Fraud on the market - part 2

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    Prof. George W. ConkGuest lecturer: Wallace Showman, Esq.

    [email protected]

    Room 409

    212-636-7446

    Adjunct Professor of Law &

    Senior Fellow

    Stein Center for Law & Ethics

    Remedies

    Fall 2014

    10b-5 Securities Fraud ActionsFraud on the market after Halliburton v. Erica P.

    John Fund (204)

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    mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]
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    Fraud on the Market

    the fraud-on-the-market theory, which

    holds that the market price of shares

    traded on well-developed markets reflects

    all publicly available information, and,

    hence, any material misrepresentations.

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    Fraud on the market - Basic

    [I]n an open and developed securities

    market, the price of a company's stock

    is determined by the available material

    information regarding the company andits business. . . . Misleading statements

    will therefore defraud purchasers of

    stock even if the purchasers do not

    directly rely on the misstatements. . .

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    Two constituent presumptions

    (1) that the public and materialmisrepresentation impacted the price ofthe security because it was traded in an

    efficient market; and

    (2) that the plaintiff purchased thesecurity in reliance on his belief that the

    market's valuation of the security wouldnot reflect fraudulently disseminatedmisinformation.

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    To invoke the presumption

    Plaintiff must show:

    Publicity

    Materiality

    Market efficiency

    Market timing

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    LangevoortJudgment Day

    What Basic does, as much as

    anything, is create an entitlement to

    an undistorted stock price via, as Ihave described it, an act of juristic

    grace.

    This is no different from what

    happens in the common law of fraud.Fraud on the market - 10 (b)(5) actions 6

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    Three Presumptions - Goldberg &

    Zipursky 1) Legally cognizable injury is shown by

    purchaseof securities at a market pricedistortedby the defendantsmisrepresentations

    2) Distortion is presumed if amisrepresentation is material,disseminated to the public, and securities

    are sold on an efficient market 3) Reliance is presumed but may be

    rebutted

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    Rebuttable Presumption of Reliance

    on the Integrity of the Market Price

    Requiring a plaintiff to show a speculativestate of facts, i.e., how he would haveacted if omitted material information had

    been disclosed, ... or if themisrepresentation had not been made...would place an unnecessarily unrealisticevidentiary burden on the Rule 10b-5

    plaintiff who has traded on an impersonalmarket.

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    Rebutting the presumption

    Any showing that severs the linkbetween the alleged

    misrepresentation and either the

    price received (or paid) by the

    plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a

    fair market price, will be sufficient to

    rebut the presumption of reliance.

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    Markets are imperfect

    n28 By accepting this rebuttablepresumption, we do not intend

    conclusively to adopt any particular

    theory of how quickly and completely

    publicly available information is

    reflected in market price.

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    Halliburton Co. V. Erica P. John Fund

    Cert. granted 11/15/ 2013

    Questions presented 1. Whether this Court should overrule

    or substantially modify the holding of

    Basic Inc. v. Levinson to the extent

    that it recognizes a presumption of

    classwide reliance derived from the

    fraud-on-the-market theory.

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    Halliburton Co. V. Erica P. John Fund

    Cert. granted 11/15/ 2013

    Questions presented 2. Whether, in a case where the

    plaintiff invokes the presumption of

    reliance to seek class certification,the defendant may rebut thepresumption and prevent classcertification by introducing evidence

    that the alleged misrepresentationsdid not distort the market price

    of its stock.Fraud on the market - 10 (b)(5) actions 13

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    13-CV-23878-UU, 2014 WL

    4814352 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29,2014)

    Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm.

    Partners Inc.,

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    Rule 23 Class Actions - Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

    (a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class

    may sue or be sued as representative parties onbehalf of all members only if:

    (1) the class is so numerousthat joinder of allmembers is impracticable;

    (2) there are questions of law or fact commonto the class;

    (3) the claims or defenses of therepresentative parties are typicalof the claimsor defenses of the class; and

    (4) the representative parties will fairly andadequately protect the interests of the class.

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    Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharma (2014)

    What was the misrepresentation?

    What was the alleged price impact?

    How did Catalyst respond?

    Who is properly in the class?

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    Aranaz v. CatalystPlaintiffs proposed class

    All persons or entities that purchased or

    otherwise acquired CatalystPharmaceutical Partners Inc. securitiesduring the period from August 27, 2013,

    through October 18, 2013, and who didnot sell such securities prior to October18, 2013

    What is the judges objection to thisdefinition?

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    Entitlement to presumption of reliance

    (1) the misrepresentation was material;

    (2) the misrepresentation was publiclyknown

    (3) the plaintiff traded the security after

    the misrepresentation was made publicbut before the truth was revealed

    (4) the security traded in an efficientmarket.

    What is the truth on the marketdefense? To what is it relevant?

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    Price impact

    What is it and what is its relevance to

    class certification?

    Who has the burden of rebuttal?

    Is it a question for the jury? Or the

    judge?

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    Superiority

    Under Rule 23(b)(3), a movant must show

    that a class action is superior to otheravailable methods for fairly and efficientlyadjudicating the controversy.

    The focus of this analysis is on therelative advantages of a class action suitover whatever other forms of litigation

    might be realistically available to theplaintiffs.

    Why is a class action a superior remedy?

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