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FLYING LESSONSFLYING LESSONS for January 30, 2014 suggested by this week’s aircraft mishap reports FLYING LESSONS uses the past week’s mishap reports to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if you face similar circumstances. In almost all cases design characteristics of a specific make and model airplane have little direct bearing on the possible causes of aircraft accidents, so apply these FLYING LESSONS to any airplane you fly. Verify all technical information before applying it to your aircraft or operation, with manufacturers’ data and recommendations taking precedence. You are pilot in command, and are ultimately responsible for the decisions you make.

FLYING LESSONS is an independent product of MASTERY FLIGHT TRAINING, INC. www.mastery-flight-training.com

This week’s lessons: I was flying a Beechcraft A36 Bonanza home to Wichita following an aviation event at Savannah, Georgia in spring 2013. As is typical in the U.S. Southeast, the air was warm and moist, and on the day of our departure air mass thunderstorms were already beginning to form inland as my passenger and I rode the bus to the airport. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air-mass_thunderstorm

An area of storms was bunching up about 150 miles northwest of Savannah along out route of flight. A Presidential TFR (Temporary Flight Restriction) in Atlanta was going to close off airspace just to the north of our route, and storms were already popping to the south. The entire area of hazardous weather was slowly drifting southeastward, toward us at Savannah, and would affect the coastal area most of the late morning and afternoon. If we sat very long where we were, we would not get out at all that day.

Many pilots would have canceled the trip then and there, and enjoyed a lovely evening in picturesque Savannah. But we’d been working there almost a week at that point and really wanted to get home—a self-imposed set-up for a dangerous weather encounter. Instead, I took a step in the right direction. We took off, under high cirrus but otherwise in clear, smooth air. I hadn’t added the Garmin 796 with XM weather to my flight bag yet at that point so we had no onboard weather, but I was actively monitoring Flight Watch (for my non-U.S. readers, Flight Watch is a dedicated en route aviation weather frequency). It and Center frequency were abuzz with pilots requesting deviations around the growing clusters of storms just northwest of Atlanta. I knew the weather was bad when I has handed off to Atlanta Approach just in time to hear Air Force One be given holding instructions—even the President wasn’t going where he wanted to go that morning.

My strategy before I ever took off was to fly as far west as safely possible, leaving myself numerous “outs” in the form of nearby diversion airports, and to exercise one of those escape plans as close to the storms as possible but still in time to tie the airplane down or, even better, get it towed into a hangar before the storm hit. As the Southern haze thickened and began to obscure the darkening skies ahead, backed by Air Traffic Control’s confirmation that there were thunderstorms at my 12 o’clock and 25 miles, I told the controller I was diverting to Macon, Georgia, which was just under my left wing. I made a fairly tight, continuous descending turn from 8000 feet to a final approach and landing, taxiing to the ramp and tying the airplane down securely and installing its control gust lock. I had not penetrated a cloud during the entire 45-minute hop up from Savannah.

About 30 minutes later a strong storm passed over the airport. It took almost an hour and a half before the storms had eked the moisture and instability out of the air, at least temporarily. I launched into some hold-over stratus clouds, the steamy evaporation from heavy, storm-dropped rains. But there were no thunderstorms on radar to the west before I took off, and none expected until the air heated back up later in the day. By the time we crossed the Mississippi River the skies were sunny and hot, resuming the cycle of air mass thunderstorm development.

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After a quick fuel-and-food stop at Walnut Ridge, Arkansas (try the catfish, but the burgers at the airport diner are good too) we took off toward home…and reports of a growing line of strong, frontal thunderstorms forming a solid line across Wichita and south toward Oklahoma City, moving quickly eastward. As we got closer to the Missouri/Kansas line, about 150 miles east of our planned destination, the skies ahead were again growing dark, and a Center Weather Advisory warned of severe thunderstorms and possible tornadoes on our route ahead.

I briefly considered a run around the south side of the line, straight west and then up to Wichita from the south, but a quick call to Flight Watch confirmed that the line had become solid and that was not an option. For the second time that day I told ATC I was going to divert and, remaining in good Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) all the way, flew north to Joplin, Missouri. We got the airplane in a hangar, borrowed a ratty old airport crew car, and were checked in to a nice local motel before the heavy thunderstorms hit. See http://geology.csupomona.edu/drjessey/class/Gsc101/Fronts.html

With the exception of my departure from Macon, I had flown the entire trip in VMC, in smooth air no closer than 25 miles from any thunderstorm cell. Had I canceled my flight out of Savannah altogether thinking I might not be able to make it all the way to Walnut Ridge non-stop (which turned out to be the case), I would have delayed most of the day before the storms drifted past the coast…by which time another round of steamy air mass thunderstorms would have formed.

Although I eventually caught up with a second, impenetrable line of severe storms and had to overnight in Joplin, that put us less than a hour’s flight from home and we still made it to work on time after a smooth, cool flight early the next morning.

This is what I mean by “stacking the deck in my favor” to support a go decision whenever possible. I used my knowledge of weather system development and movement, made frequent checks with my (limited) sources of in-flight weather data, invoked a willingness to keep my options open at all times, and stuck with my plan to land as soon as I was getting close to entering instrument conditions near an area of thunderstorms. This allowed me to go as far as safely possible.

Had I waited out the first area of storms on the ground at Savanna, I might not have made it home for several days because of successive lines of adverse weather. A final LESSON: If we had left an hour and a half earlier we probably would have made it all the way home between the lines of thunderstorms.

Let’s continue the discussion of…

REASONS FLIGHTS ARE DELAYED, RESCHEDULED OR CANCELED 1. Adverse weather

Last week we looked at one possibility to reduce the stress of go/no-go decision making on important cross-country flights for business or pleasure…purchase refundable airline tickets, and schedule your trip so that you still have time to use the airlines if you cannot make the trip by personal air. This week we’ve looked at another—making a cautious plan and executing on it as planned. See www.mastery-flight-training.com/20140123flying-lessons.pdf

The most common reason flights are delayed or canceled is adverse weather. There are five major aviation weather hazards:

a. Thunderstorms

b. Turbulence

c. Ice

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d. Reduced visibility

e. Surface winds Thunderstorms are the manifestation of unstable air and moisture, and can (and usually do) contain all the other aviation weather hazards. Dangerous turbulence can occur in any stage of thunderstorm development—incipient (or updraft); mature; and dissipation (or downdraft) phase. Significantly, a thunderstorm is considered “mature” when precipitation begins to fall from the base of the cloud. This means a thunderstorm or towering cumulus cloud may be a deadly threat to airplanes even before they would appear on a ground-based radar plot or weather data uplink.

Although we have great online and in-cockpit thunderstorm prediction and avoidance tools, they have their limitations (previously discussed in FLYING LESSONS). Ultimately it comes down to this: In areas of towering cumulus clouds and/or forecast or reported imbedded thunderstorms:

• Remain at least 10 nautical miles from green (low intensity) precipitation returns on real-time onboard weather radar displays.

• Remain at least 20 nautical miles from yellow (moderate) or greater intensity precipitation returns on real-time onboard weather radar displays, and from green (low intensity) precipitation returns on weather data uplink cockpit displays.

• Remain at least 20 nautical miles from lightning strike plots on in-cockpit lightning detectors (“spherics”).

• Remain visually clear of towering cumulus clouds regardless of depicted precipitation or spheric activity.

• Remain clear of areas of imbedded thunderstorms unless equipped with real-time onboard weather radar. If you have onboard weather radar, follow the earlier guidance.

• Remain in VMC whenever possible when near the recommended limits from towering cumulus and thunderstorms. If you can’t maintain visual, immediately exit to VMC or land right away.

Pilots must be extremely cautious when flying in areas of reported or forecast thunderstorms. Don’t depend on weather data uplinks except to give thunderstorms a wide berth—the latency period (time between when the radar picture was taken and the image appears on a screen in your cockpit) makes uplinked NEXRAD imagery useable as a thunderstorm avoidance tool only with a large distance margin for safety. Don’t count on airborne weather radar unless you are formally trained on the esoteric of its use. And expect lightning detectors to be inaccurate and provide only a general idea of the location and intensity of storm cells.

The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) has an excellent course, “Thunderstorms and ATC”, available free to AOPA members and also accessible free to registered FAA WINGS participants. This course is one way to increase or refresh your real-world thunderstorm decision making skills. See: http://www.aopa.org/AOPA-Live.aspx?watch={BBD71EF8-D780-4B48-B9AD-72519C7D501B} https://www.faasafety.gov/gslac/ALC/ExternalCourseInformation.aspx?courseID=325&UserIsNowEnrolled=True Comments? Mastery.flight.training@cox.net

Debrief: Readers write about recent FLYING LESSONS:

Last week’s LESSONS on preflight inspections apparently struck a chord with a lot of pilots. I had an unusually high number of new subscriptions this week (enough to put me over an emails-

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per-month threshold and increase my mass email service fee—special thanks to my FLYING LESSONS supporters), a request to reprint the item in an insurance-industry newsletter, and Debriefing items like these… See: www.mastery-flight-training.com/20140123flying-lessons.pdf www.mastery-flight-training.com/be_a_master_pilot.html Reader Jerald Duncan writes:

Thanks to the recent Weekly...and I’m going back to check lists. [I] have not used [checklists] for years, but your commonsense article just makes sense. One reason for lapse is that my list, which I paid good money for, was a bit too onerous. Consequently I just put such aside. Do you have any suggested lists that one can copy/modify for themselves?

I the context of last week’s LESSON, about using a checklist for preflight inspection, the best resource is probably the preflight inspection checklist contained in the airplane’s Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH), Approved Flight Manual (AFM), or other manufacturer-provided owner’s manual for the type. Most commercially produced, aftermarket checklists either omit the preflight inspection procedure to save space, or provide one either too skimpy or far too complex.

Many airplane types are represented by an owner’s club or group, with access to mechanics and/or flight instructors expert in the type. Contact the applicable type club, or ask your mechanic or a type-experienced instructor, for any tips or hints for items to check on the preflight that may not be included on the manufacturer’s checklist. Make up your own checklist (word processors make this easy) using the POH (or similar) checklist and adding those hints and tips, including anything special about your airplane because of modifications. Remember, this is just to serve as a reminder to ensure you’ve not missed anything vital, not an all-inclusive, bullet-point list of every single nut and cotter pin, etc. Thanks, Jerald.

Our preflight LESSON was prompted by reports of an airplane taking off with a tow bar still attached to its nosewheel. Reader Mike Radomski adds:

Thank you for another excellent FLYING LESSONS email. Years ago, I watched a skydive pilot get fired after pulling a C182 out of the hangar, then begin his pre-flight inspection without first removing the tow-bar. His boss had a rule that the tow bar shall never touch the ground while it is attached to the airplane [note: I’ve heard this comment from several readers this week—tt]. He had previously paid for an expensive engine rebuild and new prop following a tow bar strike, and was not about to go through it again - he had a zero-tolerance policy on this issue. I've always thought that's a good, safe practice - don't let it touch the ground.

I'm more forgetful than most, and the problem doesn't get any better as I age. There are plenty of scenarios that might lead me to forget to remove my power tug after I pull my airplane out of the hangar. It's much bigger and heavier than a manual tow bar, but even so, it is invisible from the pilot seat when it is attached to the nose wheel - or it was, until I added a flag that stares me right in the face when I'm seated in the airplane.

Good technique, and good idea, Mike. Thanks!

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Flight instructor Mike Friel adds:

An old instructor pilot once gave me great advice [that] I still follow. He told me the best way to get to the pilot’s seat is to walk around the aircraft after the preflight is completed. That advice has paid off for me several times over the years. You see the wheel chock you forgot to remove, the cargo door that you didn't latch, the seat belt hanging out the passenger door and some other interesting things that you missed during preflight while doing that last walk around to the pilot’s seat. This advise is especially helpful when your rushed or distracted during your preflight.

Keep up the great work.

You, too, Mike.

Reader Lorne Sheren reinforces the need for focus when preflighting an aircraft:

I consider my pre-flight to be "time alone" with my airplane. That means no distractions what so ever. It's time for us to bond again and make friends. If I'm distracted I start over.

Thanks, Lorne.

Reader Ruben Alconero clarifies a point from last week’s report:

In reviewing your Jan 23rd LESSON you mentioned part 121 operators are not allowed to do look-see approaches due to the FAA holding them to higher standards [than private operations]. For all practical purposes most 121 operators have Ops Specs [Operations Specifications, a Government-approve manual and limitations—tt] that allow flight crews to continue the approach if weather drops below published minimums once inbound from the FAF on non-prceision [sic] approaches or G/S [glideslope] intercept commencing the final approach segment on precision approaches. This is in essence is a form of look-see approach. Most CFIIs that have no formal experience in 121 operations are unaware of this.

True, Ruben, and you’re right, this is a variation on the “look-see” technique. I know similar Ops Specs often are approved for Part 135 operators as well—the pilot/crew cannot begin an approach unless weather is reported at or above minimums, but if conditions permit beginning the approach but worsen after the airplane is inbound of the Final Approach Fix or on glideslope, the pilot/crew may continue the approach.

This “don’t begin, but OK to continue” policy, like the Part 91 operators’ authority to begin an instrument approach without reported weather or with weather reported to be below minimums, supports the need for extreme competence in flying arrival procedures, and preparation for flying the missed any time we begin an approach. Thanks for the clarification, Ruben.

Airline captain and frequent Debriefer David Heberling writes about the “peer pressure” LESSON from the January 9th issue. David writes:

Peer pressure is a very important subject. The other night, I was flying into KSAN (San Diego, California) from KPHX (Phoenix, Arizona) at night. The weather in KSAN was indicating an overcast at 300 feet. The ILS 9 DA [Decision Altitude] is 336 feet above touchdown on runway 9. As we were being vectored for the approach, we heard a company flight ahead of us declare the missed approach. I turned to my F/O [First Officer] and told him that we would not be turning on our landing lights until the landing was assured. If I had any hope of seeing the approach lights at 336 feet AGL with a 300-foot overcast, I did not want the landing lights washing out the approach lights.

The flight that did the missed was vectored around for another quick approach. They made it in this time. We made it in too, but it was by the skin of our teeth. Just as the airplane was making the "Minimums" auto[matic] callout, I was spring-loaded to push the thrust levers up to Go Around. I saw the approach lights at the same time, which allowed me to descend to 100 feet. This provision in the reg[ulation]s has been one that has made so many approaches successful over the years. It really helps to have a capable autopilot and a second pilot onboard.

Confirmation bias has no place in the cockpit, nor are large egos that make decision making harder than it needs to be. It is hard to read about pilots and crews that succumb to either or both because we all have been there.

See www.mastery-flight-training.com/20140109flying-lessons.pdf

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Reader Tony Crescimanno adds his experience to the “peer pressure” discussion:

I remember being in a line-up of airplanes, flying downwind on vectors and seeing a two-mile diameter red cell on the radar screen that was centered over the approach end of the active runway. It looked bad, yet airplanes were flying through it and reporting a rough ride.

There were a couple aircraft ahead of me and they chose to continue the approach intending to fly through the storm cell. I declined. I told the controller that I'd like vectors to a holding pattern to wait for that cell to move. My request was approved. Other requests for holding followed. Less than 10 minutes later the cell had moved and we were able to once again accept vectors for the approach that terminated with a landing that was normal, safe, [and] uneventful.

My point is, especially for you younger pilots, don't give a hoot about what anyone thinks of your decision not to fly if that decision is based on safety. Don't accept a clearance if it puts you in harms way, whether it be a departure, cruise altitude, vector, approach and even taxi. And for those flying VFR only, remember that you are the clearance authority. It's one thing being able to fly an airplane, it's a whole ‘nother thing being a pilot.

Thank you very much, Tony.

Comments? Corrections? Suggestions? Let us know, at mastery.flight.training@cox.net.

“Your articles and views are the best because the advice is useful and can easily be implemented in my flying routine.”—Michael Madigan

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Correction: In last week’s FLYING LESSONS I attributed information about the Bombardier Challenger crash at Aspen, Colorado to aviation author Rob Finfrock. Rob writes: “I shouldn't get credit - that was from a comment…that I reposted” on Facebook. I apologize to my friend and one-time editor Rob for any confusion this created.

NTSB Most Wanted 2014 The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued its 2014 “Most Wanted” list, designed to increase awareness of a select group of transportation safety issues. General Aviation (GA) returns to the list this year, with a focus on the role of hazardous weather in GA accidents.

An NTSB fact sheet, “General Aviation: Identify and Communicate Hazardous Weather,” states that about two-thirds of all GA accidents that occur in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) are fatal — a rate much higher than the overall fatality rate for GA accidents. Hazardous weather is often the cause or a contributing factor to these accidents.

The FAA has recently developed an online training course that offers pilots a systematic approach to collecting and understanding weather information for flight. It also explains new weather technologies. See “Aviation Weather Data - A Targeted Approach.” See: www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl7_2014.html https://www.faasafety.gov/gslac/ALC/course_content.aspx?pf=1&preview=true&cID=322

Personal Aviation: Freedom. Choices. Responsibility. Thomas P. Turner, M.S. Aviation Safety, MCFI 2010 National FAA Safety Team Representative of the Year 2008 FAA Central Region CFI of the Year

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