Forward to the Past? Loyalist Paramilitarism in Northern ...€¦ · Forward to the Past? 3 by...

Forward to the Past? Loyalist Paramilitarism in

Northern Ireland Since 1994

Rachel Monaghan

Author post-print (accepted) deposited by Coventry University’s Repository

Original citation & hyperlink: Monaghan, Rachel, and Peter Shirlow. "Forward to the past? Loyalist paramilitarism in

Northern Ireland since 1994." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34.8 (2011): 649-665.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.583205

ISSN - 1057-610X

Publisher: Taylor and Francis

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.583205

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Forward to the Past?

1

Title: Forward to the Past? Loyalist Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland since

1994

Authors: Dr Rachel Monaghan (University of Ulster) and Dr Peter Shirlow (Queen’s

University Belfast)

Short bios:

Rachel Monaghan is a senior lecturer in criminology at the University of Ulster. She

has been researching paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland for the past twelve

years and has published extensively on this topic.

Peter Shirlow is the Director of Education in the School of Law at Queen's University

Belfast. He is co-author of the books Belfast: Segregation, Violence and the City and

'Beyond the Wire': Former Prisoners and Conflict Transformation in Northern

Ireland (both Pluto Press: London).


2

This article considers in detail loyalist paramilitary activity in

Northern Ireland since the paramilitary ceasefires of 1994. The

continuing nature of contemporary loyalist violence is

documented with reference to sectarian attacks against

members of the ‘Other’/Catholic community and associated

symbols of that community, violence directed at other loyalists

and the potential for future violence given constitutional

uncertainty regarding Northern Ireland’s position within the

United Kingdom. The article also challenges assumptions

within the broader literature of an inability within loyalist

paramilitary groups to move beyond violence in the post-

ceasefire period with particular reference to their conflict

transformation efforts.

Background

Prior to the 1990s Northern Ireland’s history was characterised by a period of

protracted low-intensity conflict often referred to as the ‘Troubles’, with the advent of

paramilitary ceasefires in 1994 and the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998,

Northern Ireland is considered to be post-conflict.1 Ulster loyalism has many

peculiarities and contradictions within it. The main organisations the Ulster

Volunteer Force and Ulster Defence Association (and their nom de guerre the Ulster

Freedom Fighters) mainly targeted civilian Catholics (some 80 percent of all of their

victims) following the vain idea that if they did so they would stop the Irish

Republican Army and its violent campaign to create a united Ireland. However,

members within the same organisations in the 1970s and 1980s aimed for peace,

power-sharing and accommodation with the nationalist (mainly Catholic population).

Unlike Irish Republicans loyalist paramilitary groups were rarely managed in a direct

manner. They tended towards more confederate structures and most certainly had

memberships with variant levels of sectarianism and ideology within them. Much of

their violence was based on their assertion that the British State’s hands were ‘tied’


3

by conventional laws of engagement and that their role was to use violence to prevent

the collapse of Northern Ireland’s constitutional position within the United Kingdom.

Yet, despite a political solution to the conflict, political violence albeit on a lower

level than previously experienced still continues. The particular focus of this paper is

loyalist paramilitary activity. Thus the objectives of this paper are to measure and

explain the nature of loyalist violence since the ceasefires of 19942; to examine that

violence at the level of sectarianism, feuding and future constitutional change; to

determine the meaning and rational of such violence; to analyse the form and

potential of conflict transformation and the re-definition of loyalism; and to examine

and challenge the external attitudes directed at loyalists and how this perpetuates

criminalisation and loyalist insecurity.

Peace and Violence

Analysis of post-conflict violence generally examines renewed conflict between

enemies, the rise of dissidents opposed to peace making initiatives and those who

morph into criminal gangs.3 In South Africa and Serbia some paramilitaries sought

the maintenance of status through “punishment” violence, revenge or extensive

criminality. Dowdney argues that such violence maintained lost status while Stedman

and Boyce assert that dissenters aim to ‘spoil’ what they view as unjust peace

accords.4

Such analyses are partly valid with regard to post-ceasefire loyalism.5 Violence,

although declining, continues and criminal activity has grown.6 Sluka contends that

loyalists continue to mount an “insidious campaign of violence against Catholics”


4

despite their ceasefires and peace process.7 A perception that loyalist paramilitary

groups are synonymous with criminal gangs is further enhanced by high profile

loyalists’ engagement in criminal activities, examples would include the Ulster

Defence Association’s (UDA) Andre Shoukri and the Ulster Volunteer Force’s (UVF)

Mark Haddock, who was later revealed as a paid agent of the State.8 In addition, the

attitudes of ‘middle’ or ‘political Unionism’ have compounded this perception:

Pro-state paramilitaries usually have a more difficult relationship

with their community of origin than do anti-state paramilitaries –

the latter often being seen as freedom fighters whilst the former are

often seen as ‘thugs’ in a context where the state has played a

primary role representing a community’s interests.9

Therefore, it is not surprising to learn that only 3 per cent of Protestants supported the

prisoner release scheme put in place by the Belfast Agreement and the Democratic

Unionist Party’s response to the scheme stated: “All decent people recoil with moral

contempt at the prospect of the mass release of those who have murdered and maimed

the innocent.”10

However, the present leadership attached to the UVF, Red Hand Commandos (RHC),

UDA and Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) sponsor conflict transformation and

reconciliation and have aimed to curb and re-direct the nature of loyalist military

violence. They have, for example, excluded members who perpetuated sectarian and

racist violence and criminality.11 Moreover, the UVF and the RHC in May 2007

announced that they were assuming “a non-military civilianised role” which


5

culminated in June 2009 with the decommissioning of arms.12 Similarly, the UDA

issued a Remembrance Day Statement (2007) acknowledging that “the war is over”

and stood down the UFF’s active service units.13 Decommissioning of arms

commenced in September 2009 and was finalised in early 2010.14

Bruce in particular has highlighted the identities, personalities and events that have

driven loyalist violence.15 The vacuum created by the peace process and Bruce’s

prediction that Irish Republican Army (IRA) demilitarisation would create a “hollow

façade” for loyalists is crucial in interpreting post-conflict outcomes.16 The pro-state

character of loyalism undermined political adjustment and is crucial in exploring a

truncated adjustment to peace.

The leadership’s commitment to conflict transformation is important but has been

paralleled by the use of violence especially against those who have undermined

loyalist “authority.” The utilisation of violence against loyalist opponents is

envisaged as a “necessary” removal of a key impediment to loyalist transition. Such

violence highlights the somewhat intangible nature of loyalism and encourages

external renditions that present it as an “idiocy that comes with a fragmented culture

that has lost both memory and meaning.”17

Loyalism is also castigated for “lacking” the capacity to socially transform. As noted

by Alison, “‘liberatory’ forms (Irish republicans) also usually incorporate fairly

wide-ranging goals of social transformation as part of their political programmes

while state and pro-state nationalisms (loyalists) do not.”18 Morrissey bemoans the

existence of a “warlord syndrome” in Northern Ireland whereby organisations


6

representing ex-combatants become arbitrary gate-keepers of their respective

communities hindering the ability of the statutory sector to work in working-class

areas.19

Commentators also note the electoral failures of parties directly associated with

loyalist groups.20 The Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) associated with the UDA

formed in 1981 was dissolved in 2001 and had few electoral successes during its

twenty years of existence. Its role has largely been taken over by the Ulster Political

Research Group. The Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) aligned with the UVF had

greater electoral success and in the March 2007 Northern Ireland Assembly elections

secured enough votes to return one elected politician to Stormont. At the local council

level, the party has two councillors on Belfast City Council.21 As Smyth argues “the

political path has not yet provided the political wings of the Loyalist paramilitaries

with a viable alternative to violence, since they failed to parallel the electoral success

of Sinn Féin on the Nationalist side.”22

Thus loyalism is generally represented as failing to determine a social space with a

positive vocabulary regarding the ownership and meaning of its own identity; having

undermined the potential to build social capital; infested with criminals; and divided

between neo-fascism and socialism. Such depictions have worth but are counter-

balanced by those loyalists who in rejecting the efficacy of violence as a strategy in

itself provide a powerful exercise in moral leadership. In challenging negative

portrayals of them loyalist leaders argue that positive presentations of conflict

transformation are generally unmentioned by external commentators; they have done

much to quell elements intent upon a return to conflict; networks have been created


7

that encourage dialogue with former adversaries; that they promote the principles of

conflict transformation; and loyalists are building links with statutory agencies in

order to encourage social capital formation.

Positive and negative forms of loyalism have always co-existed and the peace process

is allowing “thinking” loyalism to emerge, if slowly and unevenly.23 With the

exception of Bruce and McAuley the role of “transitional” loyalism is under-

explored.24 In furthering these analyses the research team considered recent violence

and the capacity to shift into progressive and legitimate domains. Such a transition is

crucial with regard to ending victimization, encouraging citizenship and demobilising

threat. Despite the immediacy of such issues it is obvious that the capacity to shift

loyalism forwards has come from within. There has been insufficient external

recognition of positive loyalist leadership within public discourse while much has

been made of its failures. For example, the Alliance Party demanded the end to

loyalist funding following the shooting of a police officer in Carrickfergus while

Northern Ireland’s Social Development Minister, Margaret Ritchie, tried to withdraw

support for a £1.2m project aimed at helping to move the UDA away from violence.25

Despite this and the ad hoc nature of it transitional attitudes and models are being

advanced and their promotion aims to emasculate a loyalism that does not shift

forwards but returns to a de-stabilising past.

Methods

Within social science research it has been recognised that “gaining access and insight

into partially or wholly deviant groups is fraught with difficulties.”26 However,

gaining access was not a problem regarding this study. The research team have


8

created strong working relationships with loyalists despite critical assessment of them.

To some extent paramilitary groups are willing to engage if trust has been established.

Key loyalists do not discourage criticism if it is based upon open research criteria that

underlines the aims and objectives of what is being studied and are informed and

shown the material that is to be produced, even if that material is critical and negative

of them.

Trust is generally established over a long-time frame. Among many loyalists there is

recognition that academic research furthers conflict transformation via external

dialogue. The trust built in previous projects allowed greater access than previously

granted. Thus the respondents included two prominent members of the RHC, a

member of the UVF’s Brigade Staff, a UVF Company Commander, two Inner

Council members of the UDA/UFF, and 12 volunteers drawn across these

organisations. Two members of the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) were also

interviewed as were political representatives from seven local political parties and

spokespersons from the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. The Assistant

Chief Constable was interviewed as well as staff from the British-Irish Secretariat, the

former chair of the Loyalist Commission and members of the community sector.

Analysis emerged through a process of snowball sampling, intermediary agencies and

personal contacts. This is a non-probability sample and it is legitimate to question the

quality of data arising from this methodological approach. The research did, however,

triangulate data on loyalist paramilitary violence through semi-structured interviews

with community organisations, and statutory bodies with experience of such violence,

feedback from political parties and secondary data sources (newspapers, community-


9

newssheets and police statistics). The nature and types of violence undertaken, the

justifications for its use were independently repeated in the accounts of a number of

interviewees. An “ideal-type” sampling framework simply is not available to

researchers in areas of high sensitivity.27 Liebling and Stanko note that “telling any

story about violence entails a negotiation with norms.”28 Thus the research team make

normative judgements about the types of information gained.

Low ranking members displayed a very localised knowledge concerning loyalist

activity compared to elite members who held wider interpretations. Members of the

same organisation had at times dissimilar motivations and attitudes. In overcoming

these difficulties the research team undertook interviews across a broad spectrum

from “foot soldiers” to leaders. Qualitative work was undertaken with individuals in

order to ensure that respondents spoke without hindrance from other members. In

previous research, some individuals would not dissent when they were interviewed in

the company of others. Younger and more critical voices tended to remain silent.

Personal interviewing encouraged diverse opinions and perspectives to be raised via

specific quotes and broad themes. The identity of these members of illegal

organisations is withheld.

The research also incorporated a measurement of violent events both through the

collation of deaths data and the mapping of these events in Belfast. Postcodes relating

to site of death, especially in the early 1970s and beyond Belfast, are deficient. There

are several indexes regarding politically motivated deaths in Northern Ireland and

criticism of them regarding their accuracy. With regard to this the research team


10

undertook the assemblage of their own database via newspaper articles and

information provided by respondents and the police.

A list of deaths in Northern Ireland from 1966 to (May) 2010 was also created. This

was presented to interviewees for comment and in several cases the group responsible

was altered. The post-1994 data was generally agreed but in several circumstances the

status of the victim remained contested. The UVF, for example, contended that two

persons noted as Protestant civilians were members of the LVF, although the LVF

respondents denied this. In order to create standardisation the research team accepted

the organisational claiming of members.

A database of reported loyalist paramilitary “punishments” was also created. Unlike

the available police data, the research team via consultation with respondents were

able to attribute responsibility to respective loyalist paramilitary groups.

Loyalist Violence

In developing a frame within which to analyse loyalist violence Rosenbaum and

Sederberg’s triple-level typology of vigilantism or “establishment violence” was

adopted and developed.29 Such violence “consists of acts or threats of coercion in

violation of the formal boundaries of an established socio-political order which,

however, are intended by the violators to defend that order from some form of

subversion.”30

Accordingly Rosenbaum and Sederberg’s levels of vigilantism involve crime control

vigilantism, social group control vigilantism and regime control vigilantism. Crime

control vigilantism is directed against those individuals believed to be engaged in


11

illegal activities, for example “punishment” attacks on suspected criminals or

individuals engaged in anti-social behaviour. Social group control vigilantism aims to

control groups vying for a new social order, for example loyalist sectarian attacks on

Catholics. Regime control vigilantism is establishment violence designed to alter the

regime’s functioning, for example the involvement of loyalist paramilitaries in the

Ulster Workers’ Council Strike, which saw the collapse of the Sunningdale

Agreement in 1974.31

Such “actor-based” violence remains but in fewer incidences. Crime control violence

is commonly identified but is declining. Social group violence, especially with regard

to the activities of the Loyalist Volunteer Force, C Company and the Red Hand

Defenders (a cover name used by C Company), has also been undertaken although

this violence has declined. The capacity to undertake regime change violence has

dwindled. Key loyalists supported the Belfast Agreement or understood their inability

to mobilise against it. The potential of regime change violence still lies in

constitutional uncertainty. There is an additional dimension that is crucial in

undertaking contemporary loyalist violence and that is internal group control based

upon feuding, criminality and dissent.

Loyalists were responsible for 977 deaths in the period between 1966 and the

ceasefires of 1994.32 The majority of victims (74.1 percent) were civilian Catholics.

Loyalist violence in Belfast has been undertaken within a narrow arena that is largely

confined to the Shankill in west Belfast and the interfaces between it and

nationalist/republican places. Other boundary zones between Donegall Pass and the

Lower Ormeau (south Belfast) and Short Strand and Ballymacarrett (east Belfast) are


12

important. Few killings took place beyond these interface zones and within the centre

of republican/nationalist communities. UVF bombings produced sites of multiple

casualties most of which were public bars, for example, the bombing of McGurk’s

Bar in Belfast in 1971 which resulted in the deaths of 15 people.

According to the data in the period prior to the ceasefires of 1994 the UVF/RHC were

responsible for 534 deaths or 54.6 percent of all loyalist fatalities. Catholic civilians

constituted 72.6 percent of victims. Only 4.3 percent of all victims were either

republican paramilitaries or Sinn Féin members. A further 3.1 percent were members

of the UVF and 2.8 percent of victims were members of UDA/UFF.

A similar pattern emerges in relation to UDA/UFF violence in the same time period.

This grouping was responsible for some 406 murders with the majority of victims

civilian Catholics (71.4 percent). Additionally, 4.9 percent of victims were members

of the UDA/UFF and 1.1 percent were members of the UVF.

An obvious feature of loyalist violence between 1966 and 1994 was a significant

decline in the death rate after the mid 1970s, especially within Belfast (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Loyalist Attributed Deaths in Belfast from 1966 (By Organisation)33


13

A rise in loyalist violence occurred in the 1980s but this growth did not match

previous levels. The rise in violence after 1986 was closely linked to the activities of

the UFF’s C Company and the Mid-Ulster Brigade of the UVF. The emergence of C

Company as dedicated militarists under the leadership of Johnny Adair and the

growing military status of the UVF’s Mid-Ulster Brigade member, Billy Wright was

important with regard to future violence. The formation of the LVF in 1996 was

directly linked to the mid-Ulster UVF, under Wright’s leadership, perpetuating

sectarian murder and being expelled from the organisation by the UVF leadership.

According to the data there have been 98 loyalist killings since 1994 with two-thirds

of these (59) occurring in just four years: 1997 15 killings, 1998 17, 2000 12 and 2001


14

15. These deaths can be further classified with regards to victim type and organisation

responsible as detailed in Table 1.

Table 1: Post-Ceasefire Loyalist Attributed Deaths34 (1994-2010)

Group Responsible

Victim

Type

UVF LVF* C

Company

UDA/UFF Unspecified RHC RHD Total

Catholic

Civilian

2 9 2 5 12 5 35

Protestant

Civilian

11 2 2 4 1 1 21

UVF 5 3 1 3 1 13

UDA/UFF 3 3 8 1 15

C Company 1 1

Police 1 1 2

IRA 1 1

RHC 1 1 2

LVF 4 1 1 6

RHD 1 1

PUP 1 1

Total 25 17 9 21 15 2 9 98

*Includes unsanctioned murder whilst LVF members were in UVF.

With regard to social control violence the following can be observed from the data, 35

civilian Catholics were murdered by loyalists in the post-ceasefire period. This

constituted 35.7 percent of all deaths attributed to loyalist paramilitaries. Civilian

Catholics constituted the minority of loyalist murders after 1994, although they

remain as the largest identified group. Of this group 16 (45.7 percent) were murdered

by the LVF, C Company and the RHD. An additional 12 (34.3 percent) were killed by

none of the above organisations. Furthermore, 20 percent of Catholic civilians were


15

murdered by the UVF and UDA/UFF. For example, Gary Moore was shot dead in

December 2000 by the UVF while renovating houses on the loyalist Monkstown

estate in Newtownabbey, County Antrim. The UDA shot Daniel McColgan, a postal

worker as he arrived at work in Rathcoole (Newtownabbey) in January 2002. Only

two murders were sanctioned by UFF Brigade members.35 None of these murders

committed by the UVF were according to those interviewed sanctioned at leadership

level.

Other examples of social control violence undertaken by loyalists would include the

use of pipe bombs. These are crudely made improvised explosive devices that are

relatively easy to construct. Such devices can inflict serious injuries and in some cases

cause death.36 The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) estimate that loyalists

were involved in 702 pipe bombing incidents between 2000 and the end of May

2010.37 Most of these attacks were directed at Catholic communities and targets

included homes, cars, schools, churches, licensed premises and nationalist politicians’

homes and offices. There were 236 attacks in 2001 and 135 in 2002 (65 percent of all

attacks). Attacks have been on the decline from 2003 (43) to a low of 4 in 2006 but

have begun to increase slowly. Security situation statistics record 8 in 2008, 6 in 2009

and 4 thus far for the current year. Interviewees suggested that most of these attacks

were conducted by C Company, RHD and UFF although the security situation

statistics obtained from the PSNI do not provide a breakdown by group and further

note that whilst the incident/devices may be attributed to loyalists based upon

information available to the police they do not necessarily indicate the involvement of

a paramilitary organisation.


16

Historically, loyalist paramilitaries have undertaken a policing role in the

communities in which they operate since the early 1970s.38 Initially this involved the

mounting of roadblocks, patrolling the streets and gathering evidence against petty

criminals. Over time a graduated scale or tariff system consistent with the seriousness

of the offence under consideration has developed. This tariff ranges from warnings,

threats, curfew, fines or restitution, placarding, tarring and feathering, beatings,

shootings, exiling and ultimately death. Such crime control violence is in part a

response to community pressure for the organizations “to do something” about crime

in their areas. As a UVF Commander in Belfast explains,

We want to see the end of punishment attacks in the same breath

there is a community out there who is reliant on the UVF to mete

out punishment, because in many cases the PSNI aren’t responding

and in other cases the PSNI are directing people to us knowing

they will get more satisfaction.39

Loyalist paramilitaries also take action against their own members for disobeying

orders or breaching internal codes such as self-gain robberies or misusing the

organization’s name. According to a member of the RHC Brigade Staff,

Well most of it [“punishments”] would be internal. A lot of it would

be anti-social, drug-related or discipline with the paramilitary

ranks…The levels would, if it is a misdemeanor it could be a slap

round the head; if it’s something serious he could get one in the leg;

the very extreme is being shot in the head, which is very unusual.40


17

Therefore, the decision by paramilitaries to assume a policing role is also based in

part upon a need for the organizations to ensure their own security and survival.

With regard to crime control violence in the post-ceasefire period, the research team

found that 21 civilian Protestants were murdered, more than half by the UVF. Many

were the result of “punishment” attacks, for example the death of David Templeton in

1997 six weeks after receiving a beating from the UVF while others were innocent

bystanders or misidentified paramilitaries. In terms of “punishment” beatings, the

research team recorded 546 from the ceasefires of 1994 until the end of May 2010.

Nearly half of these are attributable to the UDA and some 40 percent to the UVF.

“Punishment” shootings in the same period equalled 704 with both the UDA and UVF

responsible for 47 percent of such attacks respectively. “Punishment” violence has

declined significantly since 2005 as indicated in Figures 2 and 3.

Figure 2: “Punishment” Beatings Attributed by Organisation


18

Figure 3: “Punishment” Shootings Attributed By Organisation

During the course of the “Troubles” loyalist paramilitaries have taken action against

other loyalist paramilitary groups. Feuds resulting from such actions are nothing new

as Bruce contends that “like any two competing organizations, the UDA and UVF

have rarely been on good terms for long.”41 Early disagreements were limited to fist

fights but by the mid 1970s in Belfast this had escalated to bomb attacks against the

homes of both UDA and UVF men.

With regard to internal control, the research team found in the post-ceasefire period

36 loyalists were killed by other loyalists. This constitutes 35.7 percent of all victims.

Nineteen (52.3 percent) were killed in internal feuds and “punishments” and 17 (48.5

percent) were killed in inter-group feuding. The recent murder of Shankill loyalist

Bobby Moffett a RHC member by the UVF has raised the question as to whether the

organisation has in fact handed over all of its weapons when it decommissioned its

arms in June 2009.42 Furthermore, the continued division between the mainstream of

the UDA and the South East Antrim group persists although tensions have lessened.43

The flow of loyalist feud deaths in the post-ceasefire period is illustrated in Figure 4.


19

Figure 4: Loyalist Attributes Feud Deaths

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1973 1974 1975 1976 1992 1993 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Year

No

. o

f d

eath

s

Number of deaths

An evident peak in internal violence emerged post-1999 as a result of the feud

between C Company and the UVF and the UVF and LVF. Feud deaths grew again

after 2001 due to conflict between the UFF and C Company and the UVF and North

Belfast LVF. Feud deaths in 2005 related to the UVF move to “obliterate” the LVF.

Some 15 (51.6 percent) of loyalist murders were undertaken by or against the LVF, C

Company and the RHD. Two key individuals, Billy Wright and Johnny Adair, are

central in the explanation of that violence. Bruce argues there is little in the way of

theoretical analysis that can be applied to these persons.44 They are understood, by

other loyalists, as psychotic, self-indulgent and encouraged by “shadowy” figures

within the security forces opposed to the peace process.


20

A member of the LVF argued that their rationale was to take “loyalism back to war”

as the peace process “aimed to carry us into a United Ireland.”45 The LVF’s

disbandment in 2005, after UVF violence, was partly based upon ideology but due

mostly to their challenge to UVF authority. The eventual removal of C Company, by

the UFF, was based upon Adair’s desire to control the parent organisation. C

Company’s use of ethno-sectarian violence is understood as an opportunistic display

of status and ability and not a desire to “spoil” peacemaking initiatives.

Without doubt these persons had gained a reputation for ruthless violence and

through their desire for perpetuated status dis-engaged themselves from wider loyalist

discourse. Irrespective of their motivation Kriesberg’s argument that the basis of

conflictual behaviour is “an intention to induce the other side to yield what the

coercer wishes to obtain” is instructive.46 The “other” side with regard to post-

conflict violence were increasingly loyalists. As noted by a member of the UFF Inner

Council:

What motivated Adair and Wright isn’t important anymore.

They’re gone as are others like them. They wanted to keep using

violence to further their own aims. We wanted to build peace but

we had to fight them to get loyalism back onto the track for

peace. Their aims were outta sync with the broader loyalist

community.47

Established leaders claim they struggled to steer a course between promoting non-

violence and utilising violence towards these groups. Furthermore, the removal of


21

these groups was based upon debilitating the desire of others to join them. As noted

the Commanding Office of the RHC:

In other words, if you were having to discipline someone

within your own organisation, tactics became different because

where you once would have expelled someone, you had to be

conscious of what you were doing because them people would

have run and jumped onto this other vehicle, so that vehicle

had to be destroyed once and for all because the LVF, and

there is proof beyond a shadow of a doubt, started five feuds

and the last feud, people were adamant and determined, that

this would be the feud to end all feuds.48

This commentary echoes a definitive argument that the capacity to stop violence

became a problem internal to loyalism. In the past, the main impediment to

“thinking” loyalism was the IRA.49 In the post-1994 era the key obstructions were

internal. The “spoilers” came into opposition with “old friends.” The reaction to

them, although illegitimate, signified a desire to expel and to reduce the potential for

future violence. Militarists are “confident” that the removal of such elements will

provide a more stable arena within which to pursue conflict transformation.

The Future of Constitutional Violence

The issue of a united Ireland presented a contested series of responses even among

military leaders. Most respondents who held elite positions argued that the principle


22

of consent as outlined in the Belfast Agreement would be upheld. As noted by a

senior UVF leader:

Well I spoke earlier about the principle of consent, and there is no

sense in being a hypocrite, if people desire otherwise then so be it. If

it is the will of the people then so be it. Put it this way – I like steak

but if you try to force steak down my throat I will reject it – and this

is the beauty of the principle of consent if people vote that way then

that’s what the people want and it is not forced upon them. If it was

forced upon us then I would reject it.50

Elite members did not accept that a united Ireland is a foregone conclusion. It was

noted that the Irish state had come to disregard the desire for unification and the

British state viewed Northern Ireland as a problem that would be resolved internally.

However, a prominent member of the RHC argued that the position of loyalists was to

oppose Irish unification despite the consent principle. As stated: “The same way we

responded in 1969. The arms would be picked up again. Even if the people voted for

it, you will always get an element that will resist.”51

All non-elite members who were aged under 30, although numbering only 12 persons,

provided a distant view from their respective leaderships. They concluded that the

Belfast Agreement was illusionary and that to accept a united Ireland would be a form

of commonly denoted “enslavement.” As noted by one respondent from the UFF:


23

“We want peace and we will follow our leadership but only up to a point in time. If

there is a threat of a united Ireland then a new generation will take to arms.”52

Such competing perspectives indicate a tension within loyalism and pinpoint a failure

to create a unified voice. The necessary role of loyalist leaders with regard to

transformation into constitutionalism is not beyond doubt.

Beyond Violence

Conflict transformation is interpreted within loyalism as a process of contestation

within and beyond loyalism. It is understood that conflict is also set within a wide

social arena that encompasses suspicion, mistrust and the desire to restrain human

rights development. Additional, interpretations of conflict transformation within

loyalism include the need to transform via an interpretation of equitable social,

cultural and political definitions; that identity construction can both facilitate and

undermine the deliverance of democratic accountability; and that conflict can only be

resolved when adversaries understand the capacity for transformation and the part that

they can play in resolving conflict.

The desire to prevent future occurrences of violent disunity has been divided into two

general perspectives. Firstly, a conflict transformation perspective encourages an

analysis of the antecedents of conflict as a way out of disagreement. Secondly,

seeking out better ways to represent loyalism within a process of capacity building

has also emerged. Additional features include lifting loyalism out of insularity and

into a host of civic and inter-community based relationships; developing better

relationships with government and statutory agencies; promoting restorative justice


24

schemes; creating alternative community narratives which link loyalism into a post-

ceasefire process; and challenging the mythic status of violence and in so doing

diverting youth attention away from paramilitaries and sectarian violence.53

From this perspective, paramilitaries and former paramilitaries involved in

community work and restorative justice programmes seek to reduce tensions and/or

promote reconciliation. There is a sense of the need to create an intersection between

agency and structure via the shift from a military to negotiator role. In 2004, a

strident critic of loyalist violence the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC)

recognised the potential valuable role community restorative justice programmes

could play in their respective communities so long as they operated “accountably and

to acceptable standards, fully respect human rights, and can demonstrate to people

that they need not look to paramilitaries to deliver reasonable behaviour within their

communities.”54 The following year, the Northern Ireland Office (2005) entered into a

consultation period in relation to community-based restorative justice schemes and in

2007 published a Protocol for Community-based Restorative Justice Schemes

outlining a framework for relations between the formal criminal justice system and

such schemes.55 Five loyalist restorative justice schemes including the Greater

Shankill Alternatives which has the support of the UVF have now secured

government approval. The operation of such schemes is crucial in the delivery of

alternative “policing” methods. Loyalists have also formed inter-community groups to

stop interface violence, provided seminars to youths to promote anti-violent

approaches, worked with republicans on shared history and prisoner issues and

developed links with statutory agencies in order to draw resources into Protestant

communities.


25

Academic and funder-led evaluation of loyalist community engagement has been

positive and in particular praises the promotion of values of non-violence, human

rights and inclusiveness.56

An important factor in the promotion of non-violence is the extent to which the

military leadership offered is found to be credible among the rank and file. Credibility

has been important with regard to dissuading a return to large-scale violence as it

provides legitimacy to anti-violence discourse, but operates as a further example of

the internalised nature of transition. As a senior UFF member concluded:

Look you see if you went with all the goodwill in the world and said

“Lads the reasons for not going back to war are this and that.” They

would listen but not heed you. If I walk in and say “look I whacked

so and so,” the same fellahs would listen. We might say the same

things but you don’t have the stripes like I do.57

A fundamental problem for those involved in such interventionist work is the threats

that are endured. As noted by a UVF member:

You challenge the drug dealers in your own ranks and they could

just shoot your dead. These are the people who don’t give a shit

about the peace process. You see if we have a settled society then

they will have to go. So it is in their interest to de-stabilise

loyalism.58


26

UVF linked persons have been at the forefront of the internal discussions with

republicans which led to the production of working papers concerning respective

constituencies’ attitudes towards truth recovery processes.59 Outside their own

immediate base, loyalist and republican former prisoners have played significant roles

in other truth-focused initiatives. Loyalists have campaigned on a vast range of issues

on behalf of themselves and Protestant communities. These include improved social

services; facilities and rights; the establishment of local job-seeking and social capital

schemes; welfare, education, counselling, advisory and advocacy roles; the creation of

advice centres, family projects, counselling services, children’s activities and social

activities; and campaigning for the rights of former prisoners and their families.

Despite such shifts there remains an antipathy towards loyalism that remains

dedicated to their existence: As noted by Fred Cobain of the Ulster Unionist Party

with regard to the maintenance of paramilitary structures,

I mean the whole raison d’etre for loyalist paramilitaries has

gone and if we are working through a peace process where

there is an end to republican paramilitarism, which they are

telling us it is, that’s what this process is, then there is no

raison d’etre for loyalist paramilitaries.60

According to a republican analysis loyalism, despite developing conflict amelioration

initiatives, remains as a misguided arm of state collaboration that lacks social and

cultural credibility:


27

They don’t have an independent existence in terms of

determining what they do and where they go politically but in

fact their future is bound up with how the British securocrat

system sees the future. Up to this point the British securocrat

system has been using loyalists throughout the peace process and

before that to achieve their objectives.61

However, supportive attitudes are emerging: As contended by Sam Kincaid former

Assistant Chief Constable of the PSNI:

So I see for the first time, certainly in my experience in both sides

[UVF/UFF] a real effort, probably the last time we had anything as

determined as this in some sense would maybe go back to ’94 to the

Combined Loyalist Military Command but even then, I think that

was more to do with PR statements, I think there is genuine effort

being made by key people within organisations to say well the point

of all this has gone.62

Conclusion

The significant decline in political violence in Northern Ireland has been part-guided

by loyalists including former paramilitaries who have played a vital role in conflict

transformation. With regard to loyalist paramilitary violence this has included the

development of alternative modes of thinking that have challenged once dominant

militarist ideologies. The actors involved in these discursive shifts have pinpointed


28

alternative structures and strategies within which to pursue their respective belief

systems via non-violent means. Raising alternative debates has been a key feature of

such actor-group relationships and such discussions have been attached to wider

political shifts that are in turn translated into conflict transformation based activities

and programmes undertaken by former loyalist paramilitaries. From restorative justice

schemes through to former prisoner groups that undertake inter-community social

economy projects there is now a significant body of positive and meaningful non-

violent loyalist paramilitary intervention. This is not to deny the negative impact of

previous violence or to under-estimate the transition of some loyalist paramilitaries

into criminal gangs but there has been an undoubted shift both in terms of practice

and intent within the wider body of loyalism.

Loyalism is caught in bind between progressive and regressive elements. On the one

hand some continue and even expand their criminal empires around extortion and

drug dealing. In such cases this illustrates leadership constraints in terms of

disciplining those who do so. Evidently loyalist leaders have, especially in the past

decade, used such violence to control and discipline. However, when doing so this has

spiralled into feuds and further criminalisation of loyalist violence against their

criminal elements. A central concern of many loyalists is why the police do not

remove such persons as opposed to resting responsibility for them upon loyalist

shoulders.

Whilst on the other hand loyalists are involved in intricate intra and inter-community

work that aims to transform loyalism from a de-stabilising past and potential future.

Those efforts aim to reduce interface violence, challenge the ‘glories’ of loyalist


29

violence and imprisonment and present loyalism as containing a coherent capacity

driven potential. Ultimately, loyalist violence has declined due to not only a removal

of mainstream republican violence but also through engendering ideas and concepts

of transformation and the futility or violence. Problematically there has been

insignificant interest in positive and transformative loyalism and commentary,

especially public, remains negligible. To classify loyalism as a homogenous bloc

undermines much of the realities that explains the falls in violence and the attempt to

maintain non-violent interventions. Essentially, positive loyalism is left out on a limb

by wider narratives of criminalisation and internal ‘spoilers and wreckers’.

The authors wish to acknowledge the support of ESRC funding (RES-000-22-1013)

to carry out this work and the contribution of Dawn Purvis, with aspects of the

fieldwork. This paper has been developed from the End of Award report submitted to

the ESRC. Furthermore, we would like thank the anonymous reviewers for their

suggestions for strengthening the paper. 1 See Marieanne Elliot, ed. The Long Road to Peace in Northern Ireland (Liverpool:

Liverpool University Press, 2007); Chris Gilligan and Jon Tonge, Peace and War?

Understanding the Peace Process in Northern Ireland (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997);

and Aaron Edwards and Stephen Bloomer, eds. Transforming the Peace Process in

Northern Ireland: From Terrorism to Democratic Politics (Dublin: Irish Academic

Press, 2008). 2 The Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) issued a ceasefire statement

ending “operational hostilities” as from midnight on the 13th October 1994. The

CLMC represents the UDA, UVF and RHC. 3 David Keen, “War and Peace – What’s the Difference?,” in Adekeye Adebajo and

Chandra Lekha Sriram, eds. Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century (London:

Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 1-22; Joe Moran, “Paramilitaries, ‘Ordinary Decent Criminals’

and the Development of Organised Crime Following the Belfast Agreement,”

International Journal of the Sociology of Law 32(3) (September 2004), pp. 267-278. 4 Luke Dowdney, Neither War nor Peace: International Comparisons of Children and

Youth in Organised Armed Violence (Rio de Janeiro: COAV, 2005); Stephen John

Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22(2) (1997),

pp. 5-53; and James K. Boyce, “Aid Conditionality as a Tool for Peacebuilding:

Opportunities and Constraints,” Development and Change 33(5) (November 2002),

pp. 1025-1049. 5 Loyalism is here understood as loyalist paramilitarism and the groups associated

with it. We acknowledge there are wider definitions of loyalism with regard to the

imagined Protestant people of Ulster. See Arthur Aughey, “The Character of Ulster


30

Unionism,” in Peter Shirlow and Mark McGovern, eds. Who Are ‘The People’?

Protestantism, Unionism and Loyalism in Northern Ireland (London: Pluto Press,

1997), pp. 16-33. 6 Christina Steenkamp, “Loyalist Paramilitary Violence after the Belfast Agreement”,

Ethnopolitics 7(1) (March 2008), pp. 159-176. 7 Jeffrey A. Sluka, ““For God and Ulster”: The Culture of Terror and Loyalist Death

Squads in Northern Ireland,” in Jeffrey A. Sluka, ed. Death Squad: The Anthropology

of State Terror (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), p. 149. 8 Peter Shirlow and Kieran McEvoy, Beyond the Wire (London: Pluto, 2008); Office

of the Police Ombudsman, Report on the Police Ombudsman’s Investigation into

Matters Surrounding the Death of Raymond McCord Junior (Belfast: OPONI, 2007). 9 Claire Mitchell, “For God and ... Conflict Transformation? The Churches’

Dis/engagement with Contemporary Loyalism,” in Edwards and Bloomer, eds.

Transforming the Peace Process in Northern Ireland: From Terrorism to Democratic

Politics, p. 149. 10 Cited in Shirlow and McEvoy, Beyond the Wire, p. 11. 11 James W. McAuley, Jonathon Tonge and Peter Shirlow, “Conflict, Transformation,

and Former Loyalist Paramilitary Prisoners in Northern Ireland”, Terrorism and

Political Violence 22 (1) (2010), pp. 2-40. 12 The full statement can be found on the BBC News website at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/6618365.stm. 13 The full statement can be found on the University of Ulster’s CAIN website at

http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/uda/uda111107.htm 14 For more details see Report of the Independent International Commission on

Decommissioning, 25 February 2010. Available at

http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/decommission/iicd250210.pdf 15 Steve Bruce, The Red Hand (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

16 Ibid., p. 112.

17 Fintan O’Toole cited in Stephen Howe, “Mad Dogs and Ulstermen: the crisis of

Loyalism (part one),” Open Democracy (September 2005), p. 4. Available at

http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-protest/loyalism_2876.jsp. 18 Miranda Alison, “Women as Agents of Political Violence: Gendering Security,”

Security Dialogue 35(4) (December 2004), p. 453. 19 Mike Morrissey cited in Claire Mitchell, “The Limits of Legitimacy: Former

Loyalist Combatants and Peace-Building in Northern Ireland,” Irish Political Studies,

23(1) (February 2008), p. 3. 20 Marie Smyth, “Demilitarization and the Northern Ireland Peace Process”,

Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(3) (Autumn 2004), pp. 544-566. 21 Progressive Unionist Party website, “What is the Progressive Unionist Party?,”

available at: http://www.pup-ni.org.uk/home/default.aspx. Accessed: 22 October

2010. 22 Smyth, “Demilitarization and the Northern Ireland Peace Process”, p. 556. 23 Steve Bruce, “Turf War and Peace: Loyalist Paramilitaries since 1994,” Terrorism

and Political Violence 16(3) (Autumn 2004), pp. 501-521. 24 Ibid.; James McAuley, “‘Just Fighting to Survive’: Loyalist Paramilitary Politics

and the Progressive Unionist Party,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16(3) (Autumn

2004), pp. 522-543. 25 Alliance Party, “Alliance Leader demands end to loyalist funding after police

shooting”, (23 July 2007). Available at:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/6618365.stm

http://www.pup-ni.org.uk/home/default.aspx


31

http://www.allianceparty.org/news/003182/alliance_leader_demands_end_to_loyalist

_funding_after_police_shooting.html. Accessed: 22 October 2010; BBC, “UDA is in

‘last chance saloon’,” (10 August 2007). Available at:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/6939636.stm. Accessed: 22 October 2010. 26 Simon Winlow, Dick Hobbs, Stuart Lister and Philip Hadfield, “Get Ready to

Duck: Bouncers and the Realities of Ethnographic Research on Violent Groups,”

British Journal of Criminology 41(3) (Summer 2001), p. 537. 27 Sharon Pickering, “Undermining the Sanitized Account: Violence and Emotionality

in the Field in Northern Ireland,” British Journal of Criminology 41(3) (Summer

2001), pp. 485-501. 28 Alison Liebling and Betsy Stanko, “Allegiance and Ambivalence: Some Dilemmas

in Researching Disorder and Violence,” British Journal of Criminology 41(3)

(Summer 2001), p. 428. 29 H. Jon Rosenbaum and Peter C. Sederberg, Vigilante Politics (Philadelphia:

University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976). 30 Ibid., p. 4. 31 The Sunningdale Agreement involved the creation of a devolved power-sharing

executive for Northern Ireland in which unionist and nationalist parties together with

the Alliance Party shared responsibility and presided over an elected assembly. For

more information see Stefan Wolff’s chapter “Context and Content: Sunningdale and

the Belfast Compared”, in Rick Walford, ed. Aspects of the Belfast Agreement

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 32 Data extracted from the research team’s deaths database constructed from

newspaper articles and information provided by respondents and the police. 33 The recent murder of Bobby Moffett (28 May 2010) was the first loyalist death in

Belfast since 2005. The Protestant Action Force (PAF) and the Protestant Action

Group (PAG) were cover names used by the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) to avoid

directly claiming responsibility for killings and other acts of violence. 34 Period included all loyalist attributed deaths from the 14th October 1994 until the

end of May 2010. 35 Interviewee A, Inner Council Member UDA/UFF (November 2005). 36 For more information see AJ Gibbons, JN Farrier and SJ Key, “The Pipe Bomb: A

Modern Terrorist Weapon”, Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 149 (March

2003), pp. 23-26 and James Lucas and Jack Crane, “Fatalities Associated With Home-

Made Pipe Bombs in Northern Ireland,” American Journal of Forensic Medicine and

Pathology 29(2) (June 2008), pp. 93-98. 37 Statistics supplied on request from the Central Statistics Unit, PSNI. Prior to

January 2000, pipe bomb devices were classified as blast bombs or improvised

explosive devices and as such separate figures for pipe bombs are not available for the

years preceding 2000. 38 David Boulton, The UVF 1966-1973 (Dublin: Torc Books, 1973); and Rachel

Monaghan, “The Return of ‘Captain Moonlight’: Informal Justice in Northern

Ireland,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25(1) (January-February 2002), pp. 41-56. 39 Interviewee B, UVF Commander (November 2005). 40 Interviewee C, RHC Brigade Staff (November 2005). 41 Bruce, The Red Hand, p. 124 42 Brian Rowan, “Decisive day as loyalist politics hits a defining crossroads”, Belfast

Telegraph, 9 June 2010, p. 10.

http://www.allianceparty.org/news/003182/alliance_leader_demands_end_to_loyalist_funding_after_police_shooting.html

http://www.allianceparty.org/news/003182/alliance_leader_demands_end_to_loyalist_funding_after_police_shooting.html

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/6939636.stm


32

43 International Monitoring Commission, Twenty-Third Report (London: The

Stationery Office, 2010). 44 Bruce, “Turf War and Peace.” 45

Interviewee D, LVF member (November 2005). 46 Louis Kriesberg, Social Conflicts (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1982), p. 32. 47 Interviewee A, Inner Council Member UDA/UFF (November 2005). 48

Interviewee E, Commanding Officer RHC (November 2005). 49

Bruce, The Red Hand. 50

Interviewee B, UVF Commander (November 2005). 51 Interviewee F, Prominent member of RHC (November 2005). 52

Interviewee G, Inner Council Member UDA/UFF (November 2005). 53 Peter Shirlow and Kieran McEvoy, Beyond the Wire: Former Prisoners and

Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland (London: Pluto Press, 2008). 54 Independent Monitoring Commission, Third Report (London, The Stationery

Office, 2004), p. 36. 55 Northern Ireland Office, Protocol for Community-based Restorative Justice

Schemes (Belfast: NIO, 2007). 56 Kofi Annan, “Learning the Lessons of Peace Building”. The Tip O’Neill Lecture.

Magee College, University of Ulster (18 October 2004); Community Foundation for

Northern Ireland, Taking Calculated Risks for Peace II (Belfast: CFNI, 2003); Neil

Jarman, ed. Human Rights and Community Relations: Competing or Complementary

Approaches in Responding to Conflict? (Belfast: Institute for Conflict Research,

2002); Kieran McEvoy and Harry Mika, “Restorative Justice and the Critique of

Informalism in Northern Ireland,” British Journal of Criminology 42(3) (Summer

2002), pp. 534-563. 57 Interviewee G, Inner Council Member UDA/UFF (November 2005). 58 Interviewee H, UVF Volunteer (October 2005). 59 Eolas Project, Consultation Paper on Truth and Justice (Belfast: Relatives for

Justice, 2003); and EPIC, Truth Recovery: A Contribution from Loyalism (Belfast:

EPIC, 2005). 60 Interview with authors, Fred Cobain, Ulster Unionist Party (November 2005). 61 Interview with authors, Jim Gibney, Sinn Féin (December 2005) 62 Interview with authors, Sam Kincaid, PSNI (February 2006).

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