Freedom of religion.docx

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 106440 January 29, 1996

ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, ASUNCION MANOSCA and LEONICAMANOSCA, petitioners,

vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge,RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 168, HON. GRADUACION A. REYESCLARAVAL, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 71, andREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VITUG,J.:

In this appeal, via a petition for review on certiorari, from the decision1of the

Court of Appeals, dated 15 January 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24969 (entitled

"Alejandro Manosca, et al. v. Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, et al."), this Court is

asked to resolve whether or not the "public use" requirement of Eminent

Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-

square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National Historical Institute

("NHI") as a national historical landmark.

The facts of the case are not in dispute.

Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada,

Taguig. Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492)

square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been

the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder ofIglesia Ni Cristo, it passed

Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 42of Presidential

Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The

resolution was, on 06 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education,

Culture and Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked

on the legality of the measure. In his Opinion No. 133, Series of 1987, the

Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative; he explained:

According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or

objects that are associated with an event, achievement,

characteristic, or modification that makes a turning point or stage

in Philippine history. Thus, the birthsite of the founder of the

Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had

made contributions to Philippine history and culture has been

declared as a national landmark. It has been held that places

invested with unusual historical interest is a public use for which

the power of eminent domain may be authorized . . . .

In view thereof, it is believed that the National Historical Institute

as an agency of the Government charged with the maintenance

and care of national shrines, monuments and landmarks and the

development of historical sites that may be declared as nationalshrines, monuments and/or landmarks, may initiate the

institution of condemnation proceedings for the purpose of

acquiring the lot in question in accordance with the procedure

provided for in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The

proceedings should be instituted by the Office of the Solicitor

General in behalf of the Republic.

Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the

Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation3before the

Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI alleging, inter alia,

that:

Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, the National

Historical Institute issued Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, which

was approved on January, 1986 by the then Minister of Education,Culture and Sports, declaring the above described parcel of land

which is the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, founder of the "Iglesia ni

Cristo," as a National Historical Landrnark. The plaintiff perforce

needs the land as such national historical landmark which is a

public purpose.

At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the

issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the

property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. After a hearing, the trial

court issued, on 03 August 1989,4an order fixing the provisional market

(P54,120.00) and assessed (P16,236.00) values of the property and

authorizing the Republic to take over the property once the required sum

would have been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro

Manila.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the

intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that

the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly,

for the use, benefit, or support ofIglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary

to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987

Constitution.5Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the

implementation of the 03rd August 1989 order of the trial court.

On 15 February 1990, following the filing by respondent Republic of its reply

to petitioners' motion seeking the dismissal of the case, the trial court issued

its denial of said motion to dismiss.6Five (5) days later, or on 20 February

1990,7another order was issued by the trial court, declaring moot and

academic the motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the order of

03 August 1989 with the rejection of petitioners' motion to dismiss.

Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order

was likewise denied by the trial court in its 16th April 1991 order.8

Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorariand prohibition with the

Court of Appeals. In its now disputed 15th January 1992 decision, the

appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground that the remedy of

appeal in the ordinary course of law was an adequate remedy and that the

petition itself, in any case, had failed to show any grave abuse of discretion

or lack of jurisdictional competence on the part of the trial court. A motion

for the reconsideration of the decision was denied in the 23rd July 1992resolution of the appellate court.

We begin, in this present recourse of petitioners, with a few known

postulates.

Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less

frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent

power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to

exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more

to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain

is generally so described as "the highest and most exact idea of property

remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose

through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State.9It is a

right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public

use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of

governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from

sovereignty.10

The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private

property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."11

This

proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so

to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought

to be enforced.

Petitioners assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the guidelines set

by this Court in the case ofGuido v.Rural Progress Administration,12

to wit: (a)

the size of the land expropriated; (b) the large number of people benefited;

and, (c) the extent of social and economic reform.13

Petitioners suggest that

we confine the concept of expropriation only to the following public

uses,14

i.e., the

. . . taking of property for military posts, roads, streets, sidewalks,

bridges, ferries, levees, wharves, piers, public buildings including

schoolhouses, parks, playgrounds, plazas, market places, artesian

wells, water supply and sewerage systems, cemeteries,

crematories, and railroads.

This view of petitioners is much too limitative and restrictive.

The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the extent of the

President's power under Commonwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically, acquire

private lands for subdivision into smaller home lots or farms for resale

to bona fide tenants or occupants. It was in this particular context of the

statute that the Court had made the pronouncement. The guidelines

in Guido were not meant to be preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the

power of eminent domain should not now be understood as being confinedonly to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates.

15

The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution,

must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a

public exigency.16

Black summarizes the characterization given by various

courts to the term; thus:

Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory

basis for taking property by eminent domain. For condemnation

purposes, "public use" is one which confers same benefit or

advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public.

It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities
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for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right

of use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a

"public advantage" or "public benefit" accrues sufficient to

constitute a public use. Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457

P. 2d 769, 772, 773.

Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of

the right to take private property in virtue of eminent domain,

means a use concerning the whole community as distinguished

from particular individuals. But each and every member of society

need not be equally interested in such use, or be personally and

directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public wantor exigency, that is sufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County,

262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186. The term may be

said to mean public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is

productive of general benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants

of a small or restricted locality, but must be in common, and not

for a particular individual. The use must be a needful one for the

public, which cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss

and inconvenience. A "public use" for which land may be taken

defies absolute definition for it changes with varying conditions of

society, new appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of

scope and functions of government, and other differing

circumstances brought about by an increase in population and

new modes of communication and transportation. Katz v.

Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245 A.2d 579,586.17

The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional

purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public

use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that

"public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long

been discarded. This Court in Heirs ofJuancho Ardona v. Reyes,18

quoting

from Berman v. Parker(348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed. 27), held:

We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is

or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and

inclusive. See DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421, 424,

96 L. Ed. 469, 472, 72 S Ct 405. The values it represents are

spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is

within the power of the legislature to determine that the

community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as

well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the

present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made

determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It

is no for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of

Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as

well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that

stands in the way.

Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to

realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the

power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. See

Luxton v. North River Bridge Co. 153 US 525, 529, 530, 38 L. ed.

808, 810, 14 S Ct 891; United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co.

160 US 668, 679, 40 L. ed. 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427.

It has been explained as early as Sea v. Manila Railroad Co.,

19

that:

. . . A historical research discloses the meaning of the term "public

use" to be one of constant growth. As society advances, its

demands upon the individual increase and each demand is a new

use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. . . .

for "whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a

public use.

Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:

The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time

when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such

a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the

public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,

expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the

purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent

domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least

two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use.

One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots

for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through

the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise

to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present

whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare

satisfies the requirement of public use.20

Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia inJ.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land

Tenure Administration,21

has viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument

and one that "is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically" so as to

enable it "to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store." Fr.

Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that

what, in fact, has ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just

as broad as "public welfare."22

Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the

expropriation of (Felix Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to be a public

use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain" when only

members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some

religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what

should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casualconsequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The

purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive

contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather

than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo.

The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by

members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be

true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely

incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would

actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not

necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.23

Petitioners contend that they have been denied due process in the fixing of

the provisional value of their property. Petitioners need merely to be

reminded that what the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to beheard;

24contrary to petitioners' argument, the records of this case are

replete with pleadings25

that could have dealt, directly or indirectly, with the

provisional value of the property.

Petitioners, finally, would fault respondent appellate court in sustaining the

trial court's order which considered inapplicable the case ofNoble v. City of

Manila.26

Both courts held correctly. The Republic was not a party to the

alleged contract of exchange between the Iglesia ni Cristo and petitioners

which (the contracting parties) alone, not the Republic, could properly be

bound.

All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law

and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.


SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,vs.

JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

Vicente Sotto for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.

LAUREL,J.:

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine

Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of

prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and

selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International

Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that

he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the

celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic

Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the

fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto,

Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President

of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the

respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs

of the postage stamps for printing as follows:

"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design.

The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by

1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos."
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The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part

thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought

to be prevented by the petitioner herein.

The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper

legal remedy in the instant case, although he admits that the writ may

properly restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an

extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance

of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance

and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue

to . . . inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether

excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are without or in excess ofthe jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs.

516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial"

used with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly

comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent Director of

Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the

Constitution is a fortiorari"without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The

statutory rule, therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is

not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits

of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the

jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an

officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not

infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly

administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law

in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga

and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)

The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the

Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps

commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is

alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of

section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines,

which provides as follows:

No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied,

or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of

any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system

of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,

preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such,

except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is

assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,

orphanage, or leprosarium.

The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of

separation of church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to the

historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say

that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that

the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise

when the estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in

the furtherance of their recognized this principle of separation of church and

state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted in

the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10,

1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine

Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy

Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of the

Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite

to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All

the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking

their oath to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to

recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with

its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that

what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious

toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of

profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human

affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and

elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the

minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly

appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution,

implored "the aid ofDivine Providence, in order to establish a government

that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of thenation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their

posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and

democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the

destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human

society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions

are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our

Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively

to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the

Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment

Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a

priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is

assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or

leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines).

Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional

mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation

to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving

Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm.

Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to

beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and

bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes

against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised

Penal Code).

In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the

postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of thePhilippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:

No. 4052. AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY

THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF

ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE

APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF

POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER

PURPOSES.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

Philippines in Legislature assembled and by the authority of the

same:

SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated andmade immediately available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not

otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates and printing of postage

stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.

SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public

Works and Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or

any portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and

as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.

SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not

revert to the Treasury.

SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, February 21, 1933.

It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for

the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and

other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with

the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to

dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as

may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and

issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to have been approved

by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1,

1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The

respondent alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer

losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be

derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at P1,618,17.10 and

states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the

Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance

of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of

course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize

the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use

or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of

a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the

postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of

Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian

denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the

Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the

stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of

the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the

petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps

was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country."

The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of

international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people"

(Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the

President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is

significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit

2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned,

contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and

an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb.

3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but

Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seatof that congress. It is

obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be

said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the

resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not


4/17

the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the

Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of

incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in

view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation.

The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere

incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S.,

295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the

petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete separation of church and state

and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition.

Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance andprescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our political

development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may

lead to the belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular

religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of

Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to

the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at

bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the

Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage

stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the

Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a

poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the

case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a

poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists

which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act

assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.

The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without

pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.


SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-53487 May 25, 1981

ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEA, NICETAS

DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTES, petitioners,vs.

Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of FirstInstance of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of Valencia,Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO, CouncilmenGAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO,Barangay Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENABALTAZAR, respondents.

AQUINO,J.:1wph1.t

This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay

council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding the acquisition of the wooden

image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast

day. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the parish

priest or a layman should have the custody of the image.

On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5,

"reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April

"of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia".

That resolution designated the members of nine committees who would take

charge of the 1976 festivity. lt provided for (1) the acquisition of the image of

San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the

barangay's projects. Funds for the two projects would be obtained through

the selling of tickets and cash donations " (Exh A or 6).

On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 whichspecified that, in accordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman

Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayorof the fiesta, would be

the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would

remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as

chairman of the next feast day.

It was further provided in the resolution that the image would be made

available to the Catholic parish church during the celebration of the saint's

feast day (Exh. B or 7).

Resolutions Nos. 5 and 6 were submitted to a plebiscite and were duly

ratified by the barangay general assembly on March 26, 1976. Two hundred

seventy-two voters ratified the two resolutions (Exh. 2 and 5).

Funds were raised by means of solicitations0 and cash donations of the

barangay residents and those of the neighboring places of Valencia. With

those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of San

Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council for four

hundred pesos (Exh. F-l, 3 and 4).

On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the

Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could worship the

saint during the mass for the fiesta.

A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio

Marilao Osmea refused to return that image to the barangay council on the

pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were

used for its acquisition.

Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the occasion of his

sermon during a mass, Father Osmea allegedly uttered defamatory remarks

against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in connection

with the disputed image. That incident provoked Veloso to file against Father

Osmea in the city court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation.

Father Osmea retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Velosowith the city mayor's office and the Department of Local Government and

Community Development on the grounds of immorality, grave abuse of

authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the law.

Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic church

of Valencia. Because Father Osmea did not accede to the request of

Cabatingan to have custody of the image and "maliciously ignored" the

council's Resolution No. 6, the council enacted on May 12, 1976 Resolution

No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father

Osmea for the recovery of the image (Exh. C or 8). On June 14, 1976, the

barangay council passed Resolution No. 12, appointing Veloso as its

representative in the replevin case (Exh. D or 9).

The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City against Father

Osmea and Bishop Cipriano Urgel (Exh. F). After the barangay council hadposted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, Father Osmea turned over the

image to the council (p. 10, Rollo). ln his answer to the complaint for replevin,

he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions (Exh. F-1).

Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan

Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed

against the barangay council and its members (excluding two members) a

complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City, praying for the

annulment of the said resolutions (Civil Case No. 1680-0).

The lower court dismissed the complaint. lt upheld the validity of the

resolutions. The petitioners appealed under Republic Act No. 5440. The

petitioners contend that the barangay council was not duly constituted

because lsidoro M. Maago, Jr., the chairman of the kabataang barangay,

was not allowed to participate in its sessions.

Barangays used to be known as citizens assemblies (Presidential Decrees Nos.

86 and 86-A). Presidential Decree No. 557, which took effect on September

21, 1974, 70 O.G. 8450-L, directed that all barrios should be known as

barangays and adopted the Revised Barrio Charter as the Barangay Charter.

Barrios are units of municipalities or municipal districts in which they are

situated. They are quasi-municipal corporations endowed with such powers"

as are provided by law "for the performance of particular government

functions, to be exercised by and through their respective barrio

governments in conformity with law" (Sec. 2, Revised Barrio Charter, R.A. No.

3590).

The barrio assembly consists of all persons who are residents of the barriofor at least six months, eighteen years of age or over and Filipino citizens duly

registered in the list kept by the barrio secretary (Sec. 4, Ibid).

The barrio council, now barangay council, is composed of the barangay

captain and six councilmen (Sec. 7, Ibid). Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.

684, which took effect on April 15, 1975, provides that "the barangay youth

chairman shall be an ex-officio member of the barangay council", having the

same powers and functions as a barangay councilman.

In this case, Maago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of the

sessions of the barangay council to be held on March 23 and 26, 1976 but he


5/17

was not able to attend those sessions because he was working with a

construction company based at Ipil, Ormoc City (Par. 2[d] Exh. 1).

Maago's absence from the sessions of the barangay council did not render

the said resolutions void. There was a quorum when the said resolutions

were passed.

The other contention of the petitioners is that the resolutions contravene the

constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made respecting an

establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever

be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use,

benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution,

or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,

preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such. except

when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed

forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium

(Sec. 8, Article IV and sec. 18[2], Article VIII, Constitution).

That contention is glaringly devoid of merit. The questioned resolutions do

not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty,

nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest

or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax

money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.

Manifestly puerile and flimsy is Petitioners argument that the barangay

council favored the Catholic religion by using the funds raised by solicitationsand donations for the purchase of the patron saint's wooden image and

making the image available to the Catholic church.

The preposterousness of that argument is rendered more evident by the fact

that counsel advanced that argument in behalf of the petitioner, Father

Osmea the parish priest.

The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the

barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the

purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the

religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta

was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed

in the church when the mass was celebrated.

If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having apatron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the

worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image)

cannot be branded as illegal.

As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its

celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves

the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.

The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden

image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church.

A more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the image, if

placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to any family

desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas.

The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in their affidavits.

Petitioner Garces swore that the said resolutionsfavored the Catholic church.

On the other hand, petitioners Dagar and Edullantes swore that the

resolutionsprejudiced the Catholics because they could see the image in the

church only once a year or during the fiesta (Exh. H and J).

We find that the momentous issues of separation of church and state,

freedom of religion annd the use of public money to favor any sect or church

are not involved at all in this case even remotely or indirectly. lt is not a

microcosmic test case on those issues.

This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. lt would never

have arisen if the parties had been more diplomatic and tactful and if Father

Osmea had taken the trouble of causing contributions to be solicited from

his own parishioners for the purchase ofanother image of San Vicente Ferrerto be installed in his church.

There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay

council. Father Osmea claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The

barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who

should have custody thereof.

If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic

church. that action would not v iolate the Constitution because the image was

acquired withprivate funds and is its private property.

The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the

image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12.

Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public

funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional

provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and

banning the use of public money or property.

InAglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, what was involved was Act No. 4052 which

appropriated sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and the printing of

postage stamps with new designs. Under the law, the Director of Posts, with

the approval of the Department Head and the President of the Philippines,

issued in 1936 postage stamps to commemorate the celebration in Manila of

the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress sponsored by the Catholic Church.

The purpose of the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the Philippines.

The design of the stamps showed a map of the Philippines and nothing about

the Catholic Church. No religious purpose was intended.

Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the founder and head of the Philippine

Independent Church, sought to enjoin the sale of those commemorative

postage stamps.

It was held that the issuance of the stamps, while linked inseparably with an

event of a religious character, was not designed as a propaganda for the

Catholic Church. Aglipay's prohibition suit was dismissed.

The instant case is easily distinguishable from Verzosa vs. Fernandez, 49 Phil.,

627 and 55 Phil. 307, where a religious brotherhood, La Archicofradia del

Santisimo Sacramento, organized for the purpose of raising funds to meet

the expenses for the annual fiesta in honor of the Most Holy Sacrament and

the Virgin Lady of Guadalupe, was held accountable for the funds which it

held as trustee. 0

Finding that the petitioners have no cause of action for the annulment of the

barangay resolutions, the lower court's judgment dismissing their amended

petition is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.


SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996

IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.), petitioner,vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING

PICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S.MENDOZA, respondents.

PUNO,J.:p

This is a petition for review of the Decision dated March 24, 1995 of the

respondent Court of Appeals affirming the action of the respondent Board of

Review for Moving Pictures and Television which x-rated the TV Program

"Ang Iglesia ni Cristo."

Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a

television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every

Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and

propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times

in comparative studies with other religions.

Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992

petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures

and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and

128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the

ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions

which is expressly prohibited by law."

Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action against the respondent Board.

On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the


6/17

classification of its TV Series No. 128. It succeeded in its appeal for on

December 18, 1992, the Office of the President reversed the decision of the

respondent Board. Forthwith, the Board allowed Series No. 128 to be publicly

telecast.

On December 14, 1992, petitioner also filed against the respondent Board

Civil Case No. Q-92-14280, with the RTC, NCR Quezon City.1

Petitioner

alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave

abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV

program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119,

121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD

No. 1986 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code.

On January 4, 1993, the trial court held a hearing on petitioner's prayer for a

writ of preliminary injunction. The parties orally argued and then marked

their documentary evidence. Petitioner submitted the following as its

exhibits, viz.:

(1) Exhibit "A," respondent Board's Voting S lip for

Television showing its September 9, 1992 action on

petitioner's Series No. 115 as follows:2

REMARKS:

There are some inconsistencies in the particular

program as it is very surprising for this program toshow series of Catholic ceremonies and also some

religious sects and using it in their discussion about the

bible. There are remarks which are direct criticism

which affect other religions.

Need more opinions for this particular program. Please

subject to more opinions.

(2) Exhibit "A-1," respondent Board's Voting Slip for

Television showing its September 11, 1992 subsequent

action on petitioner's Series No. 115 as follows:3

REMARKS:

This program is criticizing different religions, based on

their own interpretation of the Bible.

We suggest that the program should delve on

explaining their own faith and beliefs and avoid attacks

on other faith.

(3) Exhibit "B," respondent Board's Voting Slip for

Television showing its October 9, 1992 action on

petitioner's Series No. 119, as follows:4

REMARKS:

The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation ofthe bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the

Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it

is found in the bible that we should do so.

This is intolerance and robs off all sects of freedom of

choice, worship and decision.

(4) Exhibit "C," respondent Board's Voting Slip for

Television showing its October 20, 1992 action on


REMARKS:

I refuse to approve the telecast of this episode for

reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the

Catholic religion.

I refuse to admit that they can tell, dictate any other

religion that they are right and the rest are wrong,

which they clearly present in this episode.

(5) Exhibit "D," respondent Board's Voting Slip for

Television showing its November 20, 1992 action on


REMARKS:

The episode presented criticizes the religious beliefs of

the Catholic and Protestant's beliefs.

We suggest a second review.

(6) Exhibits "E," "E-1," petitioner's block time contract

with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation dated

September 1, 1992.7

(7) Exhibit "F," petitioner's Airtime Contract with Island

Broadcasting Corporation.8

(8) Exhibit "G," letter dated December 18, 1992 of

former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr.,

addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the

decision of the respondent Board which x-rated the

showing of petitioner's Series No. 129. The letter reads

in part:

xxx xxx xxx

The television episode in

question is protected by theconstitutional guarantee of free

speech and expression under

Article III, section 4 of the 1987

Constitution.

We have viewed a tape of the

television episode in question, as

well as studied the passages

found by MTRCB to be

objectionable and we find no

indication that the episode poses

any clear and present danger

sufficient to limit the said

constitutional guarantee.

(9) Exhibits "H," "H-1," letter dated November 26, 1992

of Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., addressed to President Fidel V.

Ramos appealing the action of the respondent Board x-

rating petitioner's Series No. 128.

On its part, respondent Board submitted the following exhibits, viz.:

(1) Exhibit "1," Permit Certificate for Television

Exhibition No. 15181 dated December 18, 1992

allowing the showing of Series No. 128 under parental

guidance.

(2) Exhibit "2," which is Exhibit "G" of petitioner.

(3) Exhibit "3," letter dated October 12, 1992 of

Henrietta S. Mendez, addressed to the Christian Era

Broadcasting Service which reads in part:

xxx xxx xxx

In the matter of your television

show "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo"

Series No. 119, please be

informed that the Board was

constrained to deny your show a

permit to exhibit. The material

involved constitute an attack

against another religion which is

expressly prohibited by

law. Please be guided in the

submission of future shows.

After evaluating the evidence of the parties, the trial court issued

a writ of preliminary injunction on petitioner's bond o P10,000.00.

The trial court set the pre-trial of the case and the parties submitted their

pre-trial briefs.9

The pre-trial briefs show that the parties' evidence is

basically the evidence they submitted in the hearing of the issue of

preliminary injunction. The trial of the case was set and reset several times as

the parties tried to reach an amicable accord. Their efforts failed and the


7/17

records show that after submission of memoranda, the trial court rendered a

Judgment,10

on December 15, 1993, the dispositive portion of which reads:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering

respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and

Television (BRMPT) to grant petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo

the necessary permit for all the series of "Ang Iglesia ni

Cristo" program.

Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, however, is directed to

refrain from offending and attacking other existing

religions in showing "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration11

praying: (a) for the deletion of the

second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Decision, and (b) for the

Board to be perpetually enjoined from requiring petitioner to submit for

review the tapes of its program. The respondent Board opposed the

motion.12

On March 7, 1993, the trial court granted petitioner's Motion for

Reconsideration. It ordered:13

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is

granted. The second portion of the Court's Order dated

December 15, 1993, directing petitioner to refrain

from offending and attacking other existing religions in

showing "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program is hereby

deleted and set aside. Respondents are further

prohibited from requiring petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo to

submit for review VTR tapes of its religious program

"Ang Iglesia ni Cristo."

Respondent Board appealed to the Court of Appeals after its

motion for reconsideration was denied.14

On March 5, 1995, the respondent Court of Appeals 15 reversed the trial court.It ruled that: (1) the respondent board has jurisdiction and power to review

the TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and (2) the respondent Board did not

act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition

on TV of the three series of "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" on the ground that the

materials constitute an attack against another religion. It also found the

series "indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.

In this petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45, petitioner raises the

following issues:

I

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE "ANG IGLESIANI CRISTO" PROGRAM IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY

PROTECTED AS A FORM OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AND

EXPRESSION.

II


APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT BEING AN

EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE "ANG IGLESIA

NI CRISTO" PROGRAM IS SUBJECT TO THE POLICE

POWER OF THE STATE ONLY IN THE EXTREME CASE

THAT IT POSES A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER.

III


APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTRCB IS

VESTED WITH THE POWER TO CENSOR RELIGIOUS

PROGRAMS.

IV


APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE "ANG IGLESIA

NI CRISTO," A PURELY RELIGIOUS PROGRAM IS

INDECENT AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND GOOD

CUSTOMS.

The basic issues can be reduced into two: (1) first, whether the respondent

Board has the power to review petitioner's TV program "Ang Iglesia ni

Cristo," and (2) second, assuming it has the power, whether it gravely abused

its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner's religious program,

series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that they constitute an attack

against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and good

customs.

The first issue can be resolved by examining the powers of the Board under

PD No. 1986. Its section 3 pertinently provides:

Sec. 3 Powers and Functions. -- The BOARD shall have

the following functions, powers and duties:

xxx xxx xxx

b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures

as herein defined, television programs, including

publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and

stills, whether such motion pictures and publicity

materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical

distribution for television broadcast or for general

viewing, imported or produced in the Philippines andin the latter case, whether they be for local viewing or

for export.

c) To approve, delete objectionable portion from

and/or prohibitthe importation, exportation,

production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition

and/or television broadcastof the motion

pictures, television programs and publicity materials,

subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the

judgment of the BOARD applying contemporary

Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable

for being immoral, indecent, contrary to lawand/or

good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic

of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous

tendency to encourage the commission of violence orof a wrong or crime, such as but not limited to:

i) Those which tend to incite

subversion, insurrection,

rebellion or sedition against the

State, or otherwise threaten the

economic and/or political

stability of the State;

ii) Those which tend to

undermine the faith and

confidence of the people, their

government and/or duly

constituted authorities;

iii) Those which glorify criminals

or condone crimes;

iv) Those which serve no other

purpose but to satisfy the

market for violence or

pornography;

v) Those which tend to abet the

traffic in and use of prohibited

drugs;

vi) Those which are libelous or

defamatory to the good nameand reputation of any person,

whether living or dead;

vii) Those which may constitute

contempt of court or of

any quasi-judicial tribunal, or

pertain to matters which are

subjudice in nature (emphasis

ours).

The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine

all "television programs." By the clear terms of the law, the Board


8/17

has the power to "approve, delete . . . and/or prohibit the . . .

exhibition and/or television broadcast of . . . television

programs . . ." The law also directs the Board to apply

"contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard" to determine

those which are objectionable for being "immoral, indecent,

contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of

the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous

tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong

or crime."

Petitioner contends that the term "television program" should not include

religious programs like its program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." A contraryinterpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the

Constitution which guarantees that "no law shall be made respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free

exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without

discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed."

We reject petitioner's submission which need not set us adrift in a

constitutional voyage towards an uncharted sea. Freedom of religion has

been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws,

past and present. We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it is

"designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow

each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to

live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and

with the common good."16

We have also laboriously defined in our

jurisprudence the intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right toreligious profession and worship. To quote the summation of Mr. Justice

Isagani Cruz, our well-known constitutionalist:17

Religious Profession and Worship

The right to religious profession and worship has a

two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom

to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as

the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The

second is subject to regulation where the belief is

translated into external acts that affect the public

welfare.

(1) Freedom to Believe

The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he

pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his

own theories about life and death; worship any god he

chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion;

acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that

appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the

immortality of his soul -- in fact, cherish any religious

conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd

his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and

heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe

as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his

beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do

so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. "Men may

believe what they cannot prove." Every one has a right

to his beliefs and he may not be called to accountbecause he cannot prove what he believes.

(2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs

But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts

or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so

becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great

as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the

other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be

enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of

others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of

religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it

impotent in protecting the general welfare. The

inherent police power can be exercised to prevent

religious practices inimical to society. And this is true

even if such practices are pursued out of sincere

religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of

evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions

of the law.

Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: "The constitutional

provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities,

it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty,

not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from

conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from

conformity to law because of religious dogma.

Accordingly, while one has lull freedom to believe in

Satan, he may not offer the object of his piety a human

sacrifice, as this would be murder. Those who literally

interpret the Biblical command to "go forth and

multiply" are nevertheless not allowed to contract

plural marriages in violation of the laws against bigamy.

A person cannot refuse to pay taxes on the ground that

it would be against his religious tenets to recognize any

authority except that of God alone. An atheist cannot

express in his disbelief in act of derision that wound

the feelings of the faithful. The police power can validly

asserted against the Indian practice of the suttee, born

of deep religious conviction, that calls on the widow to

immolate herself at the funeral pile of her husband.

We thus reject petitioner's postulate that its religious program is per

se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its

religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a

medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates

the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State

when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive

evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the

more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare.

A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal

mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is

and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across

the sea and in our shore, the bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men

were caused by irreconcilable religious differences. Our country is still not

safe from the recurrence of this stultifying strife considering our warring

religious beliefs and the fanaticism with which some of us cling and claw to

these beliefs. Even now, we have yet to settle the near century old strife in

Mindanao, the roots of which have been nourished by the mistrust and

misunderstanding between our Christian and Muslim brothers and sisters.

The bewildering rise of weird religious cults espousing violence as an article

of faith also proves the wisdom of our rule rejecting a strict let alone policy

on the exercise of religion. For sure, we shall continue to subject any act

pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny

but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For

when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.

It is also petitioner's submission that the respondent appellate court gravely

erred when it affirmed the ruling of the respondent Board x-rating its TV

Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. The records show that therespondent Board disallowed the program series for "attacking" other

religions. Thus, Exhibits "A," "A-1," (respondent Board's Voting Slip for

Television) reveal that its reviewing members x-rated Series 115 for ". . .

criticizing different religions, based on their own interpretation of the Bible."

They suggested that the program should only explain petitioner's ". . . own

faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other faiths." Exhibit "B" shows that

Series No. 119 was x-rated because "the Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal

translation of the bible and says that our Catholic veneration of the Virgin

Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible that we

should do so. This is intolerance . . ." Exhibit "C" shows that Series No. 121

was x-rated ". . . for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the

Catholic religion. . . . (T)hey can not tell, dictate any other religion that they

are right and the rest are wrong

. . ." Exhibit "D" also shows that Series No. 128 was not favorably

recommended because it ". . . outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs." On

second review, it was x-rated because of its "unbalanced interpretations of

some parts of the bible."18

In sum, the respondent Board x-rated petitioner's

TV program series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128 because of petitioner's

controversial biblical interpretations and its "attacks" against contrary

religious beliefs. The respondent appellate court agreed and even held that

the said "attacks" are indecent, contrary to law and good customs.

We reverse the ruling of the appellate court.

First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior

restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains

speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted

with furrowed brows.19

It is the burden of the respondent Board to

overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of

censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.

Second. The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners

TV series for "attacking" either religions, especially the Catholic church. An

examination of the evidence, especially Exhibits "A," "A-1," "B," "C," and "D"

will show that the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the

deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not

viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet

they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law

and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under

section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of

speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. It

misappreciates the essence of freedom to differ as delineated in the

benchmark case ofCantwell v. Connecticut, so viz.:20


9/17

xxx xxx xxx

In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political

belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields, the tenets

of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor.

To persuade others to his own point of view, the

pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration,

to vilification of men who have been, or are prominent

in church or state or even to false statements. But the

people of this nation have ordained in the light of

history that inspite of the probability of excesses and

abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essentialto enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of

the citizens of democracy.

The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other

religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such

criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our

constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any

religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion.

Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve

peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the

establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State

from leaning towards any religion. Vis-a-vis religious differences,

the State enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its

fixed and immovable stance. In fine, respondent board cannot

squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because itattacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the

most numerous church in our country. In a State where there

ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality

of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better

theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of

thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of

dueling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace

of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for

it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that

can fan the embers of truth.

Third. The respondents cannot also rely on the ground "attacks against

another religion" in x-rating the religious program of petitioner. Even a

sideglance at section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal that it is not among the

grounds to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's television

program. The ground "attack against another religion" was merely added by

the respondent Board in its Rules.21

This rule is void for it runs smack against

the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand

the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce.

It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize" attack against any

religion" as a ground allegedly ". . . because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986

prohibits the showing of motion pictures, television programs and publicity

materials which are contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised

Penal Code punishes anyone who exhibits "shows which offendany race or

religion." We respectfully disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not

synonymous with the word "offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the

Revised Penal Code should be invoked to justify the subsequent

punishmentof a show which offends any religion. It cannot be utilized to

justifyprior censorship of speech. It must be emphasized that E.O. 876, the

law prior to PD 1986, included "attack against any religion" as a ground for

censorship. The ground was not, however, carried over by PD 1986. Its

deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent. Indeed, even

the Executive Department espouses this view.

Thus, in an Opinion dated November 28, 1985 then Minister of

Justice, now President of the Senate, Neptali Gonzales explained:

xxx xxx xxx

However, the question whether the BRMPT (now

MTRCB) may preview and censor the subject television

program of INC should be viewed in the light of the

provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of PD 1986, which

is substantially the same as the provision of Section 3,paragraph (c) of E.O. No. 876-A, which prescribes the

standards of censorship, to wit: "immoral, indecent,

contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the

prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people

or with dangerous tendency to encourage the

commission of violence, or of a wrong" as determined

by the Board, "applying contemporary Filipino cultural

values as standard." As stated, the intention of the

Board to subject the INC's television program to

"previewing and censorship is prompted by the fact

that its religious program makes mention of beliefs and

practices of other religion." On the face of the law itself,

there can conceivably be no basis for censorship of said

program by the Board as much as the alleged reason

cited by the Board does not appear to he within the

contemplation of the standards of censorship set by

law. (Emphasis supplied).

Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to

apply the clear and present danger rule. InAmerican Bible Society v. City of

Manila,22

this Court held: "The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and

enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to

disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified

like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is

aclear and present dangerof any substantive evil which the State has theright to prevent." In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,

23we further

ruled that ". . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent

animmediate and grave dangerto the security and welfare of the community

that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the

smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger."

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the

respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify

the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks

against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of

harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the

threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot

be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and

imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.

It is suggested that we re-examine the application of clear and present

danger rule to the case at bar. In the United States, it is true that the c lear

and present danger test has undergone permutations. It was Mr. Justice

Holmes who formulated the test in Schenck v. US,24

as follows: ". . . the

question in every case is whether the words used are used in such

circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clearand present

dangerthat they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a

right to prevent." Admittedly, the test was originally designed to determine

the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-government

action. Bannered by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, the test attained its full

flowering in the decade of the forties, when its umbrella was used to protect

speech other than subversive speech.25

Thus, for instance, the test was

applied to annul a total ban on labor picketing.26

The use of the test took a

downswing in the 1950's when the US Supreme Court decided Dennis

v. United States involving communist conspiracy.27 In Dennis, the

components of the test were altered as the High Court adopted Judge

Learned Hand's formulation that ". . . in each case [courts] must ask whether

the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion

of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." The imminence

requirement of the test was thus diminished and to that extent, the

protection of the rule was weakened. In 1969, however, the strength of the

test was reinstated in Brandenburg v. Ohio,28

when the High Court restored

in the test the imminence requirement, and even added an intent

requirement which according to a noted commentator ensured that only

speech directed at inciting lawlessness could be punished.29

Presentlyin the

United States, the clear and present danger test is not appliedto protectlow

value speeches such as obscene speech, commercial speech and defamation.

Be that as it may, the test is still applied to four types of speech: speech that

advocates dangerous ideas, speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction,

out of court contempt and release of information that endangers a fair

trial.30

Hence, even follow

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