Hazop & Hazid Report - Cng Gas Plant - Tambak Lorok Rev b

Approved as Noted

DOCUMENT STATUS

Not Approved

:

Approved:

Project Title :

ENGINEERING PROCUREMENT AND CONSTRUCTION COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS - TAMBAK LOMBOK

HAZOP AND HAZID STUDIES REPORT

B 24 JUL 2013 REISSUED FOR REVIEW YS MTH MEF

A 28 JUN 2013 ISSUED FOR REVIEW YS MTH MEF

REV DATE D E S C R I P T I O N PREPARED CHECKED APPROVED COMPANY

PT. Enviromate Technology International PT Pertadaya Gas HAZOP/HAZID of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK

HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB JULY 2013

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION 7

1.1 BACKGROUND 7 1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES 7 1.3 SCOPE OF HAZOP/HAZID STUDY 8 1.4 REPORT LAYOUT 8

2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION 9

2.1 OVERVIEW 9 2.1.1 Inlet scrubber (V-100) 9 2.1.2 Station Inlet metering (M-100 A/B) 9 2.1.3 Dryer Unit (D-100 A/B) 10 2.1.4 Compressor (K-101 / … / K-109) 10 2.1.5 CNG Cooler ( E-100) 11 2.1.6 CNG storage cylinders (V-200 1/../ 82) 11 2.1.7 Double pipe Exchanger 12 2.1.8 CNG Heat Exchanger (E-200) 12 2.1.9 Pressure reducing system (PV-0501 A/B) 12 2.1.10 Storage and Decanting process 12 2.1.11 Station Outlet Metering (M-200 A/B) 13 2.1.12 Waste Heat recovery Unit (E-300) 13 2.1.13 Fuel Gas 13 2.1.14 Instrument air 13 2.1.15 Cooling water (E-400) 14 2.1.16 Fire water system 14 2.1.17 Water treatment system (W-001) 14 2.1.18 Insulation 14 2.1.19 Vent System 14

3 STUDY METHODOLOGY 16

3.1 HAZOP 16 3.1.1 Overview 16 3.1.2 Worksheet Definition 16 3.2 HAZID 16 3.2.1 Overview 16 3.2.2 Worksheet Definitions 17

4 HAZOP/HAZID REVIEW SESSIONS 18

4.1 INTRODUCTION 18 4.2 THE HAZOP/HAZID TEAM 18 4.3 GUIDE WORDS 18 4.4 DRAWINGS REVIEWED 19 4.5 SELECTED NODES 20

PT. Enviromate Technology International PT Pertadaya Gas HAZOP/HAZID of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK


5 HAZOP/HAZID RESULTS 21

5.1 ACTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS 21 5.2 MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIO 23

6 HAZOP/HAZID FOLLOW-UP 25

7 REFERENCES 26

APPENDIX A HAZOP/HAZID SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS APPENDIX B HAZOP REVIEW WORKSHEETS APPENDIX C HAZID REVIEW WORKSHEETS APPENDIX D DRAWINGS

PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. PROSIM PT. Pertadaya Gas


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The PT Perta Daya Gas has awarded to PT. Enviromate Technology International (PT. ETI) to conduct and construction of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) facility. The plant will be located at Tambak Lorok, Central Java, Indonesia. The CNG facility is consisting of following equipment: Gas-Liquid separation system, Gas Drying & H2S adsorption system, Gas Compression system, CNG Cylinders storage package, Heat Exchangers and Metering systems.

The Utility for supporting CNG Plant are consisting Fuel Gas System, Gas power generation, Air Instrument Package, Waste Heat Recovery Unit, Pumps, Cooling towers, Water treatment Package and Sump system.

The incoming gas is taken from existing pipe then being compressed to CNG storage cylinders by CNG Compressors. Storage CNG will be performed maximum at 20 hours/day and decanting phase will be performed on the peak load within 4 hours/day (18.00 to 23.00). The design capacity of CNG Plant is 19.88 MMSCFD gas to the CNG storage cylinders.

Waste heat recovery Unit is provided to utilize the energy from exhaust compressor gas engine to reduce Joule Thompson effect on the pressure reducing system. The WHRU will heat water from tank which will be utilized as heating media of the CNG gas on CNG heat exchanger.

Cooling water system which consisting of Cooling Tower, Circulation pumps and CNG cooler will be pro-vided to optimize the requirement of CNG cylinders.

The HAZOP/HAZID review sessions were carried out at the Istana Karang Laut office in Plaza Citivew Kemang, Jakarta, utilizing 2 days for review, over the period 17th, and 21st June 2013.

The study identified 40 HAZOP recommendations and 18 HAZID recommendations. The recommendations would reduce potential safety or operability problems associated with the process or improve the clarity of the process drawings.

HAZOP

Design

It was noted in the HAZOP It identified during the review and also with discussion with Tambak Lorok, some of the valve arrangement need to be lock open to ensure that it doesn’t block due to human error (eg. at upstream BDV, by pass line). General comments also noted to provide setting for all the instrumentation system (e.g. PIC, PSHH, PSV)

It’s been reviewed that gas from suction compressor can be directed to downstream of E-200 to metering M-200 resulting in double counting of sales gas from Gundih meter with M-100. It was recommended to install additional check valve to PG-2"-3C-027 to prevent that case.

It recommended to provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent of sump tank due to gas blow by from V-100, to ensure equipment purchase suitable as per hazardous area classification and also to nsure vent stack at sump tank is located high enough to prevent exposure to personnel/operator at Incoming Scrubber System.



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In the Waste Heat Recovery Unit, it was recommended to provide PSHH at downstream P-500A/B to trip P-500A/B in the case of manual valve at upstream E-300 inadvertenly close resulting in overpressure of the system.

The existing fire water capacity need to be reviewed to ensure source of water and its amount is adequate to handle fire on the CNG plant in addition with existing fire water requirement in Tambak Lorok.

It was discussed also that the design of floating valve T-600 to be radar type.

Maintenance and Operational

Based on the discussion raised up, it’s required to develop operating manual for delivery gas including showing correlation between pressure and flow at storage period and operation of redundant equipment such as compressor.

To control corrosion at basin cooling tower, it was recommended to provide SOP to control PH at cooling tower periodically.

HAZID

In the HAZID session, location of the lightning stack has not identified yet, therefore it is recommended to review the location of the lightning stack to be away from the venting stack to reduce the probability of fire on the vent stack

It was reviewed also that high noise level around the compressor area will potentially injured the personnel who operate the plant in daily basis. It was recommended to have noise study and provide warning sign the area to use ear plug protection.

Fire and Gas detection was also reviewed in the HAZID, it is recommended to provide the philosophy of the fire and gas detection system of the plant in formal documentation and provide clear actions of each detector, which one create alarm or shut down/blowdown of the plant. Fire detection philosophy was not provided in the building, specifically in the electrical room such as control room/MCC/batery room. It is recommended to provide clear philosophy, e.g. providing early warning system for smoke detection in electrical room (High Sensitivity Smoke Detector), including fire suppression system such as portable fire extinguisher or automatic fire suppresion system (e.g. FM-200,etc)

The scenario of fire and explosion in the CNG plant was not established yet during the review especially in relation position of the processing facility to location where stand by personnel available such as control room. Therefore, review of this scenario is recommended to justify design and location of the control room building. It is include also the fire and explosion impact to surrounding facility at Tambak Lorok. In the discussion also identified that the control room will not provided with glass windows to avoid explosion effect from the plant, hence that CCTV is recommended to be provided in the control room to monitor the plant.

During the review, location of the vent stack has not been identified yet. Therefore, dispersion and radiation analysis need to be done to define safe location and height required for the vent stack.

Consideration for emergency situation was also reviewed, and it is recommended to review emergency evacuation plan including emergency route, muster point location, safety equipment lay out and emergency lighting.



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Good communication among parties involved (Tambak Lorok and Gundih) also important to make sure operability and deliverability of the process plant, especially to handle emergency situation. Therefore a procedure defining internal and external communication need to be established among parties to make sure the plant is operated safely.

MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIO

The Major Hazard of this plant is :

• Process Hazard : 1. High Pressure Gas containment in the CNG Storage Tanks 2. Gas Compression System 3. Hot water circulation system 4. Cold Venting

• Non Process Hazard :

1. Control Room located in hazardous area 2. Human Error - Alarm 3. Communication between ETI, IP, Gundih 4. Transportation



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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

PT. Perta Daya Gas is planning to develop CNG Plant Project. The plant will be located at Tambak Lorok, Central Java province, Indonesia.

PT. Perta Daya Gas therefore commissioned an independent Chairman and Scribe for a series of safety studies to review and identify hazards and operability issues related to operation of Compressed Natural Gas Plant Project.

This report details the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) and Hazard Identification (HAZID) review and includes a summary of the recommendations identified during the review, as well as the HAZOP/HAZID review worksheets.

1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the HAZOP study are to:

• Identify safety related hazards and operability problems related to the process that could directly threaten the safety of production personnel or cause operational problems;

• Determine the seriousness of the consequences for the identified problems;

• Identify engineering and procedural safeguards already incorporated into the design that will reduce the likelihood or the severity of consequences related to the identified problem;

• Evaluate the adequacy of existing engineering and procedural safeguards; and

• Recommend additional safeguards or operational procedures where necessary.

The objectives of the HAZID study include:

• Assess changes and consider new requirements that have emerged since the last PHA;

• Identification of new hazard causes or initiating factors associated with the modifications with a potential to result in major accident events (MAEs), which may give rise to serious and immediate risk to health and safety of personnel;

• Assessment of the consequences of these new MAEs;

• Determination of risk based on the likelihood and the severity of the consequences for each identified MAEs;

• Identification of existing safeguards that may include engineering or operational controls and measures included in the design for prevention and/or mitigation of the MAEs;

• Evaluation of the residual risk taking into account the existing control and mitigation measures; and

• Recommendation of additional safeguards or procedures, where necessary to demonstrate as Low as Reasonable Practicable (ALARP).



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1.3 SCOPE OF HAZOP/HAZID STUDY

The HAZOP/HAZID study covers these packages in detail:

1. Main Proces System:

· V-100 : Gas Scrubber

· M -100A/B & M -200A/B : Station Inlet & Outlet Metering

· D-100A/B : Gas Dryer

· K-101 to K109 : CNG Compressors

· E-100 : CNG Cooler & E-200 : CNG Heat Exchager

· V-200-1 to V-200-80 : CNG Compartement

· V-400 : Sump Tank

2. Utilities

· WHRU and Hot Water circulation

· Water Treatment Facilities and Cold water circulation

· Open & Close Drains

· Venting system

· Instrument Air System

· Fuel Gas System

· Fire Water Ring

· Engine Generator

1.4 REPORT LAYOUT

This HAZOP/HAZID report is structured as follows:

• Section 1 gives an introduction, defining the objectives and scope of the study;

• Section 2 describes the process;

• Section 3 describes the HAZOP/HAZID methodology;

• Section 4 describes the HAZOP/HAZID workshops;

• Section 5 lists the references given in the report;

• Appendix A presents the summary HAZOP & HAZID recommendations;

• Appendix B presents the HAZOP review worksheets;

• Appendix C presents the HAZID review worksheets; and

• Appendix D presents the Drawings used, outlining the nodes.



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2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION

2.1 OVERVIEW

The CNG facility is consisting of following equipment: Gas-Liquid separation system, Gas Drying

& H2S adsorption system, Gas Compression system, CNG Cylinders storage package, Heat

Exchangers and Metering systems.

The Utility for supporting CNG Plant are consisting Fuel Gas System, Gas power generation, Air

Instru-ment Package, Waste Heat Recovery Unit, Pumps, Cooling towers, Water treatment Package

and Sump system.

The incoming gas is taken from existing pipe then being compressed to CNG storage cylinders by

CNG Compressors. Storage CNG will be performed maximum at 20 hours/day and decanting phase

will be performed on the peak load within 4 to 5 hours/day (18.00 to 23.00). The design capacity of

CNG Plant is 19.88 MMSCFD gas to the CNG storage cylinders.

Waste heat recovery Unit is provided to utilize the energy from exhaust compressor gas engine to

reduce Joule Thompson effect on the pressure reducing system. The WHRU will heat water from

tank which will be utilized as heating media of the CNG gas on CNG heat exchanger.

Cooling water system which consisting of Cooling Tower, Circulation pumps and CNG cooler will

be pro-vided to optimize the requirement of CNG cylinders.

2.1.1 Inlet scrubber (V-100)

The gas scrubber (V-100) will be installed on incoming gas to remove any hydrocarbon liquid from

upstream facility. The liquid level on the gas scrubber will be controlled by control valve LV-0101

to avoid liquid carried over to the CNG Plant. High liquid level on the scrubber will initiate the

valve to open, then if liquid level has reached normal condition valve will be closed, so the valve

will be as on/off mode.

The gas scrubber is provided with PSV-0101A/B with set pressure of 34 barg for overpressure

protection, One PSV will be on operation and another one as spare.

Inlet line will be provided with SDV-0101 in order to isolate the plant in emergency condition. The

initiators of SDV-0101 closing refer to Cause & effect diagram.

2.1.2 Station Inlet metering (M-100 A/B)

The metering will measure natural gas inlet to CNG plant. Total gas inlet is 19.88 MMSCFD. Gas

inlet would be 19.88 MMSCFD and flows to inlet compressor and 1.1 MMSCFD flows to auxiliary

fuel gas. Metering type is 2x100% custody orifice meter. Metering will be operated in continous

operation. Flow and accumulation flow should be monitored by flow computer. Gas inlet to

metering tends to consist of high moisture. Orifice should be designed for wet gas condition.



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2.1.3 Dryer Unit (D-100 A/B)

The outlet gas from gas scrubber (V-100) will be dried through Gas Drying Unit (D-100A/B). Unit

consist of two Gas Dryer + H2S absorber, i.e D-100A/B and D-200A/B. These will be operated on

parallel configuration. Maximum capacity of drying Unit is 10 MMSCFD. The range of inlet

pressure is 20.6-25 barg. One bed will be on drying mode and the other one is on regenerating

mode. Gas dryer will remove water and H2S content on the feed gas to produce moisture dew point

to -40oC and maximum 3 ppm H2S. Dew point meter and H2S meter should be installed within

Dryer package unit. Adsorption time is 4-8 hours and the regeneration time is 4-8 hours (heating,

cooling and standby).

Gas dryer pre filter (F-100) will be provided at upstream of desiccant gas dryer (D-100A/B) to

ensure that gas goes to molecular sieve is clean and no hydrocarbon liquid carried over. One filter

will be operated and bypass line opened during filter maintenance, pressure differential indicator

will be provided across the filter such that operator will able to determine the switching operation.

Gas dryer after filter (F-110) will be provided on the downstream of desiccant gas dryer (D-100A/B)

to ensure that are there is no solid particle carried over on the gas before entering the CNG

compressor. One filter will be operated and bypass line opened during filter maintenance, pressure

differential indicator will be provided across the filter such that operator will able to determine the

switching operation.

Blower, electric heater, air cooler and liquid knocked out drum will be provided on the regeneration

line. A portion of dried gas will be utilized as regeneration gas. The regeneration gas will be heated

by an electric heater then after removing the water on the desiccants, the regent gas will be cooling

downed via the air cooler then liquid will be removed on the liquid knocked out drum. After

removing liquid on the knocked out drum, regent gas will be re-injected on the main gas line.

The valve sequences on the dryer unit will be controlled by a microprocessor on the dryer unit

package. Running and fault status on the dryer package will be transferred to Plant Control System

(PCS) for monitoring only.

This system is auto mode. No interlock system to main PCS.

2.1.4 Compressor (K-101 / … / K-110)

The dry gas from dryer with operating pressure of 20.6-25 barg at 26.7-51.7 oCwill be transferred to

the storage cylinder at pressure of 250 barg through CNG compressors (K-

101/102/103/104/105/106/107/108/109/110). There are 10 (ten) compressor trains with 9 (nine)

compressors will be operated in parallel and 1 (one) compressor on standby mode.

Each compressor will be operated with outlet capacity of 2.3 MMSCFD at inlet pressure of 24 barg.



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The compressor is reciprocating type in three stages compression, air coolers will be provided on

each discharge stage to enhance the efficiency of compressor.

The maximum discharge pressure and temperature from CNG compressor are 250 barg and 48OC

respectively. The compressor will be supplied by vendor as a skid including electrical and

instrumentation inside. Control system of CNG compressor is provided with PLC by vendor, the

operating parameter will be transferred to Plant Control System (PCS) for monitoring purpose.

Shutdown system of the compressors will be managed by PLC, trigger of shutdown such as lube oil

pressure low, suction pressure low, discharge pressure high, discharge temperature high and High

vibration will be further developed by vendor.

Compressors are driven by Gas Engine drive with fuel gas that supplied from upstream of dryer

skid.

2.1.5 CNG Cooler ( E-100)

Compressed gas from CNG compressor with temperature of 48oC will be cooled down to 35oC

before entering to CNG cylinders. Cooling water system is closed loop cooling system which

involving CNG cooler (E-100), Cooling water circulation pump (P-200A/B) and Cooling Tower (E-

400). The compressed natural gas need to be cooled down to 35oC for optimizing the requirement of

cylinder storage capacity. The temperature of cooling water inlet to CNG cooler (E-100) is 30oC and

temperature cooling water outlet at 39oC. To avoid prolonged overpressure due to tube rupture,

CNG Compressor would be shut downed by PSHH-0503 then CNG gas would be release to cooling

water return line to Cooling tower (E-400).

DURING DECANTING PERIOD:

Cooling water to CNG Cooler will be discontinued to produce CNG stream with temperature 48oC

and it will be commingled with CNG stream from compartment (Temperature 35 oC).

If pressure decreases and disturbing performance of CNG compressor then CNG stream could be

flowed through E-100 bypass line. Restriction orifice installed in this bypass line to giving sufficient

backpressure for CNG compressor.

2.1.6 CNG storage cylinders (V-200 1/../ 82)

CNG from E-200 will be stored at CNG storage cylinders. The CNG storage cylinders are consisting

of 95 compartment (base on 20 hours storage time at 18.7 MMSCFD CNG inlet). Each

compartment is consisting of 8 tube cylinders. One cylinder has capacity of 2.38 m3. Three CNG

compartment will be arranged in 1 (one) bank. Each bank will be provided 1 unit manual valve for

incoming and outgoing CNG. Pressure relief device (PSV) protect respectives cylinders. Discharge

PSV will be released to atmosphere and no additional pipe is required for PSV discharge line.



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2.1.7 Double pipe Exchanger

Double pipe exchanger would be installed at downstream of PV-0501 to minimize temperature

drop during CNG depressuring by PV-0501 A/B. Heating media is using Hot water in outer pipe

side and CNG stream in inner pipe. Timer valve (KV) would be opened to supply hot water to outer

pipe of double pipe exchanger. Restriction orifice (RO) is provided on hot water inlet to restrict

capacity of hot water to exchanger.

If temperature at downstream PV-0501 close with -25o C, Hot water supply could be discontinued

this condition occur when pressure in compartments was dropped.

2.1.8 CNG Heat Exchanger (E-200)

The CNG Heat exchanger is required during decanting stage, this is to reheat CNG on the

downstream of pressure reducing valve. The temperature decrease due to large pressure drop in

PV0501A/B, this is called Joule Thompson effect. Temperature on the downstream can be lower

than the dew point of CNG such that condensation may occurs.

The CNG heat exchanger (E-200) maximum duty is 4100 kW (basis 4 hours decanting time) then

duty will decrease gradually as the upstream pressure is reduced during decanting process. The

initial stage of decanting, the temperature of CNG will be increased from -38oC to about 30oC. The

heating media for this heat exchanger is hot water system with temperature of 90oC. Hot water

circulation flowrate is 140 m3/hr and the flowrate to E-200 will be controlled by (TV0502).

Temperature control Valve (TV-0502) will manipulate hot water flowrate to E-200 to maintain CNG

export to the pipeline at temperature of 30oC. Temperature control is using cascade with TIC-0502.

2.1.9 Pressure reducing system (PV-0501 A/B)

The pressure of CNG outlet to PLN will be maintained at 28 barg and temperature of 30oC. PIC-

0501A/B are used for controlling CNG outlet pressure. Pressure reducing system will be provided

by two control valves ( PV0501A/B) with one operating and one standby.

This valve is designed base on 4 hours decanting time (96 MMSCFD).

2.1.10 Storage and Decanting process

The storage and decanting process will be performed by opening and closing delivery valve (KV-

0501A/B) downstream of CNG storage cylinders. Storage CNG will be carried out fixed maximum

20 hours per day and decanting will be performed 4 to 5 hours per day. During decanting period the

CNG Cooler (E-100) will be bypassed to reduced joule thomphson effect on the downstream of PV-

0501A/B.



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Duration of decanting can be resetted from the control room, but changing setting time shall refer to

operating pressure on the CNG storage cylinders. Over pressure on the CNG cylinders will initiate

high pressure on the discharge compressor then process shutdown can be triggered.

2.1.11 Station Outlet Metering (M-200 A/B)

The metering system with 2x100% with crossover will measure natural gas outlet from CNG plant.

Total gas outlet is 113 MMSCFD for 4 hours. Metering is used as custody meter. Flow and

accumulation flow should be monitored in main PLC. For Gas composition analysis, one sampling

connection is installed at the upstream of Outlet Metering (M200A/B).

Gas Flow would be measured for 4 hours per day during decanting time. Totalizer would count total

value base on measured gasflow.

2.1.12 Waste Heat recovery Unit (E-300)

The exhaust gas from gas engines ducting will be utilized as source of energy to increase the

temperature of hot water from 63oC to 90oC. Exhaust gas from each turbine will be commingled on

header before entering WHRU, and water will be heating up on the WHRU boiler.

Hot water from WHRU will be stored on the hot water storage Tank at temperature of 90oC.

During storage phase (20 hours), WHRU would heat water in Hot water tank (T-200) for

approximately 10 hours from 30o to 90o C. The water circulating pump (P-500 A/B) with capacity of

45m3/hr is used to circulate water from T-200 through WHRU heater (E-300) and back to T-200.

During decanting phase (4 hours), Hot water pump (P-300 A/B) with capacity of 140 m3/h will

circulate hot water from T-200 to E-200 and back to T-200. Temperature of hot water in the Hot

water tank (T-200) is controlled by manipulating damper position on each exhaust gas Turbine of

CNG compressors.

2.1.13 Fuel Gas

Fuel gas is supplied for two (2) units gas engine generators (1 operation & 1 stand by) thru Fuel gas

strainer and for ten (10) units gas engine compressors (9 operation and 1 unit standby). The fuel gas

strainer is designed based on capacity of less than 1.5 MMSCFD.

Fuel Gas metering (FQI-0901) is provided to measure auxilary fuel gas consumption in CNG

facility.

2.1.14 Instrument air

The instrument air will be provided on CNG plant to enhace the overall reliability of the Plant.

Instrument air requirement is calculated based on the number of control valves and on-off control

valves plus a design margin of 20%. Three (3) Air compressors will be provided with two operating

as lead and lag basis and one compressor as a standby.



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Instrument air system will be provided with a drying unit such that the dew point of instrument air is

less than -40oC.

2.1.15 Cooling water (E-400)

Water as cooling media will be utilized for CNG Cooler (E-100) before storage stage, The CNG

from gas compressor with temperature of 48oC will be cooled down to 35oC using cooled water.

Cooling water is supplied to the heat exchangers through the Cooling Tower Pump (P-200 A/B) at

flowrate of 35m3/hr. After taking heat of CNG, cooling water leaves heat exchanger at temperature

of 30oC is re-circulated to the Cooling Tower ( E-400) for cooling down and reused. Make-up water

will be provided to compensate water losses on the Cooling Tower (E-400).

2.1.16 Fire water system

Fire water will be taken from existing fire water system in front of CNG plant.

Fire hydrants and monitors will be located based on equipment layout during detail engineering.

2.1.17 Water treatment system (W-001)

Auxiliary water for CNG plant will be taken from well in plant. Well water will be treated by

Reverse osmisis (RO) technology prior to be used as make up water. Total consumption for make

up water is 3.2 m3/h. The feedwater to the RO unit will be design accordingly based on input from

vendor.

2.1.18 Insulation

Personnel Protection Insulation (PP) shall be specified on all lines with normal operating

temperatures above 70°C. This will be applied only to sections of pipe that personnel could come

into contact with during normal operation.

Heat Conservation Insulation (HC) shall be specified for heated systems above 65°C (e.g. hot water

from WHRU).

Noise Abatement Insulation (NI) shall be specified on compressor suction and discharge lines,

subject to vendor confirmation.

2.1.19 Vent System

Relief Gas from Pressure safety valves and Blow down system would be collected to vent header

then to vent stack. Automatic drain would be provided to controlling liquid level at bottom vent

stack.

Flame arrester would be installed at upstream of vent stack to avoid flame due to lightning or other

fire source.



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Relief gas from CNG cylinders would be free vent to atmosphere instead of to vent header line as

per client and manufacture requirement.

The vent stack with providing water seal at the bottom of the vent stack to prevent air ingress.



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3 STUDY METHODOLOGY

3.1 HAZOP

3.1.1 Overview

The study was carried out using the traditional HAZOP Guide Word method, where the system is broken down into manageable sections and a set of standard Guide Words applied. The methodology requires exhaustive consideration of each process activity to determine if there are any potential problems in relation to safety or operations that may arise due to deviations in the process. The Causes and Consequences of each deviation are identified. The HAZOP team evaluates the severity of the problem and adequacy of existing safeguards, and where necessary, recommends additional safeguards as Actions. The hazard and operability problems highlighted in the course of the review were captured in the HAZOP Review worksheets (Appendix A).

3.1.2 Worksheet Definition

All concerns raised are documented in the HAZOP Review Worksheets, which include the column headers as described in Table 3.2a.

Table 3.1a HAZOP Review Worksheet

Column Heading Description No. Reference Number

Guide word/Deviation A set of standard guide words used to analyse and determine

potential problems that arise

Possible Causes Causes or problems identified

Possible Consequences Description of the consequences of the possible impact of the cause

Type Types of issues that are involved, either Drawing Error/Comment, Engineering, Operability, Safety, Financial and Regulatory

Safeguard Description of the safeguards in place

Recommendations/Comment Description of the recommendation(s) that could be in place

Action Party Relevant party taking responsibility for action(s) identified

The completed HAZOP review worksheets are attached in Appendix A.

3.2 HAZID

3.2.1 Overview

HAZID review is used as a means to identifying potential hazards, determining the associated consequences and evaluating means of preventing the hazard or controlling the consequences. They should not be confused with a HAZOP review which looks at specific areas of the process to identify potential design/operating problems and determine ways of improving the process design to



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prevent such incidents from occurring. A HAZID review is based on a combination of identification, analysis and brainstorming activities. The technique exhaustively considers each review area, by reference to an agreed set of guidewords. During the review, each facility was considered in turn with the facility broken down according to specific areas or enclosed buildings, e.g., Main Deck.

3.2.2 Worksheet Definitions

All findings during the HAZID sessions are recorded by the scribe using HAZID worksheets. These worksheets contain the column headings given in Table 3.3b.

Table 3.3b HAZID Record Sheet Headings

Column Heading Description

No. Reference number

Category / Guideword Initiating event and guideword used to generate hazard scenario

Event Description Description of scenario and mode of realization

Consequence Description of the consequences of the hazard or possible impact and escalation of the scenario

Prevention Existing measures to prevent the hazard from occurring

Control Existing measures to control or mitigate the hazard to prevent escalation

Recommendation / Comments

Actions generated during the review. Comments on the protective systems in place, justification of the design are also included in italics.

Action Party Responsibility for addressing each action item will be assigned to the design team or to the project team

Ranking Qualitative ranking of the frequency and consequence of the hazard (carried out after the review is completed to save time during the review itself)



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4 HAZOP/HAZID REVIEW SESSIONS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The HAZOP/HAZID review sessions were carried out at the Istana Karang Laut office in Plaza Citiview Kemang, Jakarta, utilizing 2 days for review, over the period 17th and 21st June 2013.

4.2 THE HAZOP/HAZID TEAM

The HAZOP/HAZID team comprises a multidisciplinary team of personnel involved with the design and operation of the facilities, led by a safety consultant from PT PROSIM The names and attendance records of the HAZOP/HAZID team members for each of the systems are tabulated in Table 4.2a.

Table 4.2a HAZOP/HAZID Team Attendance

Name Co. Role June 2013

June 2013

17 21

Margaretha T PT PROSIM Chairman Ö Ö Yulia Tirtasiwi PT PROSIM Scribe Ö Ö Sugiyanto PT ETI Process Engineer Ö Ö Bernardo PT ETI Ö Ö

Rudolf S PT ETI Ö Ö Suarno PT ETI Ö Ö

Cut Julia PT IKL Project Manager Ö Ö

Warno Abdullah PT IKL Engineering Manager Ö Ö Suseno PT IKL Process Engineer Ö Ö Irvan N PT IKL Ö Ö Haidar PT IKL Ö Ö Gigin Ginanjar PT IKL Ö Ö Isa PT IKL Process Engineer Ö Ö

4.3 GUIDE WORDS

The full set of Guide Words used in the HAZOP/HAZID Review is listed in Table 4.3a & b. It should be noted that if not found to be applicable or not to produce any problem of concern that had not already been raised, the Guide Word was not recorded in the Worksheets for that node.

Table 4.3a HAZOP Guide Words

No. Guide Word 1 No Flow 2 Less Flow 3 More Flow 4 Reverse Flow 5 Misdirected Flow 6 Less Level 7 More Level



19

8 Less Pressure 9 More Pressure 10 Less Temperature 11 More Temperature 12 Contaminants 13 Composition 14 Corrosion / Erosion 15 Instrumentation 16 Relief 17 Personnel Safety 18 External Factors 19 Operations 20 Maintenance 21 Drawing

Table 4.3b HAZID Guide Words

Safety System Guide Word No. Comments

Non Process Structural Failures 1 Extreme weather/subsidence/fatigue

Events Impact 2 Collisions

Transportation 3 Helicopter/personnel baskets/vessels

Lifting 4 Dropped Objects

Non Process Fires 5 Fires/escalated fires

Toxic Release 6 Chemical spill

Security 7 Pirates/fishermen

Noise 8 High noise areas/vibration

Health hazards 9 Diseases/working condition/chemicals

Loss of containment

Ignition 1 Fires from individual process systems

Safety Systems Ignition Sources 1 —

Escape/ Refuge 2 Personnel escape to TR

Communication 3 Hotlines/radio, etc

Emergency Lighting 4 Lighting during escape/ evacuation

Environmental Hazards

Discharge to air 1 Vent/ flare/ relief, etc

Discharge to water 2 Produced water, etc

Discharge to soil 3 Gas/ water injection , etc

Waste disposal 4 Hazardous material/ solids/ sanitary waste, etc.

4.4 DRAWINGS REVIEWED

A basic Piping and Instrumentation (P&ID) for the process acted as a basis for discussion during the review, along with the operating procedures. The drawings used are attached in Appendix B.



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4.5 SELECTED NODES

The process was initially broken down according to the step and then by each action comprising the step. Each action was considered separately with the full list of Guide Words applied. Thus each action becomes a “node”, so, for instance, each feed line into a reactor was considered as a separate node. The nodes used are presented in Table 4.5a & b while the associated worksheets are given in Appendix A (HAZOP) and Appendix B (HAZID).

Table 4.5a Nodes Reviewed in HAZOP

Node Section Drawing Number Rev

N1 Incoming Gas from Gundih field through Gas Scrubber V-100 to Station Inlet Metering M100A/B

TS78-P-PID-001 B TS78-P-PID-002 B N2 Outlet Station Inlet Metering to Gas Dryer Prefilter F-100,

Gas Dryer 100A/B, Gas Dryer After Filter F-110 including Regenerator Filter

TS78-P-PID-003 B

B N2R Regeneration System TS78-P-PID-003 B N3 Compression System K101 (typical for K102 to K109),

including Blowdown Tank VE301A TS78-P-PID-004 B

N4 Inlet CNG Cooler E-100 to CNG Compartment (STORAGE TIME)

TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 1 of 2 B

N5 Inlet CNG Heat Exchanger E-200 to Station Outlet Metering M-200A/B (DECANTING)

TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 2 of 2 B TS78-P-PID-006 B N6 Hot water circulation including Hot Water Tank T-200,

Hot Water Pump P300A/B and circulation to E-100 and E-200

TS78-P-PID-007 TS78-P-PID-005 sheet 2 of 2

B

N7 Waste Heat Recovery Unit include Water circulation pump P-500A/B and WHRU

TS78-P-PID-007 B

N8 Water Treatment Plant TS78-P-PID-012 B

N9 Cooling System, including Make up Water Tank T-400, Make Up Water Pump P-100, Cooling Tower E-400 and Cooling Tower Pump P-200 A/B

TS78-P-PID-011

B

N10 Sump Tank V-400 including Sump Tank P-400 TS78-P-PID-010 B

N11 Fuel Gas System TS78-P-PID-009 B N12 Instrument Air System TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 1 of 2

TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 2 of 2 B

N13 Fire Water System TS78-P-PID-013 B N14 Power Generation system TS78-P-PID-014 B N15 Vent Gas System, including discharge of pressure

relieving device and BDVs vent header, KO Drum V-600, up to Vent Stack VS-100

TS78-P-PID-015 B

Table 4.5b Node Reviewed in HAZID

Node Section Drawing Number Rev

N1 CNG Plant – Tambak Lorok TS78-L-LY-001 B1



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5 HAZOP/HAZID RESULTS

5.1 ACTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

A total of 40 HAZOP recommendations and 18 HAZID recommendations were generated during the review. The recommendations would reduce potential safety or operability problems associated with the process or improve the clarity of the process drawings (P&ID’s). A complete list of the recommendations made by the team during the review itself is tabulated in Appendix A. A unique number is assigned to each recommendation and the node identification number is included so that it may easily be traced back to the review worksheets (Appendix B & C). Brief summary of highlighted recommendations are presented below.

HAZOP

Design

It was noted in the HAZOP It identified during the review and also with discussion with Tambak Lorok, some of the valve arrangement need to be lock open to ensure that it doesn’t block due to human error (eg. at upstream BDV, by pass line). General comments also noted to provide setting for all the instrumentation system (e.g. PIC, PSHH, PSV)

It’s been reviewed that gas from suction compressor can be directed to downstream of E-200 to metering M-200 resulting in double counting of sales gas from Gundih meter with M-100. It was recommended to install additional check valve to PG-2"-3C-027 to prevent that case.

It recommended to provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent of sump tank due to gas blow by from V-100, to ensure equipment purchase suitable as per hazardous area classification and also to nsure vent stack at sump tank is located high enough to prevent exposure to personnel/operator at Incoming Scrubber System.

In the Waste Heat Recovery Unit, it was recommended to provide PSHH at downstream P-500A/B to trip P-500A/B in the case of manual valve at upstream E-300 inadvertenly close resulting in overpressure of the system.

The existing fire water capacity need to be reviewed to ensure source of water and its amount is adequate to handle fire on the CNG plant in addition with existing fire water requirement in Tambak Lorok.

It was discussed also that the design of floating valve T-600 to be radar type.

Maintenance and Operational

Based on the discussion raised up, it’s required to develop operating manual for delivery gas including showing correlation between pressure and flow at storage period and operation of redundant equipment such as compressor.

To control corrosion at basin cooling tower, it was recommended to provide SOP to control PH at cooling tower periodically.



22

HAZID

In the HAZID session, location of the lightning stack has not identified yet, therefore it is recommended to review the location of the lightning stack to be away from the venting stack to reduce the probability of fire on the vent stack

It was reviewed also that high noise level around the compressor area will potentially injured the personnel who operate the plant in daily basis. It was recommended to have noise study and provide warning sign the area to use ear plug protection.

Fire and Gas detection was also reviewed in the HAZID, it is recommended to provide the philosophy of the fire and gas detection system of the plant in formal documentation and provide clear actions of each detector, which one create alarm or shut down/blowdown of the plant. Fire detection philosophy was not provided in the building, specifically in the electrical room such as control room/MCC/batery room. It is recommended to provide clear philosophy, e.g. providing early warning system for smoke detection in electrical room (High Sensitivity Smoke Detector), including fire suppression system such as portable fire extinguisher or automatic fire suppresion system (e.g. FM-200,etc)

The scenario of fire and explosion in the CNG plant was not established yet during the review especially in relation position of the processing facility to location where stand by personnel available such as control room. Therefore, review of this scenario is recommended to justify design and location of the control room building. It is include also the fire and explosion impact to surrounding facility at Tambak Lorok. In the discussion also identified that the control room will not provided with glass windows to avoid explosion effect from the plant, hence that CCTV is recommended to be provided in the control room to monitor the plant.

During the review, location of the vent stack has not been identified yet. Therefore, dispersion and radiation analysis need to be done to define safe location and height required for the vent stack.

Consideration for emergency situation was also reviewed, and it is recommended to review emergency evacuation plan including emergency route, muster point location, safety equipment lay out and emergency lighting.

Good communication among parties involved (Tambak Lorok and Gundih) also important to make sure operability and deliverability of the process plant, especially to handle emergency situation. Therefore a procedure defining internal and external communication need to be established among parties to make sure the plant is operated safely.



23

5.2 MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIO

The Major Hazard of this plant is :

• Process Hazard : 1. High Pressure Gas containment in the CNG Storage Tanks 2. Gas Compression System 3. Hot water circulation system 4. Cold Venting

• Non Process Hazard :

5. Control Room located in hazardous area 6. Human Error - Alarm 7. Communication between ETI, IP, Gundih 8. Transportation



24

The hazard management plant can be shown as follow:



25

6 HAZOP/HAZID FOLLOW-UP

The project, design and operation team should conduct a HAZOP/HAZID follow up session to response the HAZOP/HAZID recommendations. The response and action plan shall be back up with the relevant data and justification whether the recommendation is agreed or rejected. At the end, the team shall formulate action plans, steward all action items and ensure that the relevant changes are made to the design to address hazard and operability concerns identified as part of this HAZOP/HAZID.

PT. Enviromate Technology International HAZOP/HAZID of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK

HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BA26 JULY 2013

7 REFERENCES

/1/ Process Plan Description - TS78 - P - BD - 001 /2/ Drawing List : No Drawing Title Drawing Number Rev

1 PID - Incoming Scrubber System TS78-P-PID-001 B 2 PID - Station Inlet Metering (M-100A/B) TS78-P-PID-002 B 3 PID - Gas Dryer (Vendor Package) TS78-P-PID-003 B 4 PID - Compressor System / K-101 (Vendor Package) TS78-P-PID-004 B 5 PID - Storage and Decanting System TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 1

of 2 B

6 PID - CNG Heat Exchanger TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 2 of 2

B

7 PID - Station Outlet Metering (M-200A/B) TS78-P-PID-006 B 8 PID - Waste Heat Recovery Unit TS78-P-PID-007 B 9 PID - Instrument Air System TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 1

of 2 B

10 PID - Instrument Air Network TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 2 of 2

B

11 PID - Fuel Gas System TS78-P-PID-009 B 12 PID - Sump System TS78-P-PID-010 B 13 PID - Cooling System TS78-P-PID-011 B 14 PID - Water Treatment Plant TS78-P-PID-012 B 15 PID - Fire Water System TS78-P-PID-013 B 16 PID - Power Generator System TS78-P-PID-014 B 17 PID - Vent Gas System TS78-P-PID-015 B 18 General Plant Lay Out TS78-L-LY-001 B1 19 PFD – Inlet Metering and Dryer TS78-P-PFD-001 B 20 PFD – Gas Compression System TS78-P-PFD-002 B 21 PFD – CNG Storage and Pressure Reducing System TS78-P-PFD-003 B 22 PFD – Waste Heat Recovery Unit TS78-P-PFD-004 B 23 PFD – Cooling Water System TS78-P-PFD-005 B 24 PFD – Heat Material Balance TS78-P-PFD-006 B 19 UFD – Fuel Gas System TS78-P-UFD-001 B 20 UFD – Instrument air system TS78-P-UFD-002 B


Appendix A

HAZOP/HAZID Summary Recommendation

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT

NODE Causes / Concerns Consequences Comments / Recommendations Rec Number1 SDV 0101 at upstream V-100

close due to failurePotential overpresurization of upstream plant (Santos Facility ) resulting in hydrocarbon release leading to fire or fatality

Ensure existing pipeline design pressure is higher than maximum discharge pressure from Gundih facility

CNG-HP-1

1 SDV 0101 at upstream V-100 close due to failure

Loss of Production Review availability of isolation valve (SDV) from Gundih facility in the case of overpressure from pipeline

CNG-HP-2

1 Any of manual valve at incoming line to V-100 inadvertently close

Potential overpresurization of upstream plant (Santos Facility ) resulting in hydrocarbon release leading to fire or fatality

Provide operating manual for delivery gas CNG-HP-3

1 PV 0105 stuck close or manual valve around the PV 0105 inadvertently close

Potential overpressurization of V-100 resulting in hydrocarbon release leading to fire or fatality

Provide setting pressure PIC-0105 to show at PID TS78-P

CNG-HP-4

1 Control loop malfunction causing LV-0101 to open fully

Gas blowby to Sump Tank V-400 leading to potential vessel damage (design pressure 3.5 barG), fire and explosion

Provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent of sump tank due to gas blow by from V-100

CNG-HP-5



Ensure equipment purchase suitable as per hazardous area classification

CNG-HP-6



Ensure vent stack at sump tank is located high enough to prevent exposure to personnel/operator

CNG-HP-7

1 Sour Gas (H2S) and water content in the production gas

Internal corrosion of piping and vessel leading to release of hydrocarbon gas and potential fire

Consider to provide corrosion coupon at upstream V-100

CNG-HP-8

2 Manual by pass valve at downstream line PG-10-30-053 from metering M100A/B to Compressor unit unit is inadvertenly open

Potential wet gas to Gas Compression system resulting in equipment damage

LC by pass manual valve 10" at downstream line PG-10-30-053 and update PID

CNG-HP-9

2 Manual valve upstream BDV-0301 inadvertenly close in the event of ESD and BDV-0301 required to open

Overpresurization of upstream equipment leading to fire/fatality

Provide Lock Open (LO) at manual valve upstream BDV-0301

CNG-HP-10

2R Blower E-101 at regeneration unit damage/ not in operation

No regeneration process causing wet gas going to compressor

Ensure interlock system install to prevent overtemperature/overpressure in the case P-101 shutdown, Electric Heater should also shutdown (Check with vendor)

CNG-HP-11

2R D-200 A-B shutdown Potential reverse flow leading to equipment damage Ensure D-200 A-B including regeneration system has adequate design to accomadate reverse flow

CNG-HP-12

3 Switch operation between Potential human error to operate manual valve and Provide operating manual for operating redundant CNG-HP-13

SUMMARY HAZOP RECOMMENDATION

3 Switch operation between compressors

Potential human error to operate manual valve and safety devices

Provide operating manual for operating redundant equipments, including compressors

CNG-HP-13

4 One of running compressor fails to operate

Less of CNG production Review sizing of manual valve incoming CNG compartment to be available at market or provide spare manual valve in the case of maintenance required

CNG-HP-14

4 Fouling/Plugging at E-100 or loss of cooling water

Inefficiency in cooling resulting in high temperature leading to less CNG production

Provide portable temperature detector to check skin temperature of CNG compartment

CNG-HP-15

4 Loss of containment/piping leak due to corrosion

Tube leak at E-100 Provide SOP to control PH at cooling tower periodically

CNG-HP-16

5 SDV0601 fails close or manual valve in the metering station inadvertenly closed

Potential overpressurization of CNG HE E-200 leading to hydrocarbon release and potential fire

Show setting point of PV 0501A/B CNG-HP-17

5 Gas from suction compressor going to downstream of E-200 to metering M-200

Double counting of sales gas from Santos meter with M-100

Install additional check valve at line PG-2"-3C-027 CNG-HP-18

5 Manual valve upstream BDV-0505 inadvertenly close in the event of ESD and BDV-0505 required to open


Provide Lock Open (LO) manual valve at upstream BDV-0505

CNG-HP-19

6 Hot Water Pump P-300A/B stop due to failure OR Strainer at upstream P-300A/B blockage

Loss of hot water supply leading to inefficient heat transfer and lower gas sales temperature

Provide low temperature switch at line PG-12"-3C-021 to close KV-0503 A to prevent low temperature in the gas sales

CNG-HP-20

6 Hot Water Pump P-300A/B stop due to failure OR Strainer at upstream P-300A/B blockage

High temperature in the circulation water around the waste heat recovery unit

Provide low temperature alarm at line PG-12"-3C-021 to alert operator

CNG-HP-21

6 Three way valve TV-0502 to E-200 is inadvertenly close


Provide Temperature Control Valve at bypass line of E-200

CNG-HP-22

7 Any manual valve at upstream E-300 inadvertenly close or check

Potential overpressure of downstream pump Vendor to provide minimum flow recycle line at P-500A/B

CNG-HP-23

7 One or more gas engine driver shutdown

Less of flue gas to E-300 resulting in lower temperature generated for water circulation

Review requirement set point of TIA-0704 CNG-HP-25

7 Start up Low gas temperature from exhaust gas compressor to WHRU resulting condensation at gas ducting E-300

Provide drain line at lowest point gas ducting E-300 CNG-HP-26

7 Condense water from flue gas at E-300

Corrosion at E-300 leading to equipment damage Review requirement TIA-0705 CNG-HP-27

CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 1 of 2 SUMMARY HAZOP RECOMMENDATION

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT

NODE Causes / Concerns Consequences Comments / Recommendations Rec Number7 Drawing Revise drawing TS78-P-PID-007 to show setting

point of all instrumentation alarm and tripCNG-HP-28

9 Manual valve at outlet T-100 is inadvertenly close or strainer blocked

Loss of pump suction and potential pump damage Provide lock open (LO) for manual valve upstream P-100 and P-600

CNG-HP-29

9 Manual valve or strainer at inlet Basin cooling water is inadvertently close

Potential overflow at T-600 Review design of floating valve T-600 to be radar type

CNG-HP-30

9 Manual valve at upstream P-200A/B inadvertenly close or strainer blocked

Loss of pump suction and potential pump damage Provide lock open (LO) for manual valve upstream P-200

CNG-HP-31

10 Liquid control valve failure at individual equipments (V-300, Compressor K-101-109, V-100)

Build up pressure in Sump Tank V-400 leading to potential overpressurization

Review outlet line at venting V-400 to be sufficient for case high pressure gas introduced from upstream equipment to this vessel

CNG-HP-32

11 3" Manual valves at incoming/outgoing line Fuel Gas filter is inadvertently closed

Loss of fuel gas supply leading to compressor shutdown

Provide lock open (LO) for 3" manual valves at upstream and downstream Fuel Gas Filter

CNG-HP-33

12 Manual valve upstream of Instrument Air Receiver V-300 inadvertently closed

Potential overpressurization of upstream piping Confirm availability of high pressure trip at internal of Air Compressor C300A/B/C package to shut down compressor in the case of block of discharge

CNG-HP-34

12 Manual valve downstream Instrument Air Receiver V-310 inadvertently closed

Loss of instrument air supply potentially leading to PSD

Lock Open (LO) for manual valve downstream Instrument Air Receiver V-310

CNG-HP-35

13 Operation Review existing Tambak Lorok’s fire water capacity to be adequate for fire water handling in CNG Plant

CNG-HP-36

13 Operation Consider to provide additional flowmeter to measure fire water consumption for Tambak Lorok

CNG-HP-37

14 Any manual valve down stream GE-100A to cooling system inadvertenly close

Overheating at GE-100A leading to equipment damage

Confirm availability of TSHH to trip Gas Generator GE-100A in case of high temperature has been included in the generator package.

CNG-HP-38

14 Any manual valve down stream GE-100A to cooling system inadvertenly close

Overheating at GE-100A leading to equipment damage

Lock Open (LO) for manual valve downstream GE-100A

CNG-HP-39

15 Lighting struck during PSV/BDV release

Fire at vent stack Consider to install CO2 snuffing system at VS-100 to extinguish fire at vent stack completed with fusible plug

CNG-HP-40

CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 2 of 2 SUMMARY HAZOP RECOMMENDATION

PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Appendix A SUMMARY HAZOP/HAZID PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT

HAZID No.

Hazard Description Consequences Prevention Control Recommendation/ Comment Co. Pr Ri Type

4.1.3 Lightning Possible damage to the equipment and potential fire

- Grounding provided for each equipment

Update EQL drawing to show Lightning protection at CNG compartment area (lightning stack) in process/utility area

CNG-HD- 1 S (4)C(3)

4 S (H16)C(H12)

Design

4.3.1 Light vehicles impact e.g. Car

Potential impact to piping/equipment leading to hydrocarbon release, fire, personnel injury/fatality and asset damage

- vehicle park area away from process area

Operation cars shall be equipped with flame arrestor and diesel engine

CNG-HD- 2 S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)

Operation / Maintenance

4.7.1 High noise level from compressor and gas engine area

Potential personnel ear injury

- Provide SOP to wear ear plug around noise area

CNG-HD- 3 S (1)C(-)

3 S (H3)C(-)

Design

4.8.1 Toxic Material during handling chemical: for cooling water, corrosion inhibitor e.g. oxygen scavanger

Personnel injury MSDS provided in the storage facility

Ensure portable eye wash station provided during chemical handling (e.g : at control room, loading area and water treatment area)

CNG-HD- 4 S (1)C(-)

3 S (H3)C(-)

Design

4.8.3 Hazardous waste disposal

Personnel injury during handling waste disposal

PPE - hand gloves, face shield

- Alocate waste disposal resulting from operation/construction activity in safe area (third party)

CNG-HD- 5 S (1)C(-)

3 S (H3)C(-)


4.9.6 Hot Surfaces at exhaust gas, WHRU and heat exchanger (E-200)

Potential injury due to exposure to heat

personal protection insulation provided

PPE Provide warning sign around hot surface equipment and pipings

CNG-HD- 6 S (2)C(-)

2 S (M4)C(-)

Design

4.10.1 Leak from Process Equipment

Release of hydrocarbon resulting in potential fire/explosion leading to injury/fatality

Unit SD by low pressure trip

Gas detection system at process area

Define philosophy of fire and gas detection system and develop fire and gas detection area at process plant

CNG-HD- 7 S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)

Design

Loss of Containment Release of hydrocarbon resulting in potential fire/explosion leading to injury/fatality

NA Fire hydrant provided with source from existing IP

Regularly to check temperature in the MCC cabinet and DCS panel to monitor short circuit and provide portable fire extinguisher

CNG-HD- 8 S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)


4.11.1 Battery Fire/explosion in the event of hydrocarbon release.

Battery room is located in non hazardous area

Heat & Smoke detector, Portable Fire Extinguisher provided at control room & MCC room


CNG-HD- 9 S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)


4.11.2 Vent Fire/explosion in the event of hydrocarbon release in process area if stroke by lightning

- Lightning protection provided at CNG compartment area

Define safe location and minimum height required for vent stack and vent location to be suitable with wind directions so that dispersed gas will not be

CNG-HD- 10 S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)

Design

Rec Number

SUMMARY HAZID RECOMMENDATION

so that dispersed gas will not be exposed to process plan

4.12.1 Fire on Plant area Personnel trap/ unable to evacuate leading to injury/fatality

ERP - Provide emergency evacuation risk analysis to determine safe evacuation route and location of muster area

CNG-HD- 11 S (4)C(4)

3 S (H8)C(H8)

Design

- - Form emergency response team (ERT) and conduct emergency drill

CNG-HD- 12 S (4)C(4)

4 S (H8)C(H8)


4.14.1 Control room Fire or explosion from process area impact to control room leading to potential personnel injury/fatality

- Heat and Smoke detector

Review scenario of fire and explosion from gas plant to the area of standby personnel such as control room and provide mitigation plan (design and location of the building) to anticipate fire/explosion

CNG-HD- 13 S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)

Design

- - Define safety requirement on control room specification to accommodate fire/explosion scenario e.g. door, wall and window specifications

CNG-HD- 14 S (4)C(4)

3 S (H8)C(H8)

Design

Inability to monitor process area

- - Consider to provide CCTV in the control room for monitoring purpose

CNG-HD- 15 S (4)C(4)

5 S (H8)C(H8)

Design

4.15.1 Inability to contact control room within emergency

Inability to coordinate response leading to potential major accident leading to personnel injury/fatality and asset loss

Each operator provided with hand held radio

F&G alarm system Define internal and external communication system (PABX) for connecting operator in the control room to outside parties

CNG-HD- 16 S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)

Design

4.16.1 Inability to initiate ESD

Inability to control fire leading to potential major accident leading to personnel injury/fatality and asset loss

Local ESD push button at control room

- Define safety layout at CNG plant to show ESD push button, fire hydrant, etc

CNG-HD- 17 S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)

Design

4.18.3 Blowdown of water from cooling tower, discharge RO

Potential contamination from process fluid

Discharge water is connected to existing canal (IP)

Define Sampling point to monitor discharge water


CNG-HD- 18

CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 1 of 1 HAZID Worksheet Summary


Appendix B

HAZOP Review Worksheets

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT

Node Abbreviations SOP Standard Operating ProceduresReview date IM Inspection & Maintenance

Client PM Preventative MaintenanceProject USD Unit ShutdownFacility PSD Process ShutdownSection ESD Emergency Shutdown

H,M,L Co Consequence

Pr ProbabilityRi RiskS Safety RiskC Commercial Risk

CommentDesign Intent

Design Conditions:

Opt. Conditions

Capacity Flowrate : 20 MMSCFD

Drawing TS78-P-PID-001 BTS78-P-PID-002 B

DT: 65 deg C

OP : 20.6-30.9 barG OT : 26.7-51.7 deg C

PID - Incoming Scrubber System

DP : 34 barG

PID - Station Inlet Metering (M-100A/B)

To remove any hydrocarbon liquid from upstream facility and measure natural gas inlet to CNG plant

117-Jun-13

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL

Incoming Gas from Gundih field through Gas Scrubber V-100 to Station Inlet Metering M100A/B

Compressed Natural Gas PlantTambak Lorok

High, Medium, Risk

RiNo. Guide

WordsDeviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Initiating

LCo Pr Ri Comments / Recommendations Rec. No.

1.1.1 No No Flow SDV 0101 at upstream V-100 close due to failure

Potential overpresurization of upstream plant (Gundih Facility ) resulting in hydrocarbon release leading to fire or fatality

Pressure regulator (PV) at upstream facility to adjust discharge pressure

S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

Ensure existing pipeline design pressure is higher than maximum discharge pressure from Gundih facility

CNG-HP-1

Loss of Production Review availability of isolation valve (SDV) from Gundih facility in the case of overpressure from pipeline

CNG-HP-2

1.1.2 No No Flow Any of manual valve at incoming line to V-100 inadvertently close

Potential overpresurization of upstream plant (Gundih Facility ) resulting in hydrocarbon release leading to fire or fatality

Pressure regulator (PV) at upstream facility to adjust discharge pressure

S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

Provide operating manual for delivery gas

CNG-HP-3

Loss of Production

Parameter: Flow

CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 1 of 53 HAZOP Node N1


No. Guide Words

Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Initiating L

Co Pr Ri Comments / Recommendations Rec. No.

1.1.3 No No Flow PV 0105 stuck close or manual valve around the PV 0105 inadvertently close

Potential overpressurization of V-100 resulting in hydrocarbon release leading to fire or fatality

PIH-0103 set at 31 barg as high pressure alarm to alert operator

S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

Provide setting pressure PIC-0105 to show at PID TS78-P

CNG-HP-4

PIHH-0103 set at 33 barG to close SDV-0101PSV 0101A/B set at 34 barG is sized for fire case

Note : maximum upstream pressure from Gundih is not more than 34 barG

1.1.4 No No Flow Any of manual valves at Station Inlet Metering M100A/B inadvertently close

Potential overpresurization of upstream M-100A/B resulting to fire or fatality

PIH-0103 set at 30 barg as high pressure alarm to alert operator

S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

PIHH-0103 set at 33 barG to close SDV-0101PSV 0101A/B set at 34 barG is sized for block discharge

1.2.1 Less Less Flow Refer to No Flow - manual valves partially closed

1.3.1 More More Flow Slugging High level at V-100 leading Slug Catcher provided at S (-) 1 S (-)1.3.1 More More Flow Slugging High level at V-100 leading to liquid carry over to metering skid M-100 and downstream equipment

Slug Catcher provided at Gundih facility

S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

LV-0101 will maintain level in Gas Scrubber V-100LIH-0102 as high level alarm to alert operatorLIHH-0102 will close SDV-0102

1.4.1 Reverse Reverse Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified

1.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified


Parameter: Level



No. Guide Words



1.6.1 Less Less Level Control loop malfunction causing LV-0101 to open fully


LIL-0102 alarm to alert Operator

S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

Provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent of sump tank due to gas blow by from V-100

CNG-HP-5

LILL-0102 to initiate shutdown of SDV-0102

Ensure equipment purchase suitable as per hazardous area classification

CNG-HP-6

Sump Tank open to atmosphere

Ensure vent stack at sump tank is located high enough to prevent exposure to personnel/operator

CNG-HP-7

1.6.2 Less Less Level Manual valve at bypass line LV-0101 or manual drain valves inadvertently open, leak at liquid lines


LIL-0102 alarm to alert Operator

S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

LILL-0102 to initiate shutdown of SDV-0102Sump Tank open to atmosphere

1.7.1 More More Level Control loop malfunction causing LV-0101 to stuck close

High level at V-100 leading to liquid carry over to metering skid M-100 and

LIH-0102 as high level alarm to alert Operator to open by pass line

S (-)E (2)C(2)

1 S (-)E (L2)C(L2)metering skid M-100 and

downstream equipmentopen by pass line C(2) C(L2)

LIHH-0102 to initiate shutdown of SDV-0101

1.7.2 More More Level Any of manual valve upstream/downstream LV-0101 inadvertently close

High level at V-100 leading to liquid carry over to metering skid M-100 and downstream equipment


S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)


1.7.3 More More Level SDV-0102 fails closed High level at V-100 leading to liquid carry over to metering skid M-100 and downstream equipment



1.7.4 More More Level Slugging High level at V-100 leading to liquid carry over to metering skid M-100 and downstream equipment


S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)



No. Guide Words




1.8.1 Less Less Pressure Loss of containment/piping leak due to corrosion

Release of hydrocarbon leading to environmental pollution and potential fire

PIL-0102 as low pressure alarm at incoming V-100 to alert operator

S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

PILL-0102 at incoming V-100 will initiate closure of SDV 0101Fire and Gas Detector at V-100

1.8.2 Less Less Pressure Refer to Misdirected Flow 1.5.11.9.1 More More Pressure Refer to No Flow 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3,

1.1.4 ; Less Level 1.6.1, 1.6.2

PV-0105 stuck open Potential overpressure at Metering M100A/B and downstream equipment

PIH-S01 set at 30 bar as high pressure alarm to alert operator

S (-)E (2)C(2)

1 S (-)E (L2)C(L2)

PSH 0301A/B at 32 barG to close SDV-0101

Manual valve at by pass line PV-0105 inadvertently open

Potential overpressure at Metering M100A/B and

PIH-S01 set at 30 bar as high pressure alarm to

S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

as

0105 inadvertently open Metering M100A/B and downstream equipment

high pressure alarm to alert operator

C(2) C(L2)

PSH 0301A/B at 32 barG to close SDV-0101

1.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified

1.11.1 More More temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified

1.12.1 As Well As

Contamination No additional significant issues of concerns identified

1.13.1 Other Than

Composition No additional significant issues of concerns identified

1.14.1 Other Than

Corrosion / Erosion

Sour Gas (H2S) and water content in the production gas


Wall thickness of piping and equipment already considered sour gas condition

S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

Consider to provide corrosion coupon at upstream V-100

CNG-HP-8

Parameter: Temperature

Parameter: Contamination

Parameter: Composition

Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion

Parameter: Instrumentation



No. Guide Words



1.15.1 Other Than

Instrumentation No additional significant issues of concerns identified

1.16.1 Other Than

Relief No additional significant issues of concerns identified

1.17.1 Other Than

Occupational Safety

No additional significant issues of concerns identified

1.18.1 Other Than

External Factors Fire at plant Overpresurization of piping leading to equipment damage

Fire and Gas Detector at V-100

S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

1.19.1 Other Than

Operations No additional significant issues of concerns identified

1.20.1 Other Than

Maintenance Single isolation valve for Maintenance of PSV-0101A/B

Potential exposure of high pressure to personnel during maintenance of PSV-0101A/B

NA Note: Certification/testing of PSV is conducted during online operation without dismantle of PSV itself. Dismantle of PSV can only be conducted if there is a risk assessment for single valve at upstream of the PSV

Parameter: Safety

Parameter: External Factor

Parameter: Operation & Maintenance

Parameter: Relief

for single valve at upstream of the PSV

1.20.2 Other Than

Maintenance No additional significant issues of concerns identified

1.21.1 Other Than

DrawingParameter: Drawing



Node Abbreviations SOP Standard Operating Procedures

Review date IM Inspection & Maintenance





Design Conditions:Opt. Conditions

Capacity Flowrate : 20 MMSCFD

Drawing Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-003 Rev: B

No. Guide Words


Co Pr Ri Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No.

2.1.1 No No Flow Any of manual valve at Gas Dryer package is inadvertenly close

Potential overpressurization of upstream equipment of D-100 leading to rupture and potential fire event

PIH 0102 alarm set at 30 barG to alert Operator

S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

PIHH 0102 set at 33 barG to initiate closure of SDV 0101

PSV 0101A/B set at 33 barg

2.2.1 Less Less Flow F-100 Blockage Potential overpressurization of upstream equipment of D-100 leading to rupture and potential fire event

PIH 0102 alarm set at 30 barG to alert Operator

S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

PIHH 0102 set at 33 barG to initiate closure of SDV 0101

PSV 0101A/B set at 33 barg

PDI at F-100 as local indicator for operator

Compressed Natural Gas Plant

High, Medium, Risk

To remove water and H2S content on the feed gas to produce moisture dew point to -40 deg C and max 3 ppm H2S

2

17-Jun-13


Outlet Station Inlet Metering to Gas Dryer Prefilter F-100, Gas Dryer 100A/B, Gas Dryer After Filter F-110 including Regenerator Filter

OP : 20.6-30.9 barG OT : 26.7-51.7 deg C

One bed of dryer will be on drying mode and the other one is on regenerating mode. Adsorption time is 4-8 hours and the regeneration time 4-8 hours (heating, cooling and standby)

Tambak Lorok

DT: 250 deg C

PID - Gas Dryer (Vendor Package)

Parameter: Flow

DP : 34 barG



No. Guide Words




AIH (dew point alarm) at downstream of Dryer unit

2.2.2 Less Less Flow D-100A/B Blockage (caking) Potential overpressurization of upstream equipment of D-100 leading to rupture and potential fire event

PSH 0301A set at 32 bar at Gas Dryer D-100A/B to close SDV-0101

S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

PSV 0301A set at 34 barG is sized for block discharge

PDSH for Local indicator at D-100A/B for operator



2.2.3 Less Less Flow F-110 Blockage Potential overpressurization of upstream equipment of D-100 leading to rupture and potential fire event

PSV 0301A set at 34 barG is sized for block discharge

S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

PDI at F-110 as local indicator for operator



2.2.4 Less Less Flow see No Flow 2.1.1 For partial blockage

2.3.1 More More Flow BDV-0301 open due to failure Depressurization of the system, loss of gas to flare and loss of production

BDV position indication and alarm

S (-)C(3)

1 S (-)C(M3)


2.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow Refer to More Flow 2.3.1

2.5.2 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual valve at 1/2-in drain line inadvertently open/leak or liquid trap at F-100 and F-110 stuck open

Gas blowby to Sump Tank leading to gas cloud and potential fire and explosion

SOP/Maintenance of liquid trap

S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

2.5.3 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual bypass line of F-100 is inadvertenly open

Potential condense liquid carry over to D-100 resulting in equipment damage

SOP



No. Guide Words



2.5.4 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual bypass line of F-110 is inadvertenly open

Potential condense liquid carry over to compressor unit resulting in equipment damage

SOP

2.5.5 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual valve to regeneration unit is inadvertenly open

Ineffective regeneration process in Gas Dryer D-100A/B

PSV 0301B set at 34 barG is sized for block discharge

2.5.6 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual by pass valve at downstream line PG-10-30-053 from metering M100A/B to Compressor unit unit is inadvertenly open


SOP S (-)C(3)

2 S (-)C(M6)

LC by pass manual valve 10" at downstream line PG-10-30-053 and update PID

CNG-HP-9

2.6.1 Less Less Level Refer to Misdirected Flow 2.5.22.7.1 More More Level Liquid trap of F-100 stuck close High level at F-100 leading

to liquid carry over to Gas Dryer D-100A/B

SOP to open by pass manual valve 1/2"

2.8.1 Less Less Pressure Loss of containment/leak on D-100 due to corrosion

Release of hydrocarbon leading to environmental damage and potential fire

Fire and gas detection system

S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

2.8.2 Less Less Pressure Refer to More Flow 2.3.12.9.2 More More Pressure See No Flow 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.2.1,

Misdirected Flow 2.5.2

2.9.1 More More Pressure Liquid trap of F-100 stuck open Low level at F-100 leading to gas blow by to Sump Tank

Sump tank connected to atmospheric

2.9. More More Pressure Manual valve upstream BDV-0301 inadvertenly close in the event of ESD and BDV-0301 required to open


NA S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

Provide Lock Open (LO) at manual valve upstream BDV-0301

CNG-HP-10



2.12.1 As Well As


2.13.1 Other Than



Parameter: Level

Parameter: Pressure






No. Guide Words



2.14.1 Other Than

Corrosion / Erosion




S (3)C(4)

1 S (M3)C(M4)

2.15.1 Other Than


2.16.1 Other Than


2.17.1 Other Than

Occupational Safety


2.18.1 Other Than

External Factors Fire Overpresurization of drier leading to equipment damage

F & G S (-)C(2)

2 S (-)C(M4)

2.19.1 Other Than


2.20.1 Other Than


2.21.1 Other Than

Drawing No additional significant issues of concerns identified


Parameter: Drawing

Parameter: Safety

Parameter: Relief










Design Opt. Capacity Flowrate : 20 MMSCFDDrawing Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-003 Rev: B

No. Guide Words



Parameter: Flow

OP : 20.6-30.9 barG OT : 26.7-51.7 deg CPID - Gas Dryer (Vendor Package)

Regeneration SystemHigh, Medium, Risk

One bed of dryer will be on drying mode and the other one is on regenerating mode. Adsorption time is 12 hours and the regeneration time 12 hours (heating, cooling and standby)To collect water from the dryer and refresh molecular sieves to be ready to absorb

DP : 34 barG DT: 250 deg C

2R17-Jun-13

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONALCompressed Natural Gas PlantTambak Lorok

2R.1.1 No No Flow Manual valve to regeneration system inadvertenly close


F-101 to collect any condense liquid

S (-)C(3)

1 S (-)C(M3)


Back up dryer available

2R.1.2 No No Flow Blower E-101 at regeneration unit damage/ not in operation


F-102 to collect any condense liquid

S (-)C(3)

1 S (-)C(M3)

Ensure interlock system install to prevent overtemperature/overpressure in the case P-101 shutdown, Electric Heater should also shutdown (Check with vendor)

CNG-HP-11

Potential overtemperature/overpressure at gas regeneration system


Back up dryer available2R.1.3 No No Flow F-102 blockage Pump cavitation Regular Filter mainentance S (-)

C(3)1 S (-)

C(M3)

Overpressurization of equipment upstream of F-102 leading to equipment damage

PSH-0301B alarm to alert Operator

Parameter: Flow

CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 10 of 53 HAZOP Node N2R


No. Guide Words



2R.2.1 Less Less Flow F-102 partially blocked Pump cavitation Regular Filter maintenance S (-)C(3)

1 S (-)C(M3)

Overpressurization of equipment upstream of F-102 leading to equipment damage

PSH-0301B alarm to alert Operator

2R.2. Less Less Flow2R.3.1 More More Flow No additional significant issues of

concerns identified2R.4.1 Reverse Reverse Flow D-200 A-B shutdown Potential reverse flow

leading to equipment damage

S (-)C(3)

1 S (-)C(M3)

Ensure D-200 A-B including regeneration system has adequate design to accomadate reverse flow

CNG-HP-12

potential more flow at D-100 A-B resulting potential offspec to compressor leading to compressor damage


PIL 501 at SS-101 as Low pressure alarm to alert operatorPILL 501 at SS-101 to shutdown SDV-151

2R.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual valve at drain line of F-102 or separator after cooler inadvertently open/leak


Sump Tank connected to Atmospheric

S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

inadvertently open/leak potential fire and explosion

2R.5. Part of Misdirected Flow Liquid trap at F-102 or at separator after cooler stuck open


Sump Tank connected to Atmospheric

S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

#N/A Part of Liquid trap maintenance

2R.6.1 Less Less Level See Misdirected flow 2R.5.22R.7. More More Level Liquid trap of F-102 or at drain line

of separator stuck closeHigh level at F-102 leading to liquid carry over to Gas Dryer D-100A/B

Manual by pass valve on around liquid trap

S (-)C(3)

1 S (-)C(M3)

Second liquid trap provided on the pipe to Sump Tank

AIH (dew point alarm)-0301 at downstream of F-101

2R.8.1 Less Less Pressure Loss of containment/leak on regeneration system due to corrosion


F & G system S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

2R.8.2 Less Less Pressure See Misdirected flow 2R.5.1

Parameter: Level

Parameter: Pressure



No. Guide Words



2R.8.3 Less Less Pressure Regeneration pump loss of power due to mechanical problem

gas cannot circulate to regeneration system resulting in wet gas to compressor


S (-)C(3)

1 S (-)C(M3)

2R.9.1 More More Pressure See Now Flow 2R.1.3

2R.10.1 Less Less Temperature Electric heater stop due to mechanical failure

In efficient heat absorbtion to D-100

Maintenance S (-)C(3)

1 S (-)C(M3)


2R.11.1 More More temperature Cooler stop due to motor failure liquid cannot be condense and separated to the separator


S (-)C(3)

1 S (-)C(M3)

2R.12.1 As Well As


2R.13.1 Other Than


2R.14.1 Other Than

Corrosion / Erosion




S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)





2R.15.1 Other Than


2R.16.1 Other Than


2R.17.1 Other Than

Occupational Safety


2R.18.1 Other Than

External Factors No additional significant issues of concerns identified

2R.19.1 Other Than


2R.20.1 Other Than


2R.21.1 Other Than



Parameter: Drawing


Parameter: Relief

Parameter: Safety









Design Conditions:

Design Capacity: 2.17 MMSCFD each compressor

Opt. Conditions

Flowrate : 20 MMSCFDPower : TBA KW (each compressor)

Drawing Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-004 Rev: B

No. Guide Words

Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No.

3.1.1 No No Flow SDV W151 fails close Potential overpressurization of upstream equipment and piping leading to loss of integrity and fire event

PSH-0301A at Gas Dryer D-100A/B to close SDV-0101

PSV 0301A/B at dryer unit

Low suction pressure to compressor leading to compressor damage and production loss

PT-501 displayed in control room

PIL 501 at SS-101 as Low pressure alarm to alert operator

Tambak LorokCompression System K101 (typical for K102 to K110), including Blowdown Tank VE301

317-Jun-13

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONALCompressed Natural Gas Plant

High, Medium, Risk

Nine (9) compressor online and One (1) stand by; reciprocating type compressor, three-stages

Suction Pressure : 26 barGDischarge Pressure : 250 barG

To compress natural gas and transfer to the storage cylinder

Shut Off Pressure :

PID - Compressor System / K-101 (Vendor Package)

Parameter: Flow



No. Guide Words


PILL 501 at SS-101 to shutdown SDV-151

3.2.1 Less Less Flow Blockage of filter FF-201 Potential overpressurization of upstream equipment and piping leading to loss of integrity and fire event

PSH-0301A at Gas Dryer D-100A/B to close SDV-0101

PDI - S01 provided around FF 201PSV 0301A/B at dryer unit



Node Abbreviations SOP Standard Operating Procedures

Review date IM Inspection & Maintenance




Comment

Design Intent

Design Conditions:

Duty CNG Cooler: 201 kW

Opt. Conditions

2.38 m3 each cylinder

Drawing Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 1 of 2 Rev: B

No. Guide Words


4.1.1 No No Flow Manual valves at inlet CNG Compartement inadvertenly close

Less of CNG production Local pressure indicator provided each compartment

4.2.1 Less Less Flow See no flow partially

PID - Storage and Decanting System

Parameter: Flow

CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet Shell side) : OP : 3 barGCNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet tube side) : OP : 249 barG

CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet Shell side) : OT : 30 deg C/ 39 deg CCNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet tube side) : OT : 48 deg C/35 deg C

To cooling down compressed gas and storage to CNG compartment

CNG Cooler : DP (shell) : 7 barG; (tube) : 263 barGCNG Compartment : DP : 374 barG

CNG Cooler DT : 65 deg CCNG Compartment DT : 70 deg C

Compressed Natural Gas PlantTambak LorokInlet CNG Cooler E-100 to CNG Compartment (STORAGE TIME)

CNG Storage cylinder consist of 95 compartments. 5 compartments will be arranged in 1 bank (each has 40 tubes).Operation : 19-20 hours storage time, 4-5 hours decanting time

4

17-Jun-13


High, Medium, Risk



No. Guide Words


4.2.2 Less Less Flow One of running compressor fails to operate

Less of CNG production Indicator of online compressor in control room

Review sizing of manual valve incoming CNG compartment to be available at market or provide spare manual valve in the case of maintenance required

CNG-HP-14

Standby compressor available

Indication of pressure and flow of storage period by graph to shown loss of production

4.3.1 More More Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified


4.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow KV-0503A leak or fails open (storage condition)

No adverse consequence PV-0501A/B will hold the pressurePIHH 0509 set at 33 barG will open XV-0506 and circulate gas to suction compressor

4.6.1 Less Less Level Not relevant4.7.1 More More Level Not relevant

4.8.1 Less Less Pressure Refer to Less Flow 4.9.1 More More Pressure Refer to No Flow 4.9.2 More More Pressure Storage time more than 20 hours Potential over pressure at

overall plant

PIH-S01 set 30 barG alarm to alert Operator PIHH-S01 set 32 barG to close SDV-SV-101/102/103 set@ 78/165/294 barg

Parameter: Level

Parameter: Pressure



No. Guide Words


Maximum discharge pressure of Compressor 255 barG is less than MAWP Tube storage design 373 barG


4.11.1 More More Temperature

Fouling/Plugging at E-100 or loss of cooling water

Inefficiency in cooling resulting in high temperature leading to less CNG production

TIH-0503/TIH 0508/TIH 0509 alarm will alert operator

Provide portable temperature detector to check skin temperature of CNG compartment

CNG-HP-15

4.12.1 As Well As

Contamination Tube leak at E-100 Gas contamination to cooling water system leading to gas release at cooling tower

Gas detector at cooling tower fan

Provide SOP to control PH at cooling tower periodically

CNG-HP-16

Explosion-proof motor of cooling tower

Gas trapped at shell side resulting in eficient heat transfer

TIH-0503/TIH 0508/TIH 0509 alarm will alert operator

4.13.1 Other Than


4.14.1 Other Than

Corrosion / Erosion

See contamination

4.15.1 Other Than

Instrumentation Instrument air failure Unable to supply gas to customer

Nitrogen back up is provided to open KV-0501 to deliver gas from CNG compartement to tambak lorok

4.16.1 Other Than




Parameter: Relief






No. Guide Words


4.17.1 Other Than

Occupational Safety


4.18.1 Other Than


4.19.1 Other Than


4.20.1 Other Than


4.21.1 Other Than


Parameter: Drawing

Parameter: Safety










Design Conditions:

Opt. Conditions

Decanting : 113 MMSCFD

Drawing TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 2 of 2 Rev: B

TS78-P-PID-006 B

No. Guide Words


5.1.1 No No Flow Any of manual valves on the decanting line to E-200 inadvertenly close or PV0501A/B stuck close

Compressor shut off pressure is 255 barg vs design pressure of equipment is 263 barg - no adverse consequence identified

PIH 0502 set at 250psig to alert operator

Inlet CNG Heat Exchanger E-200 to Station Outlet Metering M-200A/B (DECANTING)

E-200 and M-200A/B will be operated during decanting time only. Decanting Time 4-5 hours.To avoid condensation on the upstream of pressure reducing valve and to measure natural gas outlet from CNG Plant

CNG Heat Exchanger : DP (shell) : 5.5 barG; (tube) : 34 barGM-200A/B : DP : 34 barG

CNG Heat Exchanger DT : 120 deg CM-200A/B DT : 65 deg C

Parameter: Flow

CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet Shell side : OT : 90 deg C / 65 deg CCNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet tube side : OT- 38 deg C / 30 deg C

PID - CNG Heat Exchanger

PID - Station Outlet Metering (M-200A/B)

Duty CNG Heat Exchanger 3860 kWCapacity M-200A/B: 113 MMSCFD

CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet Shell side : OP : 2 barG / 1.4 barGCNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet tube side : OP : 26.7 barG / 26 barG

517-Jun-13


High, Medium, Risk



No. Guide Words


PIHH 0502 set at 255 psig to shutdown compressor

Loss of gas to customer FT-0601A/B at M-200A/B displayed at control room

FILL 0601 A/Bset at 5 MMSCFD for alarm to alert operator

5.1.2 No No Flow SDV0601 fails close or manual valve in the metering station inadvertenly closed

Potential overpressurization of CNG HE E-200 leading to hydrocarbon release and potential fire

PV0501 A/B to regulate the pressure

Show setting point of PV 0501A/B CNG-HP-17

PIH 0509 set at 31 psig to alert operator PSHH 0509 set at 33 barG to close KV 0501A

5.2.1 Less Less Flow Refer to No Flow - valve partially closed

5.3.1 More More Flow PV0501A/B stuck open Potential overpressurization of CNG HE E-200 and downstream piping

PIH 0509 set at 31 psig to alert operator

PSHH 0509 set at 33 barG to close KV 0501A

5.4.2 Reverse Reverse Flow Gas from suction compressor going to downstream of E-200 to metering M-200

Double counting of sales gas from Gundih meter with M-100

Install additional check valve at line PG-2"-3C-027

CNG-HP-18

5.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow BDV-0505 fails open Loss of gas to vent BDV position indicator and alarm in control room

5.5.2 Part of Misdirected Flow XV-0506 fails open Loss of gas back to system instead to customer

Valve position indicator and alarm in control room

5.6.1 Less Less Level No additional significant issues of concerns identified

Parameter: Level



No. Guide Words


5.7.1 More More Level No additional significant issues of concerns identified

5.8.1 Less Less Pressure Loss of containment/leak on Decanting Line


F & G

5.9.1 More More Pressure see no flow and more flow5.9. More More Pressure Manual valve upstream BDV-0505

inadvertenly close in the event of ESD and BDV-0505 required to open


NA Provide Lock Open (LO) manual valve at upstream BDV-0505

CNG-HP-19



5.12.1 As Well As

Contamination Tube leak at E-200 Gas contamination to hot water system leading to gas release at WHRU

Atmospheric venting at Hot Water Tank T-200

5.13.1 Other Than


5.14.1 Other Than

Corrosion / Erosion


5.15.1 Other Than


5.16.1 Other Than


5.17.1 Other Than

Occupational Safety



Parameter: Pressure






Parameter: Relief

Parameter: Safety



No. Guide Words


5.18.1 Other Than


5.19.1 Other Than


5.20. Other Than


5.21.1 Other Than



Parameter: Drawing




Client PM Preventative MaintenanceProject USD Unit ShutdownFacility PSD Process ShutdownSection ESD Emergency Shutdown H,M,L

Co ConsequencePr ProbabilityRi RiskS Safety RiskC Commercial Risk

Comment

Design Intent

Design Conditions:

T-200 : 290 m3P-300 : 140 m3/hrE-500 : 127 kW

Opt. Conditions

Power : 36.8 kW

Drawing Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-007 Rev:TS78-P-PID-005 sheet 2 of 2

617-Jun-13

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONALCompressed Natural Gas PlantTambak LorokHot water circulation including Hot Water Tank T-200, Hot Water Pump P300A/B and circulation to E-200

Circulation to E-200 will be on decanting time only

To heat compressed gas from storage facility to be ready for sales gas

E-500 DP : 2 barGT-200 DP : 0.17 barG

Temperature: 120 deg C

Source Pressure : atm; Discharge Pump : 3.35 barG CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet Shell side : OT : 90 deg C / 65 deg C

High, Medium, Risk

PID - Waste Heat Recovery UnitPID - CNG Heat Exchanger

BB

No. Guide Words

Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party

6.1.1 No No Flow Hot Water Pump P-300A/B stop due to failure OR Strainer at upstream P-300A/B blockage


TT-0512 as low temperature alarm to alert operator

S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

Provide low temperature switch at line PG-12"-3C-021 to close KV-0503 A to prevent low temperature in the gas sales


TIC 0703 set at 85 deg C to control exhaust gas supply from compressor

Provide low temperature alarm at line PG-12"-3C-021 to alert operator

TAH 0703 set at 85 deg C alarm to alert operatorTAH 0706 set at 85 deg C alarm to alert operator

Low discharge pressure for hot water circulation leading to inefficient heat transfer

SOP to operate standby pump P-300B

6.1.2 No No Flow Manual valve on the downstream P300A/B inadvertently closed



S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

Rec. No.

Parameter: FlowCNG-HP-20

CNG-HP-21



No. Guide Words

Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No.




Potential overpressurization of upstream piping

PSHH 0703A set at 4.5 barG to close P-300A/B

6.2.1 Less Less Flow Three way valve TV-0502 to E-200 is inadvertenly close



S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

Provide Temperature Control Valve at bypass line of E-200



TAH 0703 set at 85 deg C alarm to alert operator

Three way valve TV-0502 to by pass line E-200 is inadvertenly close

Not adverse consequence

6.3.1 More More Flow Hot Water Pump P-300A andB running simultaneously

Excess hot water supply to E-200 resulting in potential

TIC-0502 as high temperature alarm to alert

S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

CNG-HP-22

running simultaneously E-200 resulting in potential overheating

temperature alarm to alert operator

C(2) C(L2)

Pump running status indication at control room


6.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow 2-in manual valve at T-200 to open drain inadvertently open

Loss of hot water supply leading to inefficient heat transfer

SOP S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

Overheating of water to E-300 system

LSL-0702 to shutdown P-500A/B

6.6.1 Less Less Level see misdirected flow 6.5.16.6.2 Less Less Level More evaporation with less make up

waterLoss of hot water supply leading to inefficient heat transfer

Vapor Condenser E-500 provided

S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

LSL 0701 to start P-600 pump for make up water

Overheating of water to E-300 system

LSL-0702 to shutdown P-500A/B

6.7.1 More More Level Make up water activated Potential overflow to open drain

LSH 0701 to stop make up water and provide warning to operator

S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

Overflow line to Open Drain

Parameter: Level



No. Guide Words


6.8.1 Less Less Pressure refer to No Flow 6.1.16.9.1 More More Pressure Refer to No Flow

6.10.1 Less Less Temperature Leak at hot water system at discharge P-300A/B



S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)




6.10.2 Less Less Temperature Fouling/Plugging at E-200 Inefficiency in heating resulting in lower gas temperature


S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

6.10.3 Less Less Temperature Refer to No Flow


Refer to More Flow

Parameter: Pressure


Temperature

6.12.1 As Well As

Contamination E-200 Tube/tube sheet leak Gas introduce to hot water system leading to potential overpressure of hot water system

T-200 is venting to atmosphere

S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

6.13.1 Other Than


6.14.1 Other Than

Corrosion / Erosion


6.15.1 Other Than


6.16.1 Other Than


6.17.1 Other Than

Occupational Safety


6.18.1 Other Than



Parameter: Relief


d

Parameter: Safety





No. Guide Words


6.19.1 Other Than


6.20.1 Other Than


6.21.1 Other Than



Parameter: Drawing






Comment

Design Intent

Design Conditions:

P-500 : 48 m3/hr

Opt. Conditions

Power : 1283 kW

Drawing Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-007 Rev:

No. Guide Words


7.1.1 No No Flow Water Circulation Pump P-500A/B stop due to failure OR Strainer at upstream P-500A/B blockage

Loss of water circulation leading to overheating of hot water circulation to T-200

TIC-0703 to close dampener from compressor flue gas

S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

TIC-0703 as high temperature alarm to alert operatorPSV-0701 as thermal relief routed to open drain


Low discharge pressure for water circulation leading to inefficient heat transfer

SOP to operate standby pump P-500B

717-Jun-13

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONALCompressed Natural Gas PlantTambak LorokWaste Heat Recovery Unit include Water circulation pump P-500A/B and WHRU

To recover heat from exhaust gas of compressor and heating water for heating media E-100 and E-200

Pressure: WHRU : 18 Barg Temperature: WHRU : 545 deg C

Shell / Coil : 0.03 barG / 3 barG Shell / Coil OT : 490 deg C / 63 to 90 deg C

High, Medium, Risk

PID - Waste Heat Recovery Unit

Rec. No.

B

Parameter: Flow



No. Guide Words


7.1.2 No No Flow Any manual valve at upstream E-300 inadvertenly close or check valve blockage



S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

TIC-0703 as high temperature alarm to alert operatorPSV-0701 as thermal relief

Potential overpressure of downstream pump

Vendor to provide minimum flow recycle line at P-500A/B

7.2.1 Less Less Flow Any manual valve on the water circulation line at WHRU system partially closed



S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)


7.3.1 More More Flow Water Circulation Pump P-500A/B running simultaneously

Excess water circulation to E-300/T-200 - no safety consequence



7.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow 3/4" manual valve to open drain inadvertenly open



S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)


7.5.2 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual valve to venting open Loss of water circulation leading to overheating of hot water circulation to T-200


S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)




Parameter: Level

CNG-HP-23



No. Guide Words


7.8.1 Less Less Pressure Refer to No Flow 6.1.17.9.1 More More Pressure Refer to No Flow

7.10.1 Less Less Temperature Refer to No Flow

One or more gas engine driver shutdown

Less of flue gas to E-300 resulting in lower temperature generated for water circulation

TIA 0704 to alert operator S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

Review requirement set point of TIA-0704

Start up Low gas temperature from exhaust gas compressor to WHRU resulting condensation at gas ducting E-300

Provide drain line at lowest point gas ducting E-300


Refer to No Flow, Less Flow, Misdirected Flow

7.12.1 As Well As Contamination No additional significant issues of concerns identified

7.13.1 Other Than


7.14.1 Other Than

Corrosion / Erosion

Condense water from flue gas at E-300

Corrosion at E-300 leading to equipment damage

Check with vendor the requirement of TIA-0705 as low temperature alarm

S (-)C(2)

2 S (-)C(M6)

Review requirement TIA-0705

7.15.1 Other Than


7.16.1 Other Than


7.17.1 Other Than

Occupational Safety


7.18.1 Other Than


7.19.1 Other Than


7.20.1 Other Than


CNG-HP-26



Parameter: Pressure




CNG-HP-25

CNG-HP-27

Parameter: Drawing



Parameter: Relief

Parameter: Safety



No. Guide Words


7.21.1 Other Than

Drawing

7.21.2 Other Than

Drawing

7.21.3 Other Than

Drawing Revise drawing TS78-P-PID-007 to show setting point of all instrumentation alarm and trip

CNG-HP-28






Comment

Design Intent

Design Conditions:

Flow : 3.2 m3/hr

Opt. Conditions


No. Guide Words


8.1.1 No No Flow Manual valve at inlet Feed Pump P701 inadvertenly close

No make up water supply for cooler/heater leading to low performance of heat transfer

SOP to monitor Water Treatment Plant (WTP)

S (-)C(1)

2 S (-)C(L2)

Low suction pressure of P702 resulting in pump damage

PSL1209 to stop P702

8.1.2 No No Flow Pump P701 stop due to failure No make up water supply for cooler/heater leading to low performance of heat transfer

Pump maintenance S (-)C(1)

2 S (-)C(L2)



8.1.3 No No Flow MOV-1201 (valve on duty) inadvertenly close



S (-)C(1)

2 S (-)C(L2)



817-Jun-13

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONALCompressed Natural Gas PlantTambak LorokWater Treatment Plant

to treat sea water and provide potable water for cooling media

Pressure : 7 barG Temperature: 65 deg C

Pressure : 4 barG Temperature : ambient

High, Medium, Risk

PID - Water Treatment Plant

Rec. No.

B

Parameter: Flow



No. Guide Words


8.1.4 No No Flow High Pressure Pump P702 failure No make up water supply for cooler/heater leading to low performance of heat transfer


2 S (-)C(L2)

8.1.5 No No Flow Manual valve downstream P702 inadvertenly close



Potential overpressure of upstream equipment

PSH 1211 to stop P702 and P701

8.1.6 No No Flow Manual valve downstream Buffer Tank TK-02 inadvertenly close

Potential overfilling TK02 LS-1201 to stop Feed Pump P701

S (-)C(1)

1 S (-)C(L1)

LS-1201 to stop Hi press Pump PU-201

8.1.7 No No Flow High Pressure Pump PU-201 failure No make up water supply for cooler/heater leading to low performance of heat transfer


2 S (-)C(L2)

Manual valve downstream PU-201 inadvertenly close



S (-)C(1)

2 S (-)C(L2)

Potential overpressure of upstream equipment

PSH 1216 to stop PU-201

8.2.1 Less Less Flow Filter F-1A//B blockage Potential overpressure of upstream equipment

PI 1201, PI 1202 and PI 1203 to monitor differential pressure

S (-)C(1)

2 S (-)C(L2)

8.2.2 Less Less Flow Filter FX-01/02 blockage Potential overpressure of upstream equipment

PDI 1201 to monitor differential pressure

S (-)C(1)

2 S (-)C(L2)

8.2.3 Less Less Flow RO-A blockage Potential overpressure of upstream equipment

PSH 1211 to stop P702 and P701

S (-)C(1)

2 S (-)C(L2)

8.3.1 More More Flow Control valve upstream FM 1205 stuck open

Potential overflow to TK01 LS01 to stop FEED pump P701

S (-)C(1)

1 S (-)C(L1)


8.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual valve for sample inadvertenly open

Loss of make up water to environment

SOP

8.5.2 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual drain valve from RO-A to open ditch inadvertenly open

Loss of make up water to environment

SOP


8.7.1 More More Level see more flow

8.8.1 Less Less Pressure see no flow

Parameter: Level

Parameter: Pressure



No. Guide Words


8.9.1 More More Pressure see no flow and less flow




8.12.1 As Well As


8.13.1 Other Than

Composition Manual valve from chemical source inadvertenly close

Low make up water quality leading to scale

SOP

8.14.1 Other Than

Corrosion / Erosion


8.15.1 Other Than


8.16.1 Other Than


8.17.1 Other Than

Occupational Safety


8.18.1 Other Than


8.19.1 Other Than


8.20.1 Other Than


8.21.1 Other Than

Drawing




Parameter: Drawing



Parameter: Relief

Parameter: Safety








Comment

Design Intent

Design Conditions:

Capacity T-100 : 54 m3

Opt. Conditions

Power P-100 : 0.85 kW; P-200A/B : 5.88 kW


No. Guide Words


9.1.1 No No Flow Manual valve at inlet T-100 is inadvertenly close

Low level at T-100 leading to loss of pump suction and potential pump damage

LSL 1101 to shutdown Pump P-600

S (-)C(2)

2 S (-)C(M4)

Loss of make up water for cooling media and make up T-200 leading to ineffective heat transfer

Temperature alarm at WHRU, E-100 and E-200

9.1.2 No No Flow Manual valve at outlet T-100 is inadvertenly close or strainer blocked

Loss of pump suction and potential pump damage

S (-)C(2)

2 S (-)C(M4)

Provide lock open (LO) for manual valve upstream P-100 and P-600

Loss of make up water for cooling media and make up T-200 leading to ineffective heat transfer

Temperature alarm at WHRU, E-100 and E-200

9.1.3 No No Flow Make up water pump P-100 broken or stop

Loss of make up water for cooling media leading to ineffective heat transfer


S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

917-Jun-13

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONALCompressed Natural Gas PlantTambak LorokCooling System, including Make up Water Tank T-100, Make Up Water Pump P-100, Cooling Tower E-400 and Cooling Tower Pump P-200 A/B

To provide cooling media for E-100

Pressure: Cooling Tower : 3.5 Barg Temperature: 65 deg C

Pressure : ATM Temperature : 30 - 45 deg C

PID - Cooling System

Rec. No.

B

Parameter: Flow

CNG-HP-29

High, Medium, Risk



No. Guide Words


Pump maintenance9.1.4 No No Flow Manual valve or strainer at inlet

Basin cooling water is inadvertently close


Temperature alarm at E-100 S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

Potential overflow at T-600 Floating valve at T-600 to start/stop pump P-100

Review design of floating valve T-600 to be radar type

9.1.5 No No Flow Cooling water pump P-200A/B broken or not in operation



S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

9.1.6 No No Flow Manual valve at upstream P-200A/B inadvertenly close or strainer blocked

Loss of pump suction and potential pump damage

Strainer Maintenance periodically

S (-)C(2)

2 S (-)C(M4)

Provide lock open (LO) for manual valve upstream P-200


9.1.7 No No Flow Manual valve at downstream P-200A/B inadvertently close

Potential overpressurization of piping at pump discharge

PSH 1108A to stop P-200A/B

S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

9.2.1 Less Less Flow Refer to No Flow - valve partially closed

9.3.1 More More Flow Cooling Tower Pump P-200 A and B running simultenaously

More of water cooling media - no adverse consequence



9.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow 3" manual valve at T-100/E-400 to open drain inadvertenly open



9.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow 2" manual valve at E-400 to open drain inadvertenly open

Low level at E-400 leading to loss of pump suction and potential pump damage

Floating valve will flow water from T-600

9.6.1 Less Less Level see no flow 9.1.1, 9.1.2,9.1.3,9.5.1 Loss of water for cooling media resulting insufficent heat absorbed during heat transfer leading to CN gas offspec

9.6.2 Less Less Level Make up water pump P-100 fails to stop



S (-)C(2)

2 S (-)C(M4)

CNG-HP-31

CNG-HP-30

Parameter: Level



No. Guide Words


High level at Cooling Tower basin T-600

Float valve will stop incoming flow to cooling tower

9.7.1 More More Level Float valve at Cooling Tower basin E-400 failure

Potential overflow to open drain

SOP S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

9.8.1 Less Less Pressure Leak in water supply line to E-100 Loss of water for cooling media resulting insufficent heat absorbed during heat transfer leading to CN gas offspec

S (-)C(2)

2 S (-)C(M4)

9.9.1 More More Pressure see no flow 9.1.1, 9.1.2,9.1.3



Motor at E-400 fails to run high temperature of water supply to E-100 leading to less production

TT-0503 at E-100 as high temperature alarm to alert operator

S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)


9.13.1 Other Than


9.14.1 Other Than

Corrosion / Erosion


9.15.1 Other Than


9.16.1 Other Than


9.17.1 Other Than

Occupational Safety


9.18.1 Other Than


9.19.1 Other Than


9.20.1 Other Than


Parameter: Pressure






Parameter: Relief

Parameter: Safety





No. Guide Words


9.21.1 Other Than

DrawingParameter: Drawing






Comment

Design Intent

Design Conditions:

P-400 Capacity : 1.2 m3/hr

Opt. Conditions

Power P-400 : 0.3 kW


No. Guide Words


10.1.1 No No Flow 4" manual valve at inlet V-400 inadvertenly closed

High level at source vessel Safeguards at source vessel S (-)C(1)

1 S (-)C(L1)

10.2.1 Less Less Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified

10.3.1 More More Flow Liquid control valve failure at individual equipments (V-300, Compressor K-101-109, V-100)


Open venting to atmosphere S (-)C(1)

1 S (-)C(L1)

Review outlet line at venting V-400 to be sufficient for case high pressure gas introduced from upstream equipment to this vessel

10.3.2 More More Flow Manual drain valves at individual equipments inadvertently open during online operation


Open venting to atmosphere S (-)C(1)

1 S (-)C(L1)

Loss of level at the source vessel

LT at individual equipment as low level alarm to alert operator; and as low level trip to initiate USD

1017-Jun-13

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONALCompressed Natural Gas PlantTambak LorokSump Tank V-400 including Sump Tank P-400

To collect liquid drain from vessel (closed drain system)

Pressure : 3.5 barG Temperature: 45 deg C

Tank Ops Pressure : ATM; PPump Suc Pressure : Atm, Disch Pressure : 2 barG

Temperature : AMB

High, Medium, Risk

PID - Sump System

Rec. No.

B

CNG-HP-32

Parameter: Flow



No. Guide Words


Double-valve provided at drain line of the individual equipments



10.6.1 Less Less Level Sump Pump P-400 fails to stop due to LT-1001 failure to function

Loss of liquid level leading to Sump Pump P-400 damage due to cavitation

Pump will be stopped during no signal (FC)

S (-)C(1)

1 S (-)C(L1)

10.7.1 More More Level Pump stopped due to no power supply or pump damage

Overfilling of Sump Tank V-400 and liquid release from vent to environment

LAH 1001 as high level alarm to alert operator

S (-)C(1)

1 S (-)C(L1)

SOP - draining activity is attended by operatorStandby portable pump will be provided and connected to available spare nozzle

10.8.1 Less Less Pressure No additional significant issues of concerns identified

10.9.1 More More Pressure Refer to More flow10.9.2 More More Pressure Blockage of flame arrestor at vent

linePotential overpressurization of V-400

Bug screen provided





10.13.1 Other Than


10.14.1 Other Than

Corrosion / Erosion


10.15.1 Other Than





Parameter: Level

Parameter: Pressure





No. Guide Words


10.16.1 Other Than


10.17.1 Other Than

Occupational Safety


10.18.1 Other Than


10.19.1 Other Than


10.20.1 Other Than


10.21.1 Other Than

Drawing


Parameter: Drawing

Parameter: Relief

Parameter: Safety







Comment

Design Intent

Design Conditions:

Capacity : 1.5 m3

Opt. ConditionsDrawing Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-009 Rev:

No. Guide Words


11.1.1 No No Flow 3" Manual valves at incoming/outgoing line Fuel Gas filter is inadvertently closed

Loss of fuel gas supply leading to compressor shutdown

PT-0902 as low pressure alarm to alert operator

S (-)C(4)

1 S (-)C(M4)

Provide lock open (LO) for 3" manual valves at upstream and downstream Fuel Gas Filter

11.1.2 No No Flow PCV-0901A/B stuck closed Loss of fuel gas supply leading to compressor shutdown

PT-0902 as low pressure alarm to alert operator

S (-)C(4)

1 S (-)C(M4)

Standby PCV available11.2.1 Less Less Flow Pump N4 stop due to failure Less of fuel gas supply

leading to compressor shutdown

PDI 0901A/B to monitor differential pressure

S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

Back up fuel gas filter availablePT-0902 as low pressure alarm to alert operator

11.3.1 More More Flow PCV-0901A/B stuck open Potential overpressurization of downstream equipment

PT-0902 as high pressure alarm to alert operator

S (-)C(1)

1 S (-)C(L1)


Fuel Gas System

1117-Jun-13


High, Medium, Risk

To provide fuel to compressor


Pressure : 10 barG Temperature : 21 deg C

PID - Fuel Gas System B

Rec. No.

Parameter: FlowCNG-HP-33



No. Guide Words


11.5.1 Less Misdirected Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified



11.8.1 Less Less Pressure Refer to No Flow and Less Flow11.9.1 More More Pressure Refer to More Flow





11.13.1 Other Than


11.14.1 Other Than

Corrosion / Erosion


11.15.1 Other Than


11.16.1 Other Than


11.17.1 Other Than

Occupational Safety


11.18.1 Other Than


11.19.1 Other Than


11.20.1 Other Than


11.21.1 Other Than

Drawing

Parameter: Level

Parameter: Pressure



Parameter: Relief



Parameter: Drawing




Parameter: Safety






Comment

Design Intent

Design Conditions:

Capacity 183.63 SCFM (each)

Opt. Conditions

Power: 30 kW (each)

Drawing Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 1 of 2 Rev:TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 2 of 2

No. Guide Words


12.1.1 No No Flow Manual valve upstream of Instrument Air Receiver V-300 inadvertently closed


Instrument air supply from Instrument Air Receiver V-300 is provided for 5 minutes in operation

S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

PT-0803 set at 7 barg as low pressure alarm to alert Operator


NA Confirm availability of high pressure trip at internal of Air Compressor C300A/B/C package to shut down compressor in the case of block of discharge

12.1.2 No No Flow Any manual valve upstream of Air Dryer Prefilter F300A/B inadvertently closed



S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

1217-Jun-13


Pressure : 12 barG Temperature: 45 deg C

Pressure : 6 - 10 barG Temperature : AMB - 40 deg C

High, Medium, Risk

PID - Instrument Air System

Instrument Air System

To provide instrument air for instrumented system

PID - Instrument Air Network

Rec. No.

BB

Parameter: Flow

CNG-HP-34



No. Guide Words



PSV 0801 set at 12 barG release air to atmosphere

12.1.3 No No Flow Any manual valve upstream of Air Dryer D300A/B inadvertently closed




PSV 0801 set at 12 barG release air to atmosphere

12.1.4 No No Flow Any manual valve upstream Air Dryer after filter F301A/B inadvertently closed



S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)


PSV 0802 release air to atmosphere

12.1.5 No No Flow Any manual valve downstream Air Dryer after filter F301A/B inadvertently closed




PSV 0802 release air to atmosphere

12.1.6 No No Flow Air Compressors package trip/broken


Auto start of standby compressor by PSLL-0803

S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

Nitrogen back up at downstream F-310A/B

12.1.7 No Flow Manual valve downstream Instrument Air Receiver V-310 inadvertently closed



S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

Lock Open (LO) for manual valve downstream Instrument Air Receiver V-310


12.2.1 Less Less Flow Air Dryer Prefilter F300A/B blockage

Less of instrument air supply potentially leading to PSD


S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

Wet instrument air quality resulting in instrumentation damage leading to potential shutdown

Dew Point Meter D0801

Spare Air Dryer Prefilter available

CNG-HP-35



No. Guide Words


12.2.2 Less Less Flow Air Dryer D-200A/B blockage Less of instrument air supply potentially leading to PSD

PDI 0802A/B to monitor differential pressure

S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

Wet instrument air resulting in instrumentation damage leading to potential shutdown

Dew Point Meter DE 0801

Spare Air Dryer available12.2.3 Less Less Flow Air Dryer After Filter F301A/B

blockageLess of instrument air supply potentially leading to PSD


S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

Wet instrument air quality resulting in instrumentation damage leading to potential shutdown

Dew Point Meter D0801

Spare Air Dryer After filter available

12.3.1 More More Flow All Air Compressor running simultaneously - no adverse consequence


12.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow 3/4" manual drain valve at V-300 inadvertently close

High pressure air blowby to sump tank V-400

Sump Tank V-400 is open to atmosphere

S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

Less of instrument air supply potentially leading to PSD


12.7.1 More More Level Water condensation in V-300 and lube oil entrainment from compressors

Low quality of instrument air leading to potential instrument damage and shutdown

SOP to monitor LG 0801 S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

12.8.1 Less Less Pressure see no flow, less flow, misdirected flow

12.9.1 More More Pressure see no flow






Parameter: Level

Parameter: Pressure



No. Guide Words


12.12.1 As Well As


12.13.1 Other Than


12.14.1 Other Than

Corrosion / Erosion


12.15.1 Other Than


12.16.1 Other Than


12.17.1 Other Than

Occupational Safety


12.18.1 Other Than


12.19.1 Other Than


12.20.1 Other Than


12.21.1 Other Than


12.21.2 Other Than



Parameter: Drawing



Parameter: Relief

Parameter: Safety








Comment

Design Intent

Design Conditions:

Opt. Conditions


No. Guide Words


13.1.1 No No Flow Any of manual valve at fire water ring inadvertently close/stuck close

Lack of fire water supply resulting in inadequate water to extinguishing fire

SOP S (3)C(3)

1 S (M3)C(M3)

13.1.2 No No Flow Existing fire water pump inoperation Fail to supply fire water in case of fire leading to fire escalation

S (3)C(3)

1 S (M3)C(M3)

13.2.1 Less Less Flow Any of manual valve at fire water ring partially close

Lack of fire water supply resulting in inadequate water to extinguishing fire

SOP S (3)C(3)

1 S (M3)C(M3)





1317-Jun-13

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONALCompressed Natural Gas PlantTambak LorokFire Water System

Fire water is supplied from existing facility

to provide cooling system and extinguish fire from the process plant and building

Pressure : ATM Temperature: 45 deg C

Pressure : ATM Temperature : ambient

High, Medium, Risk

PID - Fire Water System

Rec. No.

B

Parameter: Flow

Parameter: Level



No. Guide Words



13.8.1 Less Less Pressure see less flow13.9.1 More More Pressure No additional significant issues of

concerns identified





13.13.1 Other Than


13.14.1 Other Than

Corrosion / Erosion


13.15.1 Other Than


13.16.1 Other Than


13.17.1 Other Than

Occupational Safety


13.18.1 Other Than


13.19.1 Other Than

Operations Review existing Tambak Lorok’s fire water capacity to be adequate for fire water handling in CNG Plant

13.19.2 Other Than

Operations Consider to provide additional flowmeter to measure fire water consumption for Tambak Lorok

13.20.1 Other Than


13.21.1 Other Than

Drawing


Parameter: Relief


Parameter: Pressure




CNG-HP-36

CNG-HP-37

Parameter: Safety



Parameter: Drawing






Comment

Design Intent

Design Conditions:

Capacity : 600 kW

Opt. ConditionsDrawing Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-014 Rev:

No. Guide Words


14.1.1 No No Flow Power Generator unable to operate due to damage

No power generated leading to plant shutdown

Standby Generator provided

S (-)C(3)

1 S (-)C(M3)

Back up power supply from PLN available

XV 1401 or XV 1402 or XV - 1403 inadvertenly closePV 1401 or PV-1402 stuck closeManual valve up stream GE-100A inadvertenly close




14.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow 2-in manual valve to drain system open

Hydrocarbon gas release to environment


1417-Jun-13

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONALCompressed Natural Gas PlantTambak LorokPower Generation system

GE-100 A is main generator and GE-100B is back up generator (emergency???)

to provide power for CNG plant

Pressure : Temperature:

Pressure : Temperature :

High, Medium, Risk

PID - Power Generator System

Rec. No.

B

Parameter: Flow

v



No. Guide Words



14.8.1 Less Less Pressure see less flow14.9.1 More More Pressure see more flow



Any manual valve down stream GE-100A to cooling system inadvertenly close

Overheating at GE-100A leading to equipment damage, plant shutdown

S (-)C(3)

1 S (-)C(M3)

Confirm availability of TSHH to trip Gas Generator GE-100A in case of high temperature has been included in the generator package.Lock Open (LO) for manual valve downstream GE-100A


14.13.1 Other Than


14.14.1 Other Than

Corrosion / Erosion


14.15.1 Other Than


14.16.1 Other Than


14.17.1 Other Than

Occupational Safety


14.18.1 Other Than


14.19.1 Other Than


14.20.1 Other Than


14.21.1 Other Than


CNG-HP-38

Parameter: Pressure



CNG-HP-39


Parameter: Drawing




Parameter: Relief

Parameter: Safety







Comment

Design Intent

Design Conditions:

Capacity Vent Stack : 12.5 MMSCFD

Opt. Conditions


No. Guide Words


15.1.1 No No Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified


15.3.1 More More Flow PSV or BDV passing Loss of gas to atmosphere resulting gas cloud around process area and potential fire if ignited

Flame arrestor installed S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)

15.4.1 Reverse Reverse Flow Air ingress to venting system Potential fire/explosion inside piping

Water seal at bottom of vent stack to prevent air ingress to venting system

S (4)C(4)

1 S (M4)C(M4)


1517-Jun-13

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONALCompressed Natural Gas PlantTambak LorokVent Gas System, including discharge of pressure relieving device and BDVs vent header, KO Drum V-600, up to Vent Stack VS-100

Normally Flare system has no hydrocarbon gas flowingDrain and liquid outlet of Vent Stack is normally close

To gather release gas from process relief valves and BDV and routing gas to safe area


Pressure : ATM - 2 barG Temperature : 10-60 deg C

High, Medium, Risk

PID - Vent Gas System

Rec. No.

B

Parameter: Flow



No. Guide Words



15.7.1 More More Level Liquid carry over from PSV/BDV release of hydrocarbon liquid to environment

Vent stack is equipped by dead leg to collect liquid and drain to Sump Tank V-400

S (-)C(2)

1 S (-)C(L2)

15.8.1 Less Less Pressure No additional significant issues of concerns identified

15.9.1 More More Pressure No additional significant issues of concerns identified





15.13.1 Other Than


15.14.1 Other Than

Corrosion / Erosion


15.15.1 Other Than


15.16.1 Other Than


15.17.1 Other Than

Occupational Safety


15.18.1 Other Than

External Factors Lighting struck during PSV/BDV release

Fire at vent stack S (4)C(3)

1 S (M4)C(M3)

Consider to install CO2 snuffing system at VS-100 to extinguish fire at vent stack completed with fusible plug

15.19.1 Other Than


15.20.1 Other Than



Parameter: Drawing

Parameter: Level






Parameter: Relief

Parameter: Safety

CNG-HP-40Parameter: External Factor

Parameter: Pressure



No. Guide Words


15.21.1 Other Than

Drawing

15.21.2 Other Than

Drawing



Appendix C

HAZID Review Worksheets

PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix C HAZID Review Worksheet PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT

Node Abbreviations SAAReview date

Co

Client PProject RiArea Rec

SC

H,M,LDrawing Drawing No. Rev. B1

No. Category/ Guideword

Hazard Description Consequences Prevention Control Recommendation/ Comment

Action Party Co. Pr Ri

4.1.1 Natural Events Earthquake Potential of loss of plant integrity leading to damage and hydrocarbon release

- Plant, equipment, building and foundation design anticipated to accommodate earthquake factor (0.15G), referring to UBC-1997 and soil investigation result

4.1.2 Natural Events Rob in process area Potential damage to process equipment

Plant is designed above Rob posistion (80 cm above average ground level vs 70 cm average rob) and in high position

NA

4.1.3 Natural Events Lightning Possible damage to the equipment and potential fire

- Grounding provided for each equipment

Update EQL drawing to show Lightning protection at CNG compartment area (lightning stack) in process/utility area

CNG-HD- 1 S (4)C(3)

4 S (H16)C(H12)

Lightning protection at CNG compartment area (lightning stack) in process/utility area

Rec Number

1 17-Jun-13 Consequency

PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL ProbabitliyCOMPRESSED NATURAL GAS PLANT RiskTAMBAK LOROK Recommendation

Comment The plan is located beside Indonesia Power Company. The North side is sea side. The South side is Turbine Generator belong by IP.

Safety RiskCommercial RiskHigh, Medium, Low

General Lay Out CNG Plant TS78-L-LY-001

CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 1 of 7 HAZID Worksheet Node 1




Action Party Co. Pr RiRec Number

4.1.4 Natural Events Settlement Possible damage to the equipment and potential fire

- Pile foundation (block design) provided to withstand settlement

4.1.5 Natural Events Land slide No major concern -4.2.1 External Events External corrosion Damage to the

equipment, loss of production

Painting & coating for piping and equipment

Periodic maintenance and inspection for all surface vessels and pipings

S (-)C(3)

2 S (-)C(H9)

-4.3.1 Transportation Light vehicles impact

e.g. CarPotential impact to piping/equipment leading to hydrocarbon release, fire, personnel injury/fatality and asset damage


Operation cars shall be equipped with flame arrestor and diesel engine

CNG-HD- 2 S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)

4.3.2 Transportation Heavy equipment to gas plant e.g. mobile crane

Potential impact to piping/equipment leading to hydrocarbon release, fire, personnel injury/fatality and asset damage

Concrete road Pipe bridge provided to connect each equipment across road

S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)

4.4.1 Lifting Lifting equipment (mobile crane, forklift) failure

Potential damage to pipeline and equipment

SOP for lifting activity including certified personnel to conduct the lifting

- S (-)C(2)

2 S (-)C(M4)

4.5.1 Non Process Fires Bush fire No additional significant issues of concerns identified

- S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)

4.6.1 Security Theft/sabotage Loss of production. Potential major accident leading to personnel injury/fatality

Fence line around the plant area

Security's Officer stand by 24 hrs at plant area

S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)






SOP for control personnel incoming to the plant

- S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)

4.6.2 Security Vandalism No additional significant issues of concerns identified

- -

4.6.3 Security Wild animals (tiger, crocodile and snake)


- -

4.7.1 Noise High noise level from compressor and gas engine area

Potential personnel ear injury

- Provide SOP to wear ear plug around noise area

CNG-HD- 3 S (1)C(-)

3 S (H3)C(-)

4.8.1 Health Hazards Toxic Material during handling chemical: for cooling water, corrosion inhibitor e.g. oxygen scavanger

Personnel injury MSDS provided in the storage facility

Ensure portable eye wash station provided during chemical handling (e.g : at control room, loading area and water treatment area)

CNG-HD- 4 S (1)C(-)

3 S (H3)C(-)


- S (1)C(-)

3 S (H3)C(-)

SOP for chemical handling

4.8.2 Health Hazards Handling molecular sieve at dryer system

Personnel exposure to H2S resulting in personnel injury


JSA S (1)C(-)

3 S (H3)C(-)

SOP for handling molecular sieve at dryer system

4.8.3 Health Hazards Personnel hygiene and living activity

Health impact to operator

Toilet and pantry are provided in control room building

Medical emergency provided (clinic) for operation personnel

S (1)C(-)

4 S (M4)C(-)






4.8.3 Health Hazards Hazardous waste disposal

Personnel injury during handling waste disposal


- Alocate waste disposal resulting from operation/construction activity in safe area (third party)

CNG-HD- 5 S (1)C(-)

3 S (H3)C(-)

4.9.1 Maintenance/ construction

Working at high location such as lightning pole, WHRU

Fall and slip resulting in injury/fatality

Maintenance access provided at WHRU

Permit to works system S (4)C(-)

2 S (H8)C(-)

SOP for working at height during maintenance and construction, including competent personnel


Hot/cold Work Fire and potential fatality

SOP for hot/cold work activity during construction, including competent personnel

permit to works system S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)


Confined Space Entry Potential fatality due to asphyxiation

SOP for confined space entry during maintenance and construction, including

permit to works system S (4)C(-)

2 S (H8)C(-)


Electrical Hazards Potential electrocution resulting in injury/fatality

Proper insulation for cabling/wiring

ELCB (Earth Leakage Circuit Breaker) provided for electrical equipment/devices e.g. welding machine

S (4)C(-)

2 S (H8)C(-)


Hot Surfaces at exhaust gas, WHRU and heat exchanger (E-200)

Potential injury due to exposure to heat

personal protection insulation provided

PPE Provide warning sign around hot surface equipment and pipings

CNG-HD- 6 S (2)C(-)

2 S (M4)C(-)






4.10.1 Loss of Containment

Leak from Process Equipment

Release of hydrocarbon resulting in potential fire/explosion leading to injury/fatality

Unit SD by low pressure trip

Gas detection system at process area

Define philosophy of fire and gas detection system and develop fire and gas detection area at process plant

CNG-HD- 7 S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)

- Fire hydrant provided with source from existing IP


CNG-HD- 8

4.10.2 Loss of Containment

Diesel Leak No additional significant issues of concerns identified

4.11.1 Ignition Sources Battery Fire/explosion in the event of hydrocarbon release.

Battery room is located in non hazardous area

Heat & Smoke detector, Portable Fire Extinguisher provided at control room & MCC room


CNG-HD- 9 S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)

4.11.2 Ignition Sources Vent Fire/explosion in the event of hydrocarbon release in process area if stroke by lightning

- Lightning protection provided at CNG compartment area

Define safe location and minimum height required for vent stack and vent location to be suitable with wind directions so that dispersed gas will not be exposed to process plan

CNG-HD- 10 S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)

S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)

4.11.3 Ignition Sources Static electricity from external vehicle

Fire/explosion in the event of hydrocarbon release.


S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)






4.12.1 Escape/ Refuge Fire on Plant area Personnel trap/ unable to evacuate leading to injury/fatality

ERP - Provide emergency evacuation risk analysis to determine safe evacuation route and location of muster area

CNG-HD- 11 S (4)C(4)

3 S (H8)C(H8)

- - Form emergency response team (ERT) and conduct emergency drill

CNG-HD- 12 S (4)C(4)

4 S (H8)C(H8)

- - S (4)C(4)

5 S (H8)C(H8)

4.13.1 Emergency Lighting

Personnel trap in wrong way

Personnel injury/fatality

Emergency lighting for evacuation is provided in control room and evacuation route

- S (4)C(4)

6 S (H8)C(H8)

4.14.1 Manned Building Control room Fire or explosion from process area impact to control room leading to potential personnel injury/fatality

- Heat and Smoke detector

Review scenario of fire and explosion from gas plant to the area of standby personnel such as control room and provide mitigation plan (design and location of the building) to anticipate fire/explosion

CNG-HD- 13 S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)

- - Define safety requirement on control room specification to accommodate fire/explosion scenario e.g. door, wall and window specifications

CNG-HD- 14 S (4)C(4)

3 S (H8)C(H8)

- - S (4)C(4)

4 S (H8)C(H8)

Inability to monitor process area

- - Consider to provide CCTV in the control room for monitoring purpose

CNG-HD- 15 S (4)C(4)

5 S (H8)C(H8)






4.15.1 Communication Inability to contact control room within emergency

Inability to coordinate response leading to potential major accident leading to personnel injury/fatality and asset loss

Each operator provided with hand held radio

F&G alarm system Define internal and external communication system (PABX) for connecting operator in the control room to outside parties

CNG-HD- 16 S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)

4.16.1 Shutdown Inability to initiate ESD

Inability to control fire leading to potential major accident leading to personnel injury/fatality and asset loss

Local ESD push button at control room

- Define safety layout at CNG plant to show ESD push button, fire hydrant, etc

CNG-HD- 17 S (4)C(4)

2 S (H8)C(H8)

4.16.2 Shutdown Loss of power Plant shutdown resulting loss of production

ESD is fail safe action

UPS is provided S (-)C(4)

2 S (-)C(H8)

Uncontrolled process upset

- Alternative power source from PLN for emergency equipment

S (-)C(4)

3 S (-)C(H8)

4.17.1 Other Plant layout - - S (-)C(-)

- S (-)C(-)

4.18.1 Discharge to air Note: venting only for emergency situation

- -

4.18.3 Discharge to water

Blowdown of water from cooling tower, discharge RO

Potential contamination from process fluid

- Discharge water is connected to existing canal (IP)


CNG-HD- 18

4.18.4 Discharge to soil No additional significant issue of concern identified

4.18.5 Waste disposal Disposal of operation/ construction waste e.g. plant, log

Potential environmental disturbance

- - Alocate waste disposal resulting from operation/construction activity in safe area (third party)

CNG-HD- 5 S (-)C(-)

4 S (-)C(-)



Appendix D

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Hazop & Hazid Report - Cng Gas Plant - Tambak Lorok Rev b

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