WAITING FOR THE 'G'

A RE-EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF THE BRITISH CAVALRY

ON THE WESTERN FRONT, 1915-18

b~

MAJOR RICHARD L. BOWES

A thesis submitted to the War Studies Cornmittee of the Royal hlilitary College of Canada in conformity with the

requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Royal MSîtary Coliege of Canada Kingston, Ontario

20 May 2000

Copyright Q Richard Bowes, 2000

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1 would like to acknowledge rny indebtedness to the many personalities who

supported and assisted me in the writing of this thesis. Of course, 1 would like to thank my

thesis supervisor, Dr. Ron Haycock, who graciously took time out of his busy schedule as

Dean of Arts at the Royal Military College of Canada to take on the extra responsibility of

providing me with guidance and support throughout the research and writing phases of my

journey. His wise counsel allowed me to refine and c o n f i i my compass bearing as 1 waded

through the vast historiography of the First World War.

1 would also like to thank rny good friend Major Tom Putt (LdSH(RC)) for helping

me to define a topic for my thesis. His perception that most of the published history of the

war was writren from either the point of view of the trench or, conversely, frorn the

perspective of the highest levels of command led me to conclude that there was still much to

be examined and said about the conduct of the war on the Western Front especially at the

brigade, division, and corps levels. In addition, 1 would also iike to thank a nurnber of other

serving officers in the Canadian Forces who either dlowed me a considerable amount of time

away from the coal face in order to permit me to properiy conduct my research and

subsequently write the thesis, or were kind enough to review the final draft of the thesis and

provide sage advice prïor to my defence: Colonel Jim Cdvin (PPCLI), Commander Harry

Harsc h (Canadian Nav y ), Lieutenant-colonel Pierre Lessard (R22eR), Major Mike Minor

(PPCLI), Captain Rick Harvie (Intelligence), Captain John Reiffenstein (PPCLI), Captain

John Grodzinski (LdSH(RC)), and Captain Helga Grodunski (Logistics).

1 would be remiss if 1 did not thank Mr. Serge Campion, Chief Librarian of the

Canadian Land Force Command and StafT College, whose landness and patience were tested

to the limit with my constant requests for loan of rare sources and my sometimes tardy r e m

of such materials. His support was invaluable to the completion of this thesis. In the same

vein. 1 would Iike to thank the helpful staff al the National Archives of Canada. Stauffer

Library at Queen's University Kingston, and Massey Library at the Royal Miiitary CoIlege.

Finally, and most importantly, ths entire undertalcmg would not have been possible

without the continuing love and support of my wife Lise, and my two daughters Amelia and

Faith. The many hours 1 spent away from them I am sure made them feel like they, in fact,

were the last casualties to be inflicted on the Western Front. To them and for them 1 am

eternall y pteful .

ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to dispel the myth surrounding the perceived inability of the British cavalry

to achieve a breakthrough on the Western front fiom 19 15 to 19 18. It demonsmes that within the

context of the British efforts to achieve a brealahrough, the cavairy was not an obsolete a m of the

British Anny. By contrast, at least in intent, the cavalry was a vital component toward achieving a

breakthrough because it was, despite its technological limitations, the only truiy mobile arm. In order

to illusrrate and substantiate this assertion, the thesis examines three occasions (The Somme: July

14~. 19 16: Cambrai: November 20&-2 1 ", 19 17; and Amiens: August srn. 19 18) on the Western Front

when, in the conduct of the offensive, British forces succeeded in creating a gap in the German iine

through which the British cavahy could have debauched and exploited the British success through a

deep drive into the German rear areas. However, on a l l three occasions the cavalry could not achieve

a breakthrough because of factors or conditions beyond its conûol. Those conditions had to do with

the requirement to maintain a high degree of tempo throughout the whole of the offensive. As is

demonsmted on ail three occasions, the maintenance of a high degree of tempo was necessary in

order to be able to create the gap in the enemy's defences, and then break the cavalry through in order

to conduct the exploitation phase deep in the enemy' s rear al1 in a tirne less than it took the enemy to

bring up his reserves. In essence, the maintenance of tempo depended on a dexenmlkd command

philosophy, on s ta f f coordination, on d-arms cooperation, and on reliable communications.

Unfortunately, in al1 the offensives Iaunched by the British on the Western Front during the war, and

particularly during the offensives examineci in this thesis, these conditions were never fully met.

Fially, the thesis concludes that contmry to the prevailing mytb in the historiography of the

war surromding the perceived obsolescence of the cavalry, the cavalry, to the contrary, was really the

Q& a m with the sense and means of mobiiity to achieve and sustain a bmdahrough should it have

occmed. The cavairy's lack of success, therefore, was not to do with the capabilities and limitations

of the arm itself, but rather with the inability of comrnanders, staffs, and the other anns of the British

Anny to rapidly adapt and take advantage of the fleeting opportunities for mobile warfare. The reason

1

they could not achieve and sustain a breakthrough was not because the cavairy was obsolete, but

because the above stated conditions necessary for the maintenance of a high degree of ternpo were

never M y reaLzed in any of the offensives.

FOREWORD

The original a h of this thesis was to chronicle the operations of the Canadian

Cavalry Brigade on the Western Front during the First World War. The idea came from the

discovery or recognition chat comparatively little of the histonography of the war had to do

with the histories of the various formations that fought and bled on the Western Front during

those four long years. Most pubiished works either examine the experience of the war from

the point of view of the man in the trenches; the 'Everyman at War' perspective of historical

scholarship, or examine the conduct and direction of the war at the highest levels of military

command such as the plethora of works that have attempted, and re-attempted, to ravage the

reptational corpse of Fieid-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. In particular, very little attention has

been paid to the various cavalry formations that continue4 throughout most of the four years

of the smiggle, to remain a part of the British order of battle on the Western Front. Indeed,

there is not, to this &y, a published history of any kind of the Canadian Cavairy Brigade

while the history of the Canadian Corps, the other principal manoeuvre formation fielded by

Canada during the war, has been examined and wrinen about to some depth especially in

recent years. Therefore, 1 thought that writing a history of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade

would be an interesting and original contribution to the historiography of the Canadian war

effort.

However, as my research progressed, a number of questions began to form in my

mind. First, it became obvious to me that in much of the historiography of the British effort

on the Western Front the role of the cavairy is easily dismissed as being obsolete especially

with the advent of the tank in the latter years of the war. But given the accual conduct of the

war and the fact that the British could never achieve a breakthrough and subsequent

exploitation against the Germans, is it valid to assume or conclude that the cavalry's place on

the battlefield of the Western Front had become archaic? Indeed, if the cavairy had become

obsolete, what arrn or capability had replaced it especially with regard to the conduct of the

breakthrough and exploitation? Furthermorc, if the cavairy still had a role to play with regard

to the breakxhrough and exploitation, why was it unable to cmy out this roIe during any of

the British offensives on the Western Front?

As these and other questions fonned in my mind 1 came to the realization that a thesis

examining the role of the British cavairy on the Western Front might constitute a much more

interesting and much more significant contribution to the historiopphy of the war. Hence,

the focus of this thesis was adjusted accordingly. Final1 y, 1 appreciate that the conclusions

reached in this thesis are somewhat controversial. Hopefully, however, it can form the bais

of a greater discussion of the place of the British cavairy on the Westem Front; a discussion,

1 feel. that still needs to be held in order to enhance and deepen our understanding of the

British conduct of the war.

LIST OF ABBRE~4TIONS

AOH

BEF

BOH

CO

COH

FGH

FSR

GHQ

GOC

GSO

MGGS

NAC

SMLE

Australian Official History

British Expeditionary Force

British Official History

Cornmanding Officer

Canadian Official Histoq

Fort Garry Horse

Field Service Regulations

General Headquarters

General Officer Commanding

General Staff Officer

Major-General, General Staff

National Archives of Canada

S h m . Magazine, Lee-Enfield

A bstract

Foreword

List of Abbreviations

Introduction

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1 The Doctrine of the Onensive and the Anne Blanche Versus Mounted infantry Controversy

Chapter 2 The Conduct of the War on the Western Front

Chapter 3 The Somme: Eigh Wood and Bazenün Ridge, Juiy 14~, 1916

Chapter 4 Cambrai: November 20" - 21': 1917

Chapter 5 Amiens: August 8* - 9-, 1918

Conclusion

Ami thete was mo-g in hot hame: the s & 4 The musîering squadron, anà the cIrrarerïng cm, Went pouring fo rwd wirir ùnpe~lous speerl, A d swimy fonning in the mnks of wcu.

Byron: ChiLie Harold's P i l ' g e , (1816)

M W is defined as the embodiment of popular ideas on natural or social

phenornena.' In cornmon parlance, a myth is an "old wives tale," a generally accepted

belief unsubstantiated b y fact.' The study of history is, in some ways, the study of myth

and can be viewed as the way in which we see the events of the past and thereby

understand them, and also the means by whch we seek to justify the present. Therefore,

as James Sadkovich cogently asserts, in the study of history:

Certain interpretations are thus preferred to others, certain data rejected or ignored because inimical to the received interpretations, and new interpretations of hallowed rnyths less than welcome. History is therefore also inherently and unavoidabiy reactionary, and the dialectic of history continuaily pits the detennined iconoclast against the established idolaters in a stmggle to rewrite past realities and recast cumnt i l l~s ions .~

War and legend, as John Terraine recognizes, are i n ~ e ~ a r a b l e . ~ World War One

(1914-18) and, in particular, the story of the British stmggle on the Western Front has not

been spared a certain share of mythc interpretation over the past eight decades. In h i s

recentl y published work entitled Demh So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the Firsr World

War, Jonathan F. Vance writes that in the context of the First World War, the word myth

1 7ne Concise Oxford Dicnonary, (London: Clarendon Press, 1983). p. 670. 3

David Adams Leeming. The Wodd of Myth. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1990). p. 3. 3 James J. Sadkovich. 'Understanding Deftat: Reappraising Itaiy's Role in World War II," Journal of Conrempuras, Hîsrory, Vol. 24, pp. 27-6 1. 4 John Terraine, The Smoke and the Fire, (London: Sidgwick and Jackson. 1980), p. 17.

"seems to capture the combination of invention, mith, and half-truth"' that has

characterized the collective memory of the war. Wrïting in a similar vein in the editorial

introduction to his recent publication entitled The First WorZd War and British Mili tuq

Hisrory, Brian Bond declares that:

The First WorId War, with its terrible atûitional character and acutely disappointing consequences, has thrown a long shadow over subsequent decades. For the reading and reflective British public it has k e n simultaneously fascinating and repellent; much further away than the Second World War yet harder to corne to tems with as history; a no man's land in the historical landscape. . . .Thus, seventy-two years [since the time of writing] after the war ended it seems appropriate to atternpt an objective historiographicai s w e y without the need for what one contributor has terrned "bunking" and "de-buking.'"

Bunking and de-bunking the many myths smund ing the First World War have k e n the

main objectives of much of the historiography of the war, an historicd dialectic to

bomow from Sadkovich. Popular myths that have becorne the objects of exploration in

recent decades have been those to do with the perceived incornpetence and cold-

heartedness of many of the British cornmanciers in general, and Field Marshal Dougias

Haig in particular. Similarly, the popular image of the British offensives of 1916-17 is

one of futility and wastefulness feeding into the myth that the "Western" strategy of the

war - the recognition that the Western Front was the key front and that Germany could

only be defeated through a drawn out attritional confrontation on this front - could have

been avoided if only Allied policy makers had seen the utility and efficacy of the indirect

approach of striking Gemany on her strategic flank through the Balkans, the Baitic, or

the Levant. While it is not the aim of this thesis to support or deny any of these myths,

-- --

5 Jonathan F. Vance. Death So Noble: Memory, Meming, a d the Firs World War. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997). p. 8.

they are, nonetheless, illustraîive of the dialectic that surrounds the historical

interpretation of the British smggle on the Western Front during the First World War.

Part of this dialectic concerns the role of the British cavalry on the Western Front

and the myth that the cavalry, throughout the many campaigns and actions fought by the

British on the Western Front, was an obsolete, anachronistic a m of the British A m y that

contribured very little, if anything at dl, to the eventual victory in 19 18. The popular

image; indeed, the popular myth about the cavahy that has b e n handed down through

the decades is one of a useless, pampered body of men simng in comfon, waiting well

behind the front line, while the poor bloody infantry were carrying on the good fight at

the front.' The Marquess of Anglesey has made great snides in dispelling this myth in his

eight volume history of the British c a ~ a l r y . ~ A reading of Anglesey leads one to conclude

that there is no disputing the fact that the cavalry rarely sat idly by while the other ams

of the British Amy were engaged in operations at the front. When not employed as

cavalry, the various regiments and formations of the Cavalry Corps were employed in the

line as infantry, in the rear area as pioneers constructing reserve trench works and supply

routes, or were cornmitted to training for the "culminating moment of truth that never

came - 'the ride for the G."" The 'Gy stood for gap and referred to the long-anticipated

gap in the enemy line for which the cavairy waited and rrained to p a s through in order to

- - - - pp -- -

6 Brian Bond, cd., The Firsr World War and Brirish Military Hisrory, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 199 1). p. 1. in speaking of Alex Danchev's article in the same publication entitled " 'B&g ' cuid Debunkïng: The Conrroversies of rhe 1 %Os" 7 S e the Reface to The Marquess of Anglesey's, A History of the British Cavalry. Vol. 8, (London, Leo Cooper, 1997). pp. xix-xxiii. S e also Vol. 4 (published in 1986) which covers the period 1899-1914 but de& primarily with the British cavairy in the Boer War, the l e s o n s learntd fiom that conflict, and the developments in the British cavalry in the inter-war years 1903- 14. 8 Ibid. Volume 8 is specifically a namative of the operations of the various regiments and formations that made up the British Cavalry Corps on the W e s m Front 19 15- 18. 9 Ibid., pp. xix-xxiu. Although the pftface States this fact in very general detail, the body of the work i l l m t c s the fact to a degrce which can hardl y be disputeci.

execute the exploitation phase, the culminating phase, of an offensive. Although British

offensive doctrine will be discussed in greater detail later on in this thesis, this phase of

an offensive was also referred to as the breakthrough and remained the primary

responsibility of the cavalry to camy out.1° And this is where the shroud of myth still

remains.

The historiography of the war has perpetuated the myth that the cavairy had no

value whatsoever toward achieving a breakthrough on the Western Front. In other words,

the value of cavairy to the oveml1 operational capability and effectiveness of the British

Army to achieve a breakthrough was negative. For example, in evaluating the Battle of

Cambrai (November 20" - 30" , 1917), Hubert Johnson asserts that the "British lacked

the troops to exploit a major breakthrough even if it had been possible.. . .Cavalry was

supposed to have one Iast, presumably glorious, role in modem warfare, but instead

[demonstrated] its obsolescence."" Later, in discussing the inability of British IV Axmy

to achieve a breakthrough at the Battle of Amiens (August 8" - 12& , 1918). Johnson

again declares that the "cavalry had once again proved its obsolescence in modem war.""

In his poiernic history of the war, Basil H. Liddell-Hart in discussing Haig's penchant for

using the British Cavalry Corps as his reserve opined that the cavalry, "under modem

conditions, did not count much during the war except in the mincis of cavalry-trained

- .

IO In Field-Marshal Haig's final ciqatch. dated 21 March 1919, was a concise description of how he had conducted operations throughout the war. He claimed that the four and a half years in Belgium and France had been a continuous campaign which had becn fought according to four distinct phases: the manoeuvre for position; the preparation or wearing-out battie of varying duration; the decisivc attack; and, finaiiy, the cavalry exploitation. Ste Kcith Simpson. "The Reputation of Sir Douglas Haig," in Bond, nle F~rsr World War d BrirLFh Miiirary Hisrory. p. 144. For the purposes of this tbesis and to simpiïfy terminology. this phase of the offensive will simply k reftrrtd to as the breakthrough. I I Hubert C. Johnson, Breakthrougkt Tacsics, Technology, and the Search for Victory on the Wesrem Fronr in World War I, (Novato, CA.: Presidio, 1994). p. 208. 12 Ibid., p. 263.

commander^."'^ Besides k i n g a non-too-subtle barb at Haig, Liddell-Hart voiced the

opinion of many about the negative value of the cavalry during the war. In his post-

mortem of the Batîie of Cambrai, Liddell-Hart goes on to state that "dl available troops

were thrown into the first blow, and no reserves were at hand to exploit the success. The

cavalry. as always on the Western Front, proved unable to carry out this role."14 Liddell-

Hart originally wrote the above words in the 1930s when his Hiszory was f m t published

as the The Real War, 1914-1918. However, the myth surrounding the perceived inability

of the cavalry to achieve a breakthrough has persisted historiographically in the

intervening decades.

J.F.C. Fuller summed up the problem of the Western Front as follows:

The problem now became the reinstatement of mobility, and its solution depended on overcorning the defensive trinity of bullet, spade and wire. The sokiiers set out to solve it in the conventional way, they turned to artillery and sought to blow a gap in their enemy's entrenched front.''

The reinstatement of mobility was the central problem on the Western Front and it was

towards this end that aU British offensives on the Western Front were conducted. The

great failure of Gemany's Schlieffen Plan was the initial reason that a stalemate had

been created on the Western front by the late autumn of 1914, but the real reason, of

course, was that the military technology of the era had led to a predominance of the

13 B.H. Liddell-Hart Hisrory of the First World War, (London: Papermac, 1992), p. 200. 14 ibid.. p. 304. 1s J-F-C. Fuller. The Conduct of War 1789-1961. (New York: Da Capo Press, 1961), p. 160. John A. Endish has termed this problem on the Western Front as "the riddle of the uenches" and points out that each army on the Western Front initially went about trying to solve the riddle in a distinctly different way from the others- For example, the Gennarz~ sought prirnariiy tactical solutions through the eventud adoption of the defence-in-depth concept while conducting defensive operations, and through the development of small-unit infiltration tactics for cmployrnent during offensive operations. In contrast, the British primarily sought. at least und 19 17, technical solutions such as mass artillcry coupled with improved artillery indirect fk techniques, and, of course, through the invention and development of the tank. Set John A. English, On I n f q , (Toronto: Praeger, 1984)- pp. 7-22.

defensive and had not yet adapted to the offensive? Consequently, tactics were reduced,

at least initially, to frontal infantry assaults preceded by massive artillery preparations

that not only resulted in high casualties among the attackers, but also rendered the terrain

impassable for any type of mobile force no matter how mounted. As John Terraine points

out. modem technology had entirely solved the problem of bringing the mass armies

quickly and efficiently ru the battlefield but had not yet solved the problem of moving

them on the battlefield." On the battlefield, horses and horse-mounted soldiers were

naked against the overwhelming firepower of rifles, machine-guns, and artillery while the

ground over which they attempted to move had been made impassable by the destructive

effects of massive artillery fire not only to horses, but to al1 forms of mobility including

the ubiqui tous dismounted infantryman. Thus. ractical mobili ty w as almost impossible to

achieve for any a m let alone the cavairy. But as the tank of the day was too primitive to

be decisive, and the blitzkrïeg form of warfare had yet to be invented, the horsed cavalry

remained the only ann capable of conducting any f o m of mobile warfare throughout

most of the war. More to the point, the cavalry remained the only arm capable of

sustaining any form of operational mobility. As Terraine concludes, as "useful as the

1916-1918 tanks were for breakhg inro [my itatics] enemy positions and saving infantry

lives, they were not weapons of exploitation such as we saw in World War 2."18 In shon,

the generals of the period were caught by "a hiatus in the mobile While it was

painfully obvious that it could not perfonn on the immediate battlefield, it remained to be

16 Richard Preston. Alex RoIand. and Sydney Wise. Men in A m . (Toronto: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich Coiiege fubiishers, 199 1). P. 233. 17 John Terraine. White H m ; The New Warjiare 1914- 18, (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1982). p. 142. 18 John Terraine, Note 1 to Editor's A-cface to J F C Fuiier's The Decisive Banies of the Western World, (London: Paladin, 1970). Vol. 2, p. 13. 19 Ibid., p. 93.

seen if it could still operate beyond the irnmediate battlefield in its role as an exploitation

force beyond the range of massed rifle, machine-gun, and artillery fire. After ail, the

cavalry was still the only ann with the speed, mobility, and adequate firepower able to

exploit success- In other words, despite its limitations, it was the still only a m capable of

sustaining some form of operational mobiiity and conducting the breakthrough.

The aim. then, of this thesis is tu dispel the myth surrounding the perceived

inability of the cavalry to achieve a breakthrough. To be mure precise. this thesis will

demonstrate that within the context of the British effons to achieve a breukihrough on the

Western Front, the cavalry was not an obsolete a m of the Brirish Amy . In fact. this

thesis will show thar the cavalry was a viral component of achieving a breakrhrough

because it was. despite its technological limitmiom, the only truly mobile a m , and thar

the cavalry could not achieve a breakthrough becouse of facms or conditions beyond irs

conrrol. In essence, this thesis examines the concept of mobility on the Western Front

from the standpoint of the cavaky. What conditions were required by which the cavairy

might be abIe to breakthrough into open country and achieve a major success, and were

these conditions met? The thesis contends that, for the most part, these conditions were

not met. While British contemporary offensive doctrine recognized the necessity for the

exploitation phase in order to clinch an ovenwhelming victory over the enemy,

comparatively little attention was paid by the commanders of the time as to how to

achieve a breakthrough and conduct the exploitation phase of the offensive. As will be

seen, the ' ndde of the trenches' became the overarching concem of the entire British

command on the Western Front. Al1 their intellectual energies went into breaking into the

German line. Consequentiy, very little notice was given to examining how to achieve and

sustain a breakthrough and, subsequently, to conduct the exploitation phase of the

offensive. Ln other words, linle attention was given to defining and establishing the

conditions necessary for the achievement and sustainment of the breakthrough.

An examination of the operations of the cavalry then serves, for the purposes of

this thesis, as an illustrâtion of this theme. Moreover, the operations of the cavairy

demonstrated that the cavalry's sense of mobility was as vital a necessity in the British

A m y of the period as the cavairy's means of mobility were becoming obsolete. Indeed,

the cavahy was realiy the & arm with a sense of mobility and that the cavalry's lack of

success was as much to do with the inability of commanders, staffs, and the other arms of

the British Arrny to rapidly adapt and take advantage of the fleeting opportunities for

mobile warfare, as it was to do with the physicaihattlefield limitations of the mounted

arm itself. More than any other am, the cavalry became caught between the proverbial

rock of the human-centric lgm Century philosophy of war, and the hard place of the

technology-centnc 20& Century philosophy of war. M a t , then, were the conditions by

which the cavalry would be able to breakthrough the enemy lines and achieve operational

success?

The fmt condition had to do with the reliance of mobile warfare on a sense of

tempo to achieve the expected results against the enemy. Tempo consists of three

elements: speed of decision, speed of execution, and the speed of transition from one

activity to an~ther.~' In a theoretical analysis of the dynamics of land warfare, Richard

Simpkin has defined tempo as simply the "operational rate of advance."*' The key to

tempo is the ability for a force to react to changing situations, and to execute tactical and

-

20 Conternporary Canadian Army docirine, CFF 300-2 21 Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swp. (London: Brasscy 's, 1985), p. 106.

operational situations faster than the enemy. In many offensives launched by the British,

this ability was sorely absent at al1 levels throughout the command structure of the m y .

In many instances, initial success was squandered by the Bntish on the Western Front

because of an inability to rapidly reinforce success, and to rapidly adjust their forces to

the changing circumstances of the battle in less time than it took for the Gexmans to react

to the British success and re-deploy reserves to cover the gaps in their line. However, in

order to sustain a hi& tempo, not only did commanders at the lower levels have to have

an ability to take initiative, but also they had to have a full understanding of the plans and

capabilities of the other arms on the battlefield. Moreover, command relationships arnong

the various arms and formations had to be simple and well understood. This was very

often not the case. Without an understanding of supporting axm or higher level plans, it

was impossible for a commander to make quick changes to his own plans, to recommend

changes to higher plans, nor to execute those plans with any degree of confidence even if

he had the delegated authority to do so. Therefore, tempo relied on a related numkr of

conditions; narnely, a de-centralized command philosophy, staff and dl-arms

coordination, and communications.

The opporninities on the Western Front for mobile warfare occurred only rare1 y.

However, when they did occur, the British Amy lacked a decenealized philosophy of

command that allowed commanders at lower levels to exercise initiative and take

advantage of the gap(s) created in the enemy line by exploiting and by reinforcing

success. Too often these opportunities were Mssed because of a slavish adherence to pre-

determined tables and schemes of advance so much so that when opportunities for

independent action presented themselves, commanders lacked the delegated authority and

the sense of initiative to take advantage of them.

With respect to the requirement for staff and dl-anns coordination, and certainly

dl-arms mechanized doctrine and capabilities, one of the persistent themes in much of

the historiography of the British effort on the Western Front is the assessrnent that the

British Arrny could not return to a state of mobile warfare because of the inherent

weaknesses and vulnerabiiities of the cavalry to the conditions of modem warfare. To be

sure, the cavalry severely lacked the protection, firepower, and tactical mobility that

would dlow it to operate freely on the battlefield, However, it is also an immutable tmth

about the Western Front that the other m s on the battlefield, in particular the infantry

and, later, the Tank Corps also, when employed in isolation also suffered the sarne fate.

Afier all, it was not until the offensives of 1917 that the British Army had begun to

employ any semblance of dl-arms doctrine. Therefore, for the commanders and staffs at

division, corps, and army leveIs, the battlefields of the Western Front had demonstrated

that the key to success, the key to unlocking the deadlock of trench warfare, was the

combination of maximum firepower with maximum mobility. Tactically, this meant all-

arms doctrine and, in particular, the integration of tanks and artillery with the infantry

advance. For commanders and staffs, it meant the plans for the attack and subsequent

breakthrough had to be underpinned by a level of coordination between formations and

arms that had heretofore been unheard of in modem warfare.

Undoubtedly the first half of the equation (firepower) had been achieved by the

spnng of 1918 with the synchronization of the infantry advance with the improvements in

predicted artillery fire planning. However, the second half of the equation (mobility) had

only been partly achieved. The advent of the tank on the battlefield had brought a certain

amount of rnostiy local and tactical rnobility but had yet to be combined with an ability to

provide tactical mobility to the infantry and the artillery. The mechanized combat team of

the mid-twentieth Century was still too far off in the future. Certainly, the advances in

tank-infantry cooperation that were wimessed during this period were instrumental in

allowing the British to break-in to the enemy lines, but were not instrumentai in dlowing

them to breakrhrough and exploit their success. The only a m that was still capable of

achieving and sustaining this type of mobility was the cavalry. However, because cav*

operations had not achieved the same Ievel of coordination with the operations of the

other arms on the battlefield as had been achieved with the infantry-tanks-artillery

formula, then the best the British Anny could h o p for in their offensives on the Westem

Front was to achieve great success at breaking into the enemy defenses, but never any

success at breaking through them and exploiting into the German rear areas.

Finally, the 1 s t condition that had to be met in order to achieve an acceptable

degree of tempo was the possession of a robust, flexible, and d iab le communications

system between cornmands. The ability to rapidy adjust plans, to take advantage of

fleeting opportunities for success, and to rapidly cwrdinate the actions of al1 arms on the

batdefield, required a similarly rapid and robust communications that quickly

disseminates data and message trafic. With wireless communication systems in only the

earliest stages of development, systems relying pnmarily on line became the

predominate means of exchanging message mit on the Westem Front. While this may

have been an adequate system for the conduct of operations in static positional warfare, it

was inadquate for the exigencies of mobile warfare and created a situation where

commanders no longer had voice control over their forces. Lack of voice control impeded

commanders in taking immediate advantage of opportunities for breakthrough on

battlefield. Commanders at d l levels were used to the decision-action cycles associated

with positionai warfare where information was transmitted over static, well-established

line systems and command decisions were made centrally based on pre-determineci

schemes of advance and tirnetables. M e n the conduct of offensives evolved into more

fluid situations where information was sketchy, and where the conduct of the advance

came to be more and more dependent upon the initiative, decisions and actions of lower

level commanders, the contemporary means of communication could not cope. This lack

of a diable and robust communications capability between commands created a tactical

difficulty with dire consequences for the chances of success for cavalry operations.

No introduction would be complete wiîhout a note on the general histonography

of the British war on the Western Front. The histonography of the British effort on the

Western Front, until recently, could be divided into two main schools of thought: the

'intemal' or 'mud-and-blood' school which held that the slaughter of British soldiers was

the direct consequence of the incornpetence and ineptitude of the British Expeditionary

Force's (BEF) commanders; and the 'extemai' school which blamed the BEF's

difficulties on the Western Front on inexperienced staff oEicers, îhe resultant difficulties

experienced with the adaptation of new technologies to the battiefieid, the superior

fighting abiiities of the Germans. and political interference." With the publication of

Liddell-Hart's The Real War in 1930, the intemal school took off with a vengeance. Later

works of this school have included Prime Minister David Lloyd George's six-volume

War Memoirs (1933)- Leon Wolff's In Flanders Fields: The 1917 Campaign (1958), and

Alan Clark's The Donkeys (1961). The intemal school was under-pinned by the literary

world with the publication of personal war memoirs such as Edmund Blunden's

Undenones of War (1 938). Robert Graves' Goodbye to Al1 Thar, and Siegfned Sassoon's

Memoirs of a Fox Hunting MUR (1928) and Memoirs of un Znfan~ry Oficer (1930)' and

the war poetry of Wilfred Owen, Rupert Brooke, and Edward Thomas to name but a very

few? The chief difficulty, of course, with the internai school is the notion that al1 the

difficulties of the Western Front generally could be laid squarely at the feet of a handful

of generals, and Haig in particular. This view has corne to be regarded as somewhat

simplistic.

The external school, on the other hand, was inaugurated with the publication of

the sixteen-volume British officia1 history entitled Miliras, Operarions: France and

Belgim, 1913-1919 b y Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds. Within this school are the

many works by the most stalwart member of the school John Terraine including Douglas

Haig: n e Educated Soldier ( 1963)' The Smoke und fhe Fire: Myths and And-Myrhs of

War 1861-1945 (1980), and Whire Hear: The New Wagare, 1914-I918 (1982). Also of

note in this school is Lord Blake's edition of The Private Papers of Douglas Haig. 1914-

1919 (1952). The chief difficulty with this school has lain with its slavish cornparison of

the British war on the Western Front with that of the Union forces in the U.S. Civil War.

According to Ian Malcolm Brown, "the desire to clear Haig's repuîatïon has ciouded

22 For a fuller explanation of the two schools of tbought see Tim Travers, Introduction to The Killing Ground, (London: Men and Unwin, 1987). pp. xvii-xix, and Ian Malcolm Brown, Brirish Logistics on the Western Froru, (London: Fracger, 1998). pp. 2-10. 23 See also Paui Fussell's seminal study of how the war tias bcen remembercd and mythologiztd in the Western world through the media of the poetry and prose of the inter-war years: Paul Fusseii, The Great War and Modem Merrwry, (iondon: Oxford University Press. 1975).

comparative arguments as much as have the mud-and-blood school's efforts to excoriate

hirn."t4

Recent accompiishments have begun to address the faults of both schools. The

publication of Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham's Fire-Power British Anny

Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945 in 1985 inaugurated a middle school of thought

in which new technologies are distinctly an external factor while the inability to adapt the

new technology with a clearly defined theory for the conduct of operations is distinctly

internaL3 Scholarship since the late 1980s has followed this same reasoning. For

example, Tim Travers's The Killing Ground has provided more of a balanced approach to

the problem of Haig and the other senior British commanders on the Western Front

emphasizing the influence of pre-war experiences and norms on the decision-making and

problem-solving abilities of Haig and his contemporaries. The point, of course, is that the

middle school portrays Haig and his contemporaries as neither completely incompetent

nor completely blameless. Other works of the middle school have included William

Rawling's Surviving Trench Waqare: Technology and the Canadian Corps 1914-1919

(1993), Tim Travers's How the War Was Won (1993), Paddy Griffith7 s Barrle Tactics of

the Wesrern Fronr: The Brirish Anny 's Art of Anack ( 1 994)' and Robin Prior's and

Trevor Wilson's Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry

Rawlinson 1914-18 (1992).

In general, this thesis endorses the views espoused in the scholarship of the

middle school. Notwithstanding this fact, however, this thesis will utilize material from

all three schools for the simple fact remains that none of the schools has dealt with the

2.4 Brown. p. 7. 25 Brown, p. 7.

issue of the role of cavalxy on the Western front to a degree which would exclude the

arguments of the others. To put it another way, al1 three schools are long on analyzing the

competency of Haig and his contemporaxies just as they are long on discussing the

emergence of infantry-artillery-tank attack doctrine; however, they are short on

discussing the place of cavalry on the Western Front and its ability to achieve a

breakthrough.

This thesis will re-evaluate the role of the British cavaIry in the context of its

ability to achieve a breakthrough on the Western Front. The first chapter discusses the

development of the British cavaS, in the "inter-war" period between the close of the

South African War (Boer War) in 1902 and the commencement of hostilities in 1914.

The chapter examines. in patïcular, the a m blanche versus mounted infantry

controveny and how the British cavalry, while not wholly shed of its m e blanche

leanings both doctrinally nor attihidinally, emerged from the penod better able to meet

the exigencies of the new warfare than would they had been able to fourteen years

previous. The chapter also chronicles the development of Haig's ideas and precepts on

the conduct of war and the role that cavaky would play on the future batdefield

The second chapter chronicles, in general terms, the course of the war on the

Western Front with a particular emphasis on the development of the Bntish b y ' s

attack doctrine in the years 19 15- 19 18. Re1 ying heavily on material from the middle

school, the chapter demonstrates that even by the final attacks of 1918, the Bntish Army

lacked the necessary conditions. as described, for the achievement of a breakthrough by

the cavairy.

The third to fifth chapters illustrate the thesis by examining three case studies in

chronological order the Battle of the Somme and in particuiar, the actions of General Sir

Henry Rawlinson's IV Army on Juiy 14". 1916 at High Wood and Bazentin Ridge; the

Battle of Cambrai (November 2 0 ~ - 21*. 1917); and. the Batde of Amiens (August 8h -

9&, 191 8). Although the British A m y conducted a number of other offensives on the

Western Front in the period 1915-1918, it was at these engagements that the opporninities

for a breakthrough were most closely realized These three chapters examine each of

these engagements in turn with the aim of determining why a breakthrough was not

achieved despite the opportunities presented to do so. Chapters three to five substantiate

the thesis by dernonstrating that breakthroughs were not achieved due to reasons beyond

the control of the cavalry and had the aforementioned conditions existed, the cavairy

could have had a good chance of achieving a breakthrough. While trying not to make a

clear case for post hoc erg0 propter hoc reasoning - hindsight based conclusions - the

point of the three chapters is to examine the contemporary application of new technology

to the battlefield, contemporary offensive doctrine, and the execution of that doctrine in

three different yet consecutive offensives over a two year period, in order to demonstrate

the limitations experienced by the British Army in achieving a breakthrough on the

Western Front.

This thesis concludes that within the context of the British efforts to achieve a

breakthrough on the Western Front, the cavalry was not an obsolete arm of the British

Anny. In fact, this thesis will show that the cavalry was a vital component of achieving a

breakthrough because it was, despite its technological limitations, the only truly mobile

arm. but that the cavalry could not achieve a breakthrough because of factors or

conditions beyond its control.

TAE DOCTRLNE OF THE OFFENSIVE AND THE ARME BLANCHE' VERSUS

In the Boer Wu.. . we O wned rwthing beyond ttrejùes of o w ctunps and bivouacs, whereas the Boers rode where they pleased all over rAe country.

W i n ChurchiU, TheV Finest How, ii, 4,1949.

Brian Bond once wrote that forming "judgements in rnili~ary history is perhaps

more tempting, but also more hazardous, than in other branches of the subject, mainly

because decisions often seem to be more clearcut and responsibility for success or

failure self-evident." Bond went on in the same articie to state his belief that the history

scholar must concentrate on understanding the past in irs own renm and leave the

extraction of contemporary lessons to oihers (his italics).* It is in this spirit that this

chapter will attempt to examine the deveiopment of British cavalry doctrine and tactics in

the years between the end of the Boer War and the commencement of hostiliaes on the

Western Front in 1914. No doubt the hndsight of eighty years can tend to give the

military historian of today the confidence to undertake a highly cnticai analysis of the

evolution of British A m y doctrine and training in the decade or so before the war. But

like C.S. Forester's fictitious Lieutenant-General ~urzon', the men of the Ume, although

they had their doubts and suspicions, did not know that war would be coming in 1914.

More to the point, few, if any, British cavalrymen would have been able to predict the

changes to their arm and, indeeà, to the whole conduct of war that would occur.

1 Anne Blanche literally means white weapon or cold steel. The tcnn is French and rcfers to the thnisting and cutting weapons used in battie. It is cspeciaiiy used in ref~ence to tfie lance and sabre as the preferred weapons of the cavaky as distinct from firtarms. On occasion it is a term for the cavalry itself. See William L. Taylor, 'The Debate Over Changing Cavalry Tactics and Wcapons, 1900- 19 14," Miiizary Affairs. Vol. Winter 1964-65). p. 173. 2 Brian Bond, "Judgement in Miiitary History," RUSI Journal, Vol. 134, No. 1 (Spring 1989)- p. 69. 3 C.S. Foresur, The General, (London: William Brcdon & Son. 1936)

Therefore, although this chapter will examine the limitations of the British Army and the

British cavairy as they entered World War 1, it wiii also highlight some of the

improvements that were made as well in order to give a more baianced assessment.

From the beginning of the Boer War (1899-1902), the Boer leaders employed

their own farmers as mounted riflemen who moved rapidly from place to place and

utilized firearms rather than edged weapons to inflict casualties on the enemy, the British.

initially. the British met this challenge dong the lines of the 19" Century tradition of

highly drilled foot soldiea in infantry columns accompanied by cavalry equipped with

the traditional steel lances and sabres. Boer tactics initially caught the Bntish forces

completely unprepared. The Boers seldom charged the British but, instead, utilized their

superior mobility to move their firepower (rifle-armed farmers and a meager amount of

horse drawn artillery pieces) around the battlefield engaging and inflicting casudties on

the Bntish from stand-off positions essentially negating the superior strength and

numbers of the British. Unlike the British who relied on the horsed cavaln, primarily for

the purpose of employing shock tactics against the enemy and delivenng the decisive

assault, the Boers relied on horses only for mobility4

At fmt, the Boers held the upper hand against the Bntish until the British

recogmzed the need to re-organize their forces in order to meet the Boers on a more equal

footing.5 According to William L. Taylor, ody:

dragoon tactics could succeed, and not until the British used their mounted elements in this fashion were they able to defeat the tenacious Boers. Lord Roberts, the commander-in-chef of British forces in South Africa concurred in these observations. He felt that the British cavalry failed

4 S u Thomas f akcnham. The Boer War, (London: Weidcnfcld and Nicolson, 1979). p. 164 and 252, and Rayne Kmgcr, Good-Bye Dolly Gray, (London: CasseIl, 1959). p. 427-8. 5 Ibid., pp. 173-4.

because it did not h o w and had not been required to know how to use the most useful weapons with which it was armed - the rifle or ~ a r b i n e . ~

Thus, to Roberts, above ali else, the Boer War had demonstrated the rapidly growing

influence of firepower on militaq doctrine and tactics especiaily with regard to the future

use of cavairy. As such, the ta& camed out by the mounted arm during the war were

certainly more in line with those of mounted infantry than of traditional cavalry. In

chronicling the operations of the Canadian forces in the war, Carman Miller writes that

Canada raised and shipped to South Africa three mounted units: the Royal Canadian

Dragoons. Lord Strathcona's Hose, and the 1" Battalion Canadian Mounted Rifles.

There is no doubt that when these units were employed in fighting they fought as infantry

utilizing their horses for tactical mobility on the battlefield. When not fighting they were

employed in more traditionai tasks such as screening, fi& protection, and

reconnaissance.' However, as Miller a f f i n :

Despite the number of militia cavalrymen in their ranks, the mounted rifle battalions were not cavalry. They were mounted infantry, armed with -303 Long Lee-Enfield Mkl rifles.. . .A mounted rifleman's most precious possessions were his rifle and his

Less than two years afier the cessation of hostilities in South Africa, a war broke

out in Manchuria between Russia and Japan (Russo-Japanese War, L904-5) in which both

sides utilized the latest in rnilitary technology. AccordingIy, the war brought home a few

more lessons about the role of cavairy in modem war? While no large cavaS, actions

ever occmed during the conflict, those that did were fought almost wholly with rifles.

6 Ibid., p. 174. 7 Carman Miller, Pcrinring the Map R d Cana& and rhe Souh Afncm War. 1899-1 902, (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), pp. 219-20. 8 ibid.. pp. 219-20. 9 Taylor, p. 174.

Neither side, as Taylor points out, demonstrated any desire to rely on the arme blanche in

battle. 'O

The central problem for the cavatry at the dawn of the 2om Century as

demonstrated by the Boer War and the Russcdapanese War was the challenge of

firepower. However, as Edward Spiers argues, the difficulty of both wars was that they

"did not produce any self-evident lessons, only a range of common experiences, liable to

whatever interpretation suited die subjective preferences of the inteqxeter."" Therefore,

to many observers, both wars were dismissed as irrelevant sideshows that portended no

discernible lessons for the future of modem warfare in Europe. The Boer War, as Mïchael

Howard affirms, could easily be dismissed as atypicai. fought as it was by an army

trained in the methods of colonial warfare against an ad hoc non-professional army

hardly worthy of cornparison to any funue adversary in ~ u r o ~ e . l2 The Russo-Japanese

War, on the other hand, had been fought by the Russians, a major European power, and

the Japanese, a powerful nation that possessed an army trained by Geman experts and a

navy trained by the British. However, European observers had aiso observed that, for

example, the Japanese assaults against the Russian defenses of Port Arthur, as high in

casualties as they were, were demonstrative of the fact that by a combination of carefuI

preparation and fanatical courage the problern of the attack on the modem banlefield

could be s01ved.'~

Nonetheless, in hindsight, Liddell-Hart recognrzed the root problem that not o d y

cavairy leaders but all leaders in the British Army were trying to corne to grips with in

10 Ibid.. p. 174. I I Edward M. Spiers, 'The British Cavalry, 1902- 19 14," J oumai of the Sociezy for A m y Hinorical Research. Vol. 57 (1979). p. 76.

the years before 1914: the dominating power of fm defence and the supreme difficulty of

crossing the fire-swept zone.14 After ail, the Boer War had demonstrateci that "the

magazine rifle and smokeIess powder had made frontal attacks more costiy for infantry

and that cavairy attacks with swords (the traditional arme blanche) had become

s ~ i c i d a l . " ~ ~ Similarly. the Russo-Japanese War had demonstrated that with both sides

armed with machine guns and employing heavy artillery, the power of the ensrenched,

barbed-wire protected defensive had rendered the frontal attack as unprofitable. With

neither side able to afford a long protracteci war, and when the way to victory by turning a

Bank had become impossible, stalemate ensued; a portend for the future.'6 So what

lessons did the British cavalrymen glean from these conflicts?

According to Anglesey, a great deal of the controversy surrounding the lessons to

be denved from both conflicts evolved from the differing interpretations of each

conflict." According to the arme blanche or Old School, in both wars the cavairy was

never afforded the opportunity to show its mie worth by conducting a 'hee-to-knee' type

cavalry charge. Moreover, the Old School could point to neither disaster nor triumph in

the validation of arme blanche tactics. Therefore, these advocates could Say that since

there was no answer to the firepowerkrossing the fire-swept zone conundnim, traditional

cavairy tactics and doctrine were not to be discounted. In fact, the Old School fell back

on the proposition that the South AErican experience was an anomaly and wouid never be

12 Michael Howard, "Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914," in Pettr Para td., Makers of Modern S m e g y , (Princeton: Princeton University Ress, 1986). p. 5 I 7. 13 Ibid., P. 5 18. 14

15 Liddell-Hart, p. 35. Preston, Roiand, and Wise, p. 228.

16 Ibid., p. 229. 17 Anglesey. Hisrory, Vol. 4, p. 402.

repeated.I8 Some members of the OId School went so far as to suggest that the Boers

would have been more successful had they possessed the arme blanche. Lieutenant-

Colonel Maude suggested that "if the commando which attacked Benson at

Bakenlaagte.. . had been able to charge home with cold steel, lance or sword, the result for

us must have been considerably wone than, in fact, it was."lg Clearly, to some, the South

African experience had only strengthened the argument for retention of the m e blanche.

As suggested above, during the Russo-Japanese War there were relatively few

cavalry actions due to the abundant employment of machine guns and quick-firing

artillery by both sides, and the consequentid grounding of the conflict into entrenched

stalemate. As with South Afiica, the lessons to be derived by both schwls depended on

their subjective interpretations of the conflict. The Old School supporters pointed to the

fact that the Russian cavalry, trained and equipped as mounted infantry and king on the

losing side, had perfonned miserably despite the evidence that their carbines were of an

inferior quaiity, and their aaining had k e n defective." A contrary conclusion was drawn

by Sir Ian Hamilton who had served as military representative of India with the Japanese

Field Army. Hamilton, a member of the mounted infantry or New School found that time

and again "the cavalry, Russian and Japanese, did nothing.. ..Cavalry trained to act as

good solid infantry when dismounted might have done much, either on the Russian or

Japanese side.. . .There was no place or opporîunity where the horse could possibly have

been of any value except to bnng a rifleman rapidly up to the right spot."21 Furthermore,

- -- -- - -

18 ïbid., p. 403. 19 Lieutenant-Colonel F.N. Maude, Cavairy: Its Pasz and Future, (1903). qtd in Anglesey, Vol. 4, p. 404. m Anglesey, Vol. 4, p. 405. 21 S u Ian Hamilton, A SuzflOjïcer's Handbook. 1, (1905). qtd in Anglesey, Vol. 4, p. 405-6.

while accompanying the Japanese First A m ~ y headquartem on November 16&, 1904

Hamilton stated:

My arguments are not . . directed against the sword as such, but only against those who would train cavairy su that îhey enter upon a field of battie thinking rather of where they may deliver a charge than of how they rnay employ their mobility to enable them to use their rifles with the best effect."

Clearly. the lessons of both confiicts were not universally discemible, as the next decade

demonstrated in the way British cavaïry and. indeed, British military doctrine and tactics

evolved.

To repeat, the clear challenge to the British &y in general. and to the cavairy in

particular, was the rapid development and ascendancy of fmpower on the battlefield and

the related challenge, as Liddell-Hart termed it, of crossing the fire-swept zone. In fact, it

is worth noting thôt the witnesses to the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa

were almost unanimous in agreeing on the practically impossible dificulty of crossing

the fire-swept zone? So what was the British response to these challenges? As Tim

Travers points out:

In the decade between the Boer War and World War 1, it gradually became evident to much of the British army that technologicai changes had rendered the defensive side of war very much more powerful than the offensive. Yet the axmy generally sought to overcome these technological factors by reemphasizing the value of moral qualities and the use of those qualities in the offensive, thus attempting to answer technical problems with moral solutions."

-- -

z? Sir Ian Hamilton. Remarks on a report by Captain J.B. Jardine, 5& Lanccrs. Yen-Tai. November 16&. 1904 published in n e RUSSO-Jupanese War. Repomfrom Brirish m c e r s Anached ro rhe Japcurese and Russian Forces in the Fie4 Vol. 11, (London: HMSO, 1908) 23 T-HE. Travers, 'Ttchnology. Tactics. and Morde: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, and British Military Theory, 1900-1914," Journal of Modern Histoty, Vol. 51 (June 1979). p. 270. 24 Royal Commission on the War in South Am4 3 vols., (Great Britain: Parliamentary Papers, vol. 4 1. [19û4]), qtd in ibid., p. 264.

Clearly, then. the preferred response to the challenge of the growing lethality of weapons

was a human rather than a technical one. Michael Howard illutnites the point M e r

when he discusses the Russo-Japanese War

The main lesson that European observers deduced from the Russo- Japanese War was that in spite of al1 the advantages which the new weapons gave the defense, the offensive was still en tk ly possible. The Japanese successfully took the initiative from the very beginning of the war and in a senes of set-piece attacks drove Russian forces slightly larger than their own out of southem Manchuria The cost had been hi&, but as a result Japan has graduated as a Great Power, and any nation that wished to remain a Great Power, Euopean commentators pointed out, must be prepared to face comparable cosü .3

The perceived lesson, then, of the Russo-Japanese War was moral or psychological rather

than technical. Therefore, the army and, indeed the nation, which had the spirit of the

offensive, no maner how formidable the enemy's defenses, and no matter how high the

cost, was bound to be triumphant. In France, the newly appointed Chief of the Generai

Staff. General JO&, believed that the South Afican and Russo-Japanese conflicts had

demonstrated more than ever the superiority of the "spirit of the offensive" over the

increased strength of the defensive? Li England, Sir Ian Hamilton argued dong the

same lines stating that, "War is essentMy the aiumph. not of a chassepot over a needle-

gun, not of a line of men entrenched behind wire entanglements and fire-swept zones

over men exposing themselves in the open, but of one will over a weaker will.. .the best

defence to a country is an army formed, trained, inspireci by the idea of the attack.""

Indeed the same wimesses to the Royal Commission also agreed that the solution to the

fie-swept zone problem was the decisive assault; i.e. the offensive.** The response, then,

25 Howard, p. 518. 26 Ibid., p. 520- 27

28 Sir Iaa Hamilton. CompuLory Service, 2.6 cd. (London: 19 1 1). qtd in Howard p. 521. Travers. p. 270.

to the challenge of firepower was mord rather than technical. It was a response in iine

with the human-cenmc philosophies of war of the 19& Century rather than a response in

line with the emerging technology-centric philosophies of war that were beginning to

emerge in the first years of the 20" Century. It was against this general background of the

doctrine of the offensive that the arme blanche versus mounted infantry controversy in

England occurred.

The British A m y , then, generally accepted the f i t part of the fmpower equation

- that new weapons and technology had rendered the batîlefield a very deadly place - but

could not accept the second part of the argument - that tactics and doctrine, accordingly,

m u t change." Instead, except for a few individual members of the defensive/fmpower

school of thought, the army loyally defended traditional arms and roles, and sought to

overcome the full implications of technology by stressing the offensive and moral and

psychological qualities of the individual ~oldier. '~ For the cavalry, therefore, the arme

blanche was the offensive ami par excellence relying as it did on the offensive spirit of

the individuai cavairyman armed with lance and sabre to carry home the attack against

the enemy.

As discussed, the amie blanche (Old School) versus mounted infantry (Firepower

School) controvers y had its f i t real airing in the inquiries of the Royal Commission on

the War in South Afnca. The most distinguished wimess in favouf of the Old Schwl was

Lieutenant-General Sir John French who expressed unreserved opposition to the rifle

k ing made the principal cavairy weapon arguing that "if the cavaLryman is taught that he

is to rely rnainly upon his rifle, his morale is taken away from him, and if that is done his

29 Travers, p. 276. M Ibid., p. 276.

power is d e s t r ~ ~ e d . " ~ * Backing French up, of course, was Douglas Haig, then stiU sening

as commanding officer of the 1 7 ~ Lancers, who testified that it had k e n a mistake to

withdraw lances and swords from the cavalry in South Afiica because although their use

had been small. their effect on Boer morale was considerable." However, Lord Roberts'

reading of the war had differed from that of Haig and French. Firrnly in the firepower

camp, Roberts believed that m e blanche or shock tactics as employed by the cavairy

had achieved linle since Napoleon's time and were even less likely to do so in the

future.33 Thus, with the publication of the inconclusive recommendations of the Royal

Commission in 1904, the battle lines had been drawn between, on the one hand, the Old

School championed by French and Haig and, on the other hanci, the Firepower School led

by Lord Roberts. The controversy would continue for the next ten years.

While the Old School believed the South Afiican War had been atypical with very

iittle to be learned for the future of cavairy on the European battlefield, Lord Roberts

believed otherwise. Roberts was convinced that the South African War must not be

ignored. As Commander-in-Chef of the British Army from 1900 to 1904, Roberts had

k e n influenced by Colonel G.F.R. Henderson whom he had chosen as his Director of

Intelligence when he deployed to South Afiica in 1900. Henderson's writings as a result

of his South African experience were unequivocal with respect to firepower and the

future of cavalry:

- - - - --

31 Qtd in Brian Bond. ''Doctrine and Training in the British Cavalry, 1870-1914," in Michel Howard. ed., The Theory and Practice of War; Essays Preserued to Captaùr B. H. Liddell-Han. (London: Cassell, 1965). p. 109. 32 Bond. "Docmne and Training.. .," p. 109. 33 Ibid.. p. 110.

It is as clear as nwnday that a mounted force as mobile as the Boers.. .will be a most effective weapon, even on a European theatre of war, in the han& of a strategist who grasps its possibiIities."

Roberts' first blow against the Old SchooI came in March, 1903 with the issuance of

Army Order 39 which directed the removal of the lance as a cavairy weapon and further

directed that "henceforth [the rifle would] be considered as the cavalry soldier's principal

~ e a ~ o n . " ~ ' In addition. Roberts also published a rnernorandurn on "Cavaky Armament"

in which he drew a nurnber of lessons from past confïicts and concbied that in the future

"the cavalry will generally act dismounted.. . ."36 However, Roberts' most contentious act

occurred just as he was about to retire from the post of Commander-in-Chief in 1904:

Roberts wrote the Preface to the new edition of Cavalry Training (1904). In the Preface,

Roberts stated that instead of the "firearm k i n g an adjunct to the sword, the sword must

henceforth be an adjunct to the rifle; and that cavairy soldiers must become expert rifle

shots and be constantly trained to act disrn~unted."~' Through his actions in a

considerably short time period, Roberts had at least laid the groundwork for a

fundamental change as to the way the British cavaky would be equipped, trained, and

prepared for future conflict. However, with Roberts' retirement in 1904, the Old Schooi

saw an opportunity to nght the wrongs he had inflicted upon the cavalry.

The years following Lord Roberts' departure from the War Office saw a

concerted effort on behalf of the Old School to reverse the many reforms to the cavalry

that Roberts had instituted. In 1907 the 1904 edition of Cavdry Training was superseded

34 G-FX. Henderson, The Science of War, (London: 19 10). p. 379. See ais0 Jay Luvaas, ïhe Educarion of an Anny, ( Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 1964). p. 238. 35 S e Anglesey, Vol. 4, pp. 391-2 for a complete rc-printing of the order. The rifle which Roberu introduced for the cavairy - the Rifle, Short, Magazine, Lee-EnfieId, Mark 1 - was virtuaily the same as chat used for the infantry, except that it was shortcned by five inches and lightened by one pound. 36 Qtd in ibid., p. 392. 37 Qtd in Spiers, p. 74.

by a rnanuai that began to place the sword and the lance back as the principal weapons of

the cavairy. The manual also made it clear that the "rifle, effective as it is, cannot replace

the effect produced by the speed of the horse, the magnetism of the charge and the temr

of cold te el."'^ This proclamation, of course, contradicted the policy as enunciated by

Roberts in the 1904 edition. Subsequent editions of the manual in 19 10 and 1912

continued to give paramountcy to the anne blanche school over the mounted infantry

school although the 1912 edition did try to strike more of a balance between the two as

will be discussed later.

But re-issuing CuvaZry Training was not enough for the Old Schoo1. By 1907,

French and Haig had both become recognized, based on their reputations as cavalry

leaders in the Boer War, as the leading experts in the field of cavairy doctrine and

naining. Of course, with French's appointment as Inspecter-General of the Forces (1907-

1 1 ); and Haig7 s posts as Inspecter-General of Cavalry in India (1 9O3-06), Director of

Military Training (1906-07), and Director of Staff Duties (1907-09), both men had the

power to entrench the cavalry firmly in the doctrine and training regimes of the anne

blanche. Before leaving hdia, Haig expounded on his views on cavalry in a publication

entitled Cavalry Studies (1907). In the introduction to the book, Haig makes it quite ciear

that the advent of unprecedented firepower has made things considerably more difficult

for the cavalry on the battlefield. However, his solution to this conundnun is, of course,

to fa11 back on the doctrine of the offensive and support the anne blanche. To Haig, the

solution to the challenge of firepower was to rely "on the character of those who have had

cornmand [of the c a ~ a l r ~ ] . " ~ ~ Also in these years. French and Haig supported the

38 Qtd in Spiers. p. 77. 39 Major-General Douglas Haig, Cavds, Sruàies, (London: Hugh Rees, 1907). p. 15.

28

founding in 1906 of the Cavalry Journal, a periodical designed to spread the anne

blanche message to the cavalry and m y audience as a whoie.

The arme blanche school in the closing years before 19 14 was the predominant

school. However, Lord Rokrts re-entered the fray by lending his support to the

publication in 1910 of Erskine Childers' War and the Arne Blanche. Childers was an

extreme critic of the arme blanche and in his book advocated the complete abolition of

the sword and lance, and sole reliance on firepower for the cavalry. Childers' effect on

official thought was limited even with the endorsement of Lord Roberts. Nonetheless, it

seems that his and Robert's determined stand on the issue were enough to convince the

wnters of the 19 12 edition of Cavolry Training to smke a more equitable balance on the

respective merits of sword, lance, and rifle?

Yet how did this controversy effect cavalry training in the inter-war years?

According to Brian Bond, cavalry training in the field was adversely effected.

Notwithstanding the standing problems of lack of training fun& and training facilities

that plagued the m y as a whole, cavalry training was almost non-existent up until 1906.

With the appointment of French as Inspecter General in 1907, the cavalry's standard of

training began to improve. Interestingly enough, it was in the same year that British

cavalry units were issued the -303 calibre Short Rifle, Magazine, Lee-Enfield (SMLE); an

indication that despite the seeming ascendancy of the Old School in matters of cavairy

training and arming, other quarters in the army had brought home the lessons of the Boer

War and had seen fit to design and procure a rifle for use by mounted as welI as

dismounted infantry units4' However, in the last exercises of the war it was plain to see

40 The material for this paragraph is from Bond, ''Doctrine and Training.. .," p. 116. 41 Sec HCB. Rogers, Weapons of the Brirish Solder. (London: Steley, Service & Co., 1960)

29

that t!!e practicing of shock tactics was the preferred training activity for most cavalry

units and formations. Afier the 1912 manoeuvres, for example, it was reported that

"cavairy cornmanciers are inclined to employ shock action whenever possible without

reference to the circumstances of particular cases," and that the "present training of

cavalry shows tendencies that may lead to the useless sacrifice of our available cavalry

9942 force in war.. . . Given that the Cavalry Division was not assembled for the 19 13

manoeuvres, it can be assumed, as Bnan Bond does, that the arme blanche school was

paramount among the cavalry on the outbreak of war in 1 9 1 4 . ~ ~

The study of the arme blanche versus firepower controversy has revealed

just how difficult it was for the British cavalry to learn from war in the immediate years

after the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War. For the cavairy leaders of the time, any

subordination of mounted training would emasculate the offensive cavalry spirit and

dilute the desire for the attack. As the arrn derived its morale and self-confidence fiorn a

mobile role wielding the cold steel of the lance or sabre, any concept that it should fight

dismounted seemed contrary to its intrinsic purpose.M Yet the arme blanche versus

mounted infantry controversy was just one facet of a greater struggle within the British

Army to corne to grips with the portents of modem warfare as they began to appear at the

beginning of the 20" Century.

The Royal Commission of 1904 affected a wider spectnun of the British defence

establishment than just the cavalry. The commission's report recited many of the army's

known command and administrative deficiencies, but did not outline a plan for

- - - - - -

42 Annual Report of inspecror-General of Forces, 1912, qtd in Bond, 'Poctrbe and Training. ..." p. 118. 43 The material for this paragraph is h m Bond. 'Doctrine and Training.. .," p. 1 18. u Spiers. p. 76.

remedying them. However, one of the commissioners was more ambitious and was

appointed by Lord Balfour, the Prime Minister, to chair a cornmittee charged with

reorganizing the War Office. Of the many recommendations submitted by the cornmittee,

Balfour accepted its proposal for the abolishment of the office of Commander-in-Chief to

be replaced by an A m y Council presided over by a Secretary of State for War and

advised by a Chief of the General Staff. Balfour also accepted the recommendation for

the permanent establishment of the Cornmittee of Imperid Defence marking the first step

towards finding a bureaucratic soiution to the problem of civil-military relations that had

so plagued the control of the war in South ~fr ica .~ '

The fmt man appointed as Secretary of State was R.B. Haldane. Between 1906-

11, Haldane instituted a number of reforms that had as their original aim to reduce the

annuaI defence estimate. Arnongst Haldane' s reforms were the establishment of an

Imperid General Staff, the re-organization of the England based regular anny into an

expeditionary force consisting of six 'great' divisions and four cavaky brigades; and the

establishment of a 'territorial' army system to form the basis for mobilization should the

expeditionary force need to be expanded in time of war, and to form a home defence

force when the expeditionary force was deployed overseas. The onginai purpose of the

expeditionary force, at least in 1907 when the reforms were initiated, was to consüuct a

contingency force for overseas service somewhere in the empire such as South Africa, the

North-West frontier, or, least likeiy, on the continent in concert with the French against

45 The mattrial for this paragraph is h m David French, The Brirish Way in Wa$are. (London: Unwin Hyman. 1990). pp. 160-1.

31

the Germans. It was only in the last years before 1914 that the latter purpose came to

dominate planning and preparations.a

Instrumental in constructing the expeditionary force and in instituting Haldane's

supporting reforms were, of course, French and Haig. French was appointai to the Army

Council as Inspecter-Gened of the Forces ( 1907- 1 1) while Haig served as, in turn,

Director of Miiïtary Training (1906-O?), and Director of Staff Duties (1 907-09). We have

already examined French and Haig's influence over the development of the cavairy in

these years. However, what has not k e n discussed is the influence that these two OId

School advocates, especially Haig, had over the development of anny doctrine and

training as a whole during the sarne period. As Director of Military Training and, later as

Director of Staff Duties, Haig was intimately involved in the construction of the British

Expeditionary Force, with the creation of the Imperid Generd Staff, and, most

importantly for the purposes of this thesis, with the composition of Field Service

Regulafions (FSR) in the version that would underpin the conduct, under Haig's

leadership, of the British effort on the Western Front in later years."

According to Denis Winter in his clearly polemic and "intemal' study of Douglas

Haig entitled Haig's Comrnand (1991), most of Haig's weaknesses in the pre-war years

were Old Army weaknesses which Haig ensured were codified in F S R . ~ The offensive

battle lay at the centre of FSR with action beginning with a short, sharp artillery

46 The material for this paragraph is fiom French. pp. 161-2. Indeed. the Moroccan Crisis of 1906 - in which Gennany threatcned France over disagreements conceming the 1904 British-hnch Treaty of Agreement (the first steps of the Entente Cordiale) in which Britain and France had settied the question of sovereignty over a number of colonial possessions including Morocco. Ncwfoundland, and Egypt - providai the imptnis for military conversations with France in 1906. It was on the basis of these talks, and a s a consequence of the growing German menace in Europe in the years foilowing, that Haldane's expeditionary force eventually became the master plan for the immediate dispatch of an expcditionary force to France in the event of hostiiitics betwecn France and Gcrmany on the continent. 47 Denis Winter, Haig's C o d , (Undon: Viking, 1991)- p. 34.

bombardment designed to upset the enemy's equilibrium preparing the way for the

infantry assault. The infantry assault would be delivered in lines with infantry rifle fire,

not artillery, to suppress the enemy's counter-fue preparing the way for the eventual

bayonet charge to cut a gap through the enemy line. Once the gag had been created, the

decisive phase would begin with the cavalry pouring through the gap in an effort to

exploit the gap by cutting the enerny's supply lines, his line of retreat, and by cutting off

his rein forcement^.^^ On the issue of the response to the fm-swept zone, FSR is clear in

its emphasis of the moral over the physical:

Success in war depends more on moral than on physical qualities. Skill cannot compensate for want of courage, energy , and determination; but even high moral qualities may not avail without careful preparation and skilful direction. The development of the necessary mord qualities is therefore the first of the objects to be attained?'

Therefore, for Haig and the pre-war British Amy, FSR clearly placed the solution to

victory in the realm of the moral/psychological. Similarly, the doctrine of the offensive

was clearly ernbedded in the manual:

Decisive success in battle c m be gained only by a vigorous offense.. . .[Above] al1 a fmer determination to conquer at any cost, [is] the chef factor of success?

According to Winter, the role of Commander-in-Chief in FSR "was conceived as

passive through much of the battle. Although he had to choose the battlefield, FSR's

emphasis on human factors like élan, courage and the charisma of command meant that

humdnim elements like topography, water tables, enemy defensive systems and the like

48 ibid.. p. 157. 49 Ibid., p. 158. 50

5 1 Field Service Regulcrricrnr (FSR), Part I . Operurioru, (Lundon: M S O , 1909). p. 13. FSR, p. 126.

33

were given a low value in that se~ec t ion . '~~~ In other words, FSR foresaw the relationship

of Commander-in-Chief with subordinate commanders as essentially hands-off relying on

the latter to bring about the moment of decision leaving the commander to decide just

when the right moment was to commit the reserve, the cavalry, against the enemy's

reinforcements and communications. While this might seem at fint glance to be a

decentralized phiiosophy of command, Winter explains why it was not:

With al1 his juniors thoroughly marinated in the spirit of the Field Service Regularions of 1909 by a lifetime's professional training, Haig assumed that harmony wodd be automatic even if commanders were out of touch with each other. Shared principles sirnply meant they would perceive the same events in the same way and respond in the same manner.

Haig's second assumption was that a handfùl of men controlled al1 that happened in battle, thus funher simplifymg the problem of coordination. A letter written by Haig in August 19 16 brings the point out. 'After tales of the uselessness of the New A m y at Gallipoli, I was a little anxious about their fighting value, but with a fairly good staff and careful training they have corne up to al1 my expectations. After ail, it is not the division which really fights well or il1 but the officer who commands it.")

Success, then. according to Haig and his contempomies was assured by a handful of

commanders imbued with the doctrine of the offensive. Although the Commander-in-

Chief would have a detached relationship with these cornmanden, it was only to this

level that this relationship was extended; hardl y a decentralized philosoph y of command

applicable to al1 levels of comrnand To be fair, FSR does place a ceriain amount of

emphasis on the need for skill, preparation, and coordination in the conduct of battle.

However, nowhere in the manuai is the need for coordination between the amis at ail

levels emphasized. The coming war would show that victory not only depended on

commanders at al1 levels of command, but on skill, dl-arms cooperation, and staff

coordination at every level and within every unit.

52 Winter. p. 159.

The notion of dl-arms cooperation and staff coordination was noticeably lacking

in pre-war British k m y doctrine and training. No doubt the Old School versus Firepower

conundrum comp!icated matters. The British Anny generally acceptai that new weapons

and technology had rendered the banlefield a very deadly place but could not accept that

tactics and doctrine must change accordingly. Just as the Old Schwl cavalry enùiusiasts

were loath to take, as they perceived it, a back seat to the firepower school, so it was with

the infantry. In fact pre-war doctrine encouraged the infantry to attack ground for no

better reason than that the enemy was occupying it. Pre-war infantry tactics, while

recognizing the growing strength of the defense, and while beginning to recognize the

advantages to employing overwhelrning supporting firepower from machine guns and

quick-finng flat-trajectory artillery, were also cognizant of the requirement for fire and

movement. One ought to suppress the enemy's fire while the infantry were advancing.

Once the infantry were within 200 yards of the enemy line, the attackers would form

extended iine and, supportai by artillery finng over open sights, would charge forward

and finish the job with the bayonet. What is aiso apparent during this penod is that given

the dominant roles of infantry and cavalry in battie, artillery up until 1914 was simply

seen as an accessory a m which had as its main role to provide direct fire support to the

infantry and cavahy in conducting their respective d e s in the as~ault. '~

By 1914, the British Anny in general had certainly recognized the growing

lethality of firepower on the banlefield and had begun to make &des at improving how

53 ibid., p. 16û. 54 For a much more detailed analysis of pre-war infantry and artillery doctrine and tactics see Paddy Griffith, Banle Tactics of the Western Front: The Brirish Anny 's Art of Ana& 191 6- 18, (New Haven: Yale Univeris, Press. 1994). pp. 48-52. and Shelford Bidweil and Dominick Graham, Fire-Power; Brirish Amy Weapons and 77zeorie.s of War 1904-1945, (Boston: George Ailen and Unwin, 1982). pp. 7-37. The limited role for the artillery is also describeci in no uncertain tKms in FSR, p. 15: 'The function of the artillcry is to

it would conduct itself on the battlefield in iight of these transformations. However,

improvements were made based on the generally accepted notion that the solutions to the

firepower challenge were to be moral rather than physical or technologicai. That being

said, efforts were made by the infantry to adopt the machine gun and, of course, the

cavalry were making a slow transition toward adopting the tenets of the mounted

infantry. For the cavairy in panicular, it was not a matter of not understanding the

growing influence of firepower on the banlefield, but rather a fear that full adoption of

the mounted infantry role would emasculate the cavalry spirit and the desire for the

offensive.

Despite the opinions of many historians, the doctrine of the offensive was not, in

itself, a bad thing especially given the experiences in colonial wars of most British

cornmanciers. An offensive spirit is required of al1 armies if they are to persevere in war

and achieve victory. However, the problem for the pre-war British A m y was in the

overarching influence the doctrine had over al1 other matters. Xn other words, it was a

rnatter of weighting. For the asmy in general, the over-emphasis on the doctrine of the

offensive meant that it went to war in 1914 without a decentralized command philosophy,

and without the rccognized requirement or abiiity to conduct dl-amis cooperation and

staff coordination at every level of command. For the cavahy. the largely successful

resistance to the mounted infantry movement meant that it entered World War 1

possessing mobility but very little fmpower. The secret to success in World War 1 was

the combination of mobility and firepower. Therefore. if the cavalry were to be

successful in the next war, it would have to be able to combine both. Notwithstanding the

assist the other arms [cavalry and infanrry] in brtaking down hostile opposition.. . .Artillery must usually iirnit its action to prcparing to support the lamr as soon as occasion demands i ~ "

36

capabilities and limitations of the early tanks, only cavairy employed as mounted

infanq, as we shall see in the next chapter, had a chance of providing that solution.5s

55 Inded John Terraine argues that it was only the British cavairy division in 19 14, as opposed to the cavalry forces of France and Germany. h t proved really effective in 19 14 because of their ability to ride to battle mounted but to fight dismounted. See Terraine, Whire Hm, p. 93.

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR ON TKE WESTERN FRONT

My God, &à we m d y send men tojight in îhaî? Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot

Kiggeii: On sechg the terrain and the mud after the battle of Passchendaele, 1917

Immediately upon the outbreak of war in the summer of 1914, the German

General S M , headed by General Helmuth von Moltke, proceeded to implement the

Schlieffen Plan; the Gennan plan for the invasion of France. On August 2nd Geman

troops occupied Luxembourg and by August 3d German lead elements were attacking the

Belgian forts around Liège. German violation of Belgian neutrality provoked a strong

response frorn the British government which, under the Treaty of 1839, was a guarantor

of Belgian neutrality and independence. Upon rejection of its ultimahm to the German

government for the withdrawal of German troops from Belgian temtory, Britain declared

war on Germany on August 4'!

The actual Geman invasion of France did not occur until August 16% To assist

the French amiy under the command of General Joseph Joffre, the British Expeditionary

Force (BEF) was dispatched to France under Sir John French and took position just south

of the Belgian border. The outcome of the Battle of the Frontiers (August 16* -23* ) was

a victory for the Germas. After driving the Belgian anny from its forts and defenses on

the frontier, three German amies advanced into centrai Belgium and then wheeled south

toward the French frontier to the West of the river Meuse. With the advance of the

Gennans, the BEF began a fighting withdrawal dong with the majority of the French

army positioned in the German path. Making maximum use of rail transport, and taking

advantage of the relatively slow German advance, Joffre was able to re-deploy most of

his forces and the BEF on his lefi to protect Paris and, if necessary, southem France.

Joffie's new defensive line ran from Verdun down the axis of the Marne v d e y to Paris.

The ensuing Batde of the Marne was a victory for the Allies. By the evening of

September 10, Moltke had k e n forced to order a general withdrawal of Gennan forces to

the river Aisne and by September 14" Moltke had been replaced as Chief of the General

Staff by General Erich von Faikenhayn. and German forces were consolidating into

defensive positions on the Aisne. The German armies succeeded in beahng off attacks

from the French and Bntish throughout the remainder of September. But as these attacks

were taking place each side had begun to detach a portion of their forces in an attempt to

envelop the other by movements around the end of the line in the West. And so started the

Race to the Sea which ended at Nieuport, Belgium on October 10. Faced now with a war

without flanks, the Germans were the first to try to break the stdemate through frontal

assault on the British positions at Ypres (first battle of Ypres) which ended on November

1 1, exactly fours years before the armistice would be signed. From this point on the

deadlock ensued for the next four years dong a Eront that extended frorn the Belgian

Coast for 450 miles to the Swiss frontier.

AIlied performance on the Western Front in 1915 was disappointing. The BEF

assaults at Neuve Chapelle, La Bassée, and Loos gained litîle ground and severely

depleted the strength of the "Old Comtemptibles" - the original soldiers of the BEF, as

well as some of the temtorials and Kitchener volunteers that had signed up since the

war's start. Of primary importance was the replacement of French by Haig in December

19 15 as the Bntish Commander-in-Chef; the post he was to hold until the end of the war.

Falkenhayn's faith in victory over France was given full sway in Febmary 1916

when the biggest Geman offensive of the war to that tirne was launched against the

French at Verdun. Falkenhayn's aim was to either achieve a breakthrough or to Wear the

French d o m to the point of collapse through attrition. The Battle of Verdun lasted until

November when Falkenhayn was forced to concede failure to the Kaiser and was

replaced by General Paul von Hindenburg as Chief of the General Staff with General

Erich Ludendorff to serve as his deputy. Nonetheless, Verdun had cost the French

332,000 casualties by the end of the year and had forced the French govemment to

replace Joffre as French Commander-in-Chief with General Robert Nivelle.

The growing strength of the BEF in France and Belgium gave Britain the ability

to relieve some of the pressure then king put on France through Falkenhayn's offensives

at Verdun. Accordingly, Haig, with his existing combination of regulars, volunteers,

temtorials, and Dominion troops, beiieved he could win a decisive victory in northern

France on the river Somme. For a week prior to the offensive, British artillery pounded

an eighteen-mile stretch of the German line. On the moming of July 1'' British troops

assaulted the German lines only to suffer 60,000 casualties on the fmt day. Haig's

repeated attacks on the Somme continued until November and resulted in approximately

400,000 casualties for the British with very little gmund gained to show in return.

When Nivelle took comrnand of the French A m y , France had run through about

half the young manpower of the country. But Nivelle optimisticall y prepared a new

French offensive on the Aisne for the spring of 1917. Nivelle's offensives were launched

in April and May and were considered a failure. Despite some tactical successes,

especially with the supporting attacks by the British in Aprïl at Arras, the offensives had

infiicted a further 200,000 casualties on the already war-weary French army causing

elements in up to 50 divisions to mutiny. A frightened French government replaceci

Nivelle with General Pétain thereby having a caiming effect on the army. By the summer,

Pétain had placated many of the concerns of the m p s and had effectively restored

discipline throughout the army.

The French f a i l m of 19 17 and consequent muîinies placed an even greater

burden on the British that year. Fortunately, the BEF continued to expand with the new

conscript armies from Britain and the Dominions. Haig had the BEF conduct an offensive

in Fianders cornrnencing in July which has been named the Third Battie of Ypres but has

also k e n referred to as Passchendaele in reference to the village captured by Canadian

troops on November 6m when the offensive finally came to a halt. Again, as with the

Somme the previous year, British casuaities were hi@ (approximatel y 240,000) and,

again, with very little ground gained to show in return. Haig finished the year with the

successful yet limited tank attack at Cambrai (November 2 0 ~ -30").

With the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 between Gemany

and Russia, the German High Command had ken able to concentrate 210 Gerrnan

divisions freed up as they were from the Russian Front. The Gemans had decided to

make their first great effort for the year against the British positions on the Somme with

the aim of dnving a wedge between the British and French armies and dtimately driving

the British and Belgians to the sea On March 21n, 67 divisions and 3,000 guns smashed

their full weight into the British lines. By the aftemoon, the Germans had penetrated the

front of the British V Amy. As Haig's reserves withered away, and with whole units and

formations of V A m y k ing either annihilatecl or surrounded, the Germans met little

resistance in their drive in the generai direction of Amiens, a key British and French rail

transportation and supply node. The situation became so mitical for the Allies that at a

hastily convened meeting on March 26m between Fxench and British politicai and

military leaders, General Ferdinand Foch was given command of al1 Allied forces on the

Western Front. Eventually. Geman logistical problems as well as stiffening and timely

Aiiied resistance eventually halted the German drive just in front of Amiens. With the

offensive against the British effectively blunted, Ludendorff launched a second offensive

further south agaînst the French on May 27& . With the aid of some newly amved

Amencan divisions. Foch's French armies dong the Marne were able to stem the German

advance and by mid-July the Gennan campaigns in both sectors, having exhausted their

reserves of men and matenal, had al1 but petered out.

Until Foch's appointment as the overall Allied commander on the Western Front,

the command relationship between the French and the British had k e n on an ad hoc and

voluntary basis. In the mid-sumrner of 19 18, Foch proposed to use the ever-increasing

AIlied superiority in forces in a senes of shîfting attacks, each with a local goal and weIl

withm the logistical capabilities of the armies. He planned to Wear down the German

resistance until there was a fatal crack in their defenses. The first of these offensives was

launched by the French on the M m e from Julyl8th to August 3d . By the end of this

operation the Germans had withdrawn to their old positions on the Aisne. and had

positioned most of their reserves behind the Aisne in anticipation of further Allied

offensives in this sector. Therefore, Foch's next move came as a complete surprise to the

Gennans.

On August 8'b , General Haig launched an offensive in Fianders with eighteen

Ailied divisions led by an armoured force of 414 tanks. The assault succeeded in

breaking into the Hindenburg line in this sector and set off such a rout of troops to the

rear area that Ludendorff calIed this &y the "Black Day" of the Gerrnan army. Haig's

dnve, a conùnuous senes of limited attacks, continueci until September 3" when it had

recovered al1 gound lost to the Germans in the spring. By the t h e Haig's campaign

came to a hait, the Americans, under the conimand of General John Pershing,

commenced an offensive in the south neâr St. Mihiel and Verdun against the Geman

salient in this sector. By September 16" , the Arnericans. with French support. had

collapsed the salient and again, had left the Gennans wondering where and when the

next blow was going to fail.

By late Septernber, Foch was ready to cary out a new smtegy. Instead of a single

sector drive far from the last one, he was now ready to conduct two simultaneous

offensives. The aim of the new strategy was to put the Germans on the horns of a

dilemma; to concentrate reserves to stem the Allies in one sector would expose the other

sector with k ing over-mn. The offensive commenced September 26" with a French-

American drive in the Meuse-Argonne region. As the Germans concentrated their

reserves in ths sector, the British un&r Haig commenced another drive in Randers

against the weakened German forces here.

As Foch's offensives drove the Allies further into France and Belgium; as

Germany's allies, one by one, began to collapse in October and early November, and as

the Geman home front began to revoit, the German authonties had no choice but to sue

for peace. Accordingly, the Armistice went into effect at 11:W AM on November 1 lh ,

1918.'

The original strength of the British cavalry in 1914 consisted of five three-

regiment brigades. During the retreat from Mons in the fall of 1914, the cavalry did its

work very well. The cd1 to adopt the role as mounted infantry had proven to be correct.

As mounted infantry, they were instrumental in covering the retreating infantry and

artillery, and provided rnuch needed reconnaissance of German movements and

dispositions. Similarly, in a dismounted role they helped bolster the thin British Iines at

Ypres in the critical days of OctoberMovember. However, once the front had been

rendered static, and the mode of warfare had shifted from mobile to trench, the cavalry's

role was put into question.' Throughout the whole of 1915, the cavalry (now the Cavairy

Corps consisting of up to five divisions) was never employed as such, although, as

discussed in the introduction, it was kept employed in the line as infantry or in the rear

areas as pioneers, with o d y occasional opportunities for mounted pamls. During the

course of the year, the British offensives at Neuve Chapelle, Festubert, and Loos were

conducted without the hope of a breakthrough for just as in the pre-war years, the advent

and employment of firepower technology to the battlefield had rendered the defensive the

superior mode of warfare. As a result, the cavalry were largely uninvolved in these

operations except as infantry inf forcement.^

1 The materiai for the preceding five pages is a synopsis of four sources: Larry Addington, The P m e m of War since the Eighzeenrh C e m r y . (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984). pp. 122-57, John Ketgan, The Firsr World War. (Toronto: Key Porta, 1998). Cyril Faiis, The First World War, (London, 1960). and Liddell-Hart, History of the First World War. 2 John Croft, "Horsed Cavalry in the 19 14-1 8 War." The Army Quarterly curd Defence Journal, Vol. 115. No. 2 (1985), p. 209. 3 Anglesey, Vol. 8, pp. 19-20.

The first real hope for a breakthrough by Haig and his contemporaries was during

the Somme offensives of 1916. For the offensive, General Hubert Gough's Reserve Anny

had k e n fonned, which had under its command the British Cavalry Corps (consisting of

ùiree cavairy divisions), in order to exploit the expected successes of the infantry assault.

Except for a fleeting opportunity on July 1 4 ~ at High Wood and Bazentin Ridge, the

opportunity for breakthrough never materialized.

The next cavalry actions of the war came in early 19 17 with the general

retirement of German forces in the Somme area to the newly constnicted Hindenburg

Line. During the course of the retirement, various cavalry formations were tasked with

pursuit and, as such, many gallant actions by a number of regiments and squadrons were

recorded. As exciting and as hopeful as these actions might have k e n , they were hardly

the oppornmity for a breakthrough the British had b e n looking for. The next opportunity

did not occur until November of the same year4

Opportunities for a breakthrough never materialized during the Third Battle of

Ypres due to the pedestrian and static nature of most of the offensive. Over the four

months of battle (July-November) British casualties were high and, again as with the

Somme, with very little ground gained to show in return, proving the ascendance of the

defensive over the offensive and that the British had yet to find a tactical formula for

success for crossing the fire-swept zone. However, an opportunity for a cavalry

breakthrough did occru near the end of the year with the successful yet limited tank

attack at Cambrai.

The next British cavairy actions came during the German offensives of

MarchIApril 19 1 8 in which. as in 19 14, the cavaïry, because of their superior mobiiity,

proved their worth as mounted infantry by being able to stay ahead of the advancing

German infantry columns, and because of their firepower, albeit limited, by being able to

delay effectively the advancing columns. In fact, the British cavalry (in particular, the

Canadian Cavalry Brigade), is credited with stopping the advance of the German army

into Amiens on March 31'' at Rifle and Moreuil ~ o o d s . ~

The next and last opportunity for a breakthrough occurred at Amiens during the

highly successful tank-infantry attack on August 8&, 1918. For Rasons that will be

discussed Iater in this thesis, the cavalry were, again, unable to exploit the success of the

initial assault and, therefore, unable to achieve a breakthrough.

As stated in the introduction, the reinstatement of mobility was the central

problem on the Western Front and it was towards this end that all British offensives on

the Western Front were conducted. Therefore, the primary role of the cavalry on the

Western Front would be to achieve and sustain the all-important breakthrough. After all,

it was the cavalry breakthrough that was seen by Haig as the culminating phase of the

offensive leading to the eventual capitulation of the enemy. The great failure of

Germany's Schlieffen Plan was the initial reason that a stalemate had been created on the

Western Front by the late autumn of 1914. But the real reason, of course, was that the

military technology of the era had led to a dominance for the defense. No one had yet

devised a doctrine to apply technology to the offensive? Yet, why was stagnation only

really a feature of the Western Front and why did we not see the same conditions in

Eastern Europe, in Mesopotamia, in Palestine, or in Asia Minor where the fronts seemed

4 See Anglesty. Vol. 8, pp. 65-89. 5 See Repon of the Minimy, Oversea Milirary Forces of Canad4 1918, (Londoa: 1919). p. 336. ColoneI G . W L Nicholson, CaMdian ,Tbpedirionary Force 1914-1 919.- O B c d History of the C d i a n A m y (COH), (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1962). pp. 369-7 1

to be iess dense and the use of cavairy in al1 phases of war more ubiquitous? The answer,

according to C y d Falls is simple yet fundamental: the Western Frcnt was regardeci as the

vital front and it posed the basic strategic problem. This, of course is the "Western"

school of thought but it was the one to which that Haig and his contempomies ascrïbed.

Therefore, the front on either side was held proportionately by more troops. more guns.

and more machine guns than in any other theatre.' Consequently, there was Little room for

manoeuvre; and tactics, at least initially, were reduced to frontal infantry assaults

preceded by massive artiliery preparations with littie room for cavalry manoeuvre. The

defensive, as prophesied in the pre-war years, was ascendant to the offensive. The

solution, then, to the problem depended on "overcoming the defensive trinity of bullet,

spade, and wire."* According to their pre-war precepts and principles, Haig and his

contemporaries, as "Westerners", set about to solve it in the conventional way; using the

only means they knew, they turned to artillery to blow a gap in the enemy's line, and to

the infantry to ensure the gap was held and the amck was dec i~ ive .~ However, it became

apparent, especially after the costly offensive on the Somme in 1916, that the traditional

methods would not be enough. Therefore, other solutions had to be sought.

Fundamental to seeking new solutions to breaking the stalemate on the Western

Front was the challenge of learning and decision-making to French, Haig and their

contemporaries especially in the eariy years of the war. In trying to answer this basic

question, Tim Travers has asked some corollary questions: what son of learning process

6 Richard Prtston, Alex Roland, and Sydney Wise. Men Ur Anns, (Toronto: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich College Publishcrs, 1991). P. 233. 7 Falls, p. 11- Sec also AJS. Taylor, Tlie Firsr Worid War, An lllustrated History, (London. 1963), pp. 68-7 1 in which Taylor concludes that the war codd only be won in the West; and that the German army could ody be beatcn by an antagonist of its own size. See aiso Danchev, p. 273. 8 Fuller, me Conduct of War. p. 160. 9 Ibid.. p. 160.

was going on amongst senior staff offïcers; which lessons were taken to kart, and which

ignored; and what overt or covert system was used in decision-making?l0 The common

understanding of historians is that there was a certain resistance to learning and decision-

making by Haig and his subordinate cornnianders during the critical 19 15- 19 16 period.

Travers, accordingly, offers three possible explanations for this condition, in ascending

order of generality, with al1 three relating to the problem of leaming. They are, first, the

concept of 'distancing'; second, adherence to a traditional or gentlemanly ideal of war,

and third, problem-solving within an existing mental set or paradigm." Distancing refers

to the phenornenon in which the participation of senior offïcers in planning batties with

heavy casualties seemed to distance them from reality and thus accustom them to the

same kinds of losses and batties in the future. The contention is that Haig and his

subordinate commanders and senior staff were aware of the temble physical conditions at

the front, but that the information wâs not considered significant and was kept at a

physical and emotional di~tance.'~

As discussed in chapter one, a second reason for not leaming was that Haig and

his contemporaries shared a gentlemanly or traditionaI ideal of war which stressed the

adaptation of fxepower and technology to the human side of war, not the other way

around.l3 As in the pre-war yean, most officers appreciated the new technology of war,

but did not lcnow how to integrate it with such human factors as morale, discipline, and

1 O Tim Travers, 'Zearning and Decision-Making on the Western Front, 19 15-19 16: The British Example," C d & Joumal of HLrtoty. Vol. 18. No. 1 (1983)- p. 87. 11 Ibid., pp. 89-90. 12 Ibid., pp. 90-1. 13 This is also the opinioa of David French who States that during World War One "the British army was at a crossroads in its dcvelopment. tom between a traditional. gcntlcmanly ideal of soldiering, and a technical and functionaily compettnt ideal." S e David Frtnch. ^Sir James Edmonds and the Official History: France and Belgium," in Bond, The First World War and British Milircry History, p. 85.

14 courage. The result, at least in the fonner half of the war was a reliance on human

factors, more and more men ably led and imbued with the spint of the offensive,

supported by technology (artillery, tanks, gas, etc.). This was certainly the perceived

formula for success in the early British offensives of 1915-1916 and especially the

Somme.

Travers further argues that resistance to learning through distancing, and through

an attachrnent to a traditionai mode of warfare, appears to relate to a paradigm or shared

mental set which enabled problem-solving to take place within the boundaries of the

traditional paradigm of war. This paradigm would stress the human side of war over the

technological, and would also preserve a strict hierarchical or centralized decision-

making shucture.15 This paradigm would help to explain why a cornmon reaction to the

failure of offensives on the Western Front during the 1915-1916 period was the 'more

and more' syndrome - that is to seek victory by increasing in sheer size an offensive

rather than examining how the offensive is conducted and what other tools were

avaiiab1e.l6 In other words, tactical changes were slow to evolve from the traditional

m a s artillery/mass manpower offensives of 19 15- 19 16 and even 191 7 (Third Battle of

Ypres). I7

The bonom line here is that Haig and his contemporaries went to war in 19 14

with a simple military doctrine for the offensive. To Haig, the offensive consisted.of four

phases: the manoeuvre for position; the preparation or wearing-out battle of varying

duration; the decisive attack; and, finally, the cavalry exploitation. Haig never deviated

- - -

14 Travers, 'Ztarning and Decision-Making," p. 9 1. 15 Ibid., pp. 92-3. 16 Ibid., p. 93. 17 Ibid.. p. 94.

from this paradigrn, but what did evolve were the methods by which the wearing battle

and decisive attack were to be conducted. Moreover, their traditional paradigrn for

learning and decision-making bound them to a set list of responses to the problem. And

this is the 'middle school' thesis in which new technologies are distinctly an external

factor while the inability to adapt the new technology with a clearly defined theory for

the conduct of operations is distinctly internai." Tim Travers's The Killing G r o d has

provided a more balanced approach to the problem of Haig and the other senior British

commanders on the Western Front emphasizing the influence of pre-war experiences and

n o m s on the decision-making and problem-solving abilities of Haig and his

contemporaries. The point, of course, is that the middle school portrays Haig and his

contemporaries as neither completely incompetent nor completely blameless. In fact, as

Paddy Griffith points out, the BEF commanders did as well as could reasonably be

expected in the strange, unprecedented and overwhelming circumstances in which they

found themsel~es. '~ So what were those responses to the problem of mobility on the

Western Front. and what solutions would avoid the need for months of preparation

thereby negating surprise, and without obliterating the surface of the battlefield thereby

impeding mobility?

18 in Travers' The Killing Ground, Travers relates five themes: fust, he was convinced that only by studying late 19" Century intellecaial history and relating it to the khavior of senior British officers could one really understand why events occwed and decisions were made; second, he emphasized the persistence of pre-war notions of traditional. human-centric warfare and the enduring legacy of the spirit of the offensive; thud. he considered the pre-war 'personalized' army structure whereby the hierarchical and personality influenced officcr corps proved inflexible in meeting the demands of the war and w u anathema to the establishment of a de-cendized decision-niaking and problem-solving process outside the select few; forrrth. he stressed the undedying conflict going on within the British officer class during and d e r the war to do with class. personalities, and the writing of history to one's personai advantage; and fifth. he concentrated on the way in which British g e n d s regarded war as o r d d and regulated, and sought to re- emphasize that order in times of confusion on the battlefield. See the introduction to Tim Travers, The Kiliing Growid, pp. xix-xxi, and Keith Simpson, 'The Rcputation of Sir Douglas Haig." p. 159. 19 Griffith, p. 9

Again, Travers has provided sorne insight. Travers has deduced that there were

really four proposed methods of warfare at play amongst the commanders and senior staff

on the Western Front. The first, which has already been discussed, was the infantry-

artillery choice. In line with Haig's and others' traditional view of the conduct of war, the

infantry-artillery choice emphasized manpower. This was aiso termeci the strategy of

abundance and the general sense was that more artillery and more infantry backed up by

cavalry ready for the exploitation were the keys to s u c ~ e s s . ~ ~

The second method was the mechanical. This method stressed the introduction of

mechanicd warfare, primarily through the use of tanks and airplanes, but also with a

much greater reliance on machine guns, mobile trench mortars, and gas than with the

infantry-artillery method. Proponents of this merhod saw the tank as the war-winning

weapon around which other weapons and axms should be employed.21 Notables in this

group were Major-General H.V. Elles (GOC Tank Corps) and Lieutenant-Colonel J.F.C.

Fuller (GSO 2 Tank corps)?

The third method was a more middle strategy and was advocated by a number of

cautious progressives such as Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson (GOC TV A m y )

and Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse (Inspecter-General training, GHQ). This method

favoured mechanical warfare, but also considered the infantry to be the ultimate means of

holding ground and achieving victory. Unlike the infantry school of abundance, the

advocates of this method believed in achieving results through a minimum in manpower,

but still saw infantry and artillery as central. Evennially, this method wodd see the

20 T h Travers. How the War was Won; Co& and Technology in the British A m y on the Wesrern Front 19 1 7-1 918. (London: Routledge. l992), p. 8. 21 Md., p. 8. 22 Ibid., p. 8.

evolution of low level dl-arms doctrine that allowed the British forces to break-in to the

Geman defences fairly eficiently and with low casualties.~

Finally, the fourth method could really be called the strategy of rational avoidance

and constituted the "Eastern" strategy as preferred by Lloyd George and his followers.

This strategy favored the avoidance of difficulties on the Western Front if possible, and

instead hoped for resuIts elsewhere either in another theatre or by the French and, later,

the Arnencans on the Western ~ront .~ '

Clearly, if one were to fight as a Westernet, as did Haig and most other

cornanders on the Western Front, then the only options open to one were the fmt three.

Of course, the secret to British success tumed out to be the third method, the middle

approach even against the new German defensive tactics of defense-in-depth adopted in

19 17.= The development of improved artillery capabilities and techniques, the tank, and

improved infantry assault tactics during the course of the war certainly went a long way

toward developing the third r n e t h ~ d . ~ ~ The secret to success on the Western Front was

-3 Ibid., p. 8. 24 Ibid.. p. 9. 3 The Gerrnan defense-in-depth concept was adopted in late 1917. In an effort to counter the Allied system of submitting the German forward trench lines with mass artiilery barrages pnor to an assault. it was evident h t new defensive tactics were needed. As of late 1917, the foremost line of craters to the enemy would be covered oniy by scattered outposts and a few light machine gus ; this area was called the 'forefield'. From 500 to 1 0 metres farther back was the forward edge of the main line of resistance. German guns were to be registertd on the forefield and when a large-scale attack was imminent the outposts might be withdrawn, ailowing the a d i e r y fire to move forward and backward in accordance with the movements of the assaulting forces. See COH, pp. 3 16-7. 26 Artillery techniques at the start of the war were primariiy concerned with the delivery of direct fire support over open sights in order to support the assadting infantry. Little expertise or capability txisted to support the infantry with indirect fires once they were out of line of sight However, by 1917 techniques had b e n refined to the point wherc artillery firt could be very precisely prcdicted merely h m the map or an air photograph, without an observer at d l , and without pre-registration. Some of the most impressive technicai achievements of the war included the comprehcnsive survey and regular aerial photographing of the entire battle zone. and the vastly improved counter-battexy techniques using sound and flash calculations. The implications of these innovations, of course. were that artiiierymcn now had the confidence to accurately identiQ the positions of their own guns in relation to any targct they chose to engage negating the need for pre-rcgistration; a limitation to the achievernent of surprise. The time- h o n o u . urgency to achieve a direct lint of sight h m gun to target, as in pre-war days, was thus rcmovtd

found to be a mastery of low level infantry tactics, the successful pioneering of tank-

infantry cooperation, the solving of some of the many problems associateci with

sustaining artillery support throughout the depth of the assault, and above aii, the

resurrection of the tactical principle of surprise." But this formula for success was a

formula for the break-in only and was not a formula for the achievement of a successful

breakthrough. Accordingly, British assaults ended up more as "Bite and Hold" attacks -

attacks designed to breaking-in to the enemy lines and for capturing local objectives -

rather than as the precursor to a an attempt at a breakthrough and, subsequently, a

reinstatement of open or mobile warfare.

Despite the success of the formula, a successful breakthrough was never achieved

on the Western Front, and neither was there a restoration of open or mobile warfare. In

analyzing this very problem, the 'Lessons of the Great War Cornmittee' - set up in 1933

by order of the Chief of the Imperia1 General Staff, Field Marshal Lord Milne, and under

the chairmanship Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Kirke - reported that in future tactical

breakthroughs would only be achieved by relying on a combination of rapid mobility, a

properly worked out fire plan, and the use of fog, smoke, or darkness to conceal the

attackers. Training manuals and methods during the war and up to the early 1930's laid

too much emphasis on the break-in phase and did not point cleariy to the need for a

separate force of dl-arms to be on-hand to convert the break-in into a breakthr~u~h.~' But

even by the end of 1918, a separate force of dl-arms, especially one based on the tank,

was not possible. During 19 16-18, the tanks were never anyhng more than mobile direct

giving the artillery the capability CO apply indirect tk onto targets in dcpdi and in support of advancing infantry. Sce Griffith. pp. 136-8. Aiso scc Bidweii and Graham, pp. 67-93 and 101 - 1 15, and A.G.L.. McNaughton. 'The Developmcat of ArtiUery in the Great War," C d i a n Defence Qurznerly, Vol. 6. No. 2, (January 1929).

fire support to the infantry for the break-in battle with only a Little greater speed than the

dismounted infantry, and considerably less staying p ~ w e r . ~ ~ According to Griffith, "in the

tactical conditions of the Great War the tank could sometimes bock out enemy machine

guns or other srrong points; but in this its record was probably no better than the

infantry's own methods of piIl-box-busting using Lewis guns, rifle-grenades or

rnor tar~."~~ John Tenaine echoes this point: "al1 tanks . . . were clumsy, slow vulnerable

weapons. The maximum (road) speed of a 1928 Mark V (the basic British heavy tank)

was 4.6 m.p.h.; the Medium Mark A ('Whippet') had a road speed of 8.3 m.p.h. Amss a

cratered banlefield, either was lucky to exceed 1.5 to 2 m.p.h."3' Yet W.C. Fuller and the

"Mechanical" School had a vision beyond that of the tank's conternporary limitations.

Fuller would have agreed with the Kirke cornmittee in its recommendation for a separate

dl-arms force designed to conduct the breakthrough and based on the tank. During the

war, Fuller had submitted just such a plan called 'Plan 1919' which foresaw the

requirement for an dl-arms mechanized force centred on the tank as a separate force

capable of breaking through the enemy's defences and penetrating deep into the enemy's

rear areas and cutiing off h is communications. However, the armistice prevented Plan

19 19 from k i n g fully realized. The state of technology had not yet been able to produce

27 Griffith, p. 10. 2a Qtd in French. 'Sir James Edmonds." p. 85. 29 Griffith, p. 162. The original concept for the tank had its genesis with Colonel Ernest D. Sivinton, a British infantry officw who conceived of a machine gun destroyer propciled by gasoline engines. The first British prototype dubbcd 'Zittie Willie" was successiïdiy demonstrated in December 1915 but the first combat mode1 was the Mark 1 "Mother" which saw action in limitai numbers at the Somme in Scptember, 19 16. The first successfut tank anack came at Cambrai in November. 19 17 w here 37 1 of the improved Mark lVs were employed in a place with hard ch* ground and without the normal adlery prcliminary bombardment that had so impeded mobility for tanks, infantry, and cavalry alike in the past Tanks were again usa i in grcat numbers and successfully at Amiens 8- 12 August 19 18. By war's end evtn the most advancd tanks, the 'Vhippct" and the Medium B and Cs were still not much fastcr than the accompanying infantry and were sril1 chronically prone to break down after a &y's operation. See also Srnithers, pp. 228- 31. 30 Griffith, p. 162.

a tank wiih the speed and the reliability required- Moreover, the calleà-for accompanying

mechanized infantry, artillery, and engineer machines were yet to be designed, trialed,

and produced. Indeed, Plan 1919, as A.]. Smithers attests, was a success when it was

finally med; but by then it was 'Plan 1940' and it was written in ~ e r m a n . ~ * If the

breakthrough could not be achieved by technology, then what was the solution?

The answer to this question, of course, was the cavairy. And it was for this reason

that Haig retained the cavairy. To Haig, the decisive assault was only the third phase of

the offensive. Moreover, if the assault couId succeed in opening up a gap in the enemy's

trench systems so fast that not even his fastest moving reserves would have time to plug

it, then the cavalry codd pass through the gap and exploit into the enemy's logistic rear

and cut off the enemy's communications. This alluring possibility was always high in

Haig's mind and was the reason he retained a cavalry capability throughout the entire

war." Indeed, it is an easily forgotten fact that the British cavalry, given their familiarity

with the mounted infantry role in the pre-war years, had started the war with a tactical

expertise superior to any other nation's cavalry. From this starting point it went on to

pioneer automatic rifles, battiefield wireless, and the development of early alI-arms

doctrine with motor machine guns and tanks."

3 1 Terraine. Smoke and Fire. p. 149. 32 Smithers. p. 23 1. See also R.M.F. Crutweil, A Hisz~ry of the Great War. l9l4-l918,T%., (Oxford. 1936). p. 547. 33 Griffith, p. 32. For a discussion on the resistance Haig met fiom both political and miiitary quarters on his decision to main the cavairy. and the actions hc took to =tain the cavairy, set Anglesey, Vol. 8, pp. 20.37-9. and 163-6. 34 In making this point Paddy Griffith refm to the paper written by HQ 3* Cavairy Division and circuiated by GHQ 24 August, 19 16, (UK Public Records Office, WO 158 1 86, Document 293). Sce Griffith, p. 16 1.

The cavairy, therefore, during the war was the only ann capable of sustaining a

mily mobile breakthr~u~h.'' More to the point, Terraine has recognized that the situation

with respect to the inability to achieve a breakthrough during the war rppresented a

unique situation in the history of warfare given the ascendant y of the defensive over the

offensive: the hiatus of the mobile m. In other words, the horsed cavaky was close to

becoming obsolete yet the antidote, the fully mechanized dl-anns force as represented by

Fuller's Plan 19 19, had yet to be developed. To illustrate this situation, Griffith refers to

the mernoin of Brigadier W.D. Croft who, throughout three yean service with the grn

(Scottish) Division could point to at least three occasions when his troops had opened up

a prornising gap which he believed the cavalry could have broken through if only they

had been close at h a x ~ d . ~ ~ Similarly, Major W.H. Watson, a member of the Tank Corps at

Cambrai, believed the cavalry could have captured Bourlon Wood on November 20,

1917.~' To both of these officers, the cavairy was certainly not an obsolete m. Yet, if

the cavalry, despite its limitations, was still the oniy arm capable of sustaining a

breakthrough, then why could it not achieve a breakthrough on the Western Front?

The answer, of course, lies with the factors or conditions necessary for the

achievement of a breakthrough. In other words, the cavalry, while still k i n g able to do its

part in sustaining a breakthrough, could not do so because of circurnstances beyond its

conaol. The cavatry's lack of success had as much to do wiîh the inabiIity of

cornmanciers, staffs, and the other anns of the British Army to rapidly adapt and take

advantage of the fleeting opportunities for mobile warfare, as it was to do with the

35

36 Griffith. P. 161. W.D. Croft, Three Years with the Nimh (Sconish) Division, (London: Murray, 1919), p. 59, qtd in

Griffith, p. 161.

physical/battlefield limitations of the mounted a m itself. What, then, were the conditions

by which the cavairy would be able to breakthrough the enemy lines and achieve

operational success?

The first condition had to do with the reliance of mobile warfare on a sense of

tempo to achieve the expected results against the enemy. A present-day explanation of

tempo suggests that tempo consists of three elements: speed of decision, speed of

execution, and the speed of transition h m one activity to an~ther. '~ Richard Simpkin has

defined tempo as the "operational rate of a~ivance."~~ The key to tempo is the ability for a

force to react to changing situations, and to execute tacticai and operationai situations

faster than the enemy. This idea of tempo is expressed by John Croft when he explains

thar in many instances on the Western Front, the opportunities for a breakthrough were

very much fleeting, perhaps lasting only an h o u or two, so it was quite useless if the

cavalry appeared 24 hours later." This meant that not only the cavairy had to have a

sense of tempo, but that the other anns thughout al1 levels of command had to be

imbued with a sense of urgency about getting the cavdry through the gap at a rate faster

than the enemy reacted. But until the race with the enemy's reserves could be won, the

British were forced to limit their offensives to the 'Bite and Hold' variety and hope to

occupy a lirnited portion of the enemy's front before the latter could react with his

reserves? The way to buy more time, of course, came with the resurrection of the

tactical principle of surprise. For example, i t was by utihzing surprise at Cambrai on

November 20" , 19 17 and Amiens on August 8& . 1918 that the greatest oppominities for

37 Sce F. Mitchell, T ' Watfiire: The Story of the T A Ur the Great War. (London: Nelson. n.d.). . 249,251, qtd in Griffith. p. 161. '' Contcmporary Canadian Army doctrine. CFP 30-2

39 Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swifi, Undon: Brassty's, 1985). p. 106

a breakthrough were achieved on the Western Front during the whole course of the war.

However. even at this comparatively late date in the war, the problem still ~ m a i n e d as to

how to deal with and maintain the success of these initial overwhelrning successes.

Despite the technology, advanced artillery procedures, the tank. and aircrafi that were

utilized by the Canadian Corps at Amiens on the first &y, tactical advantage could not

fully be taken of the initial success because the command and control doctrine (a sense of

tempo and a de-centralized command philosophy) was lacking to make it so? What is

more, in many offensives launched by the British, this condition was sorely missed

throughout the command structure of the army and initial success was lost because of an

inability to rapidly reinforce success, and to rapidly adjust to the changing circumstances

of the battie. In order to sustain a high tempo, not only did commanders at the lower

levels need an ability to take initiative. but they also had to have a full understanding of

the plans and capabilities of the other arms on the battlefield. Moreover, command

relationships among the various axms and formations had to be simple and well

understood. This was very often not the case. Therefore, tempo relied on a related

number of conditions; namely, a de-cennalized command philosophy, a i l -a rms

cooperation, staff coordination, and communications.

The opportunities on the Western Front for mobile warfare occurred only rarely.

However, when they did occur, the British A m ~ y lacked a decentralized philosophy of

command that allowed cornanders at lower levek; the commanders of the units and

lower level formations, to take the initiative and take advantage of the gap(s) created in

-

«) Crok p. 212. 41 Griffith, p. 32. 42 Sec Shane Schreiber, Shock A m of the Brirish Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Lnrt 100 Days of rhe Grau War. (Westport, Connecticut: Praega, 1997). p. 61.

the enemy line by exploiting and by reinforcing success. This state of affairs, as

discussed, stemmed from the pre-war reliance on the doctrine of the offensive and the

belief shared by Haig and his contemporaries that the key decisions on the battlefield

could be made o d y by those few higher level commanders imbued with the spirit of the

offensive. To Griffith, this was the most important tactical difficulty of a ~ 1 . ~ ' The

connection between higher and lower levels of command on the batdefields of the

Western Front was tenuous given that the practitioners of higher level tactics - Corps and

A m y commanders - lived in a totally alien environment, and were geographically

separated, from the lower levels of command at the front. Higher battle handling,

therefore, "became exceptionally dificult unless everythmg ran according to a very

precise tirnetable; and if anythmg went wrong the front-line soldier would quickly find

himself unsupporîed from the rear? More to the point, if circumstances changed at the

front, too often local actions could not be taken without higher approval, or without

reference to the pre-detennind tables and schemes of advance. Shane Schreiber

illustrates this point by demonstrating that in the more fluid conditions of the 100 days

(August to November 1918), operations had to be decided upon quickly and "there was

not time for the minute instructions which were thougtit necessary during the Trench

Warfare phase.'JS However. a decennalized command philosopby also required an all-

arms doctrine upon which to act and react.

43 Griffith. p. 23. 44 Ibid-. p. 23. 4s This is actuaily a quotation h m the GOC First Canadian Division, Major-ancrai AC. MacdoneII in reference to operations conducted by the Canadian Corps in crossing the Canal D u Nord in Septernber, 19 1 8. Althougb not particuiarly fcferring Co an e m p t at a breakthrough it, nonetheless, i l lus~ates the requircment for a de-centraiizcd command philosophy in operations of this nature. Qtd in Scbrcibcr, p. 90.

No doubt the British cavalry severely lacked the protection, fmpower, and

tactical mobility that would allow it to operate independently on the battlefield. However,

it is also an immutable tmth about the Western Front that the other arms on the

battlefield, in particuiar the infantry and, later, the Tank Corps also, when employed in

isolation also suffered the same fate. After dl , it was not until the offensives of 1917 that

the British Army had begun to employ any semblance of dl-arrns doctrine. Certainly, the

advances in tank-infantry cooperation that were witnessed during this period were

instrumental in allowing the British 'break-in' of the enemy lines, but were not

instrumental in aHowing hem to breakthrough and exploit their success. Plan 1919 was

still too far off in the future. The only a m that was stiH capable of achieving and

sustaining this type of operationid mobility was the cavalry. However, because cavalry

operations had not achieved the same level of coordination with the operations of the

other arms on the battlefield, there was a failure, during most offensives, to coordinate

arms and weapon systems after the support of the artillery and the tanks had been

~ u t r u n . ~ This was a problem created by the lack of dl-ams doctrine as well as a lack of

staff coordination amongst formations and between arms. in fact, in many instances,

tanks and cavalry often appeared n the battlefield without any prior coordination with the

in-place infantry, nor with any preliminary rehearsals in tactical c~ordination.~'

Finally, the last condition that had to be met in order to achieve an acceptable

degree of tempo was the possession of a robust, flexible, and reliable communications

system b e ~ e e n commands. With wireless communication systems in only the eariiest

and least reliable state of development, communications systems relying primarily on Iine

45 Travers. H m the War was Won, p. 152. 47 Griffith, p. 25.

60

became the predominate means of communications on the Western Front. In fact, in the

First World War communications technology did not keep Pace with the advances in

other technologies which was ironic, according to Bill Rawling, given the penchant for

cencralized decision-making and control of troops in banle? The ability to rapidy adjust

plans, to take advantage of fleeting opportunities for success, and to quickly coordinate

the actions of al1 arrns on the battlefield, required sirnilarIy rapid and robust

communications systems that prornpùy disseminated data and message traffic between

cornmands. However, wireless communications were only developed in 19 10 and really

were not beyond experimentation in 1914. Therefore, even as late as 1918, the most

reliable means of communication forward of brigade was the mnner, but this dso became

unreliable once operations in any way became fluid and had moved beyond the cable

networks (buried to six feet) of the forward trench lines. n u s , the solution in ail British

formations was to multiply the methods of communications especially during offensives

when units were on the move and the nonnd cable means were too slow to adjust to

changing conditions. Accordingly, units on the move relied upon various forms of visual

signaling, pigeons, power-buzzers, and message-carrying rockets to relay message

Even with these various means, delay continue- in the transmission of vital

messages between the front Iine and the higher command echelons. The most notorious

example of this, according to GriKith, was in the timing of cavairy interventions to

exploit fleeting opportunities that had been created by the infantry- While this situation is,

in itself, an argument for a decentraiized command philosophy, it goes a long to explain

48 Bill Rawhng, b'Communications in the Canadian Corps. 1915-1918," Canadian Military Hinory , 49 Ibid., p. 17. Also see John S. Mou, cd., History of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, 1903- 1961. ( Ottawa, 1962). p. 35. and RE. Priestley, The Signal Service in the European War of 1914 to 1918 (France), (Chatham: MacKay, 192 1). Chapter XVI.

why those fleeting opportuniaes for cavalry action were not taken.'' Terraine has viewed

this situation as the only time in the history of warfare in which cornmanders fought

without voice contr~l .~ ' Lack of voice control impeded cornmanden in taking immediate

advantage of opportunities for breakthrough on the battiefield. Commanders at al1 levels

were used to the decision-action cycles associated with positional warfare where

infornation was nansmitted over static, well-established Line systems and command

decisions were made centrally based on pre-detennined schemes of advance and

tirnetables. When the conduct of offensives evolved into more fluid situations where

information was sketchy, and where the conduct of the advance came to be more and

more dependent upon the initiative, decisions and actions of lower leveI cornanders, the

contemporary means of communication could not cope. This lack of a d i ab l e and robust

communications capability between commands created a tactical difficulty with dire

consequences for the success for cavalry operations.

k t US now examine three occasions where, on the Western Front, the British

cavairy could have achieved a breakthrough if only the above conditions had been met: at

the Somme (in particular the opportunity for a breakthrough at High Wood and Bazentin

Ridge July 14&, 19 16; at Cambrai November 2 0 ~ - 2 ls', 19 17; and., at Amiens August 8"

-9&, 1918.

THE SOMME: HIGH WOOD AND BAZENTIN RIDGE, JZTLY 14&. 1916

The genesis of the Battle of the Somme came in late 19 15 when the first senous

attempt to obtain some sort of unity of action among the Allies was made at Joffre's

headquarters at Chantilly on December srn . Attended by representatives from France,

Britain, Belgium, Russia, Italy and Japan, an agreement was sûuck which called for the

launching of a nurnber of simultaneous offensives (on the Russian, Franco-British, and

Italian fronts) against the Central Powers in the summer of I9L6. The British part in the

overaII scheme was the launching of an offensive against the German positions straddling

the river Somme sometime in the next June or ~ u l ~ . '

However, as described in the previous chapter, the Germans pre-empted the

Ailied plans by launching an offensive of their own against the French at Verdun on

Febmary 11" , 19 16. For the French, the bloody cost of defending Verdun, corning hard

on top of the staggering losses in the first two years of war, reduced the country's initial

participation in the Somme offensive of the summer of 1916 to a single axmy of eight

divisions. The weight of the offensive on the Franco-British front, therefore, would fd to

the British who were prepared to commit two amies (III A m y [Allenby] and IV Army

mawlinson]) comprising a total of 21 divisions with the date of the offensive agreed to

by Haig and Joffi-e as July, 1" (code-named Z Day). For the offensive. Haig delegated

the main responsibility for its execution to RawLinson's N Army supporteci by Generd

I The information for this parapph is from COH. pp. 130-2.

Edmond Allenby's III h m y and General Hubert Gough' s Reserve Army. The Reserve

Army was envisaged as an instrument for exploiting the hoped-for breakthrough and

cornprised, arnongst other fomiauons, of the l* and 3d Cavairy Divisions.

The area of the attack was shortened to 24 miles, extending from the Gommecourt

sector, midway between Amas and the Somme, to a point four miles south of the Somme.

In particular, at the end of June the front in the Gommecourt area generally ran south

from Gommecourt, cutting the Amiens-Cambrai road one and a half miles north-east of

Alben. The front then continued three miles farther south and skirted the southem dopes

of the Thiepvai-Morval ndge before continuing southward to meet up with the Somme

flood-bed near ~ a r i c o u d The most prominent feature in the banle area was the apex of

the Thiepvd-Mord ridge rising 500 feet above sea level and referred to as the Pozières

ridge from the village of that name located n e z the highest part of the ridge. The only

naniral obstacles to the movement of troops was an occasional wwded area and the

marsh flats of the Ancre and Somme rivers. In accordance with Falkenhayn's rigid

adherence to the doctrine of forward defence, the German front trenches were strongly

garrisoned by formations of the German Second

Strategïcally, the Somme offensive had no great geographicai objectives.

However, there were three general aims to the offensive: to relieve pressure on the

French amies at Verdun; to inflict as heavy losses as possible on the Gemans; and to aid

the Allies on other fronts by preventing the re-deployment of German troops from the

Western Front to other theatres. To accomplish these aims, Haig devised two plans, a

main plan for the British offensive on the Somme, and an alternate plan for an offensive

2 The information for this paragraph is from COH, pp. 160.1. 3 The information for this paragraph is from COH, pp. 160.1.

in the Messines area (Flanders) should the offensive on the Somme falter. With respect to

his plan for the Somme, Haig enunciated two general, yet sequential, objectives. The first

objective was to seize and consolidate a position on the Pozières ridge extending from the

vicinity of Montauban to the river Ancre. The second objective was to tuni the British

position on the Pozières ridge to best advantage:

(i) The enemy's resistance may break down, in which case our advance will be pressed eastwards far enough to enable our cavalry to push through into the open country beyond the enemy's prepared line of defence. Our object wiU then be to tum northwards, talàng the enemy's lines in flank and reverse, the bulk of the cavairy CO-operating on the outer flank of this operation while suitable detachments should be detailed to cover the movement from any offensive of the enemy from the east. (ii) Altematively, after gaining our first objective.. . we may find that a further advance eastwards is not advisable. In that case the most profitable course will probably be to transfer our main efforts rapidly to another portion of the British front, but leaving a suffkient force on the Fourth Army front to secure the ground gained.. . .4

To arnplify theses insmctions, five days later Haig issued further instructions to

Rawlinson as follows:

If the first attack goes well every effort must be made to develop the success to the utmost by firstly opening a way for Our cavalry and then as quickly as possible pushing the cavairy through to seize Bapaume and establish itself in good positions in that neighbourhood. The cavalry in G.H.Q. reserve (1" and 3rd Cavalry Divisions) under Lieutenant-General Sir H. Gough, is placed at the disposal of G.O.C. Fourth Amy for the above purpose. . . . 5

By late June, IV Army held a twenty-mile front stretching from Fonquevillers in

the north to Maricourt in the south. Rawlinson's m y compnsed the foilowing corps:

4 "G.H.Q. Leam O.A.D. 12 to Gencral Sir H. Rawlinson. 16& June 1916 Stating the Objectives." reproduced as Appendix 13 to Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds. m i a l Hïszory of t h War. Milita- Operazions Frunce and Belgium. 1916.(BOH), Vol. 1. (London. MacMillan. 1932). pp. 86-7. s "Note O.AD. 17, Datai 21" June 1916 of Commander-in-Chicf s I n s e o n s in Amplification of O.AD. 12. Issued 16" June 19 16." rcproducui as Appendix 15 in BOH 1916. Vol. 1. p. 89.

+he Allied and G e m a n fines. Amies. Corps, Divisions a objectives at zero, on Z day, 1st Juiy, 1916

addition, Rawlinson was also dlotted the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division, which forma

together with two infantry divisions, Rawlinson's army reserve. From his

reconnaissances Rawlinson realized that the German defences were very formidable

consisting of two main trench systems bolstered by a succession of fortifed villages and

protected by two belts of wire. The second trench system, some 2,0004,000 yards behind

the first, was situated on a reverse slope and was also protected by wire and, of vital

importance. lay beyond the range of the British wire-cutting artillery6

The disposition of these defences led Rawlinson to advocate a cautious step-by-

step plan. In fact, planning had begun as early as March. First, Rawlinson decided that he

would limit his froniage of attack to 20,000 yards chwsing to attack between the high

ground at Serre in the north and the Montauban-Mametz spur in the south. Second, he

plamed to attack to only a depth of 4,000-5,000 yards in the initiai stage prïmarily due to

the limitations of artillery to effectively deal with the second Iine given its position on a

reverse slope, and his fear that his troops would become disorganized beyond a depth of

3.000 yards and would not be able to fend off any counter-attacks from the second line.'

In short, Rawlinson had opted for a 'Bite and Hold' concept of operations but without the

advantage of tank support and without utilizing the principle of surprise that the Iater

"Bite and Hold" assaults of 1917-18 would enjoy. In the initial stages of the advance he

saw ten divisions attacking on a 20,000 yard front preceded by an artillery bombardment

of four to five days. The infantry would seize the first line and advance beyond it but

halting well short of the second line. After a pause of about three days, during which time

anillery would be moved forward and counter-attacks fought off, a second advance

6 Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Communù on t h Western Front: Tne Milirary Career of Sir Henry Rawlinron 1914-1 8, (Oxford: Blackwell. 1992). p. 14 1.

would be undertaken to caphue the German second ~ i n e . ~ Haig's chef objections to the

pIan were that it did not achieve surprise and that it was too cautious. In fact, Haig urged

Rawlinson to alter his plan to expand his initial depîh of advance to include the Geman

second line. After much discussion and exchange of memoranda between commands, the

final plan for IV Amy, as agreed to by Haig on 16 May, was the same as the orignal

except for the issue of the initial objectives for the infantry in the first phase. The infantry

would be required to capture the second line, and was to be prepared to capitalize on the

initial success by prepanng the way for the cavdry e~~ lo i t a t i on .~

The Allied attack went in at 7:30 AM on Z Day (Juiy 1). The preliminary

bombardment interspersed with repeated discharges of gas over the enemy lines had kept

the Germans continually on the alert, but they were expecting an assault on the north side

of the river onl y. Therefore, the French assaults were on1 y relative1 y lightly opposed and

reached their initial objectives with comparative ease.1° Rawlinson's becarne bogged

down very soon in the advance everywhere except on his right wing where Xm Corps,

alongside the French XX Corps on its right, had succeeded in capturing and passing

through Montauban, and where XV Corps, on the Xm Corps left, had succeeded in

11 capturing Mametz.. Elsewhere on the British front most of the gains, achieved at

tremendous cost, were on1 y temporary and were relinquished before nightfall. Although

the million and a half shells that had ken fired by the British in the preliminary

bombardment and on Z Day had inflicted considerable damage to the German positions

in the first line, the artillery bombardment had left many of the German dug-outs intact -

7 Ibid., p. 143. 8 ibid., p. 146. 9 ibid., p. 152. 10 COH, p. 162.

a failure that was blamed upon a shortage of heavy howitzers and on a large amount of

defec tive ammuni tion. Consequentl y, the German machine-gunners who, having

remained safe in their dugouts. re-emerged to man their weapons and defend their line

mowed down the advancing British infantry. British Iosses for the day numbered

57,470. "

For twelve more days the British effort continued as Haig attempted to reinforce

the success of Rawlinson's right wing through the traditional response of more manpower

and more artillery. Funher attacks were ordered by Rawlinson for the 2nd and 3" to

consolidare the footholds the British had in and around Mametz and Montauban. These

were carried out by XIII and XV Corps dong with other supporting attacks further to the

north in the IV Anny sector carried by the other corps of the -y. Beyond the 4" the

front was relatively quiet as the British, especially IV A m y was involved in

reconstituting its mauled divisions, in some cases replacing them with formations moved

down from the Flanders sector. Similady, the Germans were occupied in fending off the

various consolidating anacks of the British, and in bringing up reinforcementd3

Concurrent to these actions, planning was taking place at IV Army headquarters

in support of the aim of breaching the enerny second line. Over the past two weeks

Rawlinson had come to reaiize that bold and rapid measures were essential if he was to

forestall the German reinforcements and labour that were quickly re-building the second

line faster than the British could find a way through it.14 Rawlinson devised a plan to

attack and break the German second line on a four-mile front between Delville Wood on

I I A.H. Farrar-Hockley, The Somme. (London: Pan Books, 1983). pp. 152-5. 12

13 COH, p. 163. Farrar-Hockley. pp. 159-78

14 Liddell-Hart, p. 245.

the left, and Bazentin-le-Petit on the right. The right of this frontage was fully three-

quarters of a mile fiorn the German second line but with the vital tactical feaîure, Trônes

Wood still in German hands. On the left, no-man's Iand gradually narrowed until in front

of Mametz Wood it was only 300 yards wide. However, Trônes Wood enfiladed a Iarge

part of the axis of advance. It was obvious that a conventional attack dong the lines of

July 1'' was almost certain to fail. Therefore, Rawlinson devised a plan that envisioned an

advance under cover of darkness to just short of the enemy line, followed by a dawn

attack, but preceded by a humcane bombardment of just a few minutes duration. Despite

objections from Haig, Rawlinson persevered with what seemed then to be an unorthodox

plan, reviving as it did the use of surprise and shunning the use of a long preliminary

bombardment. '' The date to launch the assadt was set for July 14& with the attacking tmops

composed of the 9" and 3" Divisions of Xm Corps whose task it would be to capture

their objective Longueval-Bazentin-le-Grand Village, and the 7& and 2 1 '' Divisions of

XV Corps whose objectives were set as Bazentin-le-Petit village - Bazentin-le-Grand

Wood. On the extreme right flank the 1 8 ~ Division had the task of clearing Trônes

Wood; a task the division had completed during the evening of 13/14 July. In addition, on

the extreme left, Ill Corps formed a defensive flank between Bazentin-le-Petit Wood and

Contalmaison. Finally, three cavalry divisions, the 2" Indian, 1" and 3d Cavalry

Divisions (the latter two re-grouped from Gough earlier in the week) were in Anny

reserve. Prepared to rnove at 4:00 AM, the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division was given the

objective of capniring High Wood - a feahm of tacticai importance at a high point on the

ndge - while the other two divisions were

kept in general army reserve to be used as seen fit by Rawlinson during the course

of the battle.16

At 5:00 PM on the lzm, Rawlinson's headquarters issued the final operations

order which directed the infantry assault, after a silent night assembly in no-man's-land,

to commence at 3 2 5 AM preceded by only five minutes of preliminary bombardment.

The orders also placed the 2nd Indian Cavairy Division under comrnand of Xm Corps for

the capture of High Wood that Robin Pnor and Trevor Wilson have pointed out were

flawed considering that High Wood was centred in XV Corps sector of advance

potentially making the problem of coordination difficult once the time came for the

16 BOH. 1916, Vol. 2, pp. 66-7.

cavairy to p a s thro~~h.'~ At 3:25 AM, the 2d Indian Cavairy Division was in its

assembly area 12 miles to the rear at Morlancourt yet prepared to move, as per orders, as

At 3:20 AM the preliminary bornbardment hit the German fine as planned. Then

at 3:25 AM, according to the British Official History, the bombardment lified and the

lead battalions of the advancing divisions:

. . .rose and advanced through the ground mist at a steady pace. There was just light enough to distinguish friend from foe. Surpnsed by the shortness of the intensive and most effective bombardment, by the deployrnent of the stomers so near in the dark, and by the creeping barrage of high- explosive, the enemy made but a feeble and spasmodic resistance to the first onslaught. The Ieading Bntish wave reached the German wire before a shot was fired, and in the hostile trenches the only serious opposition came from men who nished fiom dug-outs and shelters after the fmt waves had passed to engage those which followed. The enemy counter- barrage, when it came down a little later, fell in Caterpillar Valley behind the assaulting t r00~s . '~

Ln effect, the whole of the German second line had been ovemin. In the XV Corps sector,

the 21" Division advanced through Bazentin-le-Petit Wood and captured Bazentin-le-

Petit village while the 7& Division succeeded in clearing Bazentin-le-Grand Wood.

Similady, in the Xm Corps sector to the right, the 3& Division succeeded in capturing

Bazentin-le-Grand village while the 9" Division, experiencing a little more difficulty,

fought their way through Longueval to the perimeter of Delville ~ o o d . ~ ' By 6:30 AM

Rawlinson had been assured by his corps cornmanden that both corps were occupying

their fust objectives meaning that the Bntish were now in possession of a sizeable portion

17 Aior and Wison, p. 193. 18 The division consisted of the Secunderabad Brigade. the Ambda Brigade, and the Canadian Cavairy Brigade. The Canadian Cavalry Brigade consisted of the Lord Strathcona's Horst. the Royal Canadian Drageons, and the Fort Gary Horse. as well as two batteries of Royal Canadian Horse Artillery anù a mounted machine gun squadron in support. See Anglesey. Vol. 8, p. 48, and Report of the Ministry, 0versea.s Milüary Forces of Canada 1918, pp. 3354. 19 BOH 1916. Vol. 2, pp. 78-9.

of the Pozières ridge (the initial objective of the entire British offensive on July lSt), and

that IiI Corps on the left formed a defensive flank between Bazentin-le-Petit Wood and

~ o n t a ~ m a i s o n . ~ ~

For some time the picture of success was sustained by Royal Flying Corps

reconnaissance patrols that confmed every situation report sent by III, XIII, and XV

Corps. At 7:40 AM, Congreve ordered the 2" Indian Cavairy Division to exploit as far as

High Wood while, concurrently, he and Home ordered the forward movement of artillery

to support the anticipated advances beyond the German second line." However, on the

right the 9& Division was experiencing increasing difficulty in holding Longueval and

Delville Wood against the pressure of constant German bombardrnent and Geman

counter-attacks. As it happened, the successful resistance of the Gerrnans in this locality

made the XV Corps and TV Army reluctant to continue with advance further east?

This was an unfortunate situation and one that made the chances for a successful

advance further east later in the day impossible. The British Official History at this point

indicates that at this time the 7& and 3d Divisions were fit and ready to carry on the

advance. in fact, the British Official History contends that ail opposition to the front of

these divisions had appeared to have melted away before 10:OO AM. Several senior

officers from 3d Division were reported to have walked foward up the slope towards

High Wood without a shot k ing fired at them, and without noticing any enemy activity

nor any defensive works. Accordingly, in order to take advantage of the opportunity

presented, Major-General Watts (GOC 7m Division) prûposed to XV Corps to send his

20 BOH 1916, Vol. 2, pp. 79-82. 2 1 Farrar-Hocldey, p. 189. P Ibid., p. 189. 23 BOH 1916, Vol. 2. p. 83.

reserve bngade forward to capture High Wood. However, XV Corps instructed him to

remain in place and leave the capturing of High Wood to the znd Indim Cavalry Division.

Similarly. Major-General Haldane (GOC 3* Division) had proposed the same for his

reserve brigade but was also told to hold by XIII ~ o r ~ s . "

At this bme the 20d Indian Cavalry Division was nowhere near the front. Having

been ordered by Xm Corps to begin its movement forward at 7:40 AM. The division

began its movement forward at 8:20 AM but its progress across slippery ground cut up by

trenches and pined with shell-holes was very slow. It was well p s t noon when the lead

brigade, the Secunderabad Brigade with attachmentss, amiveci in the valley south of

Montauban. As the division had not appeared at the front by noon, N Army finally

sanctioned the advance of 7& Division to High Wood. However, XV Corps, concerned

that XIII Corps was stiLl having difficulties in Longueval and Delville Wood, postponed

the advance of 7" Division until the former objectives had been taken. In addition, 2 1''

Division began to experience a swong German counter-attack against their positions in

Bazentin-le-Petit Wood at 3:ûû PM and it was not until7:OO PM that the division felt

confidant enough to report that the wood was securely in British han& again.26

At 3: 10 PM, an emneous report announcing the c a p m of the whole of

Longueval reached XV Corps which prompted Home at 3:00 PM to order 7'h Division to

advance on High Wood at 5: 15 PM and for the cavalry of 2"* Indian Cavalry Division to

cover the right flank of the manoeuvre even though the division was still technically

24 Ibid., pp. 83-4. 25 The aaachmtnts were a squadron of the Fort Garry Horse (FGH) from the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, a Royai Engineer Field Troop for mobiiity assistance. and two arrnoured cars. Ln fact, the FGH squadron carricd with thcm on pack horses coilapsible bridges for the purpose of mnch and cratcr crossing. Sce Anglesey. Vol. 8, p. 48. and letter h m Lieutmant-Colonel H.W. Paterson (CO FGH) to Colonel Max Aitken. August 26&. 1916. N & d Archives of CIurPda (NAC), RG9, III. Dl, Vol. 4681, Folda 23, File 16.

under the command of Xm Corps. However, word of this change in orders did not reach

the commander of the Secunderabad Brigade (Brigadier-General Gregory) until5:40 PM

and the brigade was not in a position to execute the task until6:25 PM at which time it

was re-grouped to the command of XV Corps. Similarly, Horne's orders did not mach the

lead brigade (9 Ist Brigade) of 7" Division until long after 5:00 PM. To complicate

matten even worse, the brigade had been told that it would be supported on the left by a

brigade from the 33" Division, which was nowhere in sight." The lead battalions of the

brigade barely anived in the assembly area to meet up with the cavalry at 6:45 PM

allowing very little time for any sort of tactical coordination between the a m . As well,

the brigade was also told that the artillery fire pian would lift at 6:15 PM with no

dlowance for the brigade commander to adjust this timing2*

Consequently, the advance onto High Wood did not begin uniil 7:ûû PM and

without artillery support. The cavairy regiments on the right flank, the 7& Dragoon

Guards and the 2 0 ~ Deccan Horse, were fired at by a machine-gumer from Delville

Wood which was soon dealt with by an aircrafi. Fortunateiy, the infantry battalions met

little resistance in their advance and entered High Wood where they found very few

Germans until they reached the north-west angle where the Gexmans were occupying a

hastily dug trench line. With the infantry occupying most of High Wood, the two cavalry

regiments reached the high ground between High Wood and Delville Wood where by

25

17 BOH, p. 85. i0t.h Brigade nom 33" Division was nowhere in sight because the ordm from 33" Division to

the brigade were never rezeived. BOW, p. 87. 23 Ibid.. p. 86.

9:30 PM, as mounted infantry, they took a line facing east into the low ground in the

direction of Flers.2g

It had taken approximately nine houn (since the cornmanden of the 3d and 7"

Divisions had reported High Wood aç unoccupied and ripe for the taking) for an attack to

be finally launched toward this objective. It is also interesting to note that whiIe the

Secunderabad Brigade was making its way forward during the afternoon, the other two

brigades of the znd Indian Cavalry Division had been ordered back to bivouac. Moreover.

the 1" and 3* Cav* Divisions had remained al1 &y in their bivouacs in and around

Buire sur Ancre and Daours (10 miles southwest of Albert) without receiving orders for

forward movement .30

Activities on the German side of the line, as reported in the German officia1

history, shed some interesting light on events that &y. General Sixt von Arnim, who took

over command of the front between Longueval and the Ancre at 9:00 AM on the 14& was

faced with "a critical situation: there were no rear positions, no switches.. .and no

communications trenches." He ordered al1 troops to hold where the y were and to organize

a defence in depth. At the moment of the attack the German 7" Division was aniving to

relieve the German 183" Division in Bazentin-le-Petit Wood-Pozières sector. Instead,

units of the 7" Division were dispersed to reinforce the points that had k e n attacked

including Longueval, and occupation of a new second line in the rear referred to b-y the

British as the "Switch Line." At the time of the attack, this line was unoccupied and only

in the earl y stages of construction. B y the evening of July 14" /15", it had been occupied,

29 Ibid., p. 87. 30 Ibid., p. 87.

improved and wired. Therefore, any hope of a breakthrough by the British the following

morning was slim given the new Geman dispositions.31

Prior and Wilson have also examined the Gennan situation on the day and have

ascertained that the reinforcements from the Gennan 183* Division began aniving in the

forward positions between 10:OO AM and 200 PM, and it was these troops that

conducted the counter-attacks against the British positions on the afternoon of the 14'.

Furthemore, they have discovered that some troops were indeed occupying the Switch

Line and High Wood at the tirne of the attack; something over a battalion in strength.

Based on this evidence, Prior and Wilson have concluded that High Wood was never

open during the battle and that it could never have k e n ovemn by the infantry and a

breakthrough achievedS3' However, their conclusion does not stand up to scrutiny.

As suggested above, weii before 10:ûû AM, the reserve brigades of the 3d and 7'

Divisions were poised to take High Wood. Given that senior officers from 3d Division

had been able to approach the wood in the open without a shot being fired at hem, and

given that the fmt G e m a n reinforcements in the area did not begin deploying until 10:OO

AM at the earliest, it is very possible that High Wood could have been taken with ease in

the early hours of the 14'. Moreover, the Rior and Wilson argument also falls down on

the fact that even as late as 7:00 PM, nine hours after German reinforcements had begun

to arrive. two battalions of British infantry were able to take most of High Wood and the

cavalry were able to occupy a line on the high ground between High Wood and Delville

Wood. The British failure to fully capture High Wood and secure a gap in the enemy iine

through which the cavahy could breakthrough and exploit was not as a consequence of

31 Excerpts of the Gcrman Official History reproducd in BOH 19 16, Vol. 2, pp. 88-9. 32 Rior and Wilson, pp. 20 1-2.

78

Germa action as Prior and Wilson contend. To the contrary, as Holger Henvig - writing

from the German perspective - points out, "undue caution, misinformation, and weak

arti llery -infanny cooperation denied Fourth Arrn y a breakthrough. "33

In other words, it was a lack of a sense of tempo compounded by the lack of a de-

cenualized command philosophy, poor dl-arms cooperation, poor staff coordination, and,

finally, poor communications on the part of the British that led to the failure to fully

capture High Wood and secure a gap in the enemy line through which the cav- could

breakthrough and exploit. The opportunity to open the gap and push the cavalry through

appeared in the early moming of the 14" when the lead brigades of the 3* and the 7&

Divisions had passed through the German second line, had captured their initial

objectives, and were ready to support the advance of their respective reserve brigades into

Hi& Wood and the high ground between it and Delville Wood This opportunity was

seen by both divisional commanders but because they lacked the delegated authonty to

act quickly on their own initiative, they had to seek higher authonty to carry on with the

advance. This was the first delay.

However, the most critical delay occurred with the decision of Congreve to stick

with the original plan of letting the 2"* Indian Cavalry Division take the wood. This

would not have been a cntical problem if the cavalry had been close behind the lead

elemenrs of the 3d Division ready to p a s through once the oppominity presented itself.

Unfortunately, the cavairy was twelve miles to the rear! Much has b e n made in the

historiopphy of the Somme about the demonstrated obsolescence of the cavalry because

of its inability on the day to traverse the twelve mile stretch of rear area in their effort to

33 Holger H. Herwig, The F i m World W a c Gernsany and Autria-Hungary 1914-1 918, (London: Arnold, 1997). p. 202.

get to the front, and the inevitable delay that this slow movement incwed on the ability

of Fourth Army to exploit its success on the day. Yet, an infantry formation would have

incurred the same delay given the same terrain conditions. The problem, thexfore, was

not with the cavalry (the cavalry even had engineer support and collapsible bridging to

assist its movement forward) but in the Iack of staff foresight and coordination in

planning that allowed the cavalry to be placed so far to the rear.

Lack of a sense of tempo was also evident in the fact that only the Secunderabad

Brigade, in the end, was brought forward for the assault at 790 PM with the other two

brigades of the division k i n g sent back to bivouac. Moreover, what is even more

puzzling is the absence of any or&n from IV Army k i n g sent to the 1'' and 3" Cavalry

Divisions, themselves even farther back in the rear than the znd hdian Cavairy Division,

during the moming of the 1 4 ~ to move fonvard in pxparation for the exploitation. While

the two brigades of the 2nd Indian Cavairy Division could have been sent back because of

the physical problems associated with moving them fonuard, the fact that the ln and 3&

Divisions were still situated so far to the rear on the moming of the 1 4 ~ and did not

receive any orders the whole &y demonstrates that Rawlinson, Congreve and their

respective staffs had no understanding of the requirements for maintaining operational

tempo. Denis Winter bIames this state of affairs on Haig but it is fairer to place the blame

lower down in the chain of command." To maintain that tempo, it is obvious now that

the cavalry assembl y areas should have been sited much farther forward and their

movements should have been tied to the rnovements of the forward infantry divisions.

However, this level of planning and coordination was not exercised.

34 Winter. p. 156.

A further point about staff coordination concerns the original grouping of the 2nd

hdian Cavaky Division under the command of Xm corps.'' The point haç already k e n

made that it would have made better sense to p u p it under XV Corps given that Hi@

Wood was in the XV Corps axis of advance. This flaw, of course, came home to roost

when the Secunderabad Brigade was re-grouped to under command XV Corps for the

eventual assault on High Wood at 7:00 PM. The consequence of this last-minute change

in command relationships again concerns staff coordination. In the end the cavaS,

rnarried up with the infantry h m 7' Division at 6:45 PM. 15 minutes pnor to crossing

the start line; hardly enough time to effectively coordinate the assault. Moreover. a

related coordination problem encountered at this stage of the battle concerned the

inability of lower level infantry or cavairy conimanders to alter the supporting artillery

fire plan as a result of changing tactical circumstances. The supporting fire plan had k e n

drawn up centrally and could not be altered at the lower level. As a consequence, the final

assault went in at 7:ûû PM without adequate fire suppon.

The final point relates to the problern of communications. At the time of the

Battle of the Somme, it had become cornmon practice to bury cables and Iines to six feet

in order to protect them from the destructive power of the recently introduced German

5.9 inch howitzer. However, the buried systerns were uncoordinated and unsystematic so

that in the event of a break a considerable time would elapse before the system would be

functional again. It was not until the winter 19 16- 17 thaî the grid systern came into

general use.36 The system, constructed as it was for static. positional warfare, had a lot of

35 John Croft raises this issue as weii in his article. Sec Crok p. 213. 36 Moù. pp. 18-19. The grid systcrn provided certain centres in each divisional sector connccted by deep cabie from front to rcar. In addition. each divisional stctor was connectcd l a d y to flanking

built-in rigidity that did not adjust well to the exigencies of movement on Juiy 14?

Because of these limitations, the main means of communication employed at the Somme

once units and formations were on the move or were forward and consolidating on

objectives were, in order, runners, visual techniques such as flags, and pigeon. It is no

wonder, then, that the passage of orders and messages arnong commands on the aftemoon

of the 14& , especially the orders to the 91* and the 1 0 0 ~ Infantry Brigades, and to the

Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade were slow and, in many cases, non-existent-

The actions by IV A m y on July 14& created one of the firs, but fleeting,

opporîunities for a breakthrough on the Western Front. Lack of a sense of tempo

exacerbated by a general lack of staff planning and coordination, a lack of dl-amis

cooperation, and delay due to the limitations of communications technology , ai1

contributed to the failure of IV Axmy to capitalize on the great opportunity that had been

created in the early hours of July 14&. In theory, it seems fair to say that the cavahy could

have achieved a breakthrough during the morning if the above conditions had k e n more

suitably met. However, the question as to how long the cavalry could have sustained a

breakthrough, and how far i t could have advanced into the Geman rear area is another

question the answer to which would be speculative and outside the scope of this thesis.

Unfortunatel y, the cavaln, was afforded no other opportunities of t h i s magnitude

during the remainder of the Somme offensives which continued until the end of

November. Of the campaign, Haig wrote as follows:

The three main objectives with which we had commenced our offensive in Jul y had . . . been achieved.. . .Verdun had been relieved; the main German forces had been held on the Western Front; and the enemy's strength had

formations and h m front to rear. Thus, in the event of a break, a message wouid be trausmiucd to the Forward Centre of a lateral formation fiom whcre it would reach its final destination.

been very considerably wom down. An y one of these three results is in irself suficient to justiS the Somme banle.""

In addition to meeting the srrategic aims as set out by Haig, the Somme offensive was

also instructive for the British army. It certainly demonstrated that the cavalry, when

employed as mounted infanûy and coordinated with the actions of other a . ,

represented an important capability on the battlefield for the British. Moreover, it was

this banle which gave the impetus to General Maxse's tactical reforms; changes in assault

tactics which would perfect the break-in battie such as the requirement for speciall y

trained assault troopers utilizing infiltration tactics, the use of ranks and low-flying

aircraft, and of course, better methods for artillery-infantry c~ordination.~' In short, the

British Anny wodd improve the midde school or 'Bite and Hold' method of overcoming

the superiority of the defensive over the offensive, and over the next year improvemenîs

would be made in the way its formations conducted the assault and sought to break-in to

the enemy defences. However, comparatively little thought or improvement would be

sven as to how a breakthrough might be achieved and maintained. Consequentiy, at

Cambrai in November, 1917 the cavalry would be in much the same predicarnent as

experienced at the Somme the previous year.

37 Quoteci in COH, p. 198. 38 Johnson. pp. 184-9.

CHAPTER FOUR

CAMBRAI: NOVEMBER u)& - 21d. 1917

..-A pretty mechanical loy. Lord Kitchener: After observing British

tank tests, 1915

On October 24& . 19 17, the C e n d powen, having reinforced the Italian Front

with a further six German divisions, launched a smng offensive across the upper Isonzo

river in northem Xdy. Using gas shells against which Itaiian respirators were useless,

General Otto von Below 's Fourteenth A m y crushed the Itaiian defences in a briliiantly

conducted banle near the town of Caporetto. With his defences collapsing, the Itdian

commander, General Cadorna, ordered a retreat to the Tagliamento River forty miles to

the rear. However, the rapid German pursuit forced the Italians back to the line Piave

River - Mount Grappa - Adige, approximateIy eighty miles h m the Isonzo. The

alamiing reports of the Caporetto disaster brought the Italians help in the form of French

and British reinforcements (six and five divisions respectively) between November lom

and December 12" . Although the Ailied divisions did not arrive in time to hdt the

German advance, the presence of these divisions was instrumental in preventing the

rnilitary and political collapse of ltaly.'

It was against the background of imminent Italian collapse, coupled with the

failed French Nivelle offensives of the previous ApriVMay and the exhaustive British

offensives in Randers. which had culminated with the capture of Passchendaele on

November 6" , that the offensive at Cambrai was authorized. On the eve of the battle on

1 COH, p. 33 1, and Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds. WiaL Hisrory of the War, Milirary Operarions Frcurce and Belgùun. I917,(BOH), Vol. 3, (London, HMSO, 1948). p. 15.

November 19", Haig is reported to have given his final and conclusive reason for

launching the attack against

CAMBRAI ;;

/i NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1917 . I

(1 . , 1 2 3 4

MILES

the Gerrnan defences at Cambrai: success would g m i t l y help the situation in ~ t a l ~ . ~ In

contras, Haig's official reason was that since the enemy, so as to maintain its defences in

the Ypres sector, had beem "obliged to reduce the garnison of certain other parts of his

line" a sudden attack "at a point where he did not expect it might attain a considerable

local suc ces^."^ According to Anglesey, Haig was looking for a comparative1 y modest

operation that would restore British prestige and strike a theatricaI blow against German y

before the winter had set ine4 To achieve his aim, Haig needed an offensive plan that

would be guaranteed to succeed. For this plan he Iooked to III Anny.

The possibility of developing operations in the Cambrai sector had been

considered in April 19 17, when Haig had orderd IV and V Armies to prepare plans for

an attack in that sector. The subsequent relief of those armies by III Army had transferred

responsibility for such a plan to the commander of III Amy, General Sir Julian ~ ~ n ~ . ~

The plan remained in relative dormancy during the prolonged offensive in Fianders over

the summer and earl y fall of 19 17. However, for precisely the reasons explained above,

Haig gave approval to Byng in mid-October to proceed in eamest with the plan.

Accordingly, Haig gave orders for the necessary tmops to be made available to Byng for

the operation and set the date for the attack as November 20' .6

In fact, planning for such an offensive began as earl y as late August with

proposals from Elles and Fuller, both of whom were eager to see the tank operaîing in its

own right as an essential factor in the offensive. Both were convinced that this codd not

2 Brigadier-General J . Charteris. Fieid-Marshi Eùrl Haig, (1929). p. 270, qtd in Anglesey. Vol. 8, p. 101. 3 Haig's 'Cambrai Despatch' datcd DeCernber 25, 19 17 and re-producd in J.H. Boraston, cd.. Sir Douglas Haig's Desparches (December 1915 - April1919). (19 19). p. 130. 4 Angiescy, Vol. 8, p. 101. 5 ïïX Army at this time consisttd of m. TV. VI. VII, and XVII Corps. 6 COR p. 333.

happen in Fianders where shell craters filled with water and broken drainage ditches

converted flat land into swamp. On August 4&, Fuller submitted a plan to Elles

consisting of a raid on a big scale of the hit-and-nxn variety in the area of Banteux-

Crèvecoeur-Marcoing-Ribécourt. The tanks, supported by iow-flying aircraft. were to

effect surprise by crashing through the German wire and trenches. Fuller's plan was

forwarded to III Army on August srn .7

The GOC N Corps, Lieutenant-Generai Sir Charles Louis Woolcombe,

subsequently fowarded a similar plan to III A m y on August 23* . Woolcombe's plan

aimed at conducting a surprise attack as a diversion from the slow and costly operations

in Randers. To achieve surprise, Woolcombe envisioned that reliance be placed upon

survey methods of gun-laying instead of allowing preliminary registration, and that tanks

should create passages through the wire for the sudden assault by the infantry; the middle

school approach. Moreover, Woolcombe recommended that an officer of the Tank Corps

be sent to reconnoitre the IV Corps front and approve the suitability for tank action.

Accordingl y, Brigadier-General Elles visited IV Corps and suggested that the scope of

the attack might be enlarged. Byng agreed and anticipateci that a successful tank action

could be followed up by a large-scale cavalry action to conduct a breakthrough to the

northeast past Cambrai and to cut deeply into the Geman lines of communi~ation.~

Accordingly, a plan dong these Lines was fonvarded to the Commander-in-Chief

who was favourably impressed. However, the plan lay dormant during September, as

there were not enough tmops available while the Randers offensives were continuing.

However, when October came, a decision on the date of the Cambrai offensive could no

7 BOH. 1917. Vol. 3. p. 6. 8 Ibid., pp. 6-7.

longer be delayed On October 15& , Haig appmved Byng's plan and aminged for an

extra four divisions, t h e tank brigades, and the Cavalry Corps (consisting of five

cav* divisions and under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir C.T. McM.

Kavanagh) to be placed at his immediate disposai for training.g

On October 26& , Byng held a conference of his corps cornmanciers and their

staffs at III Army headquarters where the plan was confided to them. The terrain in the

Cambrai sector was well suited to the proposed type of operation because the ground had

not been mashed into swampIand by massive artillery fire. Being largely hard, undulating

terrain, it was ideal tank and cavalry country. The Hindenburg Line here as elsewhere

was very formidable. It consisted of two systems between 500 yards and a mile apart,

each with its front and support trenches. The barbed wire obstacles were fifty yards wide

whle the trenches were fifteen feet wide at the top and ten feet deep. The tanks would

have no difficulty in flattening the wire, but for the trenches they would need to carry

fascines that they would drop into the trenches in order to cross them.l0

Byng's plan was M d . If fully successfui, it would see the rupture of the German

Hindenburg Line from St. Quentin, seventeen miles south of Cambrai, to the canalized

Sensée River, five miles to the north of the city. It was Byng's intention to gain

possession of the area lying ktween the Canal du Nord and the St. Quentin Canal,

bounded to the north by the Sensée." To accomplish this, III A r m y orden for Operation

'GY', as the operation was codenamed, saw III Corps nght (Lieutenant-General Sir

William Pulteney) and IV Corps left conducting the main breaking in attack supporteci by

9 bid., pp. 7-9. 10 AneJtsey, Vol. 8, p. 104. 5 1 COH, p. 333.

over 300 tanks. and by supporting attacks by VI, W, and XW Corps. V Corps

was left in reserve. With the break-in thus made. the Cavalry Corps was to break-through

-- >&.--+

SKETCH45 : =-=- :. . =-:- <-=:+ /,::$==-

and' de i,,-=3c"

CAMBRAI NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1917

and seize Cambrai, Bourlon Wood, and the passages over the Sensée River and to cut off

the trwps holding the German front line between Havrincourt and the river.I2 Hence,

Byng planned to conduct h i s offensive in three stages:

(a) The infantry attack on the German organized lines, including the capture of the crossings over the Canal de I'Escaut [St. Quentin Canai] at Masnières and Marcoing, and of the Masnières- Beaurevoir Line east of those places.

) The advance of the Cav* to isolate Cambrai, and to seize the crossings over the Sensée River, and of IV Corps to capture Bourlon Wood

(c ) The clearing of Cambrai and of the quacirilateral Canal de l'Escaut - Sensée River - Canal du Nord, and the overthrow of the Gennan divisions thus cut off.I3

Specific instructions to III Corps cietaileci the requirement to "secure the passages over

the Canal de l'Escaut at Masnières and Marcoing, and the Masnières - Beaurevoir line to

the east thereof, in order to open a gap for the Cavairy to p a s thr~ugh." '~ IV Corps' main

task was to push forward advanced guards of dl-arms to capture Bourlon Wood on Z

Day. Finally, V Corps, as reserve, was given the task of advancing north and north-east in

order to exploit success as far as the Sensée River, and to push forward across the river to

gain and hold the heights norrh of the river.''

With respect to the Cavairy Corps, the tasks allotted by m Army for Z Day were

Firsr. - To surround and isolate Cambrai, occupying the main points of tactical importance, blocking ail exits from the town and destroying means of communication.

12

13 'The Third A m y Plan. 13" Nov. 1917." re-produceci as Appendix 1 to BOH. 1917, Vol. 3, p. 306. Ibid.. p. 306.

14 Ibid.. p. 307. 1s Ibid., p. 308.

Secondy. - To secure the mssings on the River Sensée between Paiilencourt and Palluel (inclusive).

Thirdly. - To secure the flank of the forces engaged in clearing up the quacirilateral CanaI de Escau t - Sensée River - Canal du Nord, and the advance North and North-east of V corps. l6

From the five divisions of the Cavalry Corps. some re-grouping took place. 1 Cavairy

Division was placed under command of IV Corps, while the Lucknow Brigade h m 4"

Cavalry Division was attached to III Corps. The Cavalry Corps plan for the remaining

formations was to have the srn and 2nd Cavalry Divisions, in that order, carry out the

advance behind III Corps and conduct the initial breakthrough over the Canal de l'Escaut

and then to sweep round to the east and the north of Cambrai. The 3d Cavairy Division

and the two remaining brigades of the 4& would remain in reserve.'7 Most importantly. it

was Kavanagh's responsibility to pass his leading divisions (sm and y*) through on Z

Day as soon as the infantry of IIi Corps had secured the crossings at Masnières and

Marcoing, and have ensured the possibility of passing over the Masnières-Beaurevoir

Line, which could happen at any time after zero hour (6:20 AM) plus four and a haif

hours. To achieve this, Kavanagh had to maintain "the closest touch with the progress of

the infantry attack b y al1 means at his disposal. '' To clear lanes through the wire, the

Cavalry Corps was also alloned twelve wire-pulling

16 "Third A m y Instructions to Cavalry Corps. 13& Nov. 19 17." rc-produccd as Appenck 2 to BOH. 19 17. Vol. 3, p. 309. 17 Anglesey, Vol. 8. p. 108. 18 BOR 1917, Vol. 3. p. 309. 19 BOH, 19 17, Vol. 3. p. 3 10. The Cavairy Corps had also f o d h m 4& Cavairy Division the Cavairy Track Batraiion composed of 500 disrnounteci indian NCOs and sowars and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel R.C. Bell, its job was to. in concert with the twelve wirt-pulling tanks, follow closely behind the advancing infanrry. tcar away the wirc, bridge or level trcnches and sheil holes, and thus carve a uack through the Gerxnan lines to the point where the cavairy could operate fietly. The CavaLry Track Battalion traincd daily for ttirte wecks pnor to Z Day. Sce Anglesey, Vol. 8, p. 113.

The final, key element of the plan, of course, was surprise. Byng's or&r of

November 17& stated that the "element of surprise [was] the key note of the operations

of the III and N A r m y Corps." Moreover, the order went on to state that if surprise was

attained and the German lines were over-run, "a unique opportunity for the Cavairy

action becomes possible. This action may have a most far reaching effect, not only on the

local situation. but on the course of the war." 20 Surprise was now possible because the

large number of Mark N tanks would be able to m s h the wire obstacles and overcome

the immediate defences rather than relying on a preliminary bombardment to do the same

thing. Furthemore, the artillery was now able to do counter-battery and suppression

work, and was able to fire standing and lifting barrages, without previous registration

th& to the development of field survey and calibration techniques since the fail of

1917. The aim of artillery fire had shifted from destruction to neutralization meaning, as

well, that the ground would nos be rendered impassable for tanks and ca~alx-y.*~

Therefore, al1 preparations prior to the battle were made with secrecy in mind. III

A r m y arranged for many false nunours to be spread in Amiens and similar locations. It

was fortunate that with the logistic, tanks, cavalry, and troop build-up that the weather

remained du11 and misty helping to screen preparations and movements in the rear area.

Signal communications needed to be extended and improved but, for reasons of security,

the digging of trenches for buried cable was prohibited. Therefore, an armoured cable

system was devised that would simply be laid on the ground as brigades and divisions

moved forward. To maintain cornmunications with the cavairy advance, wireless,

despatch riders, visual-signaling systems, and pigeons were to be used. A cable would be

20 'Third Anny Order for ûpcration G.Y.." No. G.S. 56/154 &tcd 17& November. 19 17, NAC. RG9, m. C2, Vol. 3984, Folder 5 , File I

quickly laid to Marcoing where an advanced signai report centre was to be established

wi th Cavalry Corps headquarters.u

The roads Metz-Trescault-Ribécourt , Gouzeaucout- ViUers Plouich, and

Gouzeaucourt-la Vacquerie were reserved for the cavairy advance and were to be

improved as far fonvard as possible without attracting hostile attention? The

concentration areas for the divisions of the Cavalry Corps were east, south, and W e s t of

Péronne with the nearest, that of srn Cavalry Division, in and around Tincourt about ten

miles from the front line at Villers ~louich." The advance of the cavairy commenced at

1250 AM on the moming of November 2 0 ~ when the 5" Cavalry Division departed

Tincourt followed by the movements of the 2nd, 4', and 3* Cavairy Divisions. By 8:00

AM, al1 cavalry divisions had completed their moves to their forward assembly areas in

the area of Fins without incident. Fins was approximately six miles from the front line."

At 6:20 AM, the tanks and infantry of III and IV Corps advanced on a front

approximately six miles wide. In the III Corps sector, the 12& Division (MajorGenerd

A.B. Scott) formed the right. the 2 0 ~ Division (Major-General W.D. Smith) the centre,

and the 6" Division (Major-General T.O. Marsden) the Ieft. Al1 three divisions secured

their objectives rapidly though the 12" had severe fighting at Lateau Wood. Most

importantly, by 11 :O0 AM the 20& Division had passed through the Hindenburg front

system and was fast approaching their next objectives at Masnières and Marcoing with a

view to securing the crossings over the St. Quentin Canal (Canal de l'Escaut). In the IV

Corps sector the 5 1" Division (Major-General G.M. Harper) met up with considerable

21 Travers, ffow the War was Won. p. 20. -2 BOH, 1917, Vol. 3, pp. 37-9. 23 Ibid.. p. 39. 24 Ibid., p. 44.

resistance in front of Flesquières and by nightfail on the 2 0 ~ had estabiished a hasty

defence in this area However, elsewhere in the IV Corps sector, 62nd (Major-General

W.P. Braithwaite) Division had succeeded by 10:30 AM in capturing its second

objective, the Hindenburg front system in its sector to the point where it crossed the

Canal du Nord. Finally, to 62" Division's left came the 36& (Ulster) Division (Major-

General O.S.W. Nugent) West of the Canal du Nord. By 11:20 AM. this division had

reached its second objective in the Hindenburg fmnt system.

Thus, by 1 1 :30 AM, except at Flesquières, IIï and IV Corps had captured the

outpost and battie zones of the Hindenburg Line on nearly the whole of their frontage.

Heavy loss had k e n inflicted on the Germans in this sector. However, passage of

information had become very slow by this point in the battie largely because visual-

signaling was next to impossible owing to the fog and mist, and much wire had either

been cut or was yet to be laid to forward headquarters. The leading brigade (the Canadian

Cavalry Brigade commandeci by BrigadierGenerd J.E.B. Seely) of the 5' Cavairy

Division was waiting south-west at Gouzeaucourt when, at 11:40 AM, the division

received orders from the Cavalry Corps to advance and to keep in touch with the infantry

to the front. The order added that the situation at Masnières and Marcoing was u n ~ l e a r . ~ ~

At 10: 15 AM the IiI Corps reserve. 29" Division (Major-General Sir B. de Lisle)

was given the order to advance. pass through 6" and 2 0 ~ Divisions, and cross the canal

capturing Masnières and Marcoing, the canal crossings, and the portion of the Masnières-

Beaurevoir Line in this sector. AU three brigades (86&, 87m, and 8gm) of the division were

2s Ibid., p. 46. See also Anglesey, Vol. 8, p. 11 1. 26 BOH. 1917, Vol. 3, pp. 50-63. Sec also Major-Gencral T.T. Pitman. 'The Part Played by the British Cavalry in the Surprise Attack on Cambrai. 19 17," he Gzvuiry Journal, Vol. Xm, Jdy 1923, pp. 240-3.

95

sent forward without a single battalion kept in reserve for it was felt by de Lisle that the

enemy was on the run and wouid not be able to put up any organized opposition. By

pressing hard, de Lisle expected that neither passage of the canal nor the occupation of

the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line would offer any serious difficulty."

Thus, 88" Brigade moved on Masnières by way of la Vacquerie valley.

Encountering opposition from within and around Masnières, the brigade managed to fonn

a small bridgehead of two companies (from 4lWorcestershire) on the far side of the canal

capturing the main bridge over the canal. At about 12:40 PM a tank in support of the

Worcestershires attempted to cross the main bridge causing the bridge to coilapse and

Ieaving the tank jammed between its two broken ends. There were no other bridges in the

immediate vicinity of the bridge by which a tank could cross and the infantry in the

bridgehead were now k i n g subjected to heavy fire.

Meanwh.de, thanks to the work of the wire-cuning tanks and the Cavalry Track

Battalion, the lead elements of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade had reached the southern

outskirts of Masnières by 1 :39 PM and Seely had gone forward to liaise with the infantry

of 2om and 2gm Divisions. At 2:00 PM, Seely met with the commander of 88" Brigade

(Brigadier-General H. Nelson) who erroneously told Seely that his supporting tanks had

actually crossed the canal and that his battalions were now amiving at their objectives in

the Madères-Beaurevoir Line. On hearing this news, Seely ordered his lead regiment,

the Fort Garry Horse (Lieutenant-colonel Paterson), to continue the advance. Following

close on the heels of the lead battalions of 88" Brigade, the Canadian cavalry entered the

village of Masnières at 2: 15 PM only to discover that the main bridge was broken and

that the enemy beyond the bridge was maintaining a heavy resistance. However, 300

27 BOH, 1917, Vol. 3. p. 67.

yards south-east of the main bridge, 2/Hampshire had discovered a lock in the canal over

which the battalion was now passing. The Garrys moved to the lock and, afier a passage

for horses was constmcted with the assistance of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade Machine

Gun Squadron and some local inhabitants, the cavalry, with B Squadron leading, began to

cross at 3:30 PM. Half an hour later B Squadron was assemblai on the far side of the

canal and the advance to the ridge east of Rumilly begam2'

Meanwhile, 8 8 ~ Brigade's efforts to consolidate its foothold on the east side of

the canal, and to capture its portion of the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line, were running into

difficulty due to the lack of artillery support and the inability to pass tanks over the

By 10:O PM 88L Brigade had the equivalent of two battalions of infantry anoss

the canal but without the suppon of artiilery and tanks they could not achieve their

objectives. Consequently, they had little choice during the evening of November 2 0 ~ /2lSt

but to consolidate their positions and prepare for a renewed effort in the r n ~ n i i n ~ . ' ~

B Squadron of the Fort Garry Horse, throughout the early evening, continued with

its advance toward Rurnilly. At the time the squadron was crossing the canai, Major-

General W.H. Greenly (GOC 2nd Cavairy Division) had met up with Seely and Nelson at

Masnières and concluded that there was not sufficient daylight left to enable the cavalry

to reach their objectives and so cany out the original plan of conducting the initial

breakthrough over the canal and then sweeping round to the east and the north of

amb brai.^' Greenly, therefore, ordered Seely to halt his crossing of the canal, to assist

- - - - --

2% Ibid., pp. 69-70. and Pitman, pp. 244-5. 29 The XV Brigade RH. A. which was in direct support to 88' Brigade had found its passage down the road h m la Vacquerie blockcd by brokcn down and ditchcd tanks. The l d baucries did not rcach thtir fonvard positions until late on the afterwon of the 2 0 ~ . and tvcn then communications could not be estabLished with 88& Brigade. See BOH. 1917. Vol. 3. p. 72. Note 2. 39 Ibid., p. 89. 31 J.E.B. Scely, Adventure. (London: William Heinemann, 1930), p. 275.

88'h Brigade with holding Masnières, and to recail any tmops that had crossed the canai

already. This direction did not reach Paterson until well after B Squadron had crossed and

was out of contact wiih the rest of the re@~nent.~' Consequentiy, B Squadron, now out of

touch and under the leadership of Lieutenant H. Strachan, the squadron commander was

killed soon after the crossing, pushed on ovemnning a Geman artillery battery and

dispersing parties of disorganized German infantry. Reaiizing that his numbers were

dwindling and that the rest of the regiment and brigade were not following up behind

him, Strachan led his men back on foot over the canal in the early hours of November

7 1 2 ' 33 - . What is of interest in the B Squadron action is that the neutralization of the

Gennan battery and the subsequent dispersing of Gerrnan infantry seem to have resulted

in the creation of a gap in the Madères-Beaurevoir Line. Strachan's own account

suggests that the line in this location was nothing more than a series of 'split-locked'

(dummy) trenches with practicdly no wire in front. However, there were a few concrete

pillboxes with machine guns firing from them."

At Marcoing, the 87" Brigade (Brigadier-General C.H.T. Lucas) had b e n

directed on Marcoing by way of the Couillet Wood valley. The 87" Brigade was

successful in secuxïng the village, the main railway bridge over the canai, and a lock

further down the canal. Accordingly, the brigade was able to pass a number of infantry

companies over the canal. However, these troops began to encounter heavy machine gun

32 BOH, 19 17. Vol. 3, pp. 70- 1, and Pitman, p. 245. Grctdy had prcviously arranged with Major- Generai H.J.M. MacAndrtw (GOC 5b Cavalry Division) that if the necessity arose. hc would take the Canadian Cavalry Brigade under his command. Both cavalry divisions were using both mutes of advance: Masnières and Marcoing. Set a h lcücr Paterson CO Sccly, November 22". 1917. NAC, RG 9, Vol. 3999, File 4. 33 COH, p. 336. Sce also Suachan's own account of the action in Major H. Strachan. ' A Squadron On Its Own," The Cavalry Joumai, Vol. XVII. 1927. pp. 240-5 1, and "Narrative of Operations - Cartadian Cavairy Brigade. November 20" - 22d." NAC, RG 9, Dl, Vol. 4681. Folder 23. File 17. 34 Suachan, p. 245.

fire from the direction of the Rumilly spur, and from various positions in and around the

Masnières-Beaurevoir Line in this sector. With only two tanks on the east side of the

canal and with linle artillery support, several attempts by the battalions of the 87'h

Brigade to silence the enemy sîrongholds and occupy the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line had

failed, and at dusk the brigade dug in for the night in hasty defensive positions in and

around Marcoing. At 1 :45 PM, the lead elements of the Secunderabad Brigade

(Brigadier-General C.L. Gregory) of 5" Cavalry Division had reached the southern

outskirts of Marcoing. However, with the difficulties experïenced by the infantry of 87"

Brigade, the Secunderabad Brigade by the end of the day had succeeded only in passing

one squadron of the 7" Dragwn Guards a m s s the canal, but it came under heavy

machine gun fire and consequently dismounted and reinforceci the 87m Brigade's right

flank on the east side of the canaL3'

Therefore, the situation during the night of November 20" /21n was such that the

right fiank of III Corps was held by the 12" and 2om Divisions and extended from the

front line north-east of Gonnelieu dong the Bonavis ridge and down to the canal de

l'Escaut at Crèvecoeur. Beyond the canai the 2gm Division had troops on the eastem side

of the canal in the vicinity of Masnières where fighting continued for most of the night.

However, nowhere had a fm footing been established in the Masnieres-Beaurevoir Line.

Marcoing, Noyelles. and Nine Wood had been capnired by 29" Division. Holding-the left

of III Corps, 6" Division had forward pose on Remy Chape1 ndge and was in contact

with the right of TV Corps, the 5 1" Division, which was still in the front trenchposition at

Fiesquières. From there the line ran north where 6znd Division faced eastward through

Graincourt to the Bapaume-Cambrai road. Left of the 62Dd Division were the 36h and

35 BOH, 1917. Vol. 3, pp. 73-5.

finally the 56& Divisions which was making contact with the original British line at

~oursies. '~ During the evening, the znd and 5& Cavalry Divisions remained in locations in

and around Masnières and Marcoing, and when the situation in front permitteci they were

to rnove fornard and carry on with their original rasks."

The British attack on November 20" was a cornplete surprise for the Germans.

The Cambrai sector was held by troops of the German Second Army (GeneraI von der

Marwitz). From a point a mile north of the Bapaume-Cambrai road to Hamincourt, the

30th Landwehr Division (Lieutenant-General F. von Hanstein) held the line. From

Havrincourt to la Vacquerie stwd the 54" Division (Lieutenant-General F. von Watter).

Both divisions belonged to Xm Corps and were supported by three howitzer and six gun

batteries. In addition, as of Novernber 19", the 107" Division (Major-General

Havenstein) had begun arriving in Cambrai as relief for the 20th Landwehr ~ivision.~ '

German accounts speak of the feeling of heIplessness that possessed their infantry faced

with the onslaught of tanks and infantry against which they did not know how to fight. As

the morning wore on, the situation grew worse for the Gemans who were forced to

contemplate the destruction of the crossings over the canal and an extensive withdrawal.

In fact, eastward from Masnières to Crèvecoeur, a gap a mile wide, the Masnières-

Beaurevoir Line was not occupied at dl during the morning. During the afternoon, the

infantry of the 107~ Division was hurried fonvard and managed to disperse its banalions

to reinforcing positions stretching from Flesquières opposing 51R Division. to. on the left,

positions rnanning the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line (three battalions) between Masnières

36 Ibid., p. 89. 37 Piman, p. 247. Sec aiso ''Narrative of Operations - Canadian Cavairy Brigade, November 20" - 22='='." 38 BOH. 19 17, Vo1.3. pp. 47-9.

and Crèvecoeur (in front of 29& ~ i v i s i o n ) . ~ ~ Obviously, it was troops from the Geman

107~ Division that 29& Division encountered in the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line later in

the aftemoon of the 2om, and that B Squadron. Fon Garry Horse encountered noah-east

of Masnières. Other German formations and units at rest in other parts of the Gennan rear

area around Cambrai were also brought forward on the day, but none actudly came into

action on the 20? Inexplicably, according to the Geman accounts, the British

momennun began to slacken on the afternoon of the 2om, and had corne to a complete

stand still by nightfalLa

Haig visited Bpg at Iïi Army headquarters at Albert at 4:30 PM on the 2 0 ~ .

Reports now showed that the way for the cavairy advance, the creation of a gap in the

Masnières-Beaurevoir Lme, was not yet achieved, nor was it to be without considerable

fighting on the 21''. Haig approved of Byng's determination to make another push in the

moming. Accordingly, Byng 's intention was to make the Bourlon ridge his main

objective, but an effort was also to be made to secure the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line

from Marcoing to Crèvecoeur in order for the cavalry to get through. The former task was

given to IV Corps while the latter was obviously delegated to III Corps. Subsequent tasks

for both corps and the Cavalry Corps were in keeping with the original orders of

November 1 3m.41

In none of the corps was it easy to prepare for operations the next morning.

Communications were unreliable, and the darkness, min, and mud ma& movement and

coordination slow and difficult. Consequentl y, the renewed attack by III Corps could not

be launched until 11:OO AM, while the attacks in the IV Corps went in earlier but in a

39 Ibid.. pp. 98- 100. 40 Ibid.. p. 99.

piecemeal and uncoordinated fashion. Moreover, III Corp's plans were disrupted by a

German counter-attack at 10:O AM against 88" Brigade. Although the attack was beaten

off, it left 88& Brigade in no condition to take part in the combined 2gh and 20"

Divisions' assaolt at 11:O AM. Attacks and counter-attacks continued for the remainder

of the day. Throughout the day, the 20d and 5" Cavairy Divisions remained in their

positions in and around Marcoing and Masnières ready to exploit through the gap in the

Masnières-Beaurevoir Line if the infantry could create it. However, the opportunity never

came on the 2 1". In fact, from about 2:30 PM on, it was clear that the enemy had pushed

forward reinforcements into the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line and that the opportunity for

the cavairy exploitation east of Cambrai would not appear." The Gemans, in fact, during

the evening of November 2oh/21n had succeeded in pushing fonvard considerable

reinforcements. During the morning, a large portion of the German 2 14' Division had

amved from Douai, and at noon an infantry regiment and an artillery regiment had

arrived from the Gerrnan 30° Division. B y earl y evening, both these divisions were in the

line dong side the 1 0 7 ~ Division. and remnants of the 20th Landwehr Division and the

54& ~ivision!~ The Geman line was now too strong for the British to penetrate, yet the

British would continue trying for another week.

According to the Canadian Official History, from the second day onward, the

battle deteriorated into a race with Geman reinforcements, which were hunying in from

the Fourth Army in Flanders. The British anack reached its limit of success on the 23d

with the capture of Bourlon Wood. But the impetus and the opportunity for a

breakthrough were now lost. Some historians have argued that the chances for a

4 1 Ibid., p. 91. 42 ibid. pp. 101-18, and Pitman. p. 248.

breakthrough were lost by the early evening of the 20" once German reinforcements had

been deployed in h n t of III and IV Corps. and it was at this time. they argue, that the

offensive should have been cailed off? Yet III and IV Corps. revertïng to traditional

infantry-artillery methods of anack, continuai to deplete their sangth in piecemeal

anacks over the next few days. Consequently, on the 27", the Germans were able to re-

take Bourlon Wood. and on the 3om the Geman Second Amy launched a powerful

counter-attack which succeeded in driving the British III A m y back nearly three miles.

The fighting in this sector of the front died out with the onset of winter and heavy

snowstom during the first week of ~ecember."

The success won by the Ill Army on the moming of November 20" was no doubt

the fruit of a tactical formula for the attack that had finally been found. The British A m y

had now found a way of solving the problem of crossing the fm-swept zone. The formula

for success is described by Fuller: "In th is battle no preliminary artiIlery bombardment

was employed. Instead, grouped in threes, tanks operated iike a chain of mobile armoured

batteries in advance of the infantry.'& Indeed the new tactics lent support to the

achevernent of surprise against the Germans on November 20". However, the formula

for success only achieved half a result for it allowed the IiI Army on this occasion only to

break into the German defences. In other words, the surprise tank-infantry assault

supporteci by the predicted barrage and bombardment was a powerful formula for

breaking into the enemy defences. but breaking through was something else again. It was

a 'Bite and Hold' methodology. The tanks of the period lacked the speed and the mobility

43 BOH, 1917. Vol. 3, pp. 118-9. u Sec, for example. Tim Travers, How rhe War war Won. pp. 26-7 45 COH. p. 337. *6 Fuller, Decisive Bnnles, p. 368.

to achieve the breakthrough. Indeed, by the end of Z Day, most of the over 300 tanks that

had been amassed for the assault were either broken down, destmyed, or Iost. Cnl y a

cavdry force operating in cooperation with and supported by the other arms could

achieve the breakthrough. Unfortunately, at Cambrai the level of coordination required

for ths had not ken achieved. In the words of the British Official History, "the technical

efficiency, boldness and foresight which distinguished the Third Army's prepmtions for

the surprise assault by tanks and infantry upon the Hindenburg defences fomd no

counter-part in the mesures taken to exploit the success.'*'

As the Germans found by the aftemoon of the 20". the tempo of the assault had

considerably slackened, and was non-existent by nightfall- Consequently, the battle had

now become a race against time with the British struggling to exploit their success before

the Germans could bring in resemes to thwart the British drive. Let us now examine why

the tempo of the British assault could not be rnaintained tfiroughout the entire &y of the

2ofh.

The British Official History states that III Amy was obliged to stnke a balance

beiween the forces required for the initial assault; for the break-in, and those required for

the breakthrough and exploitation. FuIIer states M e r that "although this battle showed

that a m e solution of the stalemate had been discovered, lack of reserves led to tactical

f a i l ~ r e . ' ~ Besides the cavalry, the only troops in reservc were those of V Corps.

However, during the moming of the 2 0 ~ . V Corps remained in its assembly area twenty

miles to the rear due to the crowding in the forward areas with artillery, cavalry, etc.

Given, then. that the only real reserves at hand during the moming of the 20& were the

47 BOH. 1917. Vol. 3. p. 278. 48 Fuller. Decîrive BaMks, p. 368.

cavalry divisions, in particular, ln Cavdry Division under command of IV Coqs for the

capture of Bourlon Wood, and 2" and srn Cavaky Divisions following up behind III

Corps, the British Offrcial History makes the obvious point that perfiaps too much was

expected of the lead divisions of III and IV Corps. For in order for the cavdry to

breakrhrough, especially in the III Corps sector, it meant that the final objectives for the

corps had to be the captunng of the Hindenburg support system: the Masnières-

Beaurevoir Linee4'

For the attack of IV Corps against Bourlon ridge on Z Day, regardeci as the

principal objective by Haig, reliance was placed on the reserve brigades of the 5 I n and

620d Divisions that had made the initial assault. The two brigades were not brought under

a single divisional commander nor were the supporting tanks. Moreover, the ln Cavalry

Division - whose job it was to pass through 51n and 62nd Divisions, to debouch from the

Grand Ravine behind Marcoing, and then to envelop to Bourlon Wood from the north-

e d 0 - did not actually corne under command of IV Corps until6: 15 AM on November

20". In addition, it has k e n recorded that there was a remarkable lack of liaison and

coordination between 1 Cavalry Division and TV Corps in the week leading up to

November 20"? Consequentl y, little to no coordination nor liaison had taken place prior

to Z Day between 5 ln and 620d Divisions, and lSL Cavalry Division, to arrange for a

proper passage of lines, mutual support, or coordination of routes. To make matters even

worse, cornmunicahons between N Corps and 1' Cavalry Division on Z Day were

routed through Cavairy Corps headquarters. This system not only caused delay in the

49 lbid., p. 279. 50 "IV Corps instmctions, Operation GY, dateci November 14". 1917," qtd in Robert Woolcombe, The First Tank Bade: Cambrai 191 7. (London: Arthur Barka, 1967). p. 128.

105

time taken for messages to be passe& but also resulted in messages and, more

importantly, instructions to be a l t e d The saiient case in point concerns the order issued

by IV Corps to la Cavairy Division through Cavalry Corps at 1 1: 15 AM for lR Cavalry

Division to advance via Ribécourt dong the Grand Ravine, pass through 51" Division

and carry out its assigned task of enveloping Bourlon Wood However, Cavalry Corps

saw fit to change the or&r and ordercd the lSt Cavalry Division to advance through

Fiesquières; a cunous action given that lR Cavalry Division was shiL under command of

N ~ o r ~ s . ~ ' Flesquières, of course, was not in friendly hands and was still k i n g fought

for by 51" Division. Consequently, the 1" Cavalry Division failed to pass through the

lead divisions of N Corps during the aftemoon of the 20% Therefore, it was primaxily

due to a Iack of staff and al1 arms coordination, exacerbated by poor communications,

that the assaults on Bourlon ndge during the afternoon failed despite the relatively weak

and non-reinforceci condition of the e n e ~ n ~ . ~ ~

In the IiI Corps sector, the Canal de l'Escaut backed by the Masnières-Beaurevoir

Line formed a considerable obstacle to the advance of IïI Corps and the subsequent

breakthrough by the cavalry. III Army and III Corps relied on the swift advance by the

tanks to capture the crossings at Masnières and Marcoing intact. However, the resistance

offered by the Gemans in this sector, even before reinforceci by elernents of the 1 0 7 ~

Division in the afternoon, was such that when III Corps committed the 2g0 Division to

battle in the early aftemoon of the 2om. it could not fully secure the crossings over the

canal nor mare the gap in the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line required for the cavalry

51 bid., p. 127. Robert Woo\comb+ notes this lack h m the war diary of la Cavalry Division and =marks that ody one meeting took place betwecn the GOC N Corps and Major-General R L Muiicns (GOC 1 * Cavalry Division) on November 1 3b. S2 Woolcombe, pp. 129-30.

breakthrough. Yet the 29" Division might have had the chance to do so had its al1 amis

coordination k e n better. The headquarters of the 2gh Division had remained near

Gouzencourt, nearly six miles in the rear, too far way to maintain command and control

of subsequent operations given the communications problems that were experienced in

the a f te~noon~~. Moreover, most of the tanks in the vicinity of the canal, and much of the

infantry. were not under 2gm Divison command, while the division's allotmenr of

artillery, as describeci, was unable to provide the requisite support needed to achieve its

obje~ t ives .~~

The actions of B Squadron, the Fort Garry Horse on the day are iIlustrative of the

fact that the opportunity for a breakthrough indeed existed during the morning and early

aftemoon of November 20m and that the cavairy's role in conducting the breakthrough

was viable. However, the tempo of the initially successful III A m y attack could not be

maintained primarily. as at the Somme on July 14", 1916, k a u s e of a general lack of

staff planning at Arrny, Corps, and Divisional levels, and because of a lack of al1 m s

coordination beyond that established for the initial assault; but not because the cavalry, in

and of itself, could not carry out this role as has often been deduced to be the case? n i e

lack of staff and d l arms coordination was hampered by poor collll~lunicahons especially

as the &y wore on and the Signal Service was forced to temporarily lay more and more

n Ibid.. p. 279-8 1. 54 Along the routes uscd by the foiiow-up divisions, the tanks. and the cavalry, signalers on the morning of the 2om had hastily laid line to k c q in wmmunications with the lead formations in the assautt. Whcre the l i n s crosscd the routes. the signalers had elevated the cablcs with poles, which evidentiy were not hi& enough to clcar supply tanks or tanks loaded with fascines. Consequently. the tanlo; severcd the lines at thse junctions. Moreover, poor coordination on the part of the Signal Service with the cavalry and the tanks I d to the mountcd arms not using the appointcd crossing points and sevcring the lincs in many locations during the aftcrnoon of November 2 9 and the evening of November 20~/21'. See Pridcy. pp. 233-8. 55 ibid., p. 283. 56 See, for example. Johnson, p. 204, and Winttr, pp. 1 16-7.

surface Iine, which was prone to damage by the advancing infantry and tanks. Byng's

failure to have V Corps closer to III and IV Corps. ready to exploit the success of the

Ieading corps, or at least to reinforce the leading corps, contributed greatly to the inability

of the leading corps in sustaining their momentum and in attaining their objectives.

Moreover, reliance on the uncoordinated and poorly supportai efforts of the already

depleted reserve brigades of the 5 1" and 620d Divisions, in concert with ln Cavalry

Division, to capture Boulon ridge, and the badly coordinated efforts of 29" Division to

capture and secure the crossings over the Canai de l'Escaut, was overly ambitious.

Cleariy, Byng had underestimated the weight of effort required to achieve the break-in

and, subsequently, to sustain a breakthrough. Consequenùy, tempo was lost during the

aftemoon of the 2 0 ~ despite the oppominity for a breakthrough that persisted for most of

the &y.

The cavahy of the 2nd and 5& Cavalry Divisions, given their own efforts to stay in

contact with the advancing infantry, were ready and able to breakthrough a gap in the

Masnières-Beaurevoir Line if one had been created. In theory, it is fair to say that the

cavalry could have achieved a breakthrough during the morning if only the above

conditions had been more suitably met. However, the question as to how long the cavalry

could have sustained a breakthrough, and how far it could have advanced into the

Gennan rear area is another question the answer to which would be speculative and

outside the scope of this thesis. Onfortunately, the cavalry was afforded no other

opportunities of this magnitude during the remainder of the Cambrai offensive and would

have to wait until the next August when, at Amiens, the mounted m m would be mated

with a laîer version of the tank and would corne closer to achieving its fmt breakthrough

on the Western Front.

CHAP'rERFnTE

AMIENS: AUGUST 8& - 9". 1918

When once the oHensive has been assurneri, ït mKFt be sustrrined to the las& exaemity.

Napoleon 1: M&s of War, 1831

As discussed in Chapter Two. commencing on March 21*, 1918 Ludendorff launched

a series of offensives on the Western Front designed to &al, once and for dl , a decisive blow

against the Western allies. Indeed, the situation became so critical for the Allies during the

ensuing week that at a hastily convened meeting on March 26h between French and British

political and military leaders, General Foch was given command of al1 Allied forces in order

to achieve unity of command in the way the Allies could continue to hold back the German

onslaught. Eventudly, German logistical problem as well as Allied resistance eventually

halted the German drive just in front of Amiens. With the offensive against the Bntish

effectively blunted, Ludendorff launched a second offensive further south against the French

on May 27. With the aid of some newly arrived Amencan divisions, Foch's French annies

dong the Marne were able to stem the German advance and by mid-July the Gerrnan

campaigns in both sectors, having exhausted their reserves of men and material, had ail but

petered out. By mid-July, the German offensives on the Western Front had been stopped.

On July 24", Foch confemed with the Allied Cornmanders-in-Chief, including Haig,

at Melun, twenty-five miles south-east of Paris. For the first time since March, with the

recent addition of new American divisions to the overall Allied order of battle, and given the

depleted condition of the German forces, the Allies enjoyed an overall superiority in the

West. The moment. therefore, had corne to assume the initiative in the West by ret-ng to

the offensive. Accordingly, Foch proposeci three limited offensives to free essential

communications, to be foiiowed by two more to liberate the northern coal-mining area and

clear the Germans from the vicinity of Calais and ~unkirk.' Foch further added that should

these offensives achieve their intended aims by not too late in the year, the Allies could then

"look forward to an offensive to be launched at the end of the summer or during the a u m

of such importance as will increase our advantages and leave no respite for the enemy."'

The fmt of the planned offensives was a continuation of the limited attacks taking

place and was aimed at pushing the enemy farther back from the Paris-Toul-Avricourt

railway. The second offensive, originaily scheduled for August 1 0 ~ but later changed to the

8". was to be launched by the British from the Amiens area and was aimed at removing the

threat posed by the German sdient fonned in the Montdidier-Moreuil area to the Paris-

i

2 COH, p. 386. ''Memorandurn by Gcneral Foch read at the Conference hcld by the Commander-in-Chicf of the AIlied

Armies. 24' . July. 1918." rc-produced as Appendu XX to BOH. 1918. Vol. 3.

I l l

Amiens r a i l ~ a ~ . ~ The choice of Amiens was vital given the importance of the rail

marshalling yards in Amiens to this sector of the Allied front and to the French economy in

this region.' The third offensive, to be launched by the French and Amencans in the St.

Mihiel salient, was aimed at freeing the eastem portion of the Paris-Avncourt railway. Foch

was adamant that three offensives, plus the two in the north to be conducted by the Belgians

should follow each other closeiy so as to ovenvhelm the Gerrnans and disorganize their use

On July 28" Foch issued his formal orders to Haig for the Amiens operation. The

offensive, which was to be "pushed as far as possible in the direction of ~ o ~ e , ' " was to be

carried out by the British IV Army, still under Rawlinson, and the French 1 A m y (General

Debeney), which was piaced under Haig's command on the same &y. Accordingly, Haig

issued his formal orders on the 29". In his orden to Rawlinson and Debeney, Haig made it

clear that the object of the upcoming offensive was to disengage Amiens and the Paris-

Amiens railway.' Futhermore, he stated that the Line Méricourt-Harbonnières-Caix-Quesnel-

Hangest would be seized as quickly as possible and organized for defence. Once this line had

been consolidated, British N Army was to, "keeping their left flank on the Somme, . . .p ress

the enemy in the direction of Chaulnes," while at the same time, the French 1 A m y was to

press the enemy in the direction of ~ o ~ e . * In order to enable IV Army (which already

consisted of the Australian Corps &eutenant-General Sir John Monash] and III Corps

meutenant-General Sir R.H.K. Butler]) to achieve his objectives, Haig allotted the Canadian

3 CO& p. 386. 4 Brown. p. 197. 5 COH. p. 386, and BOH, 1918. Vol. 4. pp. 2-4. 6 BOX 1918, Vol. 4. p. 3. 7 'G.H.Q. Opcration Orda of the 2gm Juiy. 1918, OAD 900/3." reproduced as Appendix II to BOH. 1918. Vol. 4, pp. 524-5.

Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir A.W. Curie) consisting of four divisions, the 1" Ausrralan

Division (then re-grouped under Bntish comrnand elsewhere on the front), and the Cavairy

Corps (Kavanagh) consisting of the l", 20d, and 3" Cavairy Divisions. Finally, Haig was

adilmant that, just as at Cambrai, of fmt importance secrecy should be observed and that the

operation would be carried out as a surprise.g

On July 31n. Rawlinson issued his orden in which he directed that the III. Canadian,

Australian, and Cavalry Corps would carry out the attack. Also allotted to IV Anny were five

tank brigades from the Tank Corps, which Rawlinson disperseci to under command each of

his corps includirig the 3d Tank Brigade to the Cavalry Corps. The 9& Tank Brigade was held

in general Army reserve.1° Rawlinson's scheme of atrack built upon the lessons of Cambrai.

Besides the utilization of surprise as a fundamental operating principle, Rawlinson had as

early as July 17" submitted his concept of operations to Haig for approval. In it, Rawlinson

aimed to avoid the situation as had o c c u d at Cambrai in which the divisions detailed to

capture the first objectives were also involved in the capture of the second and subsequent

objectives as had been the case in, for example, the IV Corps sector. B y the end of the day on

November 20', 19 17, the troops who had conducted the initial assault were exhausted,

depleted, and disorganized. Therefore, Rawlinson aimed to avoid this situation by a concept

of operations, which saw a leapfrogging of h s h brigades ont0 successive objectives thereby

retaining the tempo of the advance. As well, Rawiinson envisioned the extensive use of tanks

(twelve battalions consisting of 552 tanks) in capturing al1 the tactical objectives. In essence,

with the exception discussed above, the battle tactics were those of Cambrai. At one hour

8 lbid., p. 524. 9 ïbid.. p. 524.

before Zero Hour (set at 4:20 AM) the tanks were to move forward to the start line under an

aircraft noise barrage whence they were to lead the infantry forward under a creeping barrage

deiivered by one-third of the IV Amy's guns. The other two-thirds were to conduct counter-

bombardment missions against the enemy artillery, but without any preliminary

registration. ' Rawiinson's scheme also included an extensive role for the cavalry. At a conference

at N Amy headquarten on August 5'. Rawlinson spelled out his objectives. The first

objective was to disengage Amiens and the Paris-Amiens railway by seizing the German

defensive line Hangest-Harbonières, otherwise hown as the Outer Amiens Defence Line.

The second objective was to push forward in the direction of the Royes-Chaulnes line "with

the least possible delay." To achieve the latter meant creating a gap in the first objective,

passing through the cavahy, and exploiting as far as the Royes-Chaulnes line. In fact, the

achievement of a breakthro~gh.'~ Rawlinson M e r directed that:

The cavalry must be ready to take advantage of any opening [gap] which may occur and to pass anywhere between the AMIENS-ROYE road and the River SOMME. For this purpose it is necessary that a body of Cavahy should be placed under the command not only of the Canadian Corps but of the Australian Corps as well. Cavairy patrols are to keep in touch with the progress of the Lnfantry and no opportunity allowed to slip of passing the Cavalry through. If Cav* are pIaced under the orders of Corps Commanders in the fmt place, these Corps Commanders will have an interest in seeing that the Cavalry is given every opportunity of pushing through. There must be no fixed points of passage, but a complete readiness dong the whole front of the

10 "Fourth Army Operation Order of 3 l* Iuly 19 18," re-produccd as Appendix Di to BOH, 19 18, Vol. 4, p. 532.

I l Prior and Wilson, p. 303-6. See a h C.E.W. Btan, mial Hisrory of Aumalia in the War of 1914-18, $PM. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson. 1942). pp. 490-3. and Fuiier, Decirive Banles, p. 375..

'?2ecord of a conferencc held at 10 am. August sh. 1918 at Fourth Army Headquarters." NAC. RG 9. III, D-2. Vol. 4798. File 106.

British attack South of the SOMME to seize any opportunity that presents itseif.13

Fuller is credited with suggesting to Rawlinson that, should the Germans manage to

withdraw some of their guns and infantry before the attacking forces could get forward to

capture or neutralize them, the cavairy must have more firepower in order to be able to pass

through the gap and exploit. Thus, Fuller proposed that the new light tank (the Whippet) be

used in conjunction with the cavairy to speed and protect the advance to the line Roye-

Chaulnes; the second objective." Rawlinson agreed and on August 4" at Cavalry Corps

headquarten explained his plans for the cavalry. The 3d Cavalry Division (Major-Generai

A.E.W. Harman) was to be placed under command of the Canadian Corps and wodd have a

battalion of Whippets attached. M e n 3d Cavahy Division had passed through the Canadian

Corps, once the latter had captured its objectives on the German defensive line Hangest-

Harbonières, it was to revert to under the command of the Cavalry Corps for the subsequent

breakthrough and exploitation toward the line Roye-Chaulnes with the idea of cutiing the

enemy's communications and easing the situation in front of the French in the south. The

same held true for 1'' Cavalry Division (Major-General R.L. Mullens) also alloned a

battalion of Whippets, which was placed under command of the Australian Corps. The 2°4

Cavalry Division (Major-General T.T. Pitman) remained under command of the Cavairy

Corps and would act as the Cavalry Corps reserve.I5

In preparation for the offensive and yet giving the impression to the Germans that

French forces were being re-deplo yed elsew here on the front, at the beginning of August the

13 ibid. This direction was also repeated the next &y on August 6" with the promulgation of a supplementary N Army Operation Order that is rc-pduced as Appcndix M. to BOH, 1918. Vol. 4, pp. 574-5. 16 Pnor and Wilson, p. 307. 15 Anglesey, Vol. 8. pp. 228-9, and Licutcnant-Colonel T. Preston, 'The Cavahy in France, August- November, 1918, Part 1," The Cavalry Journal, Vol. XXlV (January to October 1934). pp. 171-3.

IV Army's boundary with the French 1 Army was moved 7000 yards south to the Amiens-

Roye road. The change in boundary was accomplished during the first week of August

without the deployment of any new formations into the line. To the Germans, this apparent

stretching of the Allied front indicated a weakening of the Allied line and, therefore, aided in

the achievement of surprise on August 8". In reaiity, the Australians were screening the

movements of the Canadian and Cavairy Corps in the rear, plus the necessary logistic and

artillery concentrations. The relief in place of the southern portion of the Australian sector to

ch th the Canadians occumd during the evening of August 6 -7 . Thus, the order of battle on the

th th evening of August 7 -8 was from right to left, two French corps between the Avre River

and the Amiens-Roye road, the Canadian Corps between the road and the Amiens-Chaulnes

railway, the Australian Corps between the railway and the Somme, and the DI Corps between

the Somme and the hcre.16

For ease of control and reference, the Outer Amiens Defence Line was now

nicknamed the Blue Dotted Line, with intermediate objectives between it and the start line

designated as, from West to east, the Green and Red Lines, to be used as control features for

the fonvard leapfrogging of assauit brigades and divisions."

To the Canadian and Australian Corps the burden of the main blow for IV A m y feI1.

Currie's plan was to capture the Red Line with, from right to left, his 2nd, l", and 3d

Canadian Divisions. Once the Red Line was capture& the plan was to pass through the 3d

Cavalry Division to the Blue Line. The 4& Canadian Division, passing from Corps reserve

and following up behind 3d Canadian Division on the right, would also pass through the Red

16 COH. pp. 389-91.

17 COH. p. 395.

Line and would follow up the cavalry and assist them in the capture of the Blue Line if the

need should arise. Finally, in order to protect the nghr Bank of the cavalry, and also to keep

in touch with the French south of the Amiens-Roye road, Currie created the "Canadian

Independent Force" - composed of the lR and 2nd Motor Machine Gun Brigades, some Lewis

gun detachments, and some trench mortars rnounted on trucks - which was commandcd by

Brigadier-General Brutinel. It was to secure the Amiens-Roye road between the Red and

Blue Lmes.18 It should be noted here that C h e and Brutinel intended to use the Independent

Force as a highly mobile formation capable of seking and holding key terrain in advance of

the infanq, or as a means of dominating key terrain with firepower until the infantry codd

take it. Although, as Shane Schreiber points out, these Canadian expenments put the

Canadian Corps on the leading edge of developing doctrine for what would later be cailed

mechanized warfare, they were relatively primitive in their application.19 Like the tanks of

the &y, mechanized solutions to the problem of overcoming the riddle of the trenches were

solely aimed at supporting the infanûy in breaking into the enemy trench lines. Experirnents

like the Independent Force, despite the vision of Fuller's Plan 1919, were not seen as an

alternative to cavairy in its d e as the ann of exploitation.

The plan of attack for the Austraiians saw Monash leading with right to left,

the lad and 3rd Australian Divisions, which would capnue the Green line, The plan was then

for the 4" and 5" Austraiian Divisions to pass through and capture the Red and Blue Lines

and to support the exploitation by the ln Cavalry Division through the Blue Line toward the

18 COH. pp. 396-8. and Lieutenant-General Sir kW. Currie, Cimadian Corps Operarions D u ~ g the Year 1918, (Ottawa: Department of Miiitia and Defence, 19 19). pp. 34-7. Sec also '2.C. Instructions," NAC, RG 9, III. D2, Vol. 4789, File 7. L.C. stood for Llandovery Cade aftcr a Canadian Hospital Ship that had rectntly becn sunk by a German U-Boat. 19 Schrtiber, p. 36.

Royes-Chaulnes Line. The 1'' Austraüan Division would remain in Corps reserve for the

offen~ive.'~

The ground over which the battle was fought to the east of Amiens and to the

south of the Somme was, as at Cambrai, well suited to tanks and cavalry. The soi1 was hard

and there was relative1 y little damage from shell craters and entrenchments. In addition,

except for the Luce River running across the Canadian axis of advance, there were few

naturd obstacles to mobility. Also, the generai lie of the land favoured a surprise attack with

many covered approaches to the British l ine~ .~ '

The three divisions of the Cavalry Corps - with their attached Whippet tank battalions

- that had been bivouacked in the Somme valley between Rixecourt and Amiens began their

th th approach marches to their assembly areas during the evening of August 6 /7 and had

th th arrived in Iocation just West of Amiens by the morning. During the evening of the 7 /8 , they

moved forward again through the town of Amiens to their forward assembly areas in the rear

of the Canadian and Austraiian Corps in the fork between the Amiens-Roye and Viilers-

Bretonncux roads. In addition, during the evening of the 7h/8", special cavairy tracks were

constmcted by the Cavalry Corps engineers assisted by an American engineer battalion

leading from the forward assembly areas to the front line so that the cavalry would not

interfere with the fonvard movement of guns and infantry reserves the next day."

The front on which the British IV Army was going to attack coincided almost exactiy

with that of the German Second Army (General von der Marwitz), which formed the left

wing of Crown Pnnce Rupprecht's Group of Amies. The Second Army consisted of ten

m BOH, 1918, Vol. 4. p. 61. 21 Anglesey, Vol. 8. p. 223. 22 Ibid., p. 227, and Preston. pp. 172-3.

divisions in the front line and four in reserve. In addition, Second Army's boundary with the

Ge- Eighteenth A m y (General ~utie?) on the left ran northeastward across the

Amiens-Roye road thereby putting an additional two reserve divisions in the vicinity of the

Allied objectives. On a recent inspection of Second Army's front, Ludendorff had noted that

although the defences were satisfactory, they had fdlen behind those of Eighteenth h m y in

the construction of field works. However, the defences were organized in depth, as was the

Geman n o m for this period in the war, and artillery was plentiful.24

The taking over of a wider portion of the front by the Australians was observed by the

Gemans, but as the whole of the British IV A m y was widened by this re-deployment, the

deduction was made that an imminent offensive was unlikely and that the British were

holding fiesh divisions in resewe for a renewed offensive in Flanders. Because the Royal

Fiying Corps had been successful in àriving away German attempts at aerial observation into

the British rear areas, the Germans were able to detect only one indication of an irnpending

Allied offensive; noise caused by the transport of suppiies and munitions, and the

unconfmed reports of tank noises. However, no rneasures for defence against tanks were

ordered throughout Second A m ~ y during the first week of ~ u ~ u s t . ~ Of interest is the

"Summary of Information" submitted to Rupprrcht on August 6" reporting that "about a

hundred tanks observed on the road Ailly-Morisel [Moreuil]," and again nothing was done;

23 Interestingly enough this is the same General Hutier ('Vie apostle of the surprise attack") whose army, during the Ludendorff offensive in March 1918, advancal without check and succeeded in crushing the British V Army taking 50,000 prisoners and driving a wedge betwecn the British and French forces. See English, p. 22 and Dr. Laszlo M. Alfoldi. "The Hutier Legend," Parameters, 5 (1976).

24

25 COR pp. 394-5. BOH, 1918. Vol. 4, p. 37.

not even a request from Second Amy, as one German staff officer later commenteci, to "keep

a sharp look-out." 26 Consequentiy, surprise was complete on August 8h for the Allies.

th th The evening of August 7 /8 was moonless and fine but at 3:00 AM a ground mist

began to nse that grew to impede visibility by Zero Hour at 4:20 AM. Exactly at 4:20 AM

approximately 2000 guns opened up. The front German lines and most of their artiIlery were

neutralized. The creeping barrage fell200 yards ahead of the advancing infantry and tanks of

the III, Australian, and Canadian Corps and moved forward at a rate of 100 yards every three

minutes. South of the Somme, especidly in the Australian and Canadian sectors, the surprise

was complete. The advance was led forward by a line of skinnishers intended to work as

'beaters' pointing our hostile points to the following tanks and infantry. Following the

skirmishers at 250 yards came the first wave of tanks, followed by infantry columns rapidy

crossed the 500 yards of No Man's Land and the fmt line of enemy resistance was

immediatel y overcome."

Ta the south of the Austraiians and Canadians, the French IX and XXXI Corps

advancing between the Avre and the Amiens-Roye road were late in starting but the

Germans, nonetheless, were surprised by this extension of the battlefront By 9:30 AM,

Moreuil was occupied. Then, after a t h e and one haif-hour preliminary bombardrnent, the

French infantry, with very little tank suppon, conunenced their second advance of the day.

By 9:ûû PM, the French corps had taken Mézières and Fresnoy, but had yet to take le

~uesne l .28

26 Ibid., p. 37. 27 AOH, Vol. VI, pp. 529-30. 28 Fuller, Decisive Banles, p. 377.

To the north of the Australians and Canadians, the British III Corps advance was met

in the early moming hours by a gas attack that forced the advancing infantry to move forward

in their respirators thereby slowing down the advance. Yet, despite heavy casualties, by 7:4û

AM ID Corps had managed to secure their initial objectives in most places. However,

attempts to advance from then on met increasingly stiff resistance from the Geman

defenders with the consequence that the left flank of the Ausuaiian advance was to sufier

from enfilade fire originating from the area of Chipilly on the north bank of the ~ o m m e . ' ~

Moreover, the III Corps attempts to advance were aiso hampered by the significantly more

difficult terrain over which it was ts figk and the fact that it only had one tank battalion in

support, the preponderance of tanks having been dlotted to the Ausudians and Canadians.

The terrain between the Ancre and the Somme was indented with numerous ravines that only

served to strengthen the enemy's ability to defend in this se~tor .~ ' Compounding the situation

for III Corps was the fact that al1 the divisions of the corps had k e n either in the line or in

close reserve for almost a year, and dl had been depleted considerably during the retreats in

March/Apnl. Thus, there was not only a shortage of experienced officers and NCOs, but the

ranks of the infantry had k e n filled up with just newl y arrived r e c ~ u i t s . ~ ~ However, the

British Official History clearly attributes the failure of III Corps to take its subsequent

objectives to the successful attack by 5" Australian Division conducted in the now III Corps

sector on July 2gh just before the division was re-deployed further south. In retaliation, the

Germans counter-attacked on August 6". which not only upset the III Corps preparation for

29 ibid., p. 377. M BOH. 19 18, Vol. 4, p. 74. 3 1 Ibid., pp. 74-9.

the 8&, but aiso reinforced the German positions and preparaùons in front of III Corps and

thereby prevented surprise from being achieved in the III Corps ~ e c t o r . ~ ~

In contrast, surprise was definitely achieved on the Austraiian Corps battlefront to the

south of the Somme. By 6:20 AM the 2nd and 3d Australian Divisions had captureà the

whole of the Green Line in their sector. A halt was then made to allow the 4& and 5&

Ausrraiian Divisions to pass through and continue the corps advance ont0 the Red and Blue

Lines as planned. The 4" and 5& Divisions took the lead at 8:20 AM and were supported by

the 1% CavaLry Brigade (Brigadier-General H.S. Sewell) and sixteen Whippet tanks for the

capture of the Blue Line. By 9:15 AM the Red Line had been capnired by the 5'b Australian

Division on the right, but on the left the 4& Ausnalian Division was delayed by the Gennan

positions and batteries north of the Somme in the area of Chipilly as described, and did not

finally succeed in taking their portion of the Green Line until 10:30 AM. With the 4"

Austraiian Division held up, Monash, nonetheless, ordered the 5" Austraiian Division to

press on to the Blue Line. which they reached by 11:30

The 4& Austraiian Division, however, had a much more difficult time getting to the

Blue line because of the problems on their left flank. The advance to the Blue Line was to be

canied out by two picked battaiions; the 48" and 16", each to be led by nine Mark V tanks.

The Blue Line laid only half a mile away but even before the 48& could begin its advance,

three of their supporting tanks were destroyed by direct frre h m north of the Somme.

However, the Australians persevered and, except for some positions on the exbreme left

flank, succeeded in capturing its objectives on the Blue Line by 12: 10 PM. Thus, by 1 :ûû PM

on the 8", the Australian Corps had reached ail the objectives assigneci it except on the

extreme left flank due to the enemy fire from north of the Somme, and on the extrerne right

flank where the Canadian Corps had not yet reached its final objectives on its left flank."

In support of the Australian Corps, Major-General MuLlens' plan for la Cavairy

Division was to press fonuard with two brigades. the 9& and the ln, advancing behind the

lead infantry divisions. In line with Monash's plan, once the Red Line had been secured, the

cavairy were to push on as quickly as possible to the Blue Line and hold it until the infantry

had moved up to relieve them and ailow them to exploit toward the Royes-Chaulnes Line in

accordance with the ZV Army concept of operations. Once the 5th Australian Division

secured the Red Line at 9: 15 AM, 1 Cavairy Brigade (with the 17" Amoured Car Battalion

attached) passed through and broke into the rear of the German positions beyond the Red

Line. For the next h o u the cavalry and the annoured cars were able to weak havoc in the

local Gennan rear area in and around Hahnnières, destroying transport columns, disrupting

the rearward flow of stragglers, and destroying ammunition and supply dumps. At 10:OO AM

the leading squadron of the 5" Dragoon Guards bypassed Harbonnières and raced for the

Blue Line, which it found unoccupied. Joined by other squodrons, the regiment held the fine

until relieved by the i n f anq of the 5& Australian Division comrnencing at 11:30 AM. The 9"

Cavalry Brigade reached the Blue Line at around this time as well but to the south in the

region of the Amiens-Chaulnes r a i l ~ a ~ . ~ '

At 12: 15 PM Mullens conferred with Sewell, who reported that his brigade was

f i d y established on the Blue Line and k ing relieved by the infantry. Sewell also reporteci

that patrols from the 5" Dragwn Guards had advanced past the Blue Line to as far as

33 BOH. 1918, Vol. 4, pp. 61-71. Y ibid., pp. 72-3. and AOH, Vol VI, pp. 587-94. 35 BOH, 1918, Vol. 4. pp. 68-70, and AOH. Vol. VI. pp. 575-83.

123

Vauvillers where they had encountered strong resistance. At 1230 PM, Rawlinson, having

received the news that the cavalry was on the Blue Line in both the Australian and Canadian

sectors, informed the Cavalry Corps that its formations were not to stop on the Blue Line but

were to push on toward the Chauhes-Roye Line in accordance with the IV Army plan.

C a v w Corps headquarters passed these instructions on to ln and 3d Cavalry Divisions. but

the message was not received at ln Cavalry Division until4: 15 PM owing to the rapid

advance of the divisional heariquarîers and the difficulties in maintaining communications

despite the use of wireless. Meanwhile, Mullens in the aftemoon decided to use the 2nd

Cavdry Brigade and ordered it to advance southwards to Caix where it was to turn east, cross

the Blue Line, and push patrols towards Vrély and Rosières. These patrols, as well as pamls

from 9" Cavairy Brigade, met resistance in this region at around 2100 PM and reported that

both villages were strongly held. At this point, Mullens ordered the ln Cavalry Brigade back

into reserve and, once relieved by the infantry, the 2nd and nd9" Cavalry Brigades were aiso

ordered to retire at 7:30 PM?

As described by the early afiernwn of the 8", the Ausealian Corps had reached al1

the objectives assigned it except on the exrreme left flank due to the enerny fire from north of

the Somme, and on the extreme nght flank where the Canadian Corps had not yet reached its

final objectives on its left flank. Aiso, as described, by this time the lead cavalry foxmations

and regiments of ln Cavalry Division had pushed forwarà patrols with a view to fully

achieving a breakthrough on the Blue Line (the Outer Amiens Defence Line) and continuing

the exploitation toward the line Chaulnes-Roye as per the IV A m y plan, and as Rawlinson

36 Lieutenant-Colonel T. Prtstoa 'The Cavalry in France, August-Novcmbcr, 191 8. Part II," The Cavalry J o u m l , Vol. XMN (January to October 1934). pp. 345-6, and ''Nanative of Opcrations, Cavalry Corps. August gd - lzO, 19 18.' NAC. RG 9. III. C2. Vol. 3999, Cavalry Corps File.

had so ordered again during the aftemwn. Why, then, was the forward momentum stalled at

this point? It is m e that the Gemans were still putting up some resistance at points such as

Vauvillers, Vrély, and Rosières. Although this resistance was enough to block the

unsupported advance of the cavalry, every indication was that the infantry supported b y tanks

could easily have eliminated these pockets of resistance. Indeed, Monash had his

uncommitted reserve, 1 '' Ausaalian Division, in the region of the old fmnt line while his znd

and 3d Divisions were resting at the Green Line and had been told by Mon& that they

wodd not be required until5:OO the next moming." As the Ausnalian Official History points

out, once Monash had captured the Blue Line, he then became preoccupied with two

determinations - to consoiidate the position taken, and to safeguard his left ffank from

possible conter-attack from north of the ~ornme.'* In essence, Monash had stop*

Therefore, "any notion of occupying the ground ahead of the Australian infantry [the Blue

Line] while it was almost vacant the records contain no Thus, the Cavalry Corps

could not rely on a great deal of assistance ffom the Australian Corps to carry out the next

phase of the IV A m y plan: the breakthrough and exploitation toward the line Chaulnes-

Roye,

Indeed, for the remainder of the afkernoon of the 8&, except for some small actions on

the extreme left flank of 4& AustraIian Division, the Australian Corps concentratecl on

consolidating their gains "in almost unbroken quiet on the whole Australian front.. . [while]

most of the Australian front-line posts dug, slept, or discussed the marvels of the day.'& In

fact, in the early aftemmn, patrols and Royal Flying Corps reports noted that the German

37

38 AOH. Vol. VI. pp. 599-601. Ibid.. p. 601.

39 Ibid., p. 601.

activity in front of the Ausaalian Line was iight with little movement. Moreover, a patrol of

armoured cars had advanced eastward down the Roman road past the Blue Line toward

Rainecourt, operating in enemy tenitory for a couple of hours. and reported very linle enemy

However, by the late afiernoon, the situation had changed in that at 420 PM

considerable forces of infantry were reporteci mshing up to the front dong the roads through

Rouvroy, Vrély, and Rosières. As the Australian Official History points out:

Thus. if Monash, when at 1 1 :30 he head of the penenation of the armourul cars, had thought of continuing the advance on a divisional front astride of the Roman road, he must have known by 6 o'clock that within three hours of its appearance the opportunity had vanished. No order that he couid have given on hearing of it could have reached the troops in time. The villages could have k e n captured only by instant action of the commanders on the spot, possibly without previous reference even to divisional headquarters.. ..It is doubtful if the granting of such freedom to subordinates was ever conternplated by Rawlinson or Monash in devising or carrying out this day' s plan.42

Indeai, this excerpt bnngs out several points to do with tempo. The opportunity for achieving

a breakthrough on the Australian front presented itself in the early hours of the aftemoon of

the 8&. However, it is clear from the evidence that Monash was not focussed on doing his

part in supporting the achievernent of the N Army second objective: the breakthrough and

exploitation to the line Royes-Chaulnes. His sense of tempo was applied to the achievement

of his corps' objectives only, a trait also shared with his subordinate commanders. As the

excerpt also indicates, even if Monash's subordinates had desired to take the initiative and

help the cavalry. they lacked the klegated authonty to do so. Once he had captured his

immediate objectives on the Blue Line, Monash demonstrated no desire to support the

4Q Ibid., p. 602. 4 1 Ibid., p. 603. Sec also Anglesey. Vol. 8, p. 244. 42 AOH, Vol. VI, p. 604.

actions of the Cavah-y Corps fonvard. His leaving the la Australian Division on the old front

line, and the znd and 3" Australian Divisions on the Green Line, are evidence of this. B y the

same token, the evidence also indicates that Mdlens did not seek assistance from Monash

while the C ~ V - patrols were encountering resistance in the afternoon. Rather, because the

cavahy could not get by this resistance on its own, the direction was given by Mullens, and

later backed up by Kavanagh. to withdraw the cavalry in the late aftemoon of the 8!"

Finally, as indicated. communications were also a problem at this point in the batde meaning

that even if Monash had directed the forward movement of some of his formations, the

direction to do so would not have ariived in time to the lower formations and uni& in time to

take advantage of the opportunity; another reason for delegating authority to subordinate

cornmanciers." Thus, on the Australian front the opportwiity for a breakthrough appeared in

the early hours of the aftemoon of August 8m, but because of a limited sense of tempo on the

part of Monash and his chain of command, poor communications, Iack of a detentraiîzed

command philosophy, and, finally, poor staff and dl-arms coordination between the cavalry

and the infantry once the operation had to be continued past the Blue Line, advantage could

not be taken.

Surprise was also achieved on the Canadian Corps battlefront to the south of the

Amiens-Chaulnes railway and north of the Amiens-Roye road. Swn after Zero Hour the

leading brigades of the 3", lSt, and 2"6 Canadian Divisions occupied the Green Line at 7:45

43 "Warraave of Operations, Cavalry Corps," 44 The provision of signal support betwœn formations in the assault during the rnoming and aftexnoon of the 8' rernaiocd a saious challenge thmughout the &y and throughout the evcning of August 8%'. While al1 formations down to and including brigade lcvel now possessed wircitss systems, these systcms wtr t stdi relatively unrcliablt at the k t of times and, consequcntly, rcliance on line, runners, and visual signalling bccame the nom once hcadquartcrs and units wce on the move aftcr ZcmHour. Constqucntiy, delays in the trammission of messages were uaavoidable, as was the case for cxample betwcen Cavairy Corps and 1* Cavairy Division during the aftcrnoon. Sœ Priedey, pp. 304-3 1.

AM and the Red Line between 10:ûû and 11:OO AM. Upon consolidation on the Red Line,

the 4" Canadian Division passed through the 3d Canadian Division at 12:40 PM. Preceding

the division was the cavaky of the 3* Cavairy Division supported by two companies of

Whippet tankd5 Led by the Canadian Cavalry Brigade (Brigadier-General R. W. Paterson)

and followed by the 7" Cavairy Brigade (Brigadier-General A. Bm), the 3* Cavalry

Division had crossed the Luce at Iquancourt and had passed rhrough the 3" Canadian

Division on the Red Line at 1025 AM? The 7' and Canadian Cavalry Brigades commenced

their advance to the Blue Line at approximately 11:ûû AM. The Canadian Cavairy Brigade

rode forward with the Lord Strathcona's Horse on the right, the Royal Canadian Dragoons on

the left, and the Fort Garry Horse in reserve. The Strathcona's reached the Amiens-Roye road

on the ri@ whefe they met up with the Independent Force. They then pushed on over the

road to Fresnoy-en-Chaussée where they captured 125 p~soners.47 On the left. the Royal

Canadian Dragoons supported by eight Whippets were held up north-west of Beaucourt

village and Wood. Eventually, the Dragoons captured Beaucourt village but found it

impossible to advance east of it. The situation for the Dragoons until Iater in the afiernoon

when the infanby of 4" Canadian Division were brought up and cleared the wood at 4:30

PM.~*

In the meanùme, the 7& Cavalry Brigade had advanced from the Luce valley with the

6'h (Lnniskilling) Dragoons on the right, the 7& Dragwn Guanls left, and the 17& Lancers in

reserve. Encountering the same resistance as the Canadians had from Beaucourt Wood, Burt

ordered his regiments to change their axes of advance toward the stretch of open ground

45 COH. pp. 398-4434. 46 "Narrative of Operatioas, Canadian Cavalry Brigade - Au&w 8m to August 1 1 &. 19 1 8," NAC. RG 9. m. c2. VOL 3984.

128

berneen Beaucourt and Cayeux Woods. The 7& Dragoon Guards captureci Cayeux Wood by

charging the feahue and taking many casudties. By 2:35 PM the 7" Cavalry Brigade had

succeeded in occupying a portion of the Blue Line in the Canadian Corps ~ e c t o r . ~ ~ However,

in doing so cooperation between the cavdry and the Whippets began to break down. As the

Inniskiliings and the Dragoon Guards advanceci over the rolling terrain, the Whippets, with a

maximum speed of only 7 miles per hou. failed to keep up with the cavalry. The same was

m e with the Whippets accompanying the Canadian Cavairy Brigade. Had they been able to

keep up with the cavalry, the Whippets would have been able to provide the much-needed

covering fire in order to allow the cavairy to advance. Conversely, when under f in and

forced to dismount, the cavalry were unable to follow the Whippets. Consequently, the

cavalry-tank combination proved unable to sustain the breakthrough and exploitation.

However, as Anglesey points out, the Whippets were a very new weapon, which had only

k e n in action twice before Amiens but never in cooperation with the cavalry. Moreover,

there had virtually b e n no cooperative training between the two arms prior to the offensive

because there had not k n enough tirne."

As discussed, the 4'h Canadian Division had begun passing through the 3d Canadian

Division at 1240 PM. About a mile east of the Red Line, the leading battalions of the 11"

Brigade made contact with the elements of the Canadian Cavdry Brigade in the vicinity of

Beaucourt. The anack on Beaucourt Wood now began in earnest with the 1 1 Brigade,

supported by Mark V tanks, achieving success at about 4:30 PM. Accordingly, as night fell,

47 Preston. Part L p. 176. 48 Ibid.. p. 176. Anglesey. Vol. 8, pp. 231-2, and "'Narrative of Operatious, Canadian Cavalry Brigade." 49 'Warrative of Operations, Cavairy Corps*'

50 Anglesey, Vol. 8. p. 234.

the brigade was digging in front of Le Quesnel, just short of the Blue Line." This was the

only portion of the Canadian objectives on the Blue Line that were not captured that day. To

1 lm Brigade's left, 1 2 ~ Brigade advanced between Cayeux and Beaucoun Woods and met up

with the rear elements of the 7& Cavalry Brigade between 5:00 and 6:ûû PM and took over

the positions held by the 7" Cavalry Brigade in the Blue Line at about 6:00 PM. Thus. by

nightfall the Canadian Corps had succeeded in capninng the Blue Line in its sector."

With the arriva1 of the 7& Cavalry Brigade on the Blue Line by mid-afiemoon, the

question arises as to why the cavalry did not continue the advance east in accordance with IV

h y orders. The quick answer is that the cavalry could not continue the advance until the

infantry on the Blue Line relieved them. This did not occur, as discussed, until the late

afternoon. At this hour, Currie was not sure if he was to continue the advance M e r east or

consolidate on the Biue Lme for the night and prepare to resume the advance the next &y.

Confirmation of Rawlinson's intentions for the next phase of the battle did not reach Currie

until just before midnighP3 well after Kavanagh had withdrawn the cavairy to the rear." In

addition, Currie had expected to receive under command the British 32nd Division to help

hm continue the advance the next day and C h e ' s staff had written the division into the

Corps plan for the gm." However, at 9 5 5 PM. August am, Curie was informed that although

his corps would continue to anack the next day, it would not receive the 32nd Division under

command This change in IV A m y plans now caused considerable difficulty for Curie for

51 COH, p. 405. 52

53 CO& p. 406. AOH. Vol. VI, p. 61 8.

54 3d Cavairy Division was relieved by the infaauy of 44 Canadian Division at 5 3 0 PM at which hmt Kavanagh o r d d Harman to withdraw his division and prcpart for operations the next day. Sce "Narrative of Optrations. Cavairy Corps." 55 This intention was c o n f i d at the IV A m y Cotnmada's conferencc on August 5". S e Schreiber. p. 51.

plans had to be changed and new orders sent ali while the Corps and divisional headquarters

were on the move through the night. In fact, the new orders did not reach the divisions until

approxirnately 3:00 AM on the 9'. Consequently, due to the requirement to pass the new

orders down the chain of comrnand within each division, the Zero Hour for the next day was

repeatedly postponed to the point where individud brigades jumped off independentiy of

flanking brigades and without coordinated aNUery or tank support in rnany cases. 56 Of

course the continuing delays on the part of the Canadians meant that the Australians to the

north also had to delay their advance." The consequence was thar brigades advanced

an ywhere beîween 1 1 :O0 AM and 1 :ûû PM on the 9&. which meant that the fighting during

the &y for IV Anny was of a very uncoordinated nature. Moreover, the Gexmans had now

had the chance to move reserves in throughout the night creating a much more diff~cult

situation for the attackers than what had been the case 24 hours earlier when surprise had

k e n complete aimost everywhere. Although the British were able to advance the battlefront

to the Line Rouvroy-Méharicourt-Frame~lle-Méricourt-, the tempo was such

that the opportunity for a breakthrough never appeared during the day. Indeecl, by the lom it

was clear to Rawlinson and Haig that dong the whole of the IV Army front the momentum

of the offensive had died out. Accordingly, on the 1 l', offensive operations were cancelled

by IV Anny headquartea and on the 1 2 ~ the Cavalry Corps was withdrawn into reser~e.~*

By the end of the day on the 8& , although N Amy's operations had yet toswitch

toward continuing the advance to the second objective: the line Royes-Chaulnes, the enemy,

nonetheless had suffered its greatest defeat since the beginning of the war. From north to

56 Schrtiber, pp. 5 1-3. 57 AOH, VoI. VI, pp. 620-1. 58 Fuller. Decirive Battles, pp. 38 1-3.

south the German line had been thrown back as much as eight miles and, except on the

exneme left fiank of the Austraiian Corps and the extreme right flank of the Canadian Corps,

N Army was now in possession of the Blue Dotted Line, the Outer Amiens Defence ~ i n e . ~ '

Ludendorff m e of the day: "August 8" was the black day of the German Anny in the

histoiy of dus wu. . . .Everything 1 had feared, and of which I had so often given waming. had

here, in one place, become a reality.**@ Without a doubt, August 8" had k e n a harrowing

day for the Germans. The totai loss to the Geman Second Army was 650 to 700 officers and

26,000 to 27,000 other ranks. in effect, the German 1 3 ~ , 41Y, 117". and 22sm Divisions had

effectively ceased to exist by mid-moming. In the German Second Army sector, only six

divisions were within striking distance of the battlefront during the day. However, only three

were engaged during the day: the 1 19% which was east and south of Roye; the lS Reserve,

which was asnide the Amiens-Roye road between Roye and Le Quesnel; and the logrn,

which was extended in an area stretching from Harhmières to six miles eastward, It is of

interest that not until 2:00 PM had the fmt units of the 1 1 9 ~ Division taken up positions in

front of the Australians and Canadians at Vrél y and Varvillers. It was elements of this

division that ln Cavairy Division and Royal Flying Corps patrols had contacted in the later

afternoon- The lS' Reseme Division was assembled at about 8:30 AM and was ordered

foward to the area of Le Quesnel and Beaucourt at 9:46 AM arriving and deploying in the

m a between 10: 15 and 10:30 AM. It was elements of this division (and remnantsof the

routed divisions) that the Canadian and 7" Cavahy Brigades, and later the 4" Canadian

Division. encountered in their advance to the Blue Line in the late moming and early

59 COH, p. 407. 60 General Erich Ludendorff, My War Memones 1914-18, Vol. II. (London: Hutchinson, 1920), p. 679, qtd in COH, pp. 407-8.

aftemoon. Finally, the 109" Division, being closest to the battlefront, was able to assemble

its troops fairly quickly and was deployed to the north of the 119" Division in front of the

Austraiians by the early aftemoon.61

Clearly, the Gennan defences in the late moming and early aftemoon were only being

knitted together haphazardy. As the 7" Cavairy Brigade in front of the Canadians, and the

zDd and 9" C a v w Brigades in front of the Ausnalians discovered, a window of opportunity

had been created for a few hours on the 8" during which a breakthrough could have been

achieved and a drive by the cavnlry made to the Line Royes-Chaulnes. However, by the

th th evening of August 8 /9 , the Germans had consolidated a Line of defence to the east of the

Blue Line with the three divisions already rnentioned plus an additional three that had moved

in during the evening. Rawlinson's Major-General, General Staff (MGGS) Major-General Sir

Archibald Montgomery, has stated that by the end of the day on the 8&, "the situation on the

Fourth Army front was most s a t i s f a ~ t o r ~ . " ~ ~ In terms of the ground captured, and the number

of enemy formations that had been destroyed, this is a true statement. However, in terms of

the overall Army plan and the requirement to exploit beyond the Blue Line to the line

Royes-Chaulnes, much had yet to be done and al1 depended on maintaining a higher level of

tempo in the advance than that of the Gexmans in bnnging up their reinforcements to the

front. However, by this time, the tempo had been lost on both the Australian and Canadian

fronts. On the Australian front, where the greatest opportunity occurred, Monash and h is

subordinate commanders lacked a sense of tempo that, had it been otherwise, would have

gwen him the incentive to provide some infantry support to the advancing cavalry in the late

61 BOH. 1918, Vol. 4. pp. 88-92.

62 Major-Gcneral Sir Archibaid Montgomery, The Story of the Founh A m y in the B a t l l ~ t of the Hundred Days. Augur k to November 11" 1918. (London: Hoddcr and Stoughton, 19 19). p. 5 1

morning and eady afternoon of the 8? Compounding the problem in the Ausaalian sector of

course were the always prevalent communications problems, and the lack of dl-amis

cwperation and staff coordination between the la Cavalry Division and the formations of the

Australian Corps once the prospect of conducting operations beyond the Blue Dotted Line

presented itself. Finally, on the Canadian front, the oppominity for a breakthrough was less

apparent but nevertheless real when the 7& CavaLry Brigade arrived on the Blue Line in the

mid-afiernoon. However, due to the late anival of the relieving Canadian infantry, the

confusion created by communications problems, and the changing of orders throughout the

th th evening of the 8 /9 , and the growing German strength during the sarne evening, the

opportunity for a breakthrough was quickl y lost.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis has been to dispel the myth surrounding the perceived inability

of the British cavalry to achieve a breakthrough on the Western h n t from 1915 to 1918.

This thesis has demonstrated that within the context of the Bntish efforts to acheve a

breakthrough, the cavaùy was not an obsolete arm of the British Amy. By contrast, at least

in intent, the cavalry was a vital component toward achieving a breakthrough because it was,

despite its technological limitations. the only tmly mobile m. However, the cavalry could

not achieve a breakthrough because of factors or conditions beyond its control. These

conditions had to do with the requirement to maintain a high degree of tempo throughout the

whole of an offensive. The maintenance of a high degree of tempo was necessary in order to

be able to create the gap in the enemy's defences, and then break the cavalry through in order

to conduct the exploitation phase deep in the enemy's rear dl in a t h e less than it took the

enemy to b h g up his reserves. Tempo during the offensive depended on a de-centralized

cornmanci philosophy, on staff coordination, on dl-arms cooperation, and on diable

communications. Unfortunately, in al1 the offensives launched by the Bntish on the Western

Front during the war, these conditions were never fully met.

To be sure, the British A m y , at least by the time of the Cambrai offensive in 1917,

and certainly by the tirne of the Amiens offensive in 1918, had solved the problem of

overcoming the defence and of crossing the fire-swept zone. The British had perfected the

infantry-artillery attack supported by tanks and aircraft, and utilizing the principle of surpise

in order to break-in to the enemy's defences. The secret to the British success on the Western

Front eventually was found to be a mastery of low level infantry tactics, the successful

pioneering of tank-infantry cooperation, the solution of some of the many problems

associateci with sustainhg artillery support throughout the depth of the assault, and, above

d l , the reswection of the tacrical principle of surmse. In other words, they had perfected the

'Bite and HoId' attack in order to break-in to the enemy's defences. But at the end of the war,

the British had yet to corne to grips with the breakthrough. The tank of the tirne, as has been

demonstrated, was not the answer. The cavalry was really the onlv m with the sense and

means of mobility to achieve and sustain a breakthrough should it have occurred. The

cavalry's lack of success, therefore, was not to do with the capabilities and limitations of the

am^ iwlf, but rather with the inability of cornrnanders, staffs. and the other arms of the

British Army to rapidly adapt and take advantage of the fieeting opportunities for mobile

warfare. The reason they could not achieve and sustain a breakthrough was not because the

cavalry was obsolete, but because the conditions necessary for the maintenance of a high

degree of tempo were never fully realized in any of the offensives.

As was portended in the pre-war years, the main problem on the Western Front was

the reinstatement of mobility and the crossing of the fire-swept zone. The supremacy of the

defensive over the offensive had to be overcome in order to achieve victory. In the pre-war

years, the solution sought was to re-ernphasize the offensive spirit to overcome the

supremacy of firepower. This debate manifested itself for the cavalry in the Arme Blanche

versus Firepower controversy that, nonetheless, introduced the British cavalry to the practice

of fighting as mounted infantry as it had done against the Boers at the tum of the century.

The conduct of the war vindicated the new or firepower school's push for the cava-lry to

adopt the mounted infantry role. In ail the offensives, despite whether or not a breakthrough

was achieved, the cavalry was able to fight and temporarily hold ground because of their

ability to fight as mounted infantry, and to integrate their operations with those of supporting

machine guns and artillery. Moreover, the operations of the cavalry demonstrated that the

cavalry's sense of mobility was as vital a necessity in the British Army of the p e n d as the

cavalry's means of mobility were becoming obsolete. More than any other a m , the cavalry

became caught between the proverbial rock of the humanceneic 1 9 ~ Cenhuy philosophy of

war. and the hard place of the technology-centric 20" Century philosophy of war.

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