HAZID Report for ChloroAlky Plant 26 Feb 2014

HAZID Report for

Chlorinated Paraffin Wax Plant

Prepared For:

KLJ Organic Qatar W.L.L.

Project Location:

Mesaieed Industrial City

Prepared By:

Velosi Certification LLC

25-Feb-2014

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Report Type: HAZID REPORT

Project Title: Chlorinated Paraffin Wax Plant HAZID, HAZID, QRA Studies

Client Company Name: KLJ Organic - Qatar W.L.L.

Issued By: Mike Snakard

Date: 25 - February-2014

Document Production & Approval Record

Issue No. Name Signature Date Title

Prepared by Lesly Lacson

25 - Feb-14 HAZID Scribe

Check by Mike Snakard

25 - Feb-14 HAZID

Chairman

Approved by Mark Kenyon 25 - Feb-14

Regional HSE

Consultancy

Manager

Document Revision Record

Issue No. Date Details of Revision

Rev 0 25- Feb-14 Initial Report

COPYRIGHT

This report is the copyright of VELOSI Certification LLC. Any unauthorised reproduction or usage

by any person other than the addressee is strictly prohibited.

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LIMITATIONS

VELOSI Certification LLC (Applus VELOSI) has prepared this report for the sole use of KLJ

Organics Qatar in accordance with the agreement under which our services were performed.

No other warranty, expressed or implied, is made as to the professional advice included in

this report or any other services provided by us. This report may not be relied upon by any

other party without the prior and express written agreement of Applus VELOSI.

Unless otherwise stated in this report, the assessments made assume that the sites and

facilities will be used for their current intended purpose without significant change. The

conclusions and recommendations contained in this report are based upon information

provided by others and upon the assumption that all relevant information has been provided

by those parties from whom it has been requested. Information obtained from third parties

has not been independently verified by Applus VELOSI, unless otherwise stated in the

report.

Where inspections have been carried out, these have been restricted to a level of detail

required to achieve the stated objectives of the services. The results of any measurements

taken may vary spatially or with time.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

API : American Petroleum Institute

CL2 : Chlorine Gas

CPW : Chlorinated Paraffin Wax

DP : Design Pressure

DT : Design Temperature

EIA : Environmental Impact Assessment

EMS : Emergency Management System

ESD : Emergency Shutdown

FRP : Fibreglass Reinforced Plastic

H2 : Hydrogen Gas

HAZID : Hazard Identification Study

HAZID : Hazard & Operability Study

HCl : Hydrochloric Acid

HSE : Health Safety & Environment

IPF : Instrumented Protective Functions

ITM : Inspection Testing and Maintenance

MOE : Ministry Of Environment

MIC : Mesaieed Industrial City

N2 : Nitrogen

NFPA : (US) National Fire Protection Association

PPE : Personnel Protective Equipment

PTW : Permit To Work

PVC : Polyvinyl Chloride

QP : Qatar Petroleum

QRA : Quantitative Risk Assessment

SIL : Safety Integrity Level

SIMOPs : Simultaneous Operations

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SOP(s) : Standard Operating Procedure(s)

STEL : Short Term Exposure Limit

TLV : Threshold Limit Value

UPS : Uninterruptable Power Supply

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Table of Contents

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ 7

2 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 9

2.1 STUDY INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................. 9

2.2 REPORT OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................... 9

2.3 TEAM COMPOSITION ..................................................................................................... 9

3 BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE .............................................................. 10

3.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY .................................................................................... 10

3.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE HAZID......................................................................................... 10

3.3 HAZID METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................. 10

3.4 HAZID CHECKLIST ..................................................................................................... 12

4 HAZID STUDY DETAILS............................................................................................. 13

4.1 PROCESS AREAS......................................................................................................... 13

4.2 HAZID STUDY DOCUMENTATION (WORKSHEETS) ........................................................... 13

5 HAZID RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................... 14

APPENDIX A ..................................................................................................................... 16

(QP HAZARD CATEGORIES AND GUIDEWORDS) ........................................................ 16

SECTION 1: EXTERNAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS ....................................................... 17

SECTION 2: FACILITY HAZARDS .......................................................................................... 18

SECTION 3: HEALTH HAZARDS ............................................................................................ 20

SECTION 4: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES .................................................................. 21

APPENDIX B ..................................................................................................................... 22

(RISK RANKING MATRIX) .............................................................................................. 22

APPENDIX C ..................................................................................................................... 24

(HAZID STUDY WORKSHEET) ........................................................................................ 24

1. EXTERNAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARD ........................................................... 25

2. FACILITY HAZARD ...................................................................................................... 32

3. HEALTH HAZARD ......................................................................................................... 41

4. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ..................................................................................... 48

APPENDIX D ..................................................................................................................... 53

(LIST OF ATTENDEES) .................................................................................................... 53

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report describes the results of the Hazard Identification (HAZID) Review completed

for KLJs Chlorinated Paraffin Wax Project. The primary objective of this study was to

assess the hazard and impact of the proposed project on health and safety, the

surroundings and will consider potential impacts / hazards the existing surroundings

have on the proposed project.

The HAZID Review Meeting was conducted on 18th and 19th February 2014 at QIMC

office and Applus VELOSI office, respectively. The HAZID team consisted of

representatives from different technical areas of KLJ, QP, Engineering Contractors and

Applus VELOSI who acted as study facilitator and scribe.

The report prepared addresses various hazard and potential impact related to the areas

subjected to HAZID for the above facilities of KLJ. HAZID recommendations and

parking lot issues were identified during the study and are noted below:

1. QP Industrial Citys heat stress guidelines to be adhered to;

2. KLJ to adopt QP Industrial City's heat stress guidelines for construction and

operations activities;

3. KLJ to provide input regarding potential catastrophic accidents with potential for

offsite impacts to MIC for inclusion in the MIC;

4. KLJ to take appropriate action to incorporate recommendations coming from the MIC

overall QRA;

5. KLJ to train staff and raise awareness with regard QP Industrial City's Fire &

Emergency Response systems;

6. Manning / Operations philosophy to be devised according to the IRPA levels assessed

by the QRA;

7. SOPs to require SIMOPs (Simultaneous Operations) study prior to start of concurrent

operations;

8. Evaluate the need for anti-static protection within the H2 areas;

9. Ignition control management system to be established in the facility in line with the

Hazardous area classification;

10. Emergency Response Plan to be developed in line with the QP Industrial citys

Emergency Response plan and this to be communicated to the neighbours

accordingly;

11. Provide a second point of access to the facility for emergency vehicles such that

vehicles can gain access to the plant from upwind / crosswind location;

12. QRA to be performed in line with QP philosophy for HSE Risk Management Doc. No.

QP-PHL-S-0100 rev.1 and QP Guideline for Quantitative Risk Assessment Doc. No.

QP-GDL-S-032 rev.1;

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13. LSIR of 10-6 and blast over pressure of 50mili bar to be maintained within the fence

line;

14. Recommendations from the QRA regarding the plant layout to be adopted during

detailed engineering;

15. Design philosophy to be ratified for compliance against QP-PHL-S-001 rev.3 QP

Corporate Fire and Safety philosophy and Industrial citys fire safety philosophy /

requirements;

16. ITM (Inspection Testing and Maintenance) programs for fire protection systems to be

developed in accordance with NFPA;

17. Consider implementing thermal protection for segments of water lines that could be

blocked in and liquid full. Protection could be addressed through SOPs requiring

draining small amounts of liquid in the segments of piping that are blocked in;

18. Should SIL Assessment be required, SIL Assessment to be performed for

Instrumented Protective Functions (IPF) as per QP guideline for SIL assessment;

19. KLJ to conduct training of personnel on the requirements of the SOP for bypassing

interlocks, the importance of the interlock system and safety management systems

within the plant;

20. QP Industrial Citys environmental regulations to be adhered to;

21. Flammable and toxic gas detection system installation system / mapping to be

performed in line with the HAZID / QRA consequence analysis result;

22. Consider installing manual Emergency Shutdown (ESD) in the vicinity of the Cl2

system;

23. NFPA 5000, 101 and API or Chlorine Institute recommended practices for the

management of chlorine to be adopted for the project;


system;

25. Consider installing portable hood to capture Chlorine vapours and route to the

scrubber;


offsite impacts to MIC for inclusion in the MIC overall QRA;

27. Consider potential impacts from sweet/sour hydrocarbon pipelines in the KLJ vicinity;


overall QRA;

29. Traffic Management Plan will be required based on the potential volume of traffic

during the construction phase;

30. Consider potential impacts from sweet/sour hydrocarbon pipelines in the KLJ vicinity.

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2 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Study Introduction

This report describes the results of the 2-day Hazard Identification (HAZID) study performed by

Applus VELOSI for KLJ Organics Qatars ChloroAlky Plant to be constructed in Mesaieed

Industrial City.

The HAZID Review Meeting was held on 18th and 19th February 2014 at QIMC office and

Applus VELOSI office, respectively. The HAZID meeting involved the participation of key

representatives from QP, KLJ, and Engineering contractors. Applus VELOSI provided the

HAZID Chairman and Scribe. This report documents the discussions held and records the

proceedings of the HAZID Review workshop.

2.2 Report Overview

This report provides a brief description of the KLJ plant under consideration the scope of the

HAZID review, the HAZID methodology employed, The HAZID discussions and the team

findings. Section 3.0 describes the scope and objectives of the study while Sections 4.0 and

5.0 provide the methodology employed and specifics regarding this study, respectively. Finally,

Section 6.0 discusses the recommendations resulting from the study. Process areas within the

ChloroAlky plant include the study are listed below:

Chlor Alkali plant (Caustic Soda project);

Chlorinated Paraffin Wax (CPW) plant;

Calcium Chloride (CaCl2) plant; and

Storage, Utilities and other support facilities.

The Worksheets documenting the discussions and findings of the HAZID session are provided

in the appendices along with additional reference information.

2.3 Team Composition

A team knowledgeable in the design and operation of the project and equipment as well as in

the HAZID methodology was assembled to conduct the study. The team consisted of

representatives from KLJ, engineering contractors, and QP. Applus VELOSI provided the

HAZID chairman and Scribe. The team reviewed the design of the project using a structured

guideword HAZID methodology.

Discussions in the HAZID review sessions were recorded in excel using a format consistent with

the QP Guideline for Hazard Identification Study (QP-GDL-S-040 R1). The display of the

spreadsheet was projected onto a screen to enable the entire team to view the study

documentation in real-time. A list of session attendees is documented in this report provided in

Appendix D.

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3 BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

3.1 Description of the Facility

KLJ Organic Qatar W.L.L. (KLJ) is a joint venture company owned by Qatar Industrial

Manufacturing Co. (QIMC) of Qatar and KLJ Organic Ltd. of India. KLJ has acquired a plot

of land in Mesaieed Industrial City (MIC), Qatar to construct a Chlorinated Paraffin Wax

(CPW) plant. The facility will also produce caustic soda, hydrochloric acid, calcium chloride

and sodium hypochlorite ads by-products and co-products.

The plant will have a capacity of approximately 54,500 tons/year of CPW and will also

produce 66,000 tons/year of caustic soda prills, 97,450 tons/year of 32% HCl, 28,000

tons/year of calcium chloride and 6,600 tons/year of sodium hypochlorite.

3.2 Objectives of the HAZID

The objective of the HAZID (Hazard Identification) study is to aid in managing project risk

through the early identification of potential process hazards and threats from an accidental

release of within the Chlorinated Paraffin Wax Plant in MIC. The major benefit of HAZID is that

the early identification and assessment of the critical HSE (Health Safety & Environment)

hazards will provide essential input to project development decisions. This will lead to the

development of a safer design options early in the engineering phase of the project (at a time

when the cost to change is less significant).

3.3 HAZID Methodology

The HAZID technique is designed to identify and mitigate risks associated with design decisions

made in the early stages of the project. By identifying these risks early in the design phase the

cost and schedule impact associated with the implement risk reduction measures is minimized.

HAZID is the first opportunity to have experienced line and HSE staff together to review the

issues surrounding a new venture or development or modification project.

The HAZID was conducted according to the QP guidelines for HAZID to identify potential

hazards through the application of guidewords so that impacts within the following categories

could be assessed:

External and Environmental Hazards;

Facility Hazards;

Health Hazards;

Project Implementation Issues.

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The HAZID study was conducted following the following steps:

The process design team provided an overview of the design intent process operations

and operating conditions of the facility;

The first Hazard Category and guideword (Refer Appendix A) was selected for

consideration;

Credible causes of the hazards were listed;

Consequences of each cause were assessed; along with means of protection and

prevention;

The likelihood of each hazard was assessed;

A risk level for each hazard was assigned using the QP Risk Assessment Matrix (As

shown in Appendix B);

Recommendation for action or further consideration of the hazard were proposed, as

applicable;

Subsequent guidewords and subsequent hazard categories were then selected and the

process repeated;

Figure 1, below, provides a pictorial description of the review process.

Figure 4-1 QP HAZID Process

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3.4 HAZID Checklist

The study method is a combination of identification, analysis and brainstorming based on the

hazards identified on the checklist which is divided into four main sections containing several

categories. The sections contain global hazards and project implementation issues which were

be covered once for the whole development, namely:

Section 1 External and Environmental Hazard

Section 2 Facility Hazards

Section 3 Health Hazards

Section 4 Project Implementation Issues

Subtopics considered for each of these categories during the HAZID Review are listed in

Appendix A.

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4 HAZID STUDY DETAILS

4.1 Process Areas

The HAZID study assessed Hazards associated with the following areas:

Chlor Alkali plant (Caustic Soda project);

Chlorinated Paraffin Wax (CPW) plant;

Calcium Chloride (CaCl2) plant; and

Utilities and other support facilities.

4.2 HAZID Study Documentation (Worksheets)

For those deviations that were considered by the HAZID study team to be credible, the

following information was recorded in the HAZID worksheets (refer to Appendix C):

Hazard Classification: the type of hazard under consideration (e.g.: Loss of

Containment, Ergonomics, Worker Safety, etc.)

Hazard: A source of potential harm or damage, or a situation with potential for harm or damage

Hazard Description / Scenario The written description of the event that results in the

Hazard identified.

Unit/ Area: Location within the Facility under consideration.

Consequences: a description of the worst credible hazard, or series of hazards, or

operability problems that would or could result from the Cause, if subsequent events were to

proceed without consideration of safeguards which may exist. Consequences may arise

beyond the Node under study. If so, these were documented accordingly.

Safeguards / Controls: existing or proposed (for new projects) measures that detect or

warn of a Deviation or Consequence, prevent a Deviation or Consequence, or mitigate the

effects of a Consequence.

Risk: The product of the Likelihood x Consequence of the Hazard Scenario identified.

Remedial Action / Recommendations: recommendations include design, operating, or

maintenance changes that reduce or eliminate Deviations, Causes and/or Consequences.

Residual Risk: The product of the Likelihood x Consequence of the Hazard Scenario

identified after mitigation has been proposed

During the study, the team discussed all possible causes of each deviation from the design

intent and listed them. Once all causes were documented, the team focused on the

consequences for each identified cause. The consequences documented were those that

may credibly arise, given that the cause occurred. Once the consequences were

documented, the team reviewed the process design and operations for safeguards that

would prevent, detect, or mitigate each cause/consequence scenario. Any

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recommendations made are for additional safeguards that are not currently in use at the

facility.

The purposes of the recommendations are to:

reduce the probability of occurrence of an incident;

reduce the severity of the consequences, in the event the incident were to occur;

request further information, when the scenario could not be fully described owing to

a lack of data; or

request an update or addition of a particular document.

5 HAZID RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations were proposed during the HAZID Session as a means of

mitigating the risks associated with Hazards identified in the workshop:

1. QP Industrial Citys heat stress guidelines to be adhered to;

2. KLJ to adopt QP Industrial City's heat stress guidelines for construction and

operations activities;


offsite impacts to MIC for inclusion in the MIC;


overall QRA;

5. KLJ to train staff and raise awareness with regard QP Industrial City's Fire &

Emergency Response systems;

6. Manning / Operations philosophy to be devised according to the IRPA levels assessed

by the QRA;

7. SOPs to require SIMOPs (Simultaneous Operations) study prior to start of concurrent

operations;

8. Evaluate the need for anti-static protection within the H2 areas;

9. Ignition control management system to be established in the facility in line with the

Hazardous area classification;

10. Emergency Response Plan to be developed in line with the QP Industrial citys

Emergency Response plan and the elements of the plan are to be communicated to

the neighbours accordingly;

11. Provide a second point of access to the facility for emergency vehicles such that

vehicles can gain access to the plant from upwind / crosswind location;

12. QRA to be performed in line with QP philosophy for HSE Risk Management Doc. No.

QP-PHL-S-0100 rev.1 and QP Guideline for Quantitative Risk Assessment Doc. No.

QP-GDL-S-032 rev.1;

13. LSIR of 10-6 and blast over pressure of 50mili bar to be maintained within the fence

line;

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14. Recommendations from the QRA regarding the plant layout to be adopted during

detailed engineering;

15. Design philosophy to be ratified for compliance against QP-PHL-S-001 rev.3 QP

Corporate Fire and Safety philosophy and Industrial citys fire safety philosophy /

requirements;

16. ITM (Inspection Testing and Maintenance) programs for fire protection systems to be

developed in accordance with NFPA;

17. Consider implementing thermal protection for segments of water lines that could be

blocked in and liquid full. Protection could be addressed through SOPs requiring

draining small amounts of liquid in the segments of piping that are blocked in;

18. Should SIL Assessment be required, SIL Assessment to be performed for

instrumented protective functions (IPF) as per QP guideline for SIL assessment;

19. KLJ to conduct training of personnel on the requirements of the SOP for bypassing

interlocks, the importance of the interlock system and safety management systems

within the plant;

20. QP Industrial Citys environmental regulations to be adhered to;

21. Flammable and toxic gas detection system installation system / mapping to be

performed in line with the HAZID / QRA consequence analysis result;


system;

23. NFPA 5000, 101 and API or Chlorine Institute recommended practices for the

management of chlorine to be adopted for the project;


system;

25. Consider installing portable hood to capture Chlorine vapours and route to the

scrubber;


offsite impacts to MIC for inclusion in the MIC overall QRA;

27. Consider potential impacts from sweet/sour hydrocarbon pipelines in the KLJ vicinity;


overall QRA;

29. Traffic Management Plan will be required based on the potential volume of traffic

during the construction phase;

30. Consider potential impacts from sweet/sour hydrocarbon pipelines in the KLJ vicinity.

Parking lot issues were captured early in the HAZID process and all items were then

integrated into the HAZID report as recommendations.

APPENDIX A

(QP Hazard Categories and Guidewords)

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Attached is a complete list of the QP HAZID Checklist Categories, Guidewords and

Expanders. A subset of these guidewords and expanders was used for this HAZID as

recorded in the HAZID Worksheets provided in Attachment C.

Section 1: External and Environmental Hazards

Category Guideword Expanders

Natural and Environmental Hazards

Climate Extremes

Lightning

Earthquake

Erosion / Subsidence

Temp, wind, sandstorms flooding

Ground structure, foundations,

Created Hazards (Human factor)

Security Hazards - Terrorist Activity

Internal and external security threats

Effect of the Facility on the Surroundings

Geographical - Infrastructure

Proximity to Population

Adjacent Land Use

Proximity to Transport Corridors

Environmental Issues

Social Issues

Plant location, plant layout

Accommodation camps

Shipping lanes, air routes, roads, etc.

Previous land use, vulnerable fauna and flora, visual impact

Social/cultural areas of significance

Infrastructure Normal Communications

Communications for contingency planning

Supply Support

Road links, air links, water links

Consumables/spares holding

Environmental Damage

Continuous Plant Discharges to Air

Continuous Plant Discharges to Water

Continuous Plant Discharges to Soil

Emergency/upset Discharges

Contaminated Ground

Facility Impact

Waste Disposal Options

Timing of Construction

Flares, vents, fugitive emissions, energy efficiency

Target/legislative requirements, drainage facilities, oil/water separation

Drainage, chemical storage

Flares, vents, drainage

Previous use or events

Area minimization, environmental impact assessment

Seasons, periods of environmental significance

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Section 2: Facility Hazards


Control Methods / Philosophy

Manning/operations Philosophy

Operations Concept

Maintenance Philosophy

Control Philosophy

Manning Levels

Emergency Response

Concurrent Operations

Start-up Shutdown

Effect on design, effect on locality (Manned, unmanned, visited)

1 & 1 Spare or Two 50% systems

Plant/train/equipment item, heavy lifting, access, override, bypass, commonality of equipment, transport

Appropriate technology, (DCS/local panels).

Accommodation, travel, support requirements. Consistency with operations and maintenance, etc. philosophies

Isolation, ESD philosophy

Production, maintenance requirements

Partial or system wide

Fire and Explosion Hazards

Stored Flammables

Sources of Ignition

Equipment Layout

Fire Protection and Response

Operator Protection

Improper storage, operator error (release), defect, impact, fire (mitigation measures include: substitute nonflammable, minimize and separate inventory)

Electricity, static electricity, sparks, hot surfaces (mitigation measures include: identify, remove, separate)

Confinement, escalation (operator error, defect, corrosion), module layout/proximity, orientation of equipment, predominant wind direction (mitigation measures include: reduce degree of confinement, spacing based on consequence assessment, escalation barriers)

Active/passive insulation, fire/gas detection, firefighting facilities

Means of escape, PPE, communications, emergency response.

Process Hazards

Inventory

Release of Inventory

Over Pressure

Excess hazardous material (mitigation measures include: minimize hazardous inventory, alternate processes and utility systems)

Excessive process stress, impact (penetration by foreign object), process control failure, structural failure, erosion or corrosion (mitigation measures include: recognize and minimize process hazards during design, inherently safe plant, containment and recovery measures)

Offsite sources, process blockage, thermal expansion, connection of process to utility

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Over/under Temperature

Excess/zero Level

Wrong Composition/Phase

systems, chemical reaction

Atmospheric conditions, fire, hot surfaces, chemical reaction

Overfill storage tanks, loss of function in separation vessels, blow by to downstream vessels

Offsite contamination, failure of separation process, build-up of wrong phase (sand, hydrates, etc.), toxic substances

Utility Systems Firewater Systems

Fuel Gas

Heating Medium

Diesel Fuel

Power Supply

Steam

Drains

Inert Gas

Waste Storage and Treatment

Chemical/fuel Storage

Potable Water

Sewerage

Maintenance Hazards

Access Requirements Override Necessity

Bypasses Required

Commonality of Equipment

Heavy Lifting Requirements

Transport

Oil Spillage

Confined spaces

Vessels/pipes

Pits

Sewers

Containers

Sumps

Tunnel

Trenches

Excavations

Portable Containers

Manholes

Construction / Existing Facilities

Tie-ins (shutdown requirements)

Concurrent Operations

Reuse of Material

Common Equipment Capacity

Confined spaces

Vessels/pipes

Pits

Sewers

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Interface - Shutdown/blowdown/ ESD

Skid Dimensions (weight handling/equipment (congestion)

Soil Contamination (existing)

Mobilization/ demobilization

Excavation near existing cable

trench

Containers

Sumps

Tunnel

Trenches

Excavations

Portable Containers

Manholes

Section 3: Health Hazards


Health Hazards Disease Hazards

Asphyxiation hazards

Carcinogenic

Toxic

Physical

Mental

Working Hazards

Transport

Chemical & Other Hazards

Endemic diseases, infection, malarial mosquitoes, hygiene - personal and/or catering, contaminated water or foodstuff, social, e.g. AIDS, VD, etc. stagnant water, poor living conditions

Asphyxiating atmospheres, failure to use appropriate PPE, , working in confined spaces, smoke, exhaust

Chemicals in use

Hazardous atmosphere, asphyxiating atmosphere, chemicals in use

Noise, ergonomics

Shift patterns

Diving, working in water, working at heights, hazardous equipment, hazardous surfaces, electricity Extreme weather

Quality of roads (mitigation measures include: effective journey management)

Dust

Smoke

Fumes

Aerosols

Mists

Gasses

Vapor

Fluids / Corrosive Liquids

Fires

Asbestos

Noise

Unergonomic equipment

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Section 4: Project Implementation Issues


Contracting Strategy

Prevailing Influences

Legislation

External Standards

External Environmental Constraints

Stability and contractual conditions , Contractor selection constraints

Governmental contracting requirements

Additional engineering and construction standards

Governmental environmental requirements

Hazards Recognition and Management

Hazard Studies

Hazards and Effects Register

Project Controls

HAZOP, QRA, PHA, EA, HRA, etc.

Quality assurance (change control, interdepartmental involvement and interfaces)

Contingency Planning

Geographical Infrastructure

Recovery Measures

Plant location, plant layout

Medical support, firefighting support, spill leak/clean-up support, security/military support, evacuation

Competency Level of Indigenous Training

Training Requirements

Level of Technology

Quality of local workforce and contractors

APPENDIX B

(Risk Ranking Matrix)

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KLJ (QP) Risk Ranking Matrix

APPENDIX C

(HAZID Study Worksheet)

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1. External and Environmental Hazard H

azar

d N

o.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

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on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/ r

eco

mm

en

dat

ion

s

Re

solu

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n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

D

ue

Dat

e

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

H/M/L

QP Risk Assessment Matrix

H/M/L


NATURAL & ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS

Climate Extremes - High temperature

Heat stress- exposure P

eop

le

Health and Safety.

1. Potential for personnel injury. 2. Impact company liability.

1. Heat stress management including availability of drinking water, breaks and shade. 2. Supreme Council of Health heat stress and medical screening requirements.

M C4 C0 C0 C2

1. QP Industrial Citys heat stress guidelines to be adhered to 2. KLJ to adopt QP Industrial City's heat stress guidelines for construction and operations activities.

KLJ KLJ

M B4 B0 B0 B2

Heat stress- exposure A

sset

Schedule impacts.

1. Impact on schedule resulting on construction delays.

1. KLJ will comply with QP Industrial City's ATP (Approval to Proceed). 2. KLJ construction schedule will account for breaks required by Supreme Council of Health Heat Stress requirement. 3. Provision for night work is available.

M D0 D2 D0 D1

3. KLJ to adopt QP Industrial City's heat stress guidelines for construction and operations activities.

KLJ M C0 C2 C0 C1

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Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

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Safe

guar

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/ C

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Ris

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Peo

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Ass

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Envi

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Re

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tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/ r

eco

mm

en

dat

ion

s

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

D

ue

Dat

e

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

H/M/L


H/M/L


Sand Storms Blowing sand

Peo

ple

A

sset

Health and Safety.

1. Poor visibility and potential for health impact on personnel.

1. Standard PPEs provided.

L C1 C0 C0 C0

1. Potential for delayed maintenance activities.

1. Critical operations provided with stand by equipment and maintenance schedules developed with built in float.

L C0 C1 C0 c0

1. Potential delays in receiving raw materials and dispatching finished goods.

1. Inventory level and receipt of raw mat's will be scheduled so that several days of delay can be accommodated without impact to operations. 2. Product storage capacities will provide for hold up of finished products in case of inability to dispatch goods.

L B0 B2 B0 B0

of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/ r

eco

mm

en

dat

ion

s

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

D

ue

Dat

e

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

H/M/L


H/M/L


Lightning Lightning Strike

Peo

ple

Ass

et

Envi

ron

men

t R

epu

tati

on

Equipment Damage

Potential for equipment and building damage due to lightning strike

Lightning protection / lightning rods installed as per international standards

L B1 B2 B1 B0 L A4 A3 A3 A3

Earthquakes Earthquake

No significant issues. Seismic Data specific to Qatar (Seismic Zone 0) has been incorporated to the design data.

Soil Erosion Soil Erosion

No significant issues. Plant will be back filled and compacted following good industry practice.

0 0 0 0 0

Subsidence Subsidence Strike

No issues identified.

0 0 0 0 0

of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/ r

eco

mm

en

dat

ion

s

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

D

ue

Dat

e

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

H/M/L


H/M/L


CREATED (MANMADE) HAZARDS

Security Hazards Security control outside scope of project

Terrorist Activity Security control outside scope of project

0 0 0 0 0

EFFECT OF THE FACILITY ON THE SURROUNDINGS

Geographical Infrastructure

Geographical Infrastructure Strike P

eop

le

Ass

et

Envi

ron

men

t R

epu

tati

on

Potential impacts to / from outside industry / pipelines resulting from catastrophic accidents within KLJ or neighbouring facilities.

Potential impact to personnel, plant asset and reputation.

1. MIC overall QRA. 2. KLJ undertaking HAZID, HAZOP and QRA. 3. MIC master planning includes safe separation distances.

M B5 B5 B5 B4

4. KLJ to provide input regarding potential catastrophic accidents with potential for offsite impacts to MIC for inclusion in the MIC overall QRA. 5. KLJ to take appropriate action to incorporate recommendations coming from the MIC overall QRA.

KLJ KLJ

M B5 B5 B5 B4

Proximity to Population

Proximity

Addressed within QRA. Refer to QRA report no. ______________

0 0 0 0 0

Adjacent Land Use Adjacent L


0 0 0 0 0

of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/ r

eco

mm

en

dat

ion

s

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

D

ue

Dat

e

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

H/M/L


H/M/L


Proximity to Transport Corridors

Proximity Addressed within QRA. Refer to QRA report no. ______________

0 0 0 0 0

Environmental Issues

Environment

Addressed within EIA. Refer to EIA report no. ______________

0 0 0 0 0

Social Issues Social Issues

No significant issues. Project is located within the MIC master planned industrial city.

0 0 0 0 0

Pipe Routing Pipe Routing


0 0 0 0 0

INFRASTRUCTURE

Normal Communications

Normal Communications Strike

No new issues.

0 0 0 0 0

Communications for Contingency planning

Communications for Contingency planning Strike

No new issues.

0 0 0 0 0

Supply Support Supply Support Strike

No new issues.

0 0 0 0 0

Road Transport Road Transport Strike

No new issues.

0 0 0 0 0

of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/ r

eco

mm

en

dat

ion

s

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

D

ue

Dat

e

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

H/M/L


H/M/L


ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE

Continuous Plant Discharges to Air

Continuous

Environmental Clearance obtained. No significant issues. Refer to EIA report no. ____________

0 0 0 0 0

Continuous Plant Discharges to Water

Continuous


0 0 0 0 0

Continuous Plant Discharges to Soil

Continuous


0 0 0 0 0

Emergency/Upset Discharges

Emergency/Upset Discharges Strike

Not applicable.

0 0 0 0 0

Contaminated Ground

Contaminant


0 0 0 0 0

of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/ r

eco

mm

en

dat

ion

s

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

D

ue

Dat

e

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

H/M/L


H/M/L


Facility Impact Facility I Environmental Clearance obtained. No significant issues. Refer to EIA report no. ____________

0 0 0 0 0

Waste disposal Options

Waste disposal


0 0 0 0 0

Timing of Construction

Timing of


0 0 0 0 0

of 55

2. Facility Hazard H

azar

d N

o.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/ r

eco

mm

en

dat

ion

s

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

D

ue

Dat

e

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

H/M/L QP Risk Assessment

Matrix H/M/L


CONTROL METHODS / PHILOSOPHY

Manning/Operations Philosophy

Loss of Containment P

eop

le

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t R

epu

tati

on

Lack of process communication between area 1 and area 2.

Potential of overfilling HCl and CPW tanks in area 2.

1. Common control system is designed covering area 1 and area 2 with display in the control room.

L B1 B1 B1 B1


eop

le

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t R

epu

tati

on

Emergency condition within the facility.

Potential for escalation of the incident due to inadequate response capability.

1. ERP includes requirements for first respondents and support from Mesaieed Fire department.

M B3 B4 B3 B2

6. KLJ to train staff and raise awareness with regard QP Industrial City's Fire & Emergency Response systems. 7. Manning / Operations philosophy to be devised according to the IRPA levels assessed by the QRA.

KLJ KLJ

M B2 B3 B2 B2


eop

le

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t R

epu

tati

on

Construction or maintenance activities on-going concurrently with plant operations.

Potential increased risk to personnel during simultaneous operations.

1. SOPs and contractor training.

L B1 B1 B0 B0

8. SOPs to require SIMOPs (Simultaneous Operations) study prior to start of concurrent operations.

KLJ

L B0 B0 B0 B0

of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/ r

eco

mm

en

dat

ion

s

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

D

ue

Dat

e

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on


Matrix H/M/L


FIRE & EXPLOSION HAZARDS

Stored Flammables Loss of Containment P

eop

le

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t R

epu

tati

on

Loss of containment of Paraffin, Olefins and LGOs.

Potential for liquid accumulation and pool fire due to release of liquid hydrocarbons.

1. Secondary containment. 2. Mechanical Integrity Program in compliance with WOQOOD requirements to lease LGO storage tank from WOQOD. 3. Storage facilities designed in accordance with NFPA 30.

M B1 B3 B2 B2

Sources of Ignition Loss of Containment P

eop

le

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t R

epu

tati

on

Potential for ignition of H2 gas.

Potential for H2 explosion resulting personnel injuries and damage to plant.

1. Area classification has been designated according to zone classification following IP15. 2. No smoking policy within the process area.

M B4 B3 B3 B3

9. Evaluate the need for anti static protection within the H2 areas. 10. Ignition control management system to be established in the facility inline with the Hazardous area classification.

KLJ KLJ

L A4 A3 A3 A3

of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/ r

eco

mm

en

dat

ion

s

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

D

ue

Dat

e

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on


Matrix H/M/L


Emergency Access and Egress to Plant


eop

le

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t R

epu

tati

on

Single point of entry to the plant site.

Inability to meet the requirement to provide QP fire access to the facility from two points of entry in an emergency.

1. None. M C3 C4 C3 C2

11. Emergency Response Plan to be developed in line with the QP Industrial citys Emergency Response plan and this to be communicated to the neighbors accordingly. 12. Provide a second point of access to the facility for emergency vehicles such that vehicles can gain access to the plant from upwind / crosswind location.

KLJ KLJ / QP

M B3 B4 B3 B2

of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/ r

eco

mm

en

dat

ion

s

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

D

ue

Dat

e

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on


Matrix H/M/L


Equipment Layout

Poor equipment spacing.

Potential for escalation of incident due to domino effect.

1. Plant layout has been designed in accordance with good engineering practice.

L A3 A4 A2 A2

13. QRA to be performed inline with QP philosophy for HSE Risk Management Doc.No. QP-PHL-S-0100 rev.1 and QP Guideline for Quantitative Risk Assessment Doc. No. QP-GDL-S-032 rev.1. 14. LSIR of 10-6 and blast over pressure of 50mili bar to be maintained within the fence line. 15. Recommendations from the QRA regarding the plant layout to be adopted during detailed engineering.

KLJ KLJ KLJ

L A2 A3 A2 A2

of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/ r

eco

mm

en

dat

ion

s

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

D

ue

Dat

e

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on


Matrix H/M/L


Fire Protection & Response


eop

le

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t R

epu

tati

on

Fire protection system failure.

Ineffective response in case of a fire emergency.

1. Fire protection systems are designed in accordance with NFPA.

L A3 A4 A2 A2

16. Design philosophy to be ratified for compliance against QP-PHL-S-001 rev.3 QP Corporate Fire and Safety philosophy and Industrial citys fire safety philosophy / requirements. 17. ITM (Inspection Testing and Maintenance) programs for fire protection systems to be developed in accordance with NFPA.

KLJ KLJ

L A2 A3 A2 A2

Operator Protection No new issues.

of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/ r

eco

mm

en

dat

ion

s

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

D

ue

Dat

e

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on


Matrix H/M/L


PROCESS HAZARDS

Process Hazards Loss of Containment A

sset

Solar Radiation

Potential for thermal expansion of liquid full lines with potential to over pressure blocked in segments of pipe.

1. HCl and CPW pipes from area 1 and area 2 are PVC, FRP, respectively. 2. Liquid Cl2 lines are insulated and not in direct sunlight and are equipped with over pressure protection using rupture disc and expansion tanks.

L C0 C1 C0 C0

18. Consider implementing thermal protection for segments of water lines that could be blocked in and liquid full. Protection could be addressed through SOPs requiring draining small amounts of liquid in the segments of piping that are blocked in.

KLJ L C0 C0 C0 C0

UTILITY SYSTEMS

Fuel Gas (H2) Loss of Containment N

on

e

Potential for H2 leaks in the piping connections.

Potential for H2 vapour within the process area and possible flash fire if ignited.

1. H2 line pressure is very low (max 0.44kg/cm2).

L E0 E0 E0 E0

of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/ r

eco

mm

en

dat

ion

s

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

D

ue

Dat

e

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on


Matrix H/M/L



eop

le

Ass

ets

Rep

uta

tio

n

Negative pressure in the H2 system.

Potential ingress of O2 into the H2 system with potential for fire / explosion.

1. Pressure transmitter monitors in H2 system pressure and in low pressure introduces N2 into the system to maintain pressure. 2. H2 vent provided with steam quenching and flame arrester. 3. H2 vent is equipped with H20 seal. 4. H2 vent is located at an elevated safe location in an unmanned area.

M C1 C2 C0 C1

Diesel Fuel Loss of Containment P

eop

le

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t R

epu

tati

on

Loss of containment of diesel fuel.

Potential for a diesel spill with potential for environmental impact and fire.

1. Diesel storage tank installation compliant with NFPA requirements.

L B2 B2 B2 B2

of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/ r

eco

mm

en

dat

ion

s

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

D

ue

Dat

e

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on


Matrix H/M/L


Power Supply Loss of Power N

on

e Loss of power supply.

Unplanned plant shut down.

1.Back up diesel generator. 2. UPS. 3. Safety interlocks and instrument designed to fail to safe position.

L D0 D0 D0 D0

19. Should SIL Assessment be required, SIL Assessment to be performed for instrumented protective functions (IPF) as per QP guideline for SIL assessment.

KLJ

Waste Storage & Treatment

No significant issues.

MAINTENANCE HAZARDS

Access Requirements


Interlock Bypasses Required

Safety System Failure P

eop

le

Ase

ts

Envi

ron

men

t R

epu

tati

on

Potential to operate plant without safety interlocks.

Operation of the plant outside safe operating limits with potential for incidents leading to personnel injury, asset damage and environmental impact.

1. SOPs will dictate mechanism for administration control to remove and replace bypasses of interlocks. 2. Operator competency levels insured prior to placement as DCS operator.

M C2 C3 C1 C1

20. KLJ to conduct training of personnel on the requirements of the SOP for bypassing interlocks, the importance of the interlock system and safety management systems within the plant.

KLJ M B2 B3 B1 B1

Reduced Visibility


Confined space No New Issues.

of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/ r

eco

mm

en

dat

ion

s

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

D

ue

Dat

e

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on


Matrix H/M/L


CONSTRUCTION / EXISTING FACILITIES

Tie-Ins (Shutdown Requirements)

No significant issues existing systems will be shutdown prior to tie in.

Reuse of Material

Zero Discharge Facility - No significant Issues

Interface-Shutdown / Blowdown / ESD

No New issues

Equipment Congestion

Assessed as part of Plant Layout Guideword, No new Issues

Soil Contamination (Existing Facilities)

Not Applicable - Baseline soil & groundwater sampling conducted as part of EIA.

21. QP Industrial Citys environmental regulations to be adhered to.

KLJ

EXTERNAL EFFECTS

Transport No New Issues

Fatigue/Cracking

No High Pressure H2 service in the plant.

of 55

3. Health Hazard H

azar

d N

o.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/

reco

mm

end

atio

ns

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

Du

e D

ate

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on


Matrix H/M/L


HEALTH HAZARDS

Disease Hazards

None identified.

Asphyxiation Hazards

Human Error

Peo

ple

A

sset

s R

epu

tati

on

Internal equipment inspection / maintenance

Potential for personal injury and possible fatality due to lack of Oxygen.

1. PTW process that addresses confined space entry.

M B4 B0 B0 B1

Carcinogenic


of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/

reco

mm

end

atio

ns

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

Du

e D

ate

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on


Matrix H/M/L


Toxic Loss of Containment

Peo

ple

A

sset

s En

viro

nm

ent

Rep

uta

tio

n Chlorine

release from the electrolyser OVHD line.

Potential for the formation of a toxic Cl2 vapour cloud with potential for personnel exposure leading to over exposure (above the STL) and possible fatality.

1. Mechanical integrity program includes daily visual inspection and periodic replacement of FRP piping in accordance with good engineering practice. 2. Cl2 gas detection in the vicinity of the leak source and at unit battery limit. On alarm manual action is taken to capture leaking Cl2 and route to the scrubber or shut down the plant. 3. The electrolyser overhead line is a low pressure system thus any leak will be localized. 4. Control system is designed to shut down the plant on low pressure (which will be caused by a moderate leak).

L B2 B1 B1 B1

22. Flammable and toxic gas detection system installation system / mapping to be performed in line with the HAZID / QRA consequence analysis result. 23.Consider installing manual Emergency Shutdown (ESD) in the vicinity of the Cl2 system.

KLJ KLJ

L B1 B1 B1 B1

of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/

reco

mm

end

atio

ns

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

Du

e D

ate

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on


Matrix H/M/L


Loss of Containment

Peo

ple

A

sset

s En

viro

nm

ent

Rep

uta

tio

n Chlorine

release from the Cl2 compressor discharge.

Potential for Cl2 gas entry into control room or other occupied bldg. through HVAC air intake.

1. Mechanical integrity program includes visual inspection, wall thickness checks and periodic replacement as required. 2. Cl2 gas detection in the vicinity of the leak source and at unit battery limit. On alarm manual action is taken to capture leaking Cl2 and route to the scrubber or shut down the plant.

L A4 B1 B1 B2

24. NFPA 5000, 101 and API or Chlorine Institute recommended practices for the management of chlorine to be adopted for the project. 25.Consider installing manual Emergency Shutdown (ESD) in the vicinity of the Cl2 system.

KLJ KLJ

L A3 B1 B1 B2

of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/

reco

mm

end

atio

ns

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

Du

e D

ate

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on


Matrix H/M/L


Liquid Cl2 release / spill from in process liquid tank.

Presence of toxic Cl2 vapours with potential for personnel exposure above STEL and possible fatality.

1. Mechanical integrity program includes integrity checks of process tanks. 2. Cl2 gas detection in the vicinity of the leak source and at unit battery limit. On alarm manual action is taken to capture leaking Cl2 and route to the scrubber or shut down the plant. 3. Standby by empty tank available for transfer of liquid Cl2 from leaking tank to stand by tank. 4. Two isolation block valves provided in series on each inlet and outlet line of the liquid Cl2 process tank. 5.Cl2 vapour extraction hood available for capture of Cl2 leaks. Cl2 routed to scrubber system. 6. SOPs include operator rounds and visual / olfactory checks for Cl2 leaks.

M C4 C1 C1 C2

26. Consider installing portable hood to capture Chlorine vapours and route to the scrubber.

KLJ M B4 B1 B1 B2

of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/

reco

mm

end

atio

ns

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

Du

e D

ate

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on


Matrix H/M/L



eop

le

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t R

epu

tati

on

Fugitive emissions of Cl2.

Release of Cl2 vapours with potential for personnel exposure above TLV resulting in long term personnel exposure.

1. Mechanical integrity program includes the inspection and preventive maintenance of valves, flanges, and other piping components. 2. Cl2 gas detection in the vicinity of the leak source and at unit battery limit. On alarm manual action is taken to capture leaking Cl2 and route to the scrubber or shut down the plant.

L B1 B1 B1 B1

Loss of Containment

Peo

ple

A

sset

s En

viro

nm

ent

Rep

uta

tio

n

HCl liquid release / spill.

Potential for formation of HCl fumes leading to personnel exposure.

1. Secondary containment around HCl storage tanks. 2. HCl gas detection in scrubber area.

L C1 C1 C1 C1

Loss of Containment

Peo

ple

A

sset

s En

viro

nm

ent

Rep

uta

tio

n

H2SO4 liquid release / spill.

Potential for personnel burns.

1. PPE in the acid storage area includes protection against contact with acid. 2. Flange guards to be provided.

L C1 C1 C1 C1

Loss of Containment

Peo

ple

A

sset

s En

viro

nm

ent

Rep

uta

tio

n

Liquid / solid Caustic Soda spillage.

Potential for personnel burns.

1. PPE in the caustic storage area includes protection against contact with caustic soda.

L C1 C1 C1 C1

of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/

reco

mm

end

atio

ns

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

Du

e D

ate

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on


Matrix H/M/L


Physical Ergonomics

Peo

ple

R

epu

tati

on

Manual handling of bagged materials (up to 50kg)

Potential for personnel injury due to lifting of heavy objects.

1. SOPs require 2 persons for lifting of 50kg bags. 2. Fork lifts, mono rails and lifting hoists provided to assist with movement and placement of bags. 3. Training of personnel on proper lifting techniques.

M C2 C0 C0 C1

Working Hazards

Electrocution

Peo

ple

R

epu

tati

on

Maintenance on electrical equipment.

Potential for electrocution and fatality.

1. PTW system. 2.SOPs. 3. Rubber mats provided on the floor in front of panels.

M B4 B0 B0 B1

Mental Fatigue

Peo

ple

Rotating shift pattern.

Potential for fatigue resulting in increased human error.

1. Shift pattern will follow general accepted industry pattern.

M B2 B3 B2 B2

Transport


of 55

Haz

ard

No

.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/

reco

mm

end

atio

ns

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

No

.

Act

ion

Par

ty

Act

ion

Tim

ing

(Pro

ject

Ph

ase

) /

Act

ion

Du

e D

ate

Act

ion

Sta

tus

Re

sid

ual

Ris

k A

fte

r A

ctio

n

Imp

lem

en

tati

on

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on


Matrix H/M/L


Hearing loss Exposure

Peo

ple

High noise level within the facility.

Potential of loss of hearing due to long term exposure to high noise level.

1. all equipment packages designed for maximum noise level of 85 dBA at 1m distance. 2. hearing protection required in high noise areas.

M B3 B0 B0 B1

of 55

4. Project Implementation H

azar

d N

o.

Haz

ard

Cla

ssif

icat

ion

Haz

ard

Haz

ard

De

scri

pti

on

/ S

cen

ario

Un

it/

Are

a

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

Safe

guar

ds

/ C

on

tro

ls

Ris

k

Peo

ple

Ass

ets

Envi

ron

men

t

Re

pu

tati

on

Re

me

dia

l Act

ion

/ R

eco

mm

en

dat

ion

s

Re

solu

tio

n

Act

ion

HAZID Report for ChloroAlky Plant 26 Feb 2014

Documents

Transcript of HAZID Report for ChloroAlky Plant 26 Feb 2014