipping. Lastly, the cabinet felt that the action in the context of European political cooperation would provide an impetus towards a more military amalgamation of Western Europe. To serve this purpose, it went almost without saying that The Hague would fall back on the Royal NL Navy. Navy leaders for their part showed with this mission their ability and desire to fulfil the ambition to be permanently capable of operating worldwide after 1962. The possible prospect of export orders and thus a lower unit price for our own weapon platforms helped to boost this aspiration. In the light of the fortunes of the other (large) navies participating in this operation, our own shortcomings in terms of materiel did not, in the same way as the lack of discovered mines, turn out to be uncommon and did not thus create an adverse impression on the host nation. On the contrary: through audiences with the most senior figures and by awarding medals of honour, the Saudi and Egyptian authorities showed their appreciation of the well-trained, well-equipped Dutch forces. Subsequent orders for military equipment, however, after the initial interest, failed to materialise because of other political priorities or lack of funds.

As mentioned previously, the first Dutch aim of the mission had been achieved, given the reactions in Washington. Despite the fact that orders were not forthcoming from either Egypt or Saudi Arabia, the Netherlands had with this mission delivered its calling card in the region, declaring its technological and maritime-military skills. Although the Netherlands was looking after its own interests by promoting stability along an internationally important shipping route in a volatile region, it was also doing the Saudi Arabian government a great favour by visibly providing extra security for the pilgrimage to Mecca. As the CDA (the Christian Democratic Party) spokesman for Defence, A.B.M. Frinking, remarked on this subject: if you never take part, you're not entitled to a say. As far as the envisaged European cooperation was concerned in terms of peace and security, French-American controversies in particular meant that there was no official coordination, but there was actual coordination at operational level. Something that The Hague found reassuring. The fact that several European countries, including the Netherlands, had sent naval ships to the Red Sea was imparted in this context by Foreign Minister Van den Broek in the Second Chamber and in Brussels, where he, pulling out all the rhetorical stops, emphasised that, with the minehunting, Europe was making a firm contribution to the preservation of the freedom of passage and thus to the stability in a region also important to Europe. In short: for the government, the deployment of the Haarlem and the Harlingen as well as the Fokker had been a means by which different goals could be achieved and upon which they could in general terms look back with satisfaction.

Despite the subsequent absence of shipyard orders, navy chiefs were ultimately satisfied with the mission. The government had proved receptive to the possibility of using the Royal NL Navy to implement foreign and economic policy in a deployment area favourable for naval forces. In operational terms, the close contacts with the British Royal Navy in respect of supplies, exchange of intelligence, and advice proved, as always, extremely valuable. Also important was the fact that reports in trade journals and the media provided a showcase for our capabilities. Last but not least, the fact that the small minehunters were able to perform without a logistic platform, far from the home base and together with the large navies, “under completely different climatological conditions than those in which they normally operate” underlined without doubt the worldwide ambitions of the Dutch Admiralty.

� Respective sources in: J. Gerritsen, ‘Vlagvertoon bij jacht op mijnen herstelt imagozeevarende natie’, NRC Handelsblad, 30-8-1984; ‘ ‘Mijnenjagers kunnen nog meer dan we dachten…’ Tienduizend mijlen over zee’, Defensiekrant 48, 13-12-1984, 5J.O.[Oosthoek], ‘Alkmaarklasse kan wereldwijd opereren…’, Alle Hens, 38, 1, January (1985) 4-5.

� E.H. van der Beugel e.a., Te beginnen bij Nederland. Opstellen over oorlog en vrede (Amsterdam 1983); J.W. Bezemer, ‘De achtertuin van Nederland. Opstellen over buitenlandse politiek (Amsterdam 1985); R. van Diepen, ‘Beschaafd ageren voor de NAVO’ 50 jaar Atlantische Commissie (Den Haag 2002); R.E. van Ditzhuyzen, ‘De blik op het buitenland. Vijftig jaar Nederlands Genootschap voor Internationale Zaken (Assen 1995); J. Hoffenaar and G. Teitler (ed.), De Koude Oorlog. Maatschappij en Krijgsmacht in de jaren ’50 (’s-Gravenhage 1992); J. Hoffenaar, J. van der Meulen and R. de Winter (ed.), Confrontatie en ontspanning. Maatschappij en krijgsmacht in de Koude Oorlog 1966-1989 (’s-Gravenhage 2004); J.W. Honig, Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance. The Case of the Netherlands (Westport Co./London 1993); I. Megens, American aid to NATO allies in the 1950s: the Dutch Case (Amsterdam 1994); P. Scheffer, Een tevreden natie. Nederland en het wederkerend geloof in de Europese status quo (Amsterdam 1988); B. Schoenmaker and J.A.M.M. Janssen (ed.), In de schaduw van de Muur. Maatschappij en krijgsmacht rond 1960 (Den Haag 1997); J.G. Siccama (ed.), Taakspecialisatie (’s-Gravenhage 1988); A. van Staden, Een trouwe bondgenoot: Nederland en het Atlantisch Bondgenootschap 1960-1971 (Baarn 1974).

� Such as: A. ten Cate, Waarnemers op Heilige Grond (Den Haag 2003); A. ten Cate, M. van der Vorm, Callsign Nassau. Het moderne Korps Commandotroepen 1989-2012 (Amsterdam 2012); J. Hoffenaar and B. Schoenmaker, Met de blik naar het Oosten. De Koninklijke Landmacht 1945-1990 (Den Haag 1994); B. Kester, H. Roozenbeek and O. Groot, Focus op Korea. De rol van de Nederlandse pers in de beeldvorming over de Korea-oorlog 1950-1953 (Den Haag, 2000); Missie zonder vrede. Eindrapport parlementaire enquête commissie Srebrenica (’s-Gravenhage 2003); B. Schoenmaker and H. Roozenbeek (eds.), Vredesmacht in Libanon. Nederland en UNIFIL, 1979-1985 (Amsterdam, 2004).

� Exceptions are two publications about operations by the Netherlands air force outside the NATO treaty area after the end of the Cold War: P.E. van Loo, Crossing the border. De Koninklijke Luchtmacht na de van de Berlijnse Muur (Den Haag 2003) and W.H. Lutgert and R. de Winter, Check the horizon. De Koninklijke Luchtmacht en het conflict in voormalig Joegoslavië 1991-1995 (Den Haag 2001).

� L. Brouwer a.o., Tussen vloot en politiek. Honderd jaar marinestaf (Amsterdam, 1986); G.J.A. Raven (ed.), De kroon op het anker. 175 jaar Koninklijke Marine (Amsterdam 1988).

� D.C.L. Schoonoord, Mariniers in Irak en Turkije 1991: humanitaire hulpverlening door militairen aan Koerden (Leeuwarden 1992); K. Bais, Het mijnenveld van een vredesmacht: Nederlandse blauwhelmen in Cambodja (Den Haag 1994); R. Cinqualbré, M. Langenkamp, J. Majoor (eds.), Herinneringsboek detachement Cambodja – III. S.l., (1993); D.C.L. Schoonoord, De Koninklijke marine in actie voor de Verenigde Naties: mariniers in Cambodja 1992-1993 (Leeuwarden/Mechelen 1993); G.J.M.C.M. Danen e.a. (eds.), Mariniers in Bosnië 4 januari – 28 juni 1996 PR Office Royal Netherlands Marines Corps Rotterdam (Rotterdam 1997).

� J. Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1991. Political Applications of Limited Naval Force third edition (Basingstoke 1994), 188, 190; R.E. van Holst Pellekaan-I.C. de Regt, J.F. Bastiaans, Patrouilleren voor de Papoea’s. De Koninklijke Marine in Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea 1945-1960 Vol. 5a (Amsterdam 1989) 119-126, 178-188; R.E. van Holst Pellekaan-I.C. de Regt, J.F. Bastiaans, Patrouilleren voor de Papoea’s. De Koninklijke Marine in Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea 1960-1962 Vol. 5b (Amsterdam 1990), 109-126.

� D. Hellema, ‘Vlagvertoon’, in: B. de Graaff and D. Hellema (eds.), Instrumenten van buitenlandse politiek. Achtergronden en praktijk van de Nederlandse diplomatie (Amsterdam, 2007), 158-166, q.v. 166. See also: D. Hellema, De Karel Doorman naar Nieuw-Guinea. Nederlands machtsvertoon in de Oost (Amsterdam 2005).

� Admiral of the Fleet Sir J. Oswald, G.C.B., ‘U.N. Maritime Operations. “Realities, problems, and Possibilities” ’, Naval war College Review, Vol. XLVI, Number 4, Sequence 344, Autumn (1993), 124-129, q.v. 125.

� M. Pugh, J. Ginifer and Eric Grove, ‘Sea power, security and peacekeeping after the Cold War’, in: M. Pugh (ed.), Maritime security and peacekeeping. A framework for United Nations operations (Manchester and New York 1994), 10-31, q.v. 22-25. See also here: Oswald, ‘U.N. Maritime Operations’, 125. Oswald states among other things that “[…] military developed nations must take account of the sensitivities and constraints under which the U.N. operates. They have to acknowledge that fundamental legality for U.N. operations depends on the consensus within the General Assembly and the Security Council”.

� J. Hoffenaar, ‘De Nederlandse krijgsmacht in historisch perspectief’, in: E.R. Muller e.a. (ed.), Krijgsmacht. Studies over de organisatie en het optreden (Den Haag 2003), 27-66, q.v. 47; J.A.M.M. Janssen, ‘Driestromenland in optima forma: identiteit, taken en organisatorische inbedding van de krijgsmachtdelen rond 1960’, in: B. Schoenmaker, J.A.M.M. Janssen (ed.), In de schaduw van de Muur. Maatschappij en krijgsmacht rond 1960 (Den Haag 1997), 236-251, q.v. 242; F.H. Meulman en A.G.W. Ruitenberg, ‘Krijgsmachtdelen’, in: Krijgsmacht, 277-351, q.v. 283; J.W. Honig, Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance. The case of the Netherlands (Westport Con./London 1993), 46-47; N. Delfos, ‘Oriëntatie op de NAVO; de periode 1963-1986’, in: L. Brouwer e.a., Tussen vloot en politiek. Een eeuw marinestaf 1886-1986 (Amsterdam 1986), 169-215, q.v. 169; L.L.M. Eekhout, ‘Atlantisch actief 1962-1988’, in: G.J.A. Raven (ed.), De kroon op het anker. 175 jaar Koninklijke Marine (Amsterdam 1988). 135-151, q.v. 135; A. van Staden, Een trouwe bondgenoot: Nederland en het Atlantisch bondgenootschap (Baarn 1974), 183-184.

� Interview author with vice admiral (retd.) J.D.W. van Renesse, 24-3-2010; Ministry of Defence (MvD), Semi Static Archives (SSA), Archive Secretary of the Navy (STAS), inv.no. 662, CMS VADM Van der Schatte Olivier to STASdefmar, nr. S. 022.717/012.280 [1965], Subject: Considerations regarding the replacement of Holland- and Friesland-class destroyers.

� For example: Leidraad maritiem optreden. De bijdrage van het Commando Zeestrijdkrachten aan de Nederlandse krijgsmacht (Den Helder 2005); F.H. Meulman and A.G.W. Ruitenberg, ‘Krijgsmachtdelen’, in: E.R. Muller e.a., Krijgsmacht. Studies over de organisatie en het optreden (Alphen aan den Rijn 2004) 277-351; D. Weekenstroo, P.C. van Royen, J.W. Ort, Welvaart en Zeemacht. De Koninklijke Marine in de 21ste eeuw (Amsterdam 1999); F.W. Weisglas e.a., The Maritime Dimension of the New NATO. Implications for The Netherlands Presentations held at the conference organised by the Royal Netherlands Navy and the Netherlands Atlantic Association, 19 November 1999 (The Hague 1999).

� J.M. Bik, ‘Versterking en reorganisatie defensietop hard nodig’, NRC Handelsblad, 4-5-1972, 5; H.H. Siblesz, ‘The National Political Perspective of NATO’, in: F.W. Weisglas e.a., The Maritime Dimension of the New NATO. Implications for The Netherlands Presentations held at the conference organised by the Royal Netherlands Navy and the Netherlands Atlantic Association, 19 November 1999 (The Hague 1999), 31-37, q.v. 31-32, 35; Statement of K.D. Naumann, general (retd.) of the German Army during the symposium ‘Maritime Strategy Revisisted’, 22-06-2001. Quoted in: C.L. Turnhout, “Maritime Marketing”, editorial Marineblad, 377, 12 (2001), 377; Jhr. H. van Foreest, ‘Vóór alles behoud van kwaliteit vereist’, Carré, no. 4, April (1991), 10-11; Leidraad maritiem optreden. De bijdrage van het Commando Zeestrijdkrachten aan de Nederlandse krijgsmacht (Den Helder 2005), 13, 47, 193.

� G. Rommelse, ‘Follow me’. De M-fregatten van de Karel Doorman-klasse (Franeker 2008), 78-79.

� W.C. Mabesoone, ‘De Maritieme Strategie na de Koude Oorlog’, Zeewezen/Maritiem, 82, 6 (1993), 4-7, q.v. 4-5.

� Ministry of Home Affairs, Doc-Direkt Archives, Archive MvD, HNLM ships 1976-1987 C, HNMS Tromp 1979, 3. Mission Report, 91/C/79, date: 190779, letter CEKD 209/79/C to the Minister of Defence after mediation CZMNED, Confidential, Mission Report Group Deployment 1979 (12 March– 12 July 1979), At sea, 5-7-1979; de Volkskrant, 1-12-1987, 6; ‘Goalkeeper-systeem was drie weken defect’, NRC Handelsblad, 19-8-1991, 9.

� JRG, ‘De achtergrond van de admiraal. ‘Juist de marine kan bv Nederland ondersteunen’ ’, Defensiekrant, 8-6-1989, 3.

� Netherlands Institute of Military History (NIMH), Collection Maritime Documentation, P. Brader, ANP, ‘Admiraal Brainich: het vertrouwen in de marine is hersteld’, interview with vice admiral C.H.E. Brainich von Brainich Felth, The Hague, 20-2-1989.

� D. Meeldijk, ‘Minister mr. J.A.M.H. Luns had voortdurende belangstelling voor de zeemacht’ Onze gast van de maand, Ons Zeewezen. Orgaan van de Koninklijke Nederlandse vereniging “Onze Vloot”, 49, No. 5, May, (1960) 24-26

� N. Wijnolst, ‘The Royal Netherlands Navy from a National Maritime and Economic Perspective’, in: F.W. Weisglas e.a., The Maritime Dimension of the New NATO. Implications for The Netherlands Presentations held at the conference organised by the Royal Netherlands Navy and the Netherlands Atlantic Association, 19 November 1999 (The Hague 1999), 7-16, q.v. 14-15.

� R. Hill, Lewin of Greenwich. The authorised biography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin (London 2000) 259.

� E.J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident. British Naval Policy since World War II (Annapolis 1987), 336. See also in this context: A. Ellner, ‘Carrier Airpower in the Royal Navy during the Cold War: The International Strategic Context’, Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 22, Issue 1, March 2006, 23-44.

� J.W.L. Brouwer, ‘Dutch naval policy in the Cold War period’, in: J.R. Bruijn a.o. (eds.), Strategy and response in the twentieth century maritime world Papers presented to the Fourth British-Dutch maritime history conference (Amsterdam, 2001), 42-61, q.v. 48-49; NIMH, MARDOC, nr. 10007., Copy dossier, presumably from the British National Archives, Archive Ministry of the Navy, Secret, D.O. (46) 3, 7-1-1946, Memorandum Lord Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, to the Cabinet Defence Committee, ‘Aircraft Carrier for the Dutch’.

� P.B.R. de Geus, Staatsbelang en krijgsmacht. De Nederlandse defensie tijdens de Koude Oorlog (Den Haag, 1998), 8-10. See also: B.M. Blechman a.o., Force without war: U.S. armed forces as a political instrument (Washington 1978) 6-7.

� See for example: J.M.J. Bosch and G. Teitler, ‘Strategisch kader’, in: Muller, Krijgsmacht, 607-628; P.J. Teunissen and H. Emmens, ‘De krijgsmacht in internationaal verband’, in: Muller, Krijgsmacht, 67-146.

� See for observations by Dutch experts on new positions regarding matters of peace and security and military missions after 11 September 2001: J.M.J. Bosch and G. Teitler, ‘Strategisch kader’, in: Krijgsmacht, 616; B. Boxhoorn, ‘Editorial, Atlantisch Perspectief, no. 7/8 (2001) 3; A. Brouwers, met vereende kracht. Europa en de oorlog tegen Amerika terrorisme edition Atlantische Commissie (Den Haag 2002); P.A.L. Ducheine, Krijgsmacht, geweldgebruik & terreurbestrijding. Een onderzoek naar juridische aspecten van de rol van strijdkrachten bij de bestrijding van terrorisme (Nijmegen 2008) 1-7; P. Ducheine, P.H. Kamphuis, ‘Defensie en binnenlandse veiligheid: vertrouwd en toch verrassend nieuw’, Ten Geleide Militaire Spectator, 175, 11 (2006), 470-471; P. van Ham a.o., Terrorism and Counterterrorism. Insights and Perspectives after September 11 edition Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael” (Den Haag 2002); N. Hoekstra, ‘Editorial’, Atlantisch Perspectief, no. 6 (2001), 3; C. Homan, ‘Defensie heeft een aanvullende rol bij bestrijding terrorisme’, Atlantisch Perspectief, no. 6 (2001) 12; C. Klep, R. van Gils, Van Korea tot Kabul. De Nederlandse militaire deelname aan vredesoperaties sinds 1945 (Den Haag 2005) 174; W. Oosterbaan and L. Starink (eds.), Na de aanval. De wereld sinds 11 september (Amsterdam/Rotterdam 2002); F. Osinga, ‘Een nieuwe totale oorlog. Een aanslag op ons begripsvermogen?’, Internationale Spectator 55, 11 (2001) 530, 531; Internationale samenwerking continue in beeld public edition Annual Report International Cooperation 2001 edition Directorate Public Relations Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Den Haag 2002) 9; A. van Staden, ‘Einde intermezzo in de internationale politiek?’, Internationale Spectator 55, 11 (2001), 527-529; Terrorismebestrijding in mondiaal en Europees perspectief edition Advisory Council on International Affairs, No. 49, September (2006), 7, 54; Ibidem, Attachment 1, Letter regarding ‘Terrorismebestrijding in Europees en internationaal perspectief’ of the Minister of Foreign Affairs B.R. Bot to the chairman of the Advisory Council on International Affairs F. Korthals Altes, 15-7-2005; P.J. Teunissen en H. Emmens, ‘De krijgsmacht in internationaal verband’, in: Muller, Krijgsmacht, 72, 79, 80.

� A.M.C. van Dissel, P. Groen, De Nederlandse krijgsmacht in het Caribische gebied (Amsterdam 2010).

� T.W. Brocades Zaalberg, Soldiers and civil power. Supporting or substituting civil authorities in modern peace operations (Amsterdam 2005); A. ten Cate (ed.), Mannen op missie. De geschiedenis van het Korps Mariniers na 1989 (publication expected Amsterdam 2015).

� See for example: J.R. Hill, ‘The realities of medium power, 1946 to the present’, in: J.R. Hill (ed.), B. Ranft (consultant ed.), The Oxford illustrated history of the Royal Navy (Oxford/New York 1995), 381-408; G. Teitler, ‘Anglo-Dutch relations, 1936-1988. Colonial and European trends’, in: G.J.A. Raven & N.A.M. Rodger (eds.), Navies and Armies. The Anglo-Dutch relationship in war and peace 1688-1988 (Edinburgh 1990), 70-83.

� ‘Helikopters VS vegen mijnen in Rode Zee’, NRC Handelsblad, 7-8-1984; S. Truver, ‘Mines of August: an International Whodunit’, Proceedings U.S. Naval Institute Naval review , Vol. 111, nr. 5 May (1985) 97-98.

� Truver, ‘Mines of August’, 96, 102.

� G. Till, ‘The return to globalism: The Royal Navy East of Suez, 1975-2003’, in: G. Kennedy (ed.), British Naval Strategy East of Suez 1900-20002. Influences and actions Frank Cass Series (London and New York 2005) 44-268, q.v. 257; J. Roberts, Safeguarding the nation. The Story of the Modern Royal Navy (Barnsley 2009) 176-177.

� ‘Olietanker loopt op mijn in de Rode Zee’, NRC Handelsblad, 6-8-1984; Truver, ‘Mines of August’, 103.

� J. Eberle, ‘Terrorism at sea’, Editorial , Naval Forces No. V (1984) 7; Truver, ‘Mines of August’, 102.

� MvD, SSA, Note Chief of Staff (CS) Commander of Naval Forces (BDZ), rear admiral C.H.E. Brainich von Brainich-Felth to the Minister of Defence by mediation of the Secretary General (SG) iaa Chief Defence Staff (CDS), 8-8-1984, Mine threat in the Red Sea/Gulf of Suez, S 173509/145864.

� ‘Marine wil meezoeken naar mijnen Rode Zee’, NRC Handelsblad, 11-8-1984; H. van de Beek, ‘Het mijnenbestrijdingswapen als militair-maritiem middel in het buitenlands beleid’, paper Royal Netherlands Naval College (Den Helder 1985) 51; Gerritsen, ‘Vlagvertoon’.

� Press release security instructions and similar announcements by the Royal Dutch Ship Owners Society (KNRV); ‘Marine wil meezoeken naar mijnen Rode Zee’, NRC Handelsblad, 11-8-1984; ‘Olietanker loopt op mijn’; Van de Beek, ‘Mijnenbestrijdingswapen’, 50.

� ‘Kairo: Nederlandse mijnenjagers niet nodig’, NRC Handelsblad, 16-8-1984.

� Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MBZ), Archives, 6691, 1H 2/3, Passage blockage because of mines in the Suez Canal, MCM in international association and Dutch participation by the mine hunters HNLMS harlingen en haarlem, 1984. Coded message, 10-8-1984 embassy Washington [Fein] to M FA, MCM operations in the Red Sea, received 10-8-1984, Reference No. 17647, VADV, Ag.No: 228277, Dossier: 553.10 Alg/Explosion Red Sea, rmc 606 [bp] 222941, immediate, Confidential.

� Van de Beek, ‘Mijnenbestrijdingswapen’,51. See also: National Archives (NA), Minutes Council of Ministers (NMR), inv.nr. 4074,, 16-8-1984.

� MBZ, Archives, 6691, 1H 2/3, Passage blockage because of mines in the Suez Canal, MCM in international association and Dutch participation by the mine hunters HNLMS harlingen en haarlem, 1984. Coded message, 25-8-1984 embassy Cairo [Revis] to M FA, M of Defence, MCM for the Red Sea, received 25-8-1984, Reference No. 18518, VADV, Ag.No: : 236003, Dossier: 553.10 Alg/Explosion Red Sea, most immediate, Confidential.

� MBZ, Archives, 6691, 1H 2/3, Passage blockage because of mines in the Suez Canal, MCM in international association and Dutch participation by the mine hunters HNLMS harlingen en haarlem, 1984. Coded message, 27-8-1984 embassy Djeddah [Zaadhof] to M FA, MCM Red Sea, ref: my code 141., tel. conversation today ps and zaadhof, received 27-8-1984, Reference No. 818558, dav, Ag.No: 236129-2879 gs, Dossier: 553.10 Alg/ Explosion Red Sea, most immediate, Confidential.

� ‘Twee Nederlandse mijnenjagers alsnog naar Rode Zee, NRC Handelsblad, 29-8-1984. The request regarding the Fokker plane was no surprise. In 1984 this Dutch airplane constructer lobbied for an order of dozens of planes for the Saudi border control. Among others the director F. Swarttouw accompanied the Dutch Prime Minister R.F.M. Lubbers and Minister of Foreign Affairs H. van den Broek during a visit to the Saudi capital in May 1984. Source: ‘Fokker hoopt op Saoedische order’, Reformatorisch Dagblad, 14-5-1984.

� Van de Beek, ‘Mijnenbestrijdinsgwapen’, 54.

� Proceedings, Second Chamber of Parliament (HTK), Letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence J. de Ruiter to the Parliamentarian Commission on Foreign Affairs and Defence , 28-8-1984.

� NA, NMR, inv.nr. 4074, 31-8-1984.

� MBZ, Archives, 6691, 1H 2/3, Passage blockage because of mines in the Suez Canal, MCM in international association and Dutch participation by the mine hunters HNLMS harlingen en haarlem, 1984. Coded message, 29-8-1984, M BZ to embassy Jeddah, mine hunters Red Sea, Reference No. 14482, vadv, Ag.No: 242698, Dossier: 553.10 Alg/ Explosion Red Sea, rmc 97, immediate, Confidential.

� MBZ, Archives, 6691, 1H 2/3, Passage blockage because of mines in the Suez Canal, MCM in international association and Dutch participation by the mine hunters HNLMS harlingen en haarlem, 1984. Coded message, 30-8-1984, embassy Jeddah [Zaadhof] to M FA, mine hunters Red Sea, received 30-8-1984, Reference No. 18805, vadv, opinion VA, Ag.No: 242709, Dossier: 553.10 Alg/ Explosion Red Sea, immediate, Confidential.

�NA, MvD, Naval Staff, 1948-1984, Archive block number.: D19, Inv.nr.: 344, Operation order 3/84 for counter mine operations in the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea and instructions for asylum applications and stowaways. 1984. Confidential, Den Helder, 310884, No. 08401-0626/Secret, operational order 3/84, Referte: A. BDZ LAQ/L3A 311319Z Aug 84 (notal); SSA, KM, Box Mine Service, no. 51, Peace Operations, Persian Gulf, MCM Operations Red Sea, Several mission reports, Octopus, 1984 - 1988, Secret. Report Operations in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez, pp. 1-7, Confidential.

� Truver, ‘Mines of August’, 107-108.

� Ibid., 108.

� MBZ, Archives, 6691, 1H 2/3, Passage blockage because of mines in the Suez Canal, MCM in international association and Dutch participation by the mine hunters HNLMS harlingen en haarlem, 1984. Coded message, 27-8-1984, embassy Jeddah [Zaadhof] to M FA, mine hunters Red Sea, my code 141, tel. conversation today ps and Zaadhof, received: 27-8-1984, Reference No. 818558, dav, Ag.No: 236129-2879 gs, Dossier: 553.10 Alg/ Explosion Red Sea, most immediate, Confidential.

� Truver, ‘Mines of August’, 107-108.

� E-mails D.Th. Notten to author, 23-11-2013; 5-12-2013.

� Jaarboek van de Koninklijke Marine 1984 (Den Haag 1989) 201-203.

� NA, MvD, Naval Staff, 1948-1984, Archive Block no.: D19, Inv.no.: 14299, Mission of F-27 Maritime airplane and counter mine vessels to Saudi Arabia (Djedda). 1984. Abstract minutes Defence Council 12-9-1984, DR 20/84, Doss. S 173.811. See also: Truver, ‘Mines of August’, 103, 106. See also: Truver, ‘Mines of August’, 103, 106.

� Jaarboek KM 1984, 203.

� Truver, ‘Mines of August’, 96-97, 109.

� Jaarboek KM 1984, 203.

� Truver, ‘Mines of August’, 102-103; ‘Kairo: Nederlandse mijnenjagers niet nodig’, NRC Handelsblad, 16-8-1984.

� Jaarboek KM 1984, 203.

� ‘Met de groeten van HM ‘Harlingen’ ’, @@@, 28-9-1984.

� MvD, SSA, Box KM, Mines Service, no. 51, Peace Operations, Persian Gulf, MCM operations Red Sea, Several mission reports, Octopus, 1984 - 1988, Secret. Report Operations in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez, Confidential, p. 1-1; De Koninklijke Luchtmacht in de West. 336 Squadron op Curaçao 1981-2000 Brochure Royal Netherlands Air Force, History Unit Staff of the Commander in Chief ,No. 11 (Den Haag 2000) 58.

� MvD, SSA, Box KM, Mines Service, no. 51, Peace Operations, Persian Gulf, MCM operations Red Sea, Several mission reports, Octopus, 1984 - 1988, Secret. Report Operations in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez, Confidential, p. 1-5.

� MvD, SSA, Box KM, Mines Service, no. 51, Peace Operations, Persian Gulf, MCM operations Red Sea, Several mission reports, Octopus, 1984 - 1988, Secret. Report Operations in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez, Confidential, pp. 1-1, 2, 5. See also: Truver, ‘Mines of August’, 103, and Chart 4704, Hydrographic Office of the Royal Navy, edition date 9-2-2012.

� Jaarboek KM 1984, 203.

� MBZ, Archives, 1340, MCM by the Dutch navy in and around the Red Sea after invitation by Saudi Arabia 1984, 24-10-1984, embassy Jeddah J.F.E. Breman to M FA, No. 5552/525, mine hunters Red Sea, conclusion, DAV/MS, viewpoint VADV, received: 1-11-1984, , Ag.No: 299174, Dossier: 553.10 Alg/ Mines Red Sea.

� H.J. Neuman, Voorlopige plaatsbepaling. Beschouwingen over internationale vraagstukken 1961-1990 (’s-Gravenhage 1990) 141-151; ‘RDM mag duikboten voor Saoedi-Arabië bouwen’, Reformatorisch Dagblad, 13-12-1986.

� MvD, SSA, Box KM, Mines Service, no. 51, Peace Operations, Persian Gulf, MCM operations Red Sea, Several mission reports, Octopus, 1984 - 1988, Secret. Report Operations in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez, Confidential, pp. 1-2, 1-3, 1-6. Zie verder: Jaarboek KM 1984, 203, alsook E-mail D.Th. Notten to author, 23-11-2013.

� Jaarboek KM 1984, 203.

� Jaarboek Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1984-1985, Attachment 2, Lecture Minister of Foreign Affairs mr. H. van den Broek on ‘European security challenges’, Royal Institute of International Relations 2 October 1984 in Brussels (’s-Gravenhage 1985) 5B-11B, q.v. 7B.

� Egypt was eventually unable to collect the necessary funds. The authorities in Cairo also acknowledged that it would take years before the Egyptian navy was able to operate these highly sophisticated vessels. Source: E-mails D.Th. Notten to author, 23-11-2013 and 5-12-2013.

� HTK, Explanatory Statement to the Budget of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence, 19-12-1984, p. 2543.

� M. Cremasco, ‘Do-it Yourself. The National Approach to the Out-of-Area Question’, in: J.I. Coffey and G. Bonvicinni (ed.), The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East Macmillan Press Basingstoke and London, 1989), 147-192,179.-12-2013.

� Among others the Secretary of Defence W.K. Hoekzema (VVD, conservative-liberal party) expressed in December 1984 in the Lower House of parliament his “special gratitude” for the efforts made by the crews of both mine hunters. Source: HTK, 12-12-1984, pp. @@@.

� HTK, 31-1-1985, 2953. See also: Jaarboek Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1984-1985, Attachment 2, Lecture Minister of Foreign Affairs mr. H. van den Broek on ‘European security challenges, Royal Institute of International Relations 2 October 1984 in Brussels (’s-Gravenhage 1985) 5B-11B, q.v. 7B.

� MvD, SSA, Box KM, Mines Service, no. 51, Peace Operations, Persian Gulf, MCM operations Red Sea, Several mission reports, Octopus, 1984 - 1988, Secret. Report Operations in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez, Confidential, p.1-7.

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