8/18/2019 ICC Vol 1 No 3

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COUNCIL

CORRESPONDENCE

ENGLISH EDITION

F o r  Theory  a n d  Discussion

CONTENTS

T H E S E S

  O N

  BOLSHEVISM;

1 The

  significance

  of

  Bolshevism.

2 The

  preconditions.

3 The  class groupings.

4 The

  essence

  of

  Bolshevism.

5 The

  directives.

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>

v -

PAAAPULEIT PUNJAB

  BY

UNITED WORKER) PARTY

WORLD WIDE- FASCISM 

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VDeo.1934  -  Counoil Correspondence.

I I . The Precondi t i ons  of the Russian Revoluti on

4  Russian sooiety was deci si vel y condi ti oned  by i ts  posi t i on be

ommercial capitalist development,*the P

o l i

J

i o a

J :

h

®

u

J^o l i t i s t s ta te

'S K"s:™'£

and pol i ti oal system   i n i ts own peoul i ar  way.

u  i^ra'sajwisrpsi;^ gsSgf

1

®

1

^

u l l S t ° i ? i t J S  i S

 

era^of^imperialist

  u

P®*^ng oreated  two  mutually

t r l^ l ized area

  of

  Western Europe

  an d

  Nor th ^e^oa,

  ana tne

  ooioniai

oenter

  of

  passive imperialist plunder

  in the

  ®fj*°ultura

;

L reg:lone

  of

Eastern Asia.

  The

  olass menace

  to the

  imperialist system thus arises

from both these c ent ers :

  th e

  international proletarian revolution

finds  i t s  pivot  in the  highly developed oapitaliet oounitrieipeasant

Europe  and  Amerioa,  t h e  national

  a

?

r a r i

{ ^  t h e  dividing  *

countries  of  Eastern Asia.  In  Rus sia , rtlo} rtjod  a t t h e  dividing

point between

  t h e

  spheres

  of

  influence

  of the two

  imperialist oenters,

the two  revolutionary tendencies were mingiea.

6, The  Russian eoonomy  was a  combination  of  antiquatei agrarian

production characterist ic  of  Asia,  and of  modern industrial eoonomy

oharaoterlst io  of  Europe. Serfdom  in  various forms J"**™*

1

*}  g j f

tioe  for an  enormous mplority  of  Russian Peasants.  The  email begin

.lings  of  cap i t a l i s t  agi cu lt ur e were thus

tent. They merely oaused  t h e  breaking  up of the  Russian village,  i t s

Indeeorlbable pauperization, while leaving  t h e  peasant chained  to a

Joll whioh  no  longer  was  able  t o  nourish  him.  Russian agrloul'ture,

smbraoing four-fifths  of the  Russian population  and  more than half

t i e  total production,  was  u n t i l  1917 a  feudal eoonomy sprinkled with

oapitalistlo elements. Russian industry

  t a B

  e npa ft ed upon  th e  coun-

try by the  oz ar is t regime, which wanted  to be  Independent  of  foreign

countries especially  in the  production  of  army supplies. Since,  how-

sver, Russia laoked  th e  basis  of  a.well developed system  pf  handi-

craf t s  and the  rudiments  fo r t h e  building* of a  class  of  free labor-

*78 ,  this state capitalism, though born  a s  mass produotion, created

r.d  wacre-working olass.  I t was a  system o^oapitalistio serfdom,  and

preserved strong traces  of  this peculiarity down  to 1917 in  suoh

'ea'ures  as the  code  of  wage payments, barraoking  of the  workers,

sooial legislation,  eto. The  Russian workers were therefore  no t  only

technically backward,  b ut  also  t o a  g reat ex ten t i l l i ter at e  and in

large part direotly  or  indirdotly bound  t o t h e  v i l lage.  In  many

branches  of  Industry,  th e  labor foroe  was  made  up  mainly  of  seasonal

peasant workers  who had no  permanent oonneotion with  th e  oity.

Russian industry until  1917 was a  system  of  capitalist produotion  i n -

terpersed with feudal elements. Feudal agrioulture  and  cap i t a l i s t  i n -

dustry were thus mutually penetrated with eaoh other's baslo elements

*

Deo.1934  -  Oounoil Correspondence.

— — t

**d had  been combined Into  a  system whioh oould neither  be  governed

by  feudal principle#  of  eoonomy  no r  furnish  t h e  foundation®  for an o

ganlo development  o f l t f  capitalist ic elements.

7• The  eoonoaio task  of the  Russian Revolution  was,  f i r s t ,  the

sett ing aside  of the  oonaealed agrarian feudalism  an d i t s  oontlnued

exploitation  of the  peasants  a s  serfs, together with  th e  indust r ia l -

izat ion  of  agriculture, plaolng  i t on the  plane  of  modern oommodity

production; seoondly,  t o  make possible  th e  unrestricted oreation  ofa  olass  of  really "free laborers", l iber ating  t h e  industrial develop

ment from  a l l i t s  feudal fetters. Essentially,  t h e  tasks  of the  bour-

geois resolution.

6. I t was on

  this foundation that

  t h e

  State

  of

  osarlst absolutist

arose.

  The

  existence

  of

  this State depended

  on an

  equilibrium between

the two

  possessing olasses, neither

  of

  whloh

  was

  able

  t o

  dominate

  the

other.

  I f

  oapitaliem furnished

  t h e

  eoonomlo backbone

  of

  that State,

i t s

  poli t ioal prop

  was

  p rov ided ^

  Wis

  feudal nobil ity. "Constitutla#

1

"right

  t o

  vote",

  an d

  system^pf

T

self-government

i

  oould

  no t

  oonoeal

t h e

  politioal impotenoe

  o f a l l

  olasses

  in the

  osariat State whioh,

under

  th e

  oonditlons

  of the

  country's eoonomlo baokwardness,produoed

a

  method

  of

  government which

  was a

  mixture  of  fcropean absolutism

  and

Oriental despotism.

6 .  Po l i t ioal l iC  t h e  taek^ 'onfron t l iw;  th e  Russian Revolution were;

t h e  destruction

  f t

  absolutism,  t h e  abolit ion  of the  feudal nobility

as t h e  f i r s t e s t a t e ,  and the  oreation  of a  po l i t ical const i tu t ion  and

an   administrative apparatus whloh would secure poetically  t h e f u l -

fi l lment  of the  eoonomlo taek  of the  Revolution.  The  po l l t loal jpaske

of the  Russian Revolution were, therefore, quite  i n  accord with  i t e

eoonomlo pre supp osit ions ,  th e  task*  of the  botu^eois fevolution*

I I I . - Th e  Olass groupings  of the  &M l aP Rg y ^ l o f t t _

10. Due to th e  peouliar social oombillation  of  feudal  and  oap i tal -

istlo elements,  th e  Russian Revolution  was  ale© confronted with  com-

plicated tasks,  i t  d i f f e r ed  In  essence  a s  fuadamenltJly from  the

olasslo bourgeois revolution  as the  aoolal structure  of  Russian  ab -

solutism  a t t h e  beginning  of the  SOth oentpry differed,  say ,  from

that  of  Frenoh absolutism  In the 17th  century.

11*  This dif fe re noe , corresponding  t o t h e  dissimilar eoonsalo foun-

dation, found  i t s  olearest poli t ioal expression  in the  at t i tude  of tho

various olasses  of  Russia toward Csarlem  and the  revolution. From  the

standpoint  of  their economic interests,  a l l  thes e ola sse s were tondar-

mentally  in  opposition  t o  Ciarisa.  In  politioal practice, however,

this pyppsit ion differed  no t  only  l a  degree  but was  quite different

also  in i ts aim and  goal.

13. The  feudal nobility fought fundamentally only  fo r t h e  exten-

sion  o f i t s  influence over  th e  absolutist 8tate, wishing  to  keep  I t

intact  fo r t h e  safeguarding  o f i t s  privileges.

13. The  bourgeoisie, numerically weak, politically dependent  and

directly bound  t o  Ozarlom through p ta te su bs id ie s, made numerous

sh i f t s  I n i t s  po l i t ical o r ien tat ion .  The  P*o*mbxl«t movement  of 1836

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Deo. 1934"- "Counci l Corr espondenoo.

At the

  ti me

  of the

  terrori st movement

  of the

 Narodniki

  i n the 70 a

and 80' a,

  they supported

  t he

 revoluti onary movement passi vel y

  for

t he

 purpose

  of

  strengtheni ng

  t he

 pressure

  on

 Ozari sm They al so

  at -

tempted  t o uti l i ze,   as a means  of pressure,   t he

 r

®™̂ t i onar y str i ke

movement s down  to the Ootober st ruggles of

  J-

9

^

5

-

  l i J i i Smei w

l onger   t he  overt hrowbut the reformof  Czari Bm Duri ng  t he parl i amen-

tary peri od from1906 to t he spri ng  of 1917,  they entered upon  a

phase  of oooperat i on w th Osari Bm Fi nal l y,  t he Russi an bourgeoi si e,

i n  fl i ght fr omt he  oonsequenoes  of the revol ut i onary struggl es  of the

prol etari an  and peasant masses, arr i ved  at uncondi t i onal eurrendi er  to

ozari at reaoti on  i n the peri od  of t he Xorni l ov Putsch, whi ch  was de-

si gned  to  reestabl i sh  t he f ormer power  of t he Ozar .   I t  beoame oounter-

revoluti onary even before Jrhe taBks  of i t s  Rfl SSnuti oi

accompl i shed.   The f i rst ol ass oharaoteri eti o  of the Russi an Revoluti on

i s,  t herefore,   t he f aot that   as a bourgeoi s revolut i on  i t had t o be

carr i ed. through  not onl y w thout  but  di reotl y gai nst  t he bourgeoisi e.

Thus arose  a  fundamental al terati on  of i t s whol e pol i ti cal oharaoter.

14. I n conformty w th thei r overwhel mng

became  t he sooi al group whi ch at   l east passi vel y determned  t he Rus-

si an Revol ut i on. Whi l e  t he  numeri cal l y less i mport ant capUal i st i o--

mddl e  and upper—peasantry represented  a l i beral ,

?pol l oy,  t he preponderant number  Cf   f amshi ng  *nd ensl aved Smal l  p ab-

sents were f oroed by,el emental necessi t i es I nto  t he  °ourse  erf viol ent

expropri at i on  of the l arge estates. Unabl e to P U^e

of  thei r  own, t he Russi an peasant el ements found themel ves oompel l ed

t o  fol l ow t he l eadershi p  of  other ol asses. Unt i l Februaru  1917 t:hey

had, on the whol e, despi te sporadi c revol ts, been  t he  fi rmoaei s

\ Czari sm  As a resul t   of  their massi ve i mmobi l i ty  and backwardness, the

H905 revolut i on col l apsed.   I n 1917  they were deci si ve  i n bri ngi ng a-

bout   t he end of  Czari sm whi oh had organi zed them i n  great sooi al

uni ts   i n the army,   i n that they passi vel y ori ppl ed  t he h, duri ng  t he  years  of

abl e  t o mai ntai n i tsel f onl y by  reason  of  thei r furt her aoti ve assis-

tance.

15. I n  spi te  of i t s backwardness,   t he Russi an proletari at possessed

great f i ght i ng strength,   due. to t he meroi l eBBBohool l ng  of th

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I

Deo. 1934 -  Oounoi l Corr espondence.

31. The basi c pri nol pl e  of Bolshevi k pol i oy—he oonquest  and ex-

eroi ee of power by the organi sati on—e j aoobi ni oal .  The gui di ng

l i ne of the great pol i t i cal perepeot i ve  and of i ts real i zati on

through t he taoti o of the Bol shevi k organi zati on f i ghti ng  f or power

l a j aoobi ni oal ;   the mobi l i sati on of al l  sui tabl e  aeansand foroes o

sooi ety  f or the overthrowof the absoluti st opponent, oombl ned w th

t he appl i oati on of al l  methods whioh promse suooess; zi gzaggi ng anc

compromsi ng w th any sooi al foroe whi oh may be used,   i f  even for

t he shortest t i me  and i n the  l east i mportant sector of the  struggl e.

The f undamental i dea of  bol shavi st organi zati on, f i nal l y,   i s J aoob-

i ni oal ;   t he creati on of a stri ct organi zati on of  professi onal revo-^

l uti oni sts whi oh wl l remai n a pl i ant tool  of an omnipotent l eader-

shi p.

22.   Theoreti cal l y, Bol shevi smhas by no meane devel oped  a thought

struoture

  of i ts own

 which ooul d

 be

 consi dered

  a

 olosed system

  I t

has,

 rather, taken over

 t he

 l l arxist method

  of

 l ooking

 at

 cl asses

  and

adapted

  i t to the

 Russi an revol uti onary si tuat i on,

  i . e.

 basi cal l y

changed ittf oontent whi l e maintai ning

  i t s

 oonoepts.

23. The one

 i deologi cal achi evement

  of

 Bolshevi sm

i s the

 connect-

i ng of i ts own

 pol i ti oal theory

 aB a

 whol e w th phi l osophi cal mater-

i al i sm

 As a

 radi cal protagoni st

  of t he

 bourgeoi s revoluti on,

  i t

fal l s upon

  the

 radi oal , phi l osophi cal i deol ogy

  of the

 bourgeoi s

  rev-

ol uti on

 and

 makes

  i t t he

 dogma

 of i ts own

 view

of

 human sooiety.Thi s

f i xati on upon phi l osophi cal materi al i sm

i s

 aooompani ed

 by a

 oonti n-

ual  baoksl l dl ng i nto phi l osophi cal i deal i smwhi oh consi ders pol i t i -

cal  praoti ce as i n the  l ast i nstance  the emanat i on of the aot i on of

l eaders. (Treason of   reformsm i ^ at ry  of Leni n and 8tal i n. )

24. The organi zati on of Bolshevi smarose out of the soatal -demo-

orati o oi roles of  i ntel l ectual revol uti oni sts and devel op^through

facti onal struggl es, spl i ts  and defeats i nto an organi zati on,  of

l eaders w th  t he domnant posi t i ons i n the hands of the pett y-

bourgeoi s i ntel l eotuaXs.   I t s f urt her growh, favored by t he cont i nu-

ously i l l egal si tuati on, establ i shed  i t as a pol i ti oal organi zati on

of  ml i tary oharaoter, based  on professional revol uti oni sts. Onl y

through such  a  straight- l aced I nstrument  of l eadershi p ooul d  t he Bol-

shevi k taoti o be oarr i ed through  and t he hi stori cal task  of Russi a' s

revol uti onary i ntel l i gentsi a be f ul f i l l ed.

25. The Bol shevi k taoti o,   i n the servi ce of pursuing  t he oonquest

of  power  by the organi zati on, reveal ed—espeoi al l y  up to October  1917-

a powerful i nner oonsi stenoy. Ij rs conti nual outer f l uotuati ons were

essenti al l y onl y temporary adaptati ons  to al tered si tuati ons  and to

al tered rel at i ons of foroes between  t he olasses.   I n aooordanoe w th

t he pri nol pl e  of absol ute subordinati on of the means  to the end, w th-

out any  consi derati on of the  i deol ogi oal ef feot  on the ol asses whi oh

i t l ed, the taoti o-' was overhauled even  i n apparentl y f undamental

quest i ons.   I t was the task of the f uncti onari es t o make eaoh  of these

manouwers underst andable to t he  masses .  On t he other hand, avaxy^

I deologi oal sti rri ng among  t he masses, even when fundamental l y  i n

contradi cti on  to the paxty program was uti l i zed. That ooul d be done

because  the'  onl y i ssue was the uncondi t i onal oapture of masses  for

i t s  pol i oy.   I t had t o be done beoause t hese masses, workers and peas-

ants,  had oontxadi otory i nterests  and a compl etel y di f ferent oonscious-

j iea*. Preai eal y  f or t hi s reason, however,   the tacti cal method  of

Deo.1934

 -

 Oounoi l Correspondence.

'

  Bolshevi smreveal s

  i t s

 connecti on wth revol uti onary-bourgeoi s pol i -

oy: i t i s , i n

 faot,

 t he

 method

  of

 that pol i oy whi oh Bol shevism actu-

al i zes.

  J ,

V. - The

 D recti ves

 of

 Bol shevi st Pol i oy.

  H r

26. The goal whi oh furni shed  t he  ŝtarti ng poi nt  of Bolshevi smI s

t he overthrowof the ozari st system As an attack  on absol uti sm  i t

i s of  r evol uti onary-bourgeoi s character.  To t# s goal   i s subordinated

t he st ruggle about  t he taoti oal l i ne w thi n  t #e Russi an sooial demeo-raoy/  I n thi s st ruggl e, Bol shevismdevel ops  i t s methods  and  slogans.

27. I t was the hi stori cal task  of Bol shevi smt o weld together,  by

i t s l eadership taoti o,   t he rebel l i on  of the prol etari at  and peasan-

t ry, who  stood  on qui te di f ferent sooi al pl anes,   t o t he end of com

mon aot i on against  t he f eudal 8tate.   I t had to oombi ne  t ne peasant

revol t (aoti on of the bourgeoi s revol uti on at the beginning  of the

devel opment   of bourgeoi s sooi ety) w th t he prol etari an revol t  ( ao-

ti on of the prol etari an revol uti on at the end of the devel opment  of

bourgeoi s sooi ety) i nto a uni f i ed aot i on.   I t was abl e  to do thi s onl y

by  reason of the faot that  i t unfolded  a grand strategy  i n whi oh use

was made of the most di verse cl ass st i rr i ngs and t endenci es.

28.   Thi s uti l i zati on, strategy begi ns w th  t he w l l i ngness  to cap-

i tal i ze  the smal l est spl i ts ana oraoks  i n the opponent' s oamp. Thus

Lenin onoe spoke of the l i beral propri etors  as our al l i es of, tomor-

r ow ,  whi l e at another ti me he oame  out f or support of the pri ests

who turned against  t he government beoause  of thei r materi al negl eot.

He was  also ready  t o support  t he rel i gi ous seots persecuted by

Ozari sm

29. The ol ari ty  of Leni n' s t aoti o, however, reveal s i tsel f  i n the

faot that, espeoi al l y  as a resul t  of the experi ences of 1905, he

posed  the questi on  of the  al l i es of the  revoluti on on the ri ght

l i ne,   i n that  he turned more sharply agai nst  al l  compromses w th  the

domnant capi tal i st groups and  restri cted  the pol i oy  of the  A ly

and of  compromses

  o

  t he pett y-bourgeoi s and  small -peasant •l aments,

i . e .  those el ements whi oh al i ne hi stori cal l y ooul d be mobi l i zed  fo r

the bourgeoi s revol uti on  I n Russi a.  \

30. The t wo-cl ass basi s  of Bolshevik pol i oy  i s expressed broakly

i n the  taoti oal sl ogan of t he  demooratl o diotatorshi p  of the workers

and peasants , whi oh  i n 1905 was made  the general gui di ng l i ne of

Bol shevik pol i oy and whi oh sti l l oarri ed wt h  i t t he  i l l uei onary

i dea of  some sort  of parl i amentari smw thout  t he bourgeoi si e.  I t wao..

l ater repl aoed  by the  sl ogan of a  cl ass al l i ance between  the workers

and peaaants . Behi nd thi s f ormul a was oonoealed nothing but t he ' nec-

essi ty  of sett i ng both these cl asses  i n moti on  for the Bolshevik

pol i oy  of sei zi ng power.

31. The

  temporary sl ogans under which these

  two

 cl asses determn-

i ng f or the Russi an Revol uti on were'  to be mobi l i zed on the basi s of

thei r oontradi otory i nterests were ruthl essl y subordi nated

  to the

one

 purpose

  of

 usi ng

  the

  foroes

  of

 these olasses.

  I n

 order

  t o

 mobi l -

i ze the

 peasantry,

  t he

 Bol shevi ks

  as

 earl y

  as 1905 or

 thereabout?

ooJr. od

 t he

  sl ogan

  of

  radi oal expropri ati on

 of the

 l anded propri e-

tors

 by the

 peaaants . Thi s sl ogan ooul d

 be

  regarded f rom

t he

 peas-

ants

 '

 standpoint

  as an

  i nvi tati on

 t o

 di vi de

  the bi g

 estate' s among

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Deo.1934

 -

 Oounoi l Corr espondence.

t he

 emai l peaeanta. When

 t he

 Menshevi ks poi nted

  out t he

 reacti onary

oontent

  of t he

 .Bol shevi k agrari an al ogana, Lenin i nformed themt hat

t he

 Bol shevi ks

 had not i n t he

 l eaat deci ded what

 waa t o be

 done w th

t he

  expropri ated estatws.

 To

 regul ate thi s matter woul d

 be the

 func-

ti on

 of

 aocial -demoorati o pol i oy when

  the

 si tuat i on aroae. The demand

f or

  expropri ati on

 of the

 l arge estates

 by the

 peasants

 waa

  thus

 of a

demagogi c oharaoter#

but

  atruok

  t he

 peasants

 on the

 domnant point

of

  thei r i nterests.

  I n

 l i ke manner,

  the

 Bol shevi ks have al so dropped

al ogana among

  t he

 workers,

 e.g.

 that

 of t he

 aovieta. Determni ng

  for

thei r taoti o

 was

 merel y

  t he

 moaentary euoceea

  of a

 sl ogan whioh

 was

by no

 means regarded

  ae an

 obl i gati on

  of

 prj .noi pl e

 on the P r̂^ of

the

 party w th respect

  to the

 maaaea,

 but aa a

 propagandi st s meana

of a

 pol i oy having

  f or i t a

  f i nal content

  the

 oonqueat

  of

 power

 by

t he organi zati on.

32. I n the peri od 1906-14, Bolehevi amdeveloped, i n t he combi nat i on

of  l egal w th i l l egal aoti vi ty,   t he  taoti o  of  revol uti onary parl i a-

mentari sm. Thi s taoti o  was i n aooord w th  the  si tuati on of the bour-

geoi s revol uti on  i n Ruaai a. Wth  the aid of  thiB taot i c,  i t aucoeeded

i n l i nki ng  t he day-t o-day gueri l l a warf are between  the workers  and

Czari am  and between  t he  peasants and Ozari am i nto  the great l i ne  of

preparati on  for t he bourgeois revoluti on under Russian oondi ti ona.  I n

parti cul ar, eaoh etep  i n parl i amentary aoti vi ty  on the part  of the

RuBBi an aool al demooraoy bore,   i n consequenoe of ozari st di ctatori al

pol i cy,  a bourgeof i a-revol uti onary oharaoter.   I n i t s taoti o  of mobi l -

i zi ng  the t wo deci si ve cl asses of the

 Ru08

J ' ^

R

?

v ol u

|

l 0

.̂

  n

-

t h

®

a

I

tered si tuati on between

  t he

 revol uti on

 of 1905

 down

  to the

 Worl d

 War,

thi s ai m was f urther puraued  and t he Duma waa used aa a t ri bune  fo r

i t a propaganda among  the workere and peasants.

VI . -  Bolshevi smand t he Worki ng O aSB.

33.   Bol shevi amhas  aolved  t he hi stori cal probl emof the bourgeois V

revol uti on  i n  feu&al -oapi tal i at Russi a w th  t he ai d of the prol etar-

i at aa t he aoti ve, f i ghti ng i nstrument.   I t has al so appropri ated  the

revoluti onary theory  of t he worki ng ol ass and t ransformed that theory

to sui t  i ta purpoees. Marxi amLeni niBm  i a not Ha*xism  but a f i l l -

i ng of the Marxi at termnol ogy adapted  to the needs of the bourgeoia

revol uti on  i n Ruasi a w th  the aooial oontent of t he Ruaai an Revolut i on,

fhie theory beoomea,   i n the handa  of th4 Bol ahevi ka,  and i n spi te  of

I t s bei ng a means of understanding  the ol aaa structure and  tendenci es

of  Russi a, al so  the meana  of vei l i ng  t he actual ol asa content of the

Bol shevik revol ut i on. Behi nd  t he Marxi at oonoepta  and  sl ogans  i a con-

cealed

  the

 oontent

  of a

 bourgeoi a revoluti on whi oh

 had t o be

 brought

about, under

  the

  leaderahi p

  of a

  revol uti onary petty-bourgeoi s i ntel -

l i gentsi a,

  by t he

 uni ted assaul t

  of a

  social i Bti oal l y ori ented prol e-

tari at'

  and a

 peasantry ti ed

  t o

 pri vate property, agai nst ozari st

  ab-

sol uti sm l and—owni ng nobi l i ty

  and t he

 bourgeoi si e.

34. The

  absol ute ol ai m

t o

 l eadershi p

 on the

 part

  of t he

 revol uti on-

ary,

 pett y-bourgeois

 and

  j acobi ni oal i ntell i gentsi a

  i s

 concealed

 be-

hi nd

  the

 Bol shevi k oonoepti on

 of the

 rol e

 of the

 Party among

  the

worki ng cl ass.

 The

 petty-bourgeois i ntel l i gentsi a ooul d expand

  i t s

organi zati on i nto

 an

 aoti ve revoluti onary weapon onl y

  on

 oondi ti on

of

 attr acti ng

 and

 maki ng

  use of

 prol etari an f oroes.

  I t

 therefore

cal l ed

  i t s

 j acobi ni oal party prol etari an.

  The

  subordinati on

  of the

f i ghti ng working cl ass

  to the

 petty-bourgeois l eadershi p

 was

  j uati -

- 8 -

Deo. 1934 -  Counoi l Correspondence.

fi ed  by Bol shevi amon the  theory  of the  vanguard of the prol etar-

i at a

 theory whioh

  i t

 extended

  i n

 praoti oe

  to the

 pri noi pl e that

  the

party

  i s the

 embodi ment

 of t he

 olass.

 The

 Part y, that

  i s, i a not an

i natr ument

  of t he

 worki ng-olass,

 but the

 worki ng-olaes

  an

  i nstrument

of the

 Part y.

35. The

  necessi ty

  f or

 baai hg Bolehevi k pol i oy

  on the two

  l ower

olasses

  of

 Russi an sooi ety

  i s

 transcri bed

 by

 Bol shevi smi nto

 the

formula

 of a

  ol ass al l i anoe between therprol etari at

  and the

 peasan-

t r y —an al l i anoe

  i n

 whi ch logi cal l y antagoni sti c ol ass i nterests

are

  oonsci oualy l umped together.

36. The

 demand

  f or

 uncondi ti onal l eadershi p

  of the

 peasantr y

  i s

di sgui sed

  by

 Bol shevismw th

 t he

  formula

 of the

  pri macy

  of the

 prol e-

tari at

  i n the

 revol ut i on .

 As the

 prol etari at

  i n i t s

 turn

  i s

 ruled

  by

the

 Bol shevik Party,

  the

  pri maoy

  of the

 proletari at meana

  the

 pri m

acy of t he

 Bol shevi k Party

  and i ta

 ol ai m

t o

 governing both olasses.

37. The

 Bol shevi k pretenti on

 of

 sei zi ng power w th

  the

 support

  of

t wo

 cl aaaeB fi nda

  i ta

 hi gheet expreeei on

  i n the

 Bol ahevik oonoept

  of

the

  diotatorahi p

 of the

 prol etari at .

  I n

 oonj unoti on w th

  t he oon-

cept

  of the

 Party

  ae the

 absol ute l eader-organi zati on

 of the

 ol aaa,

the

  formula

  of the

 proletari an di ctatorshi p natural l y meana maatery

on the

 part

  of the

  j aoobl ni oal —bolshevi k organi zati on.

  I ta

 ol ass

 con-

tent

  i s

 f urthermore completel y done away wth

 by the

 bol shevi k defi n-

i t ion

 of the

 di ctatorshi p

  of the

 prol etari at

  as the

  class al l i anoe

between proletari at

  and

 peasantry under

  the

 pri maoy

  of the

 prol etar-

i at .   (Stal i n  and t he programof the Comntern. The Marxi at pri noi -

pl e of the di otatorahi p of the worki ng ol asa  i s thus diatort ed by

Bol ahevl smi nto  the rule over  two opposed ol asses by t he j aoobi nl cbi

part y.

38. The bourgeoi s oharaoter of the Bolshevik revol uti on  i s under-

scored by the Bol shevi ks themel ves  i n  thei r revi sed sl ogan of the

peopl e' s revol uti on ,   i . e . the oommon struggl e  of di f ferent ol aaBea

of a people  i n one revol uti on. That  ia the  typi cal 8l ogan of every

bourgeoi s revoluti on whioh behi nd  a bourgeois l eadershi p bri ngs

masses  of petty-bourgeoi s peasants and prol etari ans i nto aoti on  for

i ts own ol aaa ai m.

39. I n viewof the  organi zati on' a struggl e  f or power over the

revol uti onary ol aaaea, every demoorati o atti tude  of Bol shevi smbe-

oomes  a mere taoti oal ohess move. Thi s has been proved part i cul arl y

i n the

 que3ti ©n

  of

 workers' demooraoy

  i n the

  soviets.The Leni ni st

sl ogan of  l i aroh 1917, al l  power  to the eovi ete , bore  t he typi oal

two-ol aaa aspect   of the Russi an Revoluti on,   for the sovi ets were  the

counci l s of workers, peasants and  sol di ers ( i . e .  agai n peasants' *

Furt hermore,   the sl ogan was mere taot i o. I t was put forth by Leni n

i n the February revoluti on because  i t Beemed  t o assure  t he  peaceful

transi ti on  of oontr ol f romt he aooi al - revol uti onary Menshevik coal i -

ti on  to the Bol shevi ks  by the  i noreaee  of  thei r i nf l uence  i n the

soviets. When, aft er  t he J ul y demonstrati on,  t he  i nf l uence  of t hj

Bolshevi ks over   the Bovi ets deol i ned, Leni n temporari l y abandoned

t he  soviet sl ogan and demanded  the organi zati on of other siugâ d  of

i nsurr ecti on by the Bolehevi k Party.  I t was only when,  as a resul t  o

t he Korni l ov Putaoh,   the bol shevik i nf l uence  i n the sovi ets agai n

sharply i noreaeed, that Leni n' s part y agai n took  up the sovi et sl ope

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Deo. 1934 -  Oounoi l Corr espondence.

Si noe  t he Bol shevi ks regarded  t he  soviets preponderantl y âs ôrgans

of  i nsurr ecti on i nsteadi of  as organs of sel f -government of t he wor

ki ng ol ass, they made  i t al l t oo cl ear that  to themt he sovi ets wei \

onl y a  tool   by the ai d of whi ch their party ooul d t ake over  the

po««r^ Thi s has been demonstrated  i n general practi ce,  not onl y by

thei r organi zati on  of the sovi et state after  the  conquest  of power,

but  al so  i n the speoi al case of the bl oody repression of tne Kron-

stadt rebel l i on.  The peasant-oapi tal i st demands  of  thi s i nsurreoti oi

were granted  by t he NEP; i ts prol etari an-democrat i c demands, however

were drowned  i n working-ol ass bl ood.

40$ The st ruggle over  the content  of the Russi an soviets  l ed, as

earl y as 1930, to t he  f ormati on of a genuine, though on the whol e

sti l l weak, communi st ourrent   i n the Party.  The workers opposi ti on

(Utyanl kov) represented  the  i dea of oarrying through soviet d3moc-

racy  for the worki ng-ol ass. Li ke al l  other seri ous opposi ti ons  of

this nature, l ater  on, i t was eradi cated by i mpri sonment, exi l e and

ml i tary exeout i on,   but i ts pl atformremai ns as the hi stori oal

starti ng poi nt   f or an i ndependent, prol etari an-oommuni st movement

agai nst   the Bolshevik regi me.

41. The att i tude of the Bol shevi ks toward  the trade uni on questi on

i s  l i kew se determned f romt he poi nt  of vi ewof  control and  l eader-

shi p  of the workers by the Bol shevi k party.  I n Russi a, t he Bol sheui  ku

have oompletel y taken away f romt he t rade uni ons . the r oharaoter  pf

l abor organi zati ons,  by gOvernmental i zi ng and ml i tari zing themby

the oompul sory oharaoter i mposed upon themafter  the oonquest  ofpower.   I n the other oountri es,  t he f i nal resul t of the Bolshevik

pol i cy  has been  t o protect  the bureaucrati c, reformst trade-uni on

organi zati ons,  and  i nstead  of the breaki ng up of  suoh organi zati ons,

t he Bol shevi ks have advooated  the  oonquest of  thei r apparatus.They

were bi tter oppoaents  of the  i dea  of revol uti onary, i ndustr i al organ-

i zati ons beoause t hese l atter embodied demoorati o demooraoy.  The Bol -

sheviks fought   f or the oonquest  or renovati on of  organi zati ons con-

trol l ed  by the oentral i sti o bureaucracy, whi ch they thought  t o rul e

fromt hei r   own oommand posts.

42. As a  l eader-movement  of  j aoobi nl oal di ctatorshi p, Bol shevi sm

i n al l i t s  phases has consi stentl y oombatt ed  t he  i dea of  sel f -deter-

mnati on of the worki ng ol ass and demanded  the  subordi nati on of the

prol etari at   to the bureauorati zed organi zati on.  I n the di soussi on

whi oh took pl aoe, pri or  t o t he war, on the questi on of organi zati on

wthi n t he Seoond I nternati onal , Leni n was a viol ent  and vi ndi cati ve

opponent   of Rosa Luxemburg and supported hi mel f outspokenl y  on the

centri st Kautsky,  who duri ng and af ter  t he war,  dearl y reveal ed hi s

pol i oy  of cl ass betrayal . Bol shevi smhad even then,  as constantl y

si nce, proved that   i t not onl y has no understati ng of the questi on

of  devel opi ng  the oonsoi ousness  and t he ol ass organi zati ons  of the

proletari at,

 but

  that

  i t

 al so oombats wth

  al l

 means

 al l

 theoreti oal

and

 praoti cal attempts

  t o

 defbl op aotual olass organi zati ons

 and

nanci es.

VI I . -

 Thfi Bol shevik Revol uti on.

43.

  Bolahevi am

has

 cal l ed

  the

  revol uti on

 of

 February

  the

 bourgeoi s

revol uti on,

 and

  that

  of

 Ootober

  t he

 prol etari an revol uti on

  i n

 order

to be

 abl e

  t o

 paae

  of f i t s

 l ater regi me

 as

 prol etari an ol ass rule

  and

- 10 -

Deo. 1934 -  Oounoi l Correspondence.

i t s  eoonomo pol i oies aa sociali sm The absurdi ty  of thi s di vi sion

of the revol uti on of 1917 beooraes olear merel y f romconsi derati on of

the  fact that  i n that oase  a devel opment  of seven months would have

suff i ced  t o oreate  the eoonomo  and soci al presupposi ti ons  for a

prol etari an revol uti on  i n a oountry whi ch hed  j uet entered  the pro- \

cess  of i t s bourgeois revol uti on,   i . e .  si mpl y  t o l eap an eoonomo

and eooial phase  of development that woul d  at  l east requi re deoades. 

I n  real i ty,  the  revol uti on  of 1917 i d a qui te uni tary soci al prooesa

of  transformati on, begi nni ng wth  the ool l ap se of Czarl emand at -

taini ng  i t s cl i max wth  t he vi ctori ous armed i nsurrecti on  of the

Bolshevi ks  on November  7th.  Thi s vi ol ent process  of  transformati on

i s that  of Russi a' s bourgeoi s revoluti on under  the hi stori cal l y

oreated, pedul i ar Russi an condi ti ons.

44. I n thi s prooess,   the party  of t he revol uti onary, j aoobl ni oal

i ntel l i gentsi a sei zed power  on the t wo eooi al waves  of peasant  and

proletari an mass i nsurrecti on and created  i n the pl aoe'  of the shat-

tered governi ng t ri angl e, Ozari sm nobi l i ty, bourgeoi si e,   t he new

governi ng tri angl e, bolshevi sm peasantry, working ol ass. J ust   as

the

 state appartus

  of

 Ozari smrul ed i ndependentl y over

  the two

 poss-

essi ng cl asses,

  so t he new

 Bol shevi k state apparatus began

  t o

 make

i tsel f i ndependent

  of i t s

 doubl e cl ass basi s. Russia stepped

  out of

t he

  condi ti ons,

  of

 ozari st absol uti smi nto those

  of

 Bolshevi k absolu-

tism

45.

  Bol shevi k pol i oy attai ns, duri ng

  t he

  revol uti onary peri od, i ts

hi ghest poi nt   i n t he way of embraoi ng  and masteri ng  the  ol asa foroes

of the

 r evol uti on.

  The

 acme

  of

  thei r revol uti onary t aoti o

  l a

 reaohed

i n the

 preparati on

 and

  oarrying

  qut of t he

  armed insurrecti on.

  The

queatl on

 of the

 violent upri si ng became

  for the

 Bolsheviks

  a

 ques-

ti on

 of an

 exact, thoroughl y sohedul ed

 and

 pl anned ml i tary acti on,

t he

 head

  of

 whi oh

  as

 wel l

 as i t s

 dri vi ng

 and

 contr ol l i ng force

 was

the

 Bol shevi k Part y w th

  i t s

 ml i tary formati ons# Oonoepti on, prepar-

ati on and executi on of the armed i nsurroti on by the Bolsheviks bear

t he obvi ous stamp  of the j aoobi ni oal oonsD raoy,  (i n the Russi an

Revoluti on again  t he onl y possibl e pol i cy) that  i s, of   i nsurrecti on

under   the  pecul i ar oondi ti ons  of oarrying through  the bourgeoi s  rev-

ol uti on agai nst   t he bourgeoi si e.

46. The i nner oharaoter  of the Bol shevik revol uti on as a bourgeoi s

revol uti on reveal e I tsel f   i n i t s eoonomo sl ogans.  To the peasant

masses,   t he Bol shevi ks represented  the vi ol ent expropri ati on of the

l arge estates  by the spontaneous aotl on  of the  l and-hungry small

peasantry. They perfeotl y expressed  i n thei r agrari an praoti oe  and

sl ogans ( Peaoe and Land) t he i nterests of the peasants f i ghti ng  fo r

t he seouri ty  of smal l pri vate property, henoe  on capi tal i sti c l l nea,

and were thus,  on the agrari an questi on, ruthl ess ohampi ons of small -

oapi tal i st, hence  not  sool al l at-prol etari an i nterests agai nst feudal

and capi tal i st l anded property.

47. Nor  w th regard  to the workers were  the eoonomo demands  of

the Bo-l shevi k revol uti on fi l l ed w th  a sooi al i tt content. Leni n on

several oooasi ons r epel l ed w th dl sti not sharpness  t he Menshevi k

ori ti ciemthat Bol ehvl emrepresented  a Utopi an pol i oy  of Bool al J za-

ti on of producti on  i n a oountry  not yet  ri pe  fo r i t . The Bolsheviks

decl ared that   i n the  revol uti on  it was not at al l a questi on  of soo-»

i al i zati on of produot i on,  but  oonti ol   of  producti on  by the worker

«

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Doo. 1934 -   Oounoi l Correspondence.

The  . l og. n  Of   control

 ?

J   Pr * « «. n  pr ,

capi tal i sm

a# a

  foroe

  :f ox of

 expi rati on.

  The boa:

duoti on,

 but

 depri vi ng

  i t

  roV

ol utl on

  and t he

 Bol shevik ael f -

geoi s oharaoter

 of t he

 Bolehevi k, character,

  as

 opposed

  to the

roetr l oti on

  t o

 thl a „?°°So ovsrtt i row

of 1917,

 ooul d

  not be

0?

8

«l j thi s . l ogon of oontr ol  of produotl on.

40. The

 el emental f oroe

  of t he £ > £

  ZnShUe

and t he  sabotage  of the  fart her i nto taking, Over  the

drove  t he Bol shevi k

 i nd

}j

t

f j j

1

n

52 °J

or nmen

t al bureauoraoy.The state

i ndustr i al enterpri ses

 by t he ne ,g

  «

eX

i ,

0

d

  of war

 communi em

  al -

eoonomy whioh  at  fi rst, throughout geper i oa  ox

  L e n l n

as

 Bf i Sl i i t

  l « i

 produot

  of t he

 8tal i ni «t

  era.

4 9 .  Lenin hlm.e lf  h ad ,  how.ver n^o th er  J »

of

  soc i a l i za t i on

  of

  Qerman

  wa r

  eoonomy

  and the

  postal

duoted state eoonomy.  To him the  German

  l 2 a t l o n

  i

# e

,  eoonomio

service were i l lus t ra t ion,  of

  MOM

g oen t r a l i s t l oa l l y

-organization

  of a;i

  M W g k ] .

  Jh e

  teohnioal ,

  n o t t h e

  p r o l e t a f -

oontrolled from

  ^ o v e . Be

  p r0

blem. Lenin likewise based

l a n ,  sooial side  of the  soo l a l i za t  P .

  Q n t h e

  00

noepts  of so-

himeelf,  an d  with  him  Bolshevism,  i n  genera  ,

  l n h l # - r i n

_

oialisation propounded  by the  o e n t r

a

  completely  o r -

anoe Capital ha d  eke tohedan_

i

Jeal ized  p

  l a l l 2 l n g

  production,

ganlzed oapitalism.  Th e  a o t u a l p r o b l e m i n s o r ga n iz at i on  of

i . e .  tfce tak ing over  of the  en t e rp r i s e s  and the  organisat ion  « ^

eoonomy through  t h e  working olaes  and i t . i t by . I t had to be

shop counoiis; Bolshevism  h a s  completely  p < < nn  nt  f r aa  and

JaaSeS  S?  bemuse  t h e  Marxist  " e a of t h e  associa t ion

  a

equal produoers

  i s

  dlreotly opposed

  *° *** .

  d i d n o t

  pptaess

  t h e s o -

jaooblnioal organisation,

  an d

  beoause :RUSBJooialism.

  The

  soc i a l i ze -

oia l

  an d

  eoonomio conditions necessary

  fo r so . .

  m m i ta l i s t

u £  concept  o f t h e  Bolsheviks  i s  therefore

  1 l

£ £

i 8 t

eoonomy taken over  b y th e  S tate  an d  directed from  t h e  ° j j e i aa  ana

from above  b y i t s  buxeauoxaoyf  The  Bolshevik socialism

ganized oapitalism.

VII I .  -  Bol shevik I nternatl f tntf-

ian a n

^

t h g

50.   Duri ng  t he Worl d *

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  -

  Counoll Correepond4»oe.

t h e  oommander  of a  worla bolalxevik system  of  coupl ing toge ther  t h e

oommunie t -p ro le t a r idn  a nd  p a a e a n t - o a p i t a l i B t i n t e r e s t s . T h is p o l i c y

wa s  i n s o f a r p o s i t i v e  a s i t h a s  p r o t e c t e d  t h e  Bolshevik State f rom  im -

p e r i a l i s t i n v a s i o n  b y  o o n t i n u a l l y d i s q u i e t i n g  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t S t a t e s ,

a n d  t h o i t b y  h a s  g iven  i t  t ime  t o .  b u i l d i t s e l f g r a d u a l l y i n t o  t h e

world impc r lu l ly t f jyct^m again  b y t h e  c a p i t a l i s t m e t n o d s  o f  oommer-

c i a l rel

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Deo. 1934 -

 Counci l Corr espondence.

61. i n the  o e n t u r o f t h e f o r ^ g n p r o p a g ^ r f u ^ ^ ^ S a ' a ™ ?

1

"

shevismpl aoed  t he thesi s of  l mpe  -

  l n t h e

  l east wt h the

Uni on though euch a phrase di d ^

of

-

  nt

erest8  and  thei r

compl i cated l i nes of  ° ?? t̂ ed  to mobi l i ze  the  i nter-

oonti nual l y changi ng groupi ngs.  I t a P  ̂ through a part l y

S J i ; f . n S j

a t

p S S - S S . S S . ^

h

P

e

o £ / - ^

8

f

8

? t f

e a

1 r

t

o S

e

w

0

i ? S

n

i n

t

d

i e t

  Union.

62. o The  oppo si t i one bet we en

  V

p® Q

P

^anda

&

of  t h e  Comintern"

powers  led to the  ideological  J

  t

p

^

0

  U . 8 . 8 . R . " P r o t e o t

under  th e  slogans:

  n

^ ^

t

° ^

a

J

0

^ ^

8

;

e

J e p^sen ted irith these  op-

th e  Soviet Union".  In  that  th e  ^orsere  wo*

  v

  p o l i o y

, they

posit ions  as the  only  an d

  d e t e r

° ^ J " §

t

° ? ®

t 0  t h e

  ao tual real i t ies  of

were prevented from gaining "J.^Jnts  of the  communist parties  b e -

International poli t ios.

  T

^®   ^ l l n d  Li d  opportunistic defenders  of

oame, before everything

  e 1

?

0

' of th e  faot that  the So-

th e  Soviet Union  an d  were kept J

n

f

^ f ? ° J ^

K

ed faotor  in  imperialist

viet Union  had  long  ag o  beoome  a  full-fleagec iauw*

world politios.

63. The  continual  ory of  a l a r* ah o u t ^ i m* i n en t ^ . a r

blned imperialist powers against  th e . *, •,

 l t a

_4-a^ ion

  0

f  labor  and

pol i t ics  f o r  jus t i fy ing  th e  in^nsined mi l i tar izat ion tOi  ^ ^

th e

  increased pressure

  on the

  ^ s i a n

  p

  a W 8 t l n t

e r e s t

  In the

however,  th e  Soviet

  Un

*°A

  h

| £  "J?,??"

  y

  conflict with other States,

unconditional avoidance  of any  mil ita ry J--,*-,*,. inte rnal ly  in  lararo

The  existence  of the  ^ l ^ e v l k g o v e ^ e n t ^ e p j n d ^ l n t e r n a l l y I n ^ a r . o

measure  on the  avoidanoe  o f a l l  volut ionar y. Therefore  the Com-

pol i ti cs, both ml i tary

  as »eU as

 revol uUonai y. n̂erei or

  ^

Intern  has in  praotioe,  i n  ®*y*^

f

°®

  b o t f t

„

e  0

f jy.1

  r e a

l revolutionary

propaganda, carried

  on a

  PPl*°y

  ®*

  " 5 S u S s t p ar ti es somewhat openly

proletarian development  and in the

  f

  P.  Sovi et Union must

sure , employed str ong ges tur es aga ins t i mpe ria lis t p

8/18/2019 ICC Vol 1 No 3

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Deo.1934

  -

  Oounoll Oorreepondenoe.

henoe against

  a l l

  groupa eeeking

  t o

  anohor then anew

  i n t h e

  p r o l e t a r -

i a t i i o n e o f t h e

  f i r e t t a s k s

  i n t h e

  s t r u g g l e

  f o r t h e

  revo lu t iona ry

r e o r i e n t a t i o n

  o f t h e

  work ing o laee . P ro le ta r ian po j jo j

  1

oped only from

  t h e

  p ro le ta r ian o laee g round

  a n d

  with

  t h e

  methods

  and

organ isa t iona l fo rne adap ted the re to .

WAT'3 BEHIND

  THE NEW

  DEAL"?

The New

  Deal

  la no

  ha rb inge r

  of a new

  soc ia l o rde r" ,

  n o r l e i t s

apost le , Franklin Delano Roosevelt , se lf-p rocl aime d Messiah

  f o r t h e

" f o r g o t t e n

  man , th e

  rea l ly unse l f leh

  a n d

  p u b l l e - a p i r i t e d i n d i v i du a l

h e i s  po r t rayed .

Rooseve l t ' s e lec t ion

  wa s

  engineered, Ju st like

  a l l

  other previous

e l e c t i o n s ,

  by a

  group

  of

  individuals whose eoonomlc interests

  r e -

quired urgent governmental  a i d .

Th e  f a l l  of 1932 saw th e  oomplete oollapse  of  Amerloan industry  and

a  r i s i n g t i d e  of  ag ra r ian d l soon ten t .  Th e  current occupant  of the

White House/] Her ber t Hoover, pla ced t he re  by the  Morgan  a n d  Mellon

f in anc ia l In t e re s t s , appea red to ta l ly ob l iv ious  t o t h e  desperate

a t r a l t e  of  tpese  tw o  groups.  I t was  only nat ura l that t hes e groups

s h o u l d s t r i y i  f o r  tha t p o l i t io a l power  I n t h e  coming election which

would enable'them

  t o

  p a s s b e n e f i c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n

  f o r

  themselves.

Why was  Roosevelt se leoted  t o  " lead"  t h e  country  ou t o f  eoonomlc

chaos?  N ot  only becauss  he had  caught  t h e  n a t i o n ' s a t t e n t i o n  as a

much adve r t i sed " l ibe ra l " po l i t i c i an ,

  b u t

  even more

  so

  because

  h i s

own   economic in te re st s were ident ica l with those  o f t h e  group push-

i n g h i s

  candidacy.

James Roosevelt , fa ther

  of

  Franklin

  D .,

  one-time ^ vfcre-p resi dent

  of

t h e

  Delaware

  &

 Hudson

  R . R . ,

  accumulated such a,tremendous fortune

  i n

ra il ro ad organ izat ion*, both down South fol lowi ng

  t h e

  C i v i l

  War, and

i n t h e

  East , that- t te

  wa s

  considered

  one o f the

  f i v e r i c h e s t

  men in

New

  York Ci ty . Although young Fra nkl in

  D- , had

  expressed

  a

  d e s i r e

  to

en te r

  t h e

  Navy,

  t h e

  elder Roosevelt persuaded

  h im to

  s tudy

  l a w i n -

s tead

  an d

  thus better equip himself

  f o r t h e

  ultimate management

  of

t h e

  ea ten slv e Roosevelt hol din gs. Following gradua tion from Harvard

an d

  Columbia

  Law

  School, Roosevelt ent ered

  t h e

  o f f i o e s

  of the

  beat

e s tab l i shed f i rm

  o f

  management lawyers

  In New

  York Ci ty . While

  In

their employ,

  he

  d i r e c t e d

  t h e

  a f f a i r s

  o f t h e

  huge Aator estate,

  and

the reby e s tab l i shed

  a

  very close friendship with William Vincent

Aator,

  one o f th9

  c o u n t r y ' s m o s t i n f l u e n t i a l I n d u s t r i a l i s t s

  a n d b a n -

ke rs .

  I n a

  s p i r i t

  o f f u n ,

  Roosevelt then entered pol i t ic s . Running

s i

o r

  t h e

  s ta te S ena te

  o n t h e

  Democratic t loket ,

  h e

  surprised everyone

py

  c a p t u r i n g

  t h e

  o f f i c e .

  No

  sooner

  was he

  seated, than Roosevelt,

  t h e

yfcomparatlvely unknown, drew nat ion al at te nt io n

  t o

  himself

  by

  leading

/ a n

  oppos i t ion

  t o t h e

  Tammany nomination

  f o r

  U.S . sena to r

  ( I n

  those

/

  days,

  1911 ,

  they were elected

  b y t h e

  s ta te l eg ia la tu re ) • Thus

  h e

/

  gained through ti ls

  o n e a c t

  that unfounded reputation

  f o r

  unse l f i sh

(

  devotion

  t o t h e

  p e o p l e ' s i n t e r e s t s t h a t

  h a s

  sndured

  t o

  this day.Next

•Roosevelt boosted Woodrow Wilson

  f o r t h e

  Democratic presidentia l

- 18 -

bee.1934  -  Council Correspondence-

 

nomination  in 1912,  stumping  fo r h im  ufterwarda during the ,succeasful

election campaign-  As a  reward, Wilson appointed  hi m  Assis tant Secre-

ta ry

  of the

  Navy. Roosevelt spent seven yeara

  In

  th la poa i t lon .S eve r -

a l

  montha

  a g o , t h e

  Adml nist rati on pub li ci ty agenclea made much

  of the

State department's order removing

  t h e

  U.S.Marines

  who had

  been

  s t a -

t ioned

  in San

  Domingo (Haiti). They discreetly neglected

  t o

  mention

t h a t

  i t was

  thie sume Franklin

  D.

  Roosevelt

  who

  sent them there

  i n

1 9 1 3 i n h i e

  f i r a t o f f i c i a l

  act aa

  Aas i s tan t S ec re ta ry o s tens ib ly

  to

prot ect American l iv es, actual ly

  t o

  protect American investments,

Astor Int er es ts among oth ers During

  t h e

  summer

  an d

  f a l l

  of

  1915,our

peace-loving Asst . Secretary

  of the

  Navy began preparing

  t h e

  Navy

f o r

  e v e n t u a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n

  I n t h e

  World

  War, two

  yeara before

  o u r a c -

tual entry1

  I n

  a d d i t i o n ,

  h e

  developed

  a

  g i f t

  f o r

  o ra to ry

  an d

  began

  t o

advocate public ly

  f o r a

  much la rg er Navy. This mi ssi onar y work

  waa

l a rge ly in s t rumen ta l

  i n

  causing President Wilson

  t o

  sponsor

  t h e l a r -

geat jNavy appropriation bill

  up to

  that time. Paased

  in 1916 , i t

provided

  an

  app rop r ia t ion

  of

  $320, 00Q

r

000

  f o r

  naval expansion.

After America.was propagandized into

  the war ,

  thanks

  t o

  paid Allied

propaganda plus

  t h e

  h-elp tendered

  by

  American f inancial in terest* ,

(J

  ^.Morgan  .

  C o . ) a n d

  young Jingo'iata

  o f t h e

  Rooaevelt type,

  our

hero proved himself quite capable. Rooaevelt Invented

  t h e

  "Macy Boti r^"

t h e

  f ira t governmental

  w ar

  labo r board, which coo rdi nat ed wagep

  In \

every part

  of the

  coun t ry .

  Th e

  Na t iona l

  War

  Labor Board developed

from.this. Thla latter Board ahowed  i t a  regard  f o r  Labor  by  forbl  ri-

ding  a l l  s t r i k e s  f o r t h e  te rmina t ion  of the war .  Rooaevelt alio  s e r -

ved as

  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e

  of the

  Navy

  on the War

  Labor Pollclea Board,

charged with working  o u t  labo r po l l c lea .  I n h i a  Rapacity  a s  Navy  l a -

b o r  expert , Roosevelt helped "arbitra te" labor disputes perta ining  t o

t h e  Navy construction yards. This work brought  him  into contac; with

various American Federation  of  Labor o f f ic la l s>  h o a l l  displayed

grea t pa t r io t i sm  an d  extreme reaaonableness  i n  the i r dea l ings .

Th e  g r e a t e s t  of  these pa t r io t s  a n d t h e  most reasonable  i n h l a  demands

was the  v ice -p re s iden t o f , the In te rna t iona l Assoc ia t ion o f .Mach ln ls ta .

Roosevelt never forgot  t h e  favors  he  rece ived f rom th i s o f f ic ia l ,  and

so

  when

  t h e

  C.C.C.

  was

  In s t i tu ted laa t yea r ,

  a t i t s

  head

  was

  placed

thi s a t er l l ng pa tr io t , Robert Fechner.

After helping

  to win tne war to

  "make

  t h e

  World Safe

  f o r

  Democracy".

Rooaevelt returned

  t o

  c iv i l i an l i f e , r e suming

  h ia law

  p r a c t i c e .

  At

Alf red

  E.

  Smith 's behe8t,

  h e

  reen te red po l l t l c a , ga in ing

  t h e

  govef-

norahip

  of New

  York

  In 1928, and

  again

  I n ' 3 0 -

  During th la period,

t h e

  Governor diacovered

  h e

  poaaeaaed

  a

  remarkable radio voice,,

  f o r a

politician. From auch humble beginninga sprang that great American

Insti tu t ion: In timate Fireside Chata With

  Th e

  Prea l^e nt (through

  t h e

cou r te sy

  of

  both broadcasting systems).

H is

  admin is t ra t ion

  a s

  governor,

  i n

  s p i t e

  of

  press-agency

  tc the Con-

trary, shows

  no

  b e n e f i t s

  f o r

  l a b o r .

  Th e

  l e g i s l a t i o n

  t o

  whloh Rooae-

velt points with greatest pride

  a s a

  boon

  t o

  labor,

  The New

  Tork

S ta te

  Old Age

  Pension

  A c t ,

  doesn ' t bene f i t l abo r

  a t a l l . N ot

  only

must applicants

  bo 70

  yea re

  o r

  over, (sure ly

  no

  he lp

  t o

  moat workera

who

  never reach

  6 0 , l e t

  a lone

  7 0

  becau8e

  of

  modern working conditions

b u t t h e

  prooee.dure

  i s so

  loaded with red-tape that really needy indi-

viduals without money

  f o r

  lega l

  a i d o a n

  hardly hope

  t o

  aacure

  i t s

©*»agre banefit.a.

19 -

 

8/18/2019 ICC Vol 1 No 3

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Dec.1934

  -

  Council Correspondence.

Roosevelt

  i s n o t t h e

  only member

  of h i s

  family with extensive ra i l-

road holdings.

  H i s

  f i r s t coua in

  o n h i s

  mo th er' s sl 5e , Lyman Delano,

i s

  today Chairman

  o f t h e

  board

  of

  d i r e c t o r s

  o f t h e

  Atlantic Coast

Line R.R.Co.,

  t h e

  L o u i s v i l l e

 

Nashv i l le ,

  and has an

  i n t e r e s t

  i n

  man>

o the rs . Othe r re la t ives

  a r e

  J . J .P e l l ey , r ecen t ly re s igned p re s iden t

of the New

  York,

  New

  Haven

  Sc

  H a r t f o r d

  R.R. , and a

  sha reho lde r

  i n

o t n e r s ;

  and Mr .

  Curry

  o f t h e

  Union Pa ci f i c . Roosev elt 's thr ee moat

In t ima te f r iends

  a r e

  l ikewise indus t r ia l i s t s wi th huge ra i l road ho ld -

ings .

  Th e

  aforementioned Vincent Astor , besi des extensi ve Int ere sts

i n  i n d u s t r y  a nd  ocean t ranspo r ta t ion ,  i s a  d i r e c t o r  o f t h e  Great  N o r -

thern Ry.Co.,

  a n d . t h e

  Il l inois Central . Wm.A.Harrlman, heir

  of the

o l d  ra i l road k ing ,  I s a  d i r e c t o r  of  both  t h e  I l l i n o i s C e n t r a l  a n d t h e

Union Paoif ic . wm.K.Vanderbil t holds directorates  in the New  York

C e n t r a l ,  t h e  Michigan Central,  an d  other ra i lroads. Besides these

r e l a t i v e s  an d  c lo se f r iends ,  a l l who  supported Roosevelt 's presiden-

t i a l campaign with sub sta nti a l f i nan ci al cont r ib uti ons, a lmost every

other ra i lroad mogul  i n t h e  country likewise backed  h i m :  Robert

Goelet, Arthur  C .  James, Edward  S .  Harknes s, C.S.McCain, David Bruce,

Howard Bru ce, Wm.T.Kemper,  an d  F.H.Rawson.  Th e  railroad group behind

Roosevelt numbered almost everyone btit, significantly enough,  t h e r e -

p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f t h e  roads controlled  b y t h e  J .P .Morgan f inancall  I n -

t e r e s t s .

Th e

  r a i l r o a d s

  ha d

  indeed taken

  t h e

  worst beating

  of any

  c a p i t a l i s t

group during

  t h e

  pe r iod

  o f t h e

  c r i s i s ,

  an d

  oerta inly needed help .For

example,

  i n 1932 , 150

  selected r a i l roa ds showed

  a

  d e f i c i t

  of

$150,634,00 compared

  t o

  earnings

  of

  $896,807,000

  in 1929 . The

  r a i l -

road equipment Industry

  led by

  Wto.Woodin also marshalled behind

Roosevelt .

Another section

  of

  indust ry that r a l l i ed behind Frankli n

  D . , was th e

min ing , pa r t i cu la r ly

  t h e

  precious metals

  -

  gold

  an d

  s i l v e r

  -

  group.

Most prominent here were

  t h e

  Guggenheim

  an d

  Bernard M.Baruch inter-

e s t s , exe r t ing

  a

  virtual monopoly

  on

  si lver through control

  of the

American Smelting

  &

 Ref in ing

  C o . ,

  which e i t her extra cts

  o r

  re f ines

f o r

  others almost one-half

  o f t h e

  world s i lv er produced year ly .

  I n -

cluded with these

  i s

  al so Wm.R.Hearst,-newspaper pub li she r, lar ge

Mexican s i l v er mine owner

  an d

  sha reho lde r

  i n t h e

  Homestake Gold

  Min-

i n g

  Co.Thfo -g^oup

  i n

  advocating gold devaluation

  an d

  g r e a t e r

  use o f

s i l v e r

  f o r

  monetary 'purposes enlis ted

  t h e

  large farmers ' vote

  who de-

manded th at farm pro duo t.p ri oes

  b e

  raised through monetary legis la t ion.

A

  p o l i t i c a l

  >.

 *rty th at promised

  t o

  raise farmer purchasing power,

( f a l l e n

  in 1932 to

  almost one-half that

  of 1929) was

  bound

  t o

  gain

  t h e

support  of  indus t r ia l in te re s t s dependen t  o n t h e  f a r m e r ;  aad so we

f i n d  t h 6  McCormicks, owning  t h e  monopo l i s t i c In te rna t iona l Harves te r

Co. , and  other farm implement  a/»d  f e r t i l i z e r m a n u f a c t u r e r s j o i n i n g  t h e

Roosevelt band-wagon.

Minor indus t r ia l in te re s t s inc luded  t h e  liquor concerns  who  wanted  r e -

peal  of the  Prohibition Amendment,  a nd  construction industry moguls

such  a s  C.R.Crane  of  Crane  Co.>  J e s s e  H.  Jones (R.F.C. head)  a n d J . T .

Jones  o f t h e  Jdnes Lumber  C o . , e t c .

Behind both poli t ical part ies

  wa s

  a l so

  a

  grim struggle between

  two

f a c t i o n s

  f o r

  c o n t r o l

  o f t h e

  gi ant Chase Nat iona l Bank. Backing

  t h e

Republican Hoover wore

  h is 1928

  mentors,

  t h e

  House

  of

  Morgan. Opposing

2 0

*  i

Dec.1934

  -

  Council Correspondence.

J.P.Morgan

  wa s

  th is oth er group-of stockh olde rs headed

  by

  John Rocki

f e l l e r ,

  J r . , a nd

  including Vincent Astor ,

  t h e

  Vande rb l l t s

  an d

  Guggei.

helms.

  Th e

  fight centered about

  t h e

  polloy

  of

  J.P.Morgan,

  who co n-

t r o l l e d

  t h e

  bank,

  i n

  f o r c i n g

  t h e

  Chase National

  t o

  engage

  i n

  practlc

e s

  ou ts ide

  i t s own

  leg i t ima te f ie ld , such

  as

  lending money,

  f o r

  sped

la t lve pu rposes ,

  t h e

  f l o a t i n g

  of new

  stock

  a nd

  bond Issues,

  *nd buy-

i n g a n d

  s e l l i n g

  o n t h e

  stock market . Rockefeller ,

  J r . , a n d h i s

  all lc

who are

  p r imar i ly ind us t r i a l i s t s , v io len t ly d i sapp roved

  of

  t h i s

  po l -

i c y

  blaming

  i t i n

  great part

  f o r t h e

  stock market crash

  of

  '29.They

n o t

  only wanted

  t o

  gain contr ol

  o f t h e

  bank

  an d

  r e t u r n

  i t t o I t s n o t

m al

  commercial banking practice, which

  i s to

  provide funds

  t o

  Indus

t r y a n d

  business

  f o r

  meeting cur ren t expenses,

  on

  good securi ty ,

  but

they wanted control

  o f t h e

  fedea-al government

  i n

  o rde r

  t o

  enact

  f e d -

e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n a g a i n s t

  t h e

  Morgan policy which

  h a d

  become wide-

spread under

  t h e

  in f luence

  a nd

  example

  o f t h e

  Chase National .

  The

Lehman Br os , (among which

  i s Gov .

  H.H.Lehman

  of N . Y . ) t h e

  country '#

second largest f irm

  of

  Investment bankers,

  a nd

  other investment

houses such  a s  Halsey Stuart , supported th is a t tempt  t o  lega l ize

aga ins t the i r compe t i to r s .

  f

Roosevelt  was no  sooner inaugurated than  he  commenced  t o  remamber  t h e

f o r g o t t e n  m e n .  F i r s t  o n t h e  l i s t ,  of  course, were  t h e  Rocke fe l le r s ,

So on  March  15 , 1933 ,  J.P.Morgan  wa s  summoned before  t h e  Senate Bank-

i n g  I n v e s t i g a t i o n .  H i s  reve la t ions  a nd  those o f 'Albe r t  H .  Wlggin.the

nominal head.of  t h e  Chase National appointed  by  Morgan, were so' dam -

aging that Wiggin  wa s  foroed  t o  r e s i g n  a n d t h e  Rockefellers gained

t h e  balance  of  voting power, enabling them  t o  e l e c t t h e i r  own map

Winthrop

  W.

  Aldrich

  t o t h e

  Chairmanship

  o f t h e

  Board

  o f t h e

  Chase1

  National Bank.'When Aldrich appeared beforeHhe Banking Investiga-

'  t ion ,  he  announced that  t h e  Chase National would divorce  i t s  Chade

S ecu r i t i e s Corp .

  He

  a r g u a d ^ o r

  a

  c o m p l e t e d l ^ r c e ' o f

  t h e

  s e c u r i t i e s

bus iness

  an d

  commercial deposit banking. This suggestion

  was em-

bodied

  i n t h e

  Gla8s-Steagell Banking

  A ct

  (June

  16, 193 3)

  ordering

  a l l

commercial banks

  t o b e

  separated from t .heir se cu ri t i es business with-

i n

  twelve months. Restrictions were also placed against loans

  f o r

speculative purposes.

Th e

  deva lua t ion

  of . the

  gold doll ar , fo llowed la te r

  by the

  n a t i o n a l i -

za t ion

  of

  si lver , enriched immediate ly

  t h e

  gold

  a n d

  si lver producers .

This monetary policy plus crop curtailment

  a s

  p r a c t i c e d

  by the

  A.A.A.

h a s

  increased farm prices

  t o

  some degree.

  T he

  Administration, however,

overlooked

  t h e

  obvious fact t hat h igher food pric es r a is e

  t h e

  cost

  of

l i v i n g

  f o r t h e

  worker, which

  i s

  directly opposed

  t o t h e

  i n t e r e s t s

  of

t h e

  i n d u s t r i a l i s t

  who

  d e s i r e s

  lo w

  production costs .

Th e

  N.R.A. whose f i r 8 t form

  was

  suggested

  by

  Bernard

  M.

  Baruch

  as the

r e s u l t

  o f h i s

  war-tirae experience

  a s

  Chalrman

  of the War

  Indus t r ie s

Board,

  was

  administered

  by

  Hugh Jqhneon

  ( a

  former employe

  a n d d i s -

c i p l e

  of

  Bariich 's)

  i n

  such fashion

  as to

  allow

  t h e

  natural tendency

toward mqnopoly inherent

  i n

  c a p i t a l i s t

  t o

  deve lop un res t r ic ted ly .

Codes were drawn

  b y t h e

  l a r g e s t i n d u s t r i a l i s t s

  i n

  each industry

  and

naturally they were drawn

  i n

  t h e i r

  own

  interests. Minimum wages

  and

hours served

  t o

  e l i m i n a t e

  t h e

  small competi tors

  who

  were only able

  t o

s tay

  in th^e

  race

  by

  p-.ylng unfculte7ably lovv wages

  a nd

  working long

hours . Governmental re st r i c t ion , ther efo re , helped

  t o

  l iqu ida te these

small

  f r y a n d

  fos ter ed monopoly. S ince an ti - t ru st re st r i c t io ns have

been

  s e t

  aside during

  t h e

  course

  of

  N.R.A.,

  i t i s

  evident that th is

phase will

  b e

  continued.

- 21 -

8/18/2019 ICC Vol 1 No 3

13/13

Dec.1934  -  Council Correspondence.

I n t h e  e f f o r t  t o  help those oth er for got ten irien ,  t h e  backbone  of

h i s  p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t ,  t h e  r a i l r o a d  a nd  a d d i l i a t e d i n t e r e s t s ( l n o l u -

d in g h imse l f )  t h e  Pre s id e n t  h a s  been forced  t o  adopt  a  c a u t io u s  and

slow policy. Because they  a r e  sUbjeot  t o  fe d e ra l r e g u la t io n ,  t h e

r a i l ro a d s p re se n t  a  delicate problem. Rates cannot  be  a r b i t r a r i l y

ra ised without consent  o f t h e  Interstate Commerce Commission.  Com-

p e t i t i o n  a t t h e  hands  o f the bus ,  waterway  a n d t h e  aeroplane  has

caused  a  great drop  i n  r a i l r o a d t r a f f i c .  F o r  example: volume  of

f r e i g h t t r a f f i c t o d a y  i s  only  60 #  t h a t  o f 1929 ;  p a s se n g e r t r a f f i c

today

  i 8

  only

  50# of 1929 and 33# of 192 0. A

  c o o rd in a to r

  of

  ra i lroada

wa s  e s ta b l i sh e d a f t e r Ro o se v e l t to o k o f f i c e .  H i s j o b h a s  been  t o d e -

velop  a  plan  t o  r e e s t a b l i s h  t h e  roads.  H i s  plans ca l l  f o r  greater

consolidation among  t h e  various competing roads which would eliminate

competition between them  - - one o f th e  requirements  o f t h e  I .C.C.  In

a d d i t io n ,  i t h a s  been suggested that  t h e  I .C .C .  be  reorganized with

se p a ra te d iv i s io n s  f o r  ra i lroads , motor l ines ,  a i r  l in e s a n d o lh e r

c a r r i e r s

  i n a

  coordinated system

  of

  government regulation. If-4rhese

•

 plans

  a r e

  carr ied through,

  an d

  they should consider ing Roosevelt 's

hold

  on

  Congress today, t hen

  t h e

  ra il roa ds wi ll become more

  of a

monopoly than ever,

  an d

  r ival forms

  of

  t r a n sp o r ta t io n wi l l su f fe r .

Th e

  government will also

  be

  forced

  t o

  su b s id iz e

  t h e

  r a i l r o a d s

  i n o r -

der to

  modernize them. Private capital could hardly finance

  t h e

  costs

Involved today.

Having secured most

  of i t s

  re a l o b je c t s ,

  o r

  about

  t o

  secure them,the

New  Deal can now  a f f o r d  t o  drop  i t s  mask  of  ra d ic a l i sm .Ov e r tu re s

have been made

  t o b i g

  b u s in e s s a s su r in g

  i t

  th a t

  t h e

  a d min i s t r a t io n

is^  inher entl y devoted  to  p re se rv in g  t h e  profi t system.Because  of La-

bor ' s growing mil i t ancy  a n d i t s  r e f u s a l  t o  obey  an d  accept docile ly

t h e  t r a d i t io n a l t r a d e -u n io n l e a d e r sh ip  o f the A.F . o f L . , in the

f a c e  of  -ever-growing misery,  a  change in^be governmental labor  p o l -

icy may be  expected short ly .  In  r e t u r n  f o r  some  s o p ,  such  as  unem-

ployment insurance  of a  kind, l abor wi ll  be  made  t o  give  up i t s

r ig h t  t o  s tr ike . Once  t h e  s t r i k e  i s  outlawed,  i s  made illegal, wage

cuts will become  t h e  r u l e .  Of  course, Labor will  be  asked  to  accept

these cuts only temporar i ly unti l business revivesl 

O ur  only conclusion  i s  that Labor only  by  completely changing  t h e

s o c i a l  an d  economic system  c an  r e a l l y  an d  t ru ly g iv e i t s e l f  a New

%

Deal  f o r a l l  time.

it. *

n «

  a

  a x

« «  # # # * # _ #

N O T I C E

Each i ssue  of the  Counci l Corr espondence cont ai ns 

*  f i r s t t r a n s l a t i o n s in to En g li sh  of  some important  a

w

  t i d e  o r  pamphlet  by  Marxian theore t ic ians . This mat-#

*

  e r i a l

  i s n o t

  obtainable anywhere else. Every Marxist

  *

*

  needs

  t h e

  Council Correspondence.

  You can

  assure

  *

><

 y o u rse l f

  a

  copy

  of

  each issue

  by

  sending

  i n

  your sub-**

*

  s c r i p t i o n

  fo r 1935 NOW.

  Send

  $1 and

  your name

  and ad - *

*

  d re s s

  t o :

  Uni|»ed Workers' Par ty

  #

*

  1604 N.

  C a l i f o r n i a

  Ave . , #

Chicago,

  111 . #

sK iii

- 22 -

Dec.1934  -  Council Correspondence.

ANNOUNCEMENT  OF  CLASSES CONDUCTED  BY U. W. P.

NEW  YORK CITY: Monday eve ni ng s  - 8 P . i i .

I.W.W. Hall  - 94  F i f t h  Ave.

Su b je c t s : - D ia le c t i c Ma te r ia l i sm

C a p i t a l i s t C r i s i s  an d  Collapse

Production  &  D i s t r i b u t i o n  i n  Communism.

CHICAGO Monday ev en in gs

  - 8 :30 P .M.V 1604 N.

  C a l i f o r n i a

  Ave.

A

Subj ect:   The hi story  a«d  devel opment   of the

Ameri can Labor Movement

BUFFALO,  N . Y .  Thursday evenings  - 8 P.M.

53 3  Broadway (corner  o f  J e f f e r s o n  A v e . ) 2 n d  f l o o r -

Su b je c t s : In t ro d u c t io n  t o t h e  Economic Laws  of

Motion.

Dia le c t i c Ma te r ia l i sm .

FORTHCOMING ARTICLES  IN THE  COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE.

I n

  i s su e

  of

  January

  1935:

Th e

  Labor Movement

  a n d t h e

  Workers

  i n

  Motion

- by

  Karl Korach

Is the A. F. of L. a

  Labor Organiza t ion?

Th e

  present Stand

  p f t h e

  Eudjopfean Co un ci l Movement.

A r t i c l e

  o n t h e

  Org a n iz a t io n ' l j t f e s t io n

  - by

  Rosa Luxemburg.

Th e  Labor Movement  i n  England.

Some  ne w  t r a n s l a t i o n s f rom Ka rl L le b tn e c h t .

To  th o se  who  have wri t ten  i n  asking  f o r  a d d i t io n a l c o p ie s  ot  t h e

f i r s t i s a u e  of  Council Correspondence,  we a r e  so r ry  to say  that th is

i s su e  i a  e n t i r e ly so ld  ou t . We  hope  t o g e t o u t t h e  f e a t u r e a r t i c l e ,

What  l a  Communiam In   pamphlet form sometime  i n t h e  near fu ture ,

an d  when  we do we  wi l l n o t i f y  t h e  workera  who  have sunt  i n  th e se  r e -

q u e s t s .  We  s t i l l h a ve  a f ew  copies  o f the  November issue.

IN  GERMAN:  - -  BESTELLT  -  LEST.

Ratekorreepondenz (Theore t lschea  - und  Diskussiona-

organ  f u r d i e  Ratebewegung) Herauagegeben  von der

Gruppe Internationaler Kommunisten Holland.

Jede Mummer  10  c e n t . P o r t o f r e i . B e s t e l l t  b e i

United Workers' Party

1604 N.

  C a l i f o r n i a

  A v e . ,

Chicago,

  111 .

- 23 -