Aldaba, Rafaelita, & Yap, Josef. (2009, January). Investment and capital flows: Implications of the ASEANEconomic Community. Discussion Paper Series No. 2009–01. Makati City: Philippine Institute forDevelopment Studies. Retrieved from http://dirp4.pids.gov.ph/ris/dps/pidsdps0901.pdf.

ASEAN Secretariat. (2008a, January). ASEAN Economic Community blueprint. Jakarta, Indonesia:Author. Retrieved from http://www.asean.org/archive/5187–10.pdf.

ASEAN Secretariat. (2008b). ASEAN community progress monitoring system pan-ASEAN indicators finalreport, 2007 (Vol. 1). Jakarta, Indonesia: Author. Retrieved from http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/downloads/reports/Asean%20ACPMS%20vol%201.pdf.

ASEAN Secretariat. (2008c). ASEAN community progress monitoring system country indicators finalreport, 2007 (Vol. 2). Jakarta, Indonesia: Author. Retrieved from http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/downloads/reports/Asean%20ACPMS%20vol%202.pdf.

ASEAN Secretariat. (2008d). ASEAN community progress monitoring system indicators & monitoringtools final report, 2007 (Vol. 3). Jakarta, Indonesia: Author. Retrieved from http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/downloads/reports/Asean%20ACPMS%20vol%203.pdf.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (2012). ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard. Jakarta, Indo-nesia: ASEAN Secretariat. Retrieved from http://www.asean.org/images/2012/publications/scorecard_final.pdf.

Cuyvers, Ludo, & Tummers, Rik. (2007, December). The road to an ASEAN community: How far still togo? CAS Discussion Paper No. 57. Antwerp, Belgium: University of Antwerp, Centre for ASEANStudies. Retrieved from http://webh01.ua.ac.be/cas/PDF/CAS57.pdf.

Guerrero, Rosabel B. (2010, January). Regional integration: The ASEAN vision in 2020. IFC Bulletin No.32, 52–58. Basel, Switzerland: Bank of International Settlements. Retrieved from http://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb32c.pdf.

Petri, Peter A., Plummer, Michael, & Zhai, Fan. (2010, November 21). The ASEAN Economic Commu-nity: A general equilibrium analysis. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1682200 andhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1682200.

Plummer, Michael G., & Chia, Siow Yue. (2009). Realizing the ASEAN Economic Community: A com-prehensive assessment. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Urata, Shujiro, & Ando, Mitsuyo. (2009). Investment climate Study on ASEAN Member Countries. InJenny Corbett & So Umezaki (Eds.), Deepening East Asian economic integration (pp. 125–195).Jakarta, Indonesia: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA).

Web ResourcesAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): http://www.asean.org/ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA):http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/category/asean-free-trade-area-afta-councilASEAN Economic Scorecard: http://www.asean.org/resources/publications/asean-publications/item/asean-economic-community-scorecard-3Philippine Institute of Development Studies (PIDS): http://www.pids.gov.ph/index.php

Tina S. ClementeAsian Center, University of the Philippines, Philippines

Indian Media’s Coverage of the Chinese Premier’s May 2013Visit to New Delhi

When the leaders of the two important major powers representing over one-thirdof the world’s population meet, they attract global media’s attention. The visit ofthe Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to New Delhi May 19–22, 2013, was a closelywatched event worldwide for two reasons. First, Premier Li and President XiJinping had recently taken over from their predecessors Wen Jiabao and HuJintao, respectively, in March 2013. Since this was the first official foreign visit ofthe Chinese premier, the media attention was understandable. Second, in the

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context of the recent border skirmishes with India, the untested strategic optionsthat the new political leadership in Beijing would consider were understandablyunder scrutiny.

Featuring China in Indian Strategic and Economic DiscourseOver the last decade, the Indian academia, public opinion forums, and the

media have been giving relentless attention to China, whether it be on its domes-tic affairs or foreign policy. In 2012, the 50-year anniversary of the completion ofthe Sino-Indian War brought out several scholarly writings that revisited the warin 1962 and examined the future trajectory of the Sino-Indian relationship. Con-sidering China’s emergence as the biggest superpower next to the United States,its direct ramification on India is the most obvious explanation for this unremit-ting Indian interest in the northern giant. However, Chinese troops’ penetrationin the north-eastern and eastern borders of Indian territory is the most outstand-ing issue that featured in recent Indian discourse.

The Indian media (electronic as well as print) carried out a blatant attack onBeijing in April 2013, a month before the Chinese premier’s visit, over China’salleged incursion of troops 19 kilometers into Indian territory along the Line ofActual Control (LAC) and subsequent setting up of camps. This news createdmuch public outrage and intense debate on the Indian government’s reluctanceto take stringent actions against the Chinese troops. The media and severalwriters from various strategic think tanks in New Delhi criticized the govern-ment’s “determination to avoid confrontation with Beijing at all costs—even atthe cost of India’s territorial integrity” (Joshi, 2013). This, however, is not anisolated incident given that the Indian media has reported over 550 instances ofChinese transgressions into Indian territory since January 2010 alone, includingone in July 2012 in the same Chumar area of Ladakh (“China Needles India,”2012). China, however, consistently denied such incursions since it claims to havea different perception of the LAC (“Line of Actual Control,” 2011). In this light,Premier Li’s visit played a crucial role in easing the diplomatic standoff betweenthe two Asian giants. His charm and speeches—heavily loaded with ideologicalromanticism—helped build an atmosphere to bridge the distrust and put apositive stimulus into their otherwise tenuous relationship.

Indian Media’s Coverage of the High-Level VisitIndian media reactions to China have been guarded at best. In comparison to

U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to India, the Chinese premier did not stirmuch euphoria in the Indian media. Rather, the media and the strategic com-mentaries that appeared both online and in print expressed skepticism about theachievements drawn from the high-level visit. Although impressed by the charmoffensive carried out by the leader himself, the Indian narratives were dismissiveabout the rhetoric displayed by the foreign guest, such as “China and India arenatural partners” (“Positive Stroke,” 2013) and the supposed outcome of the visitabout reaching “strategic consensus through strategic mutual trust” (Ministry ofExternal Affairs, 2013). These were some of the statements made by Li that failedto impress the Indian mind, at the time occupied with the experience of Chineseaggressiveness at their borders.

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Several Indian commentators cited Premier Li’s failure to address India’strade imbalance issues with respect to China. Brahma Chellaney, a hardliner anda China expert, noted that the “lopsided economic engagement gives China littleincentive to bridge a widening political divide with India” (Chellaney, 2013). Theconcern over India’s vulnerability to the flooding of cheap Chinese-made goodsthat undercut Indian manufacturing is one of the primary issues raised in theIndian commentaries. Two notable writings appearing in the premier strategicNew Delhi think tank, the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSA;http://www.idsa.in/), give a fair picture of the Indian psyche. The first com-mentary, entitled “The Chinese Message and What Should the Reply Be?”(Kalha, 2013), came out during Premier Li’s visit, stating that “China faces ahostile environment on its eastern sea board with on-going quarrels with almostevery country,” such as countries in the South China Sea dispute and Japan inthe East Sea dispute, which compels it to improve relations with India on thesouthwestern side. The second commentary, entitled “What India Needs toLearn From China” (Moitra, 2013), takes a much harder stance by highlighting“deception as an integral element of Chinese strategic culture.” Moitra examinesthe diplomatic maneuvering of the Chinese leaders, pointing out that “theymake extremely effective use of ‘speech acts,’ including a combination of coer-cion and sometimes reassurance.” The Indian side of the story identifies Bei-jing’s apprehension over “deepening relations between India and the US” andthe “latter’s attempt to promote New Delhi as a counterbalance to Beijing”(Moitra, 2013). This concern is the primary motive behind China’s currentwarming up to New Delhi. The Indian articles conclude that the joint agreementssigned between the countries have not produced any substantial output. Thefrustration is apparent over the failure to produce a breakthrough despite 15rounds of discussions by the border review team from both countries over thepast 10 years. Nonetheless, the Indian media acknowledges that a high-levelpolitical exchange between the two countries is a step taken in the right direction(Chand, 2013).

The Indian commentaries have brought out some positive insights as well.Most notable is the article written by Srikanth Kondapalli, who notes severalavenues for cooperation opening up from the visit of the Chinese premier.Kondapalli argues economics as the primary incentive of this maiden visit. At atime of recession in the West, China was eyeing India’s huge consumer market,which provides lucrative opportunities for both its labor-intensive and capital-intensive manufacturing exports (Kondapalli, 2013).

Some Indian media maintain a level of cautious optimism. The new leadershipraises hope for resolving long-standing differences and promoting cooperationon international and regional issues in the coming future. The border skirmisheshave definitely overshadowed the Indian viewpoint about China’s sincerity inextending hands across the Himalayas. Nonetheless, if we can ignore the rhetoricand consider the current global strategic dynamics, there is pragmatism in whatPremier Li Keqiang said: “The world will listen to us if China and India speakwith one voice” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2013). Therefore, there is nodenying that this visit sends a positive signal to the Indian government anddomestic audience, and it suggests that unlike in the past, India is a priority areain the present Chinese foreign policy agenda.

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ReferencesChand, Manish. (2013, June 12). India, China build bridges for Premier Li’s visit. Retrieved from

http://www.indiawrites.org/india-and-the-world/india-china-build-bridges-premier-lis-visit/.Chellaney, Brahma. (2013, May 28). The iron fist in a trade glove. Retrieved from http://

chellaney.net/.China needles India in eastern Ladakh. (2012, September 19). The Times of India, New Delhi. Retrieved

from http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-09-19/india/33951305_1_chinese-troops-border-personnel-dai-bingguo.

Joshi, Shashank. (2013). Indian perspectives on border tensions with China. Retrieved fromhttp://shashankjoshi.wordpress.com/2013/04/29/indian-perspectives-on-border-tensions-with-china/.

Kalha, R. S. (2013, May 21). The Chinese message and what should the reply be?” Retrieved fromhttp://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheChineseMessageIndiareply_rskalha_210513.

Kondapalli, Srikanth. (2013, June 12). India-China relations under 5th gen leadership: Pressure pointsyes, but many avenues for cooperation. Retrieved from http://www.indiawrites.org/india-and-the-world/india-china-relations-5th-gen-leadership-pressure-points-yes-avenues-cooperation-2/.

Line of Actual Control is a matter of perception: Army commander, PTI. (2011, September 25). TheEconomic Times. Retrieved from http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-09-25/news/30200849_1_perception-chumar-in-chingthang-area-sino-indian-border.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2013). Media statements by prime minister ofIndia and Chinese premier in New Delhi. Retrieved from http://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?21728/Media+Statements+by+Prime+Minister+of+India+and+Chinese++in+New+Delhi.

Moitra, Kasturi. (2013, May 20). What India needs to learn from China. Retrieved from http://idsa.in/node/12105/30592.

Positive stroke: Li Keqiang said the right things, but India should be cautious. (2013, May 22). BusinessStandard New Delhi. Retrieved from http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/positive-strokes-113052201042_1.html.

Web ResourceInstitute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSA): http://www.idsa.in/

Anushree ChakrabortyPostdoctoral Fellow, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal NehruUniversity, India

Press TV: Iran’s Revisionist Voice in Perspective(http://www.presstv.ir/, http://www.presstv.com/)

Press TV (PTV) is perhaps the single most representative media platform of theIranian government operating at the international level. Launched in 2007 asthe global English-language arm of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting(IRIB)—otherwise known as the radio and television organization of Iran—itoffers a valuable window into the complex dynamics of how the leadershipin Tehran views the world or wishes its constituencies at home and abroadto perceive it as doing so. The very fact that IRIB’s head is directly appointedby the Supreme Leader through constitutional authorization (Article 110 of theIranian Constitution) leaves no doubt as to the high degree of significance thecorporation and its subsidiaries carry inside Iran’s political establishment.

PTV was developed “out of the need to break the global media strangleholdof Western outlets” (Fathi, 2007) and aims, according to its vision statement,

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