Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

How Can the U.S. Army Overcome IntelligenceSharing Challenges Between Conventional and

Special Operations Forces?

byMajor Michele H Bredenkamp

U.S. Army

School of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, KansasAY 2002-2003

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLEHow Can the U.S. Army Overcome Intelligence Sharing Challenges BetweenConventional and Special Operations Forces?Unclassified

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6. AUTHOR(S)Bredenkamp, Michele H. ;

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12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENTAPUBLIC RELEASE,13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES14. ABSTRACTThe emphasis on the changing global environment, the complexity of emerging military operational requirements, the U.S. Army'sTransformation Campaign Plan concept, and combined U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces operations has significantlyincreased over the past decade. Intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces is essential in successfullyfacing these challenges. The U.S. Army plans to adapt to the changes in the environment and expansion of military requirements through theArmy's Transformation Campaign Plan. Under this plan, the Army seeks to transform to a knowledge-based force reliant on intelligence,which enhances situational understanding on the battlefield and fully supports the commander's decision-making process during militaryoperations. U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces must improve intelligence sharing between one another to adapt to thechanging global environment, the broad range of emerging military operational requirements throughout the world, and to fully support theU.S. Army's Transformation Campaign Plan. This monograph examines why intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and specialoperations forces is more important than ever and identifies solutions designed to enhance conventional forces capabilities and facilitategreater intelligence sharing with special operations forces. This study addresses how U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces canovercome intelligence sharing challenges through improvements in equipment, training, and interoperability. First, this paper analyzes thecurrent operational environment that dictates the requirement for conventional and special operations forces to transform to achieve successduring military operations. Furthermore, this paper examines the current doctrinal framework that guides intelligence sharing anddissemination within the U.S. Army and identifies different approaches and areas of emphasis between overall U.S. Army doctrine,conventional doctrine, and specific special operations doctrine. Additionally, this paper reviews various theories that support the increasedneed and importance of sharing intelligence between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces, and further identifies proposedmethods to solve many of the challenges U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces encounter in intelligence sharing. This studyalso examines historical conflicts in Somalia, Kosovo and the most recent war in Afghanistan to illustrate how sharing intelligence directlyimpacts military operations. Lastly, this monograph provides possible recommendations and solutions addressing methods to improveintelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces, through enhanced equipment, training, and interoperability. Thismonograph primarily focuses on how the U.S. Army must improve conventional and special operations force capabilities to enhanceintelligence sharing. Additionally, this paper recommends U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces strengthen their intelligencesharing capabilities through improvements in intelligence equipment, individual and organizational training, and interoperability with oneanother. Improvements in intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces will also support the Army'sconcept of transformation, which advocates the increased need for sharing intelligence between forces to adapt to and operate within aknowledge-centric operational environment. With the changing global surroundings, emerging military operational requirements, and the U.S.Army's transformation, Army conventional and special operations forces must improve their intelligence sharing to operate as an effective andintegrated force capable of dominating the future battlefield.15. SUBJECT TERMSUnited States; Army; Special operations; Special Forces; Transformation; Intelligence; Cooperation; Current operating environment; Doctrine;Somalia; Kosovo; Afghanistan; Military operations; Interoperability16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION

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iiii

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Michele H. Bredenkamp

Title of Monograph: How Can the U.S. Army Overcome Intelligence SharingChallenges Between Conventional and Special Operations Forces?

Approved by:

_________________________________________ Monograph DirectorColonel Alan M. Mosher, MMAS

_________________________________________ Professor and DirectorRobert H. Berlin, Ph.D. Academic Affairs,

School of AdvancedMilitary Studies

_________________________________________ Director, Graduate DegreePhilip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Program

iiiiii

Abstract

How Can the U.S. Army Overcome Intelligence Sharing Challenges Between Conventional andSpecial Operations Forces? by Major Michele H. Bredenkamp, U.S. Army, 51 pages.

The emphasis on the changing global environment, the complexity of emerging militaryoperational requirements, the U.S. Army's Transformation Campaign Plan concept, and combinedU.S. Army conventional and special operations forces operations has significantly increased overthe past decade. Intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operationsforces is essential in successfully facing these challenges. The U.S. Army plans to adapt to thechanges in the environment and expansion of military requirements through the Army'sTransformation Campaign Plan. Under this plan, the Army seeks to transform to a knowledge-based force reliant on intelligence, which enhances situational understanding on the battlefieldand fully supports the commander's decision-making process during military operations. U.S.Army conventional and special operations forces must improve intelligence sharing between oneanother to adapt to the changing global environment, the broad range of emerging militaryoperational requirements throughout the world, and to fully support the U.S. Army'sTransformation Campaign Plan.

This monograph examines why intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional andspecial operations forces is more important than ever and identifies solutions designed to enhanceconventional forces capabilities and facilitate greater intelligence sharing with special operationsforces. This study addresses how U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces canovercome intelligence sharing challenges through improvements in equipment, training, andinteroperability. First, this paper analyzes the current operational environment that dictates therequirement for conventional and special operations forces to transform to achieve success duringmilitary operations. Furthermore, this paper examines the current doctrinal framework thatguides intelligence sharing and dissemination within the U.S. Army and identifies differentapproaches and areas of emphasis between overall U.S. Army doctrine, conventional doctrine,and specific special operations doctrine. Additionally, this paper reviews various theories thatsupport the increased need and importance of sharing intelligence between U.S. Armyconventional and special operations forces, and further identifies proposed methods to solvemany of the challenges U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces encounter inintelligence sharing. This study also examines historical conflicts in Somalia, Kosovo and themost recent war in Afghanistan to illustrate how sharing intelligence directly impacts militaryoperations. Lastly, this monograph provides possible recommendations and solutions addressingmethods to improve intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces,through enhanced equipment, training, and interoperability.

This monograph primarily focuses on how the U.S. Army must improve conventional andspecial operations force capabilities to enhance intelligence sharing. Additionally, this paperrecommends U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces strengthen their intelligencesharing capabilities through improvements in intelligence equipment, individual andorganizational training, and interoperability with one another. Improvements in intelligencesharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces will also support theArmy's concept of transformation, which advocates the increased need for sharing intelligencebetween forces to adapt to and operate within a knowledge-centric operational environment.With the changing global surroundings, emerging military operational requirements, and the U.S.Army's transformation, Army conventional and special operations forces must improve theirintelligence sharing to operate as an effective and integrated force capable of dominating thefuture battlefield.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................................................................................................ivINTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................ 1

STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY........................................................................................................... 2THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT........................................................................................................ 3MILITARY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS............................................................................. 5TRANSFORMATION: THE ARMY'S CONCEPT TO CHANGE................................................. 7CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................................ 9

DOCTRINE................................................................................................................................................. 10APPROACHES TO SHARING INTELLIGENCE.......................................................................... 10DOCTRINAL PERSPECTIVE ON EQUIPMENT.......................................................................... 13ACHIEVING INTEROPERABILITY................................................................................................19CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................................... 22

THEORY.....................................................................................................................................................24DIFFICULTIES IN SHARING INTELLIGENCE........................................................................... 24PROPOSED METHODS OF IMPROVEMENT.............................................................................. 27CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................................... 30

HISTORY....................................................................................................................................................31SOMALIA: OPERATION RESTORE HOPE................................................................................. 31KOSOVO: TASK FORCE FALCON................................................................................................34AFGHANISTAN: OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.........................................................36CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................................... 38

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................................................40EQUIPMENT ......................................................................................................................................... 40TRAINING.............................................................................................................................................. 42INTEROPERABILITY.........................................................................................................................44CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................................... 46

APPENDIX A - ABBREVIATIONS...................................................................................................... 47BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................................................... 48

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS................................................................................................... 48BOOKS....................................................................................................................................................49ARTICLES AND ESSAYS.................................................................................................................. 50THESES AND MONOGRAPHS........................................................................................................ 51OTHER SOURCES ...............................................................................................................................51

11

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Sharing intelligence between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces is

essential in military operations, particularly due to the changing global environment and

complexity of military operational requirements. The world is rapidly increasing in complexity

and poses significant challenges to the U.S. Army. Military operations throughout the world are

much more complicated, as the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war are often blurred

and the potential threats are no longer clearly defined. To adapt to the demands of the changing

environment, the U.S. Army is transforming to a knowledge-based force reliant on its Command,

Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)

capabilities that are designed to provide dominant knowledge that enables understanding, decisive

action, decision making, and compensates for the reduced physical protection.1 Therefore,

information dominance through intelligence sharing is essential to achieve success in military

operations.

The U.S. Army Transformation Campaign Plan identifies the increased need for

intelligence sharing because forces are now more interdependent on one another for information

and intelligence to maintain situational understanding.”2 This monograph examines why

intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces is more

important than ever and identifies solutions designed to enhance conventional forces' capabilities

and facilitate greater intelligence sharing with special operations forces. Chapter 1, the

introduction, defines the structure of this monograph, describes the changing global environment,

addresses the broad range of military operational requirements placed on the U.S. Army today,

and describes the Army's concept to adapt to these changes through the Army Transformation

Campaign Plan. First, this chapter reviews the structure of the study.

1 Department of the Army. Draft Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Annex to the

Army Transformation Campaign Plan (ATCP). (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 2003) 4.

22

STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

The fundamental question this monograph examines is how U.S. Army conventional

forces can increase their ability to share intelligence through improvements in equipment,

training, and interoperability with special operations forces. Chapter 1 describes the changing

environment, the broadening of emerging operational military requirements, and the U.S. Army's

transformation that justifies the need to improve intelligence sharing between conventional and

special operations forces. Additionally, this chapter outlines the organizational structure of the

monograph that examines intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special

operations forces through doctrine, theory, and history and describes the application of

equipment, training, and interoperability as evaluation criteria throughout the study. Chapter 2

outlines the current doctrinal framework that guides intelligence sharing and dissemination within

the U.S. Army and identifies different approaches and areas of emphasis between overall U.S.

Army doctrine, conventional type doctrine, and specific special operations doctrine. Chapter 3

examines various theories that support the increased need and importance of sharing intelligence

between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces, and furthermore, identifies

proposed methods to solve many of the challenges U.S. Army conventional and special

operations forces encounter in intelligence sharing. Chapter 4 reviews historical conflicts in

Somalia, Kosovo and the most recent conflict in Afghanistan. This historical study illustrates

how sharing intelligence directly impacts military operations. The final chapter of this

monograph provides possible solutions and recommendations addressing methods to improve

intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces, through enhanced

equipment, training, and interoperability. This monograph primarily focuses on why and how

U.S. Army must improve conventional force capabilities to enhance intelligence sharing with

special operations forces, especially since intelligence sharing is becoming more essential than

2 Department of the Army. Army Intelligence Transformation Campaign Plan (AI-TCP) .

(Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 2001) 24.

33

ever in enabling the U.S. Army to transform and adapt to emerging military operational

requirements and the changing global environment.

THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

The rapidly changing global environment is increasingly complex. In the past, the U.S.

Army faced clearly defined threats and operated in a bipolar environment, which provided the

Army with a higher degree of predictability of the enemy and the environment in which threats

would operate. Currently, the U.S. Army is challenged with significant changes as "the Army

operates in a geostrategic environment of considerable instability, driven by significant

demographic, economic and technological dynamics."3 As the global environment changes, U.S.

Army forces will become more involved in non-traditional conflicts and face potential threats that

are not easily identifiable and often use non-traditional means to accomplish their goals.4 These

environmental changes will cause the U.S. Army to change to adapt and achieve success in

military operations. First, this section will review the U.S. Army's role in non-traditional

conflicts.

Since the Cold War, the U.S. Army experienced an increased involvement in non-

traditional conflicts or operations other than war, as opposed to large conventional wars. U.S.

Army forces were directly involved in non-traditional conflicts in Somalia, Kosovo and the

current war in Afghanistan and within these environments, U.S. Army conventional and special

operations forces often faced challenges in sharing intelligence and information.5 Through these

non-traditional conflicts, the U.S. Army identified the fundamental need for increased

interoperability and intelligence sharing between military forces to effectively operate as an

integrated team, accomplish missions, and protect life. The global environment is changing due

to competition for resources, religious extremism, ethnic conflicts, criminal activities, cultural

3 Ibid., 13.4 Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations. (New York, NY: Touchstone Books, 1996)

36.

44

disputes, and terrorism. 6 These struggles continue to influence the conditions in the global

environment and pose a challenge to U.S. Army forces as they become more involved in non-

traditional conflicts that arise from these disputes. Therefore, U.S. Army forces must improve

intelligence sharing now, more than ever, to predict and prepare for non-traditional conflicts and

identify possible global threats.

Potential U.S. threats are not always easily identifiable and may include traditional

nation-states, as well as non-state actors that may not necessarily adhere to the laws of land

warfare. As potential global threats become increasingly more difficult to identify, U.S. Army

conventional and special operations forces must improve intelligence sharing. Additionally, non-

traditional threats may use various methods of attack to highlight their causes by targeting major

global powers and exploiting U.S. freedoms, while avoiding direct confrontation with military

forces.7 Future U.S. conflicts may "prevail from the rise of highly networked non-state

combatants and criminals, whose principle targets may, in many cases, be states."8 The 11

September 2001 terrorist attack on the U.S. clearly illustrates the non-traditional threats and

global challenges the U.S. Army must be prepared to encounter. The U.S. Army must improve

intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces to operate effectively

against potential non-traditional threats.

As the global environmental changes, U.S. Army forces will become more involved in

non-traditional conflicts and face difficulties in identifying potential threats, due to the threats'

non-traditional methods of operation. These changes increase the uncertainty of the global

environment and thereby necessitate a change in the way we operate within our battlespace.

5 Joseph D Celeski. "History of Special Forces Operations in Somalia: 1992-1995." Special

Warfare (June 2002), 16-27.6 Huntington, 42.7 Ibid, 183.8 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. In Athena's Camp. (Washington D.C.: National Defense

Research Institute, 1997), 3.

55

MILITARY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The realities of the changing global environment impel the U.S. Army to adapt to the

changes and remain engaged in a wide variety of missions throughout the world. As the

environment changes, U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces must be prepared to

operate within all levels of war and conduct operations within the same physical battlespace with

one another. First, this section will address how the changing environment affects the way U.S.

Army forces operate on the battlefield.

U.S. Army traditional levels of war were not always clearly defined, as U.S. Army

conventional and special operations tactical actions on the battlefield affect operational and

strategic aims and “operate within all levels of war.”9 With the increase in media attention,

information operations campaigns, and highly technological equipment, U.S. Army actions on the

battlefield directly affect tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Actions by a brigade

combat team, conducting tactical operations, may have strategic impact within the global

community or a special forces team may collect intelligence of tactical value on the battlefield,

rather than of direct strategic significance. The non-linear relationship between strategic-

operational-tactical levels of war are clearly exemplified through stability operations and support

operations in Bosnia, as soldiers on the ground enforced and affected international mandates and

policy. “Due to the variant levels of war in the current environment, U.S. Army conventional and

special operations forces can expect to operate in the same areas of operation in future conflicts;

thereby increasing the importance of coordination and intelligence sharing.”10 U.S. Army forces

are not only operating within all levels of war, the forces are also operating within the same

physical battlespace, which increases the requirement for U.S. Army conventional and special

operations forces to share intelligence.

9 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3.0: Operations (Washington D.C., Government Printing

Office, 2001) 2-2.10 Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces

(Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999) 4-21.

66

Military operations in Somalia, Kosovo and the current conflict in Afghanistan illustrate

how U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces operate amongst each other and

identify the requirement for increased interoperability and intelligence sharing between U.S.

Army conventional and special operations forces. Although U.S. Army conventional and special

operations forces operate within the same physical area, they often fail to coordinate or share

relevant information with one another.11 Historical accounts reveal that “often times,

conventional and special operations forces compartmentalize intelligence and lack integrated

systems to synchronize efforts and deconflict friction within the area of operations.”12

Unfortunately, these deficiencies ultimately place additional challenges on Army units, which

hinder the speed of intelligence sharing and the effectiveness towards mission accomplishment.

By integrating efforts to share intelligence, Army conventional and special operations forces will

increase their ability to maintain superior situational understanding and information dominance,

which are essential elements of future Army operations.13 Therefore, conventional and special

operations forces must improve equipment connectivity, training with one another, and

interoperability to increase their abilities to share intelligence and improve their effectiveness in

operating as an integrated force, rather than separate entities.

As the global environment changes, U.S. Army forces are required to adapt and conduct a

wide variety of military operations throughout the world. These environmental changes cause

U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces to operate at all levels of war and often

times, operate within the same physical battlespace. Therefore, the environment places greater

demands on U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces to improve integration,

interoperability, and intelligence sharing between them in order to operate more effectively. The

11 Anthony H. Cordesman. Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force

Transformation, Counterproliferation, and Arms Contro. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, 2002) 46.

12 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3.05-102: Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence(Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 2001) A-3.

13 FM 3.0, 11-3.

77

U.S. Army's approach to adapt to the changes in the global environment is outlined in the Army's

Transformation Campaign Plan.

TRANSFORMATION: THE ARMY'S CONCEPT TO CHANGE

As the global environment and military operational requirements in the world changes,

the U.S. Army identified the need to transform and adapt to the changes. The U.S. Army

Transformation Campaign Plan relies primarily on intelligence sharing and information

dominance to achieve success. This section will address how the U.S. Army is transforming to a

knowledge-centric force focused on providing commanders with intelligence and information for

decision-making and achieving operational success. First, this section will review how the U.S.

Army plans adapt to the changing environment with emphasis on its ability to operate as a

knowledge-centric force.

Intelligence sharing and interoperability are essential for responsiveness and dominance

on the battlefield. The U.S. Army's Transformation Campaign Plan is predicated upon “the

Army’s need to become more strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the

spectrum of operations.”14 Historically, the Army relied on overwhelming physical military

power and combat equipment to defeat our adversaries. Through the U.S. Army's Transformation

Plan, "the Army is developing a knowledge-centric warfighting concept that stakes its success on

dominant understanding of the battlespace, gained through dominant knowledge."15 The Army's

knowledge-centric concept relies primarily on its ability to collect, analyze, and share near-real

time intelligence; establish connectivity and interoperability between units; and maintain superior

situational understanding to achieve full spectrum dominance. “The Army places greater

emphasis on obtaining near-certain knowledge to provide an advantage to commanders in

visualizing, planning, and decision-making.”16 Therefore, the value of sharing intelligence is

more important than ever in the U.S. Army's concept of transformation, since intelligence is a key

14 DoD, AI-TCP, 8.15 Ibid., 25.

88

element in maintaining information dominance and achieving success on the battlefield,

particularly when U.S. Army forces are operating within the same area of operations.

U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces operate within the same

battlespace more so now than in the past to support commanders and conduct integrated

operations. Therefore, “it is essential they share intelligence to satisfy commanders' intelligence

requirements, assist in establishing superior situational understanding for current operations, and

more importantly, shape the battlespace for future operations.”17 To support the U.S. Army's

transformation concept, conventional and special operations forces must develop an integrated

approach to sharing intelligence. Intelligence sharing in the Transformation Plan is not only

emphasized to obtain understanding of the battlespace, but more importantly to support the

commander's decisions. “Sharing of intelligence and information is required to enable the

commander to understand rather than merely see the battlespace and support commander’s

decisions.”18 Conventional and special operations forces are responsible for sharing relevant

intelligence that may affect another force's mission or influence a commander's decision. By

overcoming the challenges in sharing intelligence, conventional and special operations units will

operate with an increased level of situational understanding, maintain a superior common

operating picture between forces and improve the commanders' ability to make decisions. This

will ultimately result in greater effectiveness towards mission accomplishment.

U.S. Army leaders designed the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan to enable U.S.

Army forces with the ability to adapt to the changes in the global environment and military

operational requirements throughout the world. The transformation concept relies on intelligence

sharing between U.S. Army forces to function as a knowledge-centric force and provide

16 FM 3.0, 5-12.17 FM 3.05-102, 3-16.18 DoD, AI-TCP, 24.

99

commanders with effective intelligence that supports decision-making and achieves operational

success.19

CONCLUSION

Due to the changing global environment, the complexity of emerging military operational

requirements, and the U.S. Army's Transformation Campaign Plan concept, intelligence sharing

between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces is essential in achieving success in

future military operations. This chapter addressed how the changing environment increases non-

traditional conflicts in the world and allows for potential threats that are not easily identifiable

and often use non-traditional means to accomplish their goals.20 Additionally, this introduction

illustrated the complexity and increasing range of military operational requirements for the U.S.

Army, particularly as the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war are no longer distinctly

clear and overlapped with one another. With the changes in the environment and expansion of

military requirements, the U.S. Army plans to adapt through the Army's Transformation

Campaign Plan. The Army plans to transform to a knowledge-based force reliant on intelligence

that supports understanding and decision-making and is essential in achieving successful military

operations.21 Therefore, U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces must improve

intelligence sharing to adapt to the changing global environment, the broad range of emerging

military operational requirements throughout the world, and to fully support the U.S. Army's

Transformation Campaign Plan.

19 DoD, ATCP, 4.20 Huntington, 36.21 DoD, ATCP, 4.

1010

CHAPTER 2

DOCTRINE

According to U.S. Army doctrinal manual FM 3.0, Operations, "doctrine is the concise

expression of how Army forces contribute to unified action in campaigns, major operations,

battles, and engagements; Army doctrine is authoritative, but not prescriptive."22 U.S. Army

doctrine clearly serves as a basis for how conventional and special operations forces operate

together and share intelligence information with one another. This is reflected in FM 3.0, which

indicates, "Army doctrine provides a common language and a common understanding of how

Army forces conduct operations."23 Chapter 2 uses the current equipment, training, and

interoperability inadequacies that exist in U.S. Army doctrine and affect intelligence sharing

between units to evaluate doctrine in several areas. This chapter also illustrates the requirement

for Army doctrine to emphasize intelligence sharing, particularly due to the Army's

transformation to a knowledge-centric force more reliant on intelligence and situational

understanding. Chapter 2 also examines the intelligence-sharing environment prescribed by

current U.S. Army doctrine. First, this chapter reviews how well U.S. Army doctrinal field

manuals support the concept of sharing intelligence.

APPROACHES TO SHARING INTELLIGENCE

Army doctrine recognizes the importance and increasing need for sharing intelligence at

all levels to gain information superiority in our ever changing and complex environment. "The

complexity of the operational environment requires sharing intelligence from the national level to

the tactical level and among headquarters at each level."24 The primary difference between Army

conventional force doctrine and specific special operations doctrine, regarding intelligence

sharing, is the approach the doctrinal manuals take to address the concept of sharing intelligence.

22 FM 3.0, 1-14.23 Ibid., 1-14.24 Ibid., 11-15.

1111

U.S. Army doctrine identifies the importance of sharing intelligence to assist the

commander in decision making and overall mission accomplishment. However, Army

conventional and special operations doctrine approach intelligence sharing from different

directions and with varied perspectives. Often, overall Army doctrine emphasizes the need for

the unit or the staff to manage and disseminate intelligence to the commander, appropriate person

or organization through an efficient management process. FM 3.0 identifies that information

management planning by the staff ensures that Army forces are able to share relevant intelligence

information vertically and horizontally, and provide it to the right person at the right time in a

usable form to facilitate situational understanding and decision-making.25 Conventional doctrine

addresses the commander and staffs' role in operations, but emphasizes the staffs' role in the

process to assist the commander. FM 71-100, Division Operations, clearly identifies the

commander as the primary element responsible for all operations within a division. However,

FM 71-100 states that the staff maintains the responsibility for developing products and the

situation to help the commander see the battlefield and provide a basis for prosecuting his plan.26

Special operations doctrine specifically addresses the commander and staffs' involvement in the

process of sharing intelligence and an organization's ability to adapt to change and maintain

flexibility when working with other units. Special operations Field Manual 3.05-102, Army

Special Operations Forces Intelligence, cites that "successful intelligence support rests in the

vision, leadership, skill, and judgment of the command and staff groups; a key to effectively

sharing intelligence is adjusting to those intelligence differences that may affect the integrated

employment of intelligence resources and sharing intelligence information."27 Army doctrine

seems to place much of the responsibility on the staff driving the process and establishing

methods of managing information to support the command and the unit, whereas specific special

25 Ibid., 11-21.26 Department of the Army. FM 71-100, Division Operations. (Washington D.C., U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1993) Chapter 3.27 FM 3.05-102, A-5.

1212

operations doctrine stresses the responsibilities of the commander and the staff in the intelligence

sharing process.

Army doctrine clearly identifies that in order to conduct successful military operations,

units are required to share intelligence in a timely manner, as well as provide intelligence to units

that need the information to facilitate mission accomplishment. Common challenges such as

classification levels, limited access, and sanitization affect unit abilities to share intelligence.

Army doctrine, specifically within intelligence manuals, addresses these challenges, but does not

clearly identify methods to quickly mitigate the problems and facilitate effective intelligence

sharing with other forces. U.S. Army doctrine attempts to provide some method of resolution to

the challenges that affect intelligence sharing, but does not emphasize the significance

intelligence may have on operational missions; nor does it exemplify the ramifications that may

occur if intelligence is not shared between organizations.28 U.S. Army intelligence manual FM

34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning, provides basic direction to Army

forces facing classification or sanitization challenges. FM 34-2 states that "if an intelligence

report exceeds the classification level of a unit's communication system or operating level the

report should be sanitized after coordinating release, and then transmitted to the unit for effective

use."29 Most U.S. Army conventional doctrine does not specifically address sanitization or

classification challenges that effect intelligence sharing, but rather makes reference to U.S. Army

intelligence manuals. However, U.S. Army special operations doctrine addresses intelligence

classification and sanitization. Field manual 3.05-102, provides brief instruction on sanitizing

intelligence by citing that "when intelligence sources and methods cannot be shared, the

intelligence should be provided after it is sanitized by effectively separating the information from

the sources and the methods used to obtain it."30 Although overall U.S. Army intelligence

doctrine, as well as specific special operations doctrine, recognizes the issue of intelligence

28 Department of the Army, Field Manual 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization

Planning. (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994) 3-2029 FM 34-2, 3-21.

1313

sanitization, they do not emphasize or expound on the importance of quickly sanitizing or

degrading classification levels to facilitate intelligence sharing with those who need it. By

emphasizing timely sanitization of intelligence reports and developing clear doctrinal methods,

units should be able to more readily share intelligence with the other. Army doctrine, to include

special operations doctrine, addresses the relevance of sharing intelligence between forces, but

each demonstrates the importance through different approaches.

Although U.S. Army doctrine addresses intelligence sharing, it must further emphasize

the importance of sharing intelligence with all forces, specifically between conventional and

special operations forces. To clearly illustrate the criticality of sharing intelligence, doctrine must

emphasize the role of commander and the staff in the process and stress the importance of

mitigating stovepiped intelligence to improve intelligence sharing between U.S. Army

conventional and special operations forces.

DOCTRINAL PERSPECTIVE ON EQUIPMENT

U.S. Army doctrine addresses the impact that equipment has on intelligence sharing and

illustrates the requirement for Army units to maintain reliable and secure equipment to share

intelligence and information effectively. This section will illustrate that U.S. Army doctrine

acknowledges the impact of equipment in the intelligence sharing process, but does not stress the

importance of maintaining equipment compatibility to share intelligence and does not thoroughly

address the complexities that information technology (IT) equipment imposes on units. First, this

section will examine how U.S. Army doctrine addresses the importance of equipment in regards

to sharing intelligence.

U.S. Army doctrine recognizes that improvements in IT equipment improve Army forces'

abilities to share intelligence and will inherently change our operational environment. Special

operations doctrine FM 3.05-102, illustrates this by discussing how technology changes our

operational environment as developments in IT revolutionize how nations, organizations, and

30 FM 3.05-102, A11.

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people interact.31 Doctrine not only addresses how equipment will change our environment, but

also how IT systems will improve our intelligence sharing capability. FM 3.0 comments that

"modernizing efforts will increase the capability of Army forces to share a full-dimensional,

highly accurate common operating picture and rapidly disseminate guidance, orders, plans, and

intelligence."32 Additionally, U.S. Army intelligence doctrinal Field Manual 34-1, Intelligence

and Electronic Warfare Operations, supports the idea that IT equipment will improve intelligence

sharing and discusses how equipment systems prevented major leaps in the military's ability to

process and share intelligence.33 U.S. Army conventional doctrine also identifies the importance

of modernized IT to improve intelligence sharing. Army Field Manual 71-3, The Armor and

Mechanized Infantry Brigade, illustrates that digitization will enhance the flow of relevant

combat information and sharing intelligence between units.34 Army special operations doctrine

also supports the concept that IT equipment will improve intelligence sharing through FM 3.05-

102, which cites “the U.S. Army designed modernized IEW systems to rapidly disseminate

critical intelligence between SOF, conventional, and national agencies."35 Although various U.S.

Army doctrinal manuals agree that IT equipment will alter our operational environment and

increase the Army's ability to share intelligence, several doctrinal manuals do not address the

issue of compatibility between equipment and systems, which is essential in enabling units to

share intelligence.

Although U.S. Army doctrine addresses the significance of modernized IT equipment to

share intelligence, doctrine does not clearly address the issue of intelligence system compatibility,

which is also essential in enabling units to successfully share intelligence. Due to the rapid

modernization of IT systems, developments occur at a much faster rate than fielding, training, and

31 Ibid., 1-17.32 FM 3.0, 11-45.33 Department of the Army. Field Manual 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare.

(Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001) Chapter 1.34 Department of the Army. Field Manual 71-3, The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade.

(Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996) Appendix E.35 FM 3.05-102, 8-8.

1515

utilization throughout the force.36 Although Army conventional doctrine, such as FM 71-100,

Division Operations, addresses how modernized IT equipment is rapidly changing and becoming

more efficient for sharing intelligence, the manual does not address the challenge of maintaining

equipment compatibility within the U.S. Army's modernization efforts.37 If U.S. Army

equipment is incompatible, its ability to share intelligence, interact with other forces and conduct

effective operations will decrease. U.S. Army doctrine illustrates the importance of equipment in

intelligence sharing, but does not clearly address the challenges of maintaining equipment

compatibility, nor does it clearly address the complexities that accompany the modernized IT

systems.

Technology provides the Army with an increased capability to rapidly share intelligence

with greater detail and accuracy, but technology also adds digital complexity to the environment.

Army leaders are important factors in managing, adapting, and integrating IT equipment into the

force.38 U.S. Army doctrine addresses the increased need for coordination, training, and

leadership to integrate IT equipment into the force. FM 3.0 illustrates that although emerging

user-friendly technologies facilitate coordinating, fusing, sharing, and displaying relevant

information, these functions remain very human and current IT is no substitute for unit training

and leadership.39 Although the Army recognizes that IT equipment will increase the forces'

capabilities, the Army must also temper modernization to ensure units maintain compatible

equipment and the capability to operate complex IT systems. Additionally, since modernized

equipment is often more complex, the Army must continue to focus on training to develop skills

and competency in understanding and operating modernized IT equipment.40 Equipment alone

will not facilitate effective intelligence sharing and interoperability between forces; training U.S.

Army forces is also an important factor.

36 Stuart Johnson and Martin Libicki. Dominant Battlespace Knowledge: The Winning Edge.

(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University. 1995), 137.37 FM 71-100, Chapter 9.38 FM 3.0, 11-23.39 FM 3.0, 11-83.

1616

TRAINING FOCUS

Training is an essential element of Army doctrine and is exemplified through many Army

doctrinal manuals. Army manual FM 3.0 illustrates this through the statement that "effective

training is the cornerstone of operational success and essential for a full-spectrum force."41 Unit

training significantly affects organizations' abilities to share intelligence information and operate

effectively with one another. Army doctrine addresses the importance of training and its affect on

successful operations and is exemplified through Field Manual 7.0 Training the Force, which

emphasizes the importance of training to establish interoperability, which is a vital component of

proficiency, readiness and effective operations.42 Although Army doctrine acknowledges

different aspects of training, only specific special operations doctrine stresses the human element

of developing relationships and interpersonal skills during training and operations with other

units; most Army doctrine does not specifically recognize its importance and link it to trained and

ready units. Although Army training doctrine emphasizes the importance of training to increase

the interoperability and intelligence sharing between units, special operations doctrine addresses

training from a different approach by addressing the element of human relationships in the

training process.

U.S. Army doctrine stresses the importance of training as a method to increase the

efficiency and inter-workings of organizations. U.S. Army manual FM 3.0 illustrates that

training improves organizations interoperability as, "teams gathered from different organizations

do not execute efficiently unless trained to work together; training emphasizes teamwork and

adaptability."43 Several U.S. Army doctrinal manuals describe training as a tool or method by

which organizations use to synchronize efforts and adapt to one another for increased

effectiveness. One example in FM 7.0 states that, “Army doctrine requires teamwork, which

40 FM 3.0, 11-24.41 FM 3.0, 1-17.42 Department of the Army, Field Manual 7.0, Training the Force (Washington D.C., U.S.

Government Printing Office, 2002) 11-5.43 FM 3.0, 2-76.

1717

training and practice develops and results in increased effectiveness, proficiency and

cohesiveness between units.”44 Training to build teams, adapt to each organization's operating

methods, and to synchronize efforts will also increase a unit's ability to share intelligence with

one another. Army doctrine, to include conventional and special operations doctrine, address the

importance of training between units to facilitate interoperability and intelligence sharing.

U.S. Army doctrine demonstrates the significance of training personnel and developing

specific Army training programs to enhance individual unit effectiveness. Army training manual

FM 7.0 illustrates the “importance of training personnel through the Army’s Leader Training and

Development Model (ALTDM) (Figure 1) to develop trained and ready units capable of operating

in any environment.”45 The Army’s Leader Training and Development Model recognizes the

importance of integrating the Army’s culture or shared set of beliefs, values, and assumptions into

training, although it does not identify the need to train and develop Army personnel on cultural

and interpersonal skills that enhance soldiers’ abilities to operate more effectively with other

units.46 Although the ALTDM focuses on individual training in Army culture, FM 7.0 addresses

individual and organizational training to improve relationships and understanding. FM 7.0

illustrates training as a method of developing mutual appreciation for other capabilities, and the

development of valuable personal and professional relationships among units, but does not

emphasize its criticality in maintaining interoperability with other units.47 Most Army

conventional doctrinal manuals for division and brigade level operations do not identify the

importance of training as a method to improve interoperability and intelligence sharing between

units. Although FMs 71-3, 71-100, and 7-30, The Infantry Brigade address various types of units

conventional Army forces may operate with, the manuals do not specifically identify the

importance of training in relation to intelligence interoperability and sharing. However, special

44 FM 7.0, 2-9.45 Ibid., 11-2.46 Ibid., 11-2.47 Ibid., 5-12.

1818

operations doctrine accentuates the importance of personal interaction through training to

facilitate interoperability and intelligence sharing between units.

Figure 1 - Army Training and Leader Development Model 48

Special operations doctrine addresses the importance in using training as a method to

develop effective organizations. FM 3.05-102 cites "personnel to interact with one another

effectively and to give them the ability to gain insight into the attitudes, beliefs, and culture of an

organization."49 Although special operations personnel operate with multinational forces more

frequently than conventional forces and therefore, must take into account various cultures, beliefs

and customs, their approach to training by emphasizing humanistic skills is essential and should

be emphasized in Army training doctrine. FM 3.05-102 identifies that "special operations

training cause personnel to use their interpersonal skills and experience to persuade each element

to coordinate their efforts."50 Additionally, special operations doctrine reflects the importance of

using training as a method to educate personnel, facilitate understanding, and develop relations

between units, which in turn increases unit efficiency.51 Through training, units will establish a

48 Ibid., 11-20.49 FM 3.05-102, 1-6.50 Ibid., 1-7.51 FM 100-25.

1919

common understanding and develop enhanced relations, which will ultimately improve their

desire to share intelligence with their military counterparts.

Army doctrine addresses the importance of training to increase soldier and unit

effectiveness. FM 7.0 identifies the increased need to train U.S. Army forces due to the

integration of complex IT systems and the changing nature of our operational environment.52

Due to the emphasis on intelligence sharing in an Army force that is transforming to become

more reliant on intelligence and focused on operating as a knowledge-centric force, training

personnel to share intelligence is more critical than ever.53 Army doctrine clearly emphasizes the

need for training to be all encompassing in leadership, technical, and tactical skills, but should

also specify the importance of training and developing the cultural and interpersonal skills of

soldiers and organizations to understand and operate effectively with one another, as illustrated in

special operations doctrine. A well-balanced training program can only serve to improve

interoperability across the spectrum of Army units.

ACHIEVING INTEROPERABILITY

Army leaders realize that interoperability between units is essential to successfully share

intelligence information and accomplish missions. The Department of Defense defines

interoperability in Field Manual 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, as "the condition

achieved among communication-electronics systems or items of communications-electronic

equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between

them and/or their users."54 Interoperability should not be limited strictly to communications and

electronic systems, but account for culture, organizational values, and relationships, since these

elements directly affect the level of interoperability between units. Although Army doctrine

addresses the need for interoperability in today's operations, many conventional doctrinal

52 FM 7.0, Preface.53 DoD, ATCP, 4.

2020

manuals focus on the technological requirements of establishing interoperability. However,

special operations doctrine clearly emphasizes the need to attain interoperability through

equipment, developing relationships, and establishing liaisons, and also identifies the essential

need for interoperability to improve intelligence sharing between units.

Special operations doctrine identifies that interoperability is essential for operational

success, particularly in sharing intelligence information. FM 3.05-102 illustrates that,

"interoperability, streamlined information, and pull-down intelligence tailored to the needs of

Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) are key to successful intelligence systems support."55

Special operations doctrine also addresses the importance of maintaining liaisons to facilitate

interoperability and greater coordination for operations and intelligence sharing between units.

According to FM 3.05-102, liaisons known as the Special Operations Command and Control

Elements (SOCCE) are an integral part of ensuring that conventional and special operations

forces maintain interoperability, which allows for sharing intelligence between units. SOCCEs

can provide real-time combat information and intelligence to assist conventional forces with

information they may otherwise not receive.56 Special operations doctrine addresses the

importance of establishing interoperability through humanistic means of developing relations and

establishing liaisons, as well as addressing the role of equipment in interoperability. Army

conventional force doctrine tends to primarily focus more on the technological aspect of

interoperability and does not always identify the human factors that are necessary for successful

interoperability and intelligence sharing between units.

Various U.S. Army conventional force doctrinal manuals do not always address the issue

of developing shared relationships between forces, when possible, that will enhance a unit’s

interoperability and desire to share intelligence effectively. One exception is U.S. Army Field

Manual 17-95, Cavalry Operations, which illustrates the importance of developing special

54 Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-02 (Draft), Operational Terms and Graphics

(Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003).55 FM 3.05-102, 8-3.

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relationships, understanding capabilities, and maintaining interoperability to facilitate the flow

and use of combat information.57 Although FM 17-95 identifies the link between strong

relationships with interoperability and intelligence sharing, most other U.S. Army conventional

force doctrinal manuals do not adequately address their relevance to one another. Several other

conventional doctrinal manuals focus on systems, technology, or transformational concepts rather

than the human aspect of interoperability and sharing intelligence. Field Manual 71-100-2,

Infantry Division Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures, addresses the need to establish liaison

elements with other units to facilitate planning, but vaguely addresses the importance of

developing relations to achieve interoperability and share intelligence.58 FM 71-100-2

emphasizes the importance of digitization and equipment, rather than developing improved

relations between units to facilitate interoperability. FM 71-100-2 exemplifies this by suggesting

that automation equipment greatly assists units in establishing interoperability and rapidly

disseminating intelligence.59 On the other hand, special operations doctrine demonstrates the

importance of relationships and their effects on intelligence sharing between organizations, but

focuses on relationships with multi-national units rather than with U.S. Army units.60 Special

operations doctrine does not focus on transformational intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance (ISR) concepts, but stresses the importance of relationships and the human aspect

of sharing intelligence.

U.S. Army doctrine fully recognizes that Army force commanders will face complex

demands in dealing with interoperability challenges and also identifies the importance of

interoperability between units conducting military operations.61 Although Army doctrine

illustrates the importance of interoperability, most conventional doctrine primarily focuses on the

56 FM 3.05-102, 3-67.57 Department of the Army. Field Manual 17-95, Cavalry Operations (Washington D.C., U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1996) Chapter 9, Section XI.58 Department of the Army. FM 71-100-2, Infantry Division Operations: Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures. (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993) Section II.59 Ibid., Section I.60 FM 100-25.61 FM 3.0, 2-45.

2222

technological requirements, rather than also addressing the human factors that are also essential in

achieving interoperability. Specific special operations doctrine clearly emphasizes the

importance of interoperability and identifies several methods to improve interoperability by

enhancing equipment, relationships, and liaisons.62 By improving interoperability, conventional

and special operations forces will enhance their abilities to improve intelligence sharing.

Additionally, as the Army transforms to a force that is reliant on maintaining the ability to operate

more closely through shared intelligence to succeed in a knowledge-centric environment, the role

of interoperability in the future is more significant than ever.

CONCLUSION

Throughout Chapter 2, this study illustrated how U.S. Army doctrine supports the

concept of sharing intelligence through a common doctrinal framework, but with different

approaches for conventional and special operations forces. Chapter 2 reviewed how U.S. Army

conventional and special operations doctrine approached intelligence sharing and addressed the

elements of equipment, training, and interoperability and how they relate to intelligence sharing.

As U.S. Army conventional doctrine focused more on equipment technology, systematic training

and procedures, and interoperability through systems, specific special operations doctrine

presented a different approach by addressing the importance cultural training and achieving

interoperability through several factors other than equipment to improve intelligence sharing.

Additionally, conventional Army doctrine did not stress the criticality of sharing intelligence,

particularly in regards to the emphasis that is placed on intelligence in the current transformation

of the Army to a force that is more reliant on intelligence. Chapter 2 illustrated that the concept

of intelligence sharing between units is not accentuated enough in relation to the importance

intelligence will have on the future knowledge-centric Army force.63 Although current Army

doctrine identifies that "U.S. forces should share all relevant and pertinent intelligence about the

62 FM 3.05-102, 3-67.63 DoD, ATCP, 4.

2323

situation and adversary to attain the best-possible common understanding of threatened interests,

determine relevant and attainable objectives, and to achieve unified efforts against the

adversary;"64 emerging Army doctrine should address the significance of intelligence in future

operations and identify methods to improve the forces' capability to share intelligence through

equipment, training, and interoperability to operate more effectively and efficiently.

64 FM 3.05-102, A9.

2424

Chapter 3

THEORY

Sharing intelligence has always been an important factor in military operations and its

significance is increasing due to the Army's transformation to a knowledge-centric force that is

more reliant on information dominance.65 Chapter 3 examines academic views on sharing

intelligence and their continuing application to the transformation of U.S. Army conventional and

special operations forces. This chapter will review the differences between several authors'

theories that attempt to explain why U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces face

great difficulty in sharing intelligence. The authors disagree on the primary cause that hinders

forces from sharing intelligence, which range from a lack of technological equipment, inadequate

training, and the inability to establish interoperability. Chapter 3 will also examine proposed

methods to improve equipment, training, and interoperability, which the authors believe are

required to improve intelligence sharing. The sources reviewed within this paper support the

increased need to improve intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special

operations forces, particularly due to the rapid changes and complexity of the global environment.

First, this chapter will examine various theories that explaining why U.S. Army conventional and

special operations forces are challenged in sharing intelligence with one another.

DIFFICULTIES IN SHARING INTELLIGENCE

A challenge the U.S. Army consistently faces during military operations is sharing

intelligence between forces. Many academics and military personnel express differing opinions

regarding the primary cause of these challenges; although they agree the difficulties stem from

equipment, training, and interoperability between forces. This section will begin by reviewing

theories on the role of equipment in intelligence sharing.

65 DoD, AI-TCP, 14.

2525

In Dominant Battlespace Knowledge, political scientist Paul Bracken illustrated his

theory that intelligence sharing is difficult because of challenges in information management

systems that are primarily caused by equipment. Bracken commented that "problems in sharing

intelligence are primarily within managing the synergy of information and intelligence with

responsiveness and efficiency with equipment; organizing information storage and processing is

the problem, not coordination of operating forces."66 Therefore, Bracken believed equipment was

the primary reason U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces faced difficulties in

sharing intelligence.67 Additionally, in Doomed to Fail, John Gentry agreed that equipment

caused vulnerability and failure in sharing intelligence. Gentry suggested that the U.S. Army's

information technology equipment and infrastructure regularly fails and contributes virtually

nothing to military operations, but high costs and limitations.68 Therefore, Gentry advocated that

equipment complexities and shortfalls affect the U.S. Army's ability to adequately share

intelligence. Although many academics expressed their beliefs that equipment impacts the U.S.

Army's ability to share intelligence, others believe that training has a more profound impact on

intelligence sharing.

In Fighting For the Future, Ralph Peters argued that the primary challenge in sharing

intelligence is not due to equipment difficulties, but a lack of training and educating soldiers. The

author cites that "the core of our force is the soldier."69 Peters did not believe that equipment

degrades or overcomplicates the U.S. Army's ability to share intelligence because the U.S. is far

technologically superior to the rest of the world. On the contrary, Peters argued that the

challenges are embedded in people, as untrained U.S. Army personnel degrade intelligence

sharing.70 The author also proposed "the U.S. Army has fallen into the old American trap of

66 Johnson and Libicki, 75.67 Ibid., 60.68 John Gentry. “Doomed to Fail: America's Blind Faith in Military Technology”. Parameters

(Winter 2002), 91.69 Ralph Peters. Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph? ( Mechanicsburg, PA:

Stackpole Books, 1999) 144.70 Ibid., 46

2626

seeking technological solutions to human problems."71 Peters did not agree that the U.S. Army

must invest heavily in its machines and equipment, but should focus on increased training and

education to improve intelligence sharing between U.S. conventional and special operations

forces.72 In Unconventional Warfare, the author Susan Marquis also believed that lack of proper

training hinders intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces.

Marquis argued, "conventional military commanders are unaware and not trained in special

operations force's capabilities, possibly due to mistrust, lack of information, or competing

interests and therefore, have misused special operations forces."73 Marquis clearly faulted

conventional forces lack of training and understanding without addressing the responsibility of

special operations forces in achieving full integration between forces.74 The academics reviewed

throughout this section believed the lack of training degrades U.S. Army conventional and special

operations forces' ability to share intelligence. However, the authors' approaches explaining the

cause in intelligence sharing difficulties varied as some focused on training individual operators

and others focused on training commanders to understand capabilities and directly affect

intelligence sharing. Additionally, several academics advocated that the lack of interoperability

causes difficulty in sharing intelligence between conventional and special operations forces.

The academics reviewed in this study, agreed that interoperability is a key element in

successfully sharing intelligence and only through people and effective relations, can the U.S.

Army achieve interoperability. These ideas are not original and reflect the views of the classic

military theorist, Ardant du Picq, who wrote "the value of the soldier is the essential element of

success; let us strengthen the soldier."75 Du Picq's theory is exemplified through several opinions

that agree human nature and organizational culture elicit a lack of interoperability and

intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces. Ralph Peters

71 Ibid., 19.72 Ibid, 55.73 Susan Marquis. Unconventional Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Virginia Press, 1997), 264.74 Ibid, 265.

2727

commented that the U.S. Army cannot focus on hardware and equipment alone because the more

difficult and subtle problems in interoperability and intelligence sharing are posed by more

complex elements of human behavior within soldiers and organizations.76 Therefore, Peters

suggested that interoperability between personnel and organizations directly influences

intelligence sharing between U.S. Army forces. Susan Marquis reinforced Peters' argument that

people are the core of interoperability and sharing intelligence. Marquis indicated that the

differences in organizational values and cultures generate separation between special operations

forces and the conventional Army, thereby provoking challenges in interoperability between

them. 77 Marquis' also believes that these differences between organizations hinder

interoperability, as well as, intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations

forces.

This section revealed differing academic theories regarding the primary cause of sharing

intelligence. The academic views varied as to the primary cause of the difficulties that U.S.

Army conventional and special operations forces face in intelligence sharing. However, all

academics reviewed and acknowledged that complications in equipment, training, and

interoperability contributed to degraded intelligence sharing between forces. Next, this section

will review proposed theories to improve intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional

and special operations forces.

PROPOSED METHODS OF IMPROVEMENT

Several academics reviewed throughout this chapter provided different opinions

regarding the primary reason conventional and special operations units face difficulties in sharing

intelligence. The authors also differed as to whether the U.S. Army should focus on improving

equipment, training, or interoperability to alleviate intelligence sharing difficulties. This section

75 Ardant Du Picq. Battle Studies: Roots of Strategy 2. (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books,

1986), 143.76 Peters, 45.77 Marquis, 47.

2828

will review advocates who promote improvements in technological equipment to enhance

intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations units.

Author Jeffrey Cooper of Dominant Battlespace Knowledge advocated improvements in

technology and equipment as a primary means to improve intelligence sharing. Cooper argued

that automated systems will replace soldiers and equipment alone will improve the flow of

intelligence.78 Contrary to Cooper's opinion, Dr. David Alberts of Dominant Battlespace

Knowledge recognized that "the military needs a balance between investments in command and

control technology, equipment, training, and education in order to improve sharing of

information."79 Additionally, other authors published in Dominant Battlespace Knowledge

addressed the importance of maintaining equipment to correlate and parse information out, but

also acknowledge the fact that technology will never substitute the human element in warfare,

which requires education and training for personnel to achieve interoperability and meet specific

objectives.80 Although equipment and technology are important enablers for conventional and

special operations forces, many academics believed the best method of increasing intelligence

sharing between forces is through improved training and interoperability.

Ralph Peters emphasized the importance of educating and training soldiers to improve

interoperability and increase relevant intelligence sharing between U.S. Army forces. Peters

advocated that "the U.S. Army needs to study and train soldiers on the behavior of individuals

and organizations, because technology will not always be the answer to our dilemmas."81 The

author believed the U.S. Army will only improve intelligence sharing through training soldiers to

operate with one another and to understand the processes, methods, and value of intelligence.

Susan Marquis also advocated increased training between conventional and special operations

forces. The author supported the concept that training reinforces distinct ways of thinking,

78 Johnson and Martin Libicki. Dominant Battlespace Knowledge. (Washington, D.C.: National

Defense University, 1995) 105.79 Ibid., 85.80 Ibid., 96.81 Peters, 194.

2929

establishes integration, and will improve interoperability during military operations between U.S.

Army conventional and special operations forces.82 Marquis believed that due to the different

nature of U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces, they require improved combined

training to enhance their familiarity and understanding of the other. The author specifically

recommended the U.S. Army improve methods of training and educating conventional

commanders to understand special operations, which will in turn increase intelligence sharing

between forces.83 Peters and Marquis advocated improvements in training as methods to

strengthen intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces, as

well as to improve interoperability.

The academics reviewed throughout this chapter agreed that interoperability is essential

in improving intelligence sharing between U.S. Army forces. Ralph Peters illustrated that

equipment, training, and interoperability contribute to improved intelligence sharing between

conventional and special operations forces. The author identified that improving technology was

not the only method of achieving interoperability; improving the training and education of people

and organizations were essential in establishing interoperability and facilitating understanding.84

Furthermore, Peters advocated that improvements in equipment and training will also enhance

interoperability, as well as enhance intelligence sharing between U.S. Army forces.85 Susan

Marquis also promoted a similar view of the role of interoperability in intelligence sharing. The

author illustrated this through her comment that "organizations can only achieve and maintain

interoperability through understanding and training with one another."86 Marquis further

identified that organizations must recognize they are different and therefore, must work together

to establish interoperability with the other, which will allow them to integrate as a team and

82 Marquis, 47.83 Ibid, 45.84 Peters, 65.85 Ibid 45.86 Marquis, 246.

3030

achieve U.S. political and military objectives.87 The authors' clearly illustrated the importance of

interoperability as an enabling factor for U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces in

sharing intelligence more effectively.

The authors' addressed throughout this section proposed improvements in interoperability

as a means to strengthen the sharing of intelligence between U.S. Army forces. The authors

presented the elements of equipment and training as primary factors that will enable forces to

achieve interoperability, and in turn, improve intelligence sharing between U.S. Army

conventional and special operations forces.

CONCLUSION

Several academics developed theories that address the challenges of sharing intelligence

between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces. Chapter 3 examined the writings

of these various academics and illustrated the different views they presented in determining the

difficulties of sharing intelligence between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces.

The academics' revealed that the primary reasons U.S. Army conventional and special operations

forces are challenged with sharing intelligence were due to difficulties in the Army's equipment,

training, and interoperability with one another. This chapter also reviewed the authors' proposals

on how to improve the sharing of intelligence, through improvements in technological equipment,

training between forces, and overall interoperability between U.S. Army conventional and special

operations forces. Many of the authors' opinions differed regarding the primary reason

conventional and special operations are challenged in sharing intelligence. However, the authors

agreed that through improvements in equipment, training, and interoperability, conventional and

special operations forces will increase their ability to share intelligence and operate more

effectively in future military operations.

87 Ibid., 248.

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Chapter 4

HISTORY

History reveals lessons and provides examples of past military actions that can contribute

towards improvement in the future of the U.S. Army. Chapter 4 reviews historical conflicts and

illustrate the challenges U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces faced in sharing

intelligence while conducting military operations in combat and peacekeeping environments.

This chapter also examines the effects that the lack of intelligence sharing had on military

operations and will specifically address examples in Somalia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan that

involved both U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces. These examples

demonstrate the value of sharing intelligence and information in support of military operations,

particularly in combat operations. Additionally, these historical examples present challenges

conventional and special operations forces faced in sharing intelligence, as well as identify

situations where intelligence was successfully shared between units. Chapter 4 primarily reviews

how equipment, training, and interoperability affected U.S. Army conventional and special

operations forces' abilities to adequately share intelligence during these military operations. First,

this chapter examines the U.S. Army's ability to share intelligence between conventional and

special operations forces during the conflict in Somalia.

SOMALIA: OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

Several academics presented their views and opinions on intelligence sharing during

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia through various publications. The authors referenced in this

section primarily agree that intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations

forces did not initially occur, due to equipment, training, and interoperability challenges; but

gradually improved throughout the operation. The first work of this chapter discusses lessons

from Major David Shelton.

3232

David Shelton clearly presented his thoughts regarding the challenges forces faced in

sharing intelligence throughout his writings in Intelligence Lessons of Restore Hope. Shelton

discussed the equipment difficulties intelligence and operations personnel encountered in

Somalia. Many of the intelligence information hardware systems and software programs that

units were utilizing were not always compatible with other units operating in Somalia and

adversely impacted the flow of intelligence at times.88 Additionally, forces faced a plethora of

connectivity and hardware difficulties with their equipment, and most of the hardware systems

used to share intelligence required substantial amount of operator expertise and training, which

many of the soldiers did not possess prior to deployment.89 Therefore, the lack of training and

familiarity with equipment, and with other units, degraded some of the units' abilities to share

intelligence. Shelton also identified how classification levels limited interoperability and

hindered the release of relevant intelligence to organizations and operators who required the

intelligence to conduct military operations.90 Shelton recognized the requirement of forces to

maintain security of missions, but also advocated a review of classification levels during combat

operations to encourage common understanding and interoperability between units involved in

the conflict.91 Author Joseph Celeski also addressed intelligence sharing challenges that occurred

in Somalia.

Joseph Celeski presented intelligence sharing difficulties conventional and special

operations forces faced in Somalia in his article, Special Forces Operations in Somalia. Celeski

suggested that although special operations forces were the primary source of all intelligence, they

did not share intelligence with conventional forces because of classification and access

requirements. Although special operations forces collected information, the intelligence was not

always disseminated and led conventional forces to encounter unexpected resistance from armed

88 David L. Shelton. "Intelligence Lessons: Operations Restore Hope Somalia" Marine Corps

Gazette, 79/2 (Winter 1995), 37-40.89 Ibid, 38.90 Ibid. 38.91 Ibid, 40.

3333

Somali factions during Operation Restore Hope.92 Celeski also identified that conventional and

special operations forces were not familiar with each other's operating procedures, which

reflected the lack of coordination and training between forces.93 Celeski pointed out that as the

conflict in Somalia continued, conventional and special operations forces became more familiar

with each other's procedures, which improved interoperability and intelligence sharing.94

Additionally, Major Clifford Day revealed the difficulties of sharing intelligence in Somalia.

Clifford Day revealed that intelligence sharing struggles existed throughout operations in

Somalia due to information management difficulties and compartmentalization. Day discussed

the challenges units and agencies faced in obtaining intelligence, and faulted the complex system

of equipment as part of the problem. Many of the systems could only achieve connectivity

through satellite links and often did not function properly, therefore many problems revolved

around dissemination.95 Additionally, Day acknowledged that units were unfamiliar with

operating with one another and compartmentalized intelligence, which degraded interoperability

and sharing of information.96 Day believes "intelligence in Somalia was not synchronized for

unity of effort to share all relevant and pertinent intelligence about the situation and adversary to

attain the best common understanding of threatened interests, and determine relevant and

attainable objectives for achieving mission success."97 Overall, Day credited U.S. failures in

Somalia partially to the lack of intelligence sharing between forces during Operation Restore

Hope.

Several authors believe U.S. forces in Somalia could have operated more effectively and

efficiently with increased sharing of intelligence. The various sources revealed difficulties with

incompatible equipment, a lack of training, and reduced interoperability between units as

92 Celeski. 19.93 Ibid, 30.94 Ibid, 19.95 Clifford Day. Defeat of Task Force Ranger. (Maxwell AFB: AL. Air Command and Staff

College, 1997) 27.96 Ibid, 28.97 Ibid., 28.

3434

contributing to the negative effects U.S. forces faced in Operation Restore Hope. Next, this

chapter will review methods of intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations

forces in Kosovo.

KOSOVO: TASK FORCE FALCON

Although U.S. military operations in Kosovo were focused on peacekeeping, U.S. Army

conventional and special operations forces faced challenges in sharing intelligence during the

initial phases of the operation. U.S. Army forces overcame these challenges rather quickly by

focusing on correcting equipment, training, and interoperability problems they initially

encountered. This section will reveal how U.S. Army conventional and special operations units

successfully shared intelligence in Kosovo and will begin by reviewing 10th Special Forces in

Kosovo.

Robert Schaefer and M. Davis' account of U.S. Army conventional and special operations

forces operations in Kosovo presented a positive view of successful intelligence sharing during

operations. The authors discuss how robust equipment packages and intelligence architecture

enabled conventional and special operations forces to share intelligence. U.S. Army forces were

well equipped with compatible systems, clear connectivity, and redundant communications that

facilitated coordination and integration between conventional and special operations forces.98

Additionally, Schaefer and Davis attributed successful intelligence sharing to training and

familiarization between conventional and special operations forces prior to deployment, as each

force established relationships and interoperability. The use of liaison and coordination elements

significantly improved the interoperability and facilitated sharing intelligence between

conventional and special operations forces.99 The authors believed that "these liaison elements

proved to be invaluable in ensuring interoperability and real-time, redundant communications link

98 Robert W. Schaefer and M. Davis. "10th SF Group Keeps Kosovo Stable." Special Warfare,

(June 2002), 52-55.99 Ibid, 53.

3535

between Task Force Falcon."100 Successful interoperability significantly increased intelligence

sharing, and enabled both conventional and special operations forces in Task Force Falcon to

work towards a common goal. Timothy Thomas also provides insight to intelligence sharing

operations in Kosovo.

Timothy Thomas addressed initial intelligence sharing challenges U.S. Army units faced

in Kosovo. Additionally, Thomas identifies solutions that attempted to correct the problems

encountered during the conflict. Thomas indicated that U.S. Army forces operated with improved

technological equipment, which facilitated the U.S. Army's success in sharing intelligence in

Kosovo.101 He stated that "the equipment did not always function all the time with perfection, but

the vast number of systems allowed for rapid collection and collation into intelligence that was

rapidly disseminated.102" Thomas believed the equipment provided U.S. forces a greater

capability to share intelligence and also identified the importance of training to share intelligence

effectively.103 The author stated that U.S. Army forces were well trained in their ability to share

intelligence by passing target information and using equipment properly, but the human

dimension in handling information was not stressed.104 Thomas identified U.S. Army equipment

and training as positive elements that contributed to the success in sharing intelligence between

U.S. Forces in Kosovo.

Various authors believe U.S. forces in Kosovo were able to successfully share

intelligence due to modernized intelligence equipment, sufficient training, and interoperability

between units. Although intelligence sharing will never occur with perfection, there are ways to

achieve success as demonstrated through U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces in

Kosovo. The final review of this chapter will examine intelligence-sharing challenges in the most

recent conflict in Afghanistan.

100 Ibid., 53.101 Timothy Thomas. "Kosovo and the Myth of Information Superiority". Parameters, (Spring

2000), 5102 Ibid, 5.103 Ibid, 10.

3636

AFGHANISTAN: OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

The conflict in Afghanistan appears to place greater importance on the value of sharing

intelligence in military operations, due to the complexity of the environment, the threat, and the

increased number of intelligence collectors on the battlefield. Although the war on terrorism is

still occurring, several academics introduced their views on intelligence sharing during the initial

stages of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This section of Chapter 5 will review works that

share a common theme amongst all cited authors and reveal intelligence sharing challenges

between conventional and special operations forces in Afghanistan. The authors demonstrated

that difficulties occurred primarily due to equipment problems, lack of training, and

interoperability challenges, although intelligence sharing has continually improved throughout the

operation. The first work of this section discusses are Lessons from Afghanistan by Anthony H.

Cordesman.

Anthony Cordesman presented lessons from OEF that clearly illustrated the intelligence

sharing challenges U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces faced during the initial

stages of combat. Cordesman addressed the difficulties each force encountered with equipment

used to communicate and share intelligence information. The equipment U.S. Army forces

initially deployed to Afghanistan with was not always fully compatible with one another or

capable of operating in the harsh environment.105 Cordesman identified how the lack of

bandwidth inhibited U.S. communications and ISR capabilities and negatively affected

intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces.106 Additionally,

environmental problems affected conventional force communications and processing equipment;

therefore intelligence was not always disseminated between forces until operable equipment was

introduced into theater. Often times, personnel were unfamiliar with and lacked training on the

newly introduced equipment, which also hindered the unit's ability to share intelligence.

104 Ibid., 11.105 Cordesman, 45.106 Ibid, 46.

3737

Cordesman also cited that units did not train together prior to deploying to Afghanistan and were

unfamiliar with methods and operating procedures and did not establish cohesion with one

another until later in the operation. Additionally, the 101st Air Assault Division's Lessons

Learned Briefing validated Cordesman's comment and identified the "requirement to train and

practice interoperability between conventional and special operations forces."107

Cordesman also addressed the lack of interoperability between forces during OEF and

illustrated his point through military actions that occurred during Operation Anaconda.

Cordesman articulated that compartmentalization of intelligence hindered operations during

Anaconda, as up-to-date intelligence information on enemy and friendly positions was not

relayed to conventional ground forces, or 10th Mountain Division.108 Although intelligence

collectors obtained information from Afghan sources, the information was questionable and was

not effectively disseminated and ground commanders were forced to alter battle plans, adapt to a

rapidly changing situation, and sent soldiers into heavily entrenched enemy positions.109

Cordesman advocated that interoperability between units will effectively diminish

compartmentalization and increase intelligence sharing between conventional and special

operations forces, and improve support to ground combat operations.110 National Defense

Fellow, Judy Chizek, also provides insight into the challenges of sharing intelligence between

U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces in Afghanistan.

Judy Chizek acknowledged that U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces

encountered challenges in sharing intelligence during the initial stages of OEF. The author

addressed the incompatibility of equipment, as well as the lack of training and interoperability as

the primary causes U.S. Army forces faced intelligence sharing difficulties in Afghanistan.

Chizek demonstrated that conventional forces utilized improved ISR assets, such as the Joint

107 Department of the Army. "101st Air Assault Division Lesson Learned Briefing." Center for

Army Lesson Learned, 2002. Available online at http://www.CALL.army.mil.108 Cordesman, 46.109 Ibid., 41.110 Ibid., 47.

3838

Tactical Terminal (JTT), to process and share intelligence in Afghanistan, but not all units were

provided with the JTT equipment.111 Additionally, soldiers were not adequately trained on the

systems, thereby decreasing their abilities to operate the equipment and share intelligence to units

in the region.112 Chizek believed the primary reason U.S. Army conventional and special

operations forces faced challenges in sharing intelligence was due to lack of interoperability. The

author cited that "although special operations forces are often interoperable and innovative

among themselves, in the past they have had difficulty communicating and coordinating with

non-special operations assets."113 Chizek acknowledged that sharing intelligence did improve

throughout OEF as conventional and special operations forces gradually corrected problems

regarding equipment and interoperability, which previously hindered their ability to share

intelligence.

The initial stages of the war against terrorism revealed various challenges U.S.

conventional and special operations forces faced in sharing intelligence. The works cited, address

difficulties in incompatible equipment, a lack of training, as well as problems of interoperability

that did not facilitate sharing intelligence between U.S. Army forces in Afghanistan. The authors

agreed these challenges occurred during the initial stages of the war, but are improving as

conventional and special operations forces work together to increase the effectiveness and

efficiency of sharing intelligence in support of combat operations in Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION

Throughout Chapter 4, sections reviewed historical combat and peacekeeping conflicts

and illustrated intelligence sharing challenges between U.S. Army conventional and special

operations forces. This chapter examined U.S. military operations conducted by both U.S. Army

conventional and special operations forces in Somalia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. These

111 Judy G. Chizek. “Military Transformation: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.”

(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 2002), 11.112 Ibid., 11.113 Ibid., 18.

3939

examples also demonstrated the effects that intelligence sharing, or the lack thereof, can have on

military operations. Chapter 4 addressed not only difficulties encountered between U.S. Army

conventional and special operations forces, but also successful solutions that were implemented,

and improved interoperability and intelligence sharing. Furthermore, this section examined the

impact of equipment, training, and interoperability on U.S. Army conventional and special

operations forces' ability to share intelligence and revealed their significance in military

operations.

4040

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This monograph demonstrated that there is an intelligence sharing gap between U.S.

Army conventional and special operations forces and that there is a requirement for these forces

to improve their ability to share intelligence with one another. Sharing intelligence between U.S.

Army conventional and special operations forces is particularly important due to the Army's

transformation to a knowledge-centric force that emphasizes an increased reliance on

intelligence.114 Additionally, sharing intelligence between units is also more important because

of the increased integration of missions and operations between conventional and special

operations forces in complex global military operations. This study examined intelligence

sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces through the areas of

doctrine, theory, and history, and revealed that many of the problems were caused by equipment,

training, and interoperability challenges. Therefore, this chapter provides recommendations to

improve U.S. Army conventional force capabilities that will strengthen intelligence sharing with

special operations forces and enable the force to increase its ability to support the U.S. Army's

Transformation Campaign Plan that advocates the increased need for sharing intelligence in a

changing complex global environment.

EQUIPMENT

The U.S. Army is transforming to a force more reliant on its C4ISR capabilities than in

the past and believes these increased capabilities will enable it to maintain greater situational

understanding and interoperability between forces on the battlefield. The U.S. Army's

Transformation Campaign Plan advocates that enhanced information technology and equipment

capabilities will enable the force to achieve greater situational understanding.115 Upgrades and

114 DoD, ATCP, 4.115 DoD, AI-TCP., 24.

4141

improvements of intelligence and communications equipment will assist in improving the

efficiency by which U.S. Army systems process and disseminate information. Although the U.S.

Army's modernized IT and intelligence equipment will increase the production and parsing of

intelligence, equipment training and interoperability are essential to improve intelligence sharing

between forces. Equipment improvements alone will not enable U.S. Army conventional and

special operations forces to improve their abilities to share intelligence with one another. The

U.S. Army must ensure intelligence equipment is compatible between conventional and special

operations units and military personnel are familiarized and capable of operating the IT systems.

Although IT and equipment enhancements are acceptable methods to assist in the improvement of

intelligence sharing between forces, the U.S. Army must also consider improving equipment

compatibility and training between conventional and special operations forces.

Special operations intelligence equipment capabilities are often more advanced and

modernized than U.S. Army conventional units' intelligence equipment and provide special

operations forces with direct connectivity to national agencies at the strategic level, but often do

not support connectivity with conventional forces. Today, U.S. Army conventional units

continue conducting operations in environments with direct strategic impact, which also require

coordination with national agencies and special operations forces. Unfortunately, U.S. Army

conventional intelligence equipment is not always compatible with special operations equipment

due to hardware, software, and system incompatibility challenges. Therefore, the U.S. Army

must improve its intelligence equipment capabilities to provide conventional military forces with

the ability to coordinate with special operations forces. If upgrades in intelligence equipment are

not feasible because of funding or fielding issues, conventional and special operations forces must

coordinate to ensure they utilize compatible hardware and software during military operations,

which improve their ability to share intelligence. The U.S. Army must also familiarize and train

military personnel to ensure they are capable of operating intelligence equipment. U.S. Army

conventional or special operations forces may be required to alter or use different intelligence

4242

equipment to maintain compatibility with one another, therefore units must ensure soldiers are

familiarized with the different systems, which will allow them to operate the equipment and result

in improved intelligence sharing.

Intelligence equipment enhancements for U.S. Army conventional forces will assist in

improving intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces,

but cannot single-handedly solve the problem. Conventional Army units, particularly at brigade

level, require organic IT equipment that will permit units to exchange intelligence through voice,

graphics, data and video teleconferencing. Systems such as the Joint Deployable Intelligence

Support System (JDISS) and JTT that the U.S. Army fields to special operations intelligence

sections should also be provided to U.S. Army conventional brigades to provide them with full

interoperability and access to intelligence databases when operating with special forces. The U.S.

Army must also ensure intelligence equipment is compatible between conventional and special

operations forces. Although U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces currently use

the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), conventional units traditionally operate with older and

underdeveloped software, whereas special operations force receive consistent upgrades in

software. The U.S. Army must field conventional forces the most up to date ASAS software to

enable them to maintain compatibility with special operations forces ASAS and to fully support

the sharing of intelligence between the two. The U.S. Army must also ensure personnel are

familiarized with the systems to facilitate increased intelligence sharing. Familiarization and

building the capability to operate equipment is achieved through training.

TRAINING

The U.S. Army must improve training between conventional and special operations

forces to enhance their ability to share intelligence with one another. Training must not only

include familiarization and refinement in using intelligence equipment, but should also include

educating U.S. Army conventional and special operations soldiers on each other's capabilities and

4343

organizational procedures, as well as conducting integrated training between conventional and

special operations forces.

Training conventional forces to understand special operations forces must occur at all

levels, from intelligence operator to commanders. U.S. Army conventional soldiers must

understand the capabilities and methods of special operations forces in order to strengthen

interoperability and intelligence sharing between the two. The U.S. Army intelligence school,

with the assistance of special operations forces, should educate and train conventional

intelligence soldiers on special operations intelligence capabilities, equipment, and intelligence

requirements. This education and training will increase soldier knowledge and facilitate

increased integration between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces. U.S. Army

conventional intelligence soldiers will better understand the methods and capabilities of special

operations forces and thereby exude confidence, rather than hesitance, in operating with their

U.S. Army counterparts. Individual training and education is only one factor to assist

conventional and special operations forces to share intelligence, unit training is also of great

importance.

U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces must also increase combined

training to improve their abilities to share intelligence. By increasing combined training, U.S.

Army conventional forces will establish a greater understanding of special operations forces'

capabilities and operating procedures, which will also improve their ability to integrate and

coordinate operations more efficiently with special operations forces. Combined training will

also enable the forces to develop relationships and familiarize themselves with the others'

operational methods, thereby enhancing greater understanding and adaptability with one another.

U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces should increase cooperative training

through combined exercises, field maneuvers, and integrated combat training center (CTC)

rotations. These shared training experiences will enable U.S. Army conventional and special

4444

operations forces to operate more effectively, as well as improve intelligence sharing between one

another.

In order to improve intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special

operations forces, the U.S. Army must enhance training between the forces. Training must

encompass improvements in education and hands-on application with intelligence equipment,

individual programs, and organizational training. U.S. Army conventional units must coordinate

with special operations forces affiliated within their regional focus areas and conducted combined

training locally, as well as during major exercises, and more importantly through CTC rotations.

These improvements in training will enhance conventional and special operations forces' ability

to share intelligence and establish interoperability.

INTEROPERABILITY

Interoperability between conventional and special operations forces is essential to

improve intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces.

Conventional and special operations units will enhance their interoperability with one another

through improvements in equipment and training, but must also strengthen their understanding of

each other's culture, as well as their relations with one another to achieve interoperability. These

intangible elements of establishing understanding, trust, and integration are difficult to gauge, but

are essential in order for conventional and special operations forces to fully achieve

interoperability and operate effectively as an integrated Army force.

U.S. Army conventional forces must understand the culture of special operations forces

to improve interoperability between the forces. Although equipment and training are methods to

achieve interoperability between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces,

establishing equipment connectivity or conducting training between units may not always achieve

effective interoperability. U.S. Army conventional forces must also enhance their understanding

of special operations forces' culture, or beliefs, traits, behavioral patterns, and characteristics to

4545

develop greater trust and integration. Increased interoperability will result in improved

intelligence sharing between the two. Increased understanding will result in greater

interoperability and will furthermore facilitate the conventional commanders' ability to visualize,

describe, and direct forces, and more importantly assist the commander in making decisions on

the battlefield. By increasing the conventional Army’s understanding of special operations

organizational culture, units will more likely establish better relationships and adapt to one

another. Conventional understanding of special operations forces will also enhance the

confidence and trust special operators place in conventional units, thereby creating more effective

operating conditions for both forces. Additionally, liaison elements are important factors that will

further improve interoperability between conventional and special operations forces.

Special operations forces often provide liaison elements to conventional units when

conducting military operations with one another. These liaison elements greatly assist

conventional Army units in developing a greater understanding of special operations forces, and

serve as a stepping-stone in establishing trust, confidence and interoperability between the two

forces. To further increase interoperability between U.S. Army conventional and special

operations forces, conventional units should also establish liaison elements within special

operations units. These conventional liaison elements should be responsible for directly

coordinating operations, integrating forces, and ensuring conventional and special operations

forces maintain fully effective interoperability with one another. Increased interoperability will

ultimately result in improved intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special

operations forces.

U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces must strengthen their

interoperability to improve intelligence sharing. Although equipment and training enhance

interoperability, conventional forces must also improve intangible elements in understanding

special operations culture and by strengthening relations with special operations forces to achieve

full interoperability. By improving interoperability with one another, U.S. Army conventional

4646

and special operations forces will operate and share intelligence more effectively, and will also

assist the commander in visualizing, describing, and directing forces on the battlefield.

CONCLUSION

U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces must improve their ability to share

intelligence with one another to adapt to the complex global environment and the increased

requirement to operate as an integrated Army operational force. Additionally, intelligence

sharing will be more important than ever in the Army's transformation to a knowledge-centric

force, which is more reliant on relevant intelligence to obtain situation understanding and conduct

successful military operations.116 This study reviewed intelligence sharing between U.S. Army

conventional and special operations forces through the areas of doctrine, theory, and history and

exemplified that equipment, training, and interoperability challenges caused several difficulties in

intelligence sharing between conventional and special operations forces. Additionally, this paper

provided recommendations for the U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces to

strengthen their intelligence sharing capabilities through improvements in intelligence equipment,

individual and organizational training, and interoperability with one another. Improvements in

intelligence sharing between U.S. Army conventional and special operations forces will also

support the Army's concept of transformation, which advocates the increased need for sharing

intelligence between forces to adapt to and operate within a knowledge-centric operational

environment. With the changing global surroundings, emerging military operational

requirements, and the U.S. Army's transformation, Army conventional and special operations

forces must improve their intelligence sharing to operate as an effective and integrated force

capable of dominating the future battlefield.

116 Ibid., 24.

4747

APPENDIX A - ABBREVIATIONS

ASAS – All Source Analysis System

ATCP - Army Transformation Campaign Plan

AITCP - Army Intelligence Transformation Campaign Plan

ALTDM - Army Leader Training Development Model

ARSOF - Army Special Operations Forces

C4ISR - Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance

CTC - Combat Training Centers

FM - Field Manual

ISR - Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

IT - Information Technology

JDISS - Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System

JTT - Joint Tactical Terminal

OEF - Operation Enduring Freedom

SOCCE - Special Operations Command and Control Element

SOF - Special Operations Forces

4848

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