Globalization and the Study of International SecurityAuthor(s): Victor D. ChaSource: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 3 (May, 2000), pp. 391-403Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/425352 .

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RS SA k -

? 2000 Journal of Peace Research, lvol 37, no. 3, 2000,pp. 391-4(03 Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) [0022-3433(200005)37:3; 391-403; 0126321

Globalization and the Study of International Security*

VICTOR D. CHA

Department of Government and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

In spite of the plethora of literature on security and globalization, there is relatively little work written by security specialists that interconnects the two. In the case of security studies, this has been in no small part because the field remains entrenched in the 'foodfight' of competing realist, liberal, and construc- tionist research programs. In the case of the globalization literature, it has stemmed from a relatively stronger focus on the social and economic processes of globalization. 'lThis essay explores how the pro- cesses ofglobalization have fundamentally changed the way we think about security. It argues that non- physical security, diversification of threats, and the salience of identity are key effects of globalization in the security realm. Tlhese security effects translate into certain behavioral tendencies in a state's foreign policy that have thus far not been studied in the literature. First, globalization creates an interpenetration of foreign and domestic ('intermestic) issues such that national governments increasingly operate in spaces defined by the intersection of internal and external security. Second, globalization puts unprece- dented bureaucratic innovation pressures on governments in their search for security, and creates multi- lateralist pressures to cooperate with substate and transnational partners rather than traditional allies. Third, globalization makes the calculation of relative capabilities extremely complex and non-linear. Finally, globalization compels contemplation of new modes of fighting as well as renders commonly accepted modes of strategic thinking and rational deterrence increasingly irrelevant. The 'new' security environment in the 21st century will operate increasingly in the space defined by the interpenetration between two spheres: globalization and national identity.

Introduction

At the threshold of the 21 st century, two top- ics have dominated the study of international relations in the USA: globalization and the

'new' security environment after the end of the Cold War. The latter has been the object of intense debate, largely dominated by those

arguing about the relative importance of

structural, institutional, and cultural variables for explaining the likelihood of global or

* Thanks to Samuel Kim, Robert I,ieber and Robert

Gallucci for comments and Balbina Hwang for research assistance.

regional peace.1 The former dynamic has been discussed so widely in scholarly and

popular circles that it has reached the ignoble status of 'buzzword', familiarly used by many to refer to some fuzzy phenomenon or trend in the world, but hardly understood by any.2 This essay explores how the processes of

globalization have fundamentally changed the way we think about security. In spite of the plethora of literature on security and

1 'I'he works here are too numerous to mention. See Lebow & Risse-Kappen (1995); Brown (1995, 1996); Katzenstcin (1996b); L,ynn-Jones (1993); Buzan et al.

(1997b). 2 For a recent insightful work in the non-academic litera-

ture, see Friedman (1999).

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REVIEW

ESSAY

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392 journal of PTR A c RES Rm 3s E n A RC H

globalization, there is relatively little work written by US security specialists that inter- connects the two. In the case of security

studies, this has been in no small part because the field remains entrenched in the

'foodfight' of competing realist, liberal, and constructionist research programs. In the case of the globalization literature, this has stemmed from a relatively stronger focus on the social and economic processes of globali- zation. The 'new' security environment in the 21st century will operate increasingly in the space defined by the interpenetration between two spheres: globalization and national identity.

Security and Globalization

Globalization is best understood as a spatial phenomenon.3 It is not an 'event', but a

gradual and ongoing expansion of interac- tion processes, forms of organization, and forms of cooperation outside the traditional

spaces defined by sovereignty. Activity takes

place in a less localized, less insulated way as transcontinental and interregional patterns criss-cross and overlap one another.4

The process of globalization is analytically distinct from interdependence. The latter, as Reinicke states, denotes growth in connec- tions and linkages between sovereign enti- ties. Interdependence complicates external

3 Sec Held (1997: 253). As Rosenau (1996: 251) writes, 'It refers neither to values nor structures but to sequences that unfold either in the mind or behavior, to interaction processes that evolve as people and organizations go about their daily tasks and seek to realize their particular goals.' 4 See Mittelman (1994: 427). Or as Goldblatt et al. (1997: 271) note: 'Globalization denotes a shift in the spatial form and extent of human organization and interaction to a transcontinental or interregional level. It involves a stretching of social relations across time and space such that day-to-day actixvities are increasingly influenced by events happening on the other side of the globe and the practices and decisions of highly localized groups and institutions can have significant global reverberations.'

sovereignty in that sovereign choices have to be made to accommodate these interdepend- ent ties. Globalization processes are not just about linkages but about interpenetration. As Guehenno noted, globalization is defined not just by the ever-expanding connections between states measured in terms of move- ment of goods and capital but the circulation and interpenetration of people and ideas

(Guehenno, 1999: 7). It affects not only external sovereignty choices but also internal

sovereignty in terms of relations between the

public and private sectors (Reinicke, 1997). Contrary to popular notions of globalization, this does not mean that sovereignty ceases to exist in the traditional Weberian sense (i.e. monopoly of legitimate authority over citi- zen and subjects within a given territory).

Instead, globalization is a spatial reorganiza- tion of production, industry, finance, and other areas which causes local decisions to have global repercussions and daily life to be affected by global events. Comparisons are often made between globalization at the end of the 20th century and the period before World War I when the developed world wit- nessed unprecedented high volumes of trade across borders and movements of capital that led to the dissolution of empires and tra- ditional structures of governance. However, these analogies are not accurate because the process of change at the turn of the 20th century was driven by, and had as its final outcome, nationalism and the consolidation of statehood. A century later, statehood and notions of sovereignty are not so much under attack by so-called 'globalization forces' as empires were, but are being modi- fied and re-oriented by them. In short, the nation-state does not end; it is just less in control. Activity and decisions for the state increasingly take place in a post-sovereign space (Reinicke, 1997; Rosenau, 1996). In this sense, globalization is both a boundary- broadening process and a boundary- weakening one (Rosenau, 1996: 251).

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Victor D. Cha G,LOBALIZATION AND SEC(URIT9'Y

Much of the literature on globalization has focused on its economic rather than

security implications.5 In part, this is because the security effects of globalization often get conflated with changes to the international

security agenda with the end of Cold War

Superpower competition.6 It is also because, unlike economics where globalization's effects are manifested and measured every- day in terms of things like international capi- tal flows and Internet use, in security, the effects are inherently harder to conceptualize and measure. To the extent possible, the

ensuing analysis tries to differentiate globali- zation from post-Cold War effects on secu-

rity. As a first-cut, one can envision a

'globalization-security' spectrum along which certain dialogues in security studies would fall. For example, the notion of selec- tive engagement, pre-emptive withdrawal, democratic enlargement, or preventive defense as viable US grand strategies for the coming century would sit at the far end of this spectrum because they are predomi- nantly security effects deriving from the end of bipolar competition rather than from globalization.7 Progressively closer to the middle would be arguments about the 'debel- licization' of security or the obsolescence of war which do not have globalization as their primary cause, but are clearly related to some of these processes.8 Also in this middle range

5 Examples of the non-security bias in the US literature on globalization include Mittelman (1994); Goldblatt et al.

(1997); Reinicke (1997); Rosenau (1996); Nye & Owens (1998); Talbott (1997); Falk (1997); Ohmae (1993); Held (1997).

' Representative of works looking at changing definitions of security at the end of the Cold War are Walt (1991); Gray (1992); Deudney (1990); Chipman (1992); Nye (1989); Lipschutz (1995). 7 For debates on selective engagement and pre-emptive drawback strategies, see Layne (1997); Ruggie (1997). Sec also Huntington (1999); Betts (1998). On preventive defense see Carter & Perry (1999). European international

relations literature that has looked at the post-Cold War

effects of security (as distinct from globalization's effects on security) include Kirchner & Sperling (1998); Leather- man & Vayrynen (1995); Buzan (1997a).

would be discussions on 'rogue' or 'pariah' states as this term is a function of the end of the Cold War; at the same time, however, the

spread of information and technology expo-

nentially raises the danger of these threats.

Similarly, the end of the Cold War provides the permissive condition for the salience of

weapons of mass destruction as the Soviet

collapse directly affected the subsequent accessibility of formerly controlled sub- stances such as plutonium or enriched ura- nium. But an equally important driver is

globalization because the technologies for

creating these weapons have become easily accessible (Falkenrath, 1998). Finally, at the far end of the 'globalization-security' spec- trum might be the salience of substate extremist groups or fundamentalist groups because their ability to organize transnation-

ally, meet virtually, and utilize terrorist tactics has been substantially enhanced by the glo- balization of technology and information. While the US security studies field has made reference to many of these issues, a more sys- tematic understanding of globalization's security effects is lacking.9

Agency and Scope of Threats

The most far-reaching security effect of glo- balization is its complication of the basic concept of 'threat' in international relations. This is in terms of both agency and scope. Agents of threat can be states but can also be non-state groups or individuals. While the vocabulary of conflict in international secu- rity traditionally centered on interstate war (e.g. between large set-piece battalions and national armed forces), with globalization, terms such as global violence and human

x For the seminal work, see Mueller (1989). See also Man-

delbaum (1999); Van Creveld (1991). 9 For a more comprehensive and useful characterization of security studies, see Buzan (1997a), although this cate-

gorization takes the post-Cold War rather than globaliza- tion as its point of departure.

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394 journal of PEACE RESEARCH

security become common parlance, where the fight is between irregular substate units such as ethnic militias, paramilitary guerrillas, cults and religious organizations, organized crime, and terrorists. Increasingly, targets are not exclusively opposing force structures or even cities, but local groups and individuals

(Buzan, 1997a: 6-21; Klare, 1998: 66; Nye, 1989; Vayrynen, 1998; Waever et al., 1993).

Similarly, security constituencies, while

nominally defined by traditional sovereign borders increasingly are defined at every level from the global to the regional to the individual. Or as Buzan (1997a: 11) notes: 'What can be clearly observed is that the state is less important in the new security agenda than in the old one. It still remains

central, but no longer dominates either as the exclusive referent object or as the principle embodiment of threat'. Thus the providers of security are still nationally defined in terms of capabilities and resources; however, increasingly they apply these in a post- sovereign space whose spectrum ranges from nonstate to substate to transstate arrangements. For this reason, security threats become inherently more difficult to

measure, locate, monitor, and contain (Freedman, 1998a: 56; Reinicke, 1997: 134).

Globalization widens the scope of secu- rity as well. As the Copenhagen school has noted, how states conceive of security and how they determine what it means to be secure in the post-Cold War era expand beyond military security at the national level."? Globalization's effects on security scope are distinct from those of the post- Cold War in that the basic transaction pro- cesses engendered by globalization - instan- taneous communication and transportation, exchanges of information and technology, flow of capital - catalyze certain dangerous phenomena or empower certain groups in ways unimagined previously. In the former

10 See Buzan (1997a). For applications, see Haas (1995); (:ha (1997).

category are things such as viruses and pollu- tion. Because of human mobility, disease has become much more of a transnational secu-

rity concern.11 Global warming, ozone

depletion, acid rain, biodiversity loss, and radioactive contamination are health and environmental problems that have intensi- fied as transnational security concerns pre- cisely because of increased human mobility and interaction (Matthew & Shambaugh, 1998; Vayrynen, 1998; Zurn, 1998).

Globalization also has given rise to a 'skill revolution' that enhances the capabilities of

groups such as drug smugglers, political ter-

rorists, criminal organizations, and ethnic

insurgents to carry out their agenda more

effectively than ever before (Arquilla &

Ronfeldt, 1996; Brown, 1998: 4-5; Godson, 1997; Klare, 1998; Rosenau, 1998: 21-23; Shinn, 1996: 38). It is important to note that the widening scope of security to these trans- national issues is not simply a short-term fix- ation with the end of bipolar Cold War competition as the defining axis for security. The threat posed by drugs, terrorism, trans- national crime, and environmental degrada- tion has been intensified precisely because of globalization. Moreover, the security solu- tions to these problems in terms of enforce- ment or containment increasingly are ineffective through national or unilateral means. 12

Globalization has ignited identity as a

source of conflict. The elevation of regional and ethnic conflict as a top-tier security issue has generally been treated as a function of the end of the Cold War. However, it is also a function of globalization. The process of globalization carries implicit homogeniza- tion tendencies and messages,13 which in combination with the 'borderlessness' of the

1l For example, the re-emergence of tuberculosis and

malaria as health hazards has been related to the develop- ment of resistant strains in the South (because of black-

market abuses of inoculation treatments), which then re-

entered the developed North through human mobility.

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Victor D. Cha GLOBA,IZA'TION AND SEC(URI''Y

globalization phenomenon elicits a cultural

pluralist response.'4 At the same time, globalization has made

us both more aware and less decisive about our motivations to intervene in such ethnic conflicts. Real-time visual images of horror and bloodshed in far-off places transmitted

through CNN make the conflicts impossible to ignore, creating pressures for interven- tion. On the other hand, the hesitancy to act is palpable, as standard measures by which to determine intervention (i.e. bipolar competi- tion in the periphery) are no longer appropri- ate, forcing us to grope with fuzzy motivations such as humanitarian interven- tion.

Non-Physical Security Globalization has anointed the concept of

non-physical security. Traditional definitions of security in terms of protection of territory and sovereignty, while certainly not irrelevant in a globalized era, expand to protection of

12 As Matthew & Shambaugh argue, it is not the luxury of the Soviet collapse that enables us to elevate the impor- tance of transnational security but the advances in human

mobility, communication, and technology that force us to. See Matthew & Shambaugh (1998: 167). A related exam- ple of how security agency and scope have changed is the

privatized army. These groups are not a new phenomenon in international politics, dating back to the US revolution-

ary war (i.e. Britain's hiring of Hessian soldiers) and the Italian city-states (of the 14th century (i.e. the condottiers). However, their salience today is a function of the changes wrought by the globalization of technology. Increasingly, national armies are retooled to fight high-intensity, high- technology conflicts and less equipped to fight loxv-inten-

sity conflicts in peripheral areas among ethnic groups where the objectives in entering battle are unclear. This

development, coupled with the decreasing Cold War era

emphasis on the periphery and the absence of domestic

support for casualties in such places, has made the

'jobbing-out' of war increasingly salient. See Shearer

(1998); Silverstein (1997); Thomson (1996). 13 Examples of homogenization impulses include the dif-

fusion of standardized consumer goods generally from the

developed North; Western forms (If capitalism (and not Asian crony capitalism); and Western liberal democracy

(not illiberal democracy).

information and technology assets. For

example, Nye & Owens (1998) cite 'infor- mation power' as increasingly defining the distribution of power in international rela- tions in the 21st century. In a similar vein, the revolution in military affairs highlights not

greater firepower but greater information

technology and 'smartness' of weapons as the defining advantage for future warfare.'5

These non-physical security aspects have

always been a part of the traditional national defense agenda. Indeed, concerns about the unauthorized transfer of sensitive technolo-

gies gave rise to such techno-nationalist insti- tutions as COCOM during the Cold War.

However, the challenge posed by globaliza- tion is that the nation-state can no longer control the movement of technology and information (Simon, 1997). Strategic alli- ances form in the private sector among lead- ing corporations that are not fettered by notions of techno-nationalism and driven instead by competitive, cost-cutting, or cutting-edge innovative needs. The result is a transnationalization of defense production that further reduces the state's control over these activities.16

More and more private companies, indi- viduals, and other non-state groups are the

14 As Falk (1997: 131-132) states, 'The rejection of these globalizing tendencies in its purest forms is associated with and expressed by the resurgence of religious and eth- nic politics in various extremist configurations. Reveal- ingly, only by retreating to premodern, traditionalist orientations does it now seem possible to seal off sover-

eign territory, partially at least, from encroachments asso- ciated with globalized lifestyles and business operations'. See also Mittelman (1994: 432); Guehenno (1999: 7); and

Waver (1993). 15 These are defined in terms of things such as ISR (intel- ligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance), C41, and precision force that can provide superior situational

awareness capabilities (e.g. dominant battlespace knowl-

edge; 'pre-crisis transparency'). See Nye & Owens (1998); Cohen (1996); Freedman (1998b); Laird & Mey (1999). Freedman correctly points out that the emphasis on infor- mation and technology is not in lieu of, but in conjunction with, superior physical military assets. The former cannot

compensate for the latter. See Freedman (1999: 51-52).

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396 journal of PEACE RES E ARC( H

producers, consumers, and merchants of a US$50 billion per year global arms market

(Klare & Lumpe, 1998). The end of the Cold War has certainly been a permissive condi- tion for the indiscriminate, profit-based incentives to sell weapons or dual-use tech-

nologies to anybody. But globalization of information and technology has made barri- ers to non-state entry low and detection costs high. Moreover, while enforcement authorities still have the benefit of these

technologies, two critical developments have altered the equation: (1) Absence of discrim- ination: over the past two decades, the pri- vate sector, rather than the government, has become the primary creator of new technol-

ogies, which in essence has removed any rel- ative advantages state agencies formerly possessed in terms of exclusive access to

eavesdropping technology, surveillance, and

encryption.17 Governments once in the posi- tion of holding monopolies on cutting edge technologies that could later be 'spun off' in the national commercial sector are now con- sumers of 'spin-on' technologies. (2) Volume and variety: the sheer growth in volume and variety of communications has overwhelmed any attempts at monitoring or control (Mathews, 1997; Freedman, 1999: 53).18 As

16 As Goldblatt et al. point out, MNCS now account for a disproportionately large share of global technology transfer as a result of EDI; joint ventures; international patenting; licensing; and knowhow agreements. This means they are more in control of transferring dual-use technologies than traditional states. See Goldblatt et al.

(1997: 277-279). 17 On the growing commercial pressure for liberalization of encryption technology, see Freeh (1997). See also Falkenrath (1998: 56-57); Corcoran (1998: 13). On the growing reliance of the US Defense Department on com-

mercial technological advances compared with the 1950- 1970s, see Carter & Perry (1999: 197-198). 18 The results of this are well known: instantaneous com- munication by facsimile, cellular phone, satellite phone, teleconferencing, alpha-numeric pagers, e-mail, computer modems, computer bulletin boards, and federal express are the norm. Approximately 250,000 Global Positioning System satellite navigation receivers are sold each month for commercial use.

noted earlier, these phenomena of glo- balization most dangerously manifest them- selves as the threat posed by substate actors with violent intentions. Through the Internet and the privatization of formerly secured national assets (e.g. plutonium or highly enriched uranium), these groups are now able to start substantially higher on the learn-

ing curve for building a weapon of mass destruction. Building an inefficient fission

weapon capable of killing 100,000 in an urban center or cultivating cultures for bio-

logical use is child's play relative to the past (Falkenrath, 1998: 54-55; Carter & Perry, 1999: 151).19 Thus in a globalized world, information and technology increasingly are the currency of non-physical security.

Propositions for Security Behavior

If non-physical security, diversification of

threats, and the salience of identity are key effects of globalization in the security realm, then how might this translate in terms of a state's foreign policy? The literature on glo- balization in both Europe and the USA remains conspicuously silent on this ques- tion. Globalization authors might argue that this criticism is inappropriate because it sug- gests an ideal endstate at which a 'globalized' country should arrive. However, the point here is not to suggest that there will be a sin- gle uniform model, but that as globalization processes permeate a state's security agenda, this might be manifested in certain general inclinations and contours of behavior. Put another way, we should observe globaliza- tion processes altering in some cases, and

19 In the case of biological weapons, effective delivery requires some form of aerosol spray technology. But the

point is that such technology, if it were perfected, would most likely be the result of commercial needs and there- fore easily available to anyone. In a related vein, Hoffman (1997) has found positive correlations between the spread of information and technology and the lethality of terror- ist attacks.

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Victor D. Cha GLOBALIZATION AND SECURI1TY

creating in other cases, new sets of security interests for states.

Intermestic Security

First, the globalization and security literature asserts but does not elaborate how security decisions increasingly take place outside the traditional purview of sovereignty. Globali- zation creates an interpenetration of foreign and domestic issues that national govern- ments must recognize in developing policy. One example of this 'intermestic' approach to security policy might be an acceptance that the transnationalization of threats has blurred traditional divisions between internal and external security (Katzenstein, 1996a). The obverse would be the frequency with which a state adheres to 'delimiting' security, formulating and justifying policy on the basis of 'national security' interests rather than universal/global interests (Moon Chung-in, 1995: 64). Examples of the former are Euro- pean institutions such as Interpol, TREVI, and the Schengen Accord, which represent an acknowledgment that domestic issues such as crime, drug-trafficking, terrorism, and immigration increasingly require trans-

national cooperation. TREVI was composed of ministers of the interior and justice of EC member-states whose purpose was to coor- dinate policy on terrorism (at Germany's ini- tiative in 1975) and international crime. The

Schengen Accords also represented a con- vergence of internal and external security with regard to common standards border controls, pursuit of criminals across borders, asylum procedures, and refugees (Katzen- stein, 1998: 11-14). In Asia, one might see

environmental pollution and transnational crime as issues where international and domestic security converge ('Special Focus:

China and Hong Kong', 1996). However, in

the near future, maritime piracy is the most

likely focal point. These are cases where sub-

state actors armed with sophisticated weap-

ons, satellite-tracking technology, and

cutting-edge document-forging equipment hijack vessels in the South and East China seas with millions of dollars worth of cargo (Cha, 1998: 51-53; Sullivan & Jordan, 1999). These groups operate transnationally; plan- ning may occur at one destination, tracking of the ship at another, the attack launched from another port, and the cargo off-loaded at yet another port. These acts fall under the

purview of local law enforcement, but they are clearly 'intermestic' security issues. The attacks occur in overlapping sovereign waters or international waters, and some- times receive the tacit consent of govern- ments where the pirated vessels are

clandestinely ported. Moreover, if targeted cargos move beyond luxury autos and video cassette recorders to strategic goods such as plutonium, then distinctions between exter- nal and internal security and criminal and

strategic threats disappear (Falkenrath, 1998; Guehenno, 1999: 11).

Multilateralism

Second, the globalization literature acknowl-

edges that security is increasingly conceived of in post-sovereign, globalized terms, but does not delineate how the modes of obtain- ing security should change. As noted above, globalization means that both the agency and

scope of threats have become more diverse

and non-state in form. This also suggests that the payoffs lessen for obtaining security through traditional means. Controlling pollu- tion, disease, technology, and information transfer cannot be easily dealt with through national, unilateral means but can only be

effectively dealt with through the application of national resources in multilateral fora or

through encouragement of transnational

cooperation. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan intimated, US bombing of targets in Sudan in retaliation for terrorist bombings of

two US embassies in Africa is a unilateral

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398 journal of PTEACE( RESEARCH

piecemeal approach far inferior to concerted

global efforts at denying terrorists sanctuar-

ies, financing, and technology and encourag- ing their extradition and prosecution.20

Thus one would expect globalized secu-

rity processes reflected in a state's striving for

regional coordination and cooperative secu-

rity. It should emphasize not exclusivity and bilateralism in relations but inclusivity and multilateralism as the best way to solve secu-

rity problems. At the extreme end of the

spectrum, globalization might downplay the

importance of eternal iron-clad alliances and

encourage the growth of select transnational

'policy coalitions' among national govern- ments, nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs), and individuals specific to each

problem (Reinicke, 1997: 134). In conjunction with multilateralism, glo-

balized conceptions of security should be reflected in norms of diffuse reciprocity and international responsibility. This is admit- tedly more amorphous and harder to

operationalize. While some self-serving instrumental motives lie behind most diplo- macy, there must be a strong sense of global responsibility and obligation that compels the state to act. Actions taken in the national interest must be balanced with a basic princi- ple that contributes to a universal, globalized value system underpinning one's own values.

Bureaucratic Innovation

The globalization literature has not done jus- tice to the role bureaucratic innovation plays in response to the new challenges of globali- zation. On this point, indeed, the literature has not kept pace with the empirics. For

example, in the USA, the Clinton Adminis- tration created the position of Undersecre- tary for Global Affairs, whose portfolio included environmental issues, promotion of

democracy and human rights, population 20 See comments by President Clinton and UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan as cited in Crossette (1998).

and migration issues, and law enforcement

(Talbott, 1997: 74). In a similar vein, the US State Department's Foreign Service Institute now has a new core course for FSOs on

narcotics-trafficking, refugee flows, and environmental technologies (albott, 1997:

75). In May 1998, the Clinton Administra- tion put forward its first comprehensive plan to combat world crime, identifying drug-traf- ficking, transfer of sensitive technology and

WMD, and trafficking of women and chil- dren as threats to the USA (EWashington Post, 1998).21 One might also expect to see foreign service bureaucracies placing greater empha- sis on international organizations and NGOs in terms of representation, placement, and

leadership if these are recognized as the key vehicles of security and politics in a glo- balized world.

Implicit in each of these examples is the trend toward greater specialization in the

pursuit of security. As globalization makes security problems more complex and diverse, national security structures need to be re-oriented, sometimes through elimina- tion of anachronistic bureaucracies or through rationalization of wasteful and over- lapping ones. In the US system, for example, while combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction is widely acknowledged as a key security objective in the 21st century, various branches of the government operate autonomously in dealing with these threats.

Hence, there are greater calls for renovation and coordination to eliminate the overlap, inefficiency, and lack of organization among State, Defense, Commerce, Energy, CIA, and FBI in combating proliferation.22

Another trend engendered by the security challenges of globalization is greater cross-

A1 The degree to which this is 'spin' or substantive remains to be seen. .2 For a detailed set of recommendations on how to ren-

ovate and create institutions to deal with these problems, see Carter & Perry (1999: 143-174). See also Schmitt

(1999).

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Victor D. Cha GL(OBALIZATION AND SECURITY

fertilization between domestic law enforce- ment and foreign policy agencies. This rela-

tionship, at least in the USA (less the case in

Europe), is at worst non-existent because domestic law enforcement has operated tra-

ditionally in isolation from national security and diplomatic concerns, or at best is a

mutually frustrating relationship because the two have neither inclination nor interest in

cooperating. States that understand the chal-

lenges of globalization, particularly on issues of drug-trafficking, environmental crimes, and technology transfer, will seek to bridge this gap, creating and capitalizing on syner- gies that develop between the two groups. Foreign policy agencies will seek out greater interaction with domestic agencies, not only on a pragmatic short-term basis employing law enforcement's skills to deal with a partic- ular problem, but also on a longer-term and regular basis cultivating familiarity, transpar- ency, and common knowledge. On the domestic side, agencies such as the FBI, Customs, and police departments (of major cities) would find themselves engaged in for- eign policy dialogues, again not only at the practitioner's level, but also in academia and think-tank forums.23

One of the longer-term effects of special- ization and cross-fertilization is that security also becomes more 'porous.' Specialization will often require changes not just at the sovereign national level, but across borders and with substate actors. 'Boilerplate' secu- rity (e.g. dealt with by 'hardshell' nation- states with national resources) becomes increasingly replaced by cooperation and coordination that may still be initiated by the national government but with indispensable partners (depending on the issue) such as NGOs, transnational groups, and the media. The obverse of this dynamic also obtains.

23 In this vein, it might not be unusual in the future to see the commissioner of New York City Police or the head of

the FBI participating in discussions of the Council on For-

eign Relations or the Brookings Institution.

With globalization, specialized 'communi- ties of choice' (e.g. landmine ban) are

empowered to organize transnationally and

penetrate the national security agendas with issues that might not otherwise have been

paid attention to (Guehenno, 1999: 9; Mathews, 1997).

Aggregating Capabilities

The globalization literature remains relatively silent on how globalization processes sub-

stantially alter the way in which states calcu- late relative capabilities. The single most

important variable in this process is the dif- fusion of technology (both old and new). In the past, measuring relative capabilities was

largely a linear process. Higher technology generally meant qualitatively better weapons and hence stronger capabilities. States could be assessed along a ship-for-ship, tank-for-

tank, jet-for-jet comparison in terms of the threat posed and their relative strength based on such linear measurements. However, the diffusion of technology has had distorting effects. While states at the higher end tech- nologically still retain advantages, globaliza- tion has enabled wider access to technology such that the measurement process is more dynamic. First, shifts in relative capabilities are more frequent and have occurred in cer- tain cases much earlier than anticipated. Sec- ond, and more significant, the measurement process is no longer one-dimensional in the sense that one cannot readily draw linear associations between technology, capabili- ties, and power. For example, what gives local, economically backward states regional and even global influence in the 21 st century is their ability to threaten across longer dis- tances. Globalization facilitates access to select technologies related to force projec- tion and weapons of mass destruction, which in turn enable states to pose threats that are asymmetric and disproportionate to their size. Moreover, these threats emanate not

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400 journal of PEACE RESEARCH

from acquisition of state-of-the-art but old and outdated technology. Thus countries like North Korea, which along most traditional measurements of power could not compare, can with old technology (SCUD and rudi-

mentary nuclear technology) pose threats and affect behavior in ways unforeseen in the

past (Bracken, 1998).

Strategies and Operational Considerations

Finally, the literature on globalization is nota-

bly silent on the long-term impact of globali- zation processes on time-tested modes of

strategic thinking and fighting. In the former

vein, the widening scope of security engen- dered by globalization means that the defini- tion of security and the fight for it will occur not on battlefields but in unconventional

places against non-traditional security adver- saries. As noted above, when states cannot deal with these threats through sovereign means, they will encourage multilateralism and cooperation at the national, transna- tional, and international levels. However, the nature of these conflicts may also require new ways of fighting, i.e. the ability to engage militarily with a high degree of lethality against combatants, but low levels of collat- eral damage. As a result, globalization's wid-

ening security scope dictates not only new strategies (discussed below) but also new forms of combat. Examples include incapac- itating crowd control munitions such as blunt projectiles (rubber balls), non-lethal crowd dispersal cartridges, 'stick 'em' and 'slick 'em' traction modifiers, or 'stink' bombs. 'Smart' non-lethal warfare that inca- pacitates equipment will also be favored, including rigid foam substances, and radio frequency and microwave technologies to disable electronics and communications (CFR Task Force, 1999).

Regarding strategy, as the agency and scope of threats diversifies in a globalized

world, traditional modes of deterrence become less relevant. Nuclear deterrence

throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War

eras, for example, was based on certain

assumptions. First, the target of the strategy was another nation-state. Second, this deterred state was assumed to have a degree of centralization in the decisionmaking pro- cess over nuclear weapons use. Third, and most important, the opponent possessed both counterforce and countervalue targets that would be the object of a second strike. While this sort of rationally based, existen- tial deterrence will still apply to interstate

security, the proliferation of weaponized non-state and substate actors increasingly renders this sort of strategic thinking obso- lete. They do not occupy sovereign territo- rial space and therefore cannot be targeted with the threat of retaliation. They also may operate as self-contained cells rather than an

organic whole which makes decapitating strikes at a central decisionmaking structure ineffective. In short, you cannot deter with the threat of retaliation that which you can- not target.

Governments may respond to this in a variety of ways. One method would be, as noted above, greater emphasis on the spe- cialized utilization of whatever state, sub- state, and multilateral methods are necessary to defend against such threats. A second likely response would be greater attention and resources directed at civil defense prep- aration and 'consequence' management to minimize widespread panic and pain in the event of an attack. A third possible response is unilateral in nature. Governments may increasingly employ pre-emptive or preven- tive strategies if rational deterrence does not apply against non-state entities. Hence one might envision two tiers of security in which stable rational deterrence applies at the state-state level but unstable pre-emptive/ preventive strategies apply at the state-non- state level.

volume 37 / number 3 / may 2000

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Victor D. Cha GL O 3BALI, AI'I o N A N D S ICUR ( Il'Y

Conclusion

What then is the 'new' security environment in the 21st century that the globalization/ security literature must strive to understand? It is most likely one that sits at the intersec- tion of globalization and national identity. In other words, as globalization processes com-

plicate the nature of security (i.e. in terms of

agency and scope), this effects a transforma- tion in the interests that inform security pol- icy. Globalization's imperatives permeate the domestic level and should be manifested in some very broad behavioral trends or styles of security policy. Manifestations of this transformation are inclinations toward inter- mestic security, multilateralism, and bureau- cratic innovation and specialization.

However, it would be short-sighted to

expect that all states will respond similarly. In some cases, policies will emerge that directly meet or adjust to the imperatives of globali- zation, but in other cases the policy that emerges will not be what one might expect to linearly follow from globalization pres- sures. The latter outcomes are the types of anomalies that offer the most clear indica- tions of the causal role of domestic factors in

the 'new' security environment (Desch, 1998: 158-160); however, these alone only highlight national identity as a residual vari- able (i.e. capable of explaining only aberra-

tions) in the 'new' security environment. One would expect, therefore, that the former outcomes would be as important to process- trace: If policy adjustments appear outwardly consistent with globalization but the under- lying rationale for such action is not, then this illustrates that the domestic-ideational mediation process is an ever-present one. The new security environment would there- fore be one in which globalization pressures on security policy and grand strategy are

continually refracted through the prism of national identity.

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VICTOR D. CHA, b. 1961, PhD in Political Science (Columbia University, 1994); Assistant Professor, Georgetown University (1995-); Hoover National Fellow (Stanford University, 1998); Fulbright Scholar (Korea, 1999). Most recent book: Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stan- ford University Press, 1999).

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