FARC_EP in Colombia

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The FARCEP in ColombiaA Revolutionary Exception in anAge of Imperialist Expansion

J A M E S J . B R I T T A I N

The United States and the Colombian ruling oligarchy have, sincethe 1960s, repeatedly implemented socioeconomic and military cam-paigns to defeat the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias deColombiaEjrcito del Pueblo, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of

ColombiaPeoples Army (FARCEP). However, this offensive, whosemain purpose is to maintain capitalist accumulation and expansion,has resulted in an embarrassing setback for U.S. imperialism and theColombian ruling class. In a time of growing and deepening U.S.imperialism, it is important to examine this failure. Over the past fourdecades, despite U.S. efforts, support has risen for what has been themost important continuous military and political force in SouthAmerica opposing imperialism. I examine how the FARCEP has notonly maintained a substantial presence within the majority of thecountry but has responded aggressively to the continuing counterin-surgency campaign. I also show as false the propaganda campaign ofthe U.S. and Colombian governments claiming that the FARCEP is

being defeated. This analysis provides an example of how a contem-porary organic, class-based sociopolitical movement can effectivelycontend with imperial power in a time of global counterrevolution.

Some Historical Background

Many years ago, Che Guevara drove through Colombia and wrotein his Motorcycle Diaries(Ocean Press, 2004, 157) that the so-calledoldest democracy in Latin America had more repression of individu-al freedom than any other country he had visited. Since Ches jour-ney, little has changed.

During the mid-twentieth century Colombia was to experience sev-

eral firsts in Latin American. Colombia was the first state to receive

2 0

James J. Brittain studies and teaches sociology at the University of New Brunswick,Canada. His research interests center on revolutionary and social movements through-out Latin America, the relevance of classical Marxism within contemporary geopolitics,and alternative forms of international development and social change.


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T H E F A R C - E P I N C O L O M B I A 2 1

assistance from the World Bank (then called the International Bank forReconstruction and Development). It was also the first country toreceive official counterinsurgency and military assistance from theUnited States. During the decade of the 1960s the percentage of thenational budget allocated for military expenditure, for the purpose ofcombating peasant and guerrilla forces, was over 16 percent.

In the current period Colombia finds itself in the throes of civil war,embedded in a model of neoliberal economics and overall subordina-tion to the United States. A small group of very wealthy landownersand capitalists within the country have the ability directly to affectgovernmental policy and economic conditions. Polarization of wealthis extreme. The richest 3 percent now own over 70 percent of the

arable land, while 57 percent subsist on less than 3 percent of thatland. The richest 1 percent of the population controls 45 percent of thewealth, while half of the farmland is held by thirty-seven large land-holders.1

The current president, lvaro Uribe Vlez, has sought to implementa neoliberal model throughout Colombia by way of mass privatization,the removal of tariffs, and restricting labor unions. Uribe has support-ed measures that have reduced overtime wages, raised the age ofretirement by a third, and cut the salaries of public sector workers by33 percent. After neoliberal restructuring the disproportion in wealth

yet further increased. In 1990, the ratio of income between the poorestand richest 10 percent was 40:1. By 2000 the ratio reached 80:1. 2 This

economic reality underlies all political and legal events in Colombia.All hypocritical blather about democracy and the rule of law aside, theColombian state is ruled with great brutality by what VenezuelasChvez has termed a rancid oligarchy, supported of course by theUnited States.

In the face of this reality, Colombia has maintained a strong tradi-tion of leftist opposition. In an 1872 essay, The Possibility ofNonviolent Revolution, Marx suggested that some countries maycontain a proletariat that can attain their goal by peaceful means;however, he asserted, we must also recognize the fact that in mostcountries this is not the case and that the lever of our revolution

must be force. If this be true of any country in the world today, thatcountry is Colombia.Class consciousness in Colombia has again and again constructed

itself organically in the face of its ruling class. In the late 1930s throughthe 1950s several hundred rural-based Colombians, of communist ide-


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M O N T H L Y R E V I E W / S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 52 2

ology, organized themselves into structures of cooperation and securi-ty in response to expanding capitalist interests penetrating the hin-terland. State-induced repression and violence aimed at smalllandholders, peasants, rural workers, and other semi-proletarians meta peaceful, but firm (and armed), response. Trying to exist as anautonomous geographical community, these self-defense groups

were based on nuclei of peasants operating land collectively in rela-tively isolated regions of the country. They sought to establish a sta-ble society, uncorrupted, and based on local control, and to counterthe repressive central government by extending the communities intoother areas. With support from a significant minority of the rural pop-ulation, these localized self-defense groups progressively expanded

their spheres of influence in the late 1950s and early 1960s to includemultiple areas of southern and central Colombia. By 1964, over sixteensuch groups of communities had been successfully establishedthroughout the country. The communities, although peaceful, wereconsidered a tremendous threat to not only the large landowning classand rising urban capitalists but also to the United States geopoliticalinterests. As a result, these regions became military targets during theCold War offensive in Latin America that intensified under theKennedy administration.3

In May of 1964, the United States and the Colombian governmentagreed to carry out attacks against the rural collectives, with groundzero being the Marquetalia region in the department of Tolima in

southwestern Colombia. The military assault, commencing May 27,1964, was made possible by extensive economic and military supportfrom the United States through the Latin American Security OperationPlan. As a result, the FARCEP considers May 27, 1964, the official dateof its origin. Contrary to the reports of several scholars that theFARCEP had been liquidated; the organization not only maintainedits existence but consistently expanded throughout the country.

The FARCEPpursuant to Protocols I and II of the GenevaConventions, which stipulate that oppositional armed movements

vying for state power must formally arrange themselves into a visibleranked military constructis formally organized as an Ejrcito del

Pueblo (a peoples army) with a distinct chain of command. TheSecretariat of the Central General Staff consists of seven members(Manual Marulanda Vlez, Ral Reyes, Timolen Jimnez, IvnMrquez, Jorge Briceo, Alfonso Cano, and Ivn Ros), who overseethe Central General Staff composed of twenty-five members specifi-


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cally located within seven blocks throughout the country (Eastern,Western, Southern, Central, Middle Magdalena, Caribbean, andCesar). In each of these blocks there are a number of fronts that con-tain, on average, 300 to 600 combatants per unit. By 2002, it was gen-erally conceded that 105 fronts exist throughout the country. Figuresobtained by the author through participant observation and open-ended interviews with the FARCEP establish that there are at least anadditional dozen fronts. Today the number of regions in Colombia

with a significant FARCEP presence is substantial; however, very lit-tle analysis of this topic has been collected, examined, or presented tothe larger public.

Immediately after its founding, the insurgency was active in four

municipalities and expanded its influence during the 1970s and 1980s.It was during the 1990swith the rise of neoliberal economic policiesaccompanied by increased state repression, often carried out withunspeakable brutality by government-sanctioned paramilitariesthatthe FARCEP dramatically increased its social presence throughoutthe country. A comprehensive study published in 1997 revealed thatthe insurgency had tangible influence in 622 municipalities (out of atotal 1,050).4 In 1999, the FARCEP had increased its power to morethan 60 percent of the country, and in less than three years it was esti-mated that over 93 percent of all regions of recent settlement inColombia had a guerrilla presence.5 One example is the department ofCundinamarca, which completely surrounds the capital city of Bogot.

Within this area the power of the FARCEP extends throughout 83 ofthe departments 116 municipalities. Although its power varies in eachborough, there is good reason to believe that the FARCEP is presentin everymunicipality throughout Colombia. Some areas are formallyarranged by the FARCEP with schools, medical facilities, grassroots

judicial structures, and so on, while others may have a guerrilla pres-ence albeit in a much smaller capacity. In conjunction with the mate-rial rise of the FARCEP it cannot be denied that the insurgency hasconsiderable support from the civilian population. Over the past sev-eral years, an increasing number of rural inhabitants have begun tomigrate to FARCEP inhabited regions, be it for protection or solidar-

ity. During peace negotiations between the insurgency and theColombian government (19982002), over 20,000 people migrated tothe FARCEP held Villa Nueva Colombia in one year alone. Many pre-ferred to live in the rebel safe haven since it provided a sense of secu-rity and the ability to create alternative community-based



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development projects.6 No better example of the growing support forthe FARCEP exists than the number of rural inhabitants entering theFARCEP maintained demilitarized zone (DMZ), acquired by theinsurgency during the peace talks. The DMZ, prior to (official)FARCEP consolidation, had a population of only about 100,000inhabitants.7 By the time the Colombian government invaded theregion and ended the peace negotiations there were roughly 740,000Colombians who had migrated to the guerrilla held territory. 8

Table 1: Four Decades of FARCEP Growth throughout

Colombian Municipalities

Year Municipality Percentage of Municipalities

1964 4 0.041970 54 0.50

1979 100 9.00

1985 173 15.00

1991 437 42.00

1995 622 59.00

1999 1,000 95.00

2004 1,050 100.00

Sources: Grace Livingstone, Inside Colombia (London: Latin American Bureau, 2003), 8;

James F. Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America (London: Lynne Reinner

Publishers, 2003), 99; FARCEP, FARCEP Historical Outline (Toronto: International

Commission, 2000), 14; Jesus Bejarano Avila, Camilo Enchandia, Roldolfo Escobedo, &

Enrique Querez, Colombia: Inserguridad, Violencia y Desempeno Economico en las Areas

Rurales (Bogot: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 1997), 133; Timothy Wickham-

Crowley, Guerrillas & Revolution in Latin America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,

1992), 10910; Jorge P. Osterling, Democracy in Colombia (Oxford: Transaction Publishers,

1989), 99.

Throughout the four decades since its inception, the FARCEP hasdeveloped into a complex and organized movement. Its programaddresses a range of critical political, social, cultural, and economicissues. Based upon ongoing research conducted by the author, the cur-rent constituency of the organization has grown from its base in thesubsistence peasantry to incorporate indigenous populations, Afro-

Colombians, the displaced, landless rural laborers, intellectuals,unionists, teachers, and sectors of the urban workforce. Forty-five per-cent of its members and commandantesare women. What began as alargely peasant-led rural-based land struggle in the 1960s has sincebeen transformed into a national sociopolitical movement attempting



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alternative development objectives through the realization of a social-ist society. By constructing a substantial support base, extensive geo-graphical distribution, and an expanding ideological model ofemancipation, the FARCEP has, with the exception of Cuba, becomethe largest and most powerful revolutionary forcepolitically andmilitarilywithin the Western Hemisphere.

The FARCEP, unlike many recent revolutionary movements andstruggles in Central and South America, is a peasant-based, organized,and maintained revolutionary organization. The revolutionaries werenot formed within classrooms or churches; they are not a movementled or largely made up of lawyers, students, doctors, or priests. On thecontrary, the FARCEPs leadership, support-base, and membership

has come from the very soil from which it provides its subsistence, forthe insurgents have been largely made up of peasants from ruralColombia, who account for roughly 65 percent of its members. This isimportant to understand when discussing the contemporary forcesarrayed against it.

The Imperial Necessity of Counterinsurgency

To respond to their systemic failure in trying to defeat the FARCEPsince 1964, the political administrations of the United States andColombia have recently reformulated their counterinsurgency plans.Part of the reason for this is that the previous drive, Clintons PlanColombia, failed. Plan Colombia reinforced the Colombian militarys

dominance over the countrys civil administration, through the mas-sive infusion of U.S. money and personnel. U.S. aid to Colombia in1995 was $30 million. Under Plan Colombia, the United States gave2.04 billion dollars between 1999 and 2002, 81 percent for arms.9 Thisplan was promoted as a way to reduce cocaine availability and usagein the United States. Embarrassingly, it neither stopped the flow ofcocaine to consuming countries, nor did it provide Colombias peas-ants with an alternative to cultivating the illicit crop. In the spring of2005, it was recognized that the level of coca being cultivated withinColombia had in fact increased.

Prior to U.S. direct intervention within Colombia by way of Plan

Colombia, levels of coca cultivation consistently hovered at40,00050,000 hectares (19861996). With Plan Colombia, coca levelsdramaticallyincreased. During the peak of Plan Colombia (2001) lev-els reached a historic high of 169,800 hectares. While a slight decline

was witnessed in 20022003, current estimates suggest that coca cul-



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tivation is again on the increase. In fact, what has occurred inColombias narco-industry is a partial monopolization of coca pro-cessing, production, internal domestic distribution, and internationaltrafficking by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)theprincipal paramilitary organization. The AUC openly admitted that itprincipally financed its counterinsurgency troops through theColombian narcotic industry. Roughly 80 percent of paramilitaryfunding comes from drug trafficking.10 The reality of Clintons PlanColombia is that the paramilitary forcesindirectly trained by theUnited States and supported by the Colombian armynow controlthe drug industry. The FARCEP, often accused by U.S. propaganda ofnarcotrafficking, is merely involved in taxing revenededoras, those

who purchase the leaves from the peasants.11

At most some 2.5 precentof all coca cultivation in the country is indirectly connected to theFARCEP.12 Though the faade of a war on drugs was somewhat usefulfor a time, the U.S./Colombian counterinsurgency was weakened asthe falsehood became evident. Therefore the aligned governments ofBush and Uribe moved toward an armed campaign against the insur-gencys support base in the people under a new rubric, the war onterror.

When Plan Colombia was first presented, a surprising amount ofopposition arose against the Clinton administrations plan. As a resultof this pressure, the government agreed to limit the number of U.S.troops and privately-contracted forces allowed to enter Colombian

territory to 800 (400 U.S. personnel and 400 contracted personnel).Under George W. Bush, a self-proclaimed war president, theDepartment of Defense ended these limits on U.S. participation andbegan a direct offensive campaign of armed aggression against specif-ic regions of Colombia. This ongoing initiative is called Plan Patriota.

Plan Patriota has seen an enormous increase in the participation ofU.S. troops and private-sector forces in armed combat in Colombia.Assaults have been carried out by conjoined United States militaryand private combatants, leading over 20,000 Colombian soldiers in ascorched earth policy directed at the civilian population. The plan islargely concentrated in the southern Colombian departments of

Putumayo, Caquet, Nario, and Meta.The reformulated policy, largely dispensing with the hypocriticaldrug war rationale, is a product of the Bush administrationsexploitation of the attacks of September 11, 2001, for openly imperialgoals. Labeling Marxist revolutionary movements as terrorist ren-



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ders the term meaningless, but it helps repress domestic opposition toU.S. global military intervention. Under the new official U.S. doctrinethe terrorist label supposedly permits an assault by the U.S. militarymachine (in total violation of all existing international law), thereforehalf or more of Colombia is now subject to total war against the peas-ant population.

Plan Patriota was presented by the Colombian military as a preludeto the renewal of the previous governments negotiations with theFARCEP, which they had sabotaged. General Reinaldo Castellanossaid: our activity and the force with which it must be carried out hasto compel (the rebels) to sit down under the conditions set out by thegovernment.13 Rural inhabitants have told me in interviews that the

general has encouraged his troops to conduct murderous attacksagainst unarmed civilians, peasants, and supposed insurgent support-ers. Under these circumstances, talk of negotiation to resolve the con-flict is meaningless. The U.S. military made no such pretense. InOctober 2002 reports were leaked indicating that United StatesMarines were on orders to eliminate all high officers of the FARC,scattering those who escape to the remote corners of the Amazon. 14

The United States and the Colombian government have tried tocreate an image that their new methods of war are working. Repeatedclaims have been made that the Colombian army is winning anddriving deep into FARCEP strongholds. In a typical article unnamedU.S. officials are quoted as claiming that the FARCEP has been

significantly degraded and now there is no portion of the countrywhere Colombian forces cannot go. The piece argues that in the pastthere were huge swathes of land that FARC dominated. The govern-ment could not exercise sovereignty in those places, and the FARC

was free to plan further operations and train recruits in these areasbut now the Marxist group cannot use these areas as havens, recruit-ing grounds or launch points for operations. This past April, UnitedStates Air Force General Richard B. Myers claimed that the currentcounterinsurgency campaign being carried out in Colombia wasdefeating the FARCEP. Myers was quoted saying that were win-ning and that the cooperation between the United States and

Colombia must be mirrored around the world for the future rests onthe ability of nations to cooperate and concentrate against extrem-ists. But it is now clear that Plan Patriota has, in fact, failed utterly todefeat the FARCEP.15

Despite propaganda that Plan Patriota was aimed at fighting the



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FARCEP, what is really happening is an attempt to drain the sea.The target is the unarmed peasantry, due to the fact that theFARCEPs military capacity, power, and support largely stems fromthis group. Plan Patriota offenses have been carried out against sus-pected rebel-extended regions. During the early stages of PlanPatriota, James Hill, the former general of the U.S. SouthernCommand, admitted that the reformulated campaign began with anattack on rural areas where local peasant farmers support the FARC,not against the guerrilla army itself.16 In response to this brutal tactic,the FARCEP purposely began to dissolve into the mountains and wasable to take pressure off specific regions where they have receivedpeasant and indigenous support. But the U.S. and Colombian troops

attacking the peasants in fact builtsupport for the FARCEP and werevulnerable to ambush and counterattack.The relationship between the peasantry and the FARCEP has

remained consistent for well over half a century and is visible through-out much of rural Colombia. During the beginning of Plan Patriota,however, some observable socio-geographical characteristics appearedto change concerning the FARCEP alliances with the rural peasantry.One example of this was documented while I was conducting research

within the department of Huila. I noted that there was minimal insur-gent visibility in areas where the guerrillas had a strong presence forover seven years. In times past it was customary to be stopped atFARCEP checkpoints on primary and secondary roads or to see guer-

rilla members in conversation with persons of the community. Upondiscussion with people from the community and through a subsequentinterview with Ral Reyes, commandante of the FARCEPsInternational Commission, I was told that the guerrillas that haveremained in the area have reduced their visible presence to preventstate aggression against the local populace. Reyes explained that theFARCEP was trying to limit the opportunity for the U.S./Colombianstate forces to enter into campesino-inhabited regions that are sup-porters of the insurgency. The Colombian military has a horrendousrecord of committing human rights abuses against noncombatants,and for this reason, the FARCEP, during specific periods of 2003 and

2004, chose to limit its immediate visible presence in the hope ofdiminishing the chance of injury against the rural populations withinFARCEP extended regions. But this withdrawal was purely tacticaland as events have developed the insurgency has not been marginal-ized by Plan Patriota but, on the contrary, has increased.



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The Response to Plan Patriota

While access through the border regions surrounding the depart-ments of southern Colombia is impeded by a major effort of the mili-tary and state-supported paramilitary, internal areas are as fully heldby the FARCEP as ever and are in fact expanding. In the last twomonths of 2004, it was apparent that the FARCEP had actuallyincreased the size of its combatant forces throughout several regions,contradicting government and mainstream media reports. In just themonth of December, the FARCEP increased the size of its movementby a total of one hundred newly trained combatants within onemunicipality alone. During my interview with Ral Reyes I was told,look around, here we are. Do you see any [government] troops? Plan

Patriota has not disseminated the FARCEP. We move freely through-out the region as we have for the past several years. However, thewithdrawal into the mountains during specific periods of 2003 and2004 is quite different from what the insurgency has done since theonset of 2005. The FARCEP was tactically withdrawing before theU.S./Colombian military offensive but preparing the counteroffensive,and it has of late demonstrated a completely new method of dealing

with Plan Patriota.Since February 2005, the FARCEP has proved itself to be at the top

of the short list of armed sociopolitical movements fighting imperial-ism. The first offensives, beginning on the first two days of the month,

were labeled as the worst two-day period for the armed forces since

President lvaro Uribe took office in August 2002 promising to defeatthe rebels on the battlefield.17 The FARCEP assaulted a major mili-tary consolidation equipped with river gunboats, a Phantom fixed-

wing gunship and helicopters. A few days later the offensive wouldbe labeled as the bloodiest rebel attack in two years.18 The EasternBlock of the FARCEP (one of seven blocks) averaged roughly onemajor attack per day during the month of February alone.

Unlike past years when one confrontation would be followed by apause of several days or more, the FARCEP remained vigilant in theiroffensive. During the subsequent days the insurgency carried outsmaller tactical operations until February 9, when the guerrilla forces

mounted another major attack that ambushed 41 soldiers in the jun-gle province of Urab and killed at least 20 Colombian soldiers,wounded several, and left eight members of the 17th Brigade unac-counted for. The attack against the 17th Brigade was then labeled asthe deadliest attack on the armed forces in years. 19 By the end of



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February, the Eastern Block (by itself) had eliminated over 450 coun-terinsurgent forces. The campaign initiated in February has continued

with an ongoing series of successful attacks on the Colombian mili-tary, dramatically illustrating that the FARCEP not only maintainedtheir substantial existence and support base, but grew in strengthdespite a determined offensive by the most vicious and powerful mil-itary forces in the world.

Table 2: Four Decades of FARCEP Growth in Combatant Forces

1964 48

1965 750

1970 1,000

1978 2,0001983 3,000

1986 4,000

1991 7,600

1992 18,000

1994 32,000

2002 40,000

2004 50,000

Sources: Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Pearanda, & Gonzalo Snchez, Violence in

Colombia 19902000 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003), 15 (1991); Russell

Crandall, Driven by Drugs (London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 61 (1965);

FARCEP, FARCEP Historical Outline (Toronto, Ont.: International Commission, 2000),17

(1964); Jorge P. Osterling, Democracy in Colombia (Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 1989),294 (19701986); Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence (New York: SUNY, 2002), 76 (1992-

1994); ongoing field research being conducted by the author and R. James Sacouman

(2002-2004). It may be argued that the latter numbers (2002-2004) are high compared to

estimates from U.S. state sources. Estimates of the FARC-EP forces have been oddly constant

over the past five years even though the geographical expansion of the insurgency has been

remarkable (see table 1). By conducting first-hand research and interviews throughout ten

departments of Colombia I found that far from remaining constant, the membership of the

FARC-EP had, in fact, grown surreptitiously with the increase of the movement's extension.

It has been well documented that the FARC-EP has about 105 fronts, at an average of 300-

600 insurgents per front. This conservatively averages to 46,000 FARC-EP combatants,

which is roughly the number obtained through the interview process.

Colombias Immediate Future and the FARCEPs Role

In the spring of 2004, Ral Reyes avowed that the FARCEPs sup-port was growing and that their objective of taking state power wasbecoming an ever closer reality. Since the spring of 2004 the insurgen-cy has increasingly aligned its program to directly support the inter-


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ests of those exploited within the rural regions of the country. TheFARCEP counteroffensive that began on February 1, 2005, demon-strates the growing depth of their strength. The dynamic of theFARCEPs revolutionary strategy has developed and increased.

In May 1982, the FARC formally added Ejrcito del Pueblo, PeoplesArmy, to their name, hence FARCEP. The reasoning behind this strat-egy was twofold. The first was that the Secretariat, through a Marxist-Leninist strategy, understood that only through the support of thepeople could a socialist society be created, and in turn, the FARCEPhad to play a decisive role in winning power for the people.20 Thesecond reason was based on the guerrillas military activity. The revo-lutionary ideology of the insurgency was heavily entrenched in main-

taining guerrilla characteristics in defensive structure and militaristicoperations. However, the insurgency recognized the need to begin itshistoric development by expanding its operations into an authenti-callyoffensiveguerrilla movement.21 For years the insurgents carriedon their familiar tactical patterns of micro-level attacks againststate/paramilitary forces without engaging the enemy in a continuousfull-scale war of assault. The actions that began in the early weeks of2005 mark an important change. While maintaining its guerrilla struc-ture, the FARCEP have been moving away from small-scale opera-tions and into large-scale, continuous, direct confrontationsimplemented through well-orchestrated, simultaneous attacks onstate forces in many parts of the country. In the last week of June 2005,

FARCEP forces carried out a major ambush of a military unit in thefar southwestern province of Putamayo (the worst death toll in a sin-gle day for the military since Uribe came to power in 2002), and theysuccessfully engaged with military troops in North Santander near the

Venezuelan border at the other end of the country. Since July and thebeginning of August, the FARCEP have fully usurped the departmentof Putumayo including several areas adjoining its southwest.

The U.S.-backed Uribe regime runs a country where torture andmurder by the military and the state-backed paramilitaries goesunpunished. Repeatedly Colombia has been acknowledged to be themost dangerous country in the world to be a trade unionist, with hun-

dreds murdered in the last several years and no one yet punished.Poisoned by U.S. anti-drug spraying operations and assassinated byColombian soldiers and paramilitary, the peasants have suffered great-ly in the years of Clintons Plan Colombia and the Bush/Uribe PlanPatriota. Under these circumstances the heroic response of the


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FARCEP is a testament to the human spirit. They have demonstratednot only that class-conscious support for revolution can be created inpopulations subjected to the utmost brutality by the forces of U.S.imperialism and the murderous Colombian oligarchy, but also thatthrough solidarity and emancipatory fortitude successfularmed revo-lutionary guerrilla warfare remains a viable option in contemporarygeopolitics.

Notes

1. Garry M. Leech, Killing Peace(New York: Information Network of the Americas,2002), 9; Ramsey Clark, The Future of Latin America in War in Colombia (NewYork: International Action Center, 2003), 2347.

2. Doug Stokes, Americas Other War(London: Zed Books, 2005), 130.

3. Ernest Feder, The Rape of the Peasantry(New York: Anchor Books, 1971), 189. JamesPetras & Maurice Zeitlin, Latin America: Reform of Revolution? A Reader(Greenwich, N.Y.: Fawcett Publications, 1968), 335; and Catherine C. LeGrandFrontier Expansion and Peasant Protest in Colombia, 18501936(University of NewMexico Press, 1986), 163.

4. Jesus Bejarano Avila, Camilo Enchandia, Roldolfo Escobedo, & Enrique Querez,Colombia: Inserguridad, Violencia y Desempeno Economico en las Areas Rurales(Bogot: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 1997), 133.

5. Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Pearanda, & Gonzalo Snchez, Violence in Colombia19902000(Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003), 15; Nazih Richani,Systems of Violence(New York: SUNY, 2002), 68

6. Garry M. Leech, Killing Peace, 78.

7. Mark Chernick, Elusive Peace: Struggling Against the Logic of Violence, NACLAReport of the Americas34, no. 2 (2000): 3237.

8. Scott Wilson, Colombias Rebel Zone: World Apart, October 18, 2003,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world/issues/colombiareport/.

9. Nazih Richani, The Politics of Negotiating Peace in Colombia NACLA Report onthe Americas38, no. 6 (MayJune 2005): 18.

10. Russell Crandall, Driven by Drugs: U.S. Policy Toward Colombia (London: LynneRienner Publishers, 2002), 88.

11. See Stan Goff, Full Spectrum Disorder(New York: Soft Skull Press, 2004), 33.

12. Wilson, Colombias Rebel Zone.

13. As quoted from Juan Pablo Toro, Colombia Says Its Winning Vs. Rebels,November 11, 2005, http://www.kansascity.com.

14. Peter Gorman, Marines Ordered into Colombia: February 2003 is Target Date,October 25, 2004, http://www.narconews.com/article.php3?ArticleID=19.

15. Jim Garamone, U.S., Colombia Will Continue Pressure on Narcoterrorists, April

12, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2005/20050412_563.html.16. As quoted in Constanza Vieira, US Increases Colombia Involvement, June 30,2004, http://www.antiwar.com/ips/vieira.php?articleid=2915.

17. Jason Webb, Colombian Rebels Strike Again, Kill Eight Troops, February 2, 2005,http://www.reuters.com.

18. Associated Press, Rebel Rockets Kill 14 Soldiers, Colombia Says, February 1, 2005,http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6894272/.


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19. Jason Webb & Luis Jaime Acosta, Marxist Rebels Ambush, Kill 20 Colombian

Troops, and Marxist Rebels Kill 17 Colombian Soldiers, February 9, 2005,http://www.reuters.com.

20. William J. Pomeroy, Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism (New York: InternationalPublishers, 1968), 313.

21. FARCEP, FARCEP Historical Outline(Toronto: International Commission, 2000),26 (italics added).


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FARC_EP in Colombia

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