GAF 4255216 Proposal Edit

7/29/2019 GAF 4255216 Proposal Edit

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Doctoral Dissertation ProposalEssays on Tenure Security in Indian Slums

Exploring the Interplay of Tenure Formalization, Tenure Security,and Housing Investment in Indian Slums

Politics of Formalizing Slums:A Case of Slum Notification in Pune, India

Measuring Tenure Security and its Link to Housing Investment in Slum in Pune, India:A Structural Equation Modeling Approach

February 2013

IntroductionIn rapidly urbanizing developing countries, it is imperative to improve the

living conditions of the urban poor in settlements with substandard housing andinfrastructure, or slums.1 Recent discussions among academics and professionalsemphasize the importance of enhancing the tenure security of slum dwellers in stimulating their investment in their houses and living facilities, which ultimately leads to poverty alleviation (Durand-Lasserve & Royston, 2002; Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2009; Payne, 2002; UN-Habitat, 2008). Integrating their informal ten

ure status into formal systemswhich is often referred to as tenure formalizationor regularization2has been becoming a common practice to achieve the objective.Although a growing number of empirical studies attempt to assess the impact

s of tenure formalization policies on the improvement of tenure security and physical environment in various parts of the developing world, they face a problemregarding the conceptualization of tenure security (Arnot, Luckert, & Boxall, 2011; Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2009; UN-Habitat, 2003a, 2011; van Gelder, 2010). In the literature, tenure security is by and large associated with the degree ofprotection against the risk of forcible eviction faced by slum dwellers. Households with weak tenure security have few reliable resorts to claim their possession of their housing or occupancy on the land against others and face the threat of the demolition of their houses and involuntary displacement without due compensation. However, due to the lack of solid theoretical background, researchers ha

ve had difficulty of operationalizing the concept for empirical studies, as vanGelder (2010, p.452) states that [t]he indiscriminate use of the different elements of tenure security and the confusion it generates easily leads to detrimentalconsequences of theory building and policy making.

In India, some states have implemented slum notification, which is a type of tenure formalization policy that provides certain level of property rights toslum dwellers in order to protect them (Banerjee, 2002; Risbud, 2009; Sharma & Barman, 2006). Slum settlements that are notified by local government agencies are called notified slums, while other slums are referred to as non-notified slums. The rules about how to select slum settlements to be notified vary from place


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to place. Households in notified slums are supposed to be legally protected fromeviction without due process for a certain period and entitled to infrastructure and urban services provided by local municipalities. Available data sources indicate that living conditions in notified slums are overall better than non-notified slums (Edelman & Mitra, 2006; NSSO, 2010a), though it is not clear to whatextent and how slum notification has contributed to the difference.

In fact, a body of literature questions the idea that tenure formalizationenhances tenure security of slum households and thereby stimulates their investment in housing. Some argue that it is not land tenure statusformal or informalbutthe perception about the risk of forcible eviction that influences housing investment by slum households (Gilbert, 2002; Payne, 2001; Varley, 1987). The urban poor might actively invest in their housing in order to increase their security when they faced the risk of eviction (Razzaz, 1993). Others point out the cases in which tenure formalization policies have brought negative impacts on the tenure security of the urban poor (Banerjee, 2007; Davis, 2006; Gilbert, 2002; Payne,Durand-Lasserve, & Rakodi, 2009; Woodruff, 2001). In Indian context, it is reported that tenure formalization is arbitrary manipulated by local bureaucrats andpoliticians as a political tool (Risbud, 2009; Roy, 2009a; Zimmer, 2012).

Against the backdrop presented above, the purpose of the proposed researchwill be to better understand what contributes to tenure security of slum households and thereby support their housing investment. Specifically, my interest is in to what extent and how slum notification has contributed to the improvement ofthe tenure security of slum households and their living conditions in India. Drawing on theoretical and empirical literature on informal settlements in urban p

lanning, development economics, and human geography, I will conceptualize and operationalize tenure security by specifying its links to determinants and outcomes. Based on the theoretical framework, I will address the following research questions: (1) How has slum notification been implemented in Indian cities?; (2) What has contributed to tenure security of households in slums? In particular, towhat extent and how has slum notification improved their tenure security?; and 3) To what extent is tenure security related to the frequency, timing, and amountof housing investment by slum households? In particular, to what extent and howhas slum notification improved housing and access to infrastructure and services in India?

My project will address the overarching research questions via a series ofthree independent studies(1) a nation-wide cross-sectional study, (2) a city-widequalitative study, and (3) a city-wide quantitative study, capitalizing on diffe

rent data and methods. While the first phase study will attempt to capture nation-wide trend, the second and third phase studies will focus on Pune, an Indian city, to take into account the local context.

Phase I: Nation-wide cross-sectional studyThe first-phase study will aim to develop a theoretical framework of the in

terplay of tenure security, housing investment, and tenure formalization, and apply it to the Indian context. I will explore how the determinants and outcomes of tenure securitysuch as slum notification, duration of residence, possession ofdocument, housing investment, and access to infrastructure and servicesare interrelated across Indian slums, using large-size sample data that cover the entire nation. Specifically, the study will statistically test the hypothesis that households in notified slums have invested in their houses more than other households

in non-notified slums, with their characteristics controlled. Underlying idea is that slum notification has enhanced tenure security of slum households and thereby encouraged their investment in housing. The data for this study will be National Sample Survey (NSS) 58th and 65th rounds housing condition survey unit data, which contain detailed information about 5,818 and 7,510 households living inslums as of 2002-03 and 2008-09 across India, respectively. The study will useOLS and logit models weighted with propensity scores to deal with selection bias.

Phase II: Qualitative study in Pune


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The second-phase study will be exploratory, rather than hypothesis testing,aiming to understand the local context of Pune. This qualitative study will bemotivated by the following questions: how has the local government determined settlements to be notified in Pune? (or, what kinds of settlements have been notified? ); how have slum dwellers negotiated with local bureaucrats or politiciansto secure their tenure?; and what, including slum notification, has possibly influenced the tenure security of slum dwellers? (in other words, what kinds of households have been forcibly evicted?). In this phase, data collection and analysis (via interviews, document analysis, and site observations) will proceed simultaneously. During the planned fieldwork from June 2013 to August 2013, I will interview at least 25 households in at least slum settlements in Pune, as well as local bureaucrats, politicians, academic and professional experts. Based on the insight from this stage, I will determine the items to be included in the surveyform for the subsequent statistical analysis.

Phase III: City-wide quantitative study in PuneFinally, I will conduct a quantitative study to address the second and thir

d sets of the research questions. During the planned fieldwork from October 2013to December 2013, I will collect surveys from 1,000 households in 50 slums across Pune. To measure the degree of tenure security, which embraces legal, de facto, and perception elements, from its link with determinants and outcomes, I willemploy a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model, a type of structural equation modeling (SEM). I will expand the measurement models introduced in Section 2.3 by incorporating multi-level aspects of tenure security. To deal with

selection bias, I will use propensity score matching. To calculate the probability of households living in notified slums, I will draw on insights from the second-phase study.

My project will bring about theoretical, methodological, and policy contributions. Theoretically, my project will present how to conceptualize and operationalize tenure security in informal settlements and its interplay with physical outcomes and tenure formalization. This will provide a solid theoretical background of tenure security, lack of which has been long recognized as problematic among researchers in urban planning and development economics. In addition, my project will widen the scope of theory by shed light on slum notification and Pune,which have been understudied in previous studies. Methodologically, the projectwill demonstrate the effectiveness of mixed-methods and SEM approaches in measur

ing tenure security. Many of the previous qualitative works that explored tenuresecurity of slum dwellers are confined to be descriptive, and systematically investigated evidence has been relatively rare. For quantitative studies, experimental design was touted as a powerful tool for causal inference, yet its practicality is severely limited in studies about urban slums. It will be important to show the advantage of mixed-methods approach that taps into both qualitative andquantitative analyses and SEM approach that has never been used in measuring tenure security of slum households. The project will benefit policy makers in Indiawho are involved in land and housing policies for the urban poor. In particular, given the current situation, in which the central government has been preparing to offer property rights to slum dwellers (Government of India, 2010, 2011), analyzing the effect of slum notification will be critically important. Improvedunderstanding how slum dwellers survive under the current informal settings and

how tenure arrangement would impact their environment can help to ensure the more efficient and effective implementation of this and other tenure regularizationinitiatives.

The remainder of this proposal is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I develop a theoretical framework that will overarch my entire project. Reviewing relevant literature, I conceptualize tenure security (Section 2.1), specify the link between tenure security, housing investment, and formalized tenure (Section 2.2), and operationalize tenure security by proposing measurement models (Section2.3). In Chapter 3, with the above theoretical framework in mind, I explore theIndian context. I review statistics to investigate the trend of slum formation


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in India and compare living conditions in non-notified and notified slums (Section 3.1). I conduct a preliminary analysis to test if the theoretical model can be applied to the Indian context (Section 3.2). I will elaborate on the analysisin my first-phase paper. Then, I review literature on two opposing forces prevailing in Indian metropolises, which critically influences tenure security of slumdwellers (Section 3.3). Chapter 4 presents overarching research questions (Section 4.1), explains the research design of three-phase project (Section 4.2), andintroduces the regional settings of its research site (Section 4.3). In Chapter5 clarify the contributions that my project will bring about. Finally, I will provide detailed descriptions of the three studies in my project in Chapter 6.

Theoretical FrameworkIn this chapter, I develop a theoretical framework that will overarch my en

tire research project by reviewing relevant literature. In Section 2.1, I conceptualize tenure security by introducing the following three key issues: 1) tenuresecurity embodies three elementslegal, de facto, and perceived tenure securities; 2) tenure security is a concept with a continuum, rather than the dichotomy ofsecure/insecure; and 3) tenure security embraces individual and collective aspects. In Section 2.2, I investigate the interplay of households tenure security, physical environment (i.e., housing and infrastructure/services), and formalizedtenure in slums. In Section 2.3, I propose how to operationalize, or measure, the degree of tenure security of households in slums in a Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) framework.

Conceptualization of Tenure SecurityIn planning literature, tenure security is by and large associated with the

degree of protection against forcible eviction without due process and compensation. For example, the United Nations defines tenure security as follows (UN-Habitat, 2008, p. 5):

the degree of confidence that land users will not be arbitrarily deprived of the rights they enjoy over land and the economic benefits that flow from it;the certainty that an individuals rights to land will be recognized by others and protected in cases of specific challenges; or, more specifically;the right of all individuals and groups to effective government protection against forced evictions.

The definitions above reflect important underpinning ideas about the nature of tenure security. First, tenure security is a multifaceted concept, embracing legal, de facto, and perceived aspects. The definitions above conceptualize tenure security as the degree of confidence, the certainty, or the rights, which correspond to perceived, de facto, and legal tenure securities, respectively.3 Second,tenure security is not a dichotomous concept with secure or insecure, but a concept with a continuum, ranging from low to high security. Thus, it is a criticaltask to appropriately measure the varying degree of tenure security of slum households with different characteristics. Third, tenure security of individuals andtheir communities can be distinguished, though they may be complicatedly intertwined. I explain these three features of tenure security one by one in the remainder of this section.

Three Aspects of Tenure SecuritySome literature distinguishes de jure and de facto tenure securities, and i

ncludes the aspect of perceived security in the latter (for example, Payne 2001). However, as I will discuss later on, conceptualizing de facto and perceived tenure securities separately is useful for several reasons. Thus, I follow van Gelder's (2010) classification, which makes clear distinctions among legal, de facto, and perceived tenure securities.

Legal tenure security


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Legal tenure security, or de jure tenure security, is established based onlegal protection, including various types of property rights authorized by governments or any other public authorities. Households with legal tenure security are able to claim their possession of properties or occupancy against others in case of conflicts or litigations. The degree of legal tenure security depends on the types of property/land rights conferred to households, such as the rights tooccupy, develop, inherit, sublet, transfer, and mortgage. Various studies have investigated the links between the level of tenure security and the types of landtenure with different bundles of property rights (Aristizabal & Gomez, 2004; Kundu, 2004; Porio & Crisol, 2004).

De facto tenure securityDe facto tenure security represents the degree of householdsactual control o

f property, regardless of the legal status in which it is held (van Gelder, 2010,p. 451). Households with de facto tenure security face less threat of evictionfor whatever reasons other than legal protection. The factors enhancing de factotenure security listed by key literature include the following: the size of settlements (the larger the settlement, the more difficult demolition is), the cohesion of communities (the more cohesive the community is, the more influential their collective action is), political support (leading to favorable arrangementsof the household/settlement), and the access to infrastructure and services (increasing legitimacy of the household/settlement). (Durand-Lasserve, 2006; Gilbert, 2002; Payne, 2001; van Gelder, 2010). Since de facto tenure security depends to a large degree on the local context, there could be a variety of other factors

influencing it.

Perceived tenure securityPerceived tenure security indicates the risk of eviction estimated or felt

by households. Households with perceived tenure security might estimate their risk of eviction low or feel little fear against it.4 Various factors might influence households perceived tenure security, including the history of eviction experienced by their own or their neighbors or relatives, their trust in governments, and/or their personalities. In addition, households perception about their tenure security may be influenced by their legal and de facto tenure security.

Tenure Security as a ContinuumBecause tenure security is a continuum, each of its three elements range fr

om low to high security, and the three elements constitute the overall level oftenure security of a household. The level of a households legal tenure security varies depending on what kinds of property rights he/she enjoys. It is not appropriate to simply regard that households with legal titles are secure and those without titles insecure. Similarly, households enjoy varying degree of de facto and perceived tenure securities.

Although households legal, de facto, and perceived tenure securities would be positively correlated, the three types of tenure security enjoyed by slum dwellers do not necessarily correspond, as argued by van Gelder (2010). In an idealsituation, three types of tenure security would converge; that is, households who are legally protected perceive no risk of eviction and actually have not facedany threat of eviction for a long period. In reality, however, there is often adiscrepancy among the levels of the three types of tenure security in slums. Fo

r example, if the enforcement of property rights is not reliable, de facto tenure security must be low for the households with full property rights. Or, households who do not trust in governments might not feel secure, no matter what kindsof legal protection they receive.

A substantive imbalance among the degree of legal, de facto, and perceivedtenure security might lower the overall level of tenure security. Payne (2001, p. 423) points out the possibility that poor households who are suddenly entitledfull property rights might face high risk of eviction due to downward raiding, meaning the movement of affluent households or private capital into the area.


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Individual and Collective SecurityOne needs to distinguish individual-level tenure security and community-lev

el tenure security. In terms of legal tenure security, a growing body of literature discusses the effectiveness of collective land rights in enhancing tenure security of the urban poor. For example, the Baan Mankong program in Bangkok provides land titles to communities in order to strengthen personal, social, and economic ties among the community members and protect them from gentrification afterupgradation (Archer, 2012; Boonyabancha, 2005, 2009). Measuring the legal tenure security of households in such communities based on individual legal rights might result in underestimation.

Decomposing tenure security into household and community levels is also important when examining the influence of household-level and community-level factors. This is because the effect of household-level factors may significantly varyamong communities. Previous quantitative studies have paid attention to tenuresecurity of either households or communities, but not to their interaction. Letus consider the influence of belonging to socially disadvantage groups (e.g., scheduled caste in India) on tenure security of households. Such an attribute might be, on average, associated with lower tenure security. However, comparing a settlement where only a few households are scheduled caste and another settlementwhere a majority of households are the scheduled caste, one may find that households in the latter settlement might enjoy higher security than expected becausethey can collectively negotiate with local bureaucrats or politicians.

Figure 1 graphically illustrates the case above. On the plots, the verticalaxis represents the level of tenure security, the horizontal axis represents an

y household-level factor that has a continuum, (let us say monthly income), andcircles and triangles indicate households. Comparing communities A and B, one can observe the positive linear relationship between the level of tenure securityand household income. In this case, the effect of the household-level attributeon tenure security in both communities is identical as indicated by the same slope of the trend lines. When all the other household-level characteristics are held equal, the gap in the level of tenure security between communities A and B (or the gap in the intercepts) stems from community-level characteristics. By contrast, the effects of the household-level attribute vary between community C andD, as indicated by the different slopes of the trend lines in the plot on the right-hand side. In addition, the plots illustrate that estimating the effects ofhousehold-level factors for tenure security without taking account of communities would result in a wrong conclusion (for example, one would see no trend if mix

ing up households in communities A and B). The third-phase study in my project will use a multilevel model to deal with these issues.

Figure 1. Household-level and community-level variances of tenure security.

Interplay of Tenure Formalization, Tenure Security, and Physical ImprovementEnhancing tenure security of vulnerable slum households itself is an importa

nt policy goal from human rights perspectives. In planning, however, the primaryinterest in tenure security is often in its role in facilitating physical consolidation in slums. In this section, I first review literature that theorizes howhouseholds determine whether to invest in their housing and other living facili

ties. Then, drawing on a variety of literature in urban planning and developmenteconomics, I discuss the potential roles of tenure security in influencing their investment. Finally, I introduce tenure formalization as a policy to enhance tenure security of slum households and thereby encourage their investment in their houses. Figure 2 illustrates the theoretical framework introduced in this chapter, which will overarch my research project.


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Figure 2. Theoretical framework of the interplay of tenure formalization, tenuresecurity, and housing investment.

Housing Investment by Slum HouseholdsSince John Turners influential argument (Turner & Fichter, 1972; Turner, 196

7, 1968, 1976), it has become popular to regard positive the efforts of the urban poor into construction and improvement of their houses in slums. The underlying idea of his theory of self-help housing is that the urban poor are capable ofaccumulating and making adequate use of various assets to improve their living environments (Mathey, 1992; Turner & Fichter, 1972; Ward, 1982). The theory projects self-construction by the urban poor as a solution to governments failure in ensuring the availability of affordable housing in growing cities. The poor havemade themselves well aware of their priorities in the course of their life cycles and remain favorably disposed to invest at their own pace in physical assets with controllable resources. Turners idea was espoused by the World Bank in the 1970s and 80s, resulting in the implementation of a number of sites-and-services and slum upgrading projects in the developing world.

Prescribing a policy to support self-help activities by the poor requires awell understanding of how they determine to invest in their housing. Turners classis model illuminates the changes in the priorities of the urban poor as they move up the economic ladder throughout their lifetime (Figure 3). Based on his observation of slum dwellers in Peru, Turner conceptualizes how households vital needs (identity, opportunity, and security) and housing needs (proximity to unskilled jobs, freehold ownership, and modern standard shelter) change depending on t

heir income level. According to the model, the priority of tenure security is low for the poorest, who are desperate for making living. For them, living near the workplace is more critical than secure tenure and housing quality. Low- or lower-middle income households who have escaped from such tough situations begin toaspire for secure tenure, with which they can gradually improve their living conditions over a period of time. Ensuring tenure security of households in this state might boost their investment in their houses.

Figure 3. Turners classic model of slum households changing needs.Source: Turner, 1972, p. 167.

Since the theory of self-help housing became an accepted norm, a number of

studies have investigated the driving (or constraining) factors of housing investment by households in slums. Specifically, one needs to consider what motivatesslum households to invest in their houses (i.e., motivation) and (2) what allows them to do so (i.e., capacity). I hypothesize that the motivation of housing investment might stem from either (a) dissatisfaction or (b) economic motivation.In the theories of residential satisfaction, the degree of a households satisfaction with his or her housing and neighborhood is measured by the difference between actual and desired (or aspired) situations (Galster & Hesser, 1981; Galster,1987; Lu, 1999). Theory of housing adjustment posits that such dissatisfactionpushes households into adjustment activities, such as altering their houses or relocation (Bruin & Cook, 1997; Morris & Jakubczak, 1988; Morris & Winter, 1975).As with Turner who points to the importance of slum households satisfaction in housing activities, this line of reasoning emphasizes role of psychological aspec

ts in explaining housing activities. By contrast, economists view housing investment as economic activities, by presupposing that households invest in their houses as long as they expect that the returns from the investment exceed the current costs (Arnot et al., 2011; Besley, 1995; Demsetz, 1967; Sjaastad & Bromley, 2000). Slum households might capitalize on their houses by renting out to tenants(S. Kumar, 1996; Struyk & Lynn, 1983; UN-Habitat, 2003b), using as work place (Benjamin, 2004; Strassmann, 1987; Tipple, 2005), or holding as economic assets until bequeathing to their children. As argued by Turner, residential dissatisfaction and economic motivation of slum households are closely tied and change throughout their lives.


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Motivated households actually invest in their houses only if they are capable of doing so. The key factors that moderate the intensity of housing investment by slum households would be (i) available resources, (ii) access to infrastructure and services, and (iii) tenure security. Because of the limitation of other options or their preference of minimizing bankrupt risk, slum households ofteninvest in their houses with their own savings or borrowing from their relativesor friends (Gilbert, 2002). In India, for instance, most of the cost of housingconstruction in slums was paid for by households own financial resources (70%) or their own labor (28%) (NSSO, 2010b). Thus, timing of investment by slum households predicates on when they are ready to have adequate income and savings. Aside from slum households financial capacity, access to infrastructure and servicesmight influence the amount of their housing investment. This is because lack ofaccess to services would reduce the expected return from the investment. Strassmann (1984) stresses the importance of installing basic infrastructure in sites-and-services or slum upgrading projects in early stage to stimulate self-help construction by the residents.

The Link Between Tenure Security and Housing InvestmentIn addition to available resources and access to infrastructure and service

s, tenure security might play a critical role in facilitating housing investmentin slum settlements. The nexus between tenure security and housing investment has been one of the primary topics in the literature on informal settlements since the link rationalizes the approach of enhancing tenure security of the urban poor as a means of upgrading their living conditions in the long run.

Theories in planning and economics have attempted to illuminate the mutually strengthening relationship between tenure security and housing: higher tenuresecurity leads to better physical environments and vice versa. As I mentioned earlier, economic theory generally presupposes that people invest in their properties as long as the expected future benefits exceed the costs (Arnot et al., 2011; Besley, 1995; Demsetz, 1967; Sjaastad & Bromley, 2000). Higher tenure securitywould encourage their investment by reducing the uncertainty about whether theywill be able to fully retrieve the expected benefits in the future. Economistsoften associate such tenure security with individual freehold property rights. By contrast, an increasing number of researchers in other fields suggest that improving de facto and perceived tenure securities of the urban poor is more effective than providing full legal titles in stimulating their investment (Gilbert, 2002; Kiddle, 2010; Payne et al., 2009; Reerink & van Gelder, 2010; Sjaastad & Br

omley, 2000; van Gelder, 2009). According to their observations and reasoning, slum households invest in their houses, regardless of their legal status, as longas they feel secure. Considering the risk of gentrification caused by the provision of full legal titles to slum households, enhancing perceived tenure security might be a better option (Payne, 2001).

It should be noted that the degree of tenure security and the amount of housing investment is not in a simple linear relationship due to the existence of areverse causation from the enhancement of physical conditions to tenure security (Besley, 1995; de Souza, 2001; Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2009; Razzaz, 1993). Better quality of housing, such as those built with cement walls, in slum settlements might reduce the risk of their being demolished by governments, which enhances de facto and perceived tenure security of the residents. Thus, while highertenure security is expected to stimulate slum dwellers investments in their house

s, extremely low tenure security might also motivate them to build up their housing in order to avoid an imminent threat.

The Effects of Tenure FormalizationI have so far discussed what motivates slum households to invest in their h

ouses and what capable them to do so. By influencing households tenure security,financial capacity, access to infrastructure and services, and motivation for investment, tenure formalization potentially plays a critical role in facilitatingphysical consolidation in slums.

The primary purpose of tenure formalization is often to enhance tenure secu


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rity of slum dwellers. Tenure formalization, by integrating informal tenure intoa system recognized by public authorities, is a common practice used to improvethe tenure security of slum dwellers (Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2009). In practice, a set of property rights are provided to slum households, ranging from the provision of occupancy rights to the freehold land tenure. Even granting a minimum level of legal tenure, such as occupancy rights for a specified period, mightgreatly enhance perceived tenure security of slum residents (Payne, 2001). Slumnotification in India is one such policy that provides occupancy rights to households for a specified period (Banerjee, 2002; Risbud, 2009; Sharma & Barman, 2006). The critical question is: what kinds of land tenure arrangements could better enhance tenure security of the urban poor in slum settlements?

On contrary to expectation, tenure legalization has resulted in the reduction in tenure security in some cases. First, provision of legal title might encourage further invasion of upper-middle class or private capital (Woodruff, 2001).In the review of empirical studies by Payne et al. (2009), tenure legalizationreduced tenure security in cases in Afghanistan, India, Egypt, Cambodia, and Rwanda. In Indonesia, some residents in inner-city settlements improved by the Kampong Improvement Program have been evicted as a result of their lack of legal tenure and the speculation caused by government policy (Tunas & Peresthu, 2010). Distorting existing social conditions based on the informal arrangements that slum dwellers have developed over a period of time may jeopardize de facto tenure security. Second, a tenure formalization approach might not be followed by the installation of infrastructure and services by governments because titling programs are, as Gilbert (2002, p. 8) contends, being conducted for reasons other than h

elping the poor and popular because they constitute housing policy on the cheap. Third, as Davis (2006) argues, titling approach could stratify slum dwellers, manyof whom are renters.5 The benefits from the titling program sometimes end up getting confiscated by bureaucrats, who often own slum estates.

Tenure formalization is also expected to facilitate slum households investment in their houses by (1) expanding their financial capacity, (2) improving their access to infrastructure and services, and/or (3) influencing their motivationfor housing investment. According to economic theories, provision of individualproperty rights to slum households would expand their financial capacity by enabling them to capitalize on their assets by accessing formal credit sources (Besley, 1995; de Soto, 2000; Deininger, 2003; Demsetz, 1967; World Bank, 1993). A body of literature, however, offers a counterargument and contracting evidence (Field & Torero, 2006; Galiani & Schargrodsky, 2010; Gilbert, 2002; Payne et al.,

2009). Gilbert (2002), for example, observes in Bogota that low-income households with legal title still borrow from informal credit sources because legal titlealone is not credible enough for lending agencies and the poor are not willingto risk their properties. Formalizing a slum settlement is often followed by theinstallation of infrastructure and services by government agencies, which wouldotherwise reluctant to do so to illegal squatters. In India, for instance, households in notified slums are entitled to infrastructure and services provided bylocal municipalities. Assurance of security and expectation of the provision ofservices in future might rush construction activities by slum households who aspire to rent out the spaces for the purpose of steady income.

I have reviewed literature to develop a theoretical framework (Figure 2) that explains what motivates and capable slum households to invest in their housesand how tenure formalization and tenure security influence the timing and inten

sity of the investment. In the framework, the intensity of hosing investment isa function of tenure security, available resources, and access to infrastructure, all of which are influenced by tenure formalization. Legal, de facto, and perceived tenure securities could respectively influence households decision to invest in their houses, though literature pays growing attention to de facto and perceived tenure security as a driver of housing investment. Next section discusseshow to measure the degree of tenure security.

Operationalization of Tenure SecurityIn order to empirically examine the theoretical framework, it is necessary


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to be able to measure the degree of tenure security of slum households. In thissection, I operationalize tenure security by clarifying its outcomes and determinants and proposing measurement models with those indicators. In SEM, two typesof indicators are used in measuring unobservable (or latent) construct. Reflective indicators (or effect indicators) are the manifests of the degree of tenure security, while formative indicators (or causal indicators) are what constitute or influence tenure security (Bollen & Lennox, 1991).

Outcomes and Determinants of Tenure SecurityIn operationalizing the concept of tenure security, it is necessary to choo

se appropriate reflective and formative indicators. Three types of tenure securitynamely, legal, de facto, and perceived tenure securitieshave different sets of reflective and formative indicators. Table 1 summarizes the list of their reflective and formative indicators discussed in literature. It is noted that some indicators may represent more than two types of tenure securities, and some reflective indicators of tenure securities may be formative indicators of other tenure securities (for example, see duration of residence). Since I already discussed the determinants of tenure security in Section 2.1, I focus on their reflective indicators here.

Table 1. Examples of reflective and formative indicators of tenure security.Reflective indicatorsFormative indicatorsLegal

tenure securityChance to win litigationsPossession of documentPremium in housing priceTypes of property rightsLand tenureRenewabilityDuration of residence (adverse possession)Possession of documentsde factotenure securityDuration of residenceProbability of evictionSize of settlementsCohesion of communitiesAccess to infrastructure and services

Political affiliationsDuration of residencePerceivedtenure securityPerception/belief of the risk of evictionPast experience of evictionTrust in governmentsPossession of documents

Legal tenure securityOne of the reflective indicators of a households legal tenure security is it

s possession of document(s) issued by governments that support its legal status.Benjamin (2004), Kundu (2002), and Mahadevia (2010) have observed that slum households in Bangalore, Delhi, Ahmedabad attempt to claim their occupancy by showing a variety of such documents, such as ID card, voters card, and certificates i

ssued by various government agencies. Estimating the premium of tenure securityin housing price is a common approach in econometrics (Friedman, Jimenez, & Mayo, 1988; Kapoor & Leblanc, 2008; Kim, 2004; Lanjouw & Levy, 2002). In their hedonic estimation approach, the price of formalized housing is decomposed into the bundle of amenities and locational characteristics, as well as the reduced risk of being arbitrarily appropriated. It is widely observed that housing market exists in slum communities, yet it is unclear whether one can assume market equilibrium on which hedonic estimation usually is based.

De facto tenure security


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A possible reflective indicator of de facto tenure security is the durationof households residence in the same places. Households who stay for a specific period are regarded to have a certain level of de facto tenure security in a sense that they have not been evicted (Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2009; Mahadevia, 2010; Struyk & Lynn, 1983). Relying on this single indicator could be, however, problematic because households with shorter duration of residence do not necessarily have insecure tenure. For example, a household with shorter duration of residence might have high tenure security if they possess legal documents that prove their freehold tenure. Using multiple indicators is a way to avoid such miss-measurement.

Perceived tenure securityOne can measure the degree of perceived tenure security by investigating ho

useholds about how they perceive the risk of eviction (Reerink & Van Gelder, 2010; van Gelder, 2009). Van Gelder (2009) asked slum households in Buenos Aires five-point scale questions, such as: The possibility that we will get evicted fromthis neighborhood is always present and The possibility of an eviction worries mesometimes. The former question asks about the perceived probability of eviction,while the latter asks about fear of eviction. His empirical test demonstrates that the degree of households fear of eviction is a better predictor of their housing investment.

Because duration of residence is an important indicator of tenure securitybut very complex, I discuss a little bit more about how to incorporate it in my

theoretical framework (Figure 2). While duration of residence is a reflective indicator of de facto tenure security, it is also formative indicators of legal, de facto, and perceived tenure securities. Duration of residence influences legaltenure security because households with a specified period of residence are able to obtain a certain level of property rights in countries where adverse possession is in effect. Beneficiaries of government projects and services are often required to show a certain period of residence. Households have de facto tenure security if they stay without being evicted for a long period, but the fact thatthey remain for a certain period might also strengthen their tenure security. Perceived tenure security also depends on duration of residence since households become confident about their security as they stay without facing the threat of eviction. For these reasons, duration of residence is conceptually closely related to tenure security.

An empirical question is about the extent to which duration of residence isrelated to tenure security. If one relies on duration of residence as a reflective indicator of tenure security, tenure security needs to be able to explain alarge portion of variation in duration of residence. However, a households duration of residence is influenced by many other factors, such as dissatisfaction ofhousing and/or neighborhood or economic/market factors. One needs to control forthose residential mobility factors when using duration of residence as an outcome of tenure security. Similarly, relying on only duration of residence as the formative indicator of tenure security is problematic. Although one could expectduration of residence to explain a certain portion of variation in tenure security as a formative indicator (or explanatory variable), households with longer (shorter) duration of residence do not necessarily have higher (lower) tenure security.

As I have discussed, the principal outcome of tenure security my project isinterested in is the intensity of housing investment. Following the theoreticalframework (Figure 2), I primarily measure the degree of tenure security from its outcome (housing investment) and determinants (tenure formalization). In practice, including duration of residence as an additional indicator of tenure security will be beneficial because it is also related to households financial capacity(income and savings) and motivation (timing of repairing/expanding houses). Therefore, adding duration of residence as an explanatory variable might be usefulfor the estimation of the intensity of housing investment to check robustness.


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Measurement ModelI propose a measurement model of tenure security with its indicators based

on a Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) framework (Figure 4). This measurement approach consists of within- and between- models to measure the variations of tenure security at both household and community levels. In the within model, I willestimate the degree of households perceived tenure security in relation to its reflective indicators, the intensity of their housing investment, the formative indicators of household-level legal and de facto tenure securities, and other factors that influence household-level perceived tenure security and/or housing investment (income and savings, access to infrastructure/services, age of householdhead, etc). The reflective indicators may include the risk of eviction and fearfor it stated by slum households (see Table 1). Since perceived tenure securityis influenced by legal and de facto tenure securities, the model contains theirformative indicators, such as formalized tenure, possession of document, duration of residence, personal relationship with politicians, etc. In the between-model, formative indicators of community-level legal tenure security (e.g., land ownership, land use designated in plans, etc.) and de facto tenure security (e.g.,size of settlement, cohesion of community, political affiliation, etc.) will capture the variation of perceived tenure security at community level.

The type of the proposed measurement model is commonly referred to as multilevel multiple indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) model (Joreskog & Goldberger,1975; Joreskog, 1981). The third-phase study of my project will employ this approach in measuring tenure security of households in non-notified and notified slums in Pune.

Figure 4. Measurement models of tenure security.Notes: Tenure securities are placed in ellipses since it is an unobservable (latent) hypothetical construct. Formative indicators are placed in rectangles, indicating that they are observable. While reflective indicators and housing investment are observable (in rectangles) at household level, their community-level variations are not directly observable (in ellipses). Arrows indicate causal directions.

Summary of This ChapterIn this chapter, reviewing relevant literature, I discussed how to conceptu

alize tenure security, specify its link with housing investment and formalized tenure, and measure its level. In Section 2.1, I conceptualized tenure security as a concept that embraces three elements: legal, de facto, and perceived tenuresecurities. The levels of households legal, de facto, and perceived tenure securities vary and might correspond with each other or differ. In addition, tenure security can be decomposed into household and community levels. In Section 2.2, Iexplained that the amount and timing of housing investment by slum households are determined by their motivation for investment, available resources, and tenuresecurity. Recent literature pays growing attention to perceived tenure securityas a driver of housing investment. Tenure formalization is expected to facilitate physical consolidation in slums by enhancing tenure security of slum households. In Section 2.3, I listed various reflective and formative indicators of legal, de facto, and perceived tenure securities and proposed the multilevel MIMIC m

odel that measures household-level and community-level tenure securities from their determinants and outcomes.

Indian ContextThe objective of this chapter is to investigate the Indian context regardin

g slums and tenure security of residents there. In Section 3.1, I examine basic


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statistics to see the current situations and trends of slum formation and livingconditions there in India. For the analysis, I tap into the survey data collected by the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO). The NSSO has conducted sample surveys regarding the living conditions at household level and slum settlement level in the entire nation. I look into 58th round housing condition survey and slum survey (2002-03) and 65th round housing condition survey and slum survey(2008-09). In Section 3.2, I will apply the theoretical framework developed inprevious chapter and test the hypothesis that slum notification stimulated theirhousing investment by enhancing their tenure security. This section will be a main component of the first-phase study of my project. In Section 3.3, I review recent literature on changing urban and political landscape since the economic liberalization, which has significantly influenced tenure security of slum dwellers in large Indian cities.

Slums in IndiaDefinitions and Trends

Although its definitions vary in India, NSSO defines a slum settlement as acompact area with a collection of poorly built tenements, mostly of temporary nature, crowded together usually with inadequate sanitary and drinking water facilities in unhygienic conditions (NSSO, 2004, p.11). Among the slums, Notified slumsare those which have been notified by the respective municipalities, corporations, local bodies or development authorities (NSSO, 2004, p.11), while other slums,if at least 20 households live there, are counted as non-notified slums. The legalstatus of the settlement, such as land tenure, is not stipulated as defining cr

iteria.NSS 58th round and 65th round surveys make it possible to extract the trends of the number of slum households and settlements (Table 2 and Table 3).6, 7 Asof 2008-09, the state with the largest number of slum households is Maharashtra(2,319,531), followed by Andhra Pradesh (924,898), Delhi (493,994), West Bengal(437,210), and Tamil Nadu (418,848). The proportion of the number of householdsin notified slums to the total number of slum households (or, notification rate) is the highest in Andhra Pradesh (74.1%), followed by West Bengal (64.1%), Tamil Nadu (57.4%), Uttar Pradesh (55.0%), and Maharashtra (54.3%). The proportionof the number of households in slums to the number of households in urban areas(or, slum rate) is the highest in Maharashtra (23.6%), Delhi (19.6%), Andhra Pradesh (14.4%), Madhya Pradesh (9.8%), and West Bengal (9.3%). Across India, the number of households in slums increased from 5,810,532 in 2002-03 to 6,363,625 in

2008-09 by 553,093, or 9.3% increase. Despite the increase in the number of households in slums, the number of slum settlements declined from 51,688 in 2002-03to 48,994 in 2008-09 by 2,694, or 5.2% decrease. This is because Andhra Pradeshand West Bengal report large scale of reduction in the number of slums. As Kumar (2010) point out, the decrease in the number of slum settlements amid the increase in the number of slum households implies the densification of existing slums.

Table 2. Estimated number of households in slums in India, 2002-03 and 2008-09.Sources: NSSO, 2004, 2010b.Note: Rate1 refers to the rate (%) of the number of notified households/settlements to the total number of households/settlements; Rate2 refers to the rate (%)of households in slums to the total number of households in urban areas.

Table 3. Estimated number of slum settlements in India, 2002-03 and 2008-09.Sources: NSSO, 2003, 2010a.Note: Rate refers to the rate (%) of the number of notified households/settlements to the total numbers.

On aggregate, slum settlements have been notified constantly since 1970s (Table 4). Because slum notification is a local policy, however, its rules and implementations vary from place to place (Banerjee, 2002; Risbud, 2009; Sharma & Ba


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rman, 2006). The basic component of the policy is the provision of occupancy rights and the entitlement to infrastructure and services provided by municipal agencies to residents in a slum settlement. In Mumbai, for instance, those in notified slums are legally protected from eviction and entitled to access to infrastructure and services provided by municipal government agencies. In addition, those who have lived in slum sites since 1995 (this is known as the cut-off date) are eligible for housing built by slum redevelopment efforts, free of cost. In Andhra Pradesh, the government provides a patta, a certificate of occupancy, to those who have stayed on state land for more than five years. Provided in the nameof the woman of the household, the patta is heritable but not alienable and canbe mortgaged in order to obtain housing loans.

Table 4. Estimated number of notified slums in major states.Source: NSSO, 2010a.

NSS 65th round slum survey hints a clue as to what kinds of settlements havebeen notified across India (NSSO, 2010a). To see the statistical association with each attribute of slum settlement and notification status, I conduct a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), which is a multivariate statistical method tocompress the information of categorical variables into a reduced numbers of dimensions by minimizing the loss of total information (Le Roux & Rouanet, 2010). The plot exhibits the relationships among five nominal variables: settlements notification status (notified or non-notified), land ownership (public or private), t

he land use of surrounding areas (residential, commercial, industrial, slums, orothers), location (fringe or non-fringe), and hazardous status of the location,such as prone to flood (hazard or non-hazard) (Figure 5). Each point on the plot represents a category of the five variables. The distances between the pointsindicate whether the settlement attributes are similar (close) or dissimilar (distant). As a result of computation, the first dimension (horizontal axis) and the second dimension (vertical axis) explain 53% and 14% of the original information in the variables, respectively. I add circles around the points of notification status to make it clear what attributes are associated with them.

The MCA plot of slums in all India demonstrates that notified slums tend tobe surrounded by slums, spread over public land, and/or be located in non-fringe areas, while non-notified slums tend to be surrounded by residential or commercial areas and/or located in fringe areas (panel (a) of Figure 5). Whether or no

t a settlement is located in hazardous areas seems to be irrelevant to its notification status based on the data. Notified slums tend to be surrounded by slumsprobably because people often settle near notified slums by expecting their settlements to be notified in future. The MCA analysis also suggests that governments are reluctant to notify slums on valuable land in commercial or industrial areas. Higher likelihood of settlement on public land being notified demonstrates that it is easier for governments to notify them because they do not have to compensate landowners.8

The MCA plot of slums in Maharashtra points to the different trend in slumnotification (panel (b) of Figure 5). Similar to the all-India trend above, notified slums tend to be surrounded by slums, spread over public land, and/or be located in non-fringe areas, while non-notified slums tend to be surrounded by residential areas in Maharashtra. Unlike all-India trend, however, being located on

land owned by public is strongly associated with notification status. In addition, slums on hazardous location tend to be non-notified. This implies that poorer people who settle in hazardous locations, such as riverbank, are likely to remain denied to access to services. The difference in the trends of the implementation of slum notification in all-India and Maharashtra suggests that studying about the process of notification entails a close investigation of the local context.

(a) All India


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(b) Maharashtra

Figure 5. Multiple Corresponding Plot of slums in India.Source: NSSO, 2010.Living Conditions and Investment

According to NSS survey data (NSSO, 2003, 2004, 2010a, 2010b), physical conditions are overall better in notified slums than in non-notified slums, thoughboth slums have experienced improvement over the last decade. In 2008-09, higherproportion of households live in houses built with permanent materials (pucca)in notified slums than in non-notified slums (Table 16 in Appendix D).9 The proportions of households with tap water and access to water for their exclusive useare higher in notified slums than in non-notified slums. Also, households in notified slums on average have better latrine availability, drainage arrangements,and electricity connection. In addition, more households have access to garbagecollection by municipalities in notified slums than in non-notified slums. Having said that, the data demonstrates that the physical conditions in non-notifiedslums have improved since 2002-03 and the gap between notified and non-notifiedslums has become narrowed.

As for settlement-level indicators, the proportion of settlements in whicha majority of households live in pucca housing is higher in notified slums thanin non-notified slums as of 2008-09 (Table 17 in Appendix D). The proportions ofsettlements that have recently experienced the improvement of services are alsohigher in notified slums. In both non-notified and notified slums, the improvem

ents stemmed from governments, while the improvements primarily by residents were limited. These data suggest that government plays a significant role in the provision and improvement of infrastructure and services, and thus slum notification that entitles slum households to the infrastructure and services is criticalfor their living conditions.

The theoretical framework I developed in the previous chapter hypothesizeshow tenure formalization could stimulate housing investment by slum households.In other words, households in notified slum would invest in their houses than others in non-notified slums. On contrary to the expectation, households in non-notified slums seem to engage in housing construction as actively as those in notified slums (NSS), 2004). As of 2002-03, about a quarter of households started housing construction in both non-notified and notified slums during the last 5 years (Table 5). More than 90 percent of the households are housing owners. Among t

he constructions are new building (51%), extension of existing building that results in the increase of floor area (10%) and any type of remodeling, renovation,or major repair work (39%). As expected, the invested houses have better structure and large floor area in notified slums. On average, households in notified slums spent Rs. 38,247 for the construction, 48 percent higher than the cost of construction in non-notified slums (Rs. 25,804). The cost was mostly financed bytheir own sources, though households with varying expenditure levels engaged inconstruction. More than 90 percent of households who engaged in housing construction during the last 5 years in notified slums possess either voter ID cards, ration card, or passport, which reflect legal tenure security.10

It is worthwhile looking at how the patterns of housing investment differ among households with different levels of monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE).Table 6 shows the proportions of households who engaged in housing investment by

slum households between 2004 and 2008 and the types of the investment by theirexpenditure levels (quintile). Interestingly, the proportions of households whoengaged in housing investment are almost equivalent throughout the quintiles. Approximately three fourths of households in the bottom quintile who engaged in housing investment built new houses, while the proportions are lower in other quintiles. This is probably because a larger fraction of low-income households are new migrants and they less engage in addition or improvement of their houses. Theproportions of addition to exiting houses become higher as expenditure levels become high. This is reasonable considering that addition of rooms is possible only when households have enough resources. The proportions of improvement of exis


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ting houses are almost same in the quintiles, except for the bottom quintile. These patterns are by and large observed similarly in non-notified and notified slums.

Figure 6 illustrates when households engage in housing investment in non-notified and notified slums. The majority of construction of new houses was conducted by newly coming residents whose duration of stay is less than 5 years. Households tend to add new rooms or expand floors when their duration of residence between 5 and 25 years. This is probably because the demand for space becomes strong as their children grow up and/or it takes a while for them to prepare enoughsavings. The improvement of existing houses seem to have two peaks at duration of residence being 10 years and 30 years, though households engage in improving their houses throughout their lifetime. There is no stark difference observed inthe patterns of housing investment above between non-notified and notified slums.

Table 5. Recent and planned housing construction in slums in India, 2002-3.Source: NSSO, 2004.Note: Figures in percentages unless otherwise noted. MPCE refers to monthly percapita expenditure.

Table 6. Recent residential construction by households in slums by expenditure level, 2002-03.Note: Figures in percentages. MPCE refers to monthly per capita expenditure.

(1) New building (2) Addition

(3) Improvement

Figure 6. Duration of residence by types of recent residential construction in slums.Source: NSSO, 2004.

Preliminary AnalysisIn this section, using the NSS sample survey data, I examine if the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter (Figure 2) can be applied to the Indian context. First, I take a closer look at duration of residence and possession of document to check if they can be used as indicators of tenure security. Then, I investigate what, including the indicators of tenure security and slumnotification status, contributes to the propensity of housing investment in slums.

Indicators of Tenure SecurityDuration of Residence

As I discussed in Section 2.3, households duration of residence is a possible indicator of tenure security. The NSS housing condition survey contain the inf

ormation about households duration of residence in slums as of 2002-03. The histograms in Figure 7 show that the distributions of households in non-notified slums, notified slums, and all slums are all skewed to the right. The average duration of residence is 19.7 years (all slums), 19.2 years (non-notified slums), and19.9 years (notified slums). The proportion of households who came to slums in the last 2 years is higher in notified slums; approximately 10 percent of households in notified slums moved into the slums in less than one year. The proportionof households with duration of residence between 2 and 20 years is slightly higher in non-notified slums than in non-notified slums, yet there is no significant difference in the distribution of the duration of residence between non-notifi


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ed and notified slums.Households who recently moved to slums might have faced lower tenure secur

ity in previous residence. The NSS data provides the list of the reasons for households movement in slums during the last 365 days as of 2002-03 (NSSO, 2004), although there is no answer that clearly indicates the lack of tenure security asa reason for movement (Table 7). Approximately 57 percent of households moved because of job-related reasons and 22 percent of households list housing problemsas the reasons for their movement. There is no difference in this trend betweenhouseholds in non-notified and notified slums. Breaking down the data by households expenditure level, however, reveals different patterns among them. While lower-income households moved to the current location for job-related reasons, higher-income households moved for housing-related reasons. This finding supports Turners (1972) hypothesis that lower-income households prioritize the proximity to unskilled jobs and, as their income rises (or duration of residence longer, see Figure 8), they begin to aspire for housing with higher standard.11

(A) All slums (B) By notification status

Figure 7. Duration of residence in slums.Source: NSSO, 2004.

Table 7. Reasons for movement in slums during the last 365 days, as of 2002-03.Source: NSSO, 2004.

Note: Figures in percentages.

Figure 8. Monthly per capita expenditure of households in slums by duration of residence, 2002-03.Source: NSSO, 2004.

To examine what contributes to households duration of residence, I estimateOLS and ordered logit models that calculate the odds of a households stay in slums for a specific period:

?log?(DURATION?_i)=?_1+?_11 ?NOTIFICATION?_i+?_12 X_i+?_1i (1)

ologit?[P(?DURATION?_i )]=?_2+?_21 ?NOTIFICATION?_i+?_22 X_i+?_2i (1)

WhereDURATION = Duration of residence in the slum (in years)NOTIFICATION = Notification status of the settlement (0 = non-notified slum, 1=notified slum)X = Household and location characteristics as follows:Monthly per capita expenditure (in Indian Rupees);Social groups (scheduled caste/tribe, or other backward caste);Hazardous location (whether the household experienced flood during the last 5 years);Size of the city (less than 100k, between 100k and 500k, between 500k and 1M, or greater than 1M).

P(DURATION) indicates the probability of ith households duration of residence being (1) less than 5 years, (2) between 5 and 10 years, (3) between 10 and 15 years, or (4) longer than 15 years. While Model (1) estimates households duration ofresidence (in years) by their characteristics, Model (1) estimates the chance ofstaying in the slums for specific durations. The sample for Model (1) is the housing-owners with duration of residence (i) less than 40 years, (ii) between 15 and 40 years, and (iii) less than 15 years. For Model (1), I choose owner households with duration of residence (i) less than 40 years, (ii) 20 years, and (iii) 15 years. In addition, I apply the models to low-income households (bottom quarti


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le (25%) among slum households) separately. Table 19 in Appendix D reports the estimation results.

Model (1) explains a small fraction of variation, particularly for households with duration of residence between 15 and 40 years, as indicated by its low R-squared (0.029). Estimating households duration of residence obviously requiresmore information about what influence their residential mobility (i.e., motivation in the theoretical framework in Figure 2). For households who came to the slums less than 15 years ago, their notification status is negatively associated with their duration of residence. This is because notified slums attract more migrants (see Figure 7). The estimation results also confirm the positive association between households expenditure level and their duration of residence, controlling for other variables.12 Households living in hazardous locations is found negatively related to their duration of residence, which implies newly coming residents tend to settle in such locations and/or higher likelihood of their moving outeither voluntarily or involuntarily. Estimation results of Model (1) show overall similar patterns, though belonging to socially disadvantaged groups is found more strongly and negatively associated with duration of residence for low-incomehouseholds.

Possession of DocumentAs discussed in Section 2.3, households possession of document issued by gov

ernment might reflect or influence their legal tenure security and enhance theirperceived tenure security. The NSS survey data contains the information about households possession of voter ID cards, ration cards, or passports. These documen

ts themselves do not legally prove their property rights. Since obtaining thesedocuments usually requires proof of residence, however, possession of the documents reflect certain level of legal tenure security (Chandrasekhar & Mukhopadhyay, 2011; Subbaraman et al., 2012). If duration of residence contributes to tenuresecurity and greater tenure security leads to higher likelihood of possession of document, duration of residence and possession of document must be positivelycorrelated. The data supports this hypothesis; the proportion of households whopossess such document in both non-notified and notified slums rise as they staylonger and reaches the plateau at their duration of residence being 15 years (Figure 9).

Figure 9. Possession of documents by duration of residence in slums, 2002-03.

Source: NSSO, 2004.

To check if households duration of residence and possession of document remain positively associated when their expenditure level and other factors controlled, I run a logit model that estimates the chance of households obtaining document issued by government from their characteristics.

logit?[P(?DOCUMENT?_i )]=?+?_1 ?log?(DURATION?_i)+?_2 ?NOTIFICATION?_i+?_3 X_i+?_i (2)

WhereDOCUMENT = Possession of voter ID card, ration card, and/or passport (0=no, 1=yes)

DURATION = Duration of residence in the slum (in years)NOTIFICATION = Notification status of the settlement (0 = non-notified slum, 1=notified slum)X = Household and location characteristics as follows:Monthly per capita expenditure (in Indian Rupees);Social groups (scheduled caste/tribe, or other backward caste);Hazardous location (whether the household experienced flood during the last 5 years);Size of the city (less than 100k, between 100k and 500k, between 500k and 1M, or greater than 1M).


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The estimation results reported in Table 20 in Appendix D confirm that evenif expenditure level is controlled, the probability of a households possessing document becomes higher as their duration of residence becomes longer until theirduration of stay reaches 15 years. In addition, duration of residence stronglyaffects the probability of possession of document by low-income households withduration of residence 15-40 years. This implies that duration of residence mightbe a critical factor for the tenure security of lower-income households. By contrast, slum notification status does not help households to access to the document.

Housing InvestmentIn my theoretical framework, the propensity or amount of housing investment

by slum households is a function of tenure securitywhich is (i) influenced by formalized tenure and duration of residence and (ii) reflected by possession of document and duration of residence, available resources, motivation, and access toinfrastructure (Figure 2). The hypothesis derived from the framework is that slum notification influences tenure security of slum households and thereby stimulate their housing investment. To test the hypothesis, one can examine whether households in notified slums have invested in housing more than other households innon-notified slums, controlling for their characteristics. For the purpose, I run the following logit and OLS models:

?logit[P(CONSTRUCTION?_i)]=?_1+?_11 ?DURATION?_i+?_12 ?DOCUMENT?_i+?_13 ?NOTIFIC

ATION?_i+?_14 ?TAP?_i+?_15 X_i+?_1i (3)

WhereCONSTRUCTION = Whether the household engaged in residential construction (new building, addition, or improvement) during the last 5 years (0 = no, 1 = yes)COST = Cost of the latest residential construction by the household (in Rs.)DOCUMENT = Possession of voter ID card, ration card, and/or passport (0 = no, 1= yes)DURATION = Duration of residence in the slum (in years)NOTIFICATION = Notification status of the settlement (0 = non-notified slum, 1=notified slum)TAP = Access to tap water (0 = no, 1 = yes)X = Household and location characteristics as follows:

Monthly per capita expenditure (in Indian Rupees);Structure of the current dwelling (katcha, semi-pucca, or pucca);Social groups (scheduled caste/tribe, or other backward caste);Distance to work place (in km);Hazardous location (whether the household experienced flood during the last 5 years);Size of the city (less than 100k, between 100k and 500k, between 500k and 1M, or greater than 1M).

In the models above, notification status is a primary proxy of tenure security,while possession of document and duration of residence are additional for robustness check. I proxy households resource availability by their monthly per capitaexpenditure. Households motivation is proxied by the structure of current dwellin

g and distance to work place. I choose the availability of tap water as the indicator of access to infrastructure and services.

I apply the models to the following subpopulations: (1) housing owner households with duration of residence in slums for less than 40 years, (2) owners with duration of residence less than 20 years, (3) low-income (the bottom quartile)owners with duration of residence less than 40 years, (4) low-income owners with duration of residence less than 20 years. For models with new building construction as dependent variables, I exclude households whose duration of residence less than 5 years. Table 21, Table 22, Table 23, and Table 24 in Appendix D report the estimation results. Table below summarize the estimation results.


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Table 8. Summary of estimation results.New buildingAdditionImprovement5-40 yrs5-20 yrs


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Evictions and Tenure SecurityThis section explores the trends of eviction and relocation of slum dwelle

rs in Indian cities and what critically influence their tenure security. First,I look into some available statistics that indicate recent massive eviction of slum residents in large cities. Then, I review literature in planning and human geography that have attempted to theorize changing urban and political landscapein post-liberalization India. The rich discussion in the literature helps to speculate on the meaning of legal and de facto tenure security in Indian slums.

StatisticsIn large Indian cities, an increasing number of incidences of massive evict

ion of slum dwellers have been reported since the late 1990s. In Delhi, approximately 51,461 houses were demolished between 1990 and 2003, and 45,000 householdswere evicted between 2004 and 2007 (Bhan, 2009); in Kolkata, more than 77,000 households were evicted in 2004 (Risbud, 2009); in Mumbai, 360,326 slum units were demolished between 1994 and 1998 (Risbud, 2009), and 90,000 households on 44 settlements were evicted between November 2004 and March 2005 (P. Kumar, 2010).

It is, however, questionable to what extent these figures are reliable because of the difficulty of counting and tracking the evicted households. Figures reported by non-profit organizations that are supportive for slum dwellers mighthave been overestimated; figured announced by government might have been underestimated. In addition, compared with the sensational massive evictions in major cities above, small scale cases in other cities are hardly counted up. Thus, no s

tatistics is available about the total number of evicted households across Indiaand its trend. Lack of systematically collected data about evicted slum dwellers limits the availability of statistical analysis to estimate what would contribute to the chance of being evicted (or protected from it).

Driving factors of evictionHuman and critical geographers have been enthusiastically engaging in unrav

eling growing hostility against slum dwellers in Indian megacities (Baviskar, 2003; Bhan, 2009; Fernandes, 2004; Ghertner, 2008, 2011; Zerah, 2007). According to the line of literature, the recent drive for slum demolition is rooted in increasing demand for (1) beautification of the city environments and (2) modernization of infrastructure, as well as (3) the criminalization of slum dwellers as amajor hindrance to their realization. Non-slum residents have increasingly begun

to deem slums that encroach reserved natural areas as environmental hazard andthose remain unsanitary near their residence as eyesores. Slums that have encroached valuable land in preferable city areas have also been recognized as obstacle to the installment of infrastructure or valorization of the land by residential, commercial, or industrial development.

The literature points out four factors that strengthen demand for beautification and modernization and therefore fuels criminalization of slum dwellers: 1)soaring property values in liberalized real estate markets; 2) emergence of so-called new middle class; 3) aspiration for world-class cities; and 4) changes in courts interpretation of the proliferation of slums.

Booming real estate valuesSince the economic liberalization in the early 1990s, India has been experi

encing rapid urbanization and economic development. Governments use to tightly control land and restrict its possession and trading by private. Deregulation ofsuch controls opened the real estate market for speculators, resulting in risingproperty values in central areas of metropolises (Nijman, 2000). As the valuesof urban land and real estate properties have been soaring, the demand for redeveloping slum sites into shopping malls, luxury condominiums, or office complex,has become increasingly high.

New middle classA growing number of new middle classaffluent urban citizens who grew up in (


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or amid the image of) modern lifestylehas begun to call for beautification of thecity environments by forming the residential welfare associations (RWAs) or environmental non-profit organizations (Baviskar, 2003; Chatterjee, 2004; Fernandes, 2004; Ghertner, 2008, 2011). Decentralization, promoted by the 74th amendmentof the Constitution, has brought about opportunity for them to make their voicesheard in policy-making process.

Aspiration for world-class citiesAspiring for world-class cities, state and city governments are also motiva

ted to modernize the built environment in order to attract foreign investment and promote economically development (Kennedy & Zrah, 2008). Financially supportedby the central government, this resulted in large-scale infrastructure development and redevelopment projects, accompanied by the relocation of slum households.

Changing rules of courtsCourt decisions play a critical role in prompting criminalization of slum r

esidents. Bhan (2009), Ghertner (2008), and Zerah (2007) analyze how the courtschanged their attitude against slum dwellers. According to the literature, courts used to show sympathy with slum dwellers who had no choice but to squat and criticize incompetency and inactivity of bureaucrats and politicians who failed to accommodate them. Since the late 1990s, however, courts have begun to attribute the dismal failure of governments realizing development plans to slum dwellersby denouncing them as illegal encroachers. The courts have strong power to coerc

e government agencies to follow their orders.

Tenure security as a moderating factorWhile the factors above have been accelerating the driving force of slum de

molition in Indian metropolises, there exit factors that protect slum dwellers from eviction. Tenure security of slum households hinges on the balance between these two opposing factors. In the Indian context, recent discussions on the tenure security of slum dwellers are centered on the political realm in which thosewho are denied to access to service as citizens seek for protection through informal negotiation. Political negotiation by mobilizing slum dwellers, who often account for more than half the population in major cities, is an important way tosecure their tenure. SPARC is an example of the organization that exert significant influence on directing policy-making toward pro-poor by mobilizing huge num

ber of slum dwellers and homeless people and accumulating expertise and knowledge (Appadurai, 2001).14What makes such political negotiation possible is the blur about what is le

gal/illegal (or formal/informal) in India. Given the improper enforcement of property rights and the prevalence of non-conforming building activities, it is upto local governments how to classify buildings formal or informal. Zimmer (2012), for example, describes how the Delhi Development Authority has arbitrarily regularized unauthorized colonies.15 Roy (2009) argues that governments have purposely left rules and implementation ambiguous so that they can tap into the political support from people who ask for formalization of their tenure. While such governments informal practice keeps tenure security of the poor hinged on a precarious status, it also allows them to take a strategy to first occupy land and thenpolitically negotiate for securing their tenure (Benjamin, 2008).

Discussions above presuppose two distinct arenas coexisting in globalizingIndian society. One is the formal domain dominated by small fraction of the elite; the other is the political realm where the underprivileged populations seek for case-by-case paralegal arrangements. Chatterjee (2004) named them as civil society and political society, respectively. According to his reasoning, the latter emerged since the 1980s when ensuring welfare of the population became the responsibility of government and political mobilization became widening. The disjunction of the civil society and political society, however, became intensified only after new middle class who used to be disengaged in urban politics return to reframe the civil society as the society by/for culturally equipped propertied citiz


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ens in the 1990s.There are three questions to be clarified. First, to what extent is slum no

tification status important for the tenure security of slum dwellers? Notification of their settlements is supposed to enhance their legal tenure security by legal protecting them from forced eviction without due legal process. However, given the governments arbitral actions and courts changing attitude discussed above,it is necessary to examine whether people in notified slums are actually protected. For example, households in notified slums are required to move out when government builds infrastructure there. If the relocation does not proceed without due process and compensation, slum notification does not necessarily contribute to tenure security of slum dwellers. Related to this point, the second question is: Is de facto tenure security is more important for slum dwellers survival thanlegal tenure security? Let us say that slum notification protects slum dwellersfrom forced relocation. What is important then is whether slum households can let their settlements notified through political negotiation, or whether informaltenure arrangement is enough for the tenure security of slum dwellers even if the notification of their settlement does not follow up. This requires a close investigation of the process of slum notification, taking fully account of the local political context. Third, the literature above tend to overly focus on selected metropolises, such as Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Hyderabad, and Bangalore. Are other large cities following those cities? Expanding locational horizon is crucial for widening the theoretical scope.

Summary of This Chapter

In this chapter, I reviewed statistics and relevant literature to explore the Indian context regarding living conditions, housing investment, and tenure security in slums. In Section 3.1, I examined the NSS survey data, which points tothe increase in the number of slum households and the decrease in the number ofslum settlements across India. The data also demonstrates a set of characteristics of slum settlements that have been notified/not notified. According to the sample surveys, living conditions in notified slums have been overall better thanin non-notified, though the gap between them has been narrowing. In Section 3.2, I investigated how determinants and outcomes of tenure securityi.e., slum notification, duration of residence, possession of document, expenditure level, and housing investmentare related, using the NSS survey data. In particular, I statistically tested the hypothesis that households in notified slums tend to invest inhousing more than those in non-notified slums, holding their characteristics eq

ual. My analysis supported the hypothesis for low-income and/or younger households. In Section 3.3, I reviewed discussion in the literature on Indian post-liberalization urbanization. Their theorizing has focused on two opposing forces: oneis driving demolition of slums and the other is de facto tenure security. Building on the discussion in this chapter, I will develop research questions overarching my research project.

Research DesignIn this Chapter, I state research questions that will overarch three indep

endent but closely knitted studies in my research project. Then, I explain research design of each study and how they are related. Finally, I introduce the rese

arch site of my project, Pune. It is noted that detailed descriptions of the three studies are provided in Chapter 6.

4.1 Research QuestionsThe purpose of my research project will be to better understand what contr

ibutes to tenure security of slum households and thereby support their housing investment. Specifically, my interest is in to what extent and how slum notification has enhanced tenure security of households in Indian slums and improved their living conditions. For the purpose, I will address the overarching research questions below:


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How has slum notification been implemented in Indian cities?What contributes to tenure security of households in slums? In particular, to what extent and how has slum notification improved their tenure security?To what extent is tenure security related to the frequency, timing, and amountof housing investment by slum households? In particular, to what extent and howhas slum notification improved housing and access to infrastructure and servicesin India?

I will address the first question by investigating the following points: (1) what kinds of settlement characteristics would increase the probability of being notified by local governments; (2) who has determined the settlements to be notified and who influenced the decision; (3) how slum dwellers have engaged in political actions to secure their tenure. In so doing, I will explore the complexity in the political process of slum notification. The second sets of questions focuson tenure security of slum residents. Based on the conceptualization and operationalization of tenure security in Chapter 2, I will aim to measure the degree of tenure security of slum households and the contribution of slum notification to it. The third set of questions will test the hypothesis that tenure formalization enhance tenure security of slum dwellers and thereby stimulate their housinginvestment and ultimately lead to the improvement of their living conditions. The three studies of my project will address more specific questions, though I will triangulate the findings to answer the overarching research questions above.

4.2 Research PlanTo address the research questions in the Indian context, my project will employ a sequential mixed-methods approach. My project will consist of three phases, each of which will address different questions by relying on different methods (Table 9). The three studies are basically independent in that they will address different research questions with different research designs, yet they are closely related in that Phase-I study and Phase-II study will lay foundation for subsequent studies (Figure 10).

Phase I: Nation-wide cross-sectional studyThe first-phase study will aim to test the applicability of the theoretical

framework developed in Chapter 2, and it will explore how the determinants andoutcomes of tenure securitysuch as slum notification, duration of residence, poss

ession of document, housing investment, and access to infrastructure and servicesare related acr

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