Ghid Oecd Pt Prvenirea Confl

7/31/2019 Ghid Oecd Pt Prvenirea Confl

1/98

GUIDANCE ONEVALUATING CONFLICT

PREVENTION ANDPEACEBUILDING ACTIVITIESWorking draft for application period

A joint project of the

DAC Network on Confict, Peace and Development Co-operationand the DAC Network on Development Evaluation


2/98

GUIDANCE ON EVALUATINGCONFLICT PREVENTION ANDPEACEBUILDING ACTIVITIES

WORKING DRAFT FOR APPLICATION PERIOD

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT


3/98

EVALUATING CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING ACTIVITIES OECD 2008

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

AND DEVELOPMENT

The OECD is a unique forum where the governments of 30 democracies work

together to address the economic, social and environmental challenges of

globalisation. The OECD is also at the forefront of efforts to understand and to help

governments respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate

governance, the information economy and the challenges of an ageing population.

The Organisation provides a setting where governments can compare policy

experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and work to

co-ordinate domestic and international policies.

The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech

Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,

Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,

Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the

United Kingdom and the United States. The Commission of the European

Communities takes part in the work of the OECD.

OECD Publishing disseminates widely the results of the Organisation's statistics

gathering and research on economic, social and environmental issues, as well as

the conventions, guidelines and standards agreed by its members.

Published in French under the title:

Guide pour lvaluation des activits de prvention des conflits et deconstruction de la paixDocument de travail pour la priode dapplication

OECD (2008)

No reproduction, copy, transmission or translation of this publication may be made without written permission.

Applications should be sent to OECD Publishing: [email protected] or by fax (+33-1) 45 24 13 91. Permission to photocopy a

portion of this work should be addressed to the Centre Franais dexploitation du droit de Copie, 20 rue des Grands-

Augustins, 75006 Paris, France ([email protected]).


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FOREWORD

Thisworkingdraftdevelopsguidanceonconductingeffectiveevaluationsofconflictpreventionand

peacebuildingwork.Thecurrentworkingdraftwillbeusedforaoneyearapplicationphasethrough

2008.ItistheresultofanongoingcollaborativeprojectbytheOECDDACNetworksonDevelopment

EvaluationandonConflict,PeaceandDevelopmentCooperation(CPDC).ThetwoNetworksbeganthis

collaborationin2005,respondingtotheneedexpressedbyCPDCmembersforgreaterclarityregarding

techniquesandissuesofevaluationintheirfield.Anassessmentofpastconflictandpeaceevaluations

andastudyofcurrentpracticeswereundertakenin2006andidentifiedaneedforfurtherguidance.In

2007aresearchpiece,EncouragingEffectiveEvaluationofConflictPreventionandPeacebuilding

Activities:TowardsDACGuidance,wascompletedbyCDACollaborativeLearningProjectsand

subsequentlypublishedasaninputtothedevelopmentofthisguidance.

ThecurrentworkingdraftreflectsvaluablecontributionsfrommembersofbothDACNetworks.

EspeciallyimportanthavebeenthecontributionsofAsbjrnEidhammerandCristinaHoyos,thelead

membersfromtheEvaluationNetworkandtheCPDCNetwork,respectively.IntheDACSecretariat,

LisaWilliams(CPDCNetwork)andHansLundgren(EvaluationNetwork)ledthetwoyearprocessto

developthedraftguidancealongwithNathalieBienvenu,MarkDownes,AnnaHellstrm,SebastianLing,

AlexandraTrzeciakDuval,AsbjrnWeeandMeganKennedy;MsKennedyfinalisedthisdocument.The

researchanddraftingprocesshasalsobenefitedfromtheinputsofexpertsinmembercountriesand

beyond:BeateBull;ClareHarkinandJuliaCompton;advisorsinaCriticalReviewPanel,including

MaryB.AndersonandhercolleaguesatCDACollaborativeLearningProjects,DianaChigasand

PeterWoodrow;

Thania

Paffenholz;

Tony

Vaux;

Robert

Picciotto;

Robert

Muggah;

as

well

as

other

membersfrombothNetworksandexpertsinthefieldsofevaluationandpeacebuildingtoonumerousto

listhere.

Giventhecomplexityofworkinthisfieldandtheneedtoaddressdifferentaudiences,evaluators

andpeacebuildingpractitionersalike,thisworkingdrafthasextensiveannexescontainingspecific

informationtocomplimenttheshortermaintext.Themaintextisdividedintoageneralintroduction,an

outlineofkeyplanningandprogrammingsteps,andadescriptionoftheevaluationprocessitself.

Individualreadersmaychoosetofocusonparticularsections,accordingtotheirinterestandneeds.

Thefuturedevelopmentofwebbasedandothermultimediaformatsfortheguidanceisalso

envisioned.This

working

draft

will

be

applied

to

field

evaluations

over

2008

and

will

be

revised

for

submissiontotheDACbasedonexperiencegainedduringtheapplicationperiod.Itisintendedto

contributetothelargerongoingprocessesofpromotingrigorousandcoordinatedevaluationof

developmentassistance,whileimprovingdonorpoliciesandpracticesforengaginginconflictaffected

areas.

TheDACNetworksonDevelopmentEvaluation

andonConflict,PeaceandDevelopmentCooperation


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Background:Key

donor

commitments

on

evaluation

and

peacebuilding

DACEvaluationQualityStandards(fortestphaseapplication)(2007)

https://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/62/36596604.pdf

TheParisDeclarationonAidEffectiveness(2005)

http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html

DACGuidelinesonHelpingPreventViolentConflict(2001)[includingDACGuidelinesonConflict,

PeaceandDevelopmentCooperation(1998)]

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/54/1886146.pdf

OECDDACGuidelinesonSecuritySystemReformandGovernance(2005)http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf

DACPrinciplesforGoodInternationalEngagementinFragileStatesandSituations(2007)


DevelopmentAssistanceManualDACPrinciplesforEffectiveAid(1992)

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/12/2755284.pdf

WholeofGovernmentApproachestoFragileStates(2006)


EVALUATINGCONFLICTPREVENTIONANDPEACEBUILDINGACTIVITIESOECD2008 4


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TABLEOFCONTENTS

FOREWORD......................................................................................................................................................3

PREFACE...........................................................................................................................................................8

Whatisthepurposeofthisguidance?........................................................................................................8

Whowillbenefitfromtheguidanceandhow?...........................................................................................8

Howtousetheguidance.............................................................................................................................9

Emerginglessonsfromtheanalyticalworkunderpinningthisguidance..................................................10

INTRODUCTIONTHE

CONFLICT

PREVENTION

AND

PEACEBUILDING

CONTEXT

...........................................

11

Theneedforstrategicpolicydevelopment...............................................................................................12

Evaluatingconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding....................................................................................13

Keyterms...................................................................................................................................................14

Understandingpeace.............................................................................................................................15

Peacebuilding.........................................................................................................................................15

Conflictprevention.................................................................................................................................16

Conflictprevention,peacebuildingandconflictsensitivity:Whentousethisguidance?....................16

OVERVIEWOFKEYSTEPS INPLANNINGANDEVALUATINGCONFLICTPREVENTIONANDPEACEBUILDING

WORK.............................................................................................................................................................

19

1.Introduction...........................................................................................................................................19

2.Somebasicprinciples.............................................................................................................................19

Conflictsensitivity..................................................................................................................................20

Genderawareness..................................................................................................................................21

Protectionandethicalresponsibilities...................................................................................................22

Otherconsiderations..............................................................................................................................22

3.Outlineofthemainelements................................................................................................................23

3.1Preconditions:Programmingtoimproveworkandstrengthenevaluation........................................24

3.2.Planningandpreparingtheevaluation...............................................................................................26

3.2.1Define

the

purpose

and

use

of

the

evaluation

..............................................................................

26

3.2.2Decidethescopeoftheevaluation...............................................................................................27

3.2.3Doorobtainaconflictanalysis.....................................................................................................28

3.2.4Outlinekeyevaluationquestions..................................................................................................29

3.2.5Taketimingandlogisticalissuesintoconsideration.....................................................................30

3.2.6Coordinatewithotheractors.......................................................................................................31

3.2.7Considerconductingajointevaluation.........................................................................................32

3.2.8Selectevaluationcriteria...............................................................................................................33

3.2.9Deviseevaluationmanagement....................................................................................................33

3.2.10DevelopTermsofReference.......................................................................................................33

3.2.11Selecttheevaluationteam.........................................................................................................34

3.2.12Contracting

..................................................................................................................................

34



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3.3Conductingtheevaluation...................................................................................................................35

3.3.1Identifytheimplementationlogicandtheoryofchange.............................................................35

3.3.2Deal

with

missing

baselines

and

other

gaps

.................................................................................

36

3.3.3Gatherdata...................................................................................................................................36

3.3.4Examinetheeffortusingvariouscriteria......................................................................................39

3.3.5Lookatthebigpicture..................................................................................................................45

3.4Concludingandlearningfromtheevaluation.....................................................................................47

3.4.1Drawconclusionsandmakerecommendations...........................................................................47

3.4.2Ensurequality................................................................................................................................47

3.4.3Conductreporting.........................................................................................................................48

3.4.4Disseminate,feedbackandengageinalearningprocess.............................................................48

CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................................50

BIBLIOGRAPHY...............................................................................................................................................

51

ANNEX1SELECTEDLISTOFKEYCONCEPTSANDTERMINOLOGY................................................................56

ANNEX2USEFULWEBSITESANDRESOURCES..............................................................................................60

ANNEX3 PLANNINGANDMONITORINGPROGRAMMES,PROJECTSANDPOLICIES INCONFLICT

PREVENTIONANDPEACEBUILDINGCONTEXTS............................................................................................62

ANNEX4CONFLICTANALYSIS.......................................................................................................................68

ANNEX5CONFLICTSENSITIVITY....................................................................................................................75

ANNEX6UNDERSTANDINGANDEVALUATINGTHEORIESOFCHANGE.......................................................77

ANNEX7EVALUATION

APPROACHES

............................................................................................................

85

ANNEX8SAMPLETERMSOFREFERENCE(TOR)...........................................................................................90

ANNEX9FRAMEWORKFORFEEDBACK........................................................................................................93

TABLES

Table1. Hierarchyofevaluationscopes................................................................................................27

Table2. Keyquestionsforconflictandpeaceanalysis..........................................................................29

Table3. Evaluationvs.Monitoring.........................................................................................................65

Table4. Asampleofimpactindicatorsandmethods............................................................................67

Table5. Summaryofselectedconflictanalysistools.............................................................................71

Table6.

Common

theories

of

change

....................................................................................................

82

FIGURES

Figure1. Conflictpreventionandpeacebuildingwork...........................................................................18

Figure2. SampleResultsChainforSecuritySystemReform..................................................................64

BOXES

Box1. AssessingtheImpactofDevelopmentCooperationinConflictZones.....................................19

Box2. Conflict(in)sensitiveevaluation................................................................................................21

Box3.

Confronting

psycho

social

trauma

............................................................................................

22



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Box4. Integratinganalysis,evaluationandredesign...........................................................................25

Box5. Whatareevaluationsusedfor?................................................................................................27

Box6. WorkingtogetherinMauritania.................................................................................................32

Box7.

Joint

multi

donor

evaluation:

Learning

together

about

peace

..................................................

33

Box8. Composinganevaluationteam:Questionstoconsider............................................................34

Box9. Makingtheoriesofchangeexplicitforevaluation.....................................................................36

Box10. Quotebox:Datainpostconflictsituations...............................................................................37

Box11. Quotebox:Howsecurityaffectsaccessanddata.....................................................................39

Box12. Typesofsuccessandfailure.......................................................................................................41

Box13. Efficiencyandspendingonsecurity...........................................................................................43

Box14. Coverageexample......................................................................................................................45

Box15. DoNoHarm:AnExamplefromTajikistan..................................................................................76



9/98

PREFACE

Whatisthepurposeofthisguidance?

Asgrowingsharesofaidresources,timeandenergyarebeingdevotedtoconflictpreventionand

peacebuildingprojects,programmes,andpolicystrategies,moreevidencedemonstratingthe

effectivenessoftheseendeavoursisessential.Thereisanincreasedinterestamongdonorsand

practitioners,aswellaspeopleaffectedbyviolentconflict,tolearnmoreaboutwhatdoesanddoesnot

work,andwhy.Thisquesttoimproveourunderstandingofwhatcontributespositivelytopeaceis

motivatedbythedesiretodevelopmorecoherent,coordinatedandeffectiveinterventionsatalllevels.

Theprimarygoalofthisguidanceistoprovidedirectiontothoseundertakingevaluationsofconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingprojects,programmes,andpolicies(hereafterreferredtoasactivities).It

aimstoassistpolicymakersandpractitionersworkingintheconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingfield

tobetterunderstandtheroleandutilityofevaluation,andatthesametimetohelpthoseworkinginthe

fieldofevaluationbetterunderstandthesensitivitiesthatapplyinthisfield.Withthatdualobjectivein

mind,thisguidancewillofferadviceonthoseaspectsofevaluatingconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding

activitiesthatdifferfromevaluationofhumanitariananddevelopmentinterventions.

Whowillbenefitfromtheguidanceandhow?

Differenttargetaudienceswillbenefitindifferentwaysfromthistext.Theprimaryaudience

includespolicy

staff;

field

and

desk

officers

from

donor

development

agencies,

especially

those

responsibleforconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingpolicystrategiesoractivitieswhomaybeinvolved

incommissioningorsupportingevaluations;andevaluationmanagerswithindonoragencies.

Implementersandprogrammemanagers,includingnongovernmentalandinternationalorganisations

(NGOs,IOs),UnitedNationsorganisationsandotherdevelopmentagencies,willalsobenefitfrom

enhancedunderstandingoftheuseandvalueofevaluationanditsimplicationsforprogramming.

Evaluationconsultantsworkinginconflictenvironmentsorhiredforarelevantconflictpreventionor

peacebuildingevaluationwillgainaclearerviewofwhatcommissionersexpectfromtheirwork.

Specifically,thisguidancesupportsevaluatorsandthosecommissioningevaluationsby:

Providinggreaterclarityonkeyemergingconceptsinthisfieldandtipsfordealingwithcommonproblems.

Suggestingtechniquesfortheuseofconflictanalysestobetterassesswhetheractivitiesinaparticularconflictarerelevantandprevent'doingharm'.

Furnishingprinciplesforethicalevaluationinconflictenvironments. Demonstratingtheimportanceofassessingassumptionsabouthowpeacecanbeachieved

(theoriesofchange).

SpecifyinghowDACCriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistancecanbeadaptedtothisfield. ProvidingadviceondraftingTermsofReferenceandpickingeffectiveteams.



10/98

Theguidancedocumentalsohelpsconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingpractitionersandpolicy

makersby:

Promotingtheuseofevaluationtoimprovelearningandaccountability,andsuggestingwaysinwhichevaluationcanprovidelessonsaboutoperationaldesign(beyondwhatislearnedthroughauditandmonitoring).

1

Encouragingfurthercriticalreflectionaboutwhatactuallycontributestopeaceandwhatdoesnot.

Helpingtorefinetheoriesaboutthecausesanddynamicsofconflict(andthelinksbetweenthem),whichwillinturnleadtomorerelevantinterventions,ultimatelyenhancing

effectiveness.

Howtousetheguidance

Thisguidanceisnotmeanttoserveasanallencompassingorconstrainingmanualforconflict

preventionandpeacebuildingevaluations.Rather,itshouldcontributetothoughtfulapproachesby

highlightingandclarifyingspecificchallengesforevaluatinginthisfield.Itoutlinesthekeystepstotake

andmainpointstoconsiderduringanevaluationprocess.Thisinformationshouldbeappliedintelligently

andadaptedcarefullytospecificcontexts.Thereportbuildsonexistingliteratureandexperiencesandis

thusnotexhaustive;aBibliographyprovidesfurthergeneralresourcesforthereader.Giventhediversity

oftheintendedaudience,somesectionsmaybemoreorlessrelevantforindividualreaders;andthetext

belowaimstoclarifythespecifictargetsofeachsection,includingtheannexes.

TheIntroductionhighlightsthedevelopmentofandchallengestoevaluationintheconflict

preventionandpeacebuildingfield,andisthereforekeyforallreaders.Italsooutlineskeyconcepts,

whichwillbeofparticularrelevancetothosewithlimitedexperienceintheconflictandpeacedomains.

Themainsectionwalksthereaderthroughthekeyelementsoftheevaluationprocess.Thisoutline

willbeusefulforreaderswithlimitedevaluationbackgroundandcanhelpprovideafootpathforthinking

through,planning,supportingandperformingtheevaluationitself.Italsoprovidesseasonedevaluators

withfurtherideasforworkinthisparticularfield.Thesectionbeginswithadescriptionofupstream

measurestohelpprogrammeplannersandpolicymakerscreateeffective,assessableintervention

strategiesandactivities.

Annexesarereferredtothroughoutthetext.Annex1includesalistofkeyterms.Thefinalannexisa

feedbackframeworkthatcanbeusedtocommentonthisworkingdraftorprovideinsightfromthetest

applicationphase

(2007/2008).

1Areviewofmorethan75evaluationsintheconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingfieldpointedtoanoveremphasisonfinancial

managementissues

and

alack

of

lesson

learning

(FAFO,

2006).



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Emerginglessonsfromtheanalyticalworkunderpinningthisguidance

Thejointprocessofdevelopingthisguidancehasbeguntorevealsomeimportantlessonsfordonoragencies

andothersworkingintheconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingfield.Thefollowinglistofemerginglessons

willberevisedandupdatedoncethisworkingdrafthasbeenfieldtested.

1) Donorsshouldpromotethesystematicuseofevaluationforallconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingwork,andrequireimplementingpartners,suchasNGOs,toconductevaluations.

Evaluationcansupportlearningandaccountabilityasprofessionalsinthisareaofdevelopmentco

operationstrivetoimprovepracticeandresults.Suchlearningiskeytobecomingmoreeffectiveat

buildingpeace.

2) Aclearneedforabetterstrategicpolicyframeworkforconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingworkhasbeendemonstrated.Thereisaneedtoevaluateatthestrategiclevelandtolookatthe

interconnectionsbetweenstrategies,policies,programmesandprojects.Policiesandoperationsin

thissensitivefieldneedtobemoreeffectivelylinkedagoalwhichcouldbeachievedinpartby

workingwith

practitioners

and

policy

makers

to

update

the

existing

DAC

Guidelines

on

Helping

PreventViolentConflict(includingthe1998GuidelinesonConflict,PeaceandDevelopmentCo

operation),inwhichdonorsrecognisedthatworkontheseissuesisacentralpartofdevelopment,

extendingbeyondhumanitarianassistancealone.

3) Evaluationsshouldbefacilitatedthroughbetterprogrammedesign,evenintheplanningstageswhen,forinstance,objectivesshouldbeclearlyarticulatedtofacilitatefutureassessmentofresults.

Thereisageneralneedforfurtherdevelopmentintermsofplanning,funding,managementand

implementationofactivitiesthattrytopreventconflictorbuildpeace.Inthisfieldingeneral,there

isaneedtobuildtailoredtoolsforlearningandaccountabilitytocontributetothe

professionalizationofinterventions,includingtheidentificationofbestpractices.

4) Coherentandcoordinatedinterventionandpolicystrategiesareneededtomakeprogresstowardspeace.Donorscannotrelysolelyonaidandmustlookatotherpolicyinstrumentsand

theirimpactsonconflictandthechancesforpeace.Strategicengagementatvariouslevelsand

acrossgovernmentsisessential.

5) Conceptsanddefinitionsofpeacebuildingandconflictpreventionrequireclarification.Evaluatorsshouldworkwithstaff,policymakers,managersandstakeholderstodetermineandassessthe

conceptsofpeacetheiractivityisoperatingon.

6) Theresultsofconflictanalysisneedtobetranslatedintoaction,usedtoinfluencetheprogrammingandevaluationprocessesandlinkedtootherformsofanalysis,suchasgovernance

assessments,power

and

drivers

of

change

analysis,

as

well

as

early

warning

indicators.

(Note:

As

fieldapplicationsareconductedandaslearningandpracticesevolve,thislistmayberefined.)

7) Theuseofmixedmethodapproachestoevaluationsisrecommendedduethecomplexityandmultifacetednatureofinterventionsinthisfield.

8) Jointevaluationsallowformoreharmonisedapproachesthatdemonstratehoweffortsofdifferentdonorsaddup.Involvingcountrypartnersisalsoimportantforunderstandinghowchangeoccurs

andisakeyelementofsupportingtheParisDeclaration.



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INTRODUCTION

THECONFLICTPREVENTIONANDPEACEBUILDINGCONTEXT

Mostcontemporaryarmedconflictstakeplacewithinstates,andthemajorityoftheirvictimsare

civilians.Notonlyisthehumancostofarmedconflictdevastating;itsimpactsonpolitical,socialand

economicdevelopmentareprofound.Whenviolentconflictbreaksout,developmentisderailed.The

benefitsofdevelopmentassistancecanbereversedbyviolentconflict,whichisnotonlyan

accompanimentofpovertybutoneofitsmaincauses.Thereisalsoanemergingunderstandingthat

developmentassistanceandotherdonorpolicies(whennotwelldesigned,implementedandco

ordinated)canincreasetensionsorrestraincapacitiesforpeace.

Whilescholars

in

diverse

academic

disciplines

have

long

been

concerned

with

issues

of

war

and

peace,conflictanalysisandpeaceresearchonlyemergedasadistinctinterdisciplinaryacademicfieldin

the1960s.Inthelastdecade,approachestounderstandingandrespondingtoboththeimmediateand

structuralcausesofviolentconflicthaveevolvedsignificantly.Workinfragilesituations2andconflict

affectedcountrieshasbecomeanintegralpartofthedevelopmentchallenge,andisnowseenasa

prerequisiteofsustainabledevelopment.

Policyinstrumentshavebeendevelopedtohelpdonorsandpartnercountriesdesignandimplement

strategiesthataddressmultiplethreatsandinsecurities,andtocontributetoconflictpreventionand

peacebuilding.Innovativeoperationalandanalyticaltoolshavebeenproposed,thoughtheyarestill

underused.Inparticular,conflictanalysishasyettoexertamajorinfluenceonplanninganddesign.

Recognisingthatmuchremainstobedonetoimprovethepeacebuildingactivities,donorswith

thehelpofpartnercountriescommittedthemselvesinthe2005ParisDeclarationonAidEffectiveness

toachievingmoresynchronisedandeffectivemonitoringandevaluationapproaches,especiallyinconflict

areas.3Newdonorstrategies,suchaswholeofgovernmentapproachesandanemergingemphasison

policycoherencereflectagrowinginterestinandcommitmenttofacingthesechallenges.Still,working

coherentlyacrossgovernmentsandorganisationsonthecomplexinterfaceofdevelopment,diplomacy,

defence,tradeandfinanceremainschallenging.

2Analystsanddonorsstillholddifferentnotionsofwhatfragilitymeans.IntheevolutionoftheconceptamongOECDmembers,

fragilestateswereonceequatedwithdifficultpartners.Amorenuancedapproachhassinceemergedbutdifferentagencies

haveadopteddifferentconcepts.Asusedhere,"fragilesituationsreferstonational,regionalandlocalterritorieswherethe

state(theexecutive,thelegislativeandthejudiciary,includingcentralandlocalauthorities)lacksthecapacityand/orpolitical

willandlegitimacytosupportequitabledevelopment.Thesesituationstendtobecharacterisedbypoorgovernance,tobeprone

toviolentconflict,andtoshowlimitedprogresstowardstheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals.Anaggregateofgovernanceand

securitycriteria,orofcapacity,accountabilityandlegitimacycriteria,isusuallyusedtomeasurefragility.3TheParisDeclarationonAidEffectivenessdemonstratesdonorcommitmenttoadapttodifferingcountryenvironmentsand

togiveincreasedattentiontofragilestatesandconflictaffectedcountries.Seefulltextat:

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf.



13/98

Theneedforstrategicpolicydevelopment

Donorsandothersworkingtohelppreventviolentconflictandsupportpeacehaverecognisedthe

needto

develop

more

strategic,

coherent

and

co

ordinated

policies

and

programmes

in

this

field.

In

the

late1990s,aslessonsemergedfromamajorjointevaluationofemergencyassistancetoRwanda,andin

theaftermathofadevastatinglyviolentdecade,pressureonandfromdonorstofindbetterwaysof

preventingviolenceincreased.4

Ongoingchallengestoworkonconflictandpeaceincludethefactthatworkinandonconflict

involvesactivitiesthatdifferfromtraditionaldevelopmentoperations,andtakeplaceinhighlypoliticised

environments.Comparedtothenumberofhumanitariananddevelopmentactivities,thereisarelatively

smallsampleofconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingactivitiesperseandthereforeofevaluations

fromwhichtodrawexperienceorguidance.5Inaddition,numerousvariablesaffectconflictandpeace

dynamicsandoutcomes.Thus,evenwhereusefulconclusionsorlessonscanbegleanedfroman

experience

in

one

conflict

environment,

they

may

not

be

readily

applicable

to

other

conflict

contexts,

evenwithinthesameregion.Lessonlearninganddiscernmentofgoodpracticeisthereforedifficultand

itisstillnotclearwhetherdonorsareusingtherightobjectivesandeffectivestrategiestoachieve

them.

Further,thesocalledfishbowleffectofahighlypoliticisedandoftenmediadenseenvironment

meansthatthereissometimesgreatpublicattentionon,andcorrespondinglyhighstakesfor,evaluators.

Whenhumansufferingishighanddonorcontributionslargeandvisible,thedesiretoseepositiveresults

canplaceadditionalpressuresonevaluatorsandmanagersinthefield.Atthesametimethereisa

tendencyforuneven,shorttermorunsystematicfundingandengagement,whichmayfollowthe

headlinesofmajorviolentconflictsandresultinthesocalledforgottencrisesanddonororphans.

Suchdynamicsdonotlendthemselvestothoughtfullearningfromandimprovinguponpastexperiences.

Theresultsofavailableresearchstudies6andoperationalevaluations

7haveidentifieda

considerablegapbetweenthepolicyintentofdonorcountriesanddefactooutcomesontheground.A

numberofthesestudieshavehighlightedthefactthatconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingpolicies,

programmesandprojectslackcoherencewitheachother,aswellaswithanoverallcountrystrategy.8

Clearly,thereisagrowingneedforthoughtfulexaminationofdonorpracticesintheseareas.

Distinctiveapproachesarerequiredtoeffectivelydeliverconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingaid

especiallyintermsofownership,harmonisation,alignmentandresults.Asevaluationisoftenan

importantlearningtool,itishopedthatbetterevaluationwillhelpaddresssomeoftheseconcerns.

Giventhegapsbetweendonorintentionsandoutcomesinthefield,coordinationproblems,andnewly

4TheRwandaevaluationwasundertakenby19OECDmemberbilateraldonoragencies,theEuropeanUnionandthe

DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee(DAC)SecretariatoftheOECD;ninemultilateralagenciesandUNunits;thetwocomponents

oftheInternationalRedCrossandRedCrescentMovements;andfiveinternationalNGOorganisations(Eriksson,J.etal.,1996).

FormoreontheimpactsoftheevaluationseeBortonandEriksson,2004.5FAFO,2006.6SeeDobbinsetal.,2005;Paris,2004;Collieretal.,2003;andStedman,CousensandRothchild,2002.7Amongothers:Cutillo,2006;Dahrendorf,2003;Donini,2002;Porter,2002;Stockton,2002;Sommers,2000;Reindorpand

Wiles,2001;Duffield,LautzeandJones,1998;andErikssonetal.,1996.8Forinstance,theUtsteinStudy,thatanalyzed336peacebuildingprojectssupportedorimplementedby,Germany,the

Netherlands,theUnitedKingdomandNorwaydeterminedthattherewasastrategicdeficitbetweenthestrategicpolicylevel

andthe

field

programmes,

and

that

this

gap

presented

asignificant

obstacle

to

sustainable

peacebuilding

(Smith,

2003).



14/98

emergingaidinstruments(especiallyinthesecuritysector),donorsshouldcontinueconsideringhowbest

toadoptmorecoordinatedandwholeofgovernmentapproachestoevaluationitself.Forinstance,

whenplanningevaluationstrategiesorcalendarsitisimportanttoplannotonlytocoverindividual

peacebuildingactivities

but

to

look

at

overall

contributions

to

peace

both

in

and

across

conflict

areas.

Thisworkonevaluationthereforerepresentsacontributiontotheongoingprocessofimproved

donorpoliciesandmoreeffectiveinterventionsinconflictaffectedareasandsituationsoffragility.

Evaluatingconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding

Evaluationofferssystematicandobjectiveassessmentsoftherelevance,effectiveness,impact,

sustainabilityandefficiencyofinterventions.Ithelpstoascertainthequalityofpoliciesandprogrammes,

toenhancetheperformanceofparticipants,toidentifygoodpracticesandtodefineappropriate

standardsforfutureoperations.9Proponentsoftransparent,evidencebasedpolicymakingand

programme

design

suggest

that

evaluation

is

needed

to

track

the

relevant

effects

of

conflict

prevention

andpeacebuilding,informthedesignofmorestrategicapproaches,andenhanceaccountability.Amore

strategicapproachcanbeencouragedbyevaluationsthatlinkprogramme,policyandprojectlevels

acrossgovernmentsandamongdonors.Asnewinstrumentsforimprovedaideffectivenessemergeinthe

conflictfield(andindevelopmentassistanceoverall),toolsandapproachesforevaluationareevolvingas

well.10

Yet,aidpractitionersandprogrammershavesometimesresistedevaluation.Theyfrequentlyassert

thatevaluationtakestime,consumesscarceskillsandresources,makesfutileattemptstoquantifythe

unquantifiable,putsforwardunrealisticrecommendationsordivertsmanagementandstaffattention

awayfromothervitalandurgenttasks.11

Manypractitionersfeelthatestablishedevaluationapproaches

areinadequateforassessingthenuancedworkofconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding(suchas

measuringchangingattitudesorculturalshifts).12

Aselsewhere,thisresistancetomonitoringand

evaluationmustbeovercome,notleastbecauseevaluationisbecominganearlyuniversalobligationof

manyfunders(includingbothpublicandprivatedonors).Furthermore,policymakersandpractitioners

havebeguntoappreciatetheneedforbetterevaluationinordertolearnfromexperience,

professionalisepeaceworkandimprovepolicymaking,coordinationandprogramming.Itishopedby

manythatbetterlearningfromevaluationwillincreaseeffectiveness.

Giventhisgrowinginterestinandsupportforevaluationandthelargeinvestmentofresourcesin

conflictpreventionwork,itisperhapssurprisingthatthereisstillcomparativelylittleevidence

demonstratingtheeffectivenessofconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingwork.13

Partoftheexplanation

9OECD,2002.10

Seeforinstancerecentworkonjointandmultidonorevaluations,countryprogrammeevaluations,impactevaluationand

generalbudgetsupportevaluations:www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationnetwork.11AndersonandOlson,2003.

12ChurchandShouldice,2003.

13AccordingtotheOECDDAC,OfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)forconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingmorethan

doubledduringtheperiod200005,asmeasuredbyreportingonthesixconflictcodes(securitysystemmanagementand

reform;civilianpeacebuilding,conflictpreventionandresolution;postconflictpeacebuilding;reintegrationandSALWcontrol;

landmineclearance;andchildsoldiers).Overall,ODAflowsincreasedfromaboutUSD650millionin2000tomorethan

USD1.6billionin2005.However,thesefiguresareincomplete,astheydonotincludelargenonODAexpensesforsecurity

relatedspendinginareassuchasdemilitarisation,thetrainingofmilitaryinnonmilitarymatterssuchashumanrights,orthe

extensionof

ODA

in

relation

to

peacekeeping

activities.



15/98

forthelackofsystematicevaluationcanbeexplainedbytheperceptionthatthisfieldposespecial

challengestoevaluation,including:

Theconflictcontext,whichinvolveshighriskstosecurityandhumanlife,inacomplex,rapidlychangingenvironment. Thisisanemergingandfastevolvingarea,anditspolicyframeworkisstilldeveloping. Relativelylimitedtheoreticalfoundations,includinglackofagreeduponorprovedstrategiesof

howtoeffectivelyworktowardspeace.Strategiesputforthorprogrammessuggestedareoften

contested,anditcanbedifficultforthoseworkinginthisfieldtobackuptheiractionswith

soundempiricalevidence.

Thelackofpreconditionsandinputsforeffectiveevaluationsincludingnobaselines,littlemonitoring,

and

missing,

unreliable

or

contradictory

data,

as

well

as

the

often

ineffective

articulationofobjectivesandtheories,whichmakesprogrammeslesseasilyevaluable.14

Thelackofclearlystatedandtestabletheoriesofchange(theimplicitorexplicitunderstandingsofhowonehopesthatwhatoneisdoingwillcontributetopeace).

Differencesinterminologies,planningculturesandapproachesbetweenvariousactorsworkinginconflictareas(defence,development,humanitarian,trade,diplomacy,etc.).

Thedifficultyofunderstandingimpactsandassigningattribution.15Fortheseandotherreasons,evaluationofconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingeffortshasonly

recentlybeen

carried

out

systematically.

The

field

needs

to

build

its

own

learning

and

accountability

tools

tocontributetotheprofessionalisationofinterventions,includingtheidentificationofbestpractices.

Thisguidanceworkstofacilitateanimportantstepinthatdirection.

Keyterms

Giventhecontinuedevolutioninthisfield,workingdefinitionsofkeytermsandconceptshaveyetto

besettled.Overlyflexibleandholisticdefinitionsleadtofragmentationofeffortsandlackofselectivityin

preventioninterventions.Alackofconsensusonvocabularycancreateconfusionandformsabarrierto

harmonisedorcoordinatedapproaches.Reachingagreementonterminologywouldhelpharmonise

policieswithinthedevelopmentcommunity.Tocontributetothisongoingprocess,alistoftermsand

conceptsis

included

in

Annex

1.

The

following

explains

key

concepts

as

they

are

used

in

this

guidance.

14Evaluability:theextenttowhichanactivitycanbeevaluatedinareliableandcrediblefashion,i.e.areitsobjectivesadequately

definedanditsresultsverifiable?(OECD,2002).15

Attributionistheascriptionofacausallinkbetweenobserved(orexpected)changesandaspecificintervention.While

attributionposesaprobleminallsocialsciences,influidconflictcontextsattributingtheimpactofanyparticularpolicyorsingle

interventiononthecomplexarrayofactorsanddynamicscanbeevenmoredifficult.Forexample,actorsworkingfromother

directionsbeyondthescopeoftheevaluation(militaryinterventionsortradepolicyforexample)mayactuallyberesponsiblefor

changesthat

are

attributed

to

conflict

prevention

or

peacebuilding

activities.



16/98

Understandingpeace

Afrequentcomplaintheardamongevaluatorsinthisfieldisthelackofclarityandconsensus

regardingthe

actual

goals

of

peacebuilding

work.

What

does

it

tangibly

mean

to

contribute

to

peace?

Avarietyofdefinitionsorunderstandingsofpeaceareatplayinconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding

contents.Forexample,JohanGaltungmadethedistinctionbetweennegative(absenceofwar)and

positivepeace(societywithoutphysicalnorstructuralviolence).Anemergingcommonunderstandingin

thefieldisthatthepathtosustainedpeaceleadsthroughconflicttransformationandsocialchange16

and

finallyasetofbuildingblocksneedstobeinplacewhenpositivepeaceisapproached.17

Thereisstill

debateaboutwhatpeaceisandhowitcanbeachieved;suchdebateshaveprovedtobeanobstaclefor

evaluationsinpeacebuilding.Achievementsinconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingcannotbeevaluated

withoutaclearvisionofwhatkindofpeaceshouldbebuiltmakingitallthemoreimportantforthose

planning,implementingorevaluatingpeaceworktobeclearaboutwhatmeaningsorimplicitdefinitions

areinuse.Makingimplicitunderstandingsofpeaceexplicitwillbeusefultobothevaluatorandplanner

andwill

help

co

ordination.

Peacebuilding

Peacebuildinghasbecomeanoverarchingtermforanentirerangeofactionsdesignedto

contributetobuildingacultureofpeace.Thetermpeacebuildingbecamepartofthepolicyvocabulary

throughtheUnitedNationsAgendaforPeace:PreventiveDiplomacy,PeaceMakingandPeacekeepingof

1992,andhasevolvedconsiderablyamongpractitioners,policymakersandthegeneralpublicoverthe

pastdecade.18

Themid1990switnessedarapidincreaseinpeacebuildingactivitiesbyavarietyofactors,

rangingfrominternationalandregionalorganisations(theUnitedNations,theEuropeanUnion,the

AfricanUnion)toacademicinstitutions,foundations,civilsocietygroups,socialmovements,business

groups,andthemedia.

Peacebuildinghasoftenbeendescribedinthepostconflictcontext(thoughthetermisusedby

somebeforeandduringconflict)asactiontoidentifyandsupportmeasuresandstructuresthatwill

strengthenandsolidifypeaceinordertoavoidarelapseintoconflict.19

Forthisguidance,peacebuilding

coversabroadrangeofmeasuresimplementedinthecontextofemerging,currentorpostconflict

situationsandwhichareexplicitlyguidedandmotivatedbyaprimarycommitmenttothepreventionof

violentconflictandthepromotionofalastingandsustainablepeace.20

16Lederach,2002.

17PaffenholzandReychler,2007.

18TheconceptwassubsequentlyelaboratedinSecurityResolution1325onwomen,peaceandsecurityin2000.InFebruary

2001,aSecurityCouncilPresidentialStatementrecognisedthatpeacemaking,peacekeepingandpeacebuildingareclosely

interrelated.In2004,theUnitedNationsHighLevelPanelonThreats,ChallengesandChangeclarifiedthatpeacebuildingshould

focusonstatebuilding,usuallybutnotexclusivelyinpostconflictcountries.TheUNhasestablishedthePeacebuilding

Commission,whichnowcoordinatesconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingefforts.19UN,1992.

20DAC

Issues

Brief,

2005.



17/98

Conflictprevention

Adecadeago,conflictpreventionreferredonlytoactionsundertakenintheshorttermtoreduce

manifesttensions

and

to

prevent

the

outbreak

or

recurrence

of

violent

conflict.

21

It

now

includes

long

termengagementaswellasshorttermresponses.22

Itaddressesthebuiltincapacitiesofsocietiesto

dealwithconflictinginterestswithoutresorttoviolence.23

Italsoextendstothemanagementofdisputes

withdestabilisingpotentials.Suchworkhelpsdelegitimisethebeliefthatviolenceisaninevitableor

acceptablewayofresolvingdisputes,makingnonviolentalternativesknownandmoreattractive,

addressingstructuralandimmediatecausesandreducingvulnerabilitytotriggers.

Thegoalisnottopreventallconflict.Someconflictisnatural,inevitableandoftenapositivepartof

developmentandotherchangeprocesses.Instead,theemphasisisonpreventingharmfulviolent

responsestotheinevitablediverginginterestsorclashingobjectivesextantinallsocieties.

Conflictprevention,peacebuildingandconflictsensitivity:Whentousethisguidance?

Comparativeanalysisofactivitiesacrosscontextsandtimesshowsthatapolicyorapproachthat

waslabelledconflictpreventionorpeacebuildinginsomeplacesisnotnecessarilydescribedassuch

elsewhere.24

Theconfusionoverdefinitionsofconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingleadsmanyto

assume(falsely)thatbybeingconflictsensitivetheyareipsofactoalsodoingpeacebuildingwork.It

alsoleadsmanypeopleworkinginconflicttoassumethatadvancesincriticalstructuralareaswill

contributeautomaticallytothereductionofconflictandthepromotionofpeace.Forinstance,many

donorfundedprogrammesandpoliciesareundertakenontheassumptionthatprogresstowards

liberalisation,economicgrowth,prosperity,humanrightsanddemocracycontributetopeace.Evidence

showsthatthisisnotalwaysthecasewhilesomeofthoseeffortsdocontributetopeace,othershave

negativeornegligibleeffectsonviolentconflict.Developmentcooperationshouldthereforedeliberately

workin

and

on

conflict

rather

than

simply

attempting

to

get

around

conflict.25

Giventhisconfusion,thefollowingdefinitionofconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingwas

developedtoserveasthebasisforthisguidance:

Conflictpreventionandpeacebuildingactivitiesareprojects,programmes,policies,strategies

orotherinterventionsthatadoptgoalsandobjectivesaimedatpreventingconflictorbuilding

peace; they are usually (but not always) focused on a particular conflict zone an area

threatenedby,inthemidstof,orrecoveringfromseriousintergroupviolence.26

21SeeOECDDevelopmentMinistersStatementonConflict,PeaceandDevelopmentCooperation(May1997)inOECDDAC,

1998and2001.22

Somepolicymakersandacademicsdistinguishbetweenoperationalandstructuralpreventionorbetweenearlyandlate

prevention.Forthepurposesofthisguidance,conflictpreventioncomprisesallofthesecategories.SeeforexampleMenkhaus

inPicciottoandWeaving,eds.2006.23

SeeOECDMinistersStatementonHelpingPreventViolentConflictinOECDDAC,1998and2001.24

OECDDACandCDA,2007.25

OECDDAC,1998and2001.26Thereisnointernationallyagreeddefinitionofthetermviolence.Thetermintergroupviolenceisusedheretodistinguish

theintentionalandillegitimateuseofarmedforce,includingbothinter andintrastateconflicts,fromothertypesofviolence

suchascriminalactivityandinterpersonalviolence.Whilesomeconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingactivitiesmayaddress

suchforms

of

violence,

this

guidance

deals

primarily

with

intergroup

violence

(war).



18/98

Usinganinterventionsgoalsandobjectivesasthedeterminingcriteriahelpstoclarifythedifference

betweenconflictsensitiveprogrammingandconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingactivities.Thefocus

ofthisguidanceisonpoliciesandactivitiesworkingonconflictmeaningtheyareintentionallytryingto

impactconflict

and

peace

prospects,

not

on

conflict

sensitive

evaluations

per

se

(though

some

policies

or

projectsworkinginconflictmayalsobenefitfromthisguidanceandsomeadvicewillbefurnishedon

conflictsensitivity).Alleffortsundertakeninconflictareasshouldbeconflictsensitive.Interventions

intendedtopreventconflictandbuildpeacemustalsobeaccountablefortheireffectivenessinimpacting

onthespecificfactorsthatdriveandshapeconflictandthecontributionstheymaketopeace.27

Still,agoalsbaseddefinitioncanbedifficulttooperationalise.Inordertoprovideamorepractical

definition,fourkeycategoriesofconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingactionandstrategywereoutlined

whiledevelopingthisguidance.28 Thefirstcategorycoversinterventionsthatsupportthepromotionofa

cultureofjustice,truthandreconciliation,whichcanbecriticalinpostconflictregionsinordertoheal

thewoundsofconflictandreconnectsociety.Second,capacitybuildingandpromotionofgood

governanceare

critical

to

human

security,

especially

where

states

are

unable

or

unwilling

to

deploy

peacefulmeanstoresolveconflictorsustainablyandindependentlyfacilitateprovisionofkeybasic

services.Third,conflictpreventionandpeacebuildingpoliciesandactionsoftenworktocreateincentives

forsystemsthatpromotethepeacefulresolutionofconflict.Supportingreformofsecurityandjustice

institutionsincludingthejudiciary,penal,policing,parliaments,defenceandmilitaryactorsiscritical

andshouldbeseenasalongtermprojecttoachievedemocraticgovernanceoverallsecurityinstitutions

andforceswhiledevelopingawiderjusticeandsecuritysystemthatupholdstheruleoflawandrespect

forthedignityofpoorpeople.Finally,socioeconomicdevelopmentandthepoliciestosupportitalso

matter,before,afterandevenduringhostilities.Addressingstructuralviolenceandinequalityisessential

toreducingtensionsandenhancingasocietyscapacitytopreventviolenceandisthusoftenafocusof

conflictpreventionwork.

Figure1outlinesexamplesofthesetypesofwork,towhichthisguidancecouldbeapplied,andis

meanttopromotethinkingabouttheinterrelatedareasofinterventionthatarerequiredtopromote

sustainablepeace.Thisisnotanexhaustivelist.Thelistisindicativeandshouldnotbeinterpretedasa

limitationonthetypesofinterventionsthatcouldcontributetopeacenordoalllistedinterventions

necessarilyalwayscontributetopeace.

27Foramoredetaileddiscussiononthedifferencesbetweenconflictsensitivedevelopmentandexplicitconflictpreventionand

peacebuildingactivities,seetheOECDDACandCDA,2007.28

AjointworkshopoftheCDACollaborativeLearningProjectsandmembersoftheDACNetworkonDevelopmentEvaluation

andthe

DAC

Network

on

Conflict,

Peace

and

Development

Co

operation

was

held

in

Oslo

in

2006.



19/98

Figure1.

Conflictpreventionandpeacebuildingwork

Transformingattitudes,structures,relationshipsandbehaviors

Source:InspiredbytheJointUtsteinStudyofPeaceBuilding,Utsteinpalette(Smith,2004a,pp.2728)andmodifiedduringaworkshopofthe

DACNetworksinOsloin2006.Bottomtextfrom:InternationalAlert(2007bp.6)

Socioeconomic

development

Balancedphysicalreconstruction

Soundandequitableeconomic

management

Equitableandbalancedpoverty

reductionGenderequality

Equitableaccesstoservices

Repatriationandreintegrationofthe

displaced

Sustainableuseofandequitableaccesstonaturalresources

Socialinclusionprojects

Reformofjusticeand

securityinstitutions

Securitysystemreform(police,

military,intelligence)

Smallarmsandlightweaponsreduction

Nonviolent

accompaniment

Communitypolicing

Peacekeeping

Nonviolentobservers

Disarmament,demobilisationandreintegrationofcombatants

Demining

Cultureofjustice,truthand

reconciliation

Dialogueamongconflictinggroups

Enhancingnonviolentdisputeresolution

systems

Prejudicereduction

or

diversitytraining

Traumahealing

Capacitybuildingandtraininginconflict

resolution

Peaceeducation

Transitionaljusticeprocesses

Warcrimestrials

Goodgovernance

Civilsocietydevelopment

Freedomsofexpression,

association,etc.

Mediadevelopment

Powersharing

Participatory

processes,access

Democratisationandelectoralprocesses

Transparencyandaccountability

Anticorruption

Humanrightsprotection

Ruleoflaw



20/98

OVERVIEWOFKEYSTEPS

IN

PLANNING

AND

EVALUATING

CONFLICTPREVENTIONANDPEACEBUILDINGWORK

1.Introduction

Eachofthechallengesmentionedintheintroductionmakeschoosingaspecificapproachto

evaluatingconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingactivitiesandpoliciesparticularlydifficult.Established

evaluationapproachesmaybemoreorlessusefulbefore,duringandafterwidespreadviolentconflict.

Manyworkinginthefield,bothevaluatorsandprogrammers,feelfrustratedbystandardevaluation

approaches,

claiming

that

they

fail

to

capture

many

of

the

significant

dimensions

involved

in

working

in

situationsofconflictandfragility.29

Questionsofmeasurement,timescale,data,complexityand

attributionhaverepeatedlybeenhighlightedasparticularweaknessesofestablishedmethodswhen

theseareappliedtoconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingevaluations.30

Thissectioncontributestoresolvingtheseconcernsbyoutlininggeneralprinciplesfortheevaluation

process,includingageneralapproachtoplanningandconductinganevaluation.Inaddition,alistof

commonevaluationmethods,withhighlightsofconflictspecificstrengthsandweaknesses,areoutlined

inAnnex7.Thefollowingprinciplesshouldbetakenintoaccountduringplanning,includedintheTerms

ofReference(TOR)andcarriedthroughouttheevaluationprocess.Whenappliedcarefully,these

principlescanenhancethecredibility,useandrigouroftheevaluationprocessesandproducts.

Box1.

AssessingtheImpactofDevelopmentCooperationinConflictZones

[PossibleexamplefromNorthEastAfghanistantobeaddedbyGermany]

Source:

2.Somebasicprinciples

Thereis

not

one

correct

or

blueprint

approach

for

undertaking

conflict

prevention

and

peacebuilding

evaluations.Evaluationisatoolboxandthegoldenruleistoapplytherighttoolfortherightquestion.It

followsthereforethatonemustfirstconsidertheusesoftheevaluationanditspurpose.Whatdowe

needtoknowforaccountabilityorlearning?Whatinformationcouldhelpimproveprogrammedesignor

influencepolicymaking?Oncetheuseandpurposeoftheevaluationhavebeendetermined,andconflict

analysiscarriedout,thechoiceoftheapproachwillbemorestraightforward.

29ChurchandShouldice,2003.

30See,amongothers:FAFO,2006;OECDDACandCDA,2007;ChurchandRogers,2006;USAIDandManagementSystems

International,2006.



21/98

Giventhecomplexnatureofsuchinterventionsitisoftennecessarytocombinedifferent

approachesinordertoanswertheevaluationquestions.Today,themostcommonlyusedmethodin

developmentevaluationisamixedmethodresultsbasedapproach,usingbothqualitativeand

quantitativeinformation.

Other

approaches

may

also

be

useful,

depending

on

the

context.

Most

such

evaluationsprovideusefulinformationonresultsatoutputandoutcomelevels,andonprocesses.Single

methodevaluationsarenotconsideredadequateforconflictpreventionandpeacebuildinganalysis.31

Theadvantagesanddisadvantagesofaparticularapproach,orcombinationofapproaches,shouldbe

consideredinlightoftheevaluationpurpose,context,budgetandtimeavailable.

Conflictsensitivity

Sometimespolicies,projectsandprogrammesworkinginoronconflictdoharmoftenwithout

intendingto.32

Doingharminaconflictsituationmeanshavingimpacts(intendedornot,director

indirect)thataggravategrievances,increasetensionorvulnerabilities,orperpetuateconflictinsome

way.

The

notion

of

conflict

sensitivity

is

intended

to

mitigate

such

harm

by

encouraging

systematically

takingintoaccountboththepositiveandnegativeimpactofinterventionsontheconflictcontextsin

whichtheyareundertaken,andviceversa.33

Thisissuefirstemergedandenteredpolicydiscussionsin

thecontextofhumanitarianinterventions,andsoonspreadthroughoutthedevelopmentfield.Conflict

sensitivityisnowakeypillarofdevelopmentpolicyandinterventionstrategies.34

Ithasnowbecomeclearthateffortstoaddressconflictissuesdirectlyorpreventviolencecanalso

doharmbyfailingtoaccountfortheinadvertentimpactsoftheirhiring,targeting,timing,andother

decisionsontheconflict.35

Inotherwords,justbecausetheyareconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding

efforts,thatdoesnotmeantheyareexemptfrombeingconflictsensitive.Itisalsoevidentthat

evaluationstakingplacebefore,duringorafteraviolentconflictshouldbesensitivetoconflict.

Theevaluation

process

itself

should

be

conflict

sensitive

and

an

evaluation

of

the

evaluators;

aself

revieworanintroductorystatementtotheevaluationreportmayexplainwhatmeasureswereorwere

nottakentoensuretheconflictsensitivityoftheevaluationitself.Inaseparatestep,theevaluatorswill

alsoassesswhetherornottheevaluationtargethasbeenconflictsensitive.Foralistoftoolsusedin

creatingandevaluatingconflictsensitiveevaluations,policiesandprogrammes,seeAnnex5.

31OECDDACandCDA,2007.

32Anderson,1999a.

33InternationalAlert,2007a.

34Forinstance,theOECDhasproducedguidelineswhichassertthatinternationalassistancemust,ataminimum,avoidnegative

effectsonconflict,and,wherepossible,makeapositivecontributiontoconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.DACGuidelineson

HelpingPreventViolentConflict(2001and1998):www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/preventionguidelines.35

Anderson,1999b

and

Uvin,

1999.



22/98

Box2.

Conflict

(in)sensitive

evaluation

[EXAMPLENEEDED:Exampleofsensitiveorinsensitiveevaluation?IllustrationofproblematicHawthorneffects?Staff,

translatorsorothersbeingthreatened/harmedafterparticipatinginevaluation?Other]

Gender

awareness

Fieldexperiencesandextensiveresearchshowthatthewaywomenandmenexperience,engagein

andareaffectedbyviolentconflictdiffersaccordingtotheirgenderedidentities.36

Conflictitselfcan

oftenplayamajorroleinformingasocietysunderstandingofandresponsestogenderroles(whatit

meanstobeamanorwomanandwhatisexpectedofandtoleratedfromeach),andviceversa.

Additionally,violentconflictisnearlyalwaysaccompaniedbyasurgeinviolencetowardswomen.37

Specificworkhasdevelopedintheareaofgender,peaceandsecurityinrecognitionofthis.38

Further

resourcesongenderandconflictcanbefoundinAnnex2.

Aclearandcriticalunderstandingofgenderwithintheparticularconflictcontextistherefore

extremelyimportantforbothevaluatorsandprogrammers.Overlysimplisticviewsofmenandwomenin

conflictare

often

based

on

misleading

stereotypes

(man

as

aggressor,

woman

as

victim)

which

are

neitheraccuratenorusefulandcanleadtopoorlydesignedormistargetedinterventionsthatdonot

contributetoreducingviolencenorconsolidatingpeace,andthatcanevenhaveharmfuleffects.

Thoseplanninganevaluationwillneedtodeterminehowthisunderstandingwillbetakeninto

accountwhenconductingtheevaluation,andwhethergenderoughttobeincludedasanevaluation

themeorfocus.Theevaluationteamshouldbothtakethisissueintoaccountintheirownworkand

consideritduringtheirevaluationoftheactivityinquestion.

36See,amongothers:InternationalAlert,2001;USAID,2007a;UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,2002;Sida,2003.

37USAID,2007a,p.11.

38

See

for

example

the

International

Alert

website:

www.conflictsensitivity.org.



23/98

Box3.

Confrontingpsycho

social

trauma

Psychosocialtraumamayaffectmuchlargernumbersofpeoplethanisoftenevidenttoanoutsider,particularly

oneunfamiliarwiththelocallanguageanduntrainedinthediagnosisofposttraumaticstressdisorders.People

beinginterviewedduringorafteramajorviolentconflictmayhaveexperiencedviolencefirsthand;theymay

havebeenforciblydisplaced,hadrelativesandfriendskilled,orperhapsseentheirpersonal,socialorcultural

identitiesshattered.Chronicinsecurityandwidespreadgenderbasedviolence,includingthesystematicuseof

rapeandotherformsoftorture,compoundtrauma.Widespreadtraumawillnodoubtimpactinteractions

betweenlocalpeopleandevaluatorteamsandshouldbehandledwithgreatcare.Thevalueanduseof

informationcollectedfromlocalswillhavetobeweighedagainstthepotentiallyharmfuleffectsofexplaining

traumaticexperiencestoevaluators.Exposedtosuchextremeexperiences,andperhapshavingthemselves

experiencedorwitnessedviolence,itisnotunheardofformembersofevaluationteamstoalsoexperiencemild

formsof

traumatic

stress

disorders.

The

practice

of

offering

counselling

or

other

support

to

returning

evaluators

shouldnotberuledout.

Source:AdaptedfromtheDACGuidanceonEvaluatingHumanitarianAidinComplexEmergencies(OECD,1999).

Protectionandethicalresponsibilities

Evaluationmanagersneedtobeawareofthefactthatconductingevaluationsinconflictzonesmay

putevaluationteamsandstakeholdersatrisk.Protectionconcernshavetobeincludedinevaluation

design,budgetingandmanagementespeciallywhenwidespreadviolenceisimminentorongoing.

Evaluatorsor

teams

should

be

closely

linked

to

in

country

offices

and

the

security

management

system.

Inaddition,evaluatorsshouldkeepinmindthatthewaytheyact,includingboththeexplicitandimplicit

messagestheytransmit,mayaffectthedegreeofrisk.Inthiscontextitisespeciallyimportanttoconsider

thesafetyofinterpretersandotherlocalstaff,partnersandbeneficiaries,whomevaluatorsmay

inadvertentlyexposetogreaterrisksthantheythemselvesface.Ethicalissuesthatmayariseduringthe

evaluation,particularlyastheyrelatetotheapproachchosen,shouldbemadeclearthroughtheconflict

analysis,beaddressedattheoutsetoftheprocessandincludedinthetermsofreference.Thisispartof

doingaconflictsensitiveevaluation.

Otherconsiderations

Fundamentalprinciplesofestablishedevaluationpracticeshouldbeapplied(seeforexamplethe

DACEvaluationQualityStandards).Independenceofanevaluationteam,participation,transparencyandinclusivenessareparticularlyimportantevaluationprincipleswhenworkinginthisfield.Local

stakeholdersshouldbeinvolvedinplanningandconductingtheevaluationasmuchaspossible,inorder

toensureatransparentprocessthatwillbevaluedandacceptedbythosedirectlyaffected.However,

particularcaremustbetakenwhendecidingwhomtoinvolveandhowinthecontextofviolentconflict.

Annex7discussesusingparticipatoryapproachesinconflictzones.Transparency,abasicevaluation

principle,canbeakeydimensionofconflictsensitivework:atransparentprocessinbothprogramming

andevaluatingcanhelpreducesuspicionandtension,thoughthedegreeofopennessmaydependupon

securityconcerns.



24/98

3.Outlineofthemainelements

Buildingontheprinciplesoutlinedabove,thissectionbeginswithkeyupstreammeasuresor

preconditionsfor

evaluation

for

policy

makers,

programme

managers

and

planners

(3.1).

These

suggestionswillhelpstaffandpolicymakerspreparefor,supportandlearnfromevaluation.Next,three

sections(3.23.4)overviewplanning,conductingandreportingevaluations.Thesesectionswillbeofuse

tothosecommissioning,planning,orconductingevaluationsaswellasthosepolicyandprogrammestaff

preparingtobeinvolvedinorlearnfromanevaluation.Thesesectionscoversomekeystepstoconsider

whenevaluatingconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingactivities,includingdimensionsofestablished

evaluationpracticeasadaptedtothespecificchallengesinthisfield.

Pleasenotethattheelementsbelowarenotnecessarilysequentialandmaybeordereddifferently,

ormaybemoreorlessimportant,dependingontheindividualevaluationpurposeandcontext.Theroles

ofindividualsinthevariousstepsarespecifiedwhererelevant.



25/98

3.1Preconditions:Programmingtoimproveworkandstrengthenevaluation

Summary:Key

steps

for

policy

makers,

programmeplannersandmanagers

9 Establishrelevant,clearandmeasureableobjectives9 Stateanexplicittheoryofchangeandprogrammelogic9 Completeandmonitoraconflictanalysis9 Developandmonitorrelevantindicators9 Focusonstrategyandpolicycoherence9 Conductsystematic,rigorousevaluation

Thisisnotaguideonhowtoplan,fund,manageorimplementpoliciesorprojectsthattryto

preventconflictorbuildpeace.However,asoutlinedabove,thereisageneralneedforfurther

developmentineachoftheseareas.Betterinterventionstrategiesandpolicycoherenceareneededto

makeprogresstowardspeace.Donorscannotrelysolelyonaidbutmustlookatotherpolicyinstruments

andtheirimpactsonconflictandthechancesforpeace.Strategicengagementatvariouslevelsand

acrossandbetweengovernmentsisessential.39

Systematic,independentandrigorousevaluationshould

beleveragedtohelpimprovepracticesandpoliciesinthisfieldaswell.Consistent,highquality

evaluationatboththeproject/programmelevelandthestrategicpolicylevelwillcontributetoimproving

effectiveness.

Inturn,programmemanagersandpolicymakerscanbettersupportand learnfromevaluationsby

helping tosystematicallyestablishcertainpreconditions forevaluation. Ideally,anumberofconditions

should be in place before an evaluation process begins. Themost essential elements are: baselines

(including a conflict analysis) and future scenarios; clear and measurable objectives; a testable

programme logic and theoryof change; andmonitoring tools, includingperformance information and

indicators (in order to measure achievements on the way). Conflict prevention and peacebuilding

activitiesoftenlacksomeorallofthesepreconditionsforavarietyofreasons,especiallywhentheyare

performedduringandafteropenarmedconflict,(oftenduetotheoftenlimitedtimeforplanning).Thisis

similartoevaluationsofcomplexemergencies.40

Tohelpaddresstheabovementionedissues,someprogrammeplanning,monitoringand

managementelementsarecoveredinAnnex3.Programmeplanners,policymakers,implementingstaff

andmanagers,andevaluatorscanworktogethertostrategiseabouthowbesttoconfronttheseissues

before,duringandaftertheevaluationprocess.

39Formoreonpolicycoherenceandinternationaldevelopmentassistance,visit:www.oecd.org/development/policycoherence.

40SeeDACGuidanceforEvaluatingHumanitarianAssistanceinComplexEmergencies:

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdf.

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdf


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Box4.

Integratinganalysis,evaluationandredesign

DFIDusedafullstrategicconflictanalysisstudyasthebasisforaconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding

evaluationofitsentireprogrammeinNepal.ThisConflictsensitiveProgrammeReviewthenfedintoa

revisedcountrystrategy.Amongthechangesthatcameaboutwasagreateremphasisontransparency,

becauseithadbeenshownthatthiscouldreducetensionslocallyandpreventMaoistinterference.The

reviewalsohighlightedtheneedforanactiveequalopportunities policytoensurethatallsocialgroups

wererepresentedamongDFIDstaff.Conflictanalysis,strategyandevaluationwereintegrated.

Source:VauxforOECDandCDA,2007.



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3.2.Planningandpreparingtheevaluation

Summary:Key

elements

of

planning

an

evaluation

forthosecommissioningorpreparingevaluations

9 Definethepurposeanduseoftheevaluation9 Decidethescopeoftheevaluation9 Outlinekeyevaluationquestions9 Doorobtainaconflictanalysis9 Taketimingandlogisticalissuesintoconsideration9 Coordinatewithotheractors9 Considerconductingajointevaluation9 Selectevaluationcriteria9 Deviseevaluationmanagement9 DevelopTermsofReference9 Selecttheevaluationteam9 Contracting

3.2.1Definethepurposeanduseoftheevaluation

Beginbyasking:Whatisthisevaluationmeanttoascertain?Definingthepurposeandobjectivesof

anevaluation

is

the

most

important

planning

step.

If

the

purpose

is

not

clear,

the

evaluation

will

not

be

clear.Anevaluationcanhaveanumberofdifferentpurposes(sometimessimultaneously),suchas:

Learningandimprovement:Systematiseknowledgeofresultsandperformance,whichcanhelp

improvethisorsimilaractivities.Evaluationscarriedoutwhileapolicyisstillbeingappliedora

programmeimplementedareusefulforimprovement.(Thistypeofpurposeismostrelevantto

immediatestakeholdersandthoseplanningorimplementingsimilarprojects.)

Accountability,controlordocumentation:Findoutwhetheranactivityhasbeenperformedas

intendedand/orwhethertheexpectedresultshavebeenachieved.(Accountabilityoriented

evaluationsaremostlyusefulfordonorsandthewiderpublic.)

Determiningtheusesoftheevaluationiscloselylinkedtodecidingitspurpose.Whoistoreceivethe

findings,whoistheaudienceandwhatwilltheydowiththeresults?Willtheevaluationbeusedfor

programmeorpolicyredesign?Renewedfundingdecisions?Forthedesignoffuturesimilaractivities?To

learnaboutprocesses?Totesttheoriesofchange?

Theusefulnessoftheevaluationresultsisanimportantprincipleforallevaluationsespeciallyin

thisfield,where,asmentionedpreviously,thereissomeresistancetoand/orunfamiliaritywithrigorous

evaluation.Evaluationswillbeinhigherdemandifthestakeholdersinvolvedfindtheresultsof

evaluationsusefulfortheirownwork.



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3.2.2Decidethescopeoftheevaluation

Thescope

should

be

clearly

defined

by

specifying

the

issues

covered,

funds

spent,

the

time

period,

typesofinterventions,geographicalcoverageandtargetgroupsaswellasotherelementsofthepolicyor

interventiontobeaddressedintheevaluation.Itisimportanttodelimittheevaluationscopeaccording

topurpose,resourcesandtime.Alsostatetheevaluationquestionsforwhichanswerswillnotbesought.

Questionstobeaskedare:Howfaralongtheresultschain(inputsoutputsoutcomesimpacts)

willtherevieworevaluationgo?(Notethatinthefieldsofconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingthelinks

tothebigpicturecanbeespeciallyimportantseeSection3.3.5.)Willitlookforimmediateandlong

termimpactsoninstitutions,onsocietyoronbroadconflictdynamics,and,ifso,how?

Table1.

Hierarchyofevaluationscopes

Typeofevaluation Definition Example

Systemwide Evaluationoftheresponsebythewholesystemtoaparticulararmedconflictor

outbreakofviolence

JointEvaluationofEmergencyAssistance

toRwanda(1996)

Partialsystem Evaluationofapartofthesystem(suchasathematicorsectorstudy)

Evaluationofcooperationinterventions

andFrenchNGO'sincrisisandfragile

institutionalcontexts(ongoing2007)

Box5.

What

are

evaluations

used

for?

Thefollowingexamples,fromdonoragencyevaluationsofconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingwork,

highlightdifferentwaysevaluationcanbeused:

Accountabilityanddocumentation:TheaimofthereviewwastoassesswhethersupporthasledtoincreasedstabilityinthePalestinianterritories.

Controlandlearning:"ThisreportwaspreparedtoascertainwhetherAsianDevelopmentBankpolicyconditionshadbeenmetandwhethertheyledtoachievementoftheTajikistanPostConflict

InfrastructureProgramsstatedobjectivesorpurpose."

Learning:ThisreviewwascommissionedinordertoprovideabetterunderstandingofthequalityandeffectivenessofUKassistancetoSecurityandJusticeSectorReforminAfrica. Improvement:Sidahascommissionedanassessmentoflessonslearnedfromsupporttoconflict

managementandpeacebuildingtoserveasaninputfordevisingnewstrategies

Source:ReportscanbefoundontheDevelopmentEvaluationResourceCentre(DEReC)website:

www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationnetwork/derec.

http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationnetwork/derechttp://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationnetwork/derec


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Singleagencyresponse Evaluationoftheoverallresponsetoaparticulararmedconflict(orseriesof

violentevents)byaparticularfunding,

channelling,or

implementing

agency

Peaceandconflictimpactassessmentof

theSwissAngolaProgramme(2002)

Singleagency,

singleproject

Evaluationofasingleproject,

programmeorpolicyundertakenbya

singleagency

TheMidtermReviewofthePalestinian

FinnishEducationProgramme(ongoing

2007)

Source:AdaptedfromOECD,1999.ExampletitlesdrawnfromDEReC.

3.2.3Doorobtainaconflictanalysis

Bydefinition,oneoftheprimarychallengestoevaluatingconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding

workisthatboththeinterventioninquestionandtheevaluationitselftakeplacewithinaconflict

context.Whether

the

evaluation

(as

well

as

the

activity

it

is

assessing)

is

taking

place

during

the

tense

periodsbeforeanoutbreakofviolence(wherepreventionisthepriority),duringopenconflictor

immediatelyfollowing,orinareasthathaveexperiencedmajorviolenceinthepastandareenteringa

periodofrecoveryandlongtermpreventiontheconflictcontextwillhavemajorimplications.Insome

cases,aninsecureenvironmentwillhaveprofoundimplicationsfortheachievementsandmodalitiesof

anactivityorevaluation.

Oneofthebestwaystofacethechallengeofworkinginthiscontextisbyusingsomeformof

conflictanalysis.Aconflictanalysisidentifiesthekeyfactorsrelatingtoconflictandthelinkagesbetween

them,pointingtosourcesanddynamicsofconflictaswellaspeace.Preferablythisincludesabaseline

analysisperformedduringtheplanningstageoftheintervention,aswellasupdatesandconflict

monitoring(over

time).

For

comparison,

acurrent

or

updated

analysis

at

the

time

of

the

evaluation

is

alsoneeded.Athoroughanduptodateunderstandingoftheconflictisthefirststepforaconflict

sensitiveevaluationprocess.Also,inordertoassessrelevance,theevaluationteamwillneedtoexamine

thetargetsdesignandimpactsinrelationtoaconflictanalysis.

Evaluatorswillalwaysneedtohavesomesortofconflictanalysis,thoughtheymaynotnecessarily

needtoperformonethemselves.Forinstance,theevaluationcouldbebasedonanalysisprovidedbya

donoragency,theevaluationtargetitself,athirdpartyoraparticipatoryprocesswithstakeholders;or,it

couldbeanassessmentcommissionedspecificallyfortheevaluation.Anactivitymayhaveincludeda

conflictorriskanalysisinitsplanningprocesses.Ifsuchabaselineexists,evaluatorswillneedtoconsider

whetherthiswasaccurate,whetheritwastranslatedintorelevantstrategiesandobjectives,whetherit

wasadapted

to

the

conflict

over

time,

and

any

further

constraints

that

have

been

created

by

the

conflict

situation.Wastheanalysiskeptuptodateanddidtheprogrammeadaptappropriately?

Asimpleandpracticalwayofdevelopingananalysisistoconductaworkshopwithkeystakeholders.

Asitisnotalwayspossibletogetallcompetingperspectivesfromthedifferentpartiesatthesametime,

itmaybenecessarytointerviewotherpeople(includingrepresentativesnotnecessarilydirectlyinvolved

intheconflict)separatelytogainawiderunderstandingoftheconflict.Bewarethatitwilllikelybe

difficulttogainconsensusonthenatureoftheconflictcontendinggroupswillnotagree.

Therearemanydifferentmodelsandframeworksforconflictanalysisusedbydevelopmentco

operationagenciesandothersengagedinworkinginandonconflict.Thosecommissioningevaluations

needtogiveconflictanalysiscarefulthoughtandmakeexplicitthebasisforanalysisintheirTermsof



30/98

Reference.Theanalysismethodselectedshouldbewelladaptedtothecontext,theevaluationscopeand

availableresources.Itfollowsthatthosefundingevaluationsshouldensurethatresourcesfortheconflict

analysisprovidedareproportionaltothetaskenvisaged.KeyquestionstoincludearelistedinTable2

andabrief

summary

of

different

conflict

analysis

models

or

techniques

has

been

outlined

in

Annex

4.

Table2.

Keyquestionsforconflictandpeaceanalysis

Profile

Whatisthepolitical,economic,andsocioculturalcontext?

Whatareemergentpolitical,economicandsocialissues?

Whatconflictprone/affectedareascanbesituatedwithinthecontext?Whatarethe

geographicdimensions?

Isthereahistoryofconflict?

Conflictcauses

andpotentials

forpeace

Whatare

the

structural

causes

of

conflict?

Whatissuescanbeconsideredasproximateordynamiccausesofconflict?

Whattriggerscouldcontributetotheoutbreak/furtherescalationofconflict?

Whatstrategiesfordealingwithconflictcontributetoviolence?

Whatnewfactorscontributetoprolongingconflictdynamics?

Whatfactorscancontributetopeace?Whatfactorsarebringingpeoplestogether?

Actors

Whoarethemainactors(peoplewhoperpetuateormitigatetheconflict)?

Whataretheirinterests,goals,positions,capacitiesandrelationships?

Whatcapacitiesforpeacecanbeidentified?Whocanmakeadifference?

Whatactorscanbeidentifiedasspoilers(thosewhobenefitfromongoingviolenceorwho

resistmovementtowardspeace)?Why?Aretheyinadvertentorintentionalspoilers?

Dynamicsand

futuretrends

Whatarecurrentconflicttrends?Negativereinforcingcycles?

Whatarewindowsofopportunity?

Whatscenarioscanbedevelopedfromtheanalysisoftheconflictprofile,causesandactors?

Howmightdifferentscenariosplayoutgivenlikelyfuturedevelopments(shortandlongrun)?

Source:AdaptedfromInternationalAlert,2007aandPaffenholzandReychler,2007.

3.2.4Outlinekeyevaluationquestions

Theevaluation

management

should

develop

detailed

questions

(lines

of

inquiry)

that

will

be

answered.Thesewilllargelybedeterminedbythetypeofintervention,thestageofimplementationand

whattheevaluationhopestoachieve.Forevaluationsofworkinandonconflict,focusingonpeace

relatedqueries(asoutlinedhere)setsastandardofhighperformanceintermsofcontributiontopeace

beyondthecriticallyimportantstandardofconflictsensitivity.Somepossibleevaluationfocifordifferent

typesofinterventionsfollow.

Explicitpeacebuildingefforts,whichhaveincorporatedspecificgoalsthatdeliberatelyseektoexert

apositiveeffectonconflictinacontextwherethereisongoingorrecentlyhaltedviolence,couldbe



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basedontheprimaryinquiry:Isthiseffortmakingarelevantcontributiontodurablepeace,by

deliberatelyandeffectivelyaddressingkeydrivingfactors41

ofconflictamongcrucialconflict

actors/constituencies?

Explicitconflictpreventioneffortsthathaveadoptedconflictrelatedgoalsandobjectivesina

contextinwhichthereareindications,throughearlywarningsystemsorothermechanismsofalert,that

violenceislikelyintheshortorlongtermmightfocusonthequestion:Isthiseffortmakinga

demonstrablecontributiontopreventingviolence,eitherbyinterveningswiftlytoavertescalating

violenceorbyaddressinglongtermstructuraldriversofconflict?

Developmentinterventionsinconflictpronecontextsareusuallyprimarilyaimedatdevelopment

objectivessuchashealth,education,andinfrastructure,butmayalsohavethepotentialformakinga

positivecontributiontopeace.Whenevaluatingsuchaneffort'sactualcontributiontopeace(beyond

assessingconflictsensitivity)evaluatorsmightlookat:hasanassessmentofpeaceconflictdynamics

been

undertaken

(and

maintained)

and

has

this

influenced

development

programming

choices?

Does

thiseffort(orcouldit)engageonkeysocialtensionsthathavebeenidentifiedasdrivingfactorsofpast,

currentorpotentialconflict?

Moreinformationandfieldtestsareneededtodeterminewhetherornotitwouldbeusefulto

evaluatehumanitarianinterventionsinthisway.Anevaluationofhumanitarianworkwouldlikelyfocus

onconflictsensitivity,ratherthanachievementofspecificpeacebuildingobjectivesperse.42

Key

questionsmightinclude:Doestheinterventionavoidcreatingtensionswithinthecrisisaffected

community;betweendisplacedpeopleandhostcommunities;betweenagenciesoverthetypeand

quantityofassistance,etc.FormoreonevaluatinghumanitarianassistanceseeOECDDAC(1999),

"GuidanceforEvaluatingHumanitarianAssistanceinComplexEmergencies".

3.2.5Take

timing

and

logistical

issues

into

consideration

Thereareusuallystandardtimeframesforconductingevaluations.Schedulesandevaluationplans

areoftendecidedwellinadvance.However,thetimingforevaluatingconflictpreventionand

peacebuildinginterventionsshouldbedeterminednotonlybythephaseofthepolicy,programmeor

projectcycle,butalsoinrelationtocurrentconflictrealitiesthisispartoftheethicalresponsibilitiesof

thoseplanningandconductingevaluations.Timingoftheevaluationshouldbeappropriateforcurrent

dynamicsoftheconflictitself,andusefulforinformingpolicydiscussionand/orprogrammeadjustments

(accordingtoobjectives).Thosecommissioningevaluationsmayhavetoadjusttheirexpectationsgiven

conflictrelatedrestraints.TheTermsofReference(TOR)shouldbeclearaboutrealistictimeframes.To

identifytherighttimeandgoodentrypointsforanevaluation,considerthefollowingquestions:

41Keydrivingforcesarethemostimportantforcesdrivingtheevolutionoftheconflict.Theyaretheelementswithoutwhichthe

conflictwouldbesignificantlydifferent.42Humanitarianinterventionsinconflictsituationsusuallydonotfocusonpeacebuildingasacoreobjective(andoftencannot

duetotheoverridingconcerntomaintaintheneutralityandimpartialityofhumanitarianaction).Theymay,undercertain

circumstances,stillmakeacontributiontopeace,forexamplebycreatingneutralspaceinwhichdialoguecanoccur.

Humanitarianinterventionsmust,however,alwaysbesensitivetotheprevailingpeaceconflictdynamicsandseektoensurethat

theydonoharm. Forexample,externalshocks,whetherhumanmadeornatural,arelikelytohaveupsetsocialstructuresand

heightenedtensionsoveraccesstoscarceresources(food,shelter,medicalsuppliesetc). Insuchsituations,humanitariansmust

becarefultoavoidexacerbatingunderlyingsourcesoftensionorcreatingnewsourcesofconflictwithincommunities.Therefore,

whenevaluatinghumanitarianaction,evaluatorsmight,inadditiontoassessingconflictsensitivity,alsoexaminethepeaceand

conflictimpacts

of

interventions.



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Whatishappeningintheconflict?Atwhatstageistheconflictcycle?Watchoutespeciallyforpotentialconflicttriggers(elections,controversialcelebrations,etc.).

Wouldanevaluationatthismomentbedisruptivetothepolicy,projectorprogrammeitself? Wouldanevaluationprovokepoliticalreactionthatcouldunderminetheintervention,bycalling

attentiontotheinterventionorby

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