In the Supreme Court of Ohiosupremecourt.ohio.gov/pdf_viewer/pdf_viewer.aspx?pdf=... · No. 14-1161...
Transcript of In the Supreme Court of Ohiosupremecourt.ohio.gov/pdf_viewer/pdf_viewer.aspx?pdf=... · No. 14-1161...
No.14-1161
IntheSupremeCourtofOhio____________
APPEALFROMTHECOURTOFAPPEALSTENTHAPPELLATEDISTRICTFRANKLINCOUNTY,OHIOCASENO.13AP-290____________
WORLDHARVESTCHURCH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GRANGEMUTUALCASUALTYCOMPANY,Defendant-Appellant,
MERITBRIEFOFAPPELLANTGRANGEMUTUALCASUALTYCOMPANY
RobertP.Rutter(0021907)OneSummitOfficePark,Suite6504700RocksideRoadCleveland,OH44131Tel: 216-642-1425Fax: 216-642-0613brutter@ohioinsurancelawyer.comAttorneyforPlaintiff-Appellee
WorldHarvestChurch
IreneC.Keyse-Walker(0013143)(COUNSELOFRECORD)BenjaminC.Sasse(0072856)TUCKERELLISLLP950MainAvenue,Suite1100Cleveland,OH44113-7213Tel: 216-592-5000Fax: [email protected]@tuckerellis.com
JamesR.Gallagher(0025658)GALLAGHER,GAMS,PRYOR,TALLAN&LITTRELLL.L.P.471EastBroadSt.,19thFloorColumbus,OH43215-3872Tel: 614-228-5151Fax: [email protected]
GrangeMutualCasualtyCompany
Supreme Court of Ohio Clerk of Court - Filed February 06, 2015 - Case No. 2014-1161
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TABLEOFCONTENTS
Page
TABLEOFAUTHORITIES........................................................................................................................iv
I. INTRODUCTIONANDSUMMARYOFTHEARGUMENT...............................................1
II. STATEMENTOFFACTS................................................................................................................3
A. TheUnderlyingAction...................................................................................................3
B. ThisLitigation....................................................................................................................7
1. TheGrangepolicies...........................................................................................7
(a) Theinsuringagreements..................................................................8
(b) TheAbuseorMolestationExclusion............................................9
2. Decisionsbelow...................................................................................................9
III. ARGUMENT....................................................................................................................................11
PropositionofLawNo.1..........................................................................................................12
A commercial liability policy containing an Abuse orMolestationExclusionwhichexcludesdamagesarisingoutofabuse“byanyone”ofanypersoninthecare,custodyorcontrol of any insured, as well as the negligentemployment or supervision of an abuser, eliminatescoverages of sums awarded based on the insured’svicariousliabilityforitsemployee’sabuseofachildintheinsured’scareandcustody........................................................................................12
A. StandardofReview.......................................................................................................12
B. This Court’s Insurance Jurisprudence Is Consistent withthe Enforcement of Subject Matter Exclusions Like theStandardizedAbuseorMolestationExclusion.................................................13
1. Gearing,ShafferandSafecofocusondamage-causing“acts” to determine whether claims are withincoverages provided by a policy, construed as awhole.....................................................................................................................14
ii
2. WHC’sadmittedvicariousliabilityforabuseisnotadamage-causingact.........................................................................................16
3. Subject matter exclusions’ focus on conductsimplifiescoveragedisputes.......................................................................18
C. Grange Had No Obligation Under the CGL or UmbrellaCoverage Forms to Reimburse WHC for Sums It Paid toSatisfyItsVicariousLiabilityforVaughan’sIIED.............................................23
1. The history, purpose and plain language of the ISOAbuseorMolestationExclusionprecludefindingsofpolicycoveragesforvicariousliabilityforabuse...............................24
2. Numerouscourtshaverejectedattemptstoskirttheplain language of the ISO Abuse or MolestationExclusion..............................................................................................................27
PropositionofLawNo.2..........................................................................................................32
When attorney’s fees are awarded solely in conjunctionwithnon-coveredconduct,“compensatory”attorney’sfeesarenotcovereddamagesunderliabilityinsurancepolicies.(Neal-Pettit v. Laham, 125 Ohio St.3d 327 (2010),construed.)........................................................................................................................32
PropositionofLawNo.3..........................................................................................................35
A liability insurance policy's supplementary paymentsclausecannotbereasonablyconstruedasanagreementtopaypost-judgmentinterestonnon-coveredclaims.......................................35
IV. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................39
CERTIFICATEOFSERVICE....................................................................................................................41
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APPENDIX Appx.Page
NoticeofAppealtoOhioSupremeCourt(July11,2014).........................................................1
Journal Entry , Tenth District Court of Appeals (on Reconsideration)(May29,2014)................................................................................................................................4
Memorandum Decision, Tenth District Court of Appeals (onReconsideration)(May29,2014)..........................................................................................6
JudgmentEntry,TenthDistrictCourtofAppeals(Jan.6,2014)..........................................14
Decision,TenthDistrictCourtofAppeals(Dec.24,2013).....................................................16
JudgmentEntry,FranklinCountyCommonPleasCourt(Mar.11,2013)........................37
Decision Denying in Part and Granting in Part plaintiff ’s Motion forSummaryJudgmentFiledSept.1,2011andDecisionDenyinginPart and Granting in Part Defendant’s Motion for SummaryJudgmentfiledSept.2,2011(Dec.16,2012).................................................................40
iv
TABLEOFAUTHORITIES
PageCases
AmericanEmpireSurplusLinesIns.Co.v.ChabadHouseofNorthDade,Inc.,450Fed.Appx.792(11thCir.2011)....................................................................................30
Bohrerv.ChurchMut.Ins.Co.,12P.3d854(Colo.App.2000).................................................................................37,38,39
Byrdv.Faber,
57OhioSt.3d56(1991)..........................................................................................................17
Caseyv.Calhoun,40OhioApp.3d83,531N.E.2d1348(8thDist.1987)...............................................38
Colterv.Spanky’sDollHouse,2dDist.MontgomeryNo.21111,2006-Ohio-408.......................................................21
CommunityActionforGreaterMiddlesexCounty,Inc.v.AmericanAlliance
Ins.Co.,757A.2d1074(Conn.2000)..................................................................................................29
Coventryv.SteveKoren,Inc.,1OhioApp.2d385(8thDist.),aff ’d4OhioSt.2d24(1965)............................36,38
Crowv.Dooley,3dDist.AllenNo.1-11-59,2012-Ohio-2565..........................................................20,21
Doev.Lenarz,Conn.Sup.Ct.No.CV0540129705,2007WL969610(Mar.21,2007)................28
Doev.Shaffer,90OhioSt.3d388,2000-Ohio-186............................................................................passim
EssexIns.Co.v.MichiganSkatelands,Inc.,6thCir.Nos.93-2132,93-2145,1994WL589670(Oct.21,1994).....................19
EvanstonIns.Co.v.Johns,530F.3d710(8thCir.2008)...................................................................................................19
Page
v
Faietav.WorldHarvestChurch,10thDist.FranklinNo.08AP-527,2008-Ohio-6959.....................................................4
Faietav.WorldHarvestChurch,147OhioMisc.2d51,2008-Ohio-3140,891N.E.2d370.............................................3
Gearingv.NationwideIns.Co.,
76OhioSt.3d34,665N.E.2d1115(1996)............................................................passim
Harperv.GulfIns.Co.,D.Wyo.No.01-CV-201-J,2002WL32290984(Dec.20,2002)...............20,26,27
Heinz-GertK.GRMv.GreatLakesGeneralAgency,9thDist.LorainNo.03CA008418,2004-Ohio-6269...........................................22-23
HolidayHospitalityFranchising,Inc.v.AmcoIns.Co.,983N.E.2d574(Ind.2013).....................................................................................................29
Hougv.StateFarmFire&Cas.Co.,509N.W.3d590(Minn.App.1993)...............................................................................29,31
HybudEquip.Corp.v.SphereDrakeIns.Co.,Ltd.,64OhioSt.3d657(1992).......................................................................................................13
InsightsTradingGroup,LLCv.FederalIns.Co.,
D.Md.No.RDB-10-340,2010WL2696750(July6,2010)......................................31
Jackson-Brownv.Monford,10thDist.FranklinNo.12AP-542,2013-Ohio-607.....................................................20
Kolbekv.TruckExchange,431S.W.3d900(Ark.2014)....................................................................................................28
LincolnCty.Sch.Dist.v.Doe,749So.2d943(Miss.1999).................................................................................3,19,27,30
Lundev.AmericanFamilyMut.Ins.Co.,297S.W.3d88(Mo.App.2009)..............................................................................................37
MonticelloIns.Co.v.KentuckyRiverCommunityCare,
6thCir.No.98-5372,1999WL236190(Apr.14,1999)...........................................25
Page
vi
Mt.VernonFireIns.Co.v.Hicks,871F.Supp.947(E.D.Mich.1994).................................................................................28-29
Nautilusv.OurCamp,Inc.,136Fed.Appx.134(10thCir.2005)....................................................................................30
Neal-Pettitv.Laham,125OhioSt.3d327,2010-Ohio-1829,928N.E.2d421......................................32,34
Neffv.AlterraHealthcareCorp.,271Fed.Appx.224,2008WL821070(3dCir.2008)...........................................19,30
NewWorldFrontier,Inc.v.Mt.VernonFireIns.Co.,253A.D.2d455,676N.Y.S.2d648(Sup.Ct.App.Div.1998)........................................31
Perezv.Otero,415So.2d101(Fla.App.1982)..............................................................................................36
ProSelectIns.Co.v.Levy,30A.3d692(Vt.2011)..............................................................................................................31
Robertsv.Mike’sTrucking,Ltd.,9N.E.3d483,2014-Ohio-766(12thDist.)......................................................................34
S.C.FarmBureauMut.Ins.Co.v.Oates,588S.E.2d378(S.C.App.2003)......................................................................................19,30
SafecoInsuranceCo.ofAm.v.White,122OhioSt.3d562,2009-Ohio-3718,913N.E.2d426....................................passim
SilverballAmusement,Inc.v.UtahHomeFireIns.Co.,842F.Supp.1151(W.D.Ark.),aff ’d33F.3d1476(8thCir.1994)..................passim
ThirdWing,Inc.v.ColumbiaCasualtyCo.,8thDist.CuyahogaNo.97622,2012-Ohio-2393..........................................................33
ValleyForgeIns.Co.v.Field,670F.3d93(1stCir.2011)...............................................................................................24-25
WedgeProds.,Inc.v.HartfordEquitySalesCo.,31OhioSt.3d65,509N.E.2d74(1987)...........................................................................38
Page
vii
WestfieldIns.Co.v.Galatis,100OhioSt.3d216,2003-Ohio-5849........................................................................12,36
Williamsv.UnitedStatesLiab.Ins.Group,5thDist.StarkNo.2011CA00252,2012-Ohio-1288..................................................22
Wrightv.Larschied,3dDist.AllenNo.1-14-02,2014-Ohio-3772.................................................................22
Rules
Civ.R.12(C).................................................................................................................................................17
Statutes
R.C.3937.182(B)......................................................................................................................................38
OtherAuthorities
CouchonInsurance(3ded.),§172:46.....................................................................................36-37
I. INTRODUCTIONANDSUMMARYOFTHEARGUMENT
This appeal arises out of a decision ordering Appellant Grange Mutual
InsuranceCompany(Grange) to indemnifyAppelleeWorldHarvestChurch(WHC)
for over $1million in compensatorydamages, attorney fees, and interest because
oneoftheChurch’spreschoolteacherssavagelybeatatwo-and-a-half-year-oldchild
in the school’s care and custody. While the panel concluded that the Grange
commercial general liability coverage form (CGL) and umbrella policies issued to
WHCprovidednocoveragesfordamagescausedbythebeatingassertedunderthe
label of “battery,” the court concluded that: (1) the policies did cover those same
damages asserted under the label of “intentional infliction of emotional distress”
(IIED)and(2)thatWHC’s“vicarious”liabilityforitsemployee’sIIED–liabilitythat
was the result of the church’s litigation strategy to admit that the abuser’s acts
should be “deemed” to be the acts ofWHC –was covered. The decision thereby
allowedalitigationstrategytocreatecoveragesforuncovereddamages.
Grange seeks a reversal and remand for the entry of judgment in its favor.
Considered as a whole, the policies at issue clearly and unambiguously exclude
coveragefordamagesarisingoutofateacher’shorrificabuseofayoungchild.Itis
respectfullysubmitted that thisCourt’s jurisprudencedeterminescoveragesbased
upon “acts,” not based upon legal labels appended to those acts or litigation
strategies.
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Here, the policies in question contained an Abuse orMolestation Exclusion
that negated coverages of bodily injury arising out of: (1) the abusebyanyone of
anyone in the care and custody of the insured and (2) the negligent hiring,
supervision or retention of the abuser. While this Court has yet to construe
insurancepoliciescontainingthestandardized,ISOAbuseorMolestationExclusion,
thenumerousstateandfederalcourtsthathaveaddressedsuchpoliciesuniformly
find no coverages for bodily injury arising out of the abuse of any person in the
insured’scare,custody,orcontrol,regardlessofwhotheabuserwas,andregardless
of the legal theorypursued. Thosedecisionsare fully consistentwith thisCourt’s
insurance jurisprudence directing courts to look to the alleged unlawful conduct
ratherthanlegallabels–i.e.,“‘dealwitheachactonitsmerits’”–whenconsidering
whether a policy provides coverages for a specific alleged or adjudicated injury.
Safeco Insurance Co. of Am. v. White, 122 Ohio St.3d 562, 2009-Ohio-3718, 913
N.E.2d426,¶32,quotingSilverballAmusement, Inc.v.UtahHomeFireIns.Co.,842
F.Supp.1151,1163(W.D.Ark.),aff’d33F.3d1476(8thCir.1994).
Subject matter exclusions tailored to specific businesses or enterprises
provide parties to an insurance contract with flexibility and clear mutual
expectations. Allclaimsarisingoutofcertainconductarebarredregardlessofthe
insured’sperspectiveorstateofmind.Whenanexclusionprecludescoveragesfor
abuse ormolestation by anyone, of anyonewithin the insured’s care, custody, or
control,itisirrelevantwhethertheabuserisanemployeeoragentoftheinsuredor
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anotherstudentoracompletestranger;itisirrelevantwhethertheinsureddoesor
doesnotpotentiallyhaverespondeat superior liability forbodily injurycausedby
abuse or molestation; it is irrelevant what cause of action is asserted or what
strategicdefensedecisionsareemployedintheensuinglitigation.Regardlessofthe
legal vehicle employed, “all classifications of damages arising out of incidents of
abuseormolestation”areexcluded.LincolnCty.Sch.Dist.v.Doe,749So.2d943,946
(Miss.1999)(enbanc).
Enforcementof theclearandunambiguous languageof thepoliciesat issue
moots the second and third propositions of lawpresented in this appeal. Should
this Court affirm the finding of some coverage, however, Grange respectfully
submits that the courts below improperly ordered Grange to reimburseWHC for
$694,000 the churchwas ordered to pay in attorney fees awarded against it and
$230,000inpost-judgmentinterest. BothjudgmentswerebasedonactstheCourt
ofAppealscorrectlyheldwerenot coveredby theCGLorumbrellapolicies. They
thereforewerenotreimbursable.
II. STATEMENTOFFACTS
A. TheUnderlyingAction.
The facts of the underlying action are set forth in post-trial and appellate
decisions summarizing and analyzing the evidence uponwhich the jury based its
verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs. See Faieta v. World Harvest Church, 147 Ohio
Misc.2d51,2008-Ohio-3140,891N.E.2d370(“FaietaTr.Op.”),R.84,Exh.13,Supp.
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at 108; Faieta v. World Harvest Church, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-527, 2008-
Ohio-6959(“FaietaApp.Op.”),R.84,Exh.14,Supp.at155.
AppelleeWorld Harvest Church (“WHC”), located in Franklin County, Ohio,
operatesapreparatoryschool,whichincludestheCuddleCarepreschoolprogram.
(FaietaTr.Op.,¶1,Supp.121;FaietaApp.Op.,¶2,Supp.at160.)OnMay30,2006,
MichaelandLaceyFaietafiledacomplaintintheFranklinCountyCourtofCommon
Pleas,individuallyandonbehalfoftheirson,AndrewFaieta,allegingthataCuddle
Careteacher(RichardVaughan)committeda“painfulandhorrificphysicalassault”
on their two-and-a-half-year-old son that “left plainly visible marks, cuts and
contusionstotherearend,backlegs,andotherparts”ofhisbody.(FaietaCompl.,p.
2,Supp.at68;seealsoFaietaApp.Op.,¶2,Supp.at160.)
Based on the assault andWHC’s refusal to investigate, the Faietas asserted
causes of action for negligence, assault and battery, negligent hiring and
supervision, respondeat superior, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED)againstVaughanandWHC.(FaietaCompl.,pp.4-7,Supp.70-73.)
Grange agreed to defend the claims under a reservation of rights. (WHC
Compl. (7/29/09), ¶8, Supp. at 61.) WHC and Vaughan’s defense team (which
includedcounselappointedbyGrangeandWHC’spersonalcounsel)pursuedajoint
defense that the incident never occurred – the marks on Andrew’s body were
“contact dermatitis” (a skin rash). (Faieta Tr. Op. ¶32, 45-46, Supp. 127, 129.)
Consistentwith that legal theory, Defendants filed joint answers to the complaint
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andamendedcomplaint inwhich theyadmitted that “atall allegedrelevant times
defendantVaughanwasactingwithinthescopeofhisemployment”withWHC;that
Vaughan’sactions“aredeemedtobetheactionsof[WHC]”andthatWHC“isliable
for theactsof itsemployeedefendantVaughan.” FaietaApp.Op.,¶46,Supp.168
(punctuationomitted).(SeealsoFaietaJointAnswer,¶30-31,Supp.80;FaietaAm.
Answer,¶30-31,Supp.86.)
Attrial,theFaietaspresentedtestimonysupportingtheallegationofasavage
beating and emotional trauma suffered by the entire family. The testimony
describedmarks on Andrew that were “raised, red, welts, cuts, abrasions, frayed
skin, and swollen” (Faieta Tr. Op., ¶34, Supp. 128). After the attack, “Andrew’s
personalitychangedandhebecamefearfulofbeingseparatedfromhisparentsand
of being enclosed in rooms, especially bathrooms.” (Faieta App. Op., ¶36, Supp.
166.) The Faietas presented “undisputed testimony” from Andrew’s treating
psychologistthatthechildsufferedfromapost-traumaticstressdisorder.(Id.)
TheFaietas’IIEDclaimagainstWHCwasbasedonWHC’s“concertedeffortto
preventplaintiffsfromlearningthecauseofAndrew’sinjury.”(FaietaTr.Op.,¶42,
Supp.129.)The“testimonyanddemeanor”ofWHC’switnesses“demonstratedthat
WHC’s primary objective in investigating the marks was to protect itself and its
employeesratherthantoconductagoodfaithinvestigation.”(Id.,¶45,Supp.129.)
Further, the school refused to speakwith the Faietas after an initialmeeting and
sent them a letter “ordering them not to come on the church’s premises” and
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“threatening *** that failing to comply with the order would result in WHC
prosecutingthemfortrespass.”(Id.,¶44,47,Supp.129,130.)SeealsoFaietaApp.
Op.,¶28-33,Supp.165-166. WHC’sactions“causedtheFaietasseriousemotional
distress”thatrequiredtreatmentinfamilytherapy.(FaietaTr.Op.,¶49,Supp.130.)
Following a seven-day trial, the jury was presented interrogatories and
verdict forms for battery, IIED, and negligent supervision. (Faieta Jury ‘Rogs,
Verdict Forms, R. 84, Exh. 10, Supp. 89.) Because WHC had admitted scope of
employmentandthatVaughan’sactsshouldbe“deemed”theactsofWHC,nojury
instruction or interrogatory was necessary or offered for WHC’s respondeat
superior liability for Vaughan’s abuse or for WHC’s ratification of Vaughan’s
malicious conduct. (FaietaTr.Op., ¶58-62, Supp. 131-133;Faieta App.Op., ¶49,
Supp.168.)
The jury returned interrogatories finding against Vaughan on plaintiffs’
battery claim; finding againstWHC on plaintiffs’ negligent supervision claim; and
findingthatVaughan“and/or”WHCintentionallyinflictedemotionaldistressonthe
Faietas. (FaietaTr.Op.,¶4,Supp.121;Faieta ‘Rogs1a-4,Supp.89-94.) Basedon
thosefindings,thejuryreturnedverdictsinfavortheFaietas,including:
•••• Compensatorydamagesof$134,865.00andpunitivedamagesof$100,000againstVaughan;and
•••• Compensatorydamagesof$764,235.00andpunitivedamagesof$5,000,000againstWHC.
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(App. Op., ¶3, Appx. 17; Faieta Verdicts, Supp. 104, 105.) Those verdict forms
furtherspecifiedthattheFaietaswereentitledtoattorneyfees fromWHC,butnot
fromVaughan.(Id.,Supp.104,105.)ThetrialcourtthereafterorderedWHCtopay
theFaietas$693,861.87inattorneyfees.(FaietaTr.Op.,¶161,Supp.153.)
Damagecapsresultedintheentryofafinaljudgmentof$2,871,431.87–WHC
was solely liable for $2,789,066.87, while Vaughan was solely liable and WHC
secondarily liable, for $82,365.00. (App. Op., ¶6, Appx. 18; Faieta JE (5/23/08),
Supp. 154.) Those awardswere affirmed on appeal. (See FaietaApp. Op., Supp.
155.) WHC settledwith the Faietas in the amount of $3,101,147,which included
approximately$230,000inpost-judgmentinterest.(App.Op.,¶8-9,Appx.18.)
B. ThisLitigation.
WHCfiledthisactiononJuly29,2009,seekingadeclarationofcoveragesfor
all damages awarded againstVaughan andWHC, including attorney fees awarded
againstWHCaloneandpost-judgmentinterest.WHCfurthersoughtcompensatory
and punitive damages for Grange’s alleged “bad faith” in providing a defense but
refusing to indemnifyamountsawarded for theadjudicatedabuse. (Compl.,Supp.
60.)
1. TheGrangepolicies.
TheCGLandumbrellapoliciesunderwhichWHCsoughtreimbursementfor
its$3.1millionpaymentarereproducedinGrange’sSupplementatpages1and34.
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(a) Theinsuringagreements.
Theinitial insuringagreementfortheCGLcoverageform,CG0001(10-01),
obligatesGrangetocover“thosesumsthattheinsuredbecomeslegallyobligatedto
pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this
insuranceapplies.”(CGLForm,Supp.14.)
Paragraph1.b.oftheinsuringagreementstatesthatthe“bodilyinjury”must
be “caused by an ‘occurrence’” (id., Supp. 14) and “occurrence” is defined as an
“accident.”(Id.,Supp.27.)
TheinsuringagreementintheCommercialLiabilityUmbrellaCoverageForm
similarlystatesthatGrangewillpayonlyfor“bodilyinjury”towhichtheinsurance
applies; that the “bodily injury” must be caused by an “occurrence”; and defines
“occurrence”as“anaccident.”(UmbrellaForm,Supp.42,55.)
TheInsuringAgreementsfurtherincludeanexclusiongenerallyknownasan
“intendedacts”exclusion:
2. Exclusions
ThisInsurancedoesnotapplyto:
a. ExpectedOrIntendedInjury
“Bodily injury” or “property damage”expectedor intended fromthestandpointoftheinsured.***
(Supp.at15,SectionI,2.a.;Supp.at42,SectionI,2.a.)
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(b) TheAbuseorMolestationExclusion.
The CGL and umbrella coverage forms contain virtually identical
endorsementsentitled“AbuseorMolestationExclusion”(CG2146(07-98)andCUP
64 (09-96)), that “modif[y] insuranceprovidedunder” thepolicies. (Supp.2,35.)
Theendorsementprovides:
Thisinsurancedoesnotapplyto“bodilyinjury”,“propertydamage” or “personal and advertising injury” arising outof:
1. The actual or threatened abuse or molestation byanyoneofanypersonwhile in thecare,custodyorcontrolofanyinsured,or
2. Thenegligent:
a. Employment;
b. Investigation;
c. Supervision;
d. Reportingtotheproperauthorities,orfailuretosoreport;or
e. Retention;
of a person for whom any insured is or ever waslegally responsible and whose conduct would beexcludedbyParagraph1.above.
(Id.)
2. Decisionsbelow.
The trial court granted each party’smotion for summary judgment in part,
finding coverages for all compensatory damages, but for none of the punitive
damages, and coverages for the attorney fees paid and post-judgment interest on
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the entire judgment. (Tr. Op., Appx. 40.) On appeal, the Tenth District Court of
Appeals agreed that the punitive damage awardswere not covered, but also held
thatnoneofthecompensatorydamageswerecoveredwithoneexception–theCGL
and umbrella coverage forms coveredWHC’s vicarious liability for compensatory
damages awarded for Vaughan’s intentional infliction of emotional distress. See
App.Op.,¶55,59Appx.33,34.
Specifically,theCourtofAppealsheldasfollows:
1. No coverages for WHC’s own, post-incident IIED (if any); coverageswere precluded by the intended acts exclusion in the insuringagreementofbothpoliciesand/orWHC’sIIEDwasnotan“occurrence”underthepolicies(App.Op.,¶40,55,Appx.28,33);
2. No coverages for Vaughan’s battery for which WHC was vicariouslyliable per Section 1 of the Abuse or Molestation Exclusion in bothpolicies(id.,¶48,Appx.30-31);and
3. NocoveragesforWHC’snegligentsupervisionofVaughan,perSection2(c)oftheAbuseorMolestationExclusion(id.,¶49,Appx.31);but
4. Coveragesexistedfor“Vaughan’sIIED,whichWHCisvicariouslyliablefor”(id.,¶55,59,Appx.33,34).
The Court thus concluded that placing a different legal label on abuse – IIED as
opposedtobattery–createdcoveragesforexcludedconduct.
Based on that erroneous premise, the Court of Appeals ordered Grange to
indemnifyWHCfor the$82,365 incompensatorydamagesawardedto theFaietas
forVaughan’sabuse.(App.Op.,¶69,Appx.36.)TheCourtfurtherorderedGrange
toindemnifyWHCfor:(1)“thatportionofthepost-judgmentinterest”thataccrued
on the $82,365, and (2) the Faietas’ attorney fees of $693,861. (Id.) On
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reconsideration, the Court increased the post-trial interest to $229,716,
representinginterestonbothcoveredanduncoveredclaims.(Recon.App.Op.,¶23,
Appx.13.)ThepanelagreedwithWHC’sargumentonreconsiderationthatinterest
was owed on uncovered liabilities based on the CGL policy’s “supplementary
payments”provision,whichstates:
1. Wewillpay,with respect to ***any “suit”againstaninsuredwedefend:
***
g. All interest on the full amount of anyjudgment that accrues after entry of thejudgmentandbeforewehavepaid,offeredtopay, or deposited in court the part of thejudgment that is within the applicable limitofinsurance.
(Recon.App.Op.,¶16,Appx.10-11;CGLexcerpts,Supp.20-21.)
Grangetimelyappealedthefindingthatthepoliciescoveredvicariousliability
for excluded abuse (and attorney fee award and interest associated with some
coverage) to this Court, and WHC filed a cross-appeal challenging each of the
findingsofnocoverage. OnDecember3,2014, thisCourtaccepted jurisdictionof
Grange’sappealanddeniedjurisdictionofWHC’scross-appeal.
III. ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the finding of coverages for excluded abuse and
remand for theentryof judgment inGrange’s favor. Thepolicies consideredas a
wholeclearlyandunambiguouslyprecludecoveragesofWHC’sadjudicatedliability.
Regardless of the number of legal claims asserted or creative litigation strategies
12
employed,Grange is not responsible for indemnifyingdamages resulting from the
savagebeatingofa child in the insured’s careandcustody. Sucha resultaccords
with this Court’s insurance jurisprudence and the uniform position of courts that
haveconstruedpolicieswiththestandardizedAbuseorMolestationExclusion.
PropositionofLawNo.1
Acommercial liabilitypolicycontaininganAbuseorMolestation
Exclusion which excludes damages arising out of abuse “by
anyone” of any person in the care, custody or control of any
insured,aswellasthenegligentemploymentorsupervisionofan
abuser, eliminates coverages of sums awarded based on the
insured’svicarious liability for itsemployee’sabuseofa child in
theinsured’scareandcustody
A. StandardofReview
A grant of summary judgment based on the interpretation of an insurance
contractisrevieweddenovo.Doev.Shaffer,90OhioSt.3d388,390,2000-Ohio-186.
Principles for the construction of an insurance contract were set forth in
Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, ¶11 as follows
(citationsomitted):
When confronted with an issue of contractualinterpretation, the role of a court is to give effect to theintent of the parties to the agreement. ***We examinethe insurance contract as awhole and presume that theintent of the parties is reflected in the language used inthepolicy.***Welooktotheplainandordinarymeaningofthelanguageusedinthepolicyunlessanothermeaningis clearly apparent from the contents of the policy. ***When the languageof awritten contract is clear, a courtmay look no further than the writing itself to find theintentoftheparties.
13
See alsoHybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., Ltd., 64 Ohio St.3d 657, 665
(1992)(citationsandemphasisomitted):
In applying these rules, we have stated that the mostcritical rule is thatwhichstops this court fromrewritingthecontractwhentheintentofthepartiesisevident,i.e.,ifthe language of the policy’s provisions is clear andunambiguous, this courtmay not “resort to constructionofthatlanguage.”***[U]nderthecaselawofthisstate,anexclusion in an insurance policy will be interpreted asapplying only to that which is clearly intended to beexcluded. *** However, the rule of strict constructiondoesnotpermitacourttochangetheobviousintentofaprovisionjusttoimposecoverage.
B. ThisCourt’sInsuranceJurisprudenceIsConsistentwiththe
Enforcement of Subject Matter Exclusions Like the
StandardizedAbuseorMolestationExclusion.
This Court has yet to interpret a standardized Abuse or Molestation
Exclusion.Butinthreedecisions–Gearingv.NationwideIns.Co.,76OhioSt.3d34,
665N.E.2d1115(1996) (“Gearing”),Doev. Shaffer,90OhioSt.3d388,738N.E.2d
1243,2000-Ohio-186(“Shaffer”)andSafecoInsuranceCompanyofAmericav.White,
122 Ohio St.3d 562, 913 N.E.2d 426, 2009-Ohio-3718 (“Safeco”) – this Court
established the following general rule of policy construction: courtsmust identify
thedamage-causing“act”andconstruethepolicyasawholetodeterminewhether
theparties intendedcoverages for thatact. ThisCourt’s focusondamage-causing
actsanticipatessubjectmatterendorsementsthatbroadlyexcludecoveragesforall
classificationsofdamagesarisingoutof incidentssuchasassault,battery,criminal
acts, abuse ormolestation. Numerous decisions fromOhio appellate courts have
14
enforcedsuchendorsements,properlyrecognizingthatthepartiestotheinsurance
contracthaveclearexpectationsthatnocoveragesareprovidedforclaimsbasedon
theexcludedconduct.
1. Gearing, Shafferand Safeco focus on damage-causing
“acts” to determine whether claims are within
coveragesprovidedbyapolicy,construedasawhole.
TheruleoflawdevelopedinGearing,ShafferandSafecoresolvesthequestion
ofwhethercoveragesexistfordamagesarisingoutofmolestationorassaultunder
policiesofinsurancethatdonothaveanAbuseorMolestationendorsement,butdo
haveageneral,“intendedacts”exclusionintheinsuringagreement.
Gearingaddressedthequestionofwhethersexualmolestationbyaninsured
constitutesanaccidental“occurrence”withintheinsuringclauseofaliabilitypolicy
whentheperpetratordeniesanyintenttoharmhisvictim.ThisCourtheldthat:(1)
intent to harm will be inferred from certain acts; and (2) when that inference
applies, public policy precludes the issuance of insurance for the act. Gearing,
syllabus.
Shafferdistinguishedallegationsthataninsurednegligentlyhired,supervised
and retained a perpetrator of intentional acts from the acts themselves, and held
that insuring such acts does not contravenepublic policy. Adopting the rationale
and analysis of Silverball Amusement, Inc. v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 842 F.Supp.
1151 (W.D.Ark.), aff’d, 33 F.3d 1476 (8th Cir.1994), this Court held that “’[t]he
correct method of analyzing this issue *** would deal with each act on its own
15
meritsandrecognizethatemployerswhomakenegligenthiringdecisionsclearlydo
notintendtheemployeestoinflictharm.’”Shafferat393-394,quotingSilverballat
1163.
Finally, Safeco applied Gearing and Shaffer to claims asserting negligent
supervision,negligentretentionandnegligentinflictionofemotionaldistressclaims
againsttheparentsofateenagerwhoattackedandstabbedanotherteenager. The
insurer argued that neither the parents’ homeowners nor umbrella policies
provided coverage for theparents’negligencebecause: “(1) the injury in this case
resulted froman intentional act by [their son], an insuredunder thepolicies, and
thereforetheactwasnotan‘occurrence,’whichbothpoliciesdefineasan‘accident,’
and(2)thepoliciesexplicitlyexcludecoveragefortheintentionalactsofaninsured,
and the severability clause in both policies does not render the language in the
exclusionaryclauseinbothpoliciesambiguous.Safeco,122OhioSt.3dat¶12.
First,thisCourtheldthatbodilyinjurycausedbynegligentactsconstitutedan
“occurrence”underthepoliciesbecausefromthenegligentparents’perspective,the
stabbingcommittedbytheirsonwasaccidental.Safeco,¶27.
Second, this Court declined todeterminewhether an ambiguitywas caused
by consideration of the policies’ intended acts exclusion in conjunction with the
severability clauses providing that “’[t]his insurance applies separately to each
insured.’”Id.,¶15,28.Themajorityconcludedthattheuseof“an”insuredor“any”
insured in the intended acts exclusion was irrelevant; the exclusion had no
16
application at all. Reiterating Silverball’s teaching that that the “correct” analysis
“would dealwith each act on its ownmerits,” this Court emphasized the need to
maintainthedistinctionbetween“tortslikenegligentsupervision,hiring,retention,
and entrustment,” and “the related intentional torts (committed by other actors)
thatmakethenegligenttortsactionable.”Id.at¶32-33.
In short, to determine coverages under occurrence-based liability policies
that includean intendedacts exclusion, courtsmust examineeachact allegedand
determine: (1) whether the harm resulting from the act is an accident from the
perspectiveoftheinsured;(2)whethertheinsured’sallegedconductgivingriseto
liabilityintendedtocauseharm;and(3)whetheranintenttoharmisinferredasa
matteroflawbasedonthenatureoftheallegedconduct.
2. WHC’s admitted vicarious liability for abuse is not a
damage-causingact.
Grange respectfully submits that the proper application of Gearing, Shaffer
and Safeco to the facts of this case requires a reversal of the Tenth District’s
conclusionthattheGrangepoliciesprovidedcoveragesforWHC’svicariousliability
forVaughan’sIIEDandentryofjudgmentinfavorofGrange.
Safecodeclined toapplyan intendedacts exclusion tonegligent supervision
claimsbecausetheparents’“acts”givingrisetothenegligentsupervisionclaimwere
“separate and distinct” from the intentional acts “committed by other actors.”
Safeco,122OhioSt.3dat¶33.Further,thosedistinctactsledtodistinctinjuries.Id.,
¶37: “To prevail, the [plaintiffs] had to demonstrate a separate injury from the
17
[parents’] negligent failure to monitor Benjamin, one that did not arise from
intentionalorillegalactionsascontemplatedbythepolicyexclusions.”
Here, WHC’s vicarious liability for Vaughan’s IIED is not based on any act
separateanddistinctfromVaughan’sabuse;itisbasedonWHC’slitigationstrategy
to admit that Vaughan’s acts “are deemed to be the actions of Defendant World
HarvestChurch.” (FaietaTr.Op.,¶58-62,Supp.131-133;FaietaApp.Op.,¶46-49,
Supp. 168.)1 Here, the Faietas could not (and did not have to) demonstrate any
separate injury arising from respondeat superior liability, much less a separate
injury“thatdidnotarisefromintentionalorillegalactionsascontemplatedbythe
policy exclusions.” Safeco, ¶37. Instead, the Faietas were entitled, by virtue of
WHC’s admissions alone, to a judgment that WHC was vicariously liable for the
injuriescausedbyVaughan’sabuse,whetherlabeledasbatteryorIIED.
1 A different litigation strategy would presumably have enabledWHC to obtain adismissal of the respondeat superior count under Civ.R. 12(C). See, e.g., Byrd v.Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56, 59 (1991) (citation omitted) (church was entitled tojudgmentonthepleadingsregardingclaimforrespondeatsuperiorliabilityarisingoutofpastor’snon-consensualsexwithparishioners:“[A]n ‘intentionalandwillfulattackcommittedbyanagentoremployee, toventhisownspleenormalevolenceagainst the injured person, is a clear departure from his employment and hisprincipaloremployerisnotresponsibletherefore’”).
18
Underthesefacts,Vaughan’sliabilityandWHC’svicariousliabilityaroseouta
singleact–intentionalabuseresultinginphysicalandemotionalharm–committed
by Vaughan and “deemed” to be committed by WHC. Under the rule of law in
Gearing,ShafferandSafeco,coveragesforthatsingleactarebarredbytheintended
actsexclusion in the insuringagreementof theCGLandUmbrella coverage forms.
TheeffectoftheTenthDistrictdecisionisthatbyadmittingtherespondeatsuperior
allegations,WHCbootstrappedcoveragesforabusethatwas itselfexcludedbythe
CGL and Umbrella coverage forms. Such bootstrapping is unsupported by public
policy.See,e.g.,Gearing,76OhioSt.3d34,paragraphtwoofthesyllabus(“thepublic
policy of the State of Ohio precludes issuance of insurance to provide liability
coverage for injuries resulting from an intentional acts of sexualmolestation of a
minor”).
In short, even without an ISO Abuse or Molestation Exclusion, the policies
provided no coverages for admitted vicarious liability. The presence of the
Exclusion, however, simplifies policy construction and provides an appropriate
platform for this Court’s consideration of the proper rules of construction for
policieswithanAbuseorMolestationorsimilarsubjectmatterexclusion.
3. Subjectmatterexclusions’focusonconductsimplifies
coveragedisputes.
While a Gearing/Shaffer/Safeco analysis can be applied here, none of the
policiesconsideredinthosecasescontainedanAbuseorMolestationExclusion–a
subjectmatterexclusionthatnegatescoveragesofalldamagesarisingoutofabuse
19
ormolestation.Numerouscourtsconstruingpolicieswithsubjectmatterexclusions
forabuseormolestation,assaultorbattery,orsimilarmisconduct,haveconcluded
that theexclusionpretermitsanalysesof “occurrence”or state-ofmindexclusions,
eliminates the need for parsing the legal theories alleged, and renders
considerationsofseparation-of-insuredsprovisionsunnecessary.Allthatmattersis
that thedamagesalleged in the complaint ariseoutof theexcluded conduct. See,
e.g.:
•••• LincolnCty.Sch.Dist.v.Doe,749So.2d943,946(Miss.1999)(enbanc) (CGLpolicywithAbuseorMolestation Exclusion “servesto exclude from coverage all classifications of damages arisingoutofincidentsofmolestation”);
•••• Evanston Ins. Co. v. Johns, 530 F.3d 710, 714 (8th Cir.2008)(applyingMinnesota law) (“Thepresenceor lackof intentdoesnotcontroltheoutcome”ofasuitseekingcoverageunderaCGLpolicywithanAbuseorMolestationExclusion);
•••• S.C.FarmBureauMut.Ins.Co.v.Oates,588S.E.2d378,384,fn.2(S.C.App.2003) (the court “need not address”whether “shakenbaby syndrome” allegations against a daycare center and itsemployee constituted an “occurrence”where claims fell withintheplainmeaningofanAbuseorMolestationExclusion);
•••• Essex Ins. Co. v.MichiganSkatelands, Inc., 6thCir.Nos.93-2132,93-2145, 1994 WL 589670, at *3 (Oct. 21, 1994) (assault orbattery exclusion barred breach of contract and negligenceclaimswhere“theunderlyingclaimsclearlyaroseoutoftortiousconduct”; the court therefore “need not resolve the remainingissues” relating to a separate exclusion “and the Policy’sdefinitionof‘occurrence’”);
•••• Neffv.AlterraHealthcareCorp.,271Fed.Appx.224,226,2008WL821070 (3d Cir.2008) (“Invoking the separation of insuredsprovision does not narrow the broad reach of an Abuse orMolestationExclusion”);
20
•••• Harper v. Gulf Ins. Co., D.Wyo. No. 01-CV-201-J, 2002 WL32290984(Dec.20,2002),at*7(“Theintentionaldesignof theISO Abuse or Molestation Exclusion is that any perceivedambiguity between the ‘intentional acts’ exclusion and theseparation-of-insuredsclauseisobviated.Itiswordedtotelltheinsured employer that he has no coverage where, as here, hisemployeeabusesormolestsanyonewhoisinanyinsured’scare,custody,andcontrol”).
Ohio appellate courts have similarly recognized that subject matter
exclusionssimplifypolicyinterpretationbybroadlyexcludingclaimsarisingoutofa
narrowcategoryofconduct.See,e.g.,Jackson-Brownv.Monford,10thDist.Franklin
No. 12AP-542, 2013-Ohio-607, ¶18 (“whether or not the shooting was an
occurrence for purposes of the policy does not matter” when subject matter
exclusionsprecludedcoverages).
The Third District Court of Appeals analyzed an abuse or molestation
exclusion in2012and foundnoduty todefendor indemnifyanyclaims, including
respondeat superior, arising out of the molestation of child by a daycare center
employee. Crowv.Dooley,3dDist.AllenNo.1-11-59,2012-Ohio-2565. TheCourt
distinguished this Court’sSafeco decisionon the grounds that the languageof the
“intended acts” exclusion in the Safeco policies required knowledge or intent to
injure on the part of the insured, while “any language regarding the necessary
knowledge or intent of the insured is remarkably absent” from the abuse or
21
molestation exclusion in the insurance policy issued to the daycare center. Id. at
¶18-20.2
Othercourtshaveconstruedadifferentsubjectmatterexclusion(assaultor
battery)andconcludedthatpolicieswithsuchendorsementsnegatecoveragesfor
allclaimsfordamagesarisingoutoftheexcludedconduct.InColterv.Spanky’sDoll
House,2dDist.MontgomeryNo.21111,2006-Ohio-408,forexample,thecourtheld
thatanassaultorbatteryexclusionnegatedcoveragesofanyclaim,whetherbased
onintentionalactsornegligence,forbodilyinjuryarisingoutofanaltercationatthe
insured’s bar.. Id. at ¶14-20. Reading the assault or battery exclusion in
conjunction with an “intended acts” exclusion, Colter court agreed with the trial
court’s reasoning that “[w]hile the first exclusion found in the main body of the
insurancepolicyonlyexcludesclaimsforbodilyinjuryexpectedorintendedbythe
insured, the latter amendment clearly modifies the policy to exclude any claim
arisingoutofanyassaultorbattery.”Id.at¶27-29(emphasisinoriginal).Seealso
¶40-41 (“By its own terms, this provision unambiguously extends to all claims
arisingoutoforrelatedtoassaultorbattery,regardlessofwhetherthemisconduct
2TheISOexclusionatissueinthiscaseisevenclearerthantheexclusionenforcedinCrow. The standardizedexclusion in theGrangepolicies (Supp. at2,35)not onlycontains a broad exclusion of any liability arising out of abuse or molestation,withoutregardtoany“requisitementalstateoftheallegedtortfeasor”(Crow,¶20),but it includes, in the second section, an explicit exclusion of damages caused bynegligenthiring,supervision,orretention.(Id.)
22
is committed by a Sparky’s employee or a third-party patron” (emphasis in
original)).
Morerecently,theThirdDistrictaddressedasimilarsubjectmatterexclusion
andheld thatbecause theunderlying complaint soughtdamagesarisingoutof an
altercationattheinsuredbar,coverageswereexcluded.SeeWrightv.Larschied,3d
Dist.AllenNo.1-14-02,2014-Ohio-3772.Thecourtrejectedtheinsured’sargument
thatitwasowedadefenseandindemnityforclaimsassertingthatthebarviolated
“policy,practiceorcustoms”andexhibiteda“deliberateindifferencetotherightsof
citizens,” holding that the subject matter exclusion “applies to any bodily injury
arising out of an assault or battery. It does not matter *** how the assault or
batteryoccurredorwhoormayormaynothavecontributedtoitsoccurrence.”Id.
at¶27-28(emphasisinoriginal).Inshort:
TheWrights in their suit could have asserted any claimthey wished against Larschied, and it still would havebeenexcludedbytheassault-or-batteryexclusionsolongas the Wrights were attempting to recover for injuriesarisingoutofassaultorbattery.
Id. at ¶31. AccordWilliams v. United States Liab. Ins. Group, 5th Dist. Stark No.
2011CA00252,2012-Ohio-1288,¶15(allegationthatbar improperlyblockedexits
oneveningofaltercationdidnotaffectbarofcoveragesof judgmentunderassault
or battery exclusion);Heinz-Gert K. GRM v. Great Lakes General Agency, 9th Dist.
LorainNo. 03CA008418, 2004-Ohio-6269,¶15-17 (exceptionproviding coverages
23
for bodily injury for liability assumed under an insured contract did not trump
assaultorbatteryexclusion).
Because they construe policies of insurance that broadly exclude a narrow
category of conduct, the above decisions are clear and easily understandable for
insurers and policyholders alike. Subject matter endorsements thus not only
provide unambiguous mutual expectations of coverages tailored to specific
enterprises,butsimplifyandstreamlinecoveragedisputes.
Here, the Court of Appeals properly concluded that “it was conclusively
determinedinthepersonalinjurycasethatVaughan’sbatteryconstitutedabuseof
theFaietas’minorchild,whichwasexcludedfromcoverageunderSection1ofthe
AbuseorMolestationExclusionoftheCGLandCUpolicies.” (App.Op.,¶48,Appx.
30-31.) The fact thatVaughan’sacts constitutedexcludedabuseends the inquiry.
Alldamagesarisingoutoftheabuse,regardlessofthecauseofactionasserted,are
excludedfromcoverages.Itisnotjusttheclaimforbatteryandassociatedvicarious
liability for abuse that is excluded; the claim for IIED and associated vicarious
liabilityisalsoexcluded.
C. Grange Had No Obligation Under the CGL or Umbrella
Coverage Forms to Reimburse WHC for Sums It Paid to
SatisfyItsVicariousLiabilityforVaughan’sIIED.
The ISOAbuseorMolestationExclusions in theCGLandUmbrella coverage
forms issued toWHCmodified coverages under the policies by broadly excluding
coverages for anybodily injuryarisingoutof: (1) theabuseormolestationof any
24
personwithin thecareorcustodyof the insuredorganization,byanyperson;and
(2) the insured organization’s negligent acts associated with the abuse or
molestation:
Thisinsurancedoesnotapplyto“bodilyinjury”,“propertydamage” or “personal and advertising injury” arising outof:
1. The actual or threatened abuse or molestation byanyoneofanypersonwhile in thecare,custodyorcontrolofanyinsured,or
2. Thenegligent***[e]mployment***[s]upervision*** or *** [r]etention of a person forwhom anyinsured is or ever was legally responsible andwhoseconductwouldbeexcludedbyParagraph1.above.
(Supp.at2,35.)Boththehistoryandpurposeofthestandardizedendorsement,as
interpretedbynumerouscourtsaroundthecountry,demonstrateitsapplicabilityto
all liabilities adjudicated in Faieta v. World Harvest Church, including WHC’s
admittedliabilityforVaughan’sIIED.
1. The history, purpose and plain language of the ISO
Abuse or Molestation Exclusion preclude findings of
policycoveragesforvicariousliabilityforabuse.
ThehistoryandpurposeofthestandardizedAbuseorMolestationExclusion
further support enforcement of its plain language. The ISOAbuse orMolestation
Exclusionwas adopted in1987, and is “not uncommon” in insurancepolicies “for
thosewho have care of others,” including “medical or therapeutic care providers,
healthcarecenters,summercamps,schoolsandpreschools, job trainingprograms,
25
churches, and the like.” Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Field, 670 F.3d 93, 97-98 (1st
Cir.2011)(citationomitted).
TheAbuseorMolestationExclusion,likeassaultandbatteryandcriminalact
exclusions,“aresensible,routine,unambiguous,andspecific.” MonticelloIns.Co.v.
Kentucky River Community Care,6th Cir. No. 98-5372, 1999WL236190 (Apr. 14,
1999)at*3(punctuationandcitationomitted).“[I]tisperfectlysensibletoexclude
coverage for immoral or illegal acts to avoidmoral hazard problems. *** In fact,
severalcasesestablishesastrongpublicpolicyagainstcoverageforsexualabuse.”
Id.
Further, “[e]xclusions of this sort have generally been found to be
unambiguousinthefaceofattacksonvariouspartsofthe languageused[.]” Field,
670 F.3d at 98, 101. The plain language of such exclusions firmly establish the
reasonablepolicycoverageexpectationsofbothinsurerandinsured:
TheExclusionprecludescoverageonthelimitedoccasionswherethedamagesflowfromsexualorphysicalabusebyanother of someone in the care of the insured. Asexplainedearlier,thatistheverypurposefortheAbuseorMolestation Exclusion since its creation. *** Since theExclusion was not ambiguous, the [insureds] had noreasonableexpectationofcoverage.
Id.at105.
The Exclusion’s history further demonstrates that the endorsement was
developed to prevent coverages for damages arising out of abuse or molestation
regardlessofthelegaltheoryallegedtorecoverdamagesforabuseormolestation,
26
andregardlessofwhethertheassertedliabilityisdirectorderivative.SeeHarperv.
GulfIns.Co.,U.S.D.C.Wyo.No.01-CV-201-J(Dec.20,2002),2002WL32290984,at
fn.9:
The International Risk Management Institute (“IRMI”)publishes a multi-volume insurance reporter seriesentitledCommercialLiabilityInsurance.Itprovides:
AbuseorMolestationExclusion
Abuse andmolestation, as intentional acts, do notcome within the CGL coverage of bodily injuryarising out of an “occurrence,” with respect to aninsured who actually commits the abuse ormolestation. Organizations that have care orcustody of others – schools, hospitals, nursinghomes,daycare centers, etc.– are likely tobeheldvicariously liable for abuse committed by theiremployees; the CGL intentional acts exclusionwouldnot interferewith coverage for an insured’svicariousliabilityinsuchcircumstances.
This endorsement eliminates coverages for aninsured organization’s liability in connection withabuseormolestationcommittedbysomeoneotherthan that insured. It applies to abuse andmolestation incidentsagainst “anypersonwhile inthe care, custody, and control of the insured”committedby“anyone.”That“anyone”couldbetheinsured’semployee,agent, independentcontractor,customer,clientorpersoncompletelyunconnectedwiththeinsuredorganization.
Thisexclusiongoesontoremovecoverageforotherrelated claims that are sometimes brought againstan organization as alternative grounds of actionwhen an incident of abuse or molestation hasoccurred. Theserelatedallegationsaresometimesmade toavoidargumentsoverwhether theactsofabuse or molestation were an occurrence(“accident”), and thus to suggest a separate
27
occurrence with respect to the employer (thenegligent act of employment or supervision). ***Such claims would be different from purelyvicarious liability claims since they allege actualnegligenceonthepartof the insuredorganization.Suchclaimsareaddressedinthesecondpartoftheexclusion. That part applies to negligent“employment, investigation, supervision, orretention” of persons who commit abuse ormolestationand forwhoseconduct the insured “isoreverwaslegallyresponsible.”
Neither the Faietas’ labeling of Vaughan’s abuse as both a “battery” and
“IIED,”norWHC’slitigationstrategytoadmitthatVaughan’sactsaretobe“deemed”
tobetheactsofWHC,changesthefactthattheFaietas’complaintsoughtdamages
arising out of abuse. The Abuse or Molestation Exclusion “is worded to tell the
insuredemployer thathehasnocoveragewhere,ashere,hisemployeeabusesor
molestsanyonewhoisinanyinsured’scare,custody,andcontrol.”Harper,supra,at
*7. “The molestation exclusion accordingly serves to exclude from coverage all
classificationsofdamagesarisingoutofincidentsofmolestation.”LincolnCty.Sch.
Dist.v.Doe,749S.W.2d943,946(Miss.1999).
2. Numerous courts have rejected attempts to skirt the
plain language of the ISO Abuse or Molestation
Exclusion.
Decisionsfromotherjurisdictionsuniformlyinterpretthebroadlanguageof
thestandardizedAbuseorMolestationExclusionasapplyingtoallcausesofaction
asserted against insured businesses and institutions when the injuries for which
damagesaresoughtariseoutofphysicalabuseorsexualmolestation.
28
In 2014, theArkansas SupremeCourt construed insurance policieswith an
Abuse or Molestation Exclusion and found no duty to defend or indemnify
allegations (including allegations of vicarious liability) arising out of abuse. See
Kolbek v. Truck Exchange, 431 S.W.3d 900 (Ark.2014) at 907 (plaintiffs alleged
negligent hiring, supervision and retention and vicarious liability against abuser’s
employer),910,fn.8(settingforththestandardizedAbuseorMolestationExclusion
atissuehere)and909-910:
WhiletheKolbekcomplaintwasamendedseveraltimestoaddandalterclaims***[t]heinjuriesanddamagesintheKolbek case truly stem from the abuse suffered by theplaintiffsbelow. Nocourt couldhelpbutbesympatheticto those individuals and the injuries they suffered.However,the***contractissuedbyTIE/FIEsimplydoesnot exist to provide an insured coverage for this type ofallegedharm.
Arkansas law was the source of this Court’s “’examine each act on its merits’”
approachadopted inShaffer andSafeco. SeeShaffer at393-94andSafecoat¶32,
quoting Silverball Amusement, Inc. v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 842 F.Supp. 1151
(W.D.Ark.),aff ’d 33F.3d1476 (8thCir. 1994). Applying that state’s insurance law
hereresultsinjudgmentforGrange.
Otherjurisdictionshavesimilarlyfoundnocoveragesforclaimsofvicarious,
derivativeliabilityarisingoutofabuseormolestationwhenthepolicycontainsan
Abuse or Molestation Exclusion. See, e.g., Doe v. Lenarz, Conn.Sup.Ct. No.
CV0540129705,2007WL969610(Mar.21,2007)(applyingAbuseorMolestation
Exclusion to claims of “derivative liability”);Mt. Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 871
29
F.Supp. 947, 952 (E.D.Mich.1994) (insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify
claims against nursing home after aide beat patient into a comatose state while
actinginthecourseandscopeofhisemployment:“Theclaimofassaultandeachof
the claims that are derivative of it are directly excluded by the molestation and
abuseprovisionsoftheinsurancepolicy”).AccordHougv.StateFarmFire&Cas.Co.,
509 N.W.3d 590, 593 (Minn.App.1993) (applying sexual assault exclusion to
respondeatsuperiorclaimsarisingoutofemployee’ssexualconduct).
Courtshavealsorejectedotherattemptstoavoidtheclearandunambiguous
language of the standardized Abuse or Molestation Exclusion when the damages
soughtariseoutofabuseormolestation.See,e.g.:
•••• HolidayHospitalityFranchising, Inc. v.Amco Ins. Co., 983N.E.2d574,578 (Ind.2013) (barringcoveragesof claimsarisingoutofhotelemployee’smolestationofaminor)(emphasisinoriginal):
We think it obvious that the plain and ordinarymeaning of the abuse/molestation exclusion as awholeisthatbothpartiesintendedtoexcludefromcoverage those claims arising from conduct likeForshey’s. *** In fact, if these facts didnot reflectthe contemplated exclusion, we would struggle toimagine what reasonably could and still remainwithintheconfinesofanordinarymotelbusiness.
•••• CommunityAction forGreaterMiddlesexCounty, Inc.v.American
Alliance Ins. Co., 757 A.2d 1074, 1083 (Conn.2000) (“[T]heplaintiffhasnotidentifiedanycase,andweareawareofnone,inwhich a policy exclusion for abuse or molestation has beendeemedambiguous”;nodutytodefendorindemnifyoperatorofpreschool where complaint alleged sexual molestation of oneminor by another at the school, “irrespective of the boys’subjectivestateofmind”);
30
•••• LincolnCty.Sch.Dist.v.Doe,749So.2d943,946(Miss.1999)(enbanc) (rejecting argument that Abuse orMolestation Exclusionwasambiguous;theExclusionbarredallclaimsassertedagainstschool where claimed damages arose of molestation of onestudentbyanother);
•••• AmericanEmpireSurplusLinesIns.Co.v.ChabadHouseofNorth
Dade, Inc., 450 Fed.Appx. 792, 794 (11th Cir.2011) (applyingFlorida law)(regardlessof the legal labelappendedto insured’salleged liability for damages causedwhen employee of insuredhome“tormentedandabused”specialneedschild(i.e.,negligentmisrepresentation, failure towarn), the “plain language” of theExclusionprecludedanydutytodefendorindemnify);
•••• Neffv.AlterraHealthcareCorp.,271Fed.Appx.224,226,2008WL821070 (3d Cir. 2008) (under Pennsylvania, Wisconsin orMassachusetts law, Abuse or Molestation Exclusion precludeddefenseorindemnityofallclaimsagainstinsuredassistedlivingfacility where claims arose out of employee abuse of patientresultinginbrokenribs:“Theplainandordinarymeaningoftheexclusionisthatthereisnocoverageifaplaintiff ’sinjuryarisesoutofabuseormolestation”(footnoteomitted)).
•••• Nautilus v. Our Camp, Inc., 136 Fed.Appx. 134 (10th Cir.2005)(applyingWyominglaw)(AbuseorMolestationExclusionbarredallclaimsagainstcamparisingoutofonecamper’smolestationof another: “The express language of the exclusion is wordedbroadly*** thepartiestoan insurancecontract, likeanyothercontract, or free to incorporate therein whatever lawful termstheydesireandthecourtsarenotatlibertytorewritethepolicyunder the guise of judicial construction (punctuation andcitationsomitted));
And courts similar exclusions have found no coverages, notwithstanding creative
pleadingandargumentsbycounselforinsureds.See,e.g.:
•••• S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Oates, 588 S.E.2d 643(S.C.App.2003) (abuse exclusion barred coverages of all claimsagainstdaycarecenterarisingoutofemployeeacts resulting in“shakenbaby”syndrome);
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•••• InsightsTradingGroup,LLCv.FederalIns.Co.,D.Md.No.RDB-10-340,2010WL2696750,at*5-*6(July6,2010)(allclaimsbasedon sexual assault of jobprograms enrollee by co-enrolleewereexcluded by subject matter exclusion: “litigants cannot skirtaround an exclusion clause merely by relying on certainalternative theories *** Insights is a sophisticated party thatclearly had notice of the plain language of the exclusionclauses”);
•••• NewWorld Frontier, Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 253 A.D.2d455, 455-456, 676 N.Y.S.2d 648 (Sup.Ct.App.Div.1998) (Where“no cause of action would exist ‘but for’ the alleged sexualmolestation,” insured had no duty to defend or indemnifyinsured preschool against complaint based on one student’smolestationofanother);
•••• ProSelect Ins. Co. v. Levy, 30 A.3d 692 (Vt.2011) (allegations of“malpractice”incomplaintinadditiontosexualassaultcouldnotcreate coverages in contravention of policy’s sexual assaultexclusionwhereallegedactsofmalpracticewereforthepurposeofisolatingpatienttopreserveimpropersexualrelationship);
•••• Houg v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 509 N.W.2d 590, 593(Minn.App.1993) (insurer had no obligation to indemnifychurch’ssettlementofclaimsagainst itarisingoutofminister’ssexualassaultofchurchmember):
M.C.’s detailed complaint and her version of thefacts brings the allegedwrong squarelywithin themeaning of [the sexual conduct] exclusion, andthereforesquarelyoutofStateFarm’sobligationtoindemnify.
Creativepleadinginthiscasesimilarlycannotchangethecontractofinsurancethat
doesnotprovidecoverageforabuse.AsimplereviewofboththeCGLandUmbrella
policies – byWHC or anyone – shows conspicuously titled Abuse or Molestation
Exclusions. Grange therefore respectfully requests reversal of that portion of the
decisionbelowthat findscoveragesforvicarious liability forabuse,alongwiththe
32
associated award of indemnity for the Faietas’ attorney fees and post-judgment
interest, and enter judgment for Grange on all claims for indemnity and
reimbursement.
PropositionofLawNo.2
Whenattorney’sfeesareawardedsolelyinconjunctionwithnon-
coveredconduct, “compensatory”attorney’s feesarenot covered
damagesunderliabilityinsurancepolicies. (Neal-Pettitv.Laham,
125OhioSt.3d327(2010),construed.)
ThisCourtneednot addressPropositionsofLawNo.2or3should itagree
that the policies issued to WHO preclude reimbursement of WHC’s admitted
vicarious liability forVaughan’s savagebeating. Should thisCourtagree thatsuch
coveragesexist,however,thenitshouldalsoconcludethatGrangehasnoobligation
toreimburseWHCfor$693,861inattorneyfeesawardedtotheFaietas.
AtissuehereistheproperapplicationofthisCourt’sdecisioninNeal-Pettitv.
Laham,125OhioSt.3d327,2010-Ohio-1829,928N.E.2d421,totheTenthDistrict’s
conclusion that Grange was obligated to indemnify WHC for the attorney’s fee
judgmentagainstit.Neal-Pettitheldthatattorney’sfeespredicatedonanawardof
punitive damages could be considered additional “compensatory” damages for
purposesofpolicycoverages.Butinthatcase,therewasonlyonedefendantactor,
and the defendant’s acts giving rise to compensatory and punitive damageswere
withinpolicycoverages.
Here, there are two defendant actors, only one of the two was liable for
attorney’s fees,andthatdefendant’sactsgivingrisetocompensatoryandpunitive
33
damages were not covered under the policies at issue. Under that scenario, the
reasoning ofNeal-Pettit precludes coverages of the “compensatory” attorney’s fee
award.
First, it isundisputedthattheFaieta juryawardeddistinctpunitivedamage
awards for the distinct malicious acts of each defendant. The jury awarded
$100,000 in punitive damages against Vaughan for his savage beating of Andrew,
and $5 million in punitive damages against WHC for its own post-incident IIED
and/or negligent supervision of Vaughan. (See Faieta Verdict Forms, Supp. 104,
105.)
Second, it isundisputed that the juryexpresslydetermined that theFaietas
were entitled to attorney fees fromWHC alone. Thus, the verdict form against
VaughanexpresslyprovidedthattheFaietaswerenotentitledtoattorneyfeesfrom
Vaughan,while the verdict formagainstWHCexpressly provided that the Faietas
wereentitledtoattorneyfeesfromWHC.(Id.)
Finally,itisundisputedthattheTenthDistrictfoundthattheGrangepolicies
issued toWHC did not cover compensatory damages awarded forWHC’s IIED or
negligent supervision of Vaughan. (App. Op., ¶40, 49, 55, Appx. 28, 31, 33.)
Therefore,thecompensatoryattorney’sfeesareexcluded.See,e.g.,ThirdWing,Inc.
v.ColumbiaCasualtyCo.,8thDist.CuyahogaNo.97622,2012-Ohio-2393,¶7(Neal-
Pettitdoesnotapplywhenattorneyfees“werenotawardedforaninjurythatwas
coveredbytheColumbiapolicy”).
34
NordidtheCourtofAppealsconstrueNeal-Pettitasrequiringcoveragesfor
attorney’s fees arising out of uncovered conduct. Instead, the Court held: (1) the
fact that onlyWHCwas to pay attorney feeswas irrelevant because, underNeal-
Pettit, attorney fees “‘are distinct from punitive damages’”; and (2) “because the
attorneyfeescannotnowbeallocatedbetweenthecoveredandnon-coveredclaims,
Grangeisliablefortheentireamount.”(App.Op.,¶59,Appx.34.)Bothconclusions
areflawed.
Contrary to the Court’s first conclusion, the fact that onlyWHCwas to pay
attorneyfeesisextremelyrelevant.AstheTwelfthDistrictrecentlyobserved,Neal-
Pettitdoesnotaffectthetwo-prongedpredicateforawardingattorneyfees:(1)the
jurymustfindthatthedefendantactedwithmalice;and(2)thejurymustmakean
actualawardofpunitivedamagesforthatmaliciousconduct. SeeRobertsv.Mike’s
Trucking,Ltd.,9N.E.3d483,2014-Ohio-766(12thDist.),¶28-29andfn.2.Here,the
jury found that Vaughan’s conduct (the battery and associated IIED, if any) was
malicious, and thatWHC’s conduct (its negligent supervision and IIED, if any, in
stonewalling and threatening the Faietas) was malicious, and returned separate
punitivedamageawardsforeachdefendant’smaliciousconduct.Theseparateand
distinctpunitivedamageawardagainstWHCcouldonlybebasedonWHC’sactsand
a finding of malice related to one or both of those acts. The jury’s award of
“compensatory” attorney fees againstWHCcouldequally only bebasedonWHC’s
35
acts;itisirrelevantthatthefeesare“distinctfrom”thepunitivedamagesawarded
forthoseacts.
Forsimilarreasons,theTenthDistrict’sconclusionthatitcouldnot“allocate”
the jury’s attorney fee award between covered and uncovered claims is flawed.
Since the only conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that the jury awarded
attorneyfeesasfurthercompensatorydamagesforuncoveredconduct(WHC’sIIED
and/or negligent supervision), those attorney fees cannot be covered under the
policy. No allocation is needed. Absent a nexus between covered conduct and
attorney’sfees,thefindingofcoveragesforattorneys’feesshouldbereversed.
PropositionofLawNo.3
A liability insurance policy's supplementary payments clause
cannot be reasonably construed as an agreement to pay post-
judgmentinterestonnon-coveredclaims.
TheGrangeCGLpolicyprovides:
Wewill pay,with respect to any claimwe investigate orsettle,orany"suit"againstaninsuredwedefend:***
g. all interestearnedon the full amountofany judgmentthat accrues after entry of the judgment and before wehavepaid,offeredtopay,ordepositedincourtthatpartofthe judgment that is within the applicable limits ofinsurance.
(Supp.20-21.)
TheTenthDistrict’sinitialdecisioninthiscasecorrectlyheldthatGrangewas
only obligated to reimburseWHC for post-judgment interest that accrued on the
covered damages of $82,365. (App. Op., ¶69, Appx. 36.) On reconsideration,
36
however, thecourtagreedwithWHC’sargument that thesupplementarypayment
provisionandCoventryv.SteveKoren,Inc.,1OhioApp.2d385(8thDist.),aff’d4Ohio
St.2d 24 (1965), obligated Grange to pay post-judgment interest on uncovered
liabilities.(Recon.App.Op.,¶23,Appx.13.)Thereconsideredrulingisinerroron
bothcounts.
Thesupplementarypaymentsclausemustbeconstruedinthecontextofthe
policyasawholeandinamannerconsistentwiththeriskinsuredagainst.Westfield
Ins.Co.v.Galatis,100OhioSt.3d216,2003-Ohio-5849,111111,14,20.Thepolicies
Grange issued toWHCagree topay "those sums that the insuredbecomes legally
obligatedtopayasdamagesbecauseof'bodilyinjury'or`propertydamage'towhich
thisinsuranceapplies.”(Supp.at14,42,emphasisadded.)Grangecanonlyagreeto
pay post-judgment interest for a "covered" judgment because the insurance only
applies to covered liabilities. Any other interpretation is unreasonable and
increases the scopeof coverages towhich theparties agreed. Perez v. Otero, 415
So.2d101(Fla.App.1982).
Further,Coventryv.SteveKoren,Inc.doesnotsupportaninterpretationofthe
supplementarypayments clause to include thepaymentofpost-judgment interest
onuncoveredportionsofajudgment.ThedisputeinCoventryisonethatmostoften
arises in an interpretations of the supplementary payments clause – the insurer
argued that the provision could not require the payment of interest in excess of
policy limits forcovered claims. Asnoted in a leading insurance treatise, “[m]any
37
policies written on a primary basis require that the insurer pay post-judgment
interestonthetotalamountofthejudgmentuntiltheinsurerpaysitspolicylimits
in satisfaction of the judgment.” Couch on Insurance (3d ed.), §172:46 (footnote
omitted). The omitted footnote explains that the principle does not apply to
uncoveredclaims(emphasisadded):
The post-judgment interest clause in an insurancecontractservesthepurposeofencouragingtheinsurertoexpeditiouslypaytheportionofthejudgmentthatisnotsubjecttodisputewiththeincentivethatifitdoes,itwillbeprotectedfromtheaccrualofinterestonanypartofthejudgment while the coverage issue is being litigated;however, once a judgment is entered, the insurer mustoffertheamountitowestohalttherunningofinterest.
Id., fn. 89, citing Lunde v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 297 S.W.3d 88
(Mo.App.2009).
ArgumentssimilartothosemadebyWHCinthiscasewerefirmlyrejectedon
bothcontractandpublicpolicygroundsinBohrerv.ChurchMut.Ins.Co.,12P.3d854
(Colo.App. 2000). The underlying judgment in Bohrer was comprised of a
compensatory andpunitivedamages award arising out of a churchmember’s six-
year counseling relationship that evolved into sexual conduct. A prior decision
determinedthatnoneofthepunitivedamageswerecoveredbytheinsurancepolicy
at issue, and a sexual assault exclusion barred coverages of the 30% of the
compensatorydamages allocated to sexualmisconduct. The insurednevertheless
arguedthatasupplementarypaymentsprovisionrequiredtheinsurertopaypost-
judgmentinterestontheentirejudgment.Thecourtofappealsdisagreed.
38
First, the court held that public policy precluded awarding post-judgment
interest on punitive damages or compensatory damages arising out of sexual
assault: “[E]ven ifwewere to assume,without deciding, that the languageof the
insurancepolicywouldrequiregarnisheetopayallinterestontheentireamountof
the judgment *** including the uncovered portion of the compensatory damages
andthepunitivedamages,suchaprovisionwouldviolateColoradopublicpolicyand
would,therefore,beunenforceable.”12P.3dat856-857(citationomitted).Ohio’s
public policy, like Colorado’s, prohibits insuring intentional conduct or punitive
damages.SeeGearingv.NationwideIns.Co.,supra,76OhioSt.3d34,paragraphtwo
ofthesyllabus;WedgeProds.,Inc.v.HartfordEquitySalesCo.,31OhioSt.3d65,67,
509N.E.2d74(1987);R.C.3937.182(B).
Second, Bohrer held that “even if” public policy permitted post-judgment
interestonjudgmentsfordamagesarisingoutofsexualassault:
*** we cannot ignore the purpose and nature of theunderlying damage award. To accept plaintiff ’scontentionwouldproducetheillogicalresultofpenalizingtheinsurancecompanyfornotpayingajudgmentitisnotlegallyobligatedtopay.
Id.at857,citing(amongothercases),Caseyv.Calhoun,40OhioApp.3d83,88,531
N.E.2d1348(8thDist.1987).
Finally, the Bohrer court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to rely on cases
which,likeCoventry,heldthatinterestoncoveredclaimscouldexceedpolicylimits:
39
Those cases, however, involved money judgments thatwerecoveredbytheprovisionsoftheinsurancepolicybutexceededtheinsured’spolicylimits.Theyareinapplicableinacaseinwhich,ashere,plaintiff isseekinginterestondamages that are not only not covered under theinsurancepolicy,butareuninsurableasamatterofpublicpolicy.
Bohrer,12P.3dat857.Aninterpretationofthesupplementarypaymentsprovision
thatwouldpunishGrangeforprovidingadefenseforuncoveredclaimsisnotonly
unreasonable and illogical, but contrary to public policy that encourages broadly
construinganinsurer'sdutytodefend.TheTenthDistricterredwhenitdeclinedto
limitpost-judgmentinteresttothoseamountsrepresentingcoveredclaims.
IV. CONCLUSION
Subject matter exclusions like the ISO Abuse or Molestation Exclusion
construedbythecourtsbelowareapprovedbyregulatorsandwidelyincorporated
inpoliciesof insurance issuedtoorganizations thathavecareofothers. Theyare
necessaryforeffectiveinsuranceunderwritingandpricingofinsurancepoliciesand,
becausetheyallowOhiobusinessestoseekthe insurancetheywant(andonlythe
insurance they want), subjectmatter endorsements foster competition and niche
marketsintheinsuranceindustry.BecausethestandardizedAbuseorMolestation
Exclusion eliminates all coverages for abuse or molestation incidents, this Court
should reverse the decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and enter
judgmentforGrangeMutualCasualtyCompany.
40
Alternatively, should thisCourtaffirm theTenthDistrict’s findingof limited
coverage forWHC’sadmittedvicarious liability, it shouldnevertheless reverse the
court’s conclusion thatGrange isobligated to reimburseWHC for theattorney fee
awardandlimitanypost-trialinterestobligationtothe$82,365awardforcovered
damages.
JamesR.Gallagher(0025658)GALLAGHER,GAMS,PRYOR,TALLAN&LITTRELLL.L.P.471EastBroadSt.,19thFloorColumbus,OH43215-3872Tel: 614-228-5151Fax:[email protected]
Respectfullysubmitted,
s/IreneC.Keyse-Walker IreneC.Keyse-Walker(0013143)(COUNSELOFRECORD)BenjaminC.Sasse(0072856)TUCKERELLISLLP950MainAvenue,Suite1100Cleveland,OH44113-7213Tel: 216-592-5000Fax:[email protected]@tuckerellis.com
AttorneysforDefendant-AppellantGrangeMutualCasualtyCompany
41011472\000002\2188394.1
CERTIFICATEOFSERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Merit Brief of Appellant Grange
Mutual Casualty Company was served on February 6, 2015, per S.Ct.Prac.R.
3.11(B),bysendingitbyregularU.S.Mailto:
RobertP.RutterOneSummitOfficePark,Suite6504700RocksideRoadCleveland,OH44131
AttorneyforPlaintiff-Appellee
WorldHarvestChurch
s/IreneC.Keyse-Walker OneoftheAttorneysforDefendant-
AppellantGrangeMutualCasualty
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