Final L Relations

7/27/2019 Final L Relations

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Labor Relations Case Digests

(A Compilation)

and

Comparison of Dismiss Now, Pay LaterDoctrines

(Wenphil, Serrano, Agabon & Jaka Doctrines)

Submitted to:

ATTY. RIZA LYN OCAMPO

Labor Relations Professor

School of Law

University of San Jose-Recoletos

Submitted by:

RON STEPHANE P. MAYLON

Labor Relations Course (Sunday, 12:00NN-3:00PM)

March 23, 2014


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Table of ContentsGENERAL TEXTILE, INC. and EDGAR TOLENTINO vs. NLRC ........................................................................... 3

FEDERICO M. LEDESMA, JR. vs.

NLRC .......................................................................................................... 5

JONERI ESCOBIN vs. NLRC ............................................................................................................................. 8

BRENT SCHOOL INC. VS ZAMORA ............................................................................................................... 10

WENPHIL CORPORATION vs NLRC .............................................................................................................. 12

SERRANO VS NLRC ...................................................................................................................................... 14

AGABON VS. NLRC ...................................................................................................................................... 17

JAKA VS. NLRC ............................................................................................................................................. 19

Comparison of Dismiss Now, Pay Later Doctrines .................................................................................... 21


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GENERAL TEXTILE, INC. and EDGAR TOLENTINO vs. NLRC

FACTS:

Private respondent Rodolfo Lopez was employed by petitioner Gentex Inc. as machine operator. Lopez fell

ill, he was later diagnosed as suffering from moderately advanced pulmonary tuberculosis.

He went on sick leave upon the advice of the company physician and was later granted by the Social

Security System sickness benefits for 60 days, he went to Gentex with the intention of returning to work.

He was instead told by the company physician to extend his leave for another 6 months.

He was confined at the Quezon Institute.

This fact was known to Gentex, as its personnel manager, petitioner Edgar Tolentino, accomplished Lopez'

Medicare form. Tolentino, sent Lopez a Notice of Termination informing him of the termination of his

employment "immediately upon receipt of this notice" on the ground that he had been absent without

official leave. Lopez filed a complaint against Gentex and- Tolentino for illegal dismissal and for non-

payment of the thirteenth-month pay and service incentive leave for the year.

In their defense, petitioners contended that Lopez abandoned work beginning September 17,1988.

Labor Arbiter ordered the reinstatenent of Lopez with full backwages from the time his salary was witheld

until his actual reinstatement, subject to his fitness for work.

On appeal, NLRC ruled that as there was no abandonment, Lopez' dismissal on such ground was illegal.

However, NLRC ruled that Lopez' reinstatement could not be forced upon Gentex, since there was

showing that his pulmonary tuberculosis was already arrested.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not an employee has abandoned his work

HELD: Section 8, Rule I, Book VI of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code, reads as follows:

Disease as a ground for dismissal.Where the employee suffers from a

disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his

health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his

employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health

authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be

cured within a period of 6 months even with proper medical treatment . If the

disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not

terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The

employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon

the restoration of his normal health.

The preceding provision explicitly requires a certification by a competent public health authority that the

disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with

proper medical treatment.

There is no showing that such a certification was presented in the course of the proceedings before the

Labor Arbiter and NLRC.


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Lopez is entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary

equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual

reinstatement.

We are also aware of the contingency that the illness of private respondent be certified by a competent

public health authority as being of such nature or at such a stage that renders him physically unfit to

return to work.

In such a case, separation pay at the rate provided for in Article 284 must be paid private respondent, inaddition to the backwages for his illegal dismissal.


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FEDERICO M. LEDESMA, JR. vs.NLRC

FACTS: Petitioner was employed as a service driver by the private respondent on probationary basis, he

was required to report at private respondents training site in Dasmarias, Cavite, under the

direct supervision of its site administrator, Pablo Manolo de Leon.

Petitioner filed a complaint against de Leon for allegedly abusing his authority as site, immoral

conduct allegedly carried out within the private respondents premises.

A copy of the complaint was duly received by private respondents Chief Accountant, Nita

Azarcon.

De Leon filed a written report against the petitioner addressed to private respondents Vice-

President for Administration, Ty citing his suspected drug use.

Private respondents Human Resource Manager, Cueva served a copy of a Notice to petitioner

requiring him to explain within why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him instead he

filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent before the Labor Arbiter.

In his Position Paper, petitioner averred that in view of the complaint he filed against de Leon,

the latter retaliated by falsely accusing petitioner as a drug user. Ty, however, instead of

verifying the veracity of report, readily believed his allegations and together with Cueva, verbally

dismissed him from service.

Petitioner immediately went to St. Dominic Medical Center for a drug test and he was found

negative for any drug substance.

With his drug result on hand, he went back to private respondents main office to talk to Ty and

Cueva and to show to them his drug test result, since his drug test proved that he was not guilty

of the drug use charge against him, he decided to continue to work.

He reported for work but he was no longer allowed to enter the training site for he was

allegedly banned there from according to the guard on duty.

Private respondent countered that petitioner was never dismissed from employment but merely

served a Notice to Explain why no disciplinary action should be filed against him in view of the

report that he was suspected of using illegal drugs. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner

prematurely lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent before the Labor

Arbiter.

Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner declaring illegal his separation from

employment.

The Labor Arbiter, however, did not order petitioners reinstatement for the same was no longer

practical, and only directed private respondent to pay petitioner backwages. Both parties

questioned the Labor Arbiters Decision before the NLRC.

Petitioner assailed the portion of the Labor Arbiters Decision denying his prayer forreinstatement, private respondent controverted the Labor Arbiters finding that petitioner was

illegally dismissed from employment, and insisted that petitioner was never dismissed from his

job but failed to report to work.

NLRC granted the appeal raised by both parties and reversed the Labor Arbiters Decision.

The NLRC declared that petitioner failed to establish the fact of dismissal for his claim that he

was banned from entering the training site was rendered impossible by the fact that he was able

to subsequently claim his salary and 13th month pay.


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Petitioners claim for reinstatement was, however, granted by the NLRC.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was likewise denied by the NLRC in its

Resolution.

The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners Petition for Certiorari and affirmed the NLRC

decision giving more credence to private respondents stance that petitioner was not dismissed

from employment, as it is more in accord with the evidence on record and the attendantcircumstances of the instant case.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by CA.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not CA subverted due process of law when it did not consider the evidence on

record showing that there was no just cause for dismissal as petitioner is not a drug user and

there is no evidence to support this ground for dismissal.

HELD:

It is best to stress that the issues raised by petitioner in this instant petition are factual in nature

which is not within the office of a Petition for Review.

The reason for this rule is that, this Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely undertake

the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties for the factual findings

of the labor officials who have acquired expertise in their own fields are accorded not only

respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court.

However, when the findings of the Labor Arbiter contradict those of the NLRC, departure from

the general rule is warranted, and this Court must of necessity make an scrutiny and examine

the records all over again including the evidence presented by the opposing parties to

determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable with evidentiary facts.

The Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment warranting

the payment of his backwages. The NLRC and the Court of Appeals found otherwise.

In reversing the Labor Arbiters Decision, the NLRC underscoredthe settled evidentiary rule that

before the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove the validity of the employees

dismissal, the employee must first sufficiently establish that he was indeed dismissed from

employment. The petitioner, in the present case, failed to establish the fact of his dismissal.

The NLRC did not give credence to petitioners allegation that he was banned by the private

respondent from entering the workplace, opining that had it been true that petitioner was no

longer allowed to enter the training site when he reported for work.

Well-entrenched is the principle that in order to establish a case before judicial and quasi-

administrative bodies, it is necessary that allegations must be supported by substantial

evidence. In the present case, there is hardly any evidence on record so as to meet the quantum of

evidence required, i.e., substantial evidence. Petitioners claim of illegal dismissal is supported

by no other than his own bare, uncorroborated and, thus, self-serving allegations, which are also

incoherent, inconsistent and contradictory.

It is true that the Constitution affords full protection to labor, and that in light of this

Constitutional mandate, we must be vigilant in striking down any attempt of the management


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to exploit or oppress the working class. However, it does not mean that we are bound to uphold

the working class in every labor dispute brought before this Court for our resolution.

The law in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor self-

destruction of the employer. It should be made clear that when the law tilts the scales of justice

in favor of labor, it is in recognition of the inherent economic inequality between labor and

management. The intent is to balance the scales of justice; to put the two parties on relatively

equal positions.


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JONERI ESCOBIN vs. NLRC

FACTS:

PEFTOK Integrated Services, Inc., is a duly licensed watchman and protective agency while

respondent UP-NDC Basilan Plantations, Inc. is a corporation duly organized in accordance with

law, and the owner/possessor of lands principally planted to rubber, coconut, citrus, coffee, andother fruit trees in Lamitan, Province of Basilan.

That complainants are bona fide members of the Basilan Security Force Association hired by PISI

to work as guards in UP-NDC Basilan Plantations premises, for the purpose of guarding and

protecting plantation property and installations from theft, pilferage, robbery, trespass and

other unlawful acts by strangers or third persons, and plantation employees .

Petitioners filed at the Regional Arbitration Branch No. 09 in Zamboanga City a Complaint

against private respondents for illegal termination by way of constructive dismissal.

After conciliation proceedings failed to settle the matter, the parties were ordered to submit

their respective position papers.

Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners, declaring the dismissal to be illegal for

being without just cause. On appeal, Respondent Commission reversed the labor arbiter and

denied Motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that petitioners

committed willful disobedience of lawful orders of their employer.

Whether or not the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that petitioners

abandoned their work.

Whether or not the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in reversing the finding of the

labor arbiter that petitioners were illegally dismissed by way of constructive dismissal.

Whether or not the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying recovery of

backwages, separation pay, damages, and attorneys fees in favor of petitioners.

HELD:

I

o

Respondent Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that

petitioners were dismissed for a just cause.

o

The reasonableness and lawfulness of a rule, order or instruction depend on the

circumstances availing in each case.

o Reasonableness pertains to the kind or character of directives and commands and to the

manner in which they are made.

o In this case, the order to report to the Manila office fails to meet this standard.

o

First, it was grossly inconvenient for petitioners, who were residents and heads offamilies residing in Basilan, to commute to Manila.

o Second, petitioners were not provided with funds to defray their transportation and

living expenses.

o Third, private respondent argues that it sent transportation money to petitioners.

However, the recipients of such funds are not parties in this case.


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o Fourth, no reason was given by private respondent company explaining why it had failed

to inform petitioners of their specific security assignments prior to their departure from

Basilan.

o This fact demonstrates that petitioners dismissal was not commensurate to their

insubordination which, we reiterate, was neither willful nor intentional they very well

knew that petitioners were not receiving any salary while they were on floating status

and, thus, also knew that they would hardly be able to comply with the directive to

report to Manila.

o In any event, dismissal was too harsh a penalty for an infraction which appears, under

the circumstances, to be excusable.

II

o This contention is untenable.

o Abandonment, as a just and valid cause for dismissal, requires a deliberate, unjustified

refusal of an employee to resume his work, coupled with a clear absence of any

intention of returning to his work.

o No evidence was presented to establish that petitioners relinquished their jobs.

o Denying they abandoned their work, petitioners contend that it was private respondent

agency which deserted them by failing to communicate with them for over two months,from February 1, 1991 to April 8, 1991

III

o No constructive dismissal.

o Constructive discharge is an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued

employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a

demotion in rank and/or a diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination,

insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.

o In this particular case, petitioners were not constructively dismissed; they were actually

dismissed without just and valid cause.

IV

o

The normal consequences of illegal dismissal are reinstatement and payment ofbackwages.

o These remedies give life to the workers constitutional right to security of tenure.

o Separation pay is generally not awarded except in instances where reinstatement is no

longer feasible or appropriate, as in this case.

o As a substitute for immediate and continued reemployment, separation pay is meant to

provide the employee during the period that he is looking for another employment.

o

In this particular case, private respondent alleges that there is no assignment in Basilan

or Zamboanga available to petitioners.

o

Transfer to another post outside said areas would have only given rise to the same

problems as those entailed by the original directive.

o Reinstatement presupposes that the previous position from which the employee had

been removed still exists, or there is an unfilled position of a similar nature, more or

less, as the one previously occupied by the employee.

o If no such position is available, reinstatement becomes a legal impossibility.


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BRENT SCHOOL INC. VS ZAMORA

FACTS:

Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by Brent School.

The contract fixed a specific term for its existence, five (5) years, subsequent subsidiary

agreements reiterated the same terms and conditions, including the expiry date, as thosecontained in the original contract.

Three months before the expiration of the stipulated period, Alegre was given a copy of the

report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor advising of the termination of his

services effective on July 16, 1976.

The stated ground for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite

period of employment."

And a month or so later, on May 26, 1976, Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed

a receipt therefor containing the phrase, "in full payment of services for the period May 16, to

July 17, 1976 as full payment of contract."

However, at the investigation conducted by a Labor Conciliator of said report of termination of

his services, Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17,

1976, since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and

his employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of a regular employee and

could not be removed except for valid cause.

The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as an application for clearance to

terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the recommendation of the

Labor Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and instead required the reinstatement of

Alegre, as a "permanent employee," to his former position without loss of seniority rights and

with full back wages.

Brent School filed a motion for reconsideration.

The Regional Director denied the motion and forwarded the case to the Secretary of Labor for

review.

The latter sustained the Regional Director.

Brent appealed to the Office of the President.

Again it was rebuffed. That Office dismissed its appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the Labor

Secretary's decision, ruling that Alegre was a permanent employee who could not be dismissed

except for just cause, and expiration of the employment contract was not one of the just causes

provided in the Labor Code for termination of services.

The School is now before this Court in a last attempt at vindication.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Alegres contract of employmentis subject to a term or he is deemed

permanent and can be removed only upon just cause

HELD:

The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed at a time when the

Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet been promulgated.


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Indeed, the Code did not come into effect some 3 years after the perfection of the employment

contract, and rights and obligations thereunder had arisen and been mutually observed and

enforced.

At that time before the advent of the Labor Code, there was no doubt whatever about the

validity of term employment. It was impliedly but nonetheless clearly recognized by the

Termination Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as amended by R.A. 1787.

Basically, this statute provided that

In cases of employment, without a definite period, in a commercial, industrial, or agricultural

establishment or enterprise, the employer or the employee may terminate at any time the

employment with just cause; or without just cause in the case of an employee by serving written

notice on the employer at least one month in advance, or in the case of an employer, by serving

such notice to the employee at least one month in advance or one-half month for every year of

service of the employee, whichever is longer, a fraction of at least six months being considered

as one whole year.

The employer, upon whom no such notice was served in case of termination of employment

without just cause, may hold the employee liable for damages.

The employee, upon whom no such notice was served in case of termination of employment

without just cause, shall be entitled to compensation from the date of termination of his

employment in an amount equivalent to his salaries or wages corresponding to the required

period of notice.

It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School and Alegre

it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration thereof

Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court.

It should have no application to instances where a fixed period of employment was agreed upon

knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being

brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or

where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more

or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the

latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would be made to apply to purposes other than those

explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and

apt to lead to absurd and unintended consequence.

Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully terminated with

and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he is declared not entitled

to reinstatement and the other relief awarded and confirmed on appeal.


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WENPHIL CORPORATION vs NLRC

FACTS:

Private respondent was hired by petitioner as a crew member at its Cubao Branch.

He thereafter became the assistant head of the Backroom department of the same branch.

On May 20, 1985 private respondent had an altercation with a co-employee, Job Barrameda, asa result of which he and Barrameda were suspended on the following morning and in the

afternoon of the same day a memorandum was issued by the Operations Manager advising

private respondent of his dismissal from the service in accordance with their Personnel Manual.

The notice of dismissal was served on private respondent.

Thus private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for unfair labor practice, illegal

suspension and illegal dismissal.

After submitting their respective position papers to the Labor Arbiter and as the hearing could

not be conducted due to repeated absence of counsel for respondent, the case was submitted

for resolution.

The decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter by dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.

Private respondent appealed to NLRC wherein in due course a decision was rendered settingaside the appealed decision and ordering the reinstatement of private respondent to his former

position without loss of seniority and other related benefits and 1 year backwages without

qualification and deduction.

Hence the herein petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.

The court issued a restraining order as prayed for in the petition enjoining the enforcement of

the decision of public respondent

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision contrary to

the evidence on record.

HELD:

The conclusion of the public respondent NLRC on appeal that private respondent was not

afforded due process before he was dismissed is binding on this Court.

Indeed, it is well taken and supported by the records.

However, it cannot justify a ruling that private respondent should be reinstated with back wages

as the public respondent NLRC so decreed.

Although belatedly, private respondent was afforded due process before the labor arbiter

wherein the just cause of his dismissal had been established.

With such finding, it would be arbitrary and unfair to order his reinstatement with back wages.

The Court holds that the policy of ordering the reinstatement to the service of an employee

without loss of seniority and the payment of his wages during the period of his separation until

his actual reinstatement but not exceeding 3 years without qualification or deduction, when it

appears he was not afforded due process, although his dismissal was found to be for just and

authorized cause in an appropriate proceeding in the Ministry of Labor and Employment, should

be re-examined.

It will be highly prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose on him the services of an

employee who has been shown to be guilty of the charges that warranted his dismissal from

employment.


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Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file if the undeserving, if not undesirable, remains in the

service.

Thus in the present case, where the private respondent, who appears to be of violent temper,

caused trouble during office hours and even defied his superiors as they tried to pacify him,

should not be rewarded with re-employment and back wages.

It may encourage him to do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline thatemployees are required to observe.

Under the circumstances the dismissal of the private respondent for just cause should be

maintained.

He has no right to return to his former employer.

However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for failure to extend to private

respondent his right to an investigation before causing his dismissal.

The rule is explicit as above discussed.

The dismissal of an employee must be for just or authorized cause and after due process.

Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement.

Thus, it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an

investigation as required by law before dismissing petitioner from employment.

The questioned decision of the public respondent NLRC for the reinstatement with back wages

of private respondent is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the decision of the labor arbiter dated

dismissing the complaint is revived and affirmed, but with the modification that petitioner is

ordered to indemnify private respondent in the amount of P1,000.00.

The restraining order issued by this Court is hereby made permanent and the bond posted by

petitioner is cancelled.


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SERRANO VS NLRC

FACTS:

Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann Department Store as a security checker to

apprehend shoplifters and prevent pilferage of merchandise.

Initially hired on contractual basis, petitioner eventually became a regular employee on 1985. In1988, he became head of the Security Checkers Section of private respondent.

Sometime in 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, private respondent decided to phase out its entire

security section and engage the services of an independent security agency.

The loss of his employment prompted petitioner to file a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal

layoff, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of salary and overtime

pay.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding petitioner to have been illegally dismissed.

He ruled that private respondent failed to establish that it had retrenched its security section to

prevent or minimize losses to its business; that private respondent failed to accord due process

to petitioner; that private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting employees

whose employment would be terminated; that private respondent had not shown thatpetitioner and other employees in the security section were so inefficient so as to justify their

replacement by a security agency, or that "cost-saving devices such as secret video cameras and

secret code tags on the merchandise" could not have been employed; instead, the day after

petitioners dismissal, private respondent employed a safety and security supervisor with duties

and functions similar to those of petitioner.

Private respondent appealed to the NLRC which, in its resolution reversed the decision of the

Labor Arbiter and ordered petitioner to be given separation pay equivalent to one month pay

for every year of service, unpaid salary, and proportionate 13th month pay. Petitioner filed a

motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied

Hence this petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the petitioner is laid off for a cause

HELD:

Art. 283 provides:

Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. - The employer

may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the

installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to

prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operations of the

establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of

circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice onthe workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one

(1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due

to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker

affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at

least one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year

of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses

and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or


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15

undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the

separation pay shall be equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or at

least month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A

fraction of at least 6 months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.

In the case at bar, we have only the bare assertion of petitioner that, in abolishing the security

section, private respondents real purpose was to avoid payment to the security checkers of the

wage increases provided in the collective bargaining agreement approved in 1990.

Such an assertion is not a sufficient basis for concluding that the termination of petitioners

employment was not a bona fide decision of management to obtain reasonable return from its

investment, which is a right guaranteed to employers under the Constitution.

The law also provides that to terminate the employment of an employee for any of the

authorized causes the employer must serve "a written notice on the workers and the

Department of Labor and Employment at least 1 month before the intended date thereof."

In the case at bar, petitioner was given a notice of termination on the same day, his services

were terminated.

He was thus denied his right to be given written notice before the termination of his

employment, and the question is the appropriate sanction for the violation of petitioners right.

The rule reversed a long standing policy theretofore followed that even though the dismissal is

based on a just cause or the termination of employment is for an authorized cause, the dismissal

or termination is illegal if effected without notice to the employee.

The court doesnt agree that disregard of this requirement by an employer renders the dismissal

or termination of employment null and void. Such a stance is actually a reversion to the

discredited pre-Wenphil rule of ordering an employee to be reinstated and paid backwages

when it is shown that he has not been given notice and hearing although his dismissal or layoff is

later found to be for a just or authorized cause. Such rule was abandoned in Wenphil because it

is really unjust to require an employer to keep in his service one who is guilty,

The Wenphil Doctrine Re-examined.

The termination of his employment should not be considered void but he should simply be paidseparation pay as provided in Art. 283 in addition to backwages.

In cases of dismissal under Art. 282, the purpose for the requirement of notice and hearing is

not to comply with Due Process Clause of the Constitution.

The time for notice and hearing is at the trial stage.

Then that is the time we speak of notice and hearing as the essence of procedural due process.

Thus, compliance by the employer with the notice requirement before he dismisses an

employee does not foreclose the right of the latter to question the legality of his dismissal.

If an employee is laid off for any of the causes in Arts. 283-284, i.e., installation of a labor-saving

device, but the employer did not give him and the DOLE a 30-day written notice of termination

in advance, then the termination of his employment should be considered ineffectual and he

should be paid backwages. The consequence of the failure either of the employer or the employee to live up to this precept

is to make him liable in damages, not to render his act (dismissal or resignation, as the case may

be) void.

The measure of damages is the amount of wages the employee should have received were it not

for the termination of his employment without prior notice.

If warranted, nominal and moral damages may also be awarded.


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Given the nature of the violation, therefore, the appropriate sanction for the failure to give

notice is the payment of backwages for the period when the employee is considered not to have

been effectively dismissed or his employment terminated.

The resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is MODIFIED by ordering private

respondent Isetann Department Store, Inc. to pay petitioner separation pay equivalent to 1

month pay for every year of service, his unpaid salary, and his proportionate 13th month pay

and, in addition, full backwages from the time his employment was terminated on October 11,

1991 up to the time the decision herein becomes final. For this purpose, this case is REMANDED

to the Labor Arbiter for computation of the separation pay, backwages, and other monetary

awards to petitioner.


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AGABON VS. NLRC

FACTS:

Virgilio and Jenny Agabon worked for respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. as gypsum

and cornice installers from January 1992 until Feb 1999. Their employment was terminated when they were dismissed for allegedly abandoning their

work.

Petitioners Agabon then filed a case of illegal dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the spouses and ordered Riviera to pay them their money

claims. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters decision, finding that the Agabons were indeed

guilty of abandonment.

The CA modified the Labor Arbiter by ruling that there was abandonment but ordering Riviera to

pay the Agabons money claims.

The arguments of both parties are as follows:

o The Agabons claim, among others that Riviera violated the requirements of notice and

hearing when the latter did not send written letters of termination to their addresses.o Riviera admitted to not sending the Agabons letters of termination to their last known

addresses because the same would be futile, as the Agabons do not reside there

anymore.

o

However, it also claims that the Agabons abandoned their work.

o

More than once, they subcontracted installation works for other companies.

o They already were warned of termination if the same act was repeated, still, they

disregarded the warning.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Agabons were illegally dismissed

Whether Riviera violated the requirements of notice and hearing

Whether or not the violation of the procedural requirements of notice and hearing for

termination of employees is a violation of the Constitutional due process

HELD:

I

o No. There was just cause for their dismissal, i.e., abandonment. Art. 282 specifies the

grounds for just dismissal

o Here, the Agabons were frequently absent from work for having performed installation

work for another company, despite prior warning given by Riviera.

o This clearly establishes an intention to sever the employer-employee relationship

between them, and which constitutes abandonment.

II

o Yes. While the employer has the right to expect good performance,diligence, good

conduct and loyalty from its employees, it also has theduty to provide just

compensation to his employees and to observe the procedural requirements of notice

and hearing in the termination of his employees.

o

A written notice to the employee specifying the grounds for termination and giving the

employee reasonable opportunity to be heard


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o

o A hearing where the employee is given the opportunity torespond to the charges

against him and present evidence or rebutthe evidence presented against him.

o A written notice of termination indicating that grounds have beenestablished to justify

his termination upon due consideration of all circumstances.

o In this case, Riviera failed to notify the Agabons of their termination to their last known

addresses.

o Hence, they violated the procedural requirement laid down by the law in the

termination of employees

III

o No. Constitutional due process is that provided under the Constitution, which involves

the protection of the individual against governmental oppression and the assurance of

his rights In civil, criminal andadministrative proceedings; statutory due process is that

found in the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and protects the individual from

being unjustly terminated without just or authorized cause after notice and hearing.

o The two are similar in that they both have two aspects:

Substantive due process and procedural due process. However, they differ inthat under the Labor Code, the first one refers to the valid and authorized

causes of employment termination, while the second one refers to the manner

of dismissal. A denial of statutory due process is not the same as a denial of

Constitutional due process for reasons enunciated in Serrano v. NLRC.

o The dismissal is valid, but Riviera should pay nominal damages to the Agabons in

vindication of the latter for violating their right to notice and hearing. The penalty is in

the nature of a penalty or indemnification, the amount dependent on the facts of each

case, including the nature of gravity of offense of the employer

o In this case, the Serrano doctrine was re-examined.

o In the Serrano case, the dismissal was upheld, but it was held to be ineffectual. Hence,

Serrano was still entitled to the payment of his backwages from the time of dismissaluntil the promulgation of the court of the existence of an authorized cause.

o Further, he was entitled to his separation pay as mandated under Art. 283. The ruling is

unfair to employers and has the danger of thefollowing consequences:

o The encouragement of filing frivolous suits even by notoriousemployees who were justly

dismissed but were deprived of statutory due process; they are rewarded by invoking

due process

o

It would create absurd situations where there is just or authorized cause but a

procedural infirmity invalidates the termination, ie an employee who became a criminal

and threatened his co-workers lives, who fled and could not be found

o It could discourage investments that would generate employment in the economy

o The payment of backwages is unjustified as only illegaltermination gives the employee

the right to be paid full backwages.

o When the dismissal is valid or upheld, the employee has no right tobackwages


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JAKA VS. NLRC

FACTS:

Respondents Darwin Pacot, Robert Parohinog, David Bisnar, Marlon Domingo, Rhoel Lescano

and Jonathan Cagabcab were earlier hired by petitioner JAKA Foods Processing Corporation until

the latter terminated their employment because the corporation was in dire financial straits.It is not disputed, however, that the termination was effected without JAKA complying with the

requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code regarding the service of a written notice upon

the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least 1 month before the

intended date of termination.

In time, respondents separately filed with the regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC

complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and nonpayment of service incentive

leave and 13th month pay against JAKA and its HRD Manager, Rosana Castelo.

After due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the termination illegal

and ordering JAKA and its HRD Manager to reinstate respondents with full backwages, and

separation pay if reinstatement is not possible.

Therefrom, JAKA went on appeal to the NLRC, which, in a decision affirmed in toto that of theLabor Arbiter. JAKA filed a motion for reconsideration.

Acting thereon, the NLRC came out with another decision this time modifying its earlier decision

it REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering respondent JAKA Foods

Processing Corporation to pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary, the

proportionate 13th month pay and, in addition, full backwages from the time their employment

was terminated on August 29, 1997 up to the time the Decision herein becomes final.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the court of appeals correctly awarded full back wages and awarded separation

pays to the respondents.

HELD:

The very recent case of Agabon vs. NLRC, the court had the opportunity to resolve a similar

question.

Therein, it was found that the employees committed a grave offense, i.e., abandonment, which

is a form of a neglect of duty which, in turn, is one of the just causes enumerated under Article

282 of the Labor Code. In said case, the validity of the dismissal despite non-compliance with

the notice requirement of the Labor Code was upheld.

The clear-cut distinction between a dismissal for just cause under Article 282 and a dismissal forauthorized cause under Article 283 is further reinforced by the fact that in the first, payment of

separation pay, as a rule, is not required, while in the second, the law requires payment of

separation pay.

For these reasons, there ought to be a difference in treatment when the ground for dismissal is

one of the just causes under Article 282, and when based on one of the authorized causes under

Article 283.


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On another breath, a dismissal for an authorized cause under Article 283 does not necessarily

imply delinquency or culpability on the part of the employee.

Instead, the dismissal process is initiated by the employers exercise of his management

prerogative, i.e. when the employer opts to install labor saving devices, when he decides to

cease business operations or when, as in this case, he undertakes to implement a retrenchment

program.

It is, therefore, established that there was ground for respondents dismissal, i.e., retrenchment,

which is one of the authorized causes enumerated under Article 283 of the Labor Code.

Likewise, it is established that JAKA failed to comply with the notice requirement under the

same Article.

Considering the factual circumstances in the instant case and the above ratiocination, it was

therefore, deem it proper to fix the indemnity at P50,000.00.

The Court of Appeals to have been in error when it ordered JAKA to pay respondents separation

pay equivalent to 1-month salary for every year of service.

The rule, therefore, is that in all cases of business closure or cessation of operation or

undertaking of the employer, the affected employee is entitled to separation pay.

This is consistent with the state policy of treating labor as a primary social economic force,

affording full protection to its rights as well as its welfare.

The exception is when the closure of business or cessation of operations is due to serious

business losses or financial reverses; duly proved, in which case, the right of affected employees

to separation pay is lost for obvious reasons.

Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered upholding the

legality of the dismissal but ordering petitioner to pay each of the respondents the amount of

P50,000.00, representing nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.


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Comparison of Dismiss Now, Pay Later Doctrines

Doctrines Distinction

Wenphil Doctrine

When the services of the employee was terminated due to a just or authorized cause but failed to

give a formal notice and conduct an investigation as required by law before dismissing from

employment, employees right to due process has been violated, the dismissal is legal but the

employee is entitled to damages by way of indemnification for the violation of the right.

Serrano Doctrine

This doctrine abandoned the WENPHIL DOCTRINE and ruled that if the employee is dismissed under

just or authorized cause but the employer did not give him and the DOLE a 30-day written notice of

termination in advance, then the termination of his employment violated the employees right to

due process, his dismissal becomes ineffectual. Therefore, the employee is entitled to backwages

from the time he was dismissed until the determination of the justness of the cause of the

dismissal.

Agabon Doctrine

Abandoned the Serrano doctrine and REINSTATED THE WENPHIL DOCTRINE. The dismissal is valid,

but employer should pay nominal damages to the Agabons in vindication of the latter for violating

their right to notice and hearing. The penalty is in the nature of a penalty or indemnification, the

amount dependent on the facts of each case, including the nature of gravity of offense of the

employer.

The payment of backwages is unjustified as only illegaltermination gives the employee the right tobe paid full backwages.

Jaka Doctrine

This doctrine the dismissal under Art 282 and 283 was distinguished; a dismissal for an authorized

cause under Article 283 does not necessarily imply delinquency or culpability on the part of the

employee. Instead, the dismissal process is initiated by the employers exercise of his management

prerogative. The rule, business closure or cessation of operation or undertaking of the employer,

the affected employee is entitled to separation pay. This is consistent with the state policy of

treating labor as a primary social economic force, affording full protection to its rights as well as its

welfare. The exception is when the closure of business or cessation of operations is due to serious

business losses or financial reverses; duly proved, in which case, the right of affected employees to

separation pay is lost for obvious reasons .

Final L Relations

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