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Fall 2013 Tu Th 9:20 – 10:35 MG 102

IR 335-010: 4 credit hours (CRN: 48334) Intervention

Chaim Kaufmann – revised 11/30/2013

CourseSite: IR-335-010-FL13 Course research guide: http://libraryguides.lehigh.edu/ir335 E-mail: ck07 Office hours (208 Maginnes): Tu Th 10:45-12:00; or by appointment. Course Objective:

It has always been common for states to intervene, by both military and non-military means, in the politics and economics of other (usually weaker) states. This is done both for narrow national security purposes (e.g., counterinsurgency, insurgency support, blockades and embargoes, covert regime change efforts) and to serve broader normative goals (e.g., disaster relief, refugee protection, peacekeeping, peace enforcement; arguably economic or political development aid and efforts at transnational spread of norms should also count). Since 1945 by far the most frequent intervener has been the United States. This can be expected to continue for at least the medium-term future, making intervention a prime foreign policy concern for Americans.

In the United Nations era, however, international legal norms favoring sovereignty have been hostile to interventions not requested by the target state, although unevenly—the Security Council has power to authorize multilateral interventions and has used it (and targets are sometimes coerced to “request” intervention). More recently, the sovereignty norm has been weakened somewhat by the concept of “humanitarian intervention” and emerging supporting legal doctrines such as the “responsibility to protect.” In addition, effectiveness of and best practices for both counterinsurgency and humanitarian interventions are much contested. Thus future trajectories in intervention will depend on evolving norms as well as on perceptions (especially in the U.S.) of effectiveness of recent and ongoing cases.

This course explores how and why states (and coalitions of states) intervene and what factors influence interveners’ success in achieving their goals as well as consequences for target societies and others. We will focus mainly on two forms—counterinsurgency and humanitarian intervention—that have been frequent and that arguably are those of greatest concern to the U.S. and arguably for the world as a whole. Many of the ideas we will confront however, have relevance to other types of intervention and such discussions will always be welcome

The goals of this course are to provide you with tools for understanding causes of interventions and determinants of outcomes; familiarity with a portion of the recent record; and to help you improve analytic and presentation skills by conducting a substantial research project. Course Outline:

I. Ethics, Law, and Politics

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II. Counterinsurgency III. Humanitarian Intervention

Prerequisites:

IR 10. One or more intermediate-level core courses is desirable, as are skills in other social science and humanities disciplines and regional or language expertise. Requirements: 1. There will be about 19 sessions for which you will need to prepare readings or films in advance. As our progress may not match the planned schedule, you are responsible for keeping track.

The course format is mainly seminar, although depending on special technical or historical issues not fully covered in readings, I may lecture for a minute or several at a time; do interrupt with questions.

Your initiatives and interaction, however, should do much of the work of directing the class. All class members are expected to be fully prepared for each seminar session, ready to structure and lead discussion. You should engage each other, not just me, and can and should seize control of the direction of discussion.

Active contribution is part of your responsibility to educate not only yourself but also your colleagues and me.

See “How to Be Effective in a Social Science Seminar” on our CourseSite. 2. Prior to each class meeting that has assigned readings (starting with #2), a one

to one and a half page essay exploring an issue that you found interesting in the reading(s) assigned for that day. Together these will form half of the seminar portion of the course grade. Although about 19 sessions will have assigned readings, only 15 daily essays are required. Extra essays count 1% extra credit toward your final grade.

See “IR 335 Daily Essays” on our CourseSite. 3. A policy-relevant research paper on an intervention case, maximum length 20

pages, produced in five stages over the course of the semester. See “IR 335 Main Assignment” on our CourseSite. Additional documents provide

detailed charges for each part. 4. Up to five simulation sessions on counterinsurgency and/or humanitarian

intervention. Up to four will be regular class meetings; one will require a weekend date (which will make up three regular dates we will miss). Tentatively, Sunday October 27. Reserve this date.

5. Do not disrupt the class. Laptops are permitted for purposes of taking notes. Other electronic devices are prohibited.

Extra credit opportunities:

If you attend a non-course lecture and discussion (at Lehigh or elsewhere) on a topic related to this course, you may submit a reaction paper worth 1% of the final course grade. A document under ‘Assignments’ provides instructions.

You will also find an assignment that allows you to contribute to improving Lehigh’s library holdings.

There is a maximum limit of 5% of the final course grade.

Grading

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Seminar 30 Research project Proposal 2 Research Tools 3 Background 15 Analysis 15 Final Paper 35 Intellectual Integrity:

The Department of International Relations Policy on Academic Integrity and Plagiarism is hereby incorporated into this syllabus. A copy will be posted on the course web site. See also the relevant pages of your Lehigh Student Handbook.

Accommodation for Students with Disabilities: Students who have a disability for which you are or may be requesting

accommodation should contact both the instructor and the Office of Academic Support Services, University Center 212 (610-758-4152) as early as possible in the semester. You must obtain documentation from Academic Support Services before accommodation can be granted. Required Textbooks: 1. John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from

Malaya and Vietnam, revised ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 2. Gerard Prunier, Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide, 3rd ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell

University Press, 2008). 3. Nick Turse, Kill Everything That Moves: The Real War in Vietnam (New York:

Metropolitan, 2013). 4. Kate L. Turabian et al., A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and

Dissertations, 7th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007) OR Joseph Gibaldi, MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers, 7th ed. (Modern Language Association, 2009).

Two more to be named. Schedule and Reading Assignments: Each session listing includes questions that you may want to keep in mind while

preparing. These are not meant to be exhaustive or to constain seminar discussion.

* = reading item on CourseSite under ‘Course Documents;’ others in textbooks (films on reserve in the Media Center). Contact me promptly if you discover a corrupt file or any other problem with a document on our CourseSite.

The ‘main documents folder’ contains many resources that are not assigned but that you may find interesting or useful.

Films are on reserve at Fairchild; you can watch them solo or in groups. 1. Tues. August 27: Studying Intervention

How should we categorize types of ‘intervention?’

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How should we categorize motives for intervention?

How should we categorize tools of intervention? Is there a bright line between military and non-military tools? Between unilateral and multilateral?

Is there a bright line between different types of intervention, especially between counterinsurgency and humanitarian intervention?

How should we assess ‘success’ and ‘failure’ of interventions, especially counterinsurgencies and humanitarian interventions? This last question will, and should, recur repeatedly.

*This syllabus, at least the ‘front matter’ and first two weeks; main research assignment

and first assignment (Proposal); memos on conduct of the seminar and on daily essays.

Also of interest (not assigned): Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 1997). Will Strunk, Jr., The Elements of Style (New York: Tribeca, 2012) or earlier edition (Strunk

& White). I: ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS 2. Thurs. August 29: Ethics and Law of Counterinsurgency [71]

Is intervention based on political or strategic interest justifiable? On an interest in governance?

Can counterinsurgency be justified on humanitarian grounds even if that is not the intervener’s main or only motive?

Is terror the only way to defeat an insurgency? If so, should we give up counterinsurgency rather than engage in terrorism?

Can counterinsurgents maintain a level of discipline that avoids large-scale collateral damage and/or war crimes? If not, does that delegitimate the entire enterprise?

Does the legitimacy of a counterinsurgency effort depend on what conditions the interveners leave behind?

*Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 4th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 4th ed., 2006),

ch. 11 and parts of chs. 9 and 19, 151-159, 176-96, 306-322. *Rebecca Johnson, “Jus Post Bellum and Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Military Ethics,

7:3 (2008), 215-30. *Edward Luttwak, “Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice,”

Harpers Magazine 314 (February 2007), 33-42. Also of interest (not assigned): Walzer chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 19. Alex P. Bellamy, “The Responsibilities of Victory: Jus Post Bellum and the Just War,”

Review of International Studies 34:4 (October 2008), 601-625. Sergio Koc-Menard, “Just War Tradition, Liberalism, and Civil War,” Philosophy in the

Contemporary World 11:2 (Fall/Winter 2004), 57-64.

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Ethics and Law of Humanitarian Intervention [67]

Is humanitarian intervention ever mandatory? Or mandatory but impractical? Or optional?

When do (or should) norms of state sovereignty block intervention?

Should we recognize a “responsibility to protect” that can require action despite sovereignty norms? When does it apply?

Should interveners worry about re-creating colonialism, or the appearance of it?

Why do we see so many pious words and so few and puny deeds?

*Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 4th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 4th ed., 2006), parts of chs. 4 and 6, 53-66, 101-108.

*Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” Foreign Affairs 81:6 (November December 2002), 99ff.

*Michael Wesley, “Toward a Realist Ethics of Intervention,” Ethics and International Affairs, 19:2 (Summer 2005), 55-72.

*Rajan Menon, “Pious Words, Puny Deeds: The International Community and Mass Atrocities,” Ethics and International Affairs (Fall 2009), 235-45.

Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup,, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, new edition (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 3-15.

Also of interest (not assigned): United Nations Charter, Chapters VI and VII. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) and

Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1997), both in Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws of War (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 179-88, 481-98.

The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/52d68d14de6160e0c12563da005fdb1b/6756482d86146898c125641e004aa3c5?OpenDocument

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) in Malcolm Evans, ed., Blackstone’s International Law Documents, 3rd ed. (London: Blackstone Press, 1991), 73-85.

Anne Ryniker, “The ICRC’s Position on ‘Humanitarian Intervention’,” International Review of the Red Cross 83:842 (June 2001), 527-532.

Bartram Brown, “Statute of the ICC: Past, Present and Future,” in Sarah Sewall and Carl Kaysen, eds., The United States and the International Criminal Court (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 61-84.

Stanley Hoffmann, “The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention,” Survival 37:4 (Winter 1995-1996), 29-51.

Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, "Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention," Ethics & International Affairs 6 (1992), 95-117.

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3. Tues. September 3: Research Tools Meeting with Roseann Bowerman (tentative: this session may be swapped with #4; if so the due date for the Research Tools assignment will be adjusted.)

Do not be absent on the day we do this. *Chaim Kaufmann, “‘Chaining’ Sources in Social Science Research” (September 6, 2012). *Familiarize yourself with the course research guide. Thurs. September 5: No class. 4: Tues. September 10: Ethics and Law of Humanitarian Intervention [67]

Is humanitarian intervention ever mandatory? Or mandatory but impractical? Or optional?

When do (or should) norms of state sovereignty block intervention?

Should we recognize a “responsibility to protect” that can require action despite sovereignty norms? When does it apply?

Should interveners worry about re-creating colonialism, or the appearance of it?

Why do we see so many pious words and so few and puny deeds?

*Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 4th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 4th ed., 2006), parts of chs. 4 and 6, 53-66, 101-108.

*Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” Foreign Affairs 81:6 (November December 2002), 99ff.

*Michael Wesley, “Toward a Realist Ethics of Intervention,” Ethics and International Affairs, 19:2 (Summer 2005), 55-72.

*Rajan Menon, “Pious Words, Puny Deeds: The International Community and Mass Atrocities,” Ethics and International Affairs (Fall 2009), 235-45.

Optional 2013: Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, new edition (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 3-15.

Also of interest (not assigned): United Nations Charter, Chapters VI and VII. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) and

Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1997), both in Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws of War (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 179-88, 481-98.

The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/52d68d14de6160e0c12563da005fdb1b/6756482d86146898c125641e004aa3c5?OpenDocument

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) in Malcolm Evans, ed., Blackstone’s International Law Documents, 3rd ed. (London: Blackstone Press, 1991), 73-85.

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Anne Ryniker, “The ICRC’s Position on ‘Humanitarian Intervention’,” International Review of the Red Cross 83:842 (June 2001), 527-532.

Bartram Brown, “Statute of the ICC: Past, Present and Future,” in Sarah Sewall and Carl Kaysen, eds., The United States and the International Criminal Court (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 61-84.

Stanley Hoffmann, “The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention,” Survival 37:4 (Winter 1995-1996), 29-51.

Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, "Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention," Ethics & International Affairs 6 (1992), 95-117.

II: INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY 5. Thurs. September 12: What is Civil War? [85]

What are the main types of civil wars?

What conditions promote the rise of insurgencies?

Recently economic models centered on individual motives of greed and survival, in which politics and identity play little role, have gained currency recently. What are the advantages and disadvantages of such models? If they leave out a lot, why might they be gaining?

Why would a foreign state intervene for or against an insurgency? What are the main means of intervention?

*Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” (Washington, D.C.:

World Bank, October 21, 2001), 1-17. *John Mueller, “The Banality of ‘Ethnic War’,” International Security, 25:1 (Summer 2000),

42-70. *Chaim Kaufmann, “Intervention in Ethnic and in Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can Be

Done and the Other Can’t,” Security Studies 6:1 (Autumn 1996), 62-100. Also of interest (not assigned): Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambidge, England: Cambridge

University Press, 2006). It’s mainly local score-settling. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, eds., Understanding Civil War: Evidence and

Analysis, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005). Collection of case studies; preface partially retracts the earlier Collier and Hoeffler claims.

Anna Simons and John Mueller, Correspondence: The Dynamics of Internal Conflict, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), 187-92.

6. Tues. September 17: Modern Insurgency and Counterinsurgency [74]

Are ‘guerrilla war’ and ‘insurgency’ the same thing?

What conditions are most productive of insurgencies?

Is insurgency inherently a rural phenomenon? Can it succeed in moderately or highly urbanized societies?

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Is insurgency inherent a leftist phenomenon? Can rightist insurgencies or ones not classifiable as left or right—e.g., religious, regional, ethnic) occur? Can they succeed?

Taber’s analysis implies that most insurgencies should succeed, but this is not the case. Can we say anything about why?

Nagel implies that in counterinsurgency military ‘learning’ is the most critical factor; what other factors might matter?

John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya

and Vietnam, revised ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), xi-xvii, 3-33.

*Robert Taber, War of the Flea (Dulles, Va.: Potomac, 2002; originally 1965), 1-37. 2014: Replace part of Taber with Race, ch 2? *Contrast Kaufmann, “Intervention.” Also of interest (not assigned): Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency (December 2006). Nagl is

said to have been the main intellectual force. Taber, rest of book. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, Conn.:

Praeger, 2006; originally published 1964). Bard E. O’ Neill, from Revolution to Apocalypse: Insurgency and Terrorism, 2nd. ed.,

revised (Dulles, Va.: Potomac, 2005). David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); also Counterinsurgency (Oxford, 2010), intended as a manual.

Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press , 2003).

Thurs. September 19: No class. 7. Tues. September 24: Counterinsurgency, I: Malaya [67]

What does Nagl identify as the two main approaches to COIN? What are they called now?

Was learning the decisive factor in British success in Malaya?

What exactly were the lessons learned?

What lessons could have been learned but were not?

In what ways do the initial conditions and insurgent and counter-insurgent behavior in Malaya resemble other cases? In what ways are they different?

How widely might lessons from Malaya by applicable to other cases such as Algeria, Vietnam, Iraq, or the Soviet or U.S. adventures in Afghanistan?

Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 26-30, 35-51, 59-81, 87-107.

Also of interest (not assigned): Julian Paget, Counter-insurgency Campaigning (London, Faber, 1967).

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Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Malaya and Singapore (London: Faber & Faber, 1973).

Lucian W. Pye, Guerilla Communication in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning (Princeton, N.J. Princeton University press, 1958).

Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1966).

British Documents on the End of Empire, series B, volume 3: Malaya (London, HMSO, 1992-).

Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. Matthew J. Connolly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the

Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2002). Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era (New York: Free Press, 1977). 8. Thurs. September 26: Vietnam, I: War Comes to Long An [c. 88]

What grievances motivated formation of the Viet Cong or made them attractive to South Vietnamese?

What were the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the Viet Cong in Long An?

What were the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the government forces in Long An?

What were the important decisions of each side, and how much were these influenced for good or ill by higher authority or outside forces?

Can you name other factors that seem to have mattered?

What factors were decisive in the trajectory of the contest in Long An up to the early 1960s?

*Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An; Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), maps, setting (1-2), part of ch 3 (120-140), ch 4 (141-209). Ch 2 and the first part of ch 3 will also repay your interest, although you can skip most of the interpolations of administrative details or correspondence.

9. Tues., October 1: Vietnam, II: The Americans Arrive [66]

What were central elements of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Vietnam? Which elements were productive and which counterproductive?

How were U.S. Army and Marine COIN approaches different? Was the difference important? What are these two approaches called now?

Long An was in III Corps (an Army area of responsibility), quite close to Saigon. How well or badly would you expect U.S. COIN methods to have functioned there compared with elsewhere in Vietnam?

In Nagl’s terms, how well or badly did US. institutions learn? How much did it matter? *Race, War Comes to Long An, ch 5 (211-76). Also of interest (not assigned):

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Philip Caputo, A Rumor of War (New York: Henry Holt, 1977). Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1986). Harry Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA:

Presidio Press, 1982). We were winning. 10. Thurs. October 3: Vietnam Film Discussion

Is the use of the plot of Heart of Darkness a comment on Vietnam specifically or on counterinsurgency generally? In what way?

What other elements of the film speak to Vietnam specifically or to counterinsurgency generally?

Are important features of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam conspicuously absent or misrepresented?

Francis Ford Coppola, dir., Apocalypse Now Redux (Lions Gate, 2001), 153 mins. Not the original release (1979) which omits the sequence at the French-owned plantation.

Also of interest (not assigned): Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness (London: Blackwood’s Magazine [serial], 1899). Michael Cimino, dir.,The Deer Hunter (MCA, 1978), 182 mins. Brian de Palma, dir., Casualties of War (Sony, 1979), 119 mins. John Wayne and Ray Kellogg, dirs., The Green Berets (1968), 142 mins., esp. first main

section on defense of a firebase and a village; second half is on exposing Communist traitors.

Stanley Kubrick, dir., Full Metal Jacket (1987), 117 mins., esp. second main section, at a base in Vietnam, and the third, part of the Battle of Hue in 1968. First section is on how basic training dehumanizes recruits and why this is necessary.

11. Tues. October 8: The Problem of Reform [77]

What reforms did the U.S. want the Diem regime to make? Were the reforms essential to achieving U.S. ultimate goals?

Could the Diem regime (and later South Vietnamese regimes) have reformed if they wanted to?

Why couldn’t the U.S. get Diem (or later regimes) to reform?

Is the same problem present in Iraq or Afghanistan? How serious is it?

What can/should interveners do about this issue?

*Douglas MacDonald, Adventures in Chaos (Harvard University Press, 1992), chapters 3, 9, part of 10; 44-73, 213-48, 259-67, 278-81.

Also of interest (not assigned): Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “Choice for Afghan Spy Chief Worries West,” New York Times,

September 12, 2012

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12. Thurs. October 10: Counterinsurgency Simulation *Chaim Kaufmann, “Iraq Patrol Simulation.” Materials to be provided. 13. Thurs. October 17: Afghanistan [66]

What was the condition of Afghan politics as of September 2001? How did it get to this condition?

What were U.S. goals during the initial intervention in 2001, and how have they changed over time?

How have U.S. goals and strategy evolved over time?

What about the Afghan government?

The Taliban?

Pakistan and other stakeholders?

To what extent does U.S. experience in Afghanistan validate or refute lessons drawn from other cases?

What are the best arguments now for and against “Oh, the Hell with it?” *Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: the U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan,

and Central Asia with a new final chapter (New York: Penguin, 2009), maps. *U.S. Army, “Afghanistan Ethnolinguistic Map, 2001-2009,” http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Afghanistan/Images/6-7big.jpg *“Five Rungs of the Traditional Afghan Tribal System,” New York Times graphic, January

31, 2010. *“Provinces with Shadow Taliban Governors,” New York Times graphic, January 10, 2010. *Seth G. Jones, “Afghanistan Chronology,” in In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War

in Afghanistan with a new afterword (New York: Norton, 2010), xi-xviii. *Hy Rothstein, “America’s Longest War,” in John Arquilla, ed., Afghan Endgames

(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 59-81. *Stephen Biddle, “Ending the War in Afghanistan: How to Avoid Failure on the Installment

Plan,” Foreign Affairs 92:5 (Sept./Oct. 2013), 49-58. *Karl W. Eikenberry, “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan: The Other

Side of the COIN,” Foreign Affairs 92:5 (Sept./Oct. 2013), 59-74. *Matthew Rosenberg and Graham Bowley, “Intractable Afghan Graft Hampering U.S.

Strategy,” New York Times, March 8, 2012. *Matthew Rosenberg, “Afghanistan Faces Cash Crunch,” New York Times, May 3, 2013. *Rod Nordland and Alissa J. Rubin, “Taliban’s Divided Tactics Raise Doubts over Talks,”

New York Times, June 26, 2013. *Matthew Rosenberg, “Impasse with Afghanistan Raises Prospect of Total US Withdrawal

in 2014,” New York Times, October 5, 2013. Also of interest (not assigned): Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: the U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan,

and Central Asia (New York: Penguin, 2009).

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Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan with a new afterword (New York: Norton, 2010).

John Arquilla, ed., Afghan Endgames (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012), rest of book.

James Igoe Walsh, The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Campaigns (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, September 2013).

Lawrence Rosen, “Anthropological Assumptions and the Afghan War,” Anthropological Quarterly 84:2 (Spring 2011), 535-558.

U.S. Embassy, Belgium, “United States Policy toward Afghanistan: A Dossier,” (undated: May 2010?).

C.J. Chivers et al., “View is Bleaker than Official Portrayal of War in Afghanistan,” New York Times, July 26, 2010. Released documents.

Stanley McChrystal, “COMISAF Initial Report,” August 30, 2009, 1-1 to 1-4. From search and destroy to clear and hold?

Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, “Targeted Killing is New U.S. Focus in Afghanistan,” New York Times, August 4, 2010. And back to search and destroy?

Rod Nordland, “Afghanistan Strategy Shifts to Civilian Effort,” New York Times, June 9, 2010.

Rod Nordland, “Security in Afghanistan Is Deteriorating, Aid Groups Say,” New York Times, September 12, 2010. Plus graphic.

Alissa J. Rubin, “Expanding Control, Taliban Refresh Stamp on Afghan Justice,” New York Times, October 8, 2010.

Alissa J. Rubin, Charlie Savage, and Rod Nordland, “Regulators Ignored Warnings about Afghan Bank,” New York Times, September 20, 2010.

Alissa J. Rubin, “After Afghan Vote, Complaints of Fraud Surface,” New York Times, September 20, 2010.

Matthew Rosenberg, “Karzai Is Planning to Be There for a Successor. Right There,” New York Times, October 6, 2013.

Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Tries to Calm Pakistan’s Anger over Airstrike,” New York Times, October 7, 2010.

Ann Jones, Kabul in Winter: Life Without Peace in Afghanistan (New York: Picador, 2006). Khaled Hosseini, The Kite Runner (Riverhead Books, 2003). Robin Bender, dir., Daughters of Afghanistan (2004). Documentary. Paul Jay and Nelofa Pazira, dirs., Return to Kandahar (2010). Documentary. 14. Tues. October 22: Atrocities, I [75]

Why did U.S. forces commit so many atrocities in Vietnam?

Are large-scale atrocities inherent in counterinsurgency, or were they due to features of this case, or to U.S. institutional arrangements or strategy, or to something else? What would Luttwak, Nagl, Race, or McDonald say?

How destructive are atrocities of the ends of counterinsurgency?

What can/should interveners do about this? Can they achieve standards that Taber, Nagl, or Kaufmann say are required?

Were the VC better? Why or why not?

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Nick Turse, Kill Everything That Moves: The Real War in Vietnam (New York: Metropolitan, 2013), 1-75.

Also of interest (not assigned): Charles J. Hanley, Sang-Hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza, The Bridge at No Gun Ri (New

York: Henry Holt, 2001), 119-46 and photographs/photocopies. Note the orders to fire on refugees shown on the 6th, 7th, and 10th pages of photos.

Mark Danner, “The Truth of El Mozote,” New Yorker, December 6, 1993. U.S.-trained Salvadoran troops.

Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final

Solution in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1992). 15. Thurs. October 24: Atrocities, II, plus film discussion [63]

Why did the U.S. military and U.S. society spend so little effort on investigating atrocities in Vietnam?

How much or little has changed—about atrocities or our responses to them—in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Should the “they are just as bad” or “they are worse” argument affect our judgments? Why or why not?

What should we do? Nick Turse, Kill Everything That Moves: The Real War in Vietnam (New York:

Metropolitan, 2013), 222-62. *Dexter Filkins, “The Fall of the Warrior King,” New York Times, September 24, 2005. *Alissa J. Rubin, “U.S. Military Apologizes for Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan,” New York

Times, October 5, 2010. “Apache Gunship Video” (July 12, 2007; released by wikileaks.org April 5, 2010).

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yo22QlP6NgQ. Note that there are three separate engagements whose legal or ethical statuses you might judge differently. 38 mins.

*Analyses of the gunship video, including Anthony Martinez, A Look Inside blog entry on Apache video, April 5, 2010, http://blog.ajmartinez.com/2010/04/05/wikileaks-collateral-murder/; Chaim Kaufmann, “Evaluation of ‘Apache Video’,” April 12, 2010 (rev. October 12, 2012); Comment thread on Martinez blog, April 7, 2010 (my pick as the most interesting of > 200); Timothy Hsia, “Reaction on Military Blogs to the Wikileaks Video,” New York Times blog, April 7, 2010; Benedict Carey, “Psychologists Explain Iraq Airstrike Video,” New York Times blog, April 8, 2010.

Also of interest (not assigned): Human Rights Watch, A Face and a Name: Civilian Victims of Insurgent Groups in Iraq,

October 3, 2005. “Iraq Wedding Party Video Backs Survivors' Claims,” Fox News, May 24, 2004. Eric Schmitt, “Three in 82nd Airborne Say Beating Iraqi Prisoners Was Routine,” New

York Times, September 24, 2005.

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Human Rights Watch, Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for the U.S. Abuse of Detainees, April 24, 2005. Also report on 82nd Airborne Division, September 24, 2005.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili and 11 other generals and admirals, “Open Letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee,” January 4, 2005.

Battle for Haditha (dir. Nick Broomfield, 2007). A ‘mock documentary’ said to capture well the events as well as the psychological environment in which they took place.

Ghali Hassan, “The Resort to Indiscriminate Killings,” Aljazeera.com, August 15, 2007. Arab media is full of such stories—with gory photos.

Colin Kahl, “How We Fight,” Foreign Affairs 85:6 (November/December 2006), 83-102. U.S. compliance with international legal standards is good and improving.

Seymour M. Hersh, “Torture at Abu Ghraib,” New Yorker, May 10, 2004. William Langewiesche, “Rules of Engagement,” Vanity Fair.com, November 2006.

Haditha. Alissa J. Rubin, “U.S. Military Apologizes for Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan,” New York

Times, October 5, 2010. Frequent. Charlie Savage, “Case of Accused Soldiers May Be Worst of 2 Wars,” New York Times,

October 4, 2010. Taimoor Shah and Alissa J. Rubin, “Relatives Tell of Civilians Killed by U.S. Soldiers,”

New York Times, October 5, 2010. Alissa J. Rubin, “U.S. Military Apologizes for Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan,” New York

Times, October 5, 2010. Frequent. “Iraq Wedding Party Video Backs Survivors' Claims,” Fox News, May 24, 2004. Frequent

in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ricki Stern, dir. The Devil Came on Horseback (Break Thru Films, 2007); 85 mins.

Documentary about Sudan. III: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 16. Tues. October 29: Practices of Humanitarian Intervention [62]

When should ethical imperatives be sufficient to motivate humanitarian interventions?

Should intervention decisions always adhere to international law and proper IGO authorization, or are there circumstances where emerging norms such as R2P or other factors should trump these?

How important is it that interventions haveWhat do we do about the fact that it is often difficult to generate domestic or international support for interventions unless national security interests, narrowly defined, are also at stake?

Is reputation as a responsible member of the society of nations a national security interest? If yes, why isn’t doesn’t this issue often get traction in intervention debates?

What have we learned about better and worse practices for humanitarian intervention?

*Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” Foreign Affairs 75:1

(January/February 1996), 16-32. *Linda Polman, The Crisis Caravan: What’s Wrong with Humanitarian Aid? (Metropolitan

Books, 2010), 114-22. Optional (2nd essay if desired): 13-47, 123-38, 172-79.

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*Chaim Kaufmann, “See No Evil: Why America Doesn’t Stop Genocide,” Foreign Affairs 81:4 (July/August 2002), 142-49. Review essay on Power and Kuperman books.

*Richard K. Betts, “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention,” Foreign Affairs 73:6 (November/December 1994), 20-33.

*Peter Gourevitch, “Alms Dealers,” New Yorker, October 10, 2011, 103, 105-106, 108. *Ruben Bolling, “‘The Wizard of Oz:’ The Aftermath,” Funny Times, November 2013, 24. Also of interest (not assigned): Edward Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” Foreign Affairs 78:4 (July/August 1999), 36-44. Warren Strobel, “The CNN Effect,” American Journalism Review, May 1996, 32-34. William Demars, “Waiting for Early Warning: Humanitarian Action after the Cold War” and

responses by Alex De Waal and Larry Minear, Journal of Refugee Studies, 8:4 (1995), 390-417.

David Rieff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2003).

Linda Polman, The Crisis Caravan: What’s Wrong with Humanitarian Aid? (Metropolitan Books, 2010).

Sarah Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006). Kelly Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement. Coercion, and Foreign

Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006). Barry R. Posen, “Military Responses to Refugee Disasters,” International Security 21:1

(Summer 1996), 72-111. Daniel Byman and Taylor Seybolt, “Humanitarian Intervention and Communal Civil Wars,”

Security Studies 13:1 (Autumn 2003), 33-78. James Fearon and David Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,”

International Security 28:4 (Spring 2004), 5-43. Barbara Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization

51:1 (Summer 1997), 335-364. Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York:

Basic Books, 2002). Alan J. Kuperman, The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda,

(Washington, DC: Brookings, 2001). Terrence Lyons and Ahmed Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention,

and Strategies for Political Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995). Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 17. Thurs. October 31: Darfur, I: Origins [61]

Who are the important actors and their conceptions of their identities and interests?

How have broader Sudanese and international politics affected Darfur?

What, exactly, is the conflict about?

Do the causes and course of this case resemble any other genocides, e.g., the Armenians, the Holocaust, Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Congo, or others familiar to you?

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Gerard Prunier, Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide, 3rd ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008), vii-xii, 25-80, map.

18. Tues. November 5: Darfur, II: Disaster [78]

Why did matters get so much worse in 2003?

Why was foreign intervention so slow in coming?

Why has the intervention had so little effect?

Could any of this have been handled better? Who would have had to act differently, what should they have done, and how could they have been persuaded to do it?

Prunier, 81-158. Thurs. November 7: No class 19. Tues. November 12: Darfur film discussion [40]

Do you trust the content entirely? How would you think about how to evaluate claims in a documentary that has an obvious political agenda?

What do films offer that texts and class discussion have not? Prunier, 159-98. Ricki Stern, dir. The Devil Came on Horseback (Break Thru Films, 2007); 85 mins.

Documentary. Also of interest (not assigned): Juanita Wilson, dir. As If I am Not There (2010), 105 mins. Strongly recommended. Danis Tanovic, dir., No Man's Land (MGM, 2001), 98 mins. Pjer Zalica, dir., Days and Hours (2004), 94 mins. Michael Winterbottom, dir., Welcome to Sarajevo (Walt Disney, 1997), 103 mins. Sabina Vajarca, dir. Back to Bosnia (Alternate Plan Productions, 2005), 75 mins.

Documentary. Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: New American

Library, 2001). 20. Thurs. November 14: Darfur, III: Should Broader Intervention Have Been

Considered? [c. 53]

What should be our criteria for deciding when humanitarian intervention is necessary?

Although the crisis in Darfur is not over, the worst was in 2003-2006. Is it too late?

What about the border war and refugee crisis in South Sudan?

When a target state opposes intervention, how much weight should be given to sovereignty? If we do consider overriding state sovereignty, can we set a boundary around situations where this should be permissible?

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Should U.N. Security Council authorization be a sine qua non for a new intervention in Sudan—i.e., should great power politics (the views of Russia and China) be decisive? Or would some lesser degree of international sanction or a “coalition of the willing” be sufficient?

What goals and what instruments would be appropriate? Note that many terms and acronyms used in all these documents can be in Prunier pp. xii-

xxi. *Department of Peace Keeping Operations, United Nations, Sudan political map, April

2007. *Michael S. Miller, Ethnolinguistic map of Darfur, in Human Rights Watch, “Darfur

Destroyed: Ethnic Cleaning by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan,” May 6, 2004, page after table of contents. Remainder of interest but not assigned.

*Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, Sudan Atrocities Summary, August 2004.

*Humanitarian Information Unit, U.S. Department of State, “Confirmed Damaged and Destroyed Villages” by year 2003-2009, April 5, 2010.

*Department of Field Support, United Nations, UNAMID deployment map, March 2010. *Sudan mined roads map, source unknown, August 2010. *Medecins sans Frontieres, “MSF Activities in Darfur and Northern Sudan,” January 21,

2010. *“NCP Describes the AU as a 'Frail' Organization after Bashir's Exclusion from Summit,”

AllAfrica.com, November 29, 2010. *Sudan oil map, Africa Confidential.com, September 11, 2009. *Sudan oil map, Africa Confidential.com, September 11, 2009. *“Old Wounds and Ethnic Rivalries Stoke Sudan War Fever,” AlArabiya.net, April 23,

2012. History. *Andrew M. Mwenda, "Sudan Conflict a Series of Internal Divisions Complicated by Oil

Riches," BBC Monitoring Africa, April 24, 2012. Economics. *David Adams, “Sudanese Refugees' Fate in Hands of the West,” Irish Times oped,

August 23, 2012. Also of interest (not assigned): Human Rights Watch, “Darfur 2007: Chaos by Design,” September 19, 2007.

http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/09/19/darfur-2007-chaos-design, esp. “Lessons Learned,” 61ff.

Human Rights Watch, “The Way Forward: Ending Human Rights Abuses and Repression across Sudan,” October 6, 2009. http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/10/06/way-forward.

Human Rights Watch, “End Continuing Repress of Darfur Human Rights Activists,” November 2, 2010. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/11/02/sudan-end-continuing-repression-darfur-activists.

Country of Origin Information Centre, LandInfo, “Female Genital Mutilation in Sudan and Somalia,” December 10, 2008. http://www.landinfo.no/asset/764/1/764_1.pdf. Estimated rates 85%+ in Northern Sudan except Darfur, c. 65% in Darfur which may indicate lower support among “Africans.” No data for Southern Sudan.

International Committee of the Red Cross, “Mission Statement,” October 29, 2010.

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International Committee of the Red Cross, “ICRC in Sudan: Facts and Figures,” March 12, 2010. http://www.icrc.org/eng/where-we-work/africa/sudan/index.jsp. First two links under “highlights” provide more recent updates.

Medecins sans Frontieres, “Mission Statement,” November 6, 2009. “Why Does Sudan Fool the United Nations Security Council With Lies All the Time?” The

Citizen (Dar es Salaam) oped, January 2, 2012. Rona Peligal, “Sudan: Halt Wave of Attacks on Civilians in Darfur,” Human Rights Watch,

November 11, 2010. Bridget Johnson, “Sudan Caucus Members Ask Obama to Send Clinton, Powell to Help

Keep Peace,” thehill.com, December 5. 2010. Jeffrey Gittleman, “Born in Unity, South Sudan is Torn Again,” New York Times, January

13, 2012. Navi Pillay, statement reported as “Pillay Welcomes South Sudan Commitment to Human

Rights But Says Much Still to Be Done in World's Newest State,” African Press Organization, May 11, 2012. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Al-Tijani Sisi, statement reported as “Darfur Official Says both Sudan, South Sudan Have to Withdraw from Region,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, May 11, 2012. Leader of Darfur Liberation and Justice Movement,

Luka Biong Deng, “Abyei - A Test of Good Relations between the Two Sudans,” The Citizen (Dar es Salaam) oped, August 20, 2012. Co-Chair of Abyei Joint Oversight Committee Representing South Sudan.

21. Tues. November 19: Methods Discussion No new reading. 22. Thurs. November 21: Humanitarian Intervention Simulation, I *Chaim Kaufmann, “Data and Roles for IR 335 Darfur Simulation” (November 2013). 23. Tues. November 26: Humanitarian Intervention Simulation, II *Chaim Kaufmann, “Data and Roles for IR 335 Darfur Simulation, Updated” (November

2013). 24. Tues. December 3: Syria [49] -How serious is the humanitarian emergency in Syria? -Government forces and pro-government militias have killed many more people than the

rebels overall, but behavior of at least some rebels has also become very bad. Do either of these facts matter?

-How important is the chemical weapons issue? -Besides CW, do we have non-humanitarian reasons to intervene (or to support

intervention by others), or not to?

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-What should we do now? * @Karybdamoid (Twitter account), “Areas of Control, October 2013.” Map. *“The Main Islamist Groups and Jihadists in Syria,” France24.com interactive map, 2013.

http://www.france24.com/static/infographies/2013/syrie-groupes-terroristes-carte/fr_02/index.html?keepThis=true&TB_iframe=true&height=858&width=620&v=6. Right click to translate.

*Norimitsu Onishi, “Syria Seen as Most Dire Refugee Crisis in A Generation,” New York Times, November 24, 2013.

*Lynsey Addario, “The Historic Scale of Syria’s Refugee Crisis,” New York Times photo gallery, October 16, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/10/16/world/middleeast/syrian-refugee-crisis-photos.html?ref=middleeast

*Ben Hubbard and Karam Shoumali, “Powerful Rebel Groups in Syria Announce Creation of Umbrella Alliance,” New York Times, November 23, 2013.

*Ben Hubbard, “Syrian Forces Press Rebels with Gains,” New York Times, November 29, 2013.

*Anne Barnard, “Disillusionment Grows among Syrian Opposition as Fighting Drags On,” New York Times, November 29, 2013.

*Nick Cumming-Bruce and Rick Gladstone, “Talks on Ending Syria’s Civil War to Begin in January,” New York Times, November 26, 2013.

*David E. Sanger, Thom Shanker, and Eric Schmitt, “West Faces Challenge in Moving Syrian Chemical Arms through Battlefields,” New York Times, November 18, 2013.

*Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein, “R2P after Syria: To Save the Doctrine, Forget Regime Change,” Foreign Affairs.com, March 26, 2013.

*Andrew J. Table, “Syria’s Collapse and How Washington Can Stop It,” Foreign Affairs 92:4 (July/August 2013), 90-100.

*François Heisbourg, “Intervening in Syria the Right Way,” Washington Post oped, October 25, 2012.

*Gary C. Gambill, “Intervention Won't Save Syria,” National Journal oped, September 27, 2012.

*Gary C. Gambill, “Partitioning Syria,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 2013. *Mustafa Khalifa, “The Impossible Partition of Syria,” Arab Reform Initiative, October

2013, maps, 13-17. Text, 1-11, optional. Here is ARI’s self- description: http://www.arab-reform.net/about-us.

*Vladimir V. Putin, “A Plea for Caution from Russia: What Putin Has to Say to Americans about Syria,” New York Times oped, September 12, 2013.

*Mark Mazzetti, Robert F. Worth and Michael R. Gordon, “Obama’s Uncertain Path amid Syria Bloodshed,” New York Times, October 23, 2013.

Also of interest (not assigned): Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Doctrine: Revived in Libya,

Buried in Syria,” Insight Turkey 15:2 (Spring 2013), 57-68. Nick Cumming-Bruce and Rick Gladstone, “U.N. Says Execution Video from Syria Shows

Apparent War Crime,” New York Times, November 3, 2012. The video itself has been taken down. Here is another that each side blames on the other: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wy_XmN1NoY0&oref=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fresults%3Fsearch_query%3Drebel%2Batrocities%2Bsyria%26oq%

20

3Drebel%2Batrocities%2Bsyria%26gs_l%3Dyoutube.3...1172.8354.0.9556.24.23.1.0.0.0.227.2001.17j4j2.23.0...0.0...1ac.1.H1S_JfhYy70&ytsession=hvNBVScuyBsWvb6Iks4cgRTVurxOttQgb8REHj4kVSfS90xABfUD8VeY4fnGNiFHo_aAOnCsPqDHx6JNfPodZWnfdlOewA9b2LbjPmdMnckd5xvFl1hf0Y3YxFFbM--i1TdjpxYlIQGtidBhhLAljXbtuocir70Y-vBlO82k12eEscrlX9A4c_UBg_aXBCX2_B8YSCj1n4uATAIuR55X2Ams-GjETdYTh4R3epUvxdgKk7DRZoh1E0skhpecKrF6dj-5k2WFIEcySDy7_6QzXsubvfBKeeMobZr3xnR_HWc (posted August 23, 2012).

Janine Di Giovanni, “Mountaintop Town Is a Diverse Haven from Syria’s Horrors,” New York Times, November 22, 2012.

Neil MacFarquhar, “Sunni Leaders Gaining Clout in Mideast,” New York Times, November 28, 2012.

Simon Tisdall, Turkey Calls on Major Powers to Intervene in Syria, Guardian (UK), October 19, 2012.

Michael R. Gordon and Mark Lander, “U.S. Moves Toward Recognizing Syria’s Opposition,” New York Times, November 30, 2012. France extended recognition on the 12th, Turkey on the 14th, and Britain on the 20th.

Neil MacFarquhar and Hania Mourtada, “Citing a ‘Credible Alternative’ to Assad, Britain Recognizes Syrian Rebel Group,” New York Times, November 21, 2012.

Sara Sorcher, “Insiders: U.S. Should Intervene if Necessary to Secure Syria's Chemical Weapons,” National Journal, August 8, 2012.

25. Thurs. December 5: Prep for counterinsurgency simulation Do not be absent on this day or the next. *Chaim Kaufmann, “Search & Destroy Simplified for Classroom Use” (December 2013). 26. Sun. December 8, 10:00 A.M.-3:30 P.M., MG 101: Counterinsurgency Simulation *Kaufmann, “S&DSFCU.” *Materials to be provided.