Geer Stanley Languaje Science

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Language and Science the Rational, Functional Language of Science and TechnologyAuthor(s): Stanley GerrSource: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Apr., 1942), pp. 146-161Published by: on behalf of theThe University of Chicago Press Philosophy of ScienceAssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/184424Accessed: 04-07-2015 13:48 UTC

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2/17

LANGUAGE AND

SCIENCE

THE

RATIONAL,

FUNCTIONAL LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE

AND

TECHNOLOGY

STANLEY GERR

INTRODUCTION: LANGUAGE

AND

THOUGHT

"Reason," said Lao

Tze some

twenty

five

hundred

years

ago,

"is of all

things

the emptiest. Yet

its use is inexhaustible."

With

equal

justice,

he

might

have

said

the same of

language.

But

Lao

Tze,

whose

profound

metaphysical

probing

appeared

to

carry

him

beyond

the reach of

linguistic

aid,

was

led

to insist that

"Those

who

know do not

speak;

those who

speak

do

not know." Yet the

"Old

Philosopher,"

as he is known

to the

Chinese, might

be said to

admit, by

the

very implications of his insistence, that language can exercise the greatest in-

fluence

on

thought,

if

only,

in

his

viewpoint,

to

nullify

it.

Today

we acknowl-

edge

this

influence

by reversing

the

great metaphysician's

statement,

those

without

speech

(i.e.

language)

in

some

form

or other cannot

know.

As to what

language

is,

E.

Sapir

has

given

us an almost

unimpeachable

defini-

tion.

"Language,"

says

this

scholar,

"is

a

purely

human

and

non-instinctive

method

of

communicating

ideas, emotions,

and

desires

by

means

of a

system

of

voluntarily produced symbols."

If

"communication"

is conceived

to

include

self-communication

or

the forms of

introspection,

then

it

is

indeed

difficult to

find

fault

with

Sapir's

statement.

But

the essential

nature

of

the

relation be-

tween

rational

thought

and

language

has never been

clearly

defined.

There

is,

in

fact,

a

consensus

of

modern

opinion

in

this field that the connection

between

these

two

elements

of

a

larger

process

is so

intimate

as to render

impossible

the

task

of

setting

up

definite

physical (i.e. physiological)

or

psychological

boundaries

delimiting speech

(language)

from ideation.

However,

this

statement,

too, requires

that the connotation

of

a

term-this

time

of the word

"language"-be

expanded.

This

extension

of

meaning,

which

makes

language

practically synonymous

with

symbolism

in

general,

is

both

necessitated

and

justified by

modern

developments

of

symbolic technique.

Accordingly, language must be recognized as such not only when it appears in

its

common,

and

possibly fundamental, spoken

form,

but also

when

found

in

any

one

of a

multitude

of

substitute

and derivative

forms

it

is

able to

assume or

develop.

These

may range

all

the

way

from

highly

socialized

ideographies

like

those

used

in

mathematics, symbolic logic,

and

many

branches of

science

and

engineering

(e.g.

chemistry, electricity, et.), through

the conventional

written

reproductions

of

spoken

languages,

down

to

many subtle,

more or

less

individualised

types

of

physiological exchange

or

psychological

transfer of

symbolic

function

which

often

remain unrecorded or even

entirely

concealed.

The

latter

would include the various

forms of

inner

or

silent

speech,

identi-

fied outright as thinking by the behaviourist school of psychology, as well as

most

instances

of

metaphorical

association of ideas

in

which

concepts

are

them-

146


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3/17

LANGUAGE AND

SCIENCE

selves

symbols

of further referents. In this

extended sense

of

the

word "lan-

guage"

is

certainly

inextricably

interwoven with

human

thought patterns

and

processes.

Moreover,

the connection between symbol and

concept,

or on a

larger

scale

between

language

and

thought,

is neither

passive

nor

accidental.

Through

its

unique history

and function of

coordinating

and

integrating

the

diverse be-

haviour, experience,

desires,

needs,

and

intentions

of

many

human

beings,

language

has

developed

a host of

'operational

techniques

(syntactic

relational

devices,

schemes of

categories,

etc.)

and

absorbed

a

multitude

of

viewpoints

which

remain latent

in

the

body

of

speech.

This has

established

it as the

collective

mind

and

memory

of society.

To

the extent that

society

is far more

complex

than the

individuals

composing

it,

language

reveals itself as

vastly

more

retentive, flexible, suggestive,

and

dynamic

than

any

individual mind.

In its written form it

has

made

possible

the

operation

of another

great

"law"

of conservation

paralleling

the

universal "law of conservation"

(of

matter and

energy)

which describes the

functioning

of

the

physical

universe. This is

the

"law"

that no

element

of human

experience,

whether real or

"imagined,"

which

has

received

written

linguistic

formulation

is ever

totally

lost.

Language

binds

into

one

vast,

fluid, yet plastic

whole the multitude

of

individual human

experiences.

Accordingly,

as the most

powerful

and

pervasive

influence

in

the social environ-

ment,

its

effect

on the mental

processes

of individual users of

language

is neces-

sarily profound. For, in addition to making possible the primary integration

of the individual into

society-which

is to

say inculcating

him

with a

set of

mental

habits

(i.e.

a

specific psychological

reaction

pattern)

characteristic of

the

language group

to

which he

belongs-language

provides

him with the

most

potent

stimulus

to

creative individual

thinking.

This it does in two

ways.

In

the first

place,

language

activates

("energizes")

the

speaker

as well

as

the

listener; or,

more

generally,

the

"symbolist"

as

well

as the

interpreter

of

symbols.

That is to

say, language

used

in

response

to an external

(e.g. linguistic)

stimulus

or to

an

internal need is

itself

capable

of

exciting

further

mental

(i.e. "linguistic")

or

physical

reactions

which,

in

turn, may

serve

to

continue the

process. Through

inclusion in the sensitive network of language, particular symbols are spon-

taneously

linked with

any

number of related

ideas.

The well known word

game

of

"associations" affords

an

excellent illustration of

this fact.

Accordingly,

the

use of a

readily duplicated symbol,

which

represents

a

distant,

fleeting,

or

van-

ished

experience,

enables the

symbolist

to

recall

it at

will,

and to associate

it

freely

with

other

linguistically

symbolised

elements

of

experience. By providing

a

convenient

stimulus

to

memory, ready

control over the

association of

ideas

through

manipulative

control

over the

signs

which

represent ideas,

and

relative

freedom from

objective

restrictions

to the

associative

flow

of

ideas, language

enables the

linguist

to

initiate, control,

and

develop

imaginary

or

symbolical

experiences

which the world of

physical

events

might

never

yield,

or could never

yield.

In

fact,

this

process

of

creative

imagination

through

the association

of

symbols

in

ideal

or

imaginary

combinations

is

particularly

suited to

147




4/17

STANLEY

GERR

dealing

with

abstract,

complex,

and

derivative

concepts.

It

has,

as

we

shall

see,

extremely important

implications

for

science.

In

the

second

place,

language

enables an

investigator

to utilize the

collective

experience

and

imagination

of the entire social

group

with whose

language

he

happens

to be

familiar. For

language,

and

especially

recorded

language,

besides

presenting

a

host of

integrations

of

individual

experiences

as so

many

"faits

accomplis",

at

the same time

provides

the

means to

effect

such

integrations

of

human

knowledge, experience,

and

imagination

as the interests

or needs of

the

investigator may

require. Language

performs

a

multiple

integration.

Through

the

operation

of

its "law

of

conservation,"

it

enables

one

to

range

through space,

time,

and

the

labyrinths

of

society

in

quest

of

knowledge, guid-

ance,

or

inspiration.

Accordingly,

in

this double

capacity

of

enabling

the individual to

tap

the

unlimited

reservoir

of

past

and

possible

human

experience

for

guidance

in

his

own

activities,

as well as

suggesting

innumerable

permutations,

combinations,

and

recombinations of the elements

of

experience, language

functions

as

the

most

powerful

stimulus to

imagination.

It

exerts

a

decisive influence on the

development

of

any

field of

thought,

and

in

its turn is

strongly

influenced

by

the

evolution

of

the

ideas

and

conceptions

which

helps

to stabilize or

develop.

At

the

same time

it

should

be noted that

language,

through

its almost

unlimited

power

of

suggestion,

can

exercise

a

retarding

as

well

as

a

stimulating

influence

on

the

development

of fields

of

thought.

For unless

speculation (i.e. linguistic

analysis) is based on objectively or experimentally established criteria of rele-

vance and

consistency,

it

is

bound

to

lose

itself,

sooner

or

later,

in

an

uncharted

morass of

infinitely

extensible

linguistic

associations-"sound

and

fury, signify-

ing nothing".

The

persistent, frequently ingenious,

often

profound, yet

finally

ineffectual

attempts

of

classical,

medieval,

and even renaissance

scientists,

philosophers,

and scholars

to

understand

and

explain

the

material universe are

at

once

proof

of

the

great

deal

which

can be

accomplished by

skillful

exploitation

of

purely linguistic methods,

and

warning

of

the

ultimate

futility

of

such

an

approach

if

pursued

"in

vacuo."

Language

reflects the structure and content

of our

thought.

But

it

also

reflects the structure and composition of the world as we conceive it. In this

twofold

capacity

its salient

features

might

be

summed

up

as follows.

It

is

universally applicable,

for

there is

no

conceivable

aspect

of

experience

or

imagina-

tion which

cannot somehow or other

be

dealt with

linguistically.

It is

capable

of

elaborating description

to

any

degree

of

approximation.

It

furnishes

a

complete,

accessible

repository

of

symbols

associated

with all

concepts

and all

relations.

It is

capable

of infinite

accommodation

to

the

infinity

of variable

phenomena presented by

the external

world. It

integrates

and

co-ordinates

the efforts of

all

people working

towards the same

goal.

In

short,

because it is

the most

flexible,

suggestive,

and

adaptable,

as

well as the

only

universal instru-

ment

developed by

man to deal

(however

inadequately)

with the

overwhelming

flux

of natural

events,

in

conjunction

with

systematic

and

controlled

observation,

language

constitutes

the

tool

par

excellence

for the rational

investigation

of

the

148




5/17

LANGUAGE AND

SCIENCE

world

of nature.

"Everything

flows,"

said

Heracleitus,

and

implied:

"How is

it then

possible

to

comprehend

the

universe?"

Language

provides

a

possible

answer:

"By

flowing along

with it

in

thought";

which is to

say, by

making

speech,

or

symbolism

in

general,

as flexible and as

suggestive

as

experience

itself.

Now

ordinary,

everyday

language

is

a

universal

instrument,

applicable

in

some

measure

to all

phenomena,

and

catering

to

every point

of

view.

But

science,

while

interested

in the

totality

of

events,

nevertheless considers

them

from

a

very special point

of

view.

Occupied

with

evolving

a

rational,

mechanis-

tic

conception

of

the

universe,

it is

naturally impelled

to use and

assimilate

chiefly

the rational and factual

elements

already

present

in the

everyday

lan-

guage.

It

disregards

almost

completely

the

enormous

linguistic

residue-

likewise

an

integral part

of the

common

speech-developed

to deal with

all

other

possible

human

approaches

to

the

problems

created

by

man's

struggle

with

his

environment

(e.g. economic,

religious,

esthetic,

etc.),

and fastens

on

that

aspect

of

the

common

language

best

suited

to its

purpose.

At

the same time

it

does

not

entirely

sever its connection with the other

aspects

of

everyday

language

because

in its

initial treatment

of

new and

unexplored

fields

it

requires

the

sug-

gestive

stimulation

of

many

points

of view

for

purposes

of orientation.

In

the

course

of

time,

however,

the

reciprocal

stimulation

of

these two elements

-the rationale

of

the scientific

approach

and the

parallel

rationalisation

of its

linguistic formulation-has led to the development of a peculiar linguistic style

characterised

largely

by

the use

of

an

essentially

"scientific"

or

"functional"

vocabulary.

At

the

same time it has

stimulated the further

development

of

language

along

the

lines of

increasing rationality

and

economy

of

expression.

In an extreme

form this has led

to the

growth

of

symbol systems,

such

as that

of

mathematics, which,

while

linguistic

in

origin,

have

evolved to the

point

where

they

no

longer

find

an

exact

counterpart

in

ordinary speech.

This

type

of

mathematical

or

purely

symbolical

expression

is doubtless

the

final,

logically

perfect

form of rational

linguistic

formulation.

It is

particularly

suited

to

organising,

recording,

and

communicating

a

completed

body

of

knowledge.

But

its universal application to the aggregate of scientific learning is practically-

and

theoretically-impossible,

because

science,

a

"self-catalysing"

or "self-

activating"

process,

can never

be reduced

to

a

completed,

perfect,

and self-

sufficient

body

of

knowledge.

Though particular

branches

of

science

and

technology

have

from

time

to

time

appeared

to be

completely investigated

and

definitively formulated,

this

has

always proved

to be

an illusion.

Periodically

revolutionary

changes

sweep

across the

world of

science,

induced

partly by

the

need

to

assimilate

newly

dis-

covered

facts

incompatible

with old

theories,

and

partly

by

the

achievement

of

a more

"perfect"

(i.e.

more

useful)

formulation

of

the assured

body

of

knowledge.

For

improved

formulation of a

group

of facts or relations

spontaneously

sharpens

and

clarifies

the

investigator's

perception

of

these

facts.

At the

same

time

it

suggests

the

way

in which

they

are to be further tested

in the

laboratory

or

149




6/17

STANLEY GERR

otherwise

employed.

Conversely,

clearer

perception

of

the

facts, resulting

from

successful

experimentation,

both

necessitates and facilitates

a

more

rational

formulation.

Science

progresses by way

of this double

process

of

linguistic

reformulation

(including

mathematical

analysis)

and

systematic

observation.

The

first

points

the

way

for the

second,

and the

latter

remoulds and reconditions

the

former.

As

an

electromagnetic

disturbance

advances

by

the

reciprocal

stimulation of

its

varying

electric and

magnetic fields,

so

science is

urged

on

by

the

reciprocal

action of its

linguistic

and

laboratory analyses.

These

linguistic

analyses

often

take

the form of "ideal" or

"imaginary"

ex-

periments

closely

related to the

"imaginary experiences"

previously

mentioned.

Like

them,

they depend

largely

on the

ability

of

language

to

provide

ready

and

unimpeded

association of

linguistically

symbolised

elements

of

experience,

thereby

turning

to account the wealth of

experience

symbolically

stored

up

in

language.

At

the

same

time

they

are

susceptible

to far

greater

control

and

ease

of

manipulation

than

the

physical

events

they represent.

For these

reasons

such

"imaginary"

experiments

can be

very

radical

in

conception,

and

successful

in

execution. But

where

"imaginary experiences"

can

be

almost

entirely

un-

restricted with

respect

to the association of

experiential

data-as

in dreams-the

"imaginary

experiments"

of

the

scientist,

engineer,

and inventor are

guided

largely

by

the

conditions

and

limitations

imposed by

the

criteria

of

objective

reality.

Used

in

such

circumstances,

language

may

be

said to function

as

an

instrument of conceptual analysis or synthesis.

It is

worth

noting

at

this

point

that

such

"symbolical

solutions" of

physical

problems closely

resemble the

methods

of mathematical

analysis.

For

in this

major

branch of

mathematics,

which

proceeds by

continuously varying

the con-

ditions which

define

a

problem,

so

that at

every step

a

permissible

operation

is

performed,

until

finally

the

configuration

of the

problem

has been

completely

changed

by

a

series

of

irreproachable

transformations

into

a

recognizable

one,

which is to

say

a

solution,

or into a

radically

new

one,

which

is

to

say

a dis-

covery,

we have a

precise analogy

of

the

procedure

followed

in the "ideal

ex-

periments"

under

consideration.

As extremely fruitful examples of such linguistic analyses we may mention

the

development

of the

atomic

hypothesis,

Galileo's

extension

of the

concept

of inertia

to uniform motion

in

a

straight

line,

and

perhaps

the most

brilliant

of

all,

Sadi Carnot's

conception

of

the

ideal

cycle

of

operations

defining

the condi-

tions of

operation

of

any

mechanism

deriving

its

energy

from

a source

of heat.

In

each case

familiar

elements

of

experience

were

subjected

to

"imaginary"

extension or

modification

by

way

of

a

parallel linguistic

manipulation

of

the

symbols

representing

the

physical

entities

in

question.

The

"yield,"

considering

the

slight expenditure

of mental and

physical

energy

in

each

case,

was enormous.

The

first

resulted

in

the

development

of the fundamental

concepts

of

chemistry,

the second became

one

of the

basic laws

of

mechanics,

and the last

gave

rise to

the

second

law of

thermodynamics,

a cornerstone

of modern science.

Even where such

imaginary

experiments prove

to

be

inconclusive,

they point

150




7/17

LANGUAGE AND

SCIENCE

the

way

to

experimental

investigation

of the

circumstances involved

in that

they

provide

the

hypotheses

which

must

precede

and

prepare

the

way

for

purposive

physical

experimentation.

It

is

in

this sense

of

being spurred

on

by

the

spon-

taneous, reciprocal stimulation of both aspects of its twofold approach to the

problems

of

the

physical

world that science

must be

regarded

as

a

"self-activat-

ing"

process.

Paradoxically

enough, then,

science which

does

not believe

in

perpetual

motion

is

itself

"perpetually

in

motion". Science must

evolve.

Accordingly,

it

requires

not

only

an

absolutely precise, purely symbolical language

like

mathematics

to

deal

with

the

more assured fields

of

knowledge,

but

also a

more

flexible

and more

suggestive,

as well as

more "universal"

language

to

keep pace

with its constant

evolution.

This

is

provided

by

what

might

be called the

everyday language of

science

and

technology,

which

is,

in

essence,

no more

than the common

language

with

its

rational

structure and factual

vocabulary

enormously developed.

In

this account we shall

limit

ourselves

to

consideration of this non-mathe-

matical,

functional

language

which

performs

a

triple

function for science:

it

acts as

a

guide

in

the

execution

of

the

"imaginary" experiments

so

vital

to the

progress

of

science;

it

serves as a framework for

rational formulation of

scientific

knowledge;

and it

records

and

communicates the

tentative results

of scientific

procedure.

It is

the

language

in

which

the

bulk

of scientific and technical

literature

is at

present formulated;

nor is it

too much to

say

that it must

always

be an important factor of expression in an evolving science. Moreover, mathe-

matical formulations of

fairly

certain

knowledge

are

themselves

particularly

susceptible

to

significant

revision-a

process

which

often

leads

to

fundamental

modification

of scientific

concepts

and

suggests

fresh

fields

of

experimental

investigation.

These

again require

the

"everyday" language

of

science

for

their

preliminary

investigation.

A

classical

example

of this was Maxwell's

mathe-

matical

analysis

of the

electrical

knowledge

of

his

time,

which

pointed

the

way

to

so

many important experimental

researches

and

industrial

developments.

The three

main

features of our

evolving

scientific

language

are:

1)

increase

in

size and

complexity

of

vocabulary

to

keep pace

with a

growing body of knowledge;

2)

rationalisation of this

vocabulary

through

the

multiplication

of "func-

tional"

or

"operational" terms;

3)

rationalisation of

linguistic

formulation as a

whole

through

progressive

reduction

of

syntactic

complexity

to

the absolute

minimum established

by

the

requirements

of

formal

logical

analysis

and

exposition,

as well as

through

the

extended

use

of

"functional" terms.

In

our

account we

shall

limit

our

consideration

of

the first feature.

Not

only

is

size

of

vocabulary

simply

a

necessary corollary

of the

development

of

any (social) undertaking

which

enlists the

support

of

language;

but also the

many

complex

terms so

frequently

encountered

in

scientific

and technical

literature

illustrate no

more

than

the

ability

of

language

in

general

to

create

compound

names

for

the

representation

of

complex

or derivative

concepts.

151




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STANLEY

GERR

Moreover,

complexity

of

linguistic

formulation

is not

necessarily

an accurate

indication

of

the

degree

of

conceptual (psychological)

unity

achieved,

as witness

the

synonyms

"radio" and

"wireless

telegraphy,"

"subway"

and

"underground

railroad,"

etc.

There are

several

principal

methods of

forming

complex

technical

terms:

crystallisation

of

phrases

and

groups

of words

into fixed

expressions,

as in

"in-

stantaneous

angular

velocity",

"copper

zinc

cell",

"necessary

and sufficient

conditions"

(used

in

mathematics);

creation

of

compound

words,

as "electro-

magnetism", "viscosimeter",

"sulfanilamide";

and

formation

of derivative

terms,

as

"electrification", "polymerise",

"ultraviolet".

But

they

are all

quite

as

characteristic

of

common,

everyday

speech

as

they

are of scientific

language

(cf.

"pot

of

gold", "teaparty", "gratify",

etc.).

Neither

is

the

creation

of tech-

nical terms through the metaphorical association of ideas peculiar to scientific

language

as such. In

technology

we find

expressions

like "crane"

(based

on

a

remote

resemblance

of

the

machine to

a

species

of

long-necked

bird),

the "teeth"

of certain

types

of

gears,

the

"migrations"

of

ions,

the

"feeding"

of

networks,

"weeping"

of

rivets,

"bleeding"

of

boilers,

etc.

But

similar

locutions,

like

"bookworm",

"social

lion",

"mainstay"

(of

a

family),

are

as

commonly

encoun-

tered

in

everyday

speech.

The

essential

characteristics

of scientific

language

are to

be

found

in the

second

and third

features enumerated above-that

is,

in

its

extensive

use

of

"functional"

or

"operational"

names

in

factual

contexts

rationally

formulated.

It is these aspects of "rationality" and "functionality" which particularly

interest us.

The word

"rationality"

is used

here

in two different

though

related

senses.

In

the

first

place,

it is

taken to

mean

that the

data of science

and

technology

are

linguistically

formulated

in accordance with the

precepts

established

by

tradi-

tional

logic

as

proper

to the

method

of

formal

exposition.

Thus

the

broad

distinction

made

in

logic

between

"conditional"

and

"categorical"

propositions

(and

syllogisms)

is also

recognized

in

the

language

of

science.

It is indicated

by

the

presence

of

expressions

like

'if

... then

. . .

",

"since

.

..

therefore

..

",

"when

.

.

.then.

.

.

",

and

"implies, includes,

excludes,

is

equivalent

to,

etc".

(or

their

equivalents

in more abstract scientific

symbol

systems).

In a sense,

too,

this

dichotomy

marks

roughly

the distinction

between

"pure"

and

"ap-

plied"

science. "Pure" science

emphasizes

the

conditional,

"applied"

science

(i.e. engineering

or

technology)

the

categorical

type

of

statement, though

the

distinction

is

by

no means

rigidly

adhered

to.

The

following,

taken

from

Prandtl

and

Tietjens'

Fundamentals

of

Hydro-

and

Aeromechanics,

is

a

good

example

of

a

"pure"

scientific

statement:

"If,

when

a

fluid is at

rest,

the circulation

is

zero for

every

closed

curve,

then

it follows

that

every

motion

developed

in

this

liquid

under

the action

of

an irrotational

field of force has

zero

circulation

along

these

lines." This stands

in

marked

contrast to the

following,

taken from

the same

authors'

Applied

Hydro-

and

Aerodynamics:

"Measurements

have shown

that

the

flow

in the core

is

con-

stant

in

cross sections

only

near

to

the entrance

(where

the

boundary

layer

has

152




9/17

LANGUAGE

AND

SCIENCE

not

yet

become too

thick),

while

for

sections

farther

away

from

it,

the

flow

in

the core has first

a

slight

and later a

more

profound

curvature."

This

formal,

rational

style

of

expression,

common to both

logic

and the

sci-

ences,

fixes the irreducible minimum of

syntactic

complexity

in the

language

of

science

and

technology.

The

syntactic

minimum

is

actually

reached

in

the

mathematical

formulation

of well-established

sciences

like theoretical mechanics

and

electromagnetic

field

theory.

But

even

in

less advanced

fields of

science,

where

the bulk of the text still consists of

ordinary

technical

terms and

expres-

sions rather

than

mathematical

symbols

and

abbreviations,

these

syntactic

"joints"

furnish

the

necessary

indications of the

scientist's

progression

towards

a

rational

linguistic

synthesis

of his

data.

The

typical

scientific

passage

is

an

exercise

in

logical

formulation.

At

the

same

time,

it

is,

perhaps,

worth

noting

that the

intimate

connection between

science and

logic,

which

is indicated on

the

one hand

by

the structural

or

syntactic

identity

of

their

linguistic formulations,

is also reflected

in

the

names

of so

many

sciences

which end

in

"-ology".

It

is

quite

conceivable that

every

science could

be so

named.

As

the

second

meaning

of

"rationality"

has reference

to "functional"

or

"operational"

terms,

its

consideration

will have to

wait till these

have

been

further elucidated.

Accordingly,

we shall

try

to trace

the

development

of

such

expressions,

and

indicate their

significance

for

a

scientific

language.

In its initial

stages,

our

knowledge

of an event

is indefinite

and

incomplete.

It is about

a

vague "something

or

other",

which "does

something

else",

"looks

like this or that", "behaves in such and such a manner", "has this in common

with that but differs

from it in the

following ways",

etc.

Precisely

because

at

this

point experience

is

so

meager

and

understanding

so

rudimentary

we are

forced-by

the

very

inadequacy

of

our

conception-to

reinforce

it with as

many

and as varied

linguistic

props

as we can

muster.

Far-fetched

metaphors,

crude

similes,

and elaborate

descriptions

are

all

utilized

for this

purpose. Pliny,

for

example, speaks

of thunderbolts

as

being

"heavenly

fire

spit

forth

by

the

planet

(Jupiter)

as

crackling

charcoal

flies

from a

burning log";

and

Maxwell,

in

his

famous

paper

"On

Physical

Lines

of

Force,"

asserts

that

"the stress

in

the

axis

of

a line of

magnetic

force is a

tension,

like

that

of

a

rope".

The function of such linguistic artifices is to endow the investigator's first

fragile

conception

of the

phenomenon

under

consideration

with "structural

rigidity".

That

is,

to

enable

it to "stand

up" long

enough

for it

to

become

the

object

of

a

critical

appraisal.

Using

a somewhat

different

metaphor,

we

might

say

that the

early investigator,

seeking

consciously

or

unconsciously

to

identify

and

delimit the

relevant

concepts

and

underlying

conditions

of a

vaguely

apprehended

phenomenon,

begins

by spinning

as

large

a

linguistic

"web" as

he

can

about

it.

He

thereby

"anchors"

(relates)

it, by

every

verbal

means

at his

command,

to

objects, operations,

and

relations

with which

he is

already

more or

less

familiar,

and

which

therefore

appear

to

imbue the

object

of

investigation

with

heightened

rationality, factuality,

and

conceptual clarity-i.e.

"reality."

An

excellent

example

of this

procedure

is

to be found

in

this

same

paper

of

Maxwell's,

where he

develops

his

famous mechanical

model

of

the

electro-

153




10/17

STANLEY GERR

magnetic

ether: "The

contiguous portions

of consecutive

(ether)

vortices

must

be

moving

in

opposite

directions....

The

only conception

which

has at all

aided

me in conceiving this kind of motion is that of the vortices being separated by a

layer

of

particles.

...

In

mechanism,

when

two wheels

are

intended

to

revolve

in

the

same

direction,

a

wheel

is

placed

between

them

so as to

be

in

gear

with

both,

and this

wheel

is

called the 'idle wheel.' The

hypothesis

about

the vortices

which

I

have to

suggest

is

that a

layer

of

particles,

acting

as idle

wheels,

is

inter-

posed

between

each vortex

and

the

next,

so

that each vortex has

a

tendency

to

make

the

neighboring

vortices revolve

in

the same

direction

as

itself."

The

extent and

complexity

of

this

linguistic "scaffolding" help

us to

organize

and

communicate our few

inadequate

and

unrelated

thoughts

about the matter

at

hand.

At

the same time

they

reveal

the utter

insufficiency

of our

early

con-

ception. In this stage, with our scientific analysis still in an "embryonic" state,

our

initial

comprehension

of

an

event

is

developed

in

terms of

the

vague

or

cus-

tomary

concepts

of

everyday

life,

and

expressed

in

the

correspondingly

nebulous

terminology

of the

common, everyday

language.

Here

our terms

are as

yet

hardly

(scientifically)

defined,

and

especially

our substantives must

be

aug-

mented

by

lengthy

descriptions

replete

with

syntactic

complexities.

Syntax,

with its

emphasis

on

elaborate,

independent

verbal

constructions,

is the dominant

feature of the

linguistic

"landscape".

Ernst

Mach,

in

his

book Die Mechanik

in

iher

Entwicklung

cites

the

following

passage

from Aristotle's

Quaestiones

Mechanicae as

typical

of

the

early

stages

of scientific

development:

"What

appears to be miraculous is nevertheless natural enough, though the cause thereof

is not manifest...

Such

is

the

case where the smaller

overpowers

the

larger,

and

smaller

weights

overcome

heavy burdens,

and

indeed

all those

problems

which we

call

'mechanical.' .. .

Those

concerning

the

lever,

which

belongs

to

this class

(of

mechanical

problems),

are difficult

to

conceive.

For

it

appears

to

be

contradictory

that

a

heavy

burden should

be moved

by

a

small

force,

even

when the former

is

attached

to

a

still

larger

weight.

For

whoever

is

unable

to

budge

a

weight,

is

able to move

it

readily

when

he

applies

a

lever

to the

task.

The cause of

all

these

lies

in

the

essential nature

of

the

circle,

which

is

indeed

natural

enough;

for

it is

by

no means

contradictory

that

something

wonderful

should

proceed

from

something

else

quite

wonderful. For

the most wonderful

thing

of all is

the combination

of

contrary

characteristics into

a

unity.

But

the

circle

is

precisely

so

constituted, being

indeed

generated

by

an

element which

moves,

and

another

which remains

rigidly

fixed in

position".

However,

the

steady growth

of

organised,

positive

knowledge

in a

given

field

or

of

a

given

event induces

a

continuous

transformation of the

corresponding

linguistic

formulation.

Simultaneously

with the

emergence

of the

fundamental

physical

entities,

their

transformations and

relations,

and the

operations per-

formed

on or with

them,

as

distinct,

relevant

conceptual units,

a

parallel

linguistic

evolution gives rise to a set of corresponding terms. As the former become con-

tinually

more

specific

with

regard

to

form, function,

and

behaviour,

the latter

constantly

acquire

a

more

specific,

and at the same time more

comprehensive

connotation. For

linguistic

reformulation

and

conceptual

revision

are

simply

154




11/17

LANGUAGE

AND

SCIENCE

correlative

phases

of the same

process

of

assimilating

and

systematizing

a

growing

body

of

knowledge.

The

development

of

a

branch

of

science

or

technology

is thus

seen to

be inti-

mately

connected

with the

development

of

a

suitable

vocabulary.

Only

when

an idea has received

an

adequate

or convenient name

does

it

become

familiar,

capable

of

ready

assimilation

or

development.

The truth

of this

is attested

by

numerous

examples

from

the

history

of

science. For

instance,

in

the

early

stages

of electrical

investigation

the word

"conductivity"

was never

employed

in

discussing

the behaviour

of electrical

conductors.

Rather,

the

complex

though

equivalent

concept

"reciprocal

of

the resistance"

(1/R)

was used instead.

The result

was

almost

complete

neglect

of

the

concept

of

conductivity.

Upon

the

introduction

of the word

into the

electrotechnical

vocabulary, however,

the

corresponding idea received a great impetus to development, so that today it

occupies

a

prominent place

in

electrical

science. On

a

larger

scale

there

is the

example

cited

by

L. Olschki in his

Geschichte

der

Neusprachlichen

Wissen-

schaftlichen

Literatur,

where

it is

pointed

out that

before

the

time

of

the

painter

Albrecht

Duerer,

the

study

of

geometry

was

completely

neglected

in

Germany

because

of the

insufficiency

of

the

German

vocabulary

in

this

respect,

notwithstanding

that

Germany

was

at that time one of the most active centers

for

the

study

of arithmetic and

algebra.

"Only

after

Duerer

was

able,

not

without

considerable

difficulty,

to

coin

German

expressions

for the

concepts

of

geometry,"

says

E.

Wuester,

citing

the same

source

in

his

Internationale

Sprachnormungin der Technik, "was it possible to include the study of geom-

etry

in the

mathematical

curriculum

of the

German schools."

As

we

have

already

seen,

a

complete parallelism

marks the

progress

of

science

along

the double

path

it

pursues. Linguistically,

the

advance

is

signalised by

progressive

rationalisation

of

the formulation

of

scientific

knowledge.

The

course

of this

rationalisation

leads

naturally

to an

extensive

use of

the "func-

tional"

or

"operational"

terms

previously

mentioned.

To

see

why

this

must

be

the

case,

we

shall

have

to

consider

briefly

some

of the

ontological

postulates

implicit

in the scientific

analysis

of the

physical

world.

The

scientist,

we have

said,

is

concerned

with

evolving

a

rational,

mechanistic

conception

of the material universe.

Necessarily,

then,

a cardinal article of his

"faith" must be

that

the

physical

world is so

constituted

as to be

capable

of re-

ceiving

such

an

interpretation.

This

constitutes

his

"philosophical

plane

of

polarisation".

The world

may actually

be

constituted

as

a

mechanical

system.

Or the

"rationality"

of the world

may

be

due,

simply,

to

an

inherent

rationality

of the

human

mind itself which

constantly

impells

the scientist to

recognise

the

same

quality

in

the world

of

nature,

so that he

might

be said

to

impress

the

rational

aspect

of

his

own

personality

on the material

universe.

In

either

case,

however,

the fundamental

"prejudice"

of the

scientist-the conviction

which

"polarises"

all

his

activity

as

scientist,

and

which

he cannot surrender without

giving

up

the

pursuit

of science

altogether-is

that the world

and its

workings

constitute

a

rational,

mechanical

system,

the

proper

comprehension

of which

requires

a

rational,

mechanistic

approach.

155




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STANLEY GERR

The

fundamental

characteristic of such

a

mechanical universe is that its

transformations and

processes

take

place

in

compliance

with the criteria of

ra-

tional laws.

That

is,

the

manner of its

functioning

is a

consistent

process

necessarily

indicative

of an

underlying

structural

pattern.

A

given

physico-

chemical

structure is thus assumed

to

imply

and to

be revealed

by

a

specific

type

of

"behaviour";

a

specific

structural

design

to

imply

a

fixed

manner

of

functioning

or

reacting

to

physico-chemical

influences.

In

all the

activity

of

the

scientist

as

scientist there is

implicit

the

dictum that

in

a

physical system

a

given

structural

pattern

is

invariably

associated with a

fixed reaction

pattern

("cause"

and "effect"

in an

earlier scientific

vocabulary).

In a

sense the whole endeavour of

science

can

be

interpreted

as

an

effort to

verify

this

fundamental

assumption

of a

rational,

mechanistic

universe.

Ac-

cordingly, the work of the scientist may be conceived as that of discovering the

basic

reaction-patterns

of

material

systems,

correlating

them

with

the structural

patterns

invariably

associated with

them,

and

formulating

this

knowledge

(i.e.

organising

it

linguistically) by

means

of

the smallest

number

of

independent

concepts

(symbols) necessary

and sufficient

for their

explanation.

In

the

last

analysis,

then,

science

tends

to

identify

structure

with

behaviour,

form

with

function,

and

finally,

matter with

energy

(energy

the

"mode

of

reac-

tion"

of

matter). Moreover,

the same basic

postulate

of invariant relation

between structural

design

and

fixed,

correlative reaction

pattern

is

likewise

implicit

in

the

application

of scientific

knowledge

to the

design

and

fabrication

of experimental apparatus and engineering structures. Accordingly, when

science

and

technology

have reached an

advanced

stage

of

development,

we find

that

the constant

application

of

this

point

of view

has resulted

in the evolution

of a

corollary

which

may

be

formulated as follows:

an

operation

is

acceptable

to

technological

science

only

when

a

device

(tool,

mechanism,

instrument,

ap-

paratus)

exists

for

carrying

it

out,

and a

process

or

physical property

only

when

it can

be

measured;

which

is

to

say,

only

when

a

device

exists

for measuring

it.

The

operation

and its mechanical

means of

realisation,

and the

process

and

its

means

of

measurement

are conceived to be

"scientifically"

or

"technologi-

cally"

identical.

A

tool,

which is to

say any

instrument

in

the

broadest

sense

of the

word,

is thus

equivalent

to or identical with its

particular function,

and

an

experimental

set-up

to a

particular process

or

property.

From this

point

of

view,

no

operation

can

be

conceived

apart

from the

mechanism

with which

it

is

executed,

and no

physical

or

chemical characteristic

can be

separated

from the

type

of

apparatus by

means

of

which it

is measured.

This

attitude

has

a

profound

effect

on the

language

of

science

and

technology.

Inevitably,

the

tendency

to

identify things

and

their

functions-that

is,

to con-

ceive

things

"dynamically",

or "in

operation"-gives

rise

to

the

corresponding

tendency

to

consider

the

names

of

things

as

being

indicative

at

the

same

time

of

their

manner

of functioning,

and

the names

of properties

and

processes

as

symbolical

of

the

apparatus

used to

detect or

produce

them.

So to the

expert

the

term

"milling"

must

conjure

up

an

image

of a

"milling

machine"

in

opera-

tion,

for it

is

hardly

possible

to form an

accurate or

even

adequate

conception

of

156




13/17

LANGUAGE AND SCIENCE

the

process

except

in

terms

of

the

corresponding

mechanism.

Again,

the

use

of

a

word like

"turn"

to

describe

the

operation

or function

of a

lathe

will,

in

time

to

come,

be

felt to

be too

vague,

perhaps

even

contradictory,

for

expert

use.

The word "lathe" itself will be regarded as the proper name of either the machine

or the work it

performs. Similarly,

a

shovel

"shovels,"

a

plough "ploughs,"

a

mould

"moulds,"

and a saw

"saws."

In

mathematics

it is not

necessary

to

"find" a

derivative or

integral;

one

simply

"differentiates"

or

"integrates".

Take,

again, processes

like

electric or

magnetic

induction,

optical dispersion,

mechanical

acceleration, etc.,

and

properties

like

inductance, capacitance,

and

resistance

in

electricity.

The

same

tendency

operates

to make these names

indicative

not

only

of the

process

or attribute

in

question,

but

also of its

measure-

ment,

and even

of

the

object

characterised

by

possession

of the

property

in

question.

For

example,

in

electricity,

words

like

"inductance", "capacitance",

and

"resistance" refer

equally

to

the

attribute,

to its

measurement,

or to the

coils,

condensers,

and rheostats

which

introduce

these

factors into

electrical

circuits.

In

general,

it

is

possible

to

express

ideas

more

accurately

and more

precisely

by

means

of substantives than

by

means

of

verbs.

The former

can

more

readily

refer

to concrete

objects

which are

capable

of

closer

and more fruitful examination

than

the

vague

and abstract

changes symbolised

by purely

verbal forms.

In

its

later

stages,

when

it is felt

that

a

particular

field

of

knowledge

has been

sufficiently developed

and

adequately

formulated

to

form

part

of

the

body

of

technological

science,

we

find

that the

terminology

used

to

deal

with it

com-

prises many of these "functional" substantives or substantival constructs. At

the

same

time that these

possess very specific

nominal

reference, they

are

also

capable

of

indicating

or

suggesting

equally

specific

verbal

significance.

Ac-

cordingly,

at

this level

of

development,

where

a

physico-chemical

or mechanical

process,

property,

or

operation

is most

adequately

conceived and

formulated

in

terms

of

the

apparatus

or device

by

means

of

which

it

is

realised,

detected,

or

produced,

language

has

gone

far towards

becoming

a

"functional

symbol

sys-

tem".

That

is

to

say,

the

significant words,

the names of

things

and

processes

pertinent

to

the

field

in

question,

now

serve

to

symbolise "things

in

operation",

or

"things

as

they

function".

It is perhaps even conceivable that the language of science and technology

might

ultimately

dispense

with all verbal forms

except

a

general

"operator"

symbol

which would serve

to

set

any

substantive

(i.e.

"mechanism")

in

motion.

This would resemble

the

English

use of several

Greek

and

Latin

suffixes for

a

similar

purpose;

cf.

words like

"liquefy", "solidify",

"macadamise", "symbolise",

etc.

It would bear

a

still

closer resemblance to

the

Japanese technique

of

suffixing

the

verb

"suru"

("to make",

"to

do")

to

Chinese

nouns

for the

purpose

of

verbalising

them. But

the best

analogy

of

this

is, perhaps,

the

example

af-

forded

by

motion

pictures,

where

a;single, elementary

operation,

that

of

unwind-

ing

the

film

before

a

projector,

which

is to

say

setting

it

in

simple,

linear

motion,

is sufficient to "release" or "realise" an

infinity

of

dynamic changes,

processes,

functions, operations,

attributes

and activities

implicit

in

the "substantival"

or

static

film.

157




14/17

STANLEY

GERR

In the

final

stages

of this

development,

then,

we

arrive

at

the

conception

of a

scientific

language

in

which

vocabulary,

in

the form

of a

sort of

generalised

"functional"

or

"operational" substantive,

almost

completely

usurps

the

early

function of

syntactic

elaboration in

expanding

and

specifying

the

meaning

of

terms. Here

the

"functional"

or

"operational" significance

of

a

material

entity,

ordinarily expressed by

means

of

a

separate

verb

form,

is subsumed

in

the name

of

the

thing

itself.

Thus

a

single symbol

(term)

connotes "the

thing

as

it

func-

tions",

and,

by

immediate

inference,

"the

thing"

and "its

function(s)".

The

mention of the name of a

mechanism

or

apparatus

is tantamount

to

naming

its

function,

or manner of

operating.

Things

are

conceived

operationally,

and

language

responds

by

charging

its

symbols

with

added

significance

till

they, too,

become

"functional".

The

final

impression

of

the

scientific

language

now

outlined

is that

of

an in-

strument

particularly

suited to the rational formulation of scientific

knowledge

in a

precise

and

efficient manner.

This is

largely

the

result of an

extensive use

of

"functional"

terms in

rationally

constructed

syntactic

formulations.

By

making every

noun a

possible

"verbal

metaphor",

the

scientist makes

verbal

connotation

dependent

upon

nominal

bases

which

have much

more

specific

and

dependable

objective

reference.

Accordingly,

through

the

coalescence

of

verbal

and nominal

significance

in

a

single

basic

symbol,

he causes each

aspect

of the

universe

he deals

with to

support

the

other,

and

thereby materially improves

the

expression

of

both.

The

verb,

which

expresses

the

functioning

or

operation

(the "work significance") of a physical or mechanical system, overcomes its

customary vagueness by borrowing

the concreteness of the noun from which it

is

derived;

the

latter,

indicative

of

the structure

or

composition

of the

mechanism

or

system

in

question,

overcomes its "lifeless"

rigidity

by

borrowing

the

dynamic

flexibility

of the

associated

verbal

connotation.

At the same

time

that

it

greatly

enhances the

accuracy, convenience,

and

precision

of technical

language,

the

use of these functional terms

represents

a

great

saving

in

the

amount

of

labor

expended

on

the

linguistic

formulation of

scientific

knowledge.

This

constitutes

the

second

aspect

of

rationality

or econ-

omy

of

expression

in

the scientist's

language

to

which we have

already

referred.

Thus he rejoices in a double rationalisation of his language tool; rationalisation

of

expression

as a

whole

through

the

employment

of

logical

syntactic

formula-

tion,

and

rationalisation

of individual

expressions through

the use of functional

terms.

This

conception

of a

rational,

functional

language

is at the same

time a

constant

remainder of

the fundamental

scientific

assumption

of a

rational,

mechanistic

universe.

Strangely enough,

the

Indo-European

languages,

in

which the

bulk of

scientific

and technical

work

has

been

recorded,

are not

as

well

adapted

in

some

important

respects

to

the needs of scientific

language

work

as

others which

are far

less

im-

portant

in

the actual

history

of

science

and

technology.

For

example,

in the

matter of a

functional

vocabulary

they

are far

inferior to the Semitic

languages,

in which an

underlying

language-pattern

causes one to see

a

noun

in

every

verb,

and a

verb

in

every

noun.

They

are still further behind the

remarkable written

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15/17

LANGUAGE AND SCIENCE

language

of the

Chinese

in

both

aspects

of

language

rationalisation.

It

should

be

noted, however,

that

English,

which has the

best

developed

scientific and

technical

vocabulary

among

the

European

languages,

is

in

the

process

of de-

veloping

the use of functional terms to a noticeable

degree.

For

example,

in

addition to

many

instances of

functional

terms found in

the scientific

vocabulary,

isolated instances of such

"generalised"

names

occur

also in

everyday English:

e.g.

"to

water"

flowers, cattle,

etc.,

to

"ship"

goods,

"hammer"

nails,

"button"

clothes,

"star" as an

actress,

and

so

on,

though

these, too,

would

appear

to be

more

or

less "technical" terms.

Remarkably

enough, English

also reveals

a

strong tendency

in

its

development

to

approximate

to

the

type

of

language

struc-

ture

represented

by

Chinese.

But

Chinese has carried the

process

of

rational,

functional

symbolisation

to a

far

greater degree

of

completion than any other language;

for in it

almost any

word

(i.e.

Chinese

character) may acquire

verbal or "functional"

significance,

depending

largely

on

context

and its

position

in

the sentence.

This

applies

not

only

to

substantives,

but also to words

ordinarily

used

as

adjectives, adverbs,

etc.;

and

not

only

to

scientific and technical

language,

but

equally

to

the vocabu-

lary

of

every

day speech

For

example,

Lao Tze

says:

"The

good,

I

good

them;

the

bad,

I

also

good

them".

That is:

"I

return

good

for

good;

but

I

also return

good

for

evil". Or

again:

"The

beginning foundations,"

meaning

"the

beginning

is

the foundation

of

what

follows";

"the ten thousand families

enemy

me", meaning

"all the 'clans' are hostile towards

me",

etc. Chinese

names (substantives) are conceived "in action". They signify not only what a

thing is,

but also what it

does,

and how it

behaves.

In

this

respect,

as well

as

in

respect

of

the

amazing economy

of

expression

it has

achieved,

Chinese

must

be

acknowledged

to rank

very

high

as

a

scientific

language.

At

the

same

time,

the

fact

that

it

makes extensive

use of a functional

vocabulary

which

is

sym-

bolised

(recorded) by

means

of

an

ideographic

written

system

whose

syntax

has

been

pared

down to a

"logical

minimum",

makes

it

possible

to

conceive

written

Chinese

as

a

sort

of

crude

but universal

"mathematics", standing

somewhere

between

ordinary

language

and

mathematics

as

regards

structure

and function.

In

fact,

failure to

appreciate

this

aspect

of Chinese

has resulted in an

entirely

inadequate conception of the language and its potentialities. It is even quite

possible

that Chinese

might

provide

the

same

stimulus to theoretical

language

studies

that Sanscrit furnished

European

scholars

a

century

and

more

ago;

indeed,

perhaps

a much

more

powerful

and

suggestive

force

than Sanscrit

since

it

represents

a

much

more

radical

departure

from the

customary European

concept

of

language.

Remarkably

enough,

a

pervading

obscurity

and uncer-

tainty

in

the

language,

which

seriously

curtail its

use as

a

scientific

language,

appear,

nevertheless,

to

spring

from

its

greatest

virtues: rational

economy

of

expression,

and the

almost universal

use of "functional"

terms.

As for

Japanese,

it is

in

the

unique

position

of

having incorporated

the

whole

vocabulary

of

an

entirely

unrelated

language

(Chinese)

into

its

own without

modifying

its

underlying grammatical

pattern

in

any important

respects.

Its

vocabulary

has

thereby

been

made

highly

functional.

But

the

hopeless

com-

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16/17

STANLEY

GERR

plexity

of

its

syntax

appears

to

render it

incapable

of

achieving

a

rational

linguistic

formulation

of

scientific

knowledge

in

the

sense

of

convenient

and

economical

exposition

based

on

the

reduction of

syntactic

elaboration to

a

logical

minimum. Both Chinese and

Japanese

also suffer

greatly

from the needless

complexity

of their

systems

of

writing,

though

the use of

ideographic

symbols

is

certainly

in

agreement

with

the

spirit

of

scientific formulation.

This

last

point

deserves elaboration. For it is

surely

one

of the most extraor-

dinary

things

in

modern

science

that in

the search

for a

concise, accurate,

econom-

ical and "universal"

formulation it has

reverted

to the

use of the same

type

of

symbol system

that

the Chinese

evolved several

thousand

years

ago.

In

organic

chemistry,

in

electrical and

radio

engineering, surveying,

in

fact,

in

practically

every

branch of science and

technology

there

is in use

an

important

and

growing

system of ideographic symbols whose origin and function is quite similar to the

origin

and use of the

system

of

Sino-Japanese

characters.

Thus

pictographs

like the

benzene

hexagon

j_

used

in

chemistry,

the

many

electrical

and

radio

circuit

symbols

like

(

for a

triode

(vacuum tube),

-0--

for

an

oil

circuit

breaker,

-1-

for a

battery,

many

symbols

used

in

mathematics,

engineering,

as

highway signs,

etc.-all these are

ideograms entirely analogous

in

many

im-

portant

respects

to the

Chinese

characters. The

great question

is

whether

they

will

undergo

an

evolution similar

to that of

the

Chinese

characters,

so

that in time

they

may

come to form the

basis

of a

complete

scientific

script

manipulated

with

the

help

of a

simplified "grammatical" system

in

very

much

the

same

way

as is now done with the characters.

I

believe it is

safe to assert

that this

will

happen;

in

fact,

it

is

already happening,

as

a

search

of

the literature

will show

that

these modern

scientific

"characters" are

frequently

used

as

nouns,

and

occasionally

even

as

verbs-though

quite

unconsciously,

so far as

the

technologists

are

concerned

SUMMARY

A

dynamic, reciprocally

stimulating

relation subsists

between

an

idea

and

its

linguistic formulation; on a larger scale, between physical science and its special

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