GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015 - GoG Maritime... · This is a visual representation of...

13 Feb 2015

Nigeria

Bight of Benin

Bight of Bonny

Ivory Coast

Ghana

Togo

Benin

Cameroon

Gabon

Eq. Guinea

Liberia Abidjan

The General Risk Area is defined based on attack frequency andproven striking distance from shore during the past 36 months:

Togo’s ports, territorial waters and EEZ up to 100 nM from shore –including Ghana’s offshore waters less than 100 nM from Lome.

Benin and Nigeria’s ports, waterways, territorial waters and EEZ, upto 200 nM from shore.

Bakassi Peninsula up to 20 nM from shore.

The GRA is determined by Bergen Risk analysts and is intended to mark thearea proven to be subjected to significant risk of piracy and similar maritimecrime.

All rights reserved. Released to subscribers only. Re-distribution of this briefing is not permitted. Please see EULA on last page.

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015General Risk Area

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Caution: Abidjan!

Nigeria

Bight of Benin

Bight of Bonny

Ivory Coast

Ghana

Togo

Benin

Cameroon

Gabon

Eq. Guinea

Liberia Abidjan

• 16 NOV 2014: Armed robbery, oil products tanker NN

• 27 AUG 2014: Armed robbery, oil products tanker SP BOSTON

• 3 FEB 2013: Hijack, chem/OP tanker GASCOGNE 66 nM off Abidjan. Released two days later.

• 13 JAN 2013: Hijack, product tanker ITRI, off Abidjan. Released 22 JAN off Lagos, Nigeria.

• 23 DEC 2012: Armed robbery/attempted hijack, chem/OP tanker MADONNA 1, Abidjan anchorage.

• 6 OCT 2012: Product tanker ORFEAS hijacked during STS ops off Abidjan. Released 54 nM ESE of Lagos, Nigeria on 9 OCT.

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Caution: Ghana!

Nigeria

Bight of Benin

Bight of Bonny

Ivory Coast

Ghana

Togo

Benin

Cameroon

Gabon

Eq. Guinea

Liberia Abidjan

• 30 JAN 2015: Hijack off Takoradi, fishing vessel Lu Rong Yuan YU 917.

• 25 JUL 2014: Hijack, oil product tanker HAI SOON 6 67 nM SE Accra. She was released some 60 nM ESE of Lagos on 3 August.

• 4 JUN 2014: Hijack, oil product tanker FAIR ARTEMIS some 50 nM south of Accra. She was released on 11 June off Ondo State, Nigeria (ESE Lagos).

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Caution: Gabon & Sao Tome!

Nigeria

Bight of Benin

Bight of Bonny

Ivory Coast

Ghana

Togo

Benin

Cameroon

Gabon

Eq. Guinea

Liberia Abidjan

• 30 NOV 2014: products tanker fired upon underway 50 nM SSW Sao Tome;

• 15 JUL 2013: Oil products tanker COTTON hijacked some 17 nMoff Gabon’s Port Gentil. Cargo of diesel stolen in two STS ops, off Gabon and Ghana. Pirates leave ship off Benin on 22 July and sail towards the Nigerian coast.

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Caution: Luanda, Angola!

Nigeria

Bight of Benin

Bight of Bonny

Ivory Coast

Ghana

Togo

Benin

Cameroon

Gabon

Eq. Guinea

Liberia Abidjan

• 17 JAN 2014: Hijack of laden chemical/oil product tanker MT KERALA. Released on 26 JAN off the north-western Niger Delta after part of her cargo of gasoil had been stolen.

13 Feb 201513 Feb 2015

Onne

Port Harcourt

Warri

Escravos

Forcados

Lagos

Brass

Qua Iboe

Calabar

Erha

AkpoAgbami

Okwori

Antan

EA

Westaf

Abo

Limbe

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Listed Area, as defined by Lloyds Joint War Committee

Bonny

NigeriaBeninTogo

Ghana

Cameroon

Bonga

AccraTema

Lome

Cotonou

Douala

Malabo

Lloyd’s Joint War Committee’s Hull, War, Strikes, Terrorism and Related Perils Listed Areas

Togo was listed on 12 June 2013 as theresult of persistent attacks, since 2012, oninternational shipping in the country’sterritorial waters and EEZ.

Benin was added in August 2011, joiningNigeria, already on the list at that time.

The Listed Area is defined as: Gulf ofGuinea, but only the waters of theTogolese, Beninese and Nigerian ExclusiveEconomic Zones north of Latitude 3° N

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Norway Maritime Authority’s caution area

Norwegian Maritime Authority notice issued 31 Jan 2014:

Expansion of security level 2 area in West African areas

Reference is made to ISPS notification dated 19.12.2013, related to West Africa. In that notification, the area where security level 2 is required was expanded to the waters off Togo and Benin, which was an addition to the already existing (since 2007) requirements for security level 2 in the waters off Nigeria.

Furthermore, on the same date (19.12.2013), the Norwegian Maritime Authority recommended that Masters carefully consider implementing relevant security measures for areas west of Togo (all the way to and including Ivory Coast) and east/south of Nigeria (all the way to and including Gabon). The relevant areas were marked on the map as “area where measures according to SSP for level 2 should be carefully considered”.

Due to recent and credible reports of Nigerian piracy activity off the coast of Angola, NMA advises vessels flying the Norwegian flag to carefully consider relevant security measures east and south of Nigeria, all the way to and including the waters off Angola.

The Norwegian Maritime Authority emphasizes that the required security level for the said area west of Togo and east/south of Nigeria is still level 1.

Source: http://www.sjofartsdir.no/om-direktoratet/aktuelt/security-and-

piracy-information/piracy-information40/

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2014Observations January, and February so far

Attacks carried out in January and early February re-affirm that the waters off Bayelsa and Akwa Ibom states in Nigeria are by far the most vulnerable to persistent and violent attacks on shipping and offshore activity.

However, the hijacking of a Chinese fishing vessel off Ghana on 30 January again shows that the risk or piracy is a regional challenge.

As at 12 February 4 serious security incidents have been recorded offshore the Niger Delta so far this year – the most serious being the attack on MT Kalamos at Qua Iboe offshore terminal ten days ago. 3 incidents have taken place on inland waterways of the delta.

Other incidents recorded so far this year are: Ivory Coast (2 suspicious approaches), Ghana (one hijacking and one armed robbery).

MTISC-GoG also reported the sighting of a suspected mothership off Angola on 22 January.

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015January incidents

All recorded incidents, incl. theft and suspicious approaches. Attacks on international stakeholders* only.

*‘Owned/managed by’, ‘working for’ or ‘associated with’.

Date Time Type of incident Area Vessel name Flag state Vessel type Source

2015-01-110400 UTC Hijack Nigeria Mariam Cook Islands Oil Products Tanker IMB, Media/Open

2015-01-142130 UTC Armed Robbery Ghana Ocean Splendor Panama Bulk Carrier IMB, IMO

2015-01-180827 UTC Armed Assault Nigeria NN Nigeria Patrol Vessel, Naval BRS

2015-01-201710 UTC Suspicious Approach Cote D'Ivoire E.R. Stavanger Liberia Offshore Supply IMB, BRS

2015-01-220000 UTC Suspicious Approach Angola NN MTISC-GoG

2015-01-220815 UTC Suspicious Approach Cote D'Ivoire NN MTISC-GoG

2015-01-231845 UTC Armed Assault Nigeria Jascon 24 Nigeria Offshore Tug/Supply Ship

BRS

2015-01-300500 UTC Hijack Ghana Lu Rong Yuan YU 917

Ghana Fishing Vessel IMB, IMO

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015GoG incidents past 6 weeks – as of 11 Feb

Map/Web solution: NavTracker by Navtor. This map also shows attacks on local shipping where information has been available.

The NavTracker is commercially available: http://bergenrisksolutions.com/maritime-security/navtor-navtracker

http://bergenrisksolutions.com/maritime-security/navtor-navtracker

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015GoG incidents past 3 months – as of 11 Feb




13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015GoG incidents past 12 months – as of 11 Feb

BIGHTS OF BENIN & BONNY: Max confirmed

offshore striking distance past 12 months, and record:

189 nM from shore, armed assault (fired upon),

chemical / oil prod. tanker BW LENA, 9 Aug 2014.

ALSO NOTE: 30 Nov 2014, products tanker fired upon.

A speed boat with eight pirates armed with machine guns and a

ladder were lowered from black hull tug. The speed boat

approached the tanker and started firing at the accommodation.




13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Incidents by county, past 12 months – as of 1 Feb



Ship type SRL LIB IVC GHA TOG BEN NIG CAM EQG S.T & P GAB CON ANG TotalAccom. barge 1 1AHTS vessel 1 3 4Bulk carrier 1 1 3 5Chemical/OP tanker 2 3 1 20 1 27Container vessel 1 1 1 3Crew boat 1 1Crude oil tanker 4 4Drilling rig 1 1Fishing vessel 1 1General cargo 2 2 4LNG/LPG tanker 1 1Offshore/supply 1 2 16 2 21Oil platform 1 1Patrol boat 5 5Research vessel 2 2Tug 4 1 5Unspecified tanker 1 1Unknown/other 1 1 4 1 2 9Total 1 0 5 8 5 0 66 0 0 1 0 8 2 96

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Incidents by ship type, past 12 months – as of 1 Feb



13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Nigeria: Shipping and offshore density

This is a visual representation of accumulated AIS plots during the second half of 2013. Offshore density and activity is clearly identified by the red and green dots on the map. Source: marinetraffic.com

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Nigeria: Current shipping activity, as at 12 Feb, 1435 GMT

Source: marinetraffic.com

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Nigeria: The attack on MT KALAMOS, 03 FEB – Fact file

• Approaching Nigerian EEZ on 26 JAN – waiting;• Entered Nigerian EEZ on 29 JAN, then drifting some 30

nM south of the coast of Akwa Ibom state until morning 31 JAN, arriving at Qua Iboe offshore terminal around noon;

• Hellenic Coast Guard said 23 people were aboard when the attack happened, including 10 Greek nationals;

• Boarded by armed pirates arriving in two speed boats in the evening of 03 FEB, around 2200 hrs LT;

• BIMCO reported that Kalamos's master activated the ship security alarm and made a Channel 16 distress call at 22.07, requesting medical assistance for injured crew;

• Greek chief engineer sustained gunshot wounds and later died while waiting to be transferred to a hospital;

• Three crew kidnapped, the 2nd engineer and two able seamen;

• Guardian Global Resources (GGR) said the ship, which had reportedly been detained over alleged non-payment of fees, had armed security personnel on board, provided by NIMASA;

• The tanker left the terminal in the morning of 11 FEB and is now, midday 12 FEB, steaming south off the coast of Gabon.

Sources: Media and BRS contacts

IMO number: 9197832

Call Sign: 9HA3598

MMSI: 229776000

Gross tonnage: 149282

DWT: 281037

Type of ship: Crude Oil Tanker

Year of build: 2000

Flag: Malta

Registered owner: KALAMOS SHIPPING CORP c/o Aeolos Management,

Athens, Greece

Ship Manager: Aeolos Management SA

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Nigeria: Attack on MT KALAMOS, 03 FEB – Nimasa’s (non) involvement

NIMASA, it is stated by sources in Nigeria, was responsible for security at Qua Iboe offshore terminal but that their protection vessels were absent during the attack.

Our investigation confirms that:

• MV NIMASA OGLAKIRIGHA left the terminal at approx. 1500 GMT on the 3rd and was present at Bonny Town just before midnight the same day, at 23:30. She was back at the terminal at 11:35 on the 4th, according to her AIS track.

• MV NIMASA OWEIKENIGHAN left the Qua Iboe at approx 14:15 GMT on the 2nd, was present at Bonny Town at 1400 hrs on the 3rd. She returned to Qua Iboe at 02:43 GMT on 4 FEB.

We do not know whether or not any other security vessel was present to cover for the absent NIMASA boats. SVS BONNY is presently, 12 FEB, patrolling the area.

It is further alleged that the KALAMOS’s chief engineer was killed in the crossfire between the pirates and Nigerian security personnel onboard the tanker. We have been unable to verify this claim.

LEARNING POINT: It is of critical importance that ships calling ports and offshore terminals in the Niger Delta maintain a security regime onboard capable of detecting and responding to a security threat at all times. The presence, alertness, responsiveness and quality of local security forces cannot always be guaranteed.

NIMASA OGLAKIRIGHA and NIMASA OWEIKENIGHAN are owned byGlobal West Vessel Specialists Nigeria Ltd, a private company controlledby Chief Government Ekpemupolo, better know as former MENDcommander Tompolo. Their non-appearance at the Qua Iboe terminalduring the attack very likely contributed to opening a wide window ofopportunity for the attackers.

Both vessels, and four identical craft, are chartered by Nimasa under acontract between Global West and the Nigerian Ministry of Transport,which has been in place since January 2012.

NIMASA OGLAKIRIGHA and NIMASA OWEIKENIGHAN are formerNorwegian Navy missile torpedo boats purchased from the NOR Navy byBritish company CAS Global in 2012, almost certainly on behalf of GlobalWest.

The photo above, taken by a Bergen Risk client, shows their identicalsister, NIMASA BARUGU at Apapa in Lagos in December 2014.

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Nigeria: Attack on MT KALAMOS, 03 FEB – map and distances

Map/Web solution: NavTracker by Navtor



13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Nigeria: Attacks off the eastern Niger Delta past 6 months, as at 11 FEB

Map/Web solution: NavTracker by Navtor


MT KALAMOS, kidnap & death 03 FEB 2015

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

Should any of our readers have reliable information about MT KALAMOS and why this particular area now is subjected to persistent attacks, please contact us at:

[email protected]

Note: We do not pay for information.


13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Nigeria: The track of MT KALAMOS, as at 12 Feb

Map/Web solution: marinetraffic.com

1. Arriving evening 26 JANDeparting early morning 29 JAN

2. Arriving 1513 GMT 29 JANDeparting 0319 GMT 31 JAN

3. Attacked 2200 (LT) 03 FEB

4. Leaving the area 1100 GMT 11 FEB

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Nigeria: Tankers detained in Lagos – clampdown on foreign guards?

NIMASA said that it will not hesitate to detain any vessel entering thecountry territorial and coastal waters with security escorts on board,whether armed or unarmed, Vanguard, a widely-read Lagos-basednewspaper, reported on 2 February.

The warning came as the agency detained three oil product tankers inLagos in January, LILAC VICTORIA, UACC EAGLE and MORGANE, becausethey sailed into Nigeria with individuals linked to private security firmsoverseas offering training on the use of weapons, thus “representing arisk to national security” according to the news report.

Leaving aside the margin of error in the Vanguard report, the message,we believe, is aimed at:

• Curtailing the ever increasing use of unauthorised foreign securitypersonnel;

• Reducing the risk of import and spread of illegal weapons;

• Reducing the risk of misunderstandings and armed confrontationbetween agencies providing security;

• Protecting the public and private business interests of NIMASA,the Navy and their civilian domestic partners.

It is not intended to curtail the legitimate use of unarmed securitypersonnel providing the offshore petroleum industry with advice onsafety and security best practices. In fact, foreign private firms such asCRG, LGS and others have formed the backbone of the offshore securitysector in Nigeria for a decade, in close collaboration with local partners,the Navy and other government security forces.

Detained, allegedly: LILAC VICTORIA – pictured above – IMO

9589815, Marshall Is flag oil products tanker built 2011 – calling Lagos

02 Jan 2015; UACC EAGLE, IMO 9550694, Marshall Is flag oil

products tanker built 2009 – calling Lagos 29 Jan 2015; MORGANE,

IMO 9327425, Marshall Is flag oil/chemical tanker built 2006 – calling

Lagos 29 Jan 2014. Photo by shipspotting.com

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Nigeria: How it started – Vanguard “Fed Govt to detain ships ...”

02 Feb 2015 – Vanguard: The Federal Government has said that it willnot hesitate to detain any vessel entering the country’s territorial andcoastal waters with security escorts on board, whether armed orunarmed.

The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, NIMASA,gave this warning when the agency detained three vessels, LILACVICTORIA, UACC EAGLE and MORGANE, because they sailed intoNigeria with individuals linked to private security firms overseasoffering training on the use of weapons.

The NIMASA Director of Shipping Development, Captain WarrediEnisuoh, said the agency was uncomfortable that vessels with highprobability of entering Nigeria with disposable arms or ammunitionwere beginning to sail in shortly after the agency and other sisterlyagencies had cleansed the Nigerian waters of scourges such as piracy.

Describing it as "a new threat" that now "looms over the horizon withpossible far-reaching consequences," Enisuoh warned ship operators,cargo owners, ship agents, among others that resultant interventionsand delays may lead to possible forfeiture of their ships and cargo tothe Federal Government.

"Private registered security firms in collusion with unscrupulousofficials have embarked on unconstitutional MoUs and partnershipsthat threaten our national security.

"NIMASA has embarked on tackling this problem as it seems to begaining tacit support underground as local Nigerian lawyers nowintervene when they are arrested."

"There is no doubt that they come with arms hidden within the ship orthrow them overboard when threatened with a search.

"The weapons they come with could be sold. This could well threatenthe peace and calm we enjoy in our waters.

"The agency is, therefore, sounding a note of warning that any vesselthat comes into Nigeria with a foreign guard, whether armed orunarmed will be detained.”

Source: http://allafrica.com/stories/201502020814.html

BACKGROUND

The reason the message is repeated from time to time is that an everincreasing horde of foreign security providers is invading Nigeria.Some of them have been caught with large weapons caches. Theclearest example so far is that of MV Myre Seadiver, a Russian securityvessel arrested in Lagos in 2012 with large amounts of weapons andammo onboard. They claimed their agent had received clearance fromlocal police to come in for a crew change. The Russians were promptlyarrested by the Navy and had their ship detained for months. Thepermission provided by the agent was declared null and void.

The Fed Govt and the Nigerian Navy want to limit the number of localMoUs in place, creating – they say – an uncontrollable securityenvironment. In March 2014, two unarmed British advisors werearrested in Warri, Delta state whilst carrying out security duties onbehalf of a shipping client.

Continued on next page

http://allafrica.com/stories/201502020814.html

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Nigeria: Fed Govt to detain ships ... contd.

The Fed Govt and the Nigerian Navy want to limit the number of localMoUs in place, creating – they say – an uncontrollable securityenvironment. In March 2014, two unarmed British advisors were arrestedin Warri, Delta state whilst carrying out security duties on behalf of ashipping client. Their employer, Port2Port, had signed a MoU with thelocal police. They Navy ignored it and detained the Britons.

There have also been armed confrontations between navy patrols andonboard armed police acting on behalf of foreign security firms.

CLARITY NEEDED

Confusion over what is and what is not allowed in terms of securingtankers and cargo vessels calling Nigerian Ports has been problematic forquite some time.

BIMCO, the shipping association, issued a security alert on 16 June lastyear stating “Members operating vessels within the Nigerian EEZ andterritorial waters should be aware that they may be at risk of potentiallysignificant liabilities and delays if they employ armed guards on boardtheir vessels who are sourced from the Nigerian Marine Police, theNigerian Police or the ‘Joint Task Force’. ...

“It would seem that the only legitimate method of acquiring armedsecurity protection in territorial waters and the EEZ of Nigeria is byutilising the services of the Nigerian Navy (although, this seems toexclude armed guards on board vessels). BIMCO is presently seekingwritten confirmation of these facts.”

IMO have also sought clarification on policy from Nigeria’s maritimeauthorities. So far none has been forthcoming as far as we have beenable to establish.

CONCLUSIONS

With regards to unarmed advisors working on offshore support vessels,we are fairly certain that personnel signed on as crew and HSSE advisorswill fall well outside the definition of “threat to national security” – as hasbeen the case in the offshore petroleum industry in the Niger Delta for adecade or so.

As for tankers and cargo ships occasionally calling Nigerian ports, we canoffer a far less accurate assessment. Apart from the obvious: “don’t go inwith any weapons onboard”, it is to be hoped that Nigeria’sgovernment’s guidance will be made available shortly to flag states andship operators to avoid further confusion over which rules apply.Meanwhile, using Lagos Safe Anchorage – protected jointly by the Navy,private vessel provider OMS and Britain’s PGS Group – is an alternative toconsider.

The Ship Security Officer function is a fully legitimate, indeed required,function onboard. It has been since the ISPS Code came into force in2004. So it’s not the security function that is threatened by NIMASA’slatest warning. It’s about uncontrolled weapons, armed and unregulatedforeign activity, un-coordinated requests to local police and othersecurity commanders. And it is about business. Maritime securityprovision is a lucrative trade for government agencies and their leadingfigures.

Under any circumstance, clarity – now more than ever – is needed. What,exactly, is permitted under Nigerian rules and regulations in terms ofprotecting merchant ships calling her EEZ, territorial waters, ports andterminals?

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Nigeria: Incidents past 6 weeks – as of 11 Feb

LEGEND: Black = incidents last 7 days regardless of category. Red: Hijack/kidnap; Yellow: Armed assault or robbery; Blue = Attempt (noreport of weapons used); Green: Suspicious approach or theft Map: World Piracy Update by Bergen Risk Solutions & Jeppesen – a Boeingcompany. This map also shows attacks on local shipping where information has been available.

01 FEB: Armed assault, Crude oil tanker REMI

05 FEB: Attempted robbery/theft,

berthed chemical tanker

18 JAN: Armed assault, navy patrol boat

14 JAN: Armed robbery, drifting bulk carrier

OCEAN SPLENDOR

11 JAN: Hijack, oil products tanker MARIAM

23 JAN: Armed assault, supply vessel JASCON 24

04 FEB: kidnap, local oil company staff, passenger boat

07 JAN: Kidnap of sergeant, JTF house boat

03 FEB: Kidnap and death, crude tanker KALAMOS

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015 Nigeria: Incidents past 12 weeks – as of 11 Feb

Observation: Incident frequency off Bayelsa and Akwa Ibom statescontinues to cause concern. Despite pressure on active criminalgroups by federal & state security forces these particular areas ofthe delta should be considered extreme risk for unprotectedshipping working or transiting here. Incidents at Lagos areattempted small time banditry.


13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Nigeria: Incidents past 12 months – as of 11 Feb


Max confirmed offshore striking distance past 13 months, and record:

189 nM from shore, armed assault (fired upon), chemical oil prod.

tanker BW LENA, 9 Aug 2014.

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Nigeria: Elections postponed

Nigeria has postponed its 14 February presidential election by six weeksbecause of security fears. An election commission official said the delayuntil 28 March was necessary because of a lack of troops available toprotect voters, according to media reports. The official continued that hehad been told that troops would not be available to help patrol the voteas they were too busy conducting operations against Boko Haram in thenorth-east of the country.

Former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari, from the All ProgressivesCongress (APC) is challenging incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan,who heads the People's Democratic Party (PDP).

Officials from the APC accuse the military of forcing the electoralcommission into the delay to help the sitting president's campaign.

Nigeria's interior minister believes the fight against Boko Haram will besuccessful enough for the postponed elections to go ahead, he told theBBC. Abbo Moro said he had been advised by the military that enoughtroops would be available in six weeks' time to secure the presidentialballot.

Opposition candidate Muhammadu Buhari has made a plea for calm. Buthe said the independence of Nigeria's electoral commission had been"gravely compromised" by the decision to postpone the elections.

Parliamentary elections due to take place on 14 February have also beenpostponed to 28 March, and elections for state governors andassemblies slated for 28 February have been moved to 11 April.

Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), on 9

January, issued maps illustrating various risks associated with the

elections. Ondo, Delta, Rivers and Akwa Ibom states have been flagged

high risk, using violence during the December primaries as an indicator.

Lagos and Bayelsa states are classified as low risk using the same

yardstick.

For the entire INEC risk briefing see: http://www.inecnigeria.org/wp-

content/uploads/2015/02/Pre-election-Risk-Mapping-.pdf

http://www.inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Pre-election-Risk-Mapping-.pdf

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015Nigeria: Selected ports and offshore terminals

Bakassi

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015 24/7/365 emergency response numbers

As promulgated in the 3 October 2014 updated GoG Guidelines, jointly developed by BIMCO, ICS, INTERTANKO and INTERCARGO:

NOTE: A swift rescue or emergency response is not guaranteed. These emergency points of contact will, however, relay information to the relevantauthorities. Offshore vessels working under the security umbrella of oil companies should consult their offshore security co-ordination plan for project specificsecurity points of contact.

MTISC-GoG (located in Accra, Ghana)Telephone (24hrs): +233 (0) 302 718 227, +233 (0) 248 060789, +233 (0) 260 561633E-mail: [email protected]: www.mtiscgog.org

IMB Piracy Reporting Centre24 Hrs ANTI PIRACY HELPLINE: +60 3 2031 0014Tel: +60 3 2078 5763/2031 0287 / 2031 3106Piracy E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]: https://icc-ccs.org

INTERPOL Command and Coordination Centre: Telephone (24hrs): +33 (0) 47244 7676

Interpol has a seat on the MTISC, E-mail: [email protected] | www.interpol.int

Lagos Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (RMRCC), Nigeria: Telephone (24hrs): +234 1 730 6618 (landline)

Lagos covers nine countries (Benin, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, São Tomé &

Príncipe and Togo).

Monrovia Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (RMRCC), Liberia: INMARSAT C: 580-460173-111 AOR-E or 580-460199-019 AOR-W, Landline: +231 770-092229, Mobile: +231 573-0144.

Monrovia covers the territorial waters of Liberia and her four neighbouring countries - Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire.

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.mtiscgog.org/



https://icc-ccs.org/


http://www.interpol.int/

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015 Current advice – General

SHIPS CALLING PORTS IN THE GULF OF GUINEA SHOULD

Ensure continuous access to updated and relevant security information.

Acquaint themselves with the Updated Anti-piracy Guidelines for Gulf of Guinea available at: https://www.bimco.org/news/2014/10/03_updated_anti-piracy_guidelines.aspx

Heed the current IMB warning: “All vessels are advised to maintain strict anti piracy watches and measures and report all attacks and suspicious sightings to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre. These official attack reports are also crucial to request the relevant Authorities to beef up patrols and stop the menace in the area.”

Hijackings are often carried out with help from insiders. Communications with external parties should be kept to a minimum, with close attention paid to organizing rendezvous points and waiting positions. Use sat-phone or e-mail rather than VHF where practical.

Rendezvous - Where possible, avoid waiting and slow steaming. Consider offering several alternative rendezvous points and advice rendezvous points at the last minute.

Anchoring - Where practicable, a prolonged stay at anchorage is to be avoided.

Avoid drifting/waiting less than 200 nM from nearest land off Benin and Nigeria; 100 nM off Togo and The Ivory Coast.

Get detailed procedures for port calls and Navy/escort points of contact from you local agent or security firm.

Note that private armed security is illegal but some navies can assist with armed escorts and guards on a case by case basis.

https://www.bimco.org/news/2014/10/03_updated_anti-piracy_guidelines.aspx

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015 General advice – Nigeria/Benin/Togo

Nigeria/Benin

Drift at +200 nM from land until called in; or go all the way in to Lagos anchorage to ensure safety in numbers and a (limited)security cover provided by the Maritime Guard Command’s patrol boats. (A joint Navy/NIMASA/private security undertaking.)

Bonny anchorage off the Niger Delta is NOT safe.

Escorted convoys on Bonny River are available. Speak to your agent or security contact on how to join one.

Togo Navy advisory to all ships at Lome anchorage

During hours of darkness ships may notice small boats passing nearby to fish as their prey are attracted to ship's light. Monitor theboats. If they are fishermen, you are advised to:

1. Report immediately to the Togolese navy’s operation centre on VHF channel 10/16. It is prohibited for any small fishingboats to stay within 300 yards around any ship.

2. Keep sharp lookout and continue to monitor the boats until a Navy patrol boat reaches your ship's position.

If you are unsure whether they are fishermen, you are required to:

1. Report any suspicious and hostile craft, using both VHF voice channel 10/16 and DSC channel 70.

2. The navy has patrol boats at sea during the night and will assist.

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015 Current advice – Togo

The Togolese Government has adopted measures to enhance the safety and security of vessels navigating in or through the country's territorial waters.

A vessel identification station called "TOGO NAVY" is established at Lome military naval base. This station is responsible for identifying all vessels navigating in or through Togolese territorial waters to ensure optimal control over these waters. The details of the vessel identification station are as follows:

VHF: Channel 16, Channel 10 "TOGO NAVY“ | Tel: 00 228 22 23 70 83 | Fax: 00 228 22 71 01 10 INMARSAT-C: 584 422 801 833 | Mail: [email protected]

The Togo Navy has four patrol boats and an Air Force helicopter to patrol maritime areas specifically in the safe anchorage. Two new Offshore Patrol Boat are expected at the end of the first semester of 2014.

A berthing zone and waiting zone where 24-hour patrols by vessels belonging to the National Navy have been established. The coordinates of the berthing zone and waiting zone are as follows:

BERTHING ZONE:A) 06°05.000N / 001°13.000 E | B) 05°56.000N / 001°13.000 E | C) 06°01.000N / 001°12.000 E |D) 06°07.000N / 001°18.000 E

WAITING ZONE:E) 06°08.000N / 001°25.000 E | F) 06°03.000N / 001°27.000 E |G) 06°04.000N / 001°30.000 E | H) 06°09.000N / 001°29.000 E

All vessels must contact the "TOGO NAVY" identification station on VHF channel 10 prior to entering the territorial waters. In cases where the vessel has armed protection, this should be notified 48 hours in advance and all arms and weaponry should be disarmed prior to entry into territorial waters.

Source: GAC Hot Port News


http://www.gac.com/hpn

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015 Current advice – Togo contd.

All vessels within Togolese territorial waters are bound to:

- ensure permanent radiotelephonic monitoring (VHF) on the international call frequency (channel 16) and channel 10;

- inform the "TOGO NAVY" identification station, by all means at its disposal, of any incident or accident which may compromise the safety of persons, the vessel or its navigation, and more generally of any situation likely to lead to pollution of the waters and coastline;

- ensure compliance with injunctions issued by the shipping and maritime authorities and to respond to any request for information issued by the Togolese authorities;

Vessels in Togolese territorial waters are obliged to comply with the following provisions:

- ensure the AIS emitter is continuously activated;

- indicate the presence of any vessel navigating within a distance of less than 222 metres;

- have a Shipping Agency;

- issue prior information to the Shipping Agency and the "TOGO NAVY" identification station prior to any operations being undertaken (transhipment or resupply) with other vessels;

- inform the "TOGO NAVY" identification station of departure from the mooring point two hours prior to unberthing.

All vessels shall be under the obligation to preferably anchor in the berthing zone or waiting zone where supervision and patrols are undertaken permanently.

All vessels, shipping companies, and shipping agents shall be entitled to request special protection by the State Armed Services through its Shipping Agency.

All movements and manoeuvres of supply vessels towards moored vessels are prohibited at night. Each supply vessel shall be under the obligation to indicate its manoeuvres to the "TOGO NAVY" identification station.

Source: GAC Hot Port News

http://www.gac.com/hpn

13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update, Feb 2015 Current advice – Ivory Coast and Ghana

IVORY COAST

Two hours before arrival on roads Master needs to call Port control on Channels 12 or 16 for security instructions. ISPS contact point, Port security and the Navy work together.

Please provide information about:

• Your working area (longitude; latitude) to your Agent in order to keep harbour Master informed about your operation;

• Contract copy with Government or other party ;

• Vessel particulars

Côte d'Ivoire navy & police 24/7 Points of Contact

• Marine :+225 234 54 325 /234 54 629/ 203 23 100/ 234 58 297

• Gendarmerie : +225 213 56 757

• ISPS contact point : +225 212 17 115 or 212 17 116, 17, 18

• Harbour master : +225 212 38 697

Note: Info provided by GAC-OMA, Ivory Coast. We have NOT tested the numbers.

GHANA

Ghana Navy Point of Contact: Ops Room Tel: + 233 (0) 244 333 914

13 Feb 2015

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13 Feb 2015

GoG Maritime Security Update

Release date 13 Feb 2014

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All rights reserved. The Gulf of Guinea Monthly Maritime Security Update is the intellectual property of Bergen Risk Solutions AS (Ltd). This Update is licensed for single user only. Multiple user licences give distribution rights within own business unit, but not to external clients or partners. You may, on an occasional and irregular basis, provide insubstantial portions of the information in memoranda, reports and presentations provided that these

insubstantial portions are only made available in print or by secure electronic means to a limited number of individuals. Maps and charts are not to be considered “insubstantial portions”. Any unauthorised copying will constitute an infringement of copyright. Hiring, lending and distribution is prohibited. Selling or

dissemination without prior written consent is prohibited. In all cases Bergen Risk Solutions shall be quoted as source.

This Update is intended as an overview only. It should not be treated as a definitive guide, nor should it be considered to cover every area of concern, or be regarded as legal advice. Bergen Risk Solutions AS (Ltd) is not liable for any losses, claims, damages, expenses or other liabilities inflicted upon the receiver or any

third party as a result of use of information contained in this report.

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