General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts Lsn 2 and 3.

General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and

Leadership ConceptsLsn 2 and 3

Agenda

• Key Theorists

• Principles of War

• Elements of Operational Design

• Forms of Maneuver

• METT-TC

• Strategy

• Strategic Leadership

Key Theorists

Clausewitz

Jomini

Clausewitz

• Carl von Clausewitz– Prussian officer born in 1780– Resigned his commission in

1812 and joined the Russian Army to fight Napoleon

– Ideas on war were heavily influenced by the mass popular warfare of the French Revolutionary period and Napoleon’s Prussian adversary Gerhard von Scharnhorst

– Died in 1831 and his wife published his On War in 1832

Clausewitz

• War is neither an art nor a science– It is a continuation of “policy” (or “politics”) by

other means.– A form of social intercourse

• War is like a wrestling match– It is “an act of force to compel our enemy to

do our will.”– But it is not unilateral. It is a contest between

two independent wills.

Clausewitz

• Used a trinitarian analysis consisting of (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the play of chance and probability; and (3) war’s element of subordination to rational policy – Often loosely expressed as “the people, the military, and the

government”• Analyzed “absolute war” or “war in theory,” but then

noted that factors such as poor intelligence, chance, friction, etc make war in practice different than war in the abstract

• Argued one should focus his military efforts against the enemy’s “center of gravity” (“Schwerpunkt”) – Very important concept in American military doctrine

Jomini

• Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) was a Swiss military theorist who sought to interpret Napoleon

• Published the Summary of the Art of War in 1838– Became the premier military-

educational text of the mid-nineteenth century and greatly influenced Civil War generals

– “Many a Civil War general went into battle with a sword in one hand and Jomini’s Summary of the Art of War in the other” (General J. D. Hittle)

• Product of the Enlightenment

Jomini

• Very geometrical and scientific approach to war

• Stressed interior lines– “those adopted by one or two armies to

oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that the general can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force in a shorter period of time than it would require for the enemy to oppose them a greater force.”

Interior Lines

• The benefits of interior lines could be gained either by central position or superior lateral communications

InteriorLinesExterior

Lines

Principles of War

Principles of War

• British military officer J. F. C. Fuller developed a list of principles based on the works of Clausewitz and Jomini for use by the British Army in World War I

• The US Army modified them and published its first list in 1921– Objective – Offensive – Mass – Economy of force – Maneuver – Unity of command – Security – Surprise– Simplicity

Objective

• When undertaking any mission, commanders should have a clear understanding of the expected outcome and its impact. Commanders need to appreciate political ends and understand how the military conditions they achieve contribute to them. – Ensure that all actions contribute to the goals of the

higher headquarters. – Example: The Emancipation Proclamation changed

the Federal objective of the war from merely restoring the Union to also ending slavery.

Offensive

• Offensive operations are essential to maintain the freedom of action necessary for success, exploit vulnerabilities, and react to rapidly changing situations and unexpected developments.– Offensive actions are those taken to dictate the

nature, scope, and tempo of an operation. – Offensive action is key to achieving decisive results; it

is the essence of successful operations.– Example: Lee’s two invasions of northern territory

represented offensive strategies.

Mass

• Commanders mass the effects of combat power in time and space to overwhelm enemies or gain control of the situation. – Time: applies the elements of combat power

against multiple targets simultaneously– Space : concentrates the effects of different

elements of combat power against a single target

– Example: Grant had a huge advantage in mass over Lee toward the end of the war.

Economy of Force

• Commanders never leave any element without a purpose. When the time comes to execute, all elements should have tasks to perform.– Economy of force requires accepting prudent risk in

selected areas to achieve superiority in the decisive operation.

– Economy of force involves the discriminating employment and distribution of forces.

– Example: The South decided to make the west an economy of force theater in spite of the arguments of the Confederate Western Concentration Bloc (Beauregard, Longstreet, et al)

Maneuver• As both an element of combat power and a principle of

war, maneuver concentrates and disperses combat power to place and keep the enemy at a disadvantage. It includes the dynamic, flexible application of leadership, firepower, information, and protection as well. – Achieves results that would otherwise be more costly– Keeps enemies off balance by making them confront new

problems and new dangers faster than they can deal with them. – Example: Chancellorsville represented the classic envelopment

while Fredericksburg and Pickett’s Charge showed the costliness of the frontal attack.

Unity of Command

• Unity of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common objective.– Develops the full combat power of a force– Usually requires giving a single commander

authority– Example: Grant and Porter cooperated as an

army-navy team at Vicksburg.

Security

• Calculated risk is inherent in conflict. Security protects and preserves combat power.– Does not involve excessive caution– Measures taken by a command to protect itself from

surprise, interference, sabotage, annoyance, and threat

– Example: Fears for the security of Washington influenced Lincoln’s decision-making during the Peninsula Campaign.

Surprise

• Surprise results from taking actions for which an enemy or adversary is unprepared.– It is only necessary that the enemy become

aware too late to react effectively. – Contributions to surprise include speed,

information superiority, and asymmetry.– Example: Sherman’s March to the Sea put the

Confederates on the “horns of a dilemma” because Sherman’s true destination was unknown.

Simplicity

• Plans and orders should be simple and direct. Simple plans executed on time are better than detailed plans executed late.– Clear and concise plans cut down on

misunderstandings– Example: Grant’s orders to Sherman in the Atlanta

Campaign are classic in their simplicity and clarity.

Elements of Operational Design

Elements of Operational Design

• Synergy

• Simultaneity and depth

• Anticipation

• Balance

• Leverage

• Timing and tempo

• Operational reach and approach

Elements of Operational Design (cont)

• Forces and functions

• Arranging operations

• Centers of gravity

• Direct versus indirect

• Decisive points

• Culmination

• Termination


• Synergy– Seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve

concentrations in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time possible and with minimum casualties

– Example: Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign relieved pressure on Lee outside of Richmond.

• Simultaneity and depth– Place more demands on adversary forces than can be handled

both in terms of time and space– Example: It was not until the end of the war that Grant brought a

grand strategy to the Federal effort that pressured the Confederacy and Lee simultaneously from all directions.


• Anticipation– Remain alert for the unexpected and opportunities to exploit the

situation– Example: Grant failed to anticipate the Confederate attack at

Shiloh and will be surprised and defeated the first day.

• Balance– Maintain the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a

manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness

– Example: Trying to defend its entire territory proved impossible for the Confederacy and led it to develop an “offensive-defensive” strategy.


• Leverage– Gain, maintain, and exploit advantages in combat

power across all dimensions– Example: Grant’s numerical advantage allowed him

to maintain constant pressure on Lee in 1864-1865.

• Timing and tempo– Conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that

best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the adversary

– Example: The speed of Sherman’s March to the Sea thwarted any meaningful resistance.


• Operational reach and approach– The distance over which military power can mass

effects and be employed decisively– Example: The superior Federal Navy allowed the

North to blockade the South.• Forces and functions

– Focus on defeating either adversary forces or functions, or a combination of both

– Example: Sherman’s March to the Sea targeted Confederate functions of war-making ability and will at the same time Grant’s Overland Campaign targeted Lee’s forces.


• Arranging operations– Achieve dimensional superiority by a combination of

simultaneous and sequential operations– Phases: Deter/engage, Seize initiative, Decisive operations,

Transition– Example: Grant’s preliminary attempts, his maneuver, his

assaults on Vicksburg, and ultimately the siege combined to produce a logical line of operation.

• Centers of gravity– Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from

which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight

– Destroying or neutralizing adversary centers of gravity is the most direct path to victory

– Example: McClellan fought as if Richmond was the Confederate center of gravity rather than Lee’s army.


• Direct versus indirect– To the extent possible, attack centers of gravity directly, but

where direct attack means attacking into an opponent’s strength seek an indirect approach

– Example: Longstreet unsuccessfully tried to convince Lee to threaten Washington or Baltimore by a turning movement rather than continuing the offensive at Gettysburg.

• Decisive points– Usually geographic in nature, but can sometimes be key events

or systems– Give a marked advantage to whoever controls them– Keys to attacking protected centers of gravity– Example: By securing the flank at Little Round Top, Chamberlain

saved day for the Federals at Gettysburg.


• Culmination– Point in time and space at which an attacker’s combat power no

longer exceeds that of the defender or the defender no longer can preserve his force

– Example: Lincoln was very frustrated that Meade did not pursue Lee after Gettysburg but decisive battles were elusive in the Civil War because of culmination.

• Termination– Military operations typically conclude with attainment of the

strategic ends for which the military force was committed, which then allows transition to other instruments of national power and agencies as the means to achieve broader goals

– Example: The end of the Civil War led to Reconstruction.

Forms of Maneuver

Forms of Maneuver

• The five forms of maneuver are the – envelopment,

– turning movement,

– infiltration,

– penetration, and

– frontal attack.

Envelopment

Envelopment

• The envelopment is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives to the enemy rear to destroy the enemy in his current positions.

• Envelopments avoid the enemy front, where he is protected and can easily concentrate fires.

• Single envelopments maneuver against one enemy flank; double envelopments maneuver against both. Either variant can develop into an encirclement.

• Example: Chancellorsville

Turning Movement

Turning Movement

• A turning movement is a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy's principal defensive positions by seizing objectives to the enemy rear and causing the enemy to move out of his current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat.

• A major threat to his rear forces the enemy to attack or withdraw rearward, thus "turning" him out of his defensive positions.

• Turning movements typically require greater depth than other forms of maneuver.

• Example: Peninsula Campaign

Infiltration

Infiltration• An infiltration is a form of maneuver in which an

attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy rear while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires

– Typically, forces infiltrate in small groups and reassemble to continue their mission.

– Infiltration rarely defeats a defense by itself. Commanders direct infiltrations to attack lightly defended positions or stronger positions from the flank and rear, to secure key terrain to support the decisive operation, or to disrupt enemy sustaining operations.

– Example: ?

Penetration

Penetration• A penetration is a form of maneuver in which an

attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system.

– Commanders direct penetrations when enemy flanks are not assailable or time does not permit another form of maneuver. Successful penetrations create assailable flanks and provide access to enemy rear areas.

– Because penetrations frequently are directed into the front of the enemy defense, they risk significantly more friendly casualties than envelopments, turning movements, and infiltrations.

– Example: Sherman’s March to the Sea

Frontal Attack

Frontal attack• The frontal attack is frequently the most costly form of

maneuver, since it exposes the majority of the attackers to the concentrated fires of the defenders.

– As the most direct form of maneuver, however, the frontal attack is useful for overwhelming light defenses, covering forces, or disorganized enemy resistance.

– It is often the best form of maneuver for hasty attacks and meeting engagements, where speed and simplicity are essential to maintain tempo and the initiative.

– Commanders may direct a frontal attack as a shaping operation and another form of maneuver as the decisive operation.

– Example: Fredericksburg

METT-TC

METT-TC

• Mission

• Enemy

• Terrain and Weather

• Troops and Equipment

• Time

• Civilians

Mission

• Seize Vicksburg in order to control the Mississippi River and separate the Confederacy in two

Enemy

• Pemberton– Five divisions totaling 43,000 effectives

• Pemberton fell under Johnston’s Department of the West– Represented some potential for a relief force

• No ironclads and only a few wooden gunboats

Terrain

• Vicksburg located astride the railroad that linked Shreveport, LA (and thus the three states west of the river) to the eastern transportation network

• Line of bluffs that dominated the river favored defense

• Northeast and west of Vicksburg was wetland that would inhibit offensive movement

Troops• Army

– Grant had a maneuver force of ten divisions (44,000 effectives)

• Navy– Porter’s Mississippi River

Squadron had about 60 combat vessels of which 20 to 25 would support the Vicksburg operation at any one time

Time

• Pemberton had ample time to prepare his defense

• Grant needed to attack before his supplies ran out and before Johnston could reinforce

• Once the siege began, time benefited the offense

Civilians

• About 5,000 lived in Vicksburg

• Pemberton was responsible for their well-being

• Other civilians along the Mississippi River posed a guerrilla threat to the Federal Navy

• Potential source of intelligence

Strategy

Strategy

• Strategy is the pursuit, protection, or advancement of national interests through the application of the instruments of power

• Instruments of power (DIME)– Diplomatic– Informational– Military– Economic

Strategy

• Strategy is about how (way or concept) leadership will use the power (means or resources) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) that support state interests

• Strategy = Ends (objectives) + Ways (course of action) + Means (instruments)– Ways to employ means to

achieve ends

Strategy:Confederates at Vicksburg

• End– Deny Federal use of the Mississippi River

• Way– Interdict river traffic at Vicksburg

• Mean– Pemberton’s force at Vicksburg

Traditional Military Strategies

• Attrition– The reduction of the effectiveness of a

force caused by loss of personnel and materiel

• Exhaustion– The gradual erosion of a nation’s will or

means to resist

• Annihilation– Seeks the immediate destruction of the

combat power of the enemy’s armed forces

Strategic Leadership

Strategic Leadership Skills

• Interpersonal Skills– Communicating– Using Dialogue– Negotiating– Achieving Consensus– Building Staffs


• Conceptual Skills– Envisioning– Developing Frames of Reference– Dealing with Uncertainty and Ambiguity


• Technical Skills– Strategic Art– Leveraging Technology– Translating Political Goals into Military

Objectives


• Interpersonal Skills– Communicating

• “When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass expedition, and the like, could succeed. When you got below, and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks; and when you turned northward east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now which to make the personal acknowledgement that you were right and I was wrong.”

– Lincoln to Grant


• Interpersonal Skills– Using Dialogue

• Pemberton preferred to command behind the scenes and had little direct communication with his soldiers or subordinate commanders

– Negotiating• Grant and Porter were able to achieve Army-Navy cooperation in

the absence of a hierarchical command relationship

– Achieving Consensus• Pemberton’s superiors, Davis and Johnston, did not achieve

consensus on the proper strategy and gave Pemberton conflicting guidance

– Building Staffs• Grant received great benefit from his logistical staff that kept him

resupplied after he “cut loose” from his base


• Conceptual Skills– Envisioning

• Success at Raymond convinced Grant to shift his decisive point from the Confederate railroads to Jackson, which allowed him to isolate Vicksburg from reinforcements.

– Developing Frames of Reference• Pemberton brought from Charleston a dictum that he must

not do anything to leave Vicksburg vulnerable.

– Dealing with Uncertainty and Ambiguity• This was Pemberton’s chief failure. He was continually left

guessing by Grant’s diversions and maneuver and was always a couple steps behind.


• Technical Skills– Strategic Art

• Control of the Mississippi would separate the Confederacy into two halves and controlling Vicksburg would give the North control of the Mississippi

– Leveraging Technology• At the time of the Vicksburg Campaign, the Confederacy had

no ironclads. The Federal Mississippi River Squadron included thirteen ironclads.

– Translating Political Goals into Military Objectives• The Anaconda Plan was rejected as a military strategy

because it failed to meet the political objective for a quick, offensive war.

Writing Requirement

• 2,000 to 2,500 word battle or campaign analysis– You pick the battle or campaign– Can be one we discussed in class or another,

but I must approve it

• On Lsn 14, bring in your introductory paragraph

• Lsn 15 will be a writing workday (no class)

Analytical Writing

• GRE Analytical Writing Measure assesses the applicant's ability to articulate complex ideas clearly and effectively examine claims and accompanying evidence support ideas with relevant reasons and

examples sustain a well-focused, coherent discussion control the elements of standard written English

Thesis

• “a position or proposition that a person ... advances and offers to maintain by argument"

• Webster’s Dictionary

Writing Style• Put the recommendation, conclusion or reason for

writing -- the “bottom line” -- in the first paragraph, not at the end. (BLUF)

• Use the active voice.

• Write for your audience, but, in general, keep it simple

– Use short sentences (an average of 15 or fewer words).

– Understand the words you use

– Write paragraphs that average 6 to 7 sentences in length.

• Use correct spelling, grammar, and punctuation.

Organization: “M1A1 Paper”

• Intro… tell them what you’re going to tell them

• Body… tell them

• Conclusion… tell them what you told them

Example

• Introduction– Robert E. Lee defeated George McClellan in the Peninsula

Campaign because of the superior Confederate intelligence system. This advantage manifested itself in terms of synthesis, analysis, and collection. In terms of synthesis, Lee was able to assemble John Magruder’s initial panicky reports and develop a reconcentration of forces in response. In terms of analysis, McClellan’s exaggerated estimates of Confederate troop strength led him to be cautious when he should have pressed his advantage. In terms of collection, Jeb Stuart’s cavalry gave Lee had an intelligence gathering asset that McClellan could not match. Lee’s superior intelligence system allowed him to act faster and more accurately than McClellan could and gave Lee a decisive advantage on the Peninsula.

Example

• Para 2– Analysis (McClellan’s exaggerations)

• Para 3– Synthesis (Magruder’s reports)

• Para 4– Collection (Stuart)

Example

• Conclusion– The key factor in the Confederate victory in the Peninsula

Campaign was superior intelligence. McClellan was cautious by nature and his inaccurate magnifications of the Confederate troop strength made him more so. Especially at this point in the war, Confederate cavalry was far superior to its Federal counterpart, and Stuart’s ride around McClellan’s army informed Lee of a vulnerability he could exploit. Finally, Lee had the personal ability to assemble complex and disorganized data into a solution and he used this skill to make sense of Magruder’s initial panicky reports. In all respects, intelligence gave the Confederates an advantage and Lee turned this advantage into victory on the Peninsula.

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General Military Strategic, Doctrinal, Operational, and Leadership Concepts Lsn 2 and 3.

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