Center for theStudy ofIntelligence

PB9-S9-2801-1· ------- " -I111~1111"~IIIIII~IIII1I~IIIII~IIIII __~~_LJ

Intelligence Support toHumanitarian-DisasterRelief Operations

An Intelligence Monograph

by G. Ted Constantine

"Both policymakers and operators....... ~·expresseda need for significantly

greater intelligence on humanitarianemergencies' issues"

REPRODUCED BY: NTISU,S. Department of Commerce_0­

Nalional Technical Information ServiceSpnngfield, Virginia 22161

Central Intelligence Agency

1575CS195-005

December 1995

tt

Center for the ~~,~Study of ~~\,Intelligence 4. ,

Intelligence Support toHumanitarian-DisasterRelief Operations

An Intelligence Monograph

by G. Ted Constantine

. Central Intelligence Agency

CS195-005December 1995

l\ ""

Foreword

Ted Constantine, author of this monograph, is a senior intelligence analyst with theDefense Intelligence Agency's Office of Transnational Issues, Low-IntensityConflict Cell. This paper is the result of his research while serving in the DCI'sExceptional Intelligence Analyst Program from May 1994 to May 1995. Mr.Constantine was an analyst with DIA's Military Geography Branch from 1985 to1994 and was a hydrologist with Dames & Moore, Consultants in theEnvironmental and Applied Earth Sciences, from 1977 to 1985. He holds abachelor of science degree from the University of Maryland and a masters of artsdegree in geography from George Washington University. He has donepostgraduate work in civil engineering at the University of California, the Universityof Texas, and Pennsylvania State University. Throughout his professional careerhe has worked with disaster- and crisis-related issues.

Comments may be directed to Mr. Constantine at DIA on (202) 231-3455 orthrough the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence on (703) 351-2698.

The Center for the Study of Intelligence promotes broader understanding of thehistory, theory, and practice of intelligence and facilitates discussion of majorissues relevant to the profession. This mission includes conducting research,writing intelligence history, declassifying historical records, and publishing aquarterly journal, books, and monographs. Inquiries may be directed to theCenter's director on (703) 351-2698.

The monograph program publishes papers written by intelligence officers onrotation to the Center under its Fellows and Scholars Programs, as well asmanuscripts submitted from throughout the Intelligence Community. Thepublications are produced in consultation with interested agency components, butthere is no formal coordination. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflectthe views of the Center or CIA.

This monograph is Unclassified in its entirety.

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: Prece Ing page an.,

Ted Constantine

iii

MemorialA black granite slab sits prominently on the

grounds of Scott AFB, Illinois. On it are inscribedthese words:

AirliftIn tribute to the airfifters of the United States Air Force who valiantly served and gallantlydied in support of this nation's dedication to the principles of liberty and freedom.

Humanitarian airlift extends the olive branch of peace and hope to those in need. Combatairlift delivers the arrows of war against those who seek to destroy the United States ofAmerica or her Allies.

let the events inscribed hereon remind all airlifters of their proud heritage and give themrenewed strength to meet the challenges of the future.

Moslems to Mecca 1952Haiti Hurricane 1954Japan Typhoon 1959Morocco Earthquake 1960Brazil Flood 1960Honduras Hurricane 1961Guam Typhoon 1962·76Iran Earthquake 1964Costa Rica Volcano 1964Alaska Earthquake 1964Pakistan Flood 1964Italy Flood 1966Mali Drought 1974Bolivia Flood 1974Vietnam Refugees 1975Guatemala Earthquake 1976Iran Evacuation 1978-79Marshall Islands Typhoon 1979Algeria Earthquake 1980Italy Earthquake 1980Mexico Earthquake 1985Soviet Armenia Earthquake 1988·89East Coast Caribbean Hurricane 1989Kurd Refugees 1991Philippines Evacuation 1991Aid to the former Soviet Republics 1992

Flying the Hump, World War 111941-45Berlin Airlift 1948-49Korean Conflict 1950-53Indo-China 1954Suez Canal 1956Hungary 1956-57Taiwan 1958Dominican Republic 1965Mideast Evacuation 1967Vietnam Conflict 1964-73US$ Pueblo 1968POW Homecoming 1973Israel 1973S5 Mayaguez 1975Korea Buildup 1976Zaire 1978lebanon 1978Grenada 1983Lebanon 1983Panama 1989-90Persian Gulf 1990-92

Note: of the 47 entries on the memorial, 21 were combatoperations and 26 (55 percent) were humanitarian reliefoperations. Of the humanitarian operations, 20 were naturaldisaster relief operations conducted from 1954 to 1989.

350575PM5 11·95

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Table of Contents

Foreword

Airlift Memorial

I. Introduction and Key Findings

II. The Selling

A. The Nature of Disasters

B. History of Disaster Relief Operations

C. Doctrinal Issues

D. Managing Intelligence Support

III. Development of Disaster Relief Intelligence

A. National Intelligence Estimates: Humanitarian Emergencies

B. Environmental Defense Intelligence

C. Other Players

D. Other Activities

IV. Key Findings

A. Operations Intelligence Consumers

B. Intelligence Requirements

C. Intelligence Community Capabilities and Appropriateness

D. Best Intelligence Assets

V. Recommendations

Appendix

Organizations Contacted

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I. Introduction and Key Findings

Introduction

~-This paper presents the results of an inquiryinto the role of the US Intelligence Communityin support of humanitarian-disaster reliefoperations conducted abroad by US militaryforces.

Its objectives are to provide the IntelligenceCommunity and consumers of its products acomprehensive view of disaster relief issuesand to improve understanding of a largely ill­defined and poorly understood intelligencemission. The author hopes that the results of theinquiry will help practitioners coordinate futureefforts, avoid duplication, and perhaps providemodels for addressing other intelligence issuesassociated with humanitarian emergencies.To that end the project's goals were to:

• Identify the consumers of intelligence fordisaster relief operations.

• Determine their intelligence requirements.

• Assess the Intelligence Community'scapabilities to provide such intelligence tomeet these requirements and theappropriateness of such missions.

• Identify the best intelligence assets forperforming that mission.

• Recommend any organizational changesthat would facilitate provision of relevant,timely intelligence in support of reliefoperations.

The inquiry focused on humanitarianemergencies caused by natural ortechnological disasters, such as the one thatled to Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh in1991. "Complex" humanitarian emergencies­those generated primarily by conflict, such asin Bosnia-are similar yet distinct from disasterrelief operations. Yet, all categories of militaryhumanitarian relief operations require many ofthe same essential elements of information.

The author conducted extensive interviewswith people who have responsibilities in thisfield: intelligence and military personnel andboth government and nongovernmentalconsumers of intelligence. Interviewees wereasked to discuss their roles, responsibilities,intelligence requirements, and issues ofconcern regarding disaster relief operations.Some were invited to evaluate the usefulnessto their missions of various intelligenceproducts, specifically the Defense IntelligenceAgency's, Contingency Support Study (CSS),Environmental Defense Intelligence for NaturalDisaster Relief Operations, Bangladesh,published in April 1993.

Visits were made to military commands andservices in the field, and to agencies anddepartmental units in the Washington area. UNand other international bodies; academic,scientific and research institutions; andnongovernmental relief organizations werealso visited. (See appendix.)

Additional information was obtained throughparticipation in several conferences andworking groups that addressed issues relatingto humanitarian and environmental disasterrelief, and by extensively searching therelevant literature.

During the inquiry, several consumers ofhumanitarian relief operations intelligencecited the difficulties imposed by usingclassified information. They contended that itsignificantly reduced the size of the usercommunity, excluded important players, andthereby limited the value of the informationprovided. This report, accordingly, isunclassified in order to make it available toanyone with responsibilities relating to reliefoperations. Although classified information isnot included, the author believes the report is athorough discussion of the relevant issues.

The objective isto provide theIntelligenceCommunity andconsumers of itsproducts acomprehensiveview of disasterrelief issues.

1

"The IntelligenceCommunity'slevel ofcommitment toprovidingintelligence fordisaster reliefoperations is.. , notcommensuratewith consumerneeds."

2

Key Findings

Two general findings emerged from thisinquiry:

• Both policymakers and operators expresseda need for significantly greater intelligence onhumanitarian emergencies issues.

• The Intelligence Community's level ofcommitment to providing intelligence fordisaster relief operations is uneven and, withfew exceptions, not commensurate withexpressed consumer needs.

With regard to the five goals stated in theintroduction:

• The principle consumers of disaster reliefintelligence are the planners and operators inthe military services and the unifiedcommands who organize and manage reliefoperations.

• Their primary intelligence requirements arefor (a) help in identifying future humanitarianemergency issues and areas where futuredisaster relief operations may be conducted;(b) finished intelligence products that willassist contingency planning for suchoperations, particularly societal andenvironmental information in addition totraditional contingency intelligence; (c)whenever possible, and especially whenrelief operations are in progress, unclassifiedintelligence products that can be shared withcooperating international andnongovernmental organizations.

• Within the Intelligence Community, theDefense Intelligence Agency has beendesignated the Defense Department'sprimary producer of disaster relief operationsintelligence. Intelligence analysis andproduction units, particularly in defenseintelligence organizations, are capable ofproducing the comprehensive intelligenceproducts that satisfy most consumerrequirements.

• The best intelligence assets are DIA's all­source analysis and production units, whichcan produce comprehensive contingencyproducts with appropriate graphics and havethe widest and most reliable consumerdissemination network. Collection assets indescending order of importance for disasterrelief operations, are: human intelligence(HUMINT), open sources, imageryintelligence (IMINT), and communicationsintelligence (COMINT).

• The author recommends that a small unit ofintelligence analysts be established withinthe Defense Intelligence Agency tocoordinate the Intelligence Community'scollection, analysis, production, anddissemination of all-source intelligence tosupport humanitarian relief operations by themilitary services and unified commands.Whenever possible, its products should beunclassified or the classified intelligenceshould be provided in separate appendixes.

II. The Setting

A. The Nature of Disasters

Disasters are generally divided into two broadcategories:

• Natural disasters:

-Floods, hurricanes, tropical cyclones,typhoons.

-Earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.

-Droughts and crop failures.

-Massive tidal waves, forest fires, andinsect infestations.

• Technological disasters:

-Acute industrial catastrophes.

-Pervasive or massive pollution orenvironmental degradation of ground,water, and air.

-Overuse or misuse of natural resources,particularly water.

-Environmental sabotage.

Natural and technological disasters may beacute or pervasive. For example, technologicaldisasters may initially be a pervasive problemthat becomes acute over time or after acatastrophic event. Disaster relief operationstypically respond to acute events such ashurricanes and earthquakes. However, manyof the pervasive, temporally extendeddisasters, such as droughts and crop failures,sometimes contribute to humanitarianemergencies.

Natural and technological disasters can be justas destabilizing as conflicts arising frompolitical, economic, ethnic, religious, orterritorial disputes. Such disasters often createlarge numbers of refugees or displaced

populations in need of immediate assistance inorder to prevent even greater disasters suchas famines, epidemics, or complete societalcollapse.

Natural disasters occur in recognized naturalhazard zones that extend over limited portionsof the earth's surface. The only disasters ofinterest from an intelligence perspective arethose that affect large, vulnerable populationsand overwhelm indigenous relief forces. Theseare the events that generate foreigngovernment requests for immediate outsideassistance that often involves the use ofmilitary forces. Identifying situations and areaswhere such events may occur is the first andperhaps most challenging role for disasterrelief intelligence specialists.

Disasters of equal force often produce unequalconsequences. The level of human andeconomic losses and the needs of survivor andvictim populations vary significantly fromcountry to country for similar disaster events.The difference is largely due to the nature ofthe affected area's physical infrastructure(construction techniques and materials,settlement patterns, transportation networks,etc.); the population's attitudes and practices(cultural and societal factors); the area'smedical capabilities; and the capabilities andeffectiveness of indigenous disaster warning,management, and relief forces. For example,powerful tropical cyclones of equal forcestriking the coasts of Bangladesh and Australiaproduce very different results. Reliefrequirements and government responses alsoare very different. These factors must beunderstood and incorporated into the disasterrelief intelligence cycle.

In addition, similar events often producedifferent responses from governments in theaffected areas. In the Kobe, Japan,earthquake of January 1995, some 5,000people were killed, and many more wererendered homeless. The Japanese

"The onlydisasters ofinterest from anintelligenceperspective arethose that affectlarge, vulnerablepopulations andoverwhelmindigenous reliefforces. "

3

Technologicaldisasterspresent a morechallengingintelligenceproblem thannatural disasters.

4

Government did not request any foreignassistance, but some minor assistance waseventually accepted, including delivery ofblankets and water containers by US militaryaircraft. A similar earthquake in Armenia,would produce different effects andgovernment reactions. In many countries,military forces are the instrument of first, ratherthan last, resort to mitigate the effects ofdisasters. These issues must also beunderstood and incorporated into the disasterrelief intelligence cycle.

Technological disasters present a morechallenging intelligence problem. Catastrophictechnological disasters, partiCUlarly those thatmay precipitate foreign military assistance, arevery difficult to assess. Is it possible toestimate the probability of the next Chernobyl'type accident? Perhaps not. However, somedisaster relief planners have given this seriousthought. In 1994 the US European Commandand the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)held a series of international logistics seminarsemploying "gaming" scenarios based onpotential future disasters in the Baltic states.IDA concluded that an accident at the IgnalinaNuclear Power Plant in Lithuania met thecriteria for a potential future disaster andincluded a scenario for such an accident.

Figure 1 shows the total number of peopleaffected by disasters of all types, worldwide,for the years 1967-91. More than 50 percentwere affected by natural disasters. Althoughthe figures vary significantly from year to year,there is a rising trend. For the first six years ofdata, 1967-72, no more than 50 million peoplewere affected by disasters in any given year.However, for the most recent five years of data,1987-91, no less than 125 million people wereaffected by disasters in any given year. Thisreflects the explosive growth in globalpopulation in recent decades that has forcedmillions of people to move into morehazardous environments.

The table on page 8 shows how many peoplewere killed worldwide for disasters from 1967to 1991. The fact that more were killed bynatural disasters than by civil strife belies acommonly held misconception that theopposite is true. (Civil strife disasters are"National [civil strife, civil war], warlikeencounters between armed groups from thesame country that take place within theborders.") 1

B. History of Disaster Relief Operations

Disaster relief operations are not new to UnitedStates military forces. As one Americanscholar recently wrote:

After recent hurricanes . .. many peoplehailed the superb contributions of theArmed Forces to disaster relief asevidence of a new role. Nothing couldhave been more incorrect. The serviceshave regularly provided such relief in thepast . .. This has been true throughoutour history, [as noted in an official 1969Army history.}

Samuel P. Huntington,Harvard University,Joint Forces Quarterly.Autumn 1993

Historical data from the US Air MobilityCommand (AMC) indicates that in the pastthree decades the US military response toforeign natural disasters has been asconsistently robust as Huntington's claim forearlier years. The AMC (formerly Military AirliftCommand) has primary responsibility in theDOD for airlift. Hence, it almost always isinvolved in Department of Defense disasterrelief operations.

I Source: World Disaster Report 1993. InternationalFederation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,Geneva, Switzerland.

Figure 1Number of People Affected by Disastersper Year, 1967-91

Millions of people

400

"Until veryrecently, USmilitary forceslacked officialDOD doctrinemanuals ortrainingexercises forhumanitarian anddisaster reliefoperations. "

300

200

100

o 1967 70 75 80 85 90 91

Note: The number of people affected by disastersvaries greatly from year to year, but there is ageneral rising trend.

Source: World Disaster Report 1993, InternationalFederation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,Geneva, Switzerland.

Figure 2 shows the "significant" or "major"relief operations conducted by AMC from 1972through 1994. After the mid-1970s, a cleartrend emerges when the yearly numbers ofAMC operations are roughly proportional to theyearly numbers of people "affected" by thedisasters. The peak "affected" years, shown infigure 1, correlate well with the years whenAMC foreign natural disaster operationsexceeded the yearly average (for the 22-yearperiod of record) of 4.5 operations per yearshown in figure 2. The relationship is mostpronounced for the years 1979, 1983, and1991 in figure 1.

The level of US military responses to foreigndisasters is difficult to gauge and largelymisunderstood even by people familiar with

350149All,-95

these operations. Many interviewees had littleknowledge of response levels, particularlyefforts beyond their immediate chain ofcommand. The problem reflects difficulties inidentifying scales of measure and the lack ofdata.

Military historians suggested that one way toprovide perspective is to examine "named" USmilitary operations. Figure 3 shows all "named"US military operations from 1989 through1993. During these formative years of thepost-Cold War era, there was considerabledebate over roles and missions for both thedefense and intelligence communities.

5

"Within theunifiedcommands, theUS PacificCommand hasplayed a leadingrole in disasterrelief operationspreparednessand contingencyinformationplanning. "

6

In figure 3, foreign disaster relief operationsrepresent 11 of all "named" operations. The barrepresenting "Humanitarian" operations (25percent) does not include disaster operations,although they are a type of humanitarianoperation. If disaster operations are combinedwith the other "humanitarian" operations, totalhumanitarian operations represent a startling36 percent of all named US military operationsfor this time period.

Different operations involve differing levels ofmilitary force, resource commitments, orthreats, thus complicating efforts to gauge thelevel of intelligence support required. In anycase, humanitarian operations clearly are animportant component of military missions inrecent years.

c. Doctrinal Issues

Until very recently, US military forces lackedofficial DOD doctrine manuals or trainingexercises for humanitarian and disaster reliefoperations. Most operators noted that thisseverely constrained their ability to articulateintelligence requirements. Several militaryorganizations have recognized and addressedthese deficiencies and have pUblisheddocuments addressing humanitarian/disasterrelief doctrine, tactics, techniques, andprocedures. A sample of these publicationsfollows.

Within the "joint" community, the Air-Land-SeaApplication Center, Langley AFB, VA,published the manual, Multi-ServiceProcedures for Humanitarian AssistanceOperations, in March 1994. The center is ajoint Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navyorganization responsible for developingmultiservice tactics, techniques, andprocedures. In interviews, authors of themanual stated that it was intended as aprecursor for a future Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) manual for humanitarian reliefoperations.

The purpose of the center's manual is toprovide "military forces, civilians, and volunteerorganizations with information pertaining tohumanitarian assistance (HA) operationswhere the size or extent of the assistancerequires the formulation of a US military jointtask force (JTF) ... (HA) provides the JTFcommander, his staff, and supportingcomponents with information to assist in theplanning and execution of HA operations." Fordisaster relief operations, "HA missions ...include efforts to mitigate the results of naturalor manmade disasters."

Within the unified commands, the US PacificCommand has played a leading role in disasterrelief operations preparedness andcontingency information planning. Starting inthe late 1980s, USPACOM developed DisasterPreparedness Planning Survey (DPPS)manuals. They are based on the concept that"past experience indicates prior planningsignificantly reduces response time in initiatingappropriate relief operations." Therefore, the"DPPS program is part of the USCINCPACStrategic Peacetime Initiatives ... It wasdeveloped to support Humanitarian Assistanceprograms by providing a source document fordisaster assistance ... "

DPPS manuals have been produced forseveral disaster-prone countries withinUSPACOM's area of responsibility. Themanuals are similar to DIA's ContingencySupport StUdy on Bangladesh but are lesscomprehensive and have fewer graphics. TheDPPS program is managed by USPACOM J3(Operations). In interviews, J3 personnelopined that the information in their manualscould be adapted to a CSS-type prodUCt. BothJ3 and other staff elements at USPACOMexpressed hopes for closer coordination andpossible joint production with DIA.

Figure 2Air Mobility Command (AMC) "Significant/Major"Foreign Disaster Relief Operations, 1972-94

Number of operations

15

10

5

"Within the USGovernment, theprimaryresponsibility forthe managementof foreigndisaster reliefoperationsresides withthe StateDepartment andthe Office of USForeign DisasterAssistance(OFDA) in theAgency forInternationalDevelopment. "

o 1972 75 80 85 90 94

Note: Although there appears to be no trend inthe number of AMC operations per year, there isin fact a correlation between the peak years forpeople "affected" by disasters shown in figure 1

Source: Headquarters, AMC Historian Office,Scott AFB, IL, March 1995.

Within the services, publications of the Centerfor Army Lessons Learned (CALL), US ArmyCombined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth,KS, have addressed humanitarian anddisaster relief operations doctrine, recognizingthat "operations other than war constitute acontinuing and growing mission. Given thecurrent coexisting environments of peacetimeand conflict (as opposed to war), we canexpect to be involved in the full gamut ofoperations other than war, from peaceenforcement and antiterrorism to counterdrugand disaster assistance." Two CALL volumeshave addressed humanitarian operationsissues: Operations Other Than War; Volume I,Humanitarian Assistance, December 1992,focuses on complex humanitarian emergency

and the years when AMC operations exceed theirmean of 4.5 operations per year. The relationshipis strongest for the peak "affected" years 1979,1983, and 1991 in figure 1.

350150AI 11·95

operations; Operations Other Than War;Volume II, October 1993, focuses on naturaldisaster relief operations.

D. Managing Intelligence Support

Within the US Government, the primaryresponsibility for the management of foreigndisaster relief operations resides with the StateDepartment and the Office of US ForeignDisaster Assistance (OFDA) in the Agency forInternational Development (AID). OFDA is asmall organization (about 50 people) withlimited relief operations capabilities. I~ primary

7

aThis number is the sum only ofnatural disaster types. These eventskilled more people than civil strifedisasters during the 25-year period,1967-91.

Source: World Disaster Report 1993,International Federation of Red Crossand Red Crescent Societies, Geneva,Switzerland.

"Informationmanagement andorganizationalresponsibilitiesfor disasterswithin the UnitedStates are betterdeveloped andmore clearlydelineated thanfor foreigndisasters. "

responsibility is the management of US foreigndisaster assistance efforts, not themanagement of intelligence information.

Under most circumstances, the USGovernment first becomes involved in foreigndisasters when the State Department declaresa state of disaster. OFDA is first required to tryto use commercial carriers to transport reliefsupplies to foreign countries, but often theurgency of the disaster and its remote locationnecessitate tasking DOD resources. In somecases, US military forces eventually dominatethe relief mission.

Within DOD, the Office of the AssistantSecretary of Defense, Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, Humanitarian andRefugee Affairs coordinates DOD's assets fordisaster assistance overseas. The commandcomponent for military relief forces variesdepending on the scale, scope, and area of theoperation.

Several US Government civilian agencies maybe tasked to provide some information tosupport the military's disaster relief operationsabroad. These have included AID, OFDA, andthe US Geological Survey.

Within the Intelligence Community, the CentralIntelligence Agency and intelligencecomponents of the military commands andservices provide varying levels of intelligencesupport to deployed US disaster relief forces.However, these organizations typically do notprovide comprehensive intelligence analysesor prepare contingency support products onthe full range of disaster operationsintelligence issues.

Total Number of PeopleKilled, by Type of Disaster,1967-91

Type

All types of natural disastersAccidentsAvalancheChemical accidentCivil strifeCold waveCycloneDisplaced personsDroughtEpidemicEarthquakeFamineFireFloodFood shortageHurricaneHigh windInsect infestationLandslidePower shortageStormTsunamiTyphoonVolcano

Number Killed

3,413,5298

71,7451,23715,7873,007,1544,926846,24068,7411,333,728124,338646,307605,83281,970304,87025215,13913,904o41,992o54,5006,39034,68427,642

8

Information management and organizationalresponsibilities for disasters within the UnitedStates are better developed and more clearlydelineated than for foreign disasters. Fordomestic disasters, The Federal ResponsePlan (Public Law 93-288, as Amended)defines organizational responsibilities for US

350190PM5 11·95

Government agencies, including theapplication of Department of Defenseresources. The Federal Response Plandesignates the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) as the primary

350151AI 11·95

Figure 3Named US Military OperationsAbroad, January 1989 toDecember 1993ab

producer and manager of disaster reliefinformation. Information products widely usedfor contingency planning are the FloodInsurance Studies (FIS) produced underFEMA's National Flood Insurance Program.The studies identify the nature, location, andextent of domestic flood disasters and provide

estimates and cartographic displays ofpotential future flood disasters and floodhazard zones.

There is no single official document for foreigndisasters similar to the Federal ResponsePlan, but a loosely analogous structure existsfor producing intelligence relating to foreignmilitary disaster relief operations. DODintelligence production responsibilities areprescribed in a document published under theauspices of the Department of DefenseIntelligence Production Program (DODIPP).2The DODIPP document assigns primaryresponsibility for producing intelligence forhumanitarian relief operations to DIA'sNational Military Intelligence ProductionCenter (NMIPC). The document alsodesignates NMIPC as primary manager ofDOD production of physical and environmentintelligence relating to natural disasters. Theseproduction management responsibilities apply,in general, when a DOD consumer requiresinformation from non-DOD organizations. Inthese cases, NMIPC ''will negotiate with theappropriate non-DOD intelligence producer forthe required product."

This inqUiry found DIA elements largelyunaware of their DODIPP assignments fordisaster relief. In addition, none wanted todevote the resources necessary to produceintelligence products that would satisfyconsumer requirements.

2 Defense Intelligence Management Document,Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program:Production Responsibilities, DIA, March 1995.

Number of operationso 2 4 6 8 10

I

!=:::::I:==:I::::::::r::-::r25%

16%1==;::I::::::::l~=l16°/~

11%1==;::I::~11o;J

Types of operationsHumanitarianPeacekeepingEvacuationDisaster reliefOffensivec

Defensivec

LogisticsDrug interventionInterdiction of sea lanesRescueInternal defense

aFigures do not add to 100 percent dueto rounding.bTotal operations equals 38.cThree of the four offensive operationsand all defensive operations were partof the 1990-91 Gulf war.

Source: Headquarters, US Training andDocument Command, Fort Monroe,Virginia, April 1994

9

III. Development of Disaster ReliefIntelligence

National-level intelligence support of disasterrelief operations is a relatively new mission.Discussed below are important relateddevelopments within the IntelligenceCommunity that have occurred in recent years.

A. National Intelligence Estimates:Humanitarian Emergencies

Perhaps the most important has been thedevelopment of the process that produces theannual National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) forHumanitarian Emergencies and theestablishment of the position of NationalIntelligence Officer (NIO) for Global andMultilateral Issues.

The humanitarian emergencies NIE assessesthe location, extent, type, likelihood of need,and severity of need for global humanitarianemergencies in the coming year. It provides,for the first time, information on possiblenatural disasters, including countries withsignificant popUlations vulnerable to majornatural disasters. The first NIE onhumanitarian emergencies was produced in1992 under the auspices of the N10 forWarning. 3 In 1993 the first NIO for Global andMultilateral Issues was appointed andassigned responsibility for producing theannual NIE for humanitarian emergencies.

The NIE production process is important todisaster relief operations for two reasons. First,by participating in the production of thehumanitarian emergencies NIE, a cadre ofintelligence analysts from throughout theCommunity has developed minimal levels ofexpertise in intelligence for humanitariandisaster relief operations. Most of them haveother duties often unrelated to humanitarian

J National Intelligence Officers are responsible forcoordinating National Intelligence Estimates relating toregions or subjects for which they have jurisdiction.Together they comprise the National Intelligence Council(NIC), which serves under the Director of CentralIntelligence.

emergencies, but because their offices aretasked annually to contribute to the NIE, a fundof basic knowledge has been established thatdid not exist previously. Second, the NIO forGlobal and Multilateral Issues provides anauthoritative focal point for addressingenvironmental and humanitarian intelligenceissues, including disaster relief.

B. Environmental Defense Intelligence

In 1992 the Defense Intelligence Agencysought to improve support for future disasterrelief operations. The initiative was largely aresponse to Operation Sea Angel, a majordisaster relief operation in Bangladesh in May1991 in which some 152,000 people werekilled by a tropical cyclone. Interviews with SeaAngel commanders indicated they had not hadadequate intelligence on Bangladesh'sphysical and cultural environment,infrastructure, disaster relief capabilities, andthe potential for further disasters. The DIAinitiative attempted to satisfy theserequirements in preparing for disasters.

The most important component of this initiativewas the development of a new, all-source,comprehensive finished intelligence productmodeled on DIA's Contingency SupportStudies (CSS) and Contingency SupportProducts. Such products originally weredesigned to provide "off-the-shelf" contingencyintelligence for combat operations andNoncombatant Evacuation Operations. Thenew CSS-type product was designed forpotential future humanitarian relief operationsgenerated by natural or technologicaldisasters. In addition to the traditionalEssential Elements of Information (EEl)included in studies that support the movementand deployment of military forces-such astransportation infrastructure intelligence-theproduct was designed to include EEls that areunique and yet critical to the planning andprosecution of disaster relief operations.

"... byparticipating inthe production ofthe humanitarianemergencies NIE,a cadre ofintelligenceanalysts fromthroughout theCommunity hasdevelopedminimal levels ofexpertise inintelligence fordisaster reliefoperations. "

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"The EEls fordisaster reliefoperationsinclude details onthe physical,environmental,and cultural orsocietal factorsrelating to targetareas."

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The EEls for disaster relief operations includedetails on the physical, environmental, andcultural or societal factors relating to targetareas. These are important to planners whomust understand what causes disasters and tooperators who must know what and whom theyare likely to encounter in the target areas.

The physical and environmental informationrequired includes estimates of the probabilitiesfor future disasters as well as the types,locations, and magnitudes of devastation forevents that would most likely precipitaterequests for foreign military assistance.Estimates of probabilities (which are notpredictions) provide perspective and contextthat are essential to the contingency planningprocess.

The new intelligence product was designed toinclude information on the roles andcapabilities of host governments, militaryforces, and nongovernmental organizationsthat respond to disasters, as well as culturaland societal intelligence on a target area.Relief operations often occur in countries thatare low on the list of intelligence priorities.Frequently, little or no information resides inintelligence data bases on the roles andcapabilities of host government andnongovernmental disaster relief organizationsand victim populations-information that hasbeen crucial to US military operating forces.

The effort at DIA to produce this kind ofintelligence was labeled EnvironmentalDefense Intelligence, or EDI. An articleoutlining this effort was published in DIA'sGlobal Intelligence Issues, in May 1993. Thefirst EDI Contingency Support Study,Environmental Defense Intelligence forDisaster Relief Operations, Bangladesh, waspublished in April 1993. Consumers reportedthat the product was well received and widelyused for contingency planning. No otherforeign disaster contingency intelligenceproducts have been published within theIntelligence Community since that time.

The Bangladesh publication and the EDIarticle were produced in the MilitaryGeography Branch. DIA currently has noplanned production effort for contingencysupport of disaster relief operations. If tasked,the Military Geography Branch-within theNational Military Intelligence ProductionCenter (NMIPC), Combat Support Directorate(PG)-would most likely be the primaryproducer, with support from imagery and otherintelligence elements.

c. Other Players

Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center(AFMIC), located at Fort Detrick, MD, is part ofthe Defense Intelligence Agency. It directscollection, maintains data bases, andproduces medical intelligence products. Thecenter's primary mission is to identify medical,disease, and health threats to the war fighter.For some disaster-prone countries, its effortshave potential disaster operations in mind.AFMIC does not produce disaster reliefcontingency products, but, when tasked on anad hoc basis, has produced information on theroles and capabilities of a disaster area'smedical infrastructure as well asenvironmental health and disease threats torelief forces. AFMIC interviewees said theywould welcome collaboration with otherintelligence organizations, particUlarly DiAlNMIPC, in producing comprehensivecontingency intelligence for humanitarian anddisaster relief operations.

Defense Intelligence Agency/Indications andWarning Threat Management Division (DIAlJ21& W) addresses disasters from the perspectivethat after disasters strike they may generateinstability or unrest threatening US interests orpersonnel. This can include disasters thatthreaten US personnel while in the theater of ahumanitarian mission. Disasters that maygenerate foreign disaster relief operations byUS military units, however, are not thedivision's responsibility.

US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM),located at Scott AFB, IL, provides the primaryairlift and sealift capability for DOD. Thisincludes rapid deployment for disaster reliefoperations, which often are provided by the AirMobility Command (AMC). The JointIntelligence Center US TransportationCommand (JICTRANS), producestransportation intelligence products in supportof TRANSCOM missions.

JICTRANS has a robust effort to supportdisaster relief operations. The majority of itscurrently planned intelligence products are forpotential humanitarian and disaster reliefoperations. These products typically providean overview of a target area's transportationinfrastructure and ability to sustaincontingency operations. They are frequentlyprepared with the assistance of DIA, CIA,State Department, and the Defense MappingAgency. JICTRANS products do not attempt tocover disaster relief intelligence issues otherthan those relating to transportation.

Most interviewees at TRANSCOM, JICTRANS,and AMC were familiar with, andenthusiastically supported, DIA efforts tosupport disaster relief operations, including theproduction of the Bangladesh CSS.TRANSCOM used the Bangladesh study duringanother more recent crisis in Bangladesh andfound it useful. Personnel in the commandencouraged future collaboration with DIA inproducing comprehensive intelligence tosupport disaster relief operations.

National Photographic Interpretation Center(NPIC) has an experienced imagery analysisteam that supports domestic and foreigndisaster relief operations, providinginformation and products that emergencyresponse managers use to perform triage in adisaster area. Consumer interviews confirmthat NPIC's imagery-derived maps and relatedreports have greatly improved the timeline.ssand effectiveness of relief operations onnumerous occasions. At the request of theFederal Emergency Management Agency,

NIPC is developing contingency plans forimagery support for potential domesticdisasters. It provides analysis on a broadrange of foreign disasters but has not beentasked to develop contingency plans forpotential foreign relief operations.

The Office of Transnational Security andTechnology Issues (TSTI) at CIA (formerly theOffice of Resources, Trade, and Technology)has primary responsibility there for disasterissues. One analyst addresses these issueson a part-time basis and several other analystsare familiar with the issues. The office does notproduce contingency support products inanticipation of disaster relief operations. It has,however, provided products that address thenature, extent, and potential effects of someon-going disasters that pose potential threatsto relief efforts. At press time, a small unit hasbeen formed in TSTI to address humanitarianissues.

The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) forWarning publishes The Warning Committee'sWatchlist. This weekly publication incorporatescontributions from CIA, DIA, StateDepartment, and the National Security Agency(NSA). The Watchlist now includes a newregular feature, the "Humanitarian Crisis" list,which identifies countries with ongoing orpotential humanitarian crises of all types.

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA)produces the Generic IntelligenceRequirements Handbook, which in its 1994edition included a chapter on humanitarianintervention. The EEls contained in thischapter provided for the first time intelligencerequirements for supporting Marine Corpshumanitarian relief operations. Because thehandbook is designed for a Marine audience, itdoes not attempt to include the larger set ofEEls that may be applicable to other servicesor intelligence producers. The humanitarianintervention chapter, however, does providegeneric EEls that may guide other intelligenceproducers in supporting military reliefoperations.

The Marine CorpsGenericIntelligenceReqUirementsHandbook, in itshumanitarianinterventionchapter, containsEEls that mayguide otherintelligenceproducers insupportingmilitary reliefoperations.

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Humanitariandisaster reliefissues wereaddressed in1994·95 inseveral forumsthat broughttogether USofficials involvedin reliefoperations.

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At the request of the First MarineExpeditionary Force, MCIA also publishedExpeditionary Warfare Intelligence SupportProduct (EWISP), 1-94: Southern Sudan,which was based on a potential complexhumanitarian emergency there.

MCIA intelligence analysts noted that, iftasked, they could produce disaster reliefcontingency products but that DIA shouldproduce the more comprehensive contingencyproducts.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research(lNR) has responsibility within the Departmentof State for humanitarian and disaster reliefintelligence issues. It has lead severalIntelligence Community eHorts to facilitatebetter communication among private,government, and military organizationsinvolved in humanitarian relief activities,including sponsoring several conferences. INRmaintains data bases on some humanitarianrelief issues, publishes articles, andcontributes to the NIE on humanitarianemergencies but does not produce productsdirectly supporting military disaster reliefoperations.

An important INR contribution to humanitarianand disaster relief intelligence is the currentdevelopment of "ReliefWeb," a multilateral,strategic, global communication network linkedto Internet that contains open-source andunclassified intelligence information onhumanitarian and disaster relief issues.ReliefWeb is being developed in cooperationwith a consortium of humanitarian assistanceorganizations, the UN, and other US agencies,including the Department of Defense.

INR also is developing a humanitarianemergencies early warning capability that isnot yet connected with military or otherintelligence components.

D. Other Activities

Humanitarian-disaster relief issues were alsoaddressed in 1994-95 in several forumsincluding three conferences, a seminar, and anexercise that brought together US oHicialsinvolved in humanitarian and disaster reliefoperations and-at the seminar-responsiblepersonnel from international organizations.These events were:

• Marine Corps and Humanitarian AssistanceOperations Game, sponsored by the Centerfor Naval Analyses and the US MarineCorps, Alexandria, VA, May 1994.

• Imagery Support for Disaster Response andScientific Analysis Conference, sponsoredby the National Photographic InterpretationCenter, Washington, DC, June 1994.

• International Logistics Seminar-DisasterRelief Scenarios: Albania, June 1994; Latvia,August, 1994; Lithuania, September, 1994­sponsored by US European Command.

• Emerald Express '95 Conference onHumanitarian Assistance and PeaceOperations, Integrating Military and CivilianEfforts, hosted by the Department of State,Bureau of Intelligence and Research andFirst Marine Expeditionary Force, CampPendleton, CA, April 1995.

• Environmental Security and NationalSecurity Conference, cosponsored by theIntelligence Community Management Staffand OHice of the Deputy Under Secretary ofDefense, Environmental Security,Washington, DC, June 1995.

IV. Key Findings

Two overriding findings emerged from thisinquiry:

• Both policymakers and operators expressedthe need for significantly greater intelligencesupport on humanitarian emergenciesissues. The fact that, from 1989 through1993, humanitarian and disaster reliefoperations constituted 36 percent of allnamed US military operations (humanitarian,25 percent; disaster, 11 percent)underscores the need. Several seniorcommanders pointed out that humanitarianmissions are distinct from other militaryoperations, with unique sets of intelligencerequirements and procedures. Theyrecommended that the IntelligenceCommunity develop a cadre thoroughlyversed in the intelligence issues associatedwith such missions. Some suggested that a"Humanitarian Assistance IntelligenceCenter" be established.

• The Intelligence Community's level ofcommitment to providing intelligence fordisaster relief operations is uneven and, withfew exceptions, not commensurate withexpressed consumer needs. Institutionalcommitments vary between the requisiteresource allocations made to intelligencecomponents at some unified commands andservices-lead by the Marine Corps-to acautious and largely noncommittal approachat DIA. This inquiry found that suchnonuniformity has hindered overallcapabilities to satisfy the intelligencerequi rements.

Many intelligence consumers, particularlysenior officers and veterans of humanitarianand disaster relief operations, expresseddismay at what they perceived is theIntelligence Community's haphazard efforts tosupport such operations. They want to receivethe same level of intelligence support andinstitutional commitment for these missions

from the Intelligence Community -particularlyDIA-that other types of military operationsreceive.

Although DIA has been assigned responsibilitywithin the DOD for providing intelligence tosupport humanitarian and disaster reliefmissions, this responsibility has not beeninstitutionalized to the extent necessary.

A. Operations Intelligence Consumers

Principle ConsumersThe principle consumers for disaster reliefoperations intelligence are the planners (J5­Plans and Policy) and operators (J3­Operations) in the unified commands andmilitary services.

Planners who were interviewed stated thatfinished intelligence products such as DIA'sprototype for Bangladesh would be the mostimportant intelligence support product forplanning and executing disaster reliefoperations.

Operators also stressed the importance ofhaving a contingency support product on handboth before and during deployment. Productscombining text and graphics-including liberaluse of photographs, maps, and charts-weredeemed crucial to the preparatory phase ofoperations. For field deployed forces, theyplaced greater value on unclassified products,whenever possible, which could be sharedwith coalition partners, host governmentofficials, and nongovernmental organizations.

Senior officials interviewed at USEUCOM,USPACOM, USTRANSCOM, and theservices-particularly the Marine Corps­encouraged closer working relationships withDIA on the full spectrum of humanitarianemergency intelligence issues, and theproduction of contingency support products.

Many intelligenceconsumersexpresseddismayconcerning theIntelligenceCommunity'shaphazardsupport ofhumanitarian anddisaster reliefoperations.

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It is important tohave priorknowledge of atarget area'smedicalcapabilities andthe roles andcapabilities ofnongovernmentorganizations.

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Other principle consumers include theintelligence (J2), and logistic (J4) componentsin the commands and services.

Military medical components stressed theimportance of having prior knowledge of atarget area's medical capabilities, the rolesand capabilities of nongovernmentalorganizations, and the likely requirements ofsurviving victims.

Other ConsumersDefense Department. The Office of theAssistant Secretary of Defense, SpecialOperations/Low-Intensity Confl ict,Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs,coordinates DOD's assets for disasterassistance overseas. Its officials said theBangladesh CSS prototype provided valuablesupport for their mission, and they encouragedcloser working relationships with DIA and theproduction of humanitarian and disaster reliefcontingency products for other countries.

Transportation Command. Personnel inTRANSCOM, both a producer and consumerof disaster relief intelligence, found great valuein Intelligence Community products thatsupport their disaster relief missions.

Department of State: Office of theUndersecretary of State for Global Affairs.State Department interviewees wereenthusiastic about an Intelligence Communityeffort to provide products that would supporthumanitarian and disaster relief operations.They were familiar with those alreadyproduced under the direction of the NIO forGlobal and Multilateral Issues and regardcontingency support intelligence products as alogical extension of that process.

Agency for International Development:Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance(OFDA). Interviewees at the OFDA praisedIntelligence Community products in support ofthe office's mission. They want to developcloser working relationships with DIA and

would welcome additional contingencyintelligence products supportive of theirmission.

Other Intelligence Agencies. Producers alsoare often consumers; they use each others'products to support their missions. Finishedintelligence products are frequently sharedand used by agencies of the IntelligenceCommunity. These additional "consumers"expressed interest in receiving disaster reliefintelligence products similar to DIA'sBangladesh prototype. They included variouselements at: CIA, DIA, the NIC, State/INR,I&W components, Army's Intelligence andThreat Analysis Center, and other militaryservice intelligence components.

Potential Nongovernment Consumers• United Nations Department of Humanitarian

Affairs, Geneva, Switzerland.

• InterAction, a Washington DC-basedumbrella organization representing over 160American-based groups involved in foreignhumanitarian relief operations.

• Refugee Policy Group, a Washington DC­based organization that recently producedan unclassified version of the NIE forHumanitarian Emergencies, under contractto the National Intelligence Council.

Personnel from potential nongovernmentconsumer organizations were interviewed, andall enthusiastically supported any effort by theIntelligence Community to provide disasterrelief intelligence. Most had at times receivedunclassified intelligence information whileconducting their missions. When shown anunclassified version of the DIA Bangladeshprototype, they extolled it as the type ofproduct needed to support their missions incooperation with US forces.

Whether US intelligence information should bepassed to the United Nations or to foreigndisaster assistance organizations based in the

United States is a policy issue beyond thescope of this report. UN and privateinterviewees stated that they would not, in anycase, anticipate having tasking authority orreceiving intelligence information directly fromUS intelligence producers.

Potential UN and nongovernmentalconsumers were primarily concerned withsharing unclassified information with USmilitary forces or intelligence componentswhile participating as coalition partners inforeign disaster relief missions. All of thembelieved that such sharing could significantlyimprove prospects for successful missions. UNrepresentatives in particular expressed astrong desire for this kind of informationsharing.

B. Intelligence Requirements

The requirements cited by the large anddiverse consumer interview pool were in fourgeneral categories:

• Help consumers identify future humanitarianemergency issues and areas where disasterrelief operations may be conducted. Allconsumer interviewees believed thathumanitarian relief operations will constitutesignificant shares of their future missions.However, many were unaware of mostintelligence efforts to support disaster reliefoperations, and few had training orexperience with relief operations.

Some consumers were hesitant to requestcontingency products, largely because theywere uncertain how to define the problem setand frame appropriate questions. Othersnoted that they simply did not know what toask for, despite their belief that they wouldparticipate in future disaster operations.Virtually all consumers stated the need forbetter coordination with national-levelintelligence agencies on disaster reliefissues. Many opined that the national

agencies should be responsible for advisingthem and providing estimates andappropriate contingency products forpotential humanitarian emergencies, therebyimproving their grasp of the issues and theirability to articulate future requirements.

Many consumers (and some producers)believed that estimating where futuredisasters might occur is beyond anyone'scapabilities. This common misconceptionconfuses "estimates" or "probabilities" with"predictions." Although no one can predictthe time and place of future disasters beyondimmediate time frames, the state of the art forestimating probabilities and identifyinghazard zones for certain natural disasters,particularly meteorologically generatedevents, is quite good. Intelligence producerscan identify these areas, estimate frequencyprobabilities for some types of disasters, andreadily provide this information toconsumers. It can be packaged in familiarproducts and be readily accessible tointelligence consumers via normaldissemination channels. This kind ofinformation has been valuable to USdomestic disaster relief planners, managers,and operators, including military forces.

• Contingency support products that aidplanning and execution of disaster reliefoperations are needed. Many consumersnoted the dearth of such products. They werefamiliar with the coordination processbetween intelligence producers (particularlyDIA) and consumers that facilitates robustproduction of other contingency productsand overwhelmingly suggested theestablishment of similar procedures fordisaster relief products. Several suggestedusing the Humanitarian Emergencies NIE asa baseline for identifying potentialhumanitarian emergencies.

The principle consumers in the unifiedcommands and services stressed theimportance of graphics in contingency

"Contingencysupportproducts that aidplanning andexecution ofdisaster reliefoperations areneeded."

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"Successful reliefoperations oftenhinge on reliefforcesunderstandingthe needs of thepopulation, oncooperating withnongovernmentalorganizations,

and on workingwith local tribalandadministrativeentities."

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products and recommended liberal use ofboth ground and overhead photographs,maps, and charts.

• More cultural, societal, and environmentalintelligence for potential 'target areas' isdesired. This refers primarily to informationon disaster area populations and the rolesand capabilities of host governments andprivate organizations in relief operations.Disaster relief operations often occur incountries that are low on intelligence prioritylists. Hence, planners and operators typicallyhave little information on local populationsand relief organizations. Successful reliefoperations often hinge on relief forcesunderstanding the needs of the population,on cooperating with nongovernmentalorganizations, and on working with localtribal and administrative entities.

Environmental intelligence includestraditional military geography for the targetarea (terrain, vegetation, meteorology). Italso embraces estimates of potential futuredisasters, the possible extent of disaster­induced damage, the impact on cross­country movement, and environmentalconstraints on operating forces. Much of thisinformation is typically in short supply formany of the low-priority, disaster-pronecountries.This type of environmentalintelligence is critical to the planning process.

• If possible, produce disaster reliefintelligence products at the unclassifiedlevel. Most consumers emphasized theimportance of sharing intelligenceinformation, when appropriate, with coalitionpartners, UN participants, host governments,and especially nongovernmentalorganizations. These bodies are usuallymore familiar with the target area than USforces. Nonhost coalition partners oftenpossess even less intelligence on the targetarea than do US forces. Sharing unclassifiedintelligence information could significantlyimprove operational coordination andchances for mission success.

Essential Elements of Information

Many of the disaster relief EEls discussedduring this project were recently published forthe first time in an unclassified andconveniently formatted document: the USMarine Corps,' Intelligence Activity, GenericIntelligence Requirements Handbook (GIRH).The handbook is oriented for USMCoperations and therefore does not include allconsumers' requirements, but it provides asound guide for intelligence producers tosatisfy most intelligence needs. The EElcategories from the Marine handbook listed inthe inset show the breadth of consumers'requirements.

C. Intelligence Community Capabilities andAppropriateness

The original query addressing "capabilities andappropriateness" was refined during thecourse of the inq uiry to pose the following moredefinitive queries: (1) Does the IntelligenceCommunity have the tools or resources toproduce disaster relief intelligence products,and (2) is it appropriate for the community toproduce these products?

Capabilities

The Intelligence Community has demonstratedthat it has the requisite resources to provideproducts that satisfy disaster relief policy andoperational requirements. These resourcesinclude vast and effective collection assets,both open-source and classified intelligencedata bases, experienced analytic resources,rapid and reliable communications, and therequisite publication and disseminationfacilities.

The resources that are most capable ofproviding finished contingency supportintelligence are all-source analysis andproduction units within defense intelligence.

Essential Elements of Information (EEI)8

What organizations are providing relief? (1)

What type of service are they providing? (1)

What is the home base of uniVorganization(s) involved? (1)

What are the intended results of the effort?(1)

What were the date(s) uniVorganizationarrived in the area? (1)

What maps are needed? Are there nativeedition maps available? (3)

What information can be gained fromavailable interviewee? (2)

What is the sociological and culturalmakeup? (16)

What type of equipment is in the country:

• Telecommunication/Informationsystems? (7)

• Vehicles? (5)

• Engineering and demolition equipment?(4)

• Aircraft/airports? (5)

Where are the logistic and food distributionpoints? (5)

What is the geography in the operationsarea:

• Surface configuration? (70)

• Topography? (19)

• Meteorology? (40)

• Hydrology? (66)

• Vegetation? (61)

• Airfields (100)

• Helicopter landing zones? (29)

• Ports and harbors? (189)

What are the lines of communication andtransportation? (7)

What types of agriculture and livestock arein the country? (3)

What is the availability of water? (4)

What are potential manmade facilities to aidrelief operations (specify location(s) by bestavailable method: geo/UTM/gridcoordinates/reference points/etc.)? (7)

What is the present state of the economywhere relief efforts are to be performed?(12)

What information is available concerningthe government where the relief effort is totake place? (8)

What is the medical situation in the areawhere the relief effort is to take place? (21)

Who currently provides security to the reliefarea of operations? (12)

aUS Marine Corps, Marine CorpsIntelligence Activity, Generic IntelligenceRequirements Handbook, (GIRH),Quantico, VA, 1994. (The numbers in

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"IntelligenceCommunitysupport todisaster reliefoperations . .. issomewhatcontroversialbecause of theadditionaldemands itplaces oncommunityresources. "

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These units have extensive experienceproducing these products, have someexpertise in dealing with disaster reliefintelligence issues, and have well-establisheddissemination networks. This inquiry foundthat DIA's Military Geography Branch hadmore of these attributes than any other unit.

Appropriateness

Intelligence Community support to disasterrelief operations is relatively new. It also issomewhat controversial because of theadditional demands it places on communityresources.

When the United States decides to take actionin response to a foreign natural disaster, theunified commands and services of the UnitedStates occasionally are called upon to conductdisaster relief operations. Hence, they are theprincipal consumers of operational intelligencedeveloped to support those missions, and it isappropriate for the Intelligence Community toproduce that intelligence.

In the Department of Defense IntelligenceProduction Program (DODIPP) of March 1995,DIA's National Military Intelligence ProductionCenter (NMIPC) already has been assignedresponsibility for both producing disaster reliefoperations intelligence and managing theDepartment's production of environmentalintelligence relating to natural disasters.

D. Best Intelligence Assets

As previously stated, the best qualified unitsfor addressing the majority of consumerintelligence requirements reside withindefense intelligence-particularly DIA. Theycan produce comprehensive finishedintelligence with appropriate graphics andhave the widest and best establisheddissemination network.

Intelligence collection assets that best supportintelligence analysis associated with disasterrelief operations are, in order of importance:Human intelligence (HUMINT), imageryintelligence (IMINT), and communicationsintelligence (COMINT).

Much of the relevant HUMINT can be derivedfrom open sources and is available from othergovernment agencies, nongovernmental relieforganizations, academia, scientific andresearch institutions, and internationalagencies. Increasingly, the information will beaccessible from automated electronic databases via the Internet or other electronic mailservices. Examples include:

• Consortium for International Earth ScienceInformation Network (CIESIN), a USGovernment-funded (partially by DOD)initiative providing the largest, worldwideautomated data network of physical, natural,and socioeconomic information.

• Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA),Disaster Information Center/DisasterInformation Resources Program, a disaster­related information clearing house.

• ReliefWeb, a multilateral, strategic, globalcommunications network funded, directed,and operated by a consortium ofhumanitarian assistance organizations andgovernments.

Other information from human sources isavailable through regular HUMINT collectionchannels.

Imagery plays an important role in disasterrelief operations and is readily availablethrough open sources as well as classifiedchannels. The consumers who wereinterviewed extolled the high-qualityphotographs in the DIA Bangladesh CSS.

COMINT is the least important collection assetcontributing to the analytic process but mayprovide unique and important missing piecesof the disaster relief intelligence puzzle.

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v. Recommendations

For the foreseeable future some of themost challenging and rewardingoperations on the horizon are apt toinvolve humanitarian intervention anddisaster relief. Every military unit that islikely to be committed to these missionsshould anticipate what could be requiredand plan accordingly.

Lt. Gen. Henry C. Stackpole IIIand Col. Eric L. Chase, USMCMarine Corp Gazette, February 1993

Catastrophic disasters will continue to occurand occasionally will overwhelm indigenousrelief forces, causing foreign governments torequest immediate outside assistance.TheUnited States Government will respondpositively to these requests, and, in the worstdisasters, it will order US military forces todeliver that assistance.

An official poster on a Pentagon wall depictsan American soldier helping a small child, anapparent survivor of a recent natural disasterThe caption reads: "I'm a soldier, count on me."

Who shall the soldier count on to provide himthe intelligence he needs to perform hismission? Virtually all consumers-and mostproducers-of intelligence recommended thatDIA provide the leadership in this effort andthat it develop a robust capability for producingthe required intelligence.

Several veteran Joint Task Force commandersof humanitarian and disaster relief operationsrecommended that the Intelligence Communitydevelop what some referred to as a"Humanitarian Assistance (or Relief)Intelligence Center (or Cell)." Virtually allhumanitarian emergency intelligencepersonnel supported this concept.

It was recommended that such a unit haveclearly dedicated responsibility for allhumanitarian emergency intelligence issues­not just disaster relief-and be composed of

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analysts who are well versed in the EEls andwho have the unique skills these issues require.Like other teams of intelligence analystsfocused on discrete intelligence disciplines (forinstance, counterdrug specialists), such a teamwould benefit from the synergistic effects of unitcohesion and teamwork.

Two recommendations accordingly follow.

A Humanitarian Emergencies IntelligenceUnit of All-Source Intelligence AnalystsShould Be Formed.

It should have full-time dedicated responsibilityfor covering the full range of foreignhumanitarian emergency issues, not justdisaster relief, that might lead to US militaryintervention.

The unit should reside within the DefenseIntelligence Agency where it could bestcoordinate collection, analysis, production anddissemination, avoid duplication throughout thecommunity, and ensure that the requirements ofthe principle consumers in the military servicesand unified commands are satisfied.

Strive for Unclassified IntelligenceProducts

Humanitarian and disaster relief supportproducts should be produced at theunclassified level whenever possible so theycan be shared with coalition forces and hostgovernments and private organizations. Thoseportions of products that cannot beunclassified should be put in a separateclassified appendix.

These measures would address the concernsand needs expressed during this inquiry. Themilitary organizations involved in humanitarianrelief operations, as a result, would be assuredof having the intelligence required to performtheir important missions.

"For theforeseeablefuture some ofthe mostchallenging andrewardingoperations on thehorizon are apt toinvolvehumanitarianintervention anddisaster relief. "

Marine CorpsGazette

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Appendix

Organizations Contacted

Many organizations within the Department of Defense, services, commands, andCIA that were contacted are not listed separately. Similarly, only the key non-USGovernment organizations consulted are identified. Asterisks indicate where on­site interviews or meetings occurred.

Intelligence Community

Central Intelligence Agency*National Intelligence Council*Community Management Staff*National Photographic Interpretation Center*Defense Intelligence Agency*Central Imagery Office*National Security AgencyMarine Corps Intelligence Activity*Office of Naval Intelligence"Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center*Bureau of Intelligence and Research,* Department of State

Unified Commands

European Command, Stuttgart, Germany"Pacific Command, Camp Smith, HI"Transportation Command, Scott AFB, IL*Southern CommandAtlantic CommandSpecial Operations Command

Military Services

Army"Navy"Air Force"Marine Corps"Coast GuardJoint Chiefs of Staff*

( ---- - - - --- - -- _.---

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Other US Government

Department of Defense*Department of State*Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration*Department of Interior, US Geological Survey*Federal Emergency Management Agency*Agency for International Development, Office of US Foreign DisasterAssistance*Environmental Protection AgencyHouse of Representatives, Staff of Committee on Foreign Affairs

International

United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva, Switzerland*Organizations for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentWorld Bank

Scientific and Research Institutions

Center for Naval Analyses*Institute for Defense Analyses*National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Commission onGeosciences, Board on Natural Disasters*American Association for the Advancement of Science, Science andInternational SecurityThe Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Environmental Changeand Security Project*Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network*

Academic

US Army War College, Center for Strategic LeadershipUniversity of Hawaii, John A. Burns School of MedicineGeorgetown University, Department of DemographyUniversity of Maryland, Department of Government and Politics*Tufts University, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

The George Washington University, Institute for Crisis and DisasterManagement*

Nongovernmental Relief Organizations

InterAction*International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent SocietiesAmerican Red CrossRefugee Policy Group*

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