INTERNAL EMERGENCY PLAN CASE 1 Example Slovenia Ike van der Putte

This Project is funded by the European Union

Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

This project is funded by the European UnionProjekat finansira Evropska Unija


Projekat realizuje Human Dynamics Konzorcijum

INTERNAL EMERGENCY PLAN CASE 1EXAMPLE SLOVENIA

IKE VAN DER PUTTE



INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN FOR BUTAN PLIN

SEE SESSION 22 FOR GUIDELINE AND CONTENTS IERP



Railway Car unloading StationVertical LPG Storage Vessels (250m3)

View of Site from Top of Vertical Storage Vessels Cylinder Filling Station

The establishment Butan Plin d.d. is situated in the industrial zone Šiška in northern part of Ljubljana



1. SCOPE OF THE PLAN (1)This plan provides details of the emergency response measures for a release of LPG in Butan Plin d.d. which may give rise to:

• Jet fire at ruptured hose during loading/unloading activities;• Pool fire after spill during loading/unloading activities;• Explosion of the vapour cloud (UVCE).

The maximum quantity of released LPG is either:50 or 90 m3, depending on the size of the railway car (full railway car release scenario)6 m3 (one minute release scenario).



1. SCOPE OF THE PLAN (2)

Potential knock-on effects of a vapour cloud explosion and a pool fire are also considered. A vapour cloud of LPG formed in a major-accident scenario could explode either inside or outside the Butan Plin site. This may cause injuries to personnel, damage to buildings and infrastructure and additional fires in Butan Plin and/or surroundings.

In the case of a pool fire, the first knock-on effect is a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) of the neighbouring railway car, which may then cause further events as follows:A pool fire engulfs an adjacent railway car leading to a BLEVE. A missile or the thermal radiation generated by the BLEVE damages another LPG storage vessel. The resultant damage is such that a further release of LPG occurs and a vapour cloud is formed. This vapour cloud would give rise to similar effects as that formed in the case of the full railway car release.



2. Extent of Planning

The extent of on-site emergency planning is defined by an LPG release scenario which leads to a:• Jet fire• Pool fire• BLEVE • UVCE.Geographically, the extent of this plan is defined as the site boundary of Butan Plin.

The extent of off-site emergency planning (municipal planning) is defined by an LPG release scenario which leads to a:• BLEVE • UVCE.Geographically, the extent of municipal planning is defined by the maximum radius of effect, i.e. 700m, see next slide



Summary of the worst case results of the modelling exercise (1)

Maximum Downwind Distance from Release to Reference Overpressure for Vapour Cloud Explosion and BLEVE (m)

0.021 bar 700

0.138 bar 300

0.207 bar 270

Maximum Downwind Distance from Release to Reference Radiation Level for BLEVE (m)

4.5kW/m2 530

12.5kW/m2 320

37.5kW/m2 180

Summary of Results for 90 m3 Car Release



The overpressures required to directly injure humans are significantly higher than those required to damage buildings. Injuries resulting from secondary impacts, such as building damage/collapse or flying debris, are more likely to occur and therefore the distances to the following overpressures are usually determined for each scenario modelled:

0.207 bar Steel frame building distorted and pulled away from foundations; Rupture of storage tanks. Serious damage to buildings and equipment.

0.138 bar Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses.0.021 bar “Safe distance” – 95% probability of no serious damage

beyond this point; 10% of glass windows broken.

Overpressure damage effects



37.5 kW/m2 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment12.5 kW/m2 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood,

melting plastic tubing, etc4.5 kW/m2 Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach

cover within 20 seconds, however, blistering of skin

(first degree burns) is unlikely

Heat Radiation Effects



Summary of the worst case results of the modelling exercise (2)

Weather B1 D5 F2 Maximum Downwind Ground Level Distance from Point of Release to

Reference Radiation Level for Jet Fire (m) 4.5kW/m2 200 - -

12.5kW/m2 170 - -

37.5kW/m2 150 - -

Maximum Downwind Distance from Centre of Pool to Reference Radiation Level for Pool Fire (m)

4.5kW/m2 - - 73

12.5kW/m2 - 50 -

37.5kW/m2 - 27 -

Maximum Downwind Distance from Release to Reference Overpressure for Vapour Cloud Explosion (m)

0.021 bar 540

0.138 bar 220

0.207 bar 200

Results for 6m3 1 minute release scenario



The estimated duration of the full railway car release scenario is around 20-30 minutes. After the railway car has emptied, the explosion hazard will be significantly reduced. It is difficult to predict the length of time required to evaporate the spilled liquid. However, it may take an additional 30 minutes for the remaining pool to evaporate after the tanker has emptied.

Therefore, it is estimated that the explosion hazard is unlikely to persist for longer than 60 minutes following commencement of the release. Based on this estimation, it is considered that in the case of vapour cloud formation, a period 15 to 30 minutes, after an alert is raised, should be an appropriate response time for the implementation of protective measures at the municipality level

In the case of the 6m3 (one minute release) scenario, the explosion hazard is likely to persist for less than 5 minutes. After this time, the liquid remaining on the ground may pose a risk though not significant.



Close co-ordination of internal (Butan Plin) and external (municipal – MOL) planning is particularly important for the cases which lead to an UVCE. • Monitoring of the situation, • measurement of explosive concentrations and the movement of the cloud, • prompt evaluation of possible developments and • avoidance of ignition sources in the cloud's path will be the focus of the activities at this stage.

Based on these, recommendations and decisions about implementation of protective measures will be given

Co-ordination



Geographic Extent of Municipal Protection and Rescue Plan



If re-activation of the excess flow valve on the railway car is not successful, the expected consequence is the full car release scenario. The maximum released quantity is 90 m3 of LPG. This is MAJOR ACCIDENT potential.

If re-activation of the excess flow valve on the railway car succeeds, it is the released quantity which determines major accident potential and further emergency actions. The quantity of released gas is evaluated based on duration of release and visual control of the cloud (white fog, heavier than air, is formed). Based on the following figures an incident should be classified:less than 30 seconds release duration – NOT MAJOR INCIDENTmore than 30 seconds release duration – MAJOR INCIDENT

Basis for classification of an incident



Task Level Timeframe

Immediate response to incident; application of first on-site protection measures defined within PRP

Butan Plin Immediately after an incident occurs (<1 min)

Classification of the incident (Note 1)

Butan Plin <1 min after an incident occurs

Major Incident First alert/notification of the Notification Centre (tel. 112) (Regional Centre for Communication, Ljubljana)

Butan Plin <2 min after incident occurs

Commence implementation of the first off-site protection measures defined within MPRP

MOL <10 min after incident occurs

Closing Verovškova and Litostrojska streets at a distance of up to 200m from Butan Plin site (this action is based on the classification of the incident)

Butan Plin, MOL <10 min after incident occurs

First recommendations to the residents and other present in the area of potential risk (based on the development of the incident)

Main Incident Controller (a team consisting of heads of EES Units),

Site Incident Controller, Main Control Team

<20 min after incident occurs

Full implementation of the MPRP; decisions about applying foreseen protective measures against exposure to blast overpressure and excessive thermal radiation

Main Incident Controller, Site Incident Controller,

Main Control Team, External Emergency

Services

<30 min after incident occurs

Notes: 1. The basis for the evaluation and classification of an incident in terms of the possibility

for its development into a major accident with a focus on potential for off-site consequences is given in Appendix 2.

Timeframes for implementing tasks in the case of emergency



3. IMPLEMENTATION AND USE OF THE PLAN (1).

Incident (immediate intervention by FCT)

1

Basis for classification (see Appendix 2)

3 Classification of Incident

(minor/major)

2

Raise Alarm

4

Activate ECC and MCT Implement Protection Measures

5

Establish Control Over Incident

6

Investigate and Report

Remediate

7

END 8

Brought Under Control by FCT

9

END 11

Investigate and Report Remediate

10

Minor Major

Investigate and report Remediate

End

ECC=Emergency Control CentreMCT=Main Control TeamFCT= Forward Control Team



The implementation of the plan is dependent on the evaluation of whether the Operators/Forward Control Team (FCT) are capable of:Stopping the release of LPG in less than 30 seconds, or Control the fire before it eventually causes a BLEVE of an adjacent railway car.

If so, it means that the incident is brought under control by the FCT and that its development into an off-site major-accident is prevented. If the FCT response is not successful and the situation indicates that there is apotential for a vapour cloud to cross the site boundary or that a BLEVE could occur, the alarm is raised and the Notification Centre (Regional Centre for Communication, Ljubljana) is alerted. The person responsible for implementing the MPRP at MOL is notified by the Notification Centre and implementation of the MPRP is requested/ recommended.

The Notification Centre alerts the necessary external emergency services.

3. IMPLEMENTATION AND USE OF THE PLAN (2)



Item Action Response Responsibility/ Implementer

Task/Further Specification

1. Initial event Immediate response to incident; application of first on-site protection measures, activate FCT

Butan Plin Operators, i.e., members of the FCT

Bring situation under control, e.g. stop release by activating excess flow valve on railway car or closing the main liquid phase valve on railway car.

2. Classification of Incident

Evaluation of possible development of the initial event

Butan Plin Site Incident Controller and Communicator between FCT and MCT

Site Incident Controller and Communicator between FCT and MCT are promptly informed that an incident has occurred (while fog in the area, noise, operators response). They assess the situation and classify the incident as major or minor. Basis for classification is outlined in Appendix .

3. Basis for classification

Butan Plin Site Incident Controller and Communicator between FCT and MCT

Outlined in Appendix .

Specification of actions and tasks when implementing PRP





Major Incident

4. Raise alarm First alert/ notification of the Notification Centre

Butan Plin Site Incident Controller or Communicator between FCT and MCT

Call Notification Centre at 112

5. Activate ECC and MCT

Commence implementation of the first protection measures defined within Butan Plin PRR and MPRP.

After raising alarm, the Main Control Team starts emergency activities in the ECC.

Notification Centre alerts relevant external emergency services.

MOL activates MPRP

Butan Plin, Notification Centre

Butan Plin Site Incident Controller triggers the on-site PRP and assembly of MCT.

Notification Centre alerts relevant emergency services.

Communication scheme is outlined in Figure.

Mobilisation of resources is described in Chapter 6.

Management and Administration is described in Chapter 7.

6. Establish control over incident

Emergency response teams take appropriate response

Butan Plin, EES

Make site safe if possible

Butan Plin FCT Stop all operations on the plant.

Turn off all ignition sources, power supplies, etc.

Cover drains, sewers etc.

Turn on deluge if appropriate.

Remove railway cars if safe.

Closing Verovškova and Litostrojska streets at a distance of up to 200m from Butan Plin site (this action is based on the classification of the incident)

Butan Plin Site Incident Controller and FCT

Site Incident Controller calls security service at Lek and AHL to close Verovškova street.

Delegated employee from Butan Plin take action to close Litostrojska.





Major Incident

First recommendations to the residents and others present in the area of potential risk (based on the development of the incident).

Head of Intervention, Site Incident Controller, Main Control Team

Head of Intervention and/or Site Incident Controller: - indicates requirements about not starting any engines (cars) or using open fires. - provides recommendations about evacuating/not entering risk area; avoiding immersion in vapour cloud, etc.

Full implementation of the MPRP; decisions about applying foreseen protective measures against exposure to blast overpressure and excessive thermal radiation

Head of Intervention, Site Incident Controller, Main Control Team

Head of Intervention and/or Site Incident Controller: indicates requirement to take positions in the upper floors of buildings; to find shelter behind solid walls, away from buildings of light construction and windows; to cover skin, to stay away from sewage coverings, etc.

7. Investigate and report Remediate

Investigation and reporting of remedial action

Site Incident Controller, MOL, External Emergency Services

Site Incident Controller reviews causes of incident and emergency response and prepares written report with recommendations as appropriate. MOL and external emergency services review adequacy of response and prepare a written report with recommendations as appropriate. Butan Plin and external services review interfaces and communication and update PRPs as appropriate.





Major Incident

8. End Archiving of the documentation, record keeping, lessons learning, upgrading of the plans

Butan Plin, MOL Implement lessons learned and upgrade plans as appropriate.

Minor Incident

9. Initial Event Brought Under Control by FCT

FCT successful in implementing protection measures

FCT FCT takes appropriate remedial action to bring event under control.

10. Investigate and Report Remediate

Investigation and reporting of remedial action

Site Incident Controller

Site Incident Controller reviews causes of incident and emergency response and prepares written report with recommendations as appropriate.

11. End Implement lessons learned and upgrade plans as appropriate.



Concept of Communication in case of Emergency

Site incident Controller



4. Resources

The following resources are available at the site:• Six professional and nine voluntary firemen • Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) - Breathing Apparatus – 2 pieces - Fireproof trousers and jackets – 7 sets - Helmets - 9 - Firemen belts - 9• Hoses - Type B, 200 m - Type C, 375 m• Fire extinguishers - S9, 90 pieces - S100, 6 pieces - S50, 3 pieces• Rescue ropesThese resources enable effective implementation of the PRP.



5. Monitoring, Notification and Warning (1)

Monitoring, notification and warning of the on-site personnel, off-site personnel, neighbouring industry and the public is split between Butan Plin, the Notification Centre and the MOL.

Butan Plin is responsible for on-site monitoring, notification and warning, as well as first notification, i.e. raising alarm in the case of major incident.

In the event that the incident is classified as major, the first external call is to the Notification Centre. The responsible person at MOL is also alerted. After activation of the on-site ECC, the Main Control Team acts according to Figure given in terms of communication.



5. Monitoring, Notification and Warning (2)

General monitoring of the facility, and particularly the LPG storage vessels, during an incident is performed by the Communicator between FCT and MCT and/or voluntary firemen who are at stand-by alert and are back-up for the professional firemen who carry out the fire-fighting.

In the case of vapour cloud formation, four voluntary firemen take positions approximately 20m inside the site from the boundary/fence, on the north, south, east and west side. They measure the concentration of gas in the air with handheld devices (explosion meters) and notify the Communicator between FCT and MCT and the Site Incident Controller about movement of the cloud inside Butan Plin. The communication is performed by Ex rated radios. On the side(s) where the vapour cloud crosses the Butan Plin boundary members of the EES firefighting unit take over further measurements and notification about movement of the cloud. Off-site notification and warning to adjacent establishments is the responsibility of Butan Plin. Off-site notification and warning to the public is the responsibility of the Notification Centre and MOL. This is specified in the MPRP



6. Mobilisation of Resources

First LevelOperators and members of the FCT/Site Personnel 1 do not need any mobilisation approval but react immediately after an incident occurs

Second Level The Site Incident Controller and Communicator between FCT and MCT classify the incident and assess the situation in terms of potential major-accident development. They also assess the capability of the FCT to control the event and prevent escalation. If the incident is classified as a Major Incident, the Site Incident Controller of Butan Plin notifies the Notification Centre and the responsible person/authority at MOL for approving implementation of the MPRP

Third Level The third level covers mobilisation of resources according to the MPRP. The responsible person for approval is specified by the MPRP.



7. Management and Administration

The on-site Emergency Response Team (ERT), i.e. team of respondents to emergency situation, is made up of two basic groups:

Main Control Team - in the event of an emergency, the Main Control Team (MCT) manages the overall emergency. It ensures that a proper evacuation is taking place, that emergency services have been called and that other essential tasks, including traffic control and site access control, are carried out. MCT informs SHV representative about the incident.

Forward Control Team - the Forward Control Team (FCT) responds to the location of the incident, in fire gear or other protective clothing as appropriate, with the objective of achieving control of the source of the emergency in a safe manner.



8. PROTECTION, RESCUE AND RELIEFAccording to the Act on protection against natural and other hazards, the following protection measures are envisaged:• evacuation• partial sheltering• technical. Partial sheltering and technical measures apply for the whole endangered area, while within this plan, evacuation is planned for Butan Plin facilities only.The protective measures depend on the incidentDue to physical properties of LPG (heavier than air, an aphyxiant) immersion in vapour cloud should be avoided. Besides fire/explosion, lack of oxygen is the main hazard associated with immersion in vapour cloud.

In general, the site Main Incident Controller will take responsibility for protection measures

For Evacuation paths from buildings and assembly point see nest slide



Evacuation Paths



Protection Measures Protection measures depend on the incident. There are two main incidents which require implementation of protection measures:BLEVEUVCE

In the case of a BLEVE protection measures apply particularly for those directly responding to the incident, residents and others within a radius of 400m of the site.

In the case of UVCE protection measures apply to the area with a radius of 700m of the site.



In the event of BLEVEEvacuation of Butan Plin industrial facilities. This applies for non-members of the FCT. Evacuation paths are depicted (see slide).

Open the windows to prevent glass break due to explosionPartial sheltering which is aimed at avoiding exposure to overpresuure and thermal radiation. Recommendations are:• take position in the upper floors of buildings; • find shelter behind solid wall; • avoid buildings of light constructions and windows; • cover skin; • use helmet if available.



In the event of UVCE• DO NOT USE OPEN FIRE! DO NOT START ENGINES/CARS! DO NOT USE ANY DEVICE WHICH MAY CAUSE EXPLOSION!• Evacuation of Butan Plin industrial facilities. This applies for non-members of the FCT. Evacuation paths are depicted .• Close windows at ground level and on the first floor (preventing gas access into the building) and open the windows in the upper floors to prevent glass break due to eventual explosion• Partial sheltering which is aimed at avoiding exposure to overpressure and thermal radiation. Recommendations are:

leave risk areado not enter (or re-enter) risk areaavoid immersion in vapour cloudkeep away from sewage coveringstake position in the upper floors of buildings find shelter behind solid wall avoid buildings of light constructions and windows

cover skin use helmet if available.



In the case of release without ignition Turn off valves in order to prevent leakingStop operations in the Filling Plant and workshopsTurn off gas stoves in the officesSwitch the electricity off Cover all drains in the Filling Plant area in order to prevent gas flowing through drains.

In the case of jet fire/pool fire Turn on deluge systemPerform cooling of the surroundings to prevent secondary firesRemove other railway cars if possible



TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR BUTAN PLIN PERSONNELPerson/Duty Frequency of Training Scope of Training

General Manager Annual drilling/ exercises According to PRP tasks and responsibilities

Operations Manager Annual drilling/ exercises According to PRP tasks and responsibilities

Safety Manager

At commence of employment

Defined by the employer

Annual drilling/ exercises Seminars, specialisations, demonstrations, etc.; PRP defined tasks and responsibilities

Professional firemen


Introductory training defined by the Decree on equipment and training of rescue forces, Official Gazette 22/99

Annually + occassional drilling

Advanced training with practical work and demonstrations, tasks and responsibilities defined by the PRP

Every two years Training on simulator

Voluntary firemen



On regular basis (every two years) + occassional drilling

Repeated introductionary training with demonstrations and practical work, tasks and responsibilities defined by the PRP

Workers/security staff



Occassional drilling Repeated introductionary training, tasks and responsibilities defined by the PRP

Drivers



On regular basis (every two years)

Repeated introductionary training with demonstrations and practical work

Members of the First Aid Unit

On regular basis (every three years) + drilling on exercises

Introductory training defined by the Decree on equipment and training of rescue forces, Official Gazette 22/99, tasks and responsibilities defined by the PRP



REFERENCESCOUNCIL DIRECTIVE 96/82/ECof 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances(OJ L 10, 14.1.1997, p. 13) – consolidated version

DIRECTIVE 2012/18/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 4 July 2012 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC

Planning for Emergencies Involving Dangerous Substances for Slovenia. Final Report. Contract no: SL-0081.0011.01. 28 February 2002. I.van der Putte: Regional Environment Accession Project (REAP). Nethconsult/BKH Consulting Engineers/RPS. Subcontractors: AEA Technology, URS/Dames & Moore, EPCE, Project Management Group, REC Hungary

INTERNAL EMERGENCY PLAN CASE 1 Example Slovenia Ike van der Putte

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