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GSJ Article 26 July 2013

Issue 35

Environment and Climate Change as Geopolitical Issues inthe Asias: What Can Be Learned from the European

Experience?

Branko Bošnjaković

University of Rijeka, CroatiaFormerly UN Economic Commission for Europe

Keywords: Europe/Asia, geopolitics, governance, pan-European cooperation, publicparticipation, transboundary air/water/climate environment

The 1960s and the 1970s were a period of scientific and technical advances, and rapidgrowth of production. This growth was accompanied by an increasing consumption ofnatural resources and an unprecedented increase in pollution with gaseous, liquid andsolid industrial wastes and consumption residues exerting negative effects on theenvironment and human health. The hazardous smog of 1952 and 1956 in London,which had taken the lives of 5,000 people were fresh in memory, and frequent smogin Los Angeles, Chicago, Tokyo and many other large cities brought widespreadanxiety. The Minamata disease, a neurological syndrome caused by severe mercurypoisoning, was first discovered in 1956. Then in 1962, a milestone book, Silent Springby Rachel Carson, documented detrimental effects of pesticides on the environmentand accused the chemical industry of spreading disinformation, and public officials ofaccepting industry claims uncritically. At the same time, scientific reports on long-range transboundary dispersion of radioactivity submitted to the General Assembly ofthe UN laid the scientific grounds on which the Test Ban Treaty on the prohibition ofnuclear testing in the atmosphere was negotiated and signed in 1963. In parallel,growing scientific evidence identified environmental and health effects of polluted air,water and soil. In 1967, Swedish scientist Svante Odén published the first widelydiscussed research report on damaging effects of acid rain on forests, waters andcrops. This culminated in 1974 when scientists suggested for the first time thatchlorofluorocarbons may be causing a thinning of the stratospheric ozone layer, aglobal environmental threat.

Citizens also started organising themselves in numerous associations all over theworld. Radkau (2011:124) describes the time around 1970 with environment-relateddevelopments and events referred to as the “ecological revolution”. The Club of Romepublished The Limits to Growth in 1972 that stressed the importance of theenvironment, and the essential links with population and energy. In the same year,the historical UN Conference on Human Environment was held in Stockholm. This ledto the creation of government environment agencies in most countries of the world as

Abstract: While the European Union’s environmental achievements have proved important thenext major issue is the pan-European cooperation in the broader region covered by the UNEconomic Commission for Europe. When improving security in Europe became a commongeopolitical goal in the 1970s and 1980s, several conventions on transboundary environmentalissues, including air, water, impact assessment, and industrial accidents were established. Beyondtheir technical implications and successes, such agreements have potential to preventtransboundary conflicts that are now opening to all UN member states. The lessons learned withtransboundary agreements and negotiations as well as those regarding regional seas, such as theBaltic and Caspian, could be useful for cooperation in Asia. On climate change mitigation,Europe’s role tends to become marginalized in comparison with geopolitical actors like the bigAsian economies and the US, which are less willing to come to an effective global agreement ongreenhouse gases reduction.

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well as setting up of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). But it was theEuropean Community that picked up, in the late 1970s and during the 1980s, theworld leadership in environmental protection policy and legislation.

The European Community as World Environmental Leader

The immediate period after the Second World War experienced the gradualdevelopment of the European Community. Visionary statesmen, like Robert Schumanand Konrad Adenauer, conceived of Europe as a peace project based upon closeeconomic cooperation. In 1951, six countries – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,Luxembourg and the Netherlands – signed a treaty to cooperate in running their coaland steel industries. The countries extended their cooperation to other economicsectors and established in 1957, under the Treaty of Rome, the European EconomicCommunity (EEC).

However, environmental policy came in rather late and notably, environmentalprotection was not mentioned in the Treaty of Rome. In 1972, the EuropeanCommunity adopted its first Environment Action Programme based on the idea thatthe prevention is better than cure, and the “polluter pays” principle. The Communitystarted building its body of environmental legislation with the adoption of severaldirectives, e.g. on waste, bathing water and birds protection. In 1980, the keyEnvironmental Impact Assessment Directive was adopted and after expanding totwelve member states, the Community regained momentum through the SingleEuropean Act of 1987 by devoting an entire section to environment policy.

The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a number of accidents that gave additional push tocalls for environmental awareness and action. First, in 1976 an explosion occurred at achemical plant near Seveso in Italy, whereby a toxic cloud containing dioxincontaminated a densely populated area. Then in 1982 the “Seveso” Directive wasissued to prevent major industrial accidents with dangerous substances. Two yearslater, an accident involving chemicals of much higher gravity took place in Bhopal,India. With 5,000 short-term fatalities, and the number of long-term fatalitiesestimated as 135,000 (Radkau 2011:501), the Bhopal accident was the largestindustrial accident in the world history at the time. In 1978, oil tanker Amoco Cadizspilled 68 million gallons off the coast of France. One year later, a partial meltdown ofthe Three Mile Island nuclear plant in the United States put the future of nuclearenergy in question. For the nuclear industry, worse was still to come. In 1986, anuncontrolled chain reaction in a reactor in the Chernobyl power plant north of Kiev,Ukraine caused explosions which blowed the reactor’s lid off. More than thirty-oneworkers died instantly and about 135,000 people were evacuated from thesurrounding area, leaving long-term fatalities. The Chernobyl accident reactivatedanti-nuclear movements not only in Europe, but worldwide, and accelerated thedisintegration tendencies in the Soviet Union (Radkau 2011:502). The collapse ofcommunism across central and eastern Europe, symbolized by the fall of the BerlinWall in 1989, opened the door to German reunification and the extension of EuropeanCommunity.

The 1990s was the decade of international commitments to sustainable developmentand of the consolidation of the importance of environmental information. In 1990, theEuropean Environment Agency was established to provide independent, reliable andcomparable environmental information for decision-makers and the public. Threeyears later, the Maastricht Treaty went into force creating the European Union (EU).In 1995, the EU gained three new member states, namely, Austria, Finland andSweden, that were environmental leaders. More pioneering EU legislation includedthe Water Framework Directive (2000), and the Directive on “StrategicEnvironmental Assessment” (2001). However, energy security concerns, globalisationand terrorism often overshadowed environmental policy concerns.

In thirty-five years, EU’s environmental policy made huge strides. Initially, thedevelopment of a vast body of environmental legislation dealt mostly with technicalstandards. The EU has passed legislation aimed at improving the quality of water,tackling air and noise pollution, assuring the safety of chemicals, setting standards forwaste disposal and protecting the EU’s native wildlife and plants. This legislationworks when fully implemented and enforced, and without it our environment wouldlook quite different.[1] Lead would still be being pumped into the air from cars fleet,chlorofluorocarbons would have further depleted the ozone layer, nitrogen oxideemissions from road transport would be ten times higher, and organisms in rivers,lakes and estuaries would still be choked by effluent, including the prospect of bathingin coastal waters polluted by sewage. Additionally, swathes of land would be eaten upby expanding landfills for waste, and waste incinerators would not be operating tostrict standards.

Gradually, the spectrum of policy tools has broadened with the introduction ofmarket-based instruments. Environmental concerns are increasingly being integratedinto other policy areas, such as energy, agriculture and transport. In turn, this helps toprevent the problems at their source. The present EU sustainable development

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strategy provides the over-arching long-term framework, aiming at synergiesbetween economic, social and environmental goals. The EU took environmentalleadership globally.

Since 2000, ten countries of central and eastern Europe as well as Cyprus and Maltajoined in 2004, bringing membership of the EU up to twenty-seven. The cost ofcompliance with EU environmental legislation for the new member states has beenestimated at €100 billion, and EU funding covers 4% of this sum.[2] As many threatsto the environment are global and should be tackled on an international scale, the EU’scommitment plays an important role in setting this agenda, and encouraging othercountries to adopt similar measures. Environmental policy is one area where there is agreat deal of public support for action at a Europe-wide level. But the state ofenvironment is still far from ideal. The EU produces up to 20% of global greenhousegas emissions and creates over two billion tons of waste a year. Concurrently, manyEuropeans fear that the cost of EU environmental regulation can undermine thecompetitiveness of EU businesses.

The environmental achievements of the European Community (and later with the EU)must be measured against the developments at the pan-European level. Around 1972,at the time of the Stockholm Conference, Europe within its geographic limits wasdivided, apart from a few non-aligned countries, into two power blocs (NATO and theWarsaw Pact) and basically three economic groups of countries: the EuropeanEconomic Community (EEC[3]), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA[4]), andthe majority of communist countries under the Soviet-controlled Council for MutualEconomic Asssistance (CMEA[5]). The only overarching organisation with pan-European character was the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), whichembraced all European countries including the USA and Canada. The political andeconomic future of Europe as a whole, including its environment, was full ofuncertainties. It is worth examining how the issue of transboundary air pollutionbrought various players to the negotiations table.

Transboundary Air Pollution: The Convention on Long-RangeTransboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP)

The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the constellation of two developments with historicdimensions. On the one hand, gradual political détente in the East-West conflict andon the other hand, growing scientific insight and public awareness with regard toenvironmental degradation and its consequences. Transboundary environmentalissues introduced a new dimension, namely, the need to negotiate between sovereignstates.

Talks have been mooted about a European security group since the 1950s as the ColdWar prevented any substantial progress until the talks in Helsinki began in November1972. The Soviet Union aimed to use these talks for cementing its control over thecommunist countries in Eastern Europe. Whereas, Western Europe saw them as away to reduce the tension in the region, furthering economic cooperation andobtaining humanitarian improvement for the populations of the Communist bloc. TheConference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opened in Helsinki in 1973with thirty-five states sending representatives. After the main working phase, theHelsinki Final Act was signed from July 30 to August 1, 1975. Rather than being aformal treaty, the CSCE Final Act represented a political commitment to buildsecurity and cooperation in Europe on the basis of its provisions. Signatories for thefirst time accepted that treatment of citizens within their borders was also a matter oflegitimate international concern. This open process of the CSCE has often been givencredit for helping build democracy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, thusleading to the end of the Cold War.[6]

The Helsinki Final Act’s fifth part was devoted to cooperation on environmentalprotection. Specifically:

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In 1976, the Government of the USSR suggested that a series of pan-European meetings and conferences aimed at putting into practice theprovisions of the Helsinki Final Act should be organised within theUNECE framework at the highest ministerial level. A conference onenvironmental protection was included in this list. However, politiciansof several Western countries, in connection with the violation of humanrights in the USSR, suspected this suggestion to be a propagandamanoeuvre and rejected it during the next session of UNECE . . . [They]argued that practical cooperation should be organised only on ecologicalproblems having the priority in all European countries . . . Searching forwell-reasoned initiatives, Soviet experts [concluded] that the problemof acid rain could be considered the most promising field for practicalcooperation.. The Institute of Applied Geophysics of theHydrometeorological Service of the USSR proved . . . thattransboundary deposition of acid rain in the European part of the USSRwas several times greater than the corresponding deposition from

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During a visit to the USSR in 1978, the Norwegian Minister of EnvironmentalProtection, Ms. Gro Brundtland, confirmed that acid rain from sources in othercountries caused serious damage to fisheries in the lakes of Norway and Sweden, andcalled for a convention on the reduction of sulphur dioxide emissions. During the nextsession of the Senior Advisers to UNECE Governments on Environmental Problemsseveral Western delegations expressed doubts about the validity of the hypothesis oftransboundary character of acid rain. In response, delegations of Sweeden andNorway proved that the atmospheric deposition of sulphur dioxide over theirterritories exceeded national emissions by several times. At the end of 1978, thesearguments were confirmed by the preliminary results of the Cooperative Programmefor Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants inEurope (EMEP). The objections of the Federal Republic of Germany duringsubsequent negotiations were seriously undermined by the Green Party, whichcriticized the Government pointing to the damages to forests from acid rain.

Intense, even arduous, negotiations at the end of 1978 and the beginning of 1979resulted in the final compromise concerning the character of the Convention. Therewas agreement on a framework convention with clear statements of its final goal,urgent tasks, principles and fields of cooperation, mechanisms for the implementationof decisions and settlement of disputes. The particular measures aimed at reducingtransboundary air pollution had to be determined later and fixed in separateprotocols. Yet, at least some aspects had to be clearly stated in the Convention,including the need to obtain estimates of transboundary air pollution within theframework of EMEP. To ensure the participation of the USSR without violatingsecrecy demands, Soviet specialists declared their readiness to submit data on totalnational emissions and on the fluxes of air pollutants from Soviet sources crossingwestern borders (Kakebeeke et al. 2004:12).

While acid rain problems gave the initial impetus, it was agreed that the Conventionshould not be restricted to the emissions of sulphur and nitrogen oxides ( and ). Otherharmful substances in transboundary air fluxes, such as lead, mercury, other heavymetals, dioxins and persistent organic pollutants (POP) were also mentioned at theearly stages of preparation.

The Soviet Union was the first country to ratify the Convention in 1980. Three yearslater it came into force and Norway, Finland and Sweden submitted a proposal for aconcerted programme to reduce sulphur emissions by 30% by no later than by 1993.Political pressure increased not only in Germany, but also in several other Westerncountries. It was not forest damage alone that led Germany to take an active role inthe abatement of long-range air pollution, but also the knowledge of technical solutionsto the problem: flue gas desulphurization, a new technique developed in Germany,improved and applied in Japan and imported to Germany. Similar developments tookplace to purify car emissions with catalysts developed in Japan and the developmentof flue gas denitrification, both techniques became a basis for the later Protocol on (Jost 2004:16).

Adopted in 1985[7], the Sulphur Protocol was the first substantive protocol withobligations to reduce national emissions and to abate long-range transboundary airpollution. Its merits were the following: the 30% flat-rate approach provided a clearbasis for political negotiations, the Protocol was easy to verify, and the 30% reductionwas seen as a first step in a direction of future reductions (Jost 2004:16).

It is not possible to understand the politics leading to the Convention by consideringenvironmental policy goals alone: it only makes sense if the Cold War is brought intothe context. The Helsinki Final Act, a fruit of détente, could be seen as a belated peacetreaty after the Second World War and a recognition of geopolitical changes that tookplace in its aftermath. When the Soviet Union in 1975 proposed cooperation on theenvironment in UNECE, it was hardly because of its strong environmental views. Andwhen Western and non-aligned governments responded favorably to the proposal,few of them were guided at the time by urgent environmental objectives. Theenvironment was an area of cooperation that would pose little danger to the overallbalance between the two power blocs and at the same time it could serve as theneeded bridge or communication link between them (Björkbom 2004:21-22).

The next “window of opportunity” leading to the surprising signing of the SulphurProtoco, needs some political explanation. The Soviet bloc countries were initiallyagainst the Convention. At the same time, the first Reagan administration’sconfrontational policy was trying to get the upper hand in the West-East balance ofpower. The US was pressing for the deployment of Pershing II missiles in WesternEurope to counter the SS-20 missiles on the other side of the Iron Curtain. This wasmet with fierce political reaction in the Federal Republic of Germany and elsewhere,particularly among left wing and “green” political groups, which were in general also in

Soviet sources to the West of the State boundary. Annual damage fromacid rain to agriculture…was estimated to be more than $150 million(Kakebeeke et al. 2004:9).

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favour of environmental protection policies. When the US and UK reacted verynegatively to the Nordic proposal on emission reductions, the USSR might have seenan opportunity to sow division in the NATO stand on the nuclear issue by appealing tothe anti-deployment public opinion through a changed though moderate stand onanti-air pollution measures in Europe. According to Björkbom (2004:23), a politicalsettlement was reached in Munich in the summer of 1984 after a late eveningconsultation between the major powers from both sides of the Iron Curtain.Thereafter the negotiations proceeded in Geneva without too many obstructions andin July 1985 the Protocol was signed by all, including the USSR. The fact that theSoviet Union had by then got a new Secretary-General as head of the CommunistParty, Mr. Gorbachev, might have played a role. His entrance into the political scenewas the beginning of change in East-West relations that led to major upheavals inEuropean geopolitics.

To what extent the obligations in the Sulphur Protocol pushed forwardimplementation is a matter to reflect upon. Many countries could implement theirobligations by switching to nuclear power and nature gas electricity generation.Others were “helped” by the downturn in economic activity and industrialrestructuring following the dissolution of the communist countries’ Council for MutualEconomic Asssistance. The UK’s initial resistance to the Protocol evaporated after theGovernment’s showdown against the coal miners’ union in 1986 and subsequentdecisions that deregulated the nationalized energy industry. The process ofestablishing an international environmental agreement does not take place in isolationfrom the overall pattern of national developments and international relations, andthese “external” factors strongly influence the process (Björkbom 2004:24).

As a complementary view on why it was not possible to agree on emission reductionsin 1979 when six years later the Sulphur Protocol was adopted, Kakebeeke (2004:28)formulated prerequisites for successful negotiations:

Is the relevant environmental issue addressed at the appropriate geographicallevel?Does the international community recognize the issue as warrantinginternational action?Is there a high level of international scientific consensus?Is sufficient and accepted leadership available?Compared to national measures, does international action add value?Are measures to address the problem available and affordable?

The development and signing of the Convention was largely succesful becausescientists, specialists and the general public in Europe and North America were fullyaware of the need for cooperative efforts of all countries to solve urgent ecologicalproblems. For the first time, the priority of common ecological interests wasacknowledged to be superior to political disagreements. The Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) served as a bridge across the invisiblecold-war front (Kakebeeke et al. 2004:13).

Achievements of CLRTAP

The key to success of CLRTAP was that it addressed problems in a realistic way byusing sound science and techniques that led to significant improvements. Many of thelessons that can be drawn from these achievements are valid not only for air pollution,but also for other transboundary environmental issues.

Effects of air pollution: real and serious. The process that started in Europe in the1960s was driven by concerns about deleterious effects of air pollution and thesomewhat discouraging conclusion that no country could solve its problems alone.Initially it was the environmental effects on freshwaters, soils and forests that werethe policy drivers and sulphur emissions were the prime target. Surprisingly, onlylater did the concern for human health emerge as a driving force for emissionreduction schemes, something that led to subsequent protocols which addressed ,volatile organic compounds (VOC), heavy metals and persistent organic pollutants(POPs) and, indirectly, small particles (Air 2010:4). The World Health Organization(WHO) estimates that some 800,000 premature deaths occur annually in the worlddue to urban air pollution (cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants) while 1.5million deaths are attributed to outdoor air pollution in general, mostly ground-levelozone and small particles, i.e. 6,300 per day (Air 2010:6-7). Moreover, air pollution,particularly ozone, contributes to agricultural yield loss, and thus to the problem ofstarvation and general poverty.

One specific health issue is the combined effect of heat waves (the frequency of whichincreases through climate change) and high ozone levels. Recent studies suggest thatthe overall contribution of ozone to mortality in cities may range from 2.5% to 85% inperiods of high temperature (Air 2010:25). The fact that carbon dioxide and airpollutants often derive from the same emission sources speaks in favour ofcoordinated approaches for the control of air pollution and carbon dioxide emissions:

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joint measures may lead to significant co-benefits for countries and regions.

Scientific approach, integrated assessment modelling and monitoring. Scientificprogress provided strong incentives for remedial action (Air 2010:6). Whereas scienceprogresses almost continuously, policy applications come in intervals with yearsbetween the successive steps. A telling story is the development of protocols underCLRTAP. In 1985, the first sulphur protocol was signed, and followed by protocols on(1988), VOC (1991), heavy metals and POPs, respectively (1998), and then the 1999the Gothenburg protocol on sulphur, , ammonia and VOC (Air 2010:19).

Two interlinked fields of science have played decisive roles in the progress on policyregarding air pollution. Firstly, the critical loads approach is based on the notion thatthere are pollution thresholds for different receptors below which damage is thoughtnot to occur. If deposition and/or concentration are higher than the criticalloads/levels then the exceedance can be quantified. With that, negotiators have abenchmark against which to discuss emission reductions. Secondly, the integratedassessment modelling is a way to find the most cost-effective and environmentallysound manner to reduce exceedances over large areas and to attribute emissionreductions to countries or regions where they will make the greatest contribution.Without these two inputs from science, negotiators would have found themselves in amuch more difficult position when agreeing on emission reductions and other strategiccommitments (Air 2010:20-21). Solid knowledge provides a good basis for buildingawareness and for influencing people’s attitudes and behaviour.

Started in 1977, the EMEP monitoring network was one of the first internationalenvironmental measurement networks set up in Europe. The long term nature hasbeen important as it slowly evolved over more than 30 years along with the wideningand changing of interests. Those results have been a crucial basis for environmentalassessments and policy processes because EMEP data helped to understand theoutcome of reductions done and the need for further abatement (Grennfelt et al.2004).

The reality and significance of transboundary impacts. Information on atmospherictransport is indispensable for making progress. On the basis of emission inventoriesand meteorological conditions, models have become available which can calculate howmuch of a country’s own emissions fall within its territory and how much will settlesomewhere else. Advanced modelling has indeed confirmed that 80-90% of sulphurand nitrogen deposition in Norway and Sweden derived from countries other thantheir own. To elucidate the significance of transboundary sulphur air pollution thefollowing examples are based on calculations by EMEP for the year 2000. The mainpolluters of Kazakhstan are in order of importance: Russian Federation (222 hundredtons sulphur), Ukraine (146), Turkey (120), Kazakhstan (108), Romania (51), etc. ForSweden the main polluters are: Poland (276), Baltic Sea shipping (149), Germany(120), Sweden (112), United Kingdom (107), etc. The main polluters of the UnitedKingdom are: United Kingdom (1310), North Sea shipping (143), Northeast Atlanticshipping (74), Spain (72), France (70), and so on. The figures partly explain thedifferent willingness of various countries to enter into far-reaching agreements onemission reductions since the benefits (and burdens) vary from country to country. Abig receiver of transboundary pollution, such as Sweden, will naturally take anotherposition than a big polluter, like the United Kingdom. A relevant point is pollution fromshipping is that while land-based sources have already been controlled to a largeextent, shipping now contributes to an increasing share of long-range pollution (Air2010:39-44).

Effectiveness of policy interventions. The best documented emission trends weregiven to the EU by the European Environmental Agency (2011). Across the EU-27,the largest emission reduction has been achieved for the acidifying pollutant .Emissions in 2009 were 80% less than in 1990. The emission reductions across theEU-27 since 1990 have been achieved as a result of a combination of measures,including fuel-switching in energy-related sectors away from high sulphur-containingsolid and liquid fuels to low sulphur fuels such as natural gas, the fitting of flue gasdesulphurisation abatement technology in industrial facilities and the impact ofseveral EU directives. Admittedly, a significant decrease in emissions (a reduction of21% between 2008 and 2009) occurred as a result of the economic recession.Emissions of other key air pollutants also fell significantly since 1990, including of thethree air pollutants primarily responsible for the formation of harmful ground-levelozone in the atmosphere: carbon monoxide (62% reduction), non-methane volatileorganic compounds (55% reduction) and nitrogen oxides (44% reduction). Emissionreductions have been achieved from the road transport sector for all three pollutants,primarily through legislative measures requiring abatement of vehicle tailpipeemissions.

As a whole, deposition and concentrations of targeted pollutants have decreased inEurope and North America and led to recovery of damaged ecosystems. The biologicalresponse is sluggish, but recovery is now being recorded in many ecosystems. Anotherexample of the effectiveness of policy interventions is seen in the observed and

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predicted loss of life expectancy due to small particles from anthropogenic sources: lifeexpectancy may increase by up to three years in the most affected areas. Moreimportantly, people will be able to live longer, not only statistically, but above all in ahealthier environment which provides a better quality of life (Air 2010:18).

The Pan-European Environmental Architecture: A Bridge to Asia

It was not only the success of CLRTAP and of the Sulphur Protocol that encouragedstates to develop further environmental instruments, but the pan-Europeanenvironmental scene was shattered when the Chernobyl nuclear accident occurred inApril 1986. Whereas the Soviet economic top-down reform programme (perestroika)had been initiated by Gorbachev already before Chernobyl, the era of increasedtransparency (glasnost) started after the accident. That accident has definitivelydelegitimized the Soviet system of secrecy and cover-up of ecological disasters. Itseems that the intended top-down reform ran out of control due to Chernobyl(Radkau 2011:509-510). At the same time, the achieved degree of détente was notenough for the populations of Soviet-controlled countries. Indeed, the wake-up call formore democracy and independence was unmistakeable in all Soviet satellite countriesand even within the Soviet Union, in particular in the Baltic republics and the Ukraine.In such atmosphere of prospective transition and transformation, the time has comefor far-reaching transboundary cooperation going beyond the air pollution issues.

New Enviromental Conventions

The main breakthrough occurred during the Meeting on the Protection of theEnvironment of the CSCE, held in Sofia, Bulgaria, from 16 October to 3 November1989. The participating states recommended a number of agreements under the aegisof UNECE to cope with transboundary environmental issues. The implementation ofthese recommendations was to take place as soon as possible, bearing in mind that theresults would be evaluated by the next Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE, to be held inHelsinki in 1992. Indeed, during the short period between February 1991 and March1992, three important UNECE conventions were adopted: Convention onEnvironmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, Finland, 25February 1991), Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents(Helsinki, 17 March 1992), and the Convention on the Protection and Use ofTransboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Helsinki, 17 March 1992). Inview of the role played by the CSCE in the initiation phase, it is not surprising that theUNECE conventions were supposed to have considerable potential in preventingconflicts and settling transboundary environmental disputes (Bošnjaković 2000).

These three new conventions were very different in character from CLRTAP. Theywere not intended to set detailed limiting values or emission reduction goals region-wide, but to establish frameworks for cooperative action, prevention of conflicts anddispute resolution with regard to possible transboundary environmental, includingenvironmental health impacts. In view of the looming geopolitical changes in Centraland Eastern Europe and the USSR (disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia andCzechoslovakia, and the emergence of new states), the number of transboundaryissues – not necessarily environment related – were exploding.[8] Between 1990 and1995, the UNECE membership increased from thirty-four to fifty-five countries,including twenty-seven countries in transition (CIT) from a centrally planned to amarket economy. Nine of these[9] were also members of ESCAP (Economic and SocialCommission for Asia and the Pacific) and can be considered geographically as part ofAsia. Environmental legacies from the past were affecting in serious way thesecountries in transition, and in particular in the context of transboundary rivers (e.g.Danube and Niemen) and land-locked waters (e.g. the Aral, Caspian, Peipsi andOhrid).

The rapid or even hasty adoption of these three conventions reflected the spirit of thetime, represented positive political priorities within the increasingly influential EUwith focus on environment, better information provision to the citizens andparticipation of the stakeholders in decision-making. However, it also marks thenegative experiences symbolized by recent accidents world-wide in the nuclearindustry (Chernobyl), chemical industry (Bhopal, Basel) and shipping (oil spills at sea).Both elements pointed strongly to the inclusion of numerous references to moretransparency and public participation in all UNECE agreements, including conventionsand protocols, adopted since 1990.

Public Participation and Transparency

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) has proven to be a significant instrumentfor implementing and strengthening sustainable decision-making for the EuropeanCommunity. Within the UNECE region, the Espoo Convention on EnvironmentalImpact Assessment in the Transboundary Context was the first multilateral treaty tospecify procedural rights and duties of Parties with regard to transboundary impactsof proposed activities. The Convention covers a range of seventeen groups[10] ofactivities to which the provisions apply and contains several references to public

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participation. In particular, it requires the concerned parties to ensure that the publicof the affected party in the areas likely to be affected is informed of, and provided withpossibilities for making comments on, or objections to the proposed activity.

It has been suggested that regional transboundary EIA agreements like the EspooConvention largely reflect domestic EIA laws. “The main way that the agreementsextend beyond the domestic laws is by ensuring that states apply EIA withoutextraterritorial discrimination” (Knox 2002:291). There has been much criticismabout the disjuncture between EIA formal goals and national institutionalarrangement. EIAs in many developing countries have been classified as secret orsubjected to corruption, and often completely disregarded (Hironaka and Schofer2002:224).

The principles of ensuring information and participation of the public came to fullfruition when the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation inDecision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters was adopted in 1998in Aarhus. The Aarhus Convention is a new kind of environmental agreement. It linksenvironmental rights and human rights, acknowledges that we owe an obligation tofuture generations, establishes that sustainable development can be achieved onlythrough the involvement of all stakeholders, links government accountability andenvironmental protection, and focuses on interactions between the public and publicauthorities in a democratic context[11].

The Convention is not only an environmental agreement, but it is also aboutgovernment accountability, transparency and responsiveness. It grants the publicrights and imposes on parties obligations regarding access to information and publicparticipation and access to justice. The main thrust of the obligations contained in theConvention is towards public authorities, which are defined so as to covergovernmental bodies from all sectors and at all levels (national, regional, local), andbodies performing public administrative functions. The Aarhus Convention is alsointended to forge a new process for public participation in the negotiation andimplementation of international agreements. Significantly, the Convention is open toaccession by non-ECE countries, subject to approval of the meeting of the parties.

The challenge of implementing the Aarhus Convention in Eastern Europe, Caucasusand Central Asia (EECCA) countries is formidable. “The first so-called pillar of accessto information sets in place rights that directly contradict the fundamental secrecy ofthe former Soviet Union countries. Some officials’ reluctance to share environmentalinformation may also be linked to the economic duress of the current transitionperiod, where information may be an official’s only asset. The second pillar of publicparticipation also poses difficulties for officials for whom the highest praise is to beconsidered a ´professional´. In their belief that no one knows better than they do,they are reluctant to spend time and resources to make decision-making transparentand to involve the public. The third pillar of access to justice breaks new ground forpost-socialist countries still developing their judicial systems. Though several highlysophisticated NGOs have been successful in using courts, it remains difficult for anordinary EECCA citizen to bring an environment-related legal action. Changing theseattitudes and practices will be a long and troublesome process. The AarhusConvention will not be truly implemented until openness, transparency andaccountability in environmental decision-making become everyday habits”(Zaharchenko and Goldenman 2004:229-251).

Environmental Performance Reviews

Soon after the Dobřiš Assessment (Europe’s Environment 1995) had drawn a firstoverall picture of the state of the environment in Europe in 1993, the EnvironmentMinisters decided that countries would be reviewed individually in much more detail.The aim was to examine not only these countries’ environmental conditions, but alsothe strategies, policies and tools that they used to manage the environment. Thepattern to follow with the OECD Country Environmental Performance ReviewProgramme was developed and gradually extended in cooperation with the UNECE toCentral and Eastern Europe. Environmental performance reviews assess a country’sefforts to reduce its overall pollution burden, to manage its natural resources, and tointegrate environmental and socio-economic policies. Since 1996, all Central, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe and Central Asia countries have been under review,including 15 of them even for the second time. The reviews have significantlycontributed to achieve three main objectives. First, helping countries to improve theirmanagement of the environment by establishing baseline conditions andrecommending better policy implementation and performance. Next, promotingcontinuous dialogue between UNECE member countries by sharing information aboutpolicies and experiences. And thirdly, stimulating greater involvement of the public inenvironmental discussions and decision-making.[12]

The pan-European environmental architecture came into existence due to a numberof specific circumstances, including a strong tradition of democracy, rule of law andgood governance in the UNECE region mainly dominated by Western member states.

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Additionally, a heterogeneous but strong environmental movement, politicallyinfluential through green parties, the geographic and political extension of the EU andits environmental policy into Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe helped aswell. The prospects of extending this environmental architecture into the rest ofEurasia and the Pacific remain uncertain but not impossible.

Transboundary Waters: Rivers and Lakes

More than 150 major rivers and 50 large lakes in the UNECE region run along orstraddle the border between two or more countries. Twenty European countriesdepend for more than 10% of their water resources on neighbouring countries and fivecountries draw 75% of their resources from upstream countries. UNECE memberStates are mostly aware of the need for cooperation when sharing the same waterresources. This predominantly positive approach to the problem has been triggered,in no small measure, by the Convention on the Protection and Use of TransboundaryWatercourses and International Lakes, which 36 UNECE countries and the EuropeanCommunity have already ratified.[13]

The Convention is based on the understanding that water resources play an integralpart in ecosystems as well as in human societies and economies. Its commitment tointegrated water resources management replaces an earlier focus on localized sourcesof pollution and management of separate components of the ecosystem. This approachincludes reasonable and equitable use of transboundary waters. The main and coreobligation to the Riparian States, i.e. the parties bordering the same transboundarywaters, is to enter on the basis of equality and reciprocity into bilateral or otherarrangements, in order to define their mutual relations and conduct regarding theprevention, control and reduction of transboundary impacts. Such agreements mustestablish joint bodies, which cover well-defined catchment areas with main tasks to:(a) collect, compile and evaluate data on pollution sources; (b) elaborate jointmonitoring; (c) establish emission limits for waste water and evaluate controlprogrammes; (d) elaborate joint water-quality objectives; (e) establish warning andalarm procedures.

The work of the joint bodies specifically includes also the cooperation with coastalstates, as well with the joint bodies established by coastal states for the protection ofthe marine environment directly affected by transboundary impact. The RiparianParties must also ensure that information is made available to the public on water-quality objectives, permits used and conditions required to be met, and results ofwater and effluent sampling. The Convention contains provisions on the settlement ofdisputes, including the 2003 amendment “to allow accession by countries outside theUNECE region, thus inviting the rest of the world to use the Convention’s legalframework and to benefit from its experience. Once the amendment enters into force,this will be of particular importance for countries that border the UNECE region, suchas Afghanistan, China and the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

The Water Convention draws upon the long experience with cooperation models. In1993, some 150 international bilateral or multilateral agreements existed in Europeand North America on the protection and use of transboundary waters such as for theriver Rhine. The negotiations leading to international water-related agreements wereanalysed by Bošnjaković (2003). One striking example is environmental protectionand restoration of the Danube river basin. The International Commission for theProtection of the Danube River (ICPDR) was established under the Danube RiverProtection Convention (in effect since 22 October 1998), which follows very closely theprovisions of the UNECE Water Convention and can thus be seen as its first“legitimate” daughter.

The first Assessment of Transboundary Rivers, Lakes and Groundwaters waspublished by UNECE (2007). This in-depth report covers 140 transboundary riversand 30 transboundary lakes in the European and Asian parts of the region, as well as70 transboundary aquifers located in South-Eastern Europe, Caucasus and CentralAsia. It diagnosed the hydrological regimes of these water bodies, pressure factors intheir basins, their status and transboundary impact. The assessment pointed to majorissues to be jointly dealt with in the future (UNECE 2007:2-3):

The effects of climate change are becoming visible in almost all of the analysedbasins.Water-sharing among countries often causes upstream-downstream conflictsrelated to water quantity[14]. In transboundary aquifers, abstraction foragriculture and drinking water supply may lead to overuse.Organic pollution, nutrient pollution, pollution by hazardous substances andhydro-morphological alterations require action to improve the chemical andecological status. Contamination of drinking water supplies – significant inEastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia (EECCA) – may cause water-relateddiseases (cholera, dysentery, coliform infections, viral hepatitis A and typhoid).Whereas pollution from diffuse sources (agriculture, urban areas) is a keyconcern in Western and Central Europe, action to decrease water pollution from

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point sources (municipal sewage treatment, old industrial installations) is ofprimary importance in basins in EECCA.Plans for integrated water resources management (IWRM), including for land-use planning, need to be developed for almost all basins, but countries in theEECCA region face the biggest challenges to reduce transboundary impact.

A complementary report (UNECE 2009) analyzed the organization and activities of 23joint bodies in the EECCA region by identifying best practices for institutionalcooperation. Watercourse agreements and joint bodies can be divided into thosecovering an entire basin of a transboundary watercourse, part of a basin, onlyboundary waters, or cooperation within a particular project, programme or use of atransboundary watercourse. There is a clear trend in the international practicetowards concluding watercourse agreements with the participation of all riparianstates to implement the basin approach and ensure the application of IWRMprinciples (UNECE 2009:1). The report observes that there are cases in whichwatercourse agreements do not cover critical parts of basins. The Mekong RiverCommission was established in 1995 by the agreement of the Governments ofCambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Thailand and Vietnam. China, whichcontributes 16% of Mekong’s flow, and Myanmar do not participate in the 1995Agreement (UNECE 2009:13).

Some states resist participating in agreements on transboundary watercourses,whether framework agreements or those for specific watercourses. Turkey, as oneexample, has signed neither the UNECE Water Convention nor the United NationsConvention of 1997. Turkey faces serious criticism for implementing large waterdiversion projects without consultations with Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. Thesecond example is China. Its decisions on water diversion and construction of watermanagement facilities at the Irtysh and Ili have raised concerns in neighbouringcountries and the environmental community. China participates in bilateralagreements. The Kazakhstan-China Commission approaches the discussion of theseproblems with extreme caution. Attempts by Kazakhstan to involve the RussianFederation in the settlement of the situation over the Irtysh are not supported byChina, which insists on the bilateral format of the negotiations (UNECE 2009:15).

The report stresses the variety of existing joint commissions, which differ from oneanother in terms of the scope of application, competence, functions, powers andorganizational structure. None of the existing joint bodies can be considered as anabsolute model for others, since joint bodies are established in relation to specificwaters in the context of real political, economic and social challenges. At the sametime, principles of organization and activities enshrined in the UNECE WaterConvention increase the efficiency of joint bodies and contribute to reaching a maturelevel in cooperation of the riparian states. They are based on practical experience inthe management of transboundary water resources. With that in mind, many of theexisting joint bodies in EECCA countries have weak institutional mechanisms. Thereport concludes that efforts and activities aimed at reaching new agreements andestablishing new joint bodies between or with participation of the EECCA countriesshould be guided by following considerations (UNECE 2009:40-41):

Mutual trust among the riparian States and the motivation to cooperate areprerequisites for entering into agreements and establishing joint bodies. Evenwhen such trust does not exist, cooperation may start with joint activities ontechnical issues or in specific areas of cooperation. When a basin-wide agreementby all riparian States cannot be reached, cooperation may start from anagreement and a joint body established by some riparian States with a view toattracting all riparian States to such cooperation in the future.Conducting a joint study of a basin can identify the benefits of cooperation for allpotential participants. The existing agreements and joint bodies need to beassessed, their shortcomings and strengths identified. A stakeholder analysismay ensure stakeholder participation in the negotiations, and subsequently theirparticipation in a joint body’s activities. To secure a vital future for anagreement, it is important to involve in the negotiations representatives of theministries of justice, foreign affairs, economy and finance.International organizations can offer valuable expertise and become neutralfacilitators of the dialogue between riparian States. Joint bodies existingelsewhere can offer wide expertise with regard to the organizational structureand mechanisms. Joint bodies created by coastal States can become importantallies in establishing joint bodies for relevant watercourses.

Protection of the Marine Environment

The Regional Seas’ Programme is one of UNEP’s most significant achievements of thepast 35 years[15]. This 1974 program addresses the accelerating degradation ofoceans and coastal areas by engaging neighbouring countries in actions to protect theirshared marine environment. Today, more than 143 countries participate in 13programs, including those on the Black Sea and Mediterranean as relevant for Europe,and East Asian Seas, South Asian Seas and Northwest Pacific as relevant for Asia and

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the Pacific. Each of these programs functions through an action plan, mostlyunderpinned with a strong legal framework in the form of a regional Convention.There are also several partner programs e.g. for the Arctic, Baltic Sea, Caspian andNorth-East Atlantic.

The UNECE Water Convention emphasises the cooperation of river basin joint bodieswith the joint bodies established by coastal states for the protection of the marineenvironment directly affected by transboundary impact (UNECE 2009:37). As anexample, the Commission on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution, and theInternational Commission for the Protection of the Danube River have developedclose cooperation. Both are members of the Danube Black Sea Task Force set up as a2001 platform for cooperation between international financing institutions, donors andcountries of the region to ensure the protection of water and water-relatedecosystems in the Danube and the Black Sea. Another example is that of theInternational Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR[16]) and theOSPAR[17] Commission, which promotes international cooperation under theConvention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic(1992). The two Commissions grant each other observer status.

Of particular interest is the protection of marine environment in sensitive landlockedwater bodies like the Caspian, or semi-closed seas as the Baltic Sea. For the first timeever, all the sources of pollution around an entire sea were made subject to a singleconvention, signed in 1974 by the then seven Baltic coastal states. The 1974Convention entered into force on May 3, 1980. In the light of political changes, anddevelopments in international, environmental and maritime law, a modifiedConvention was signed in 1992 by all the states bordering on the Baltic Sea, and theEuropean Community, and entered into force in 2000. The Convention on theProtection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area[18] (HelsinkiConvention) covers the whole of the Baltic Sea area, including inland waters as well asthe water of the sea itself and the sea-bed. Measures are taken in the wholecatchment area of the Baltic Sea to reduce land-based pollution, which is both a uniqueand pioneering approach. The present contracting parties are Denmark, Estonia,European Community, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia andSweden.

In retrospect, it has been argued that the Cold War politics affected in several waysnegotiations and contents of the 1974 Helsinki Convention. According to Räsänen andLaakkonen (2007:229-236), the Soviet Union used the emerging internationalenvironmental issues as a new tool of power politics. But what counts are tangibleresults achieved by the governing body of the Helsinki Commission, known asHELCOM with a “vision for the future is a healthy Baltic Sea environment withdiverse biological components functioning in balance, resulting in a good ecologicalstatus and supporting a wide range of sustainable economic and social activities.”HELCOM develops common objectives and actions, provides information about themarine environment, and the protective measures, develops recommendations, ensures that environmental standards are fully implemented, and coordinatesmultilateral response in case of major maritime incidents. Although the status ofbiodiversity appears not to be satisfactory in many parts of the Baltic Sea, HELCOMhas been successful in reducing the inputs of nitrogen and especially phosphorus.During the decade from 1990 to 2006, the direct point-source inputs of phosphorusand nitrogen decreased by 45% and 30%, respectively (Ecosystem Health 2007).[19]

There is a very different picture around the Caspian, a border area between Europeand Asia of geopolitical importance with considerable security challenges(Environment and Security 2008). In the Eastern Caspian region, environment andsecurity are strongly linked.

The Eastern Caspian region is well endowed with oil and gas resources. Growingdemand for energy, from Western (EU, USA) and Asian markets (China, India) haveencouraged competition, making this part of the world the nub of the “New GreatGame.” Annually thousands of tons of petroleum hydrocarbons are discharged intothe Caspian Sea by the Volga River alone from land-based sources. Rivers draininginto the Caspian Sea carry more than 50% of total pollution. High concentrations ofphenols and oil-products, which damage biodiversity are already being observed inthe northern part of the Caspian (Environment and Security 2008:43).

Construction and operation of military-industrial facilities and testing sites activitiesduring the Cold War arms race provided environmental impact. In Kazakhstan, large-scale testing ranges stretching for hundreds of kilometers, polluted steppes withrocket fuel and radioactivity, making agricultural use of land difficult or impossible(Environment and Security 2008:21-50).

All provinces in the eastern Caspian region suffer from a shortage of good-qualityfreshwater. The Ural River, the second largest watercourse in the whole Caspianregion after the Volga River, is heavily polluted. Inadequate access to water reinforcespoverty in rural areas and a significant proportion of the population drinks water of

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insufficient quality (Environment and Security 2008:55-57).

Intensive fishing since the 1950s, and unsustainable fishery practices rapidly depletedfish stocks. The catch of sturgeon, the main commercial fish of the Caspian Sea, hasdropped steadily from 16,000 tons in 1981, through 8.000 tons in 1991, to less than1,000 tons in the 2000s. But fishing remains an important factor in the survival of thecoastal population of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. A stable, healthy environmentplays a critical role for the livelihoods of coastal communities (Environment andSecurity 2008:59).

Caspian coastal regions are exposed to considerable fluctuations in sea level, which hasfallen and risen, many times in the past. Rising sea levels and storm surges flood vastareas containing oil wells and infrastructure, increase pollution and damage scarcefarmland. The main factor affecting the sea level is believed to be the changingclimatic conditions, especially in the Volga river basin making up 80% of the water inthe sea (Environment and Security 2008:62).

One key geopolitical question is whether the Caspian should be considered a sea or alake. The answer to this question has considerable implications for use of theresources of both the Caspian surface waters and its sea-bed. If the Caspian counts asa sea then the UN Law of the Sea would be the applicable body of law. In this case,each littoral state would be allotted 12 nautical miles of territorial waters as well as anexclusive economic zone. From 1921 to 1991, the Caspian was considered a lake, andits waters were consequently divided by extensions of land borderlines by consensusof the bordering states, Iran and the USSR. With the break-up of the Soviet Union,there were now five sovereign states (Azerbaijan, Russian Federation, Kazakhstan,Turkmenistan as well as Iran) with an interest in the Caspian’s resources. Thecountries are still negotiating on the legal status of the Caspian but an overarchingagreement has still to be reached. By ratifying the Framework Convention on theProtection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea (Tehran Convention) thatentered into force in 2006, the signatories – all five bordering states – signalled thatthey are willing to search for common strategies to protect the Caspian environment(Environment and Security 2008:26).

Political stability and security in the larger Caspian basin will be of paramountimportance for further development of the region. Caspian Sea states should furtherdevelop trust and confidence-building measures that ultimately lead to greaterregional cooperation.

Climate Change Policy in Europe and Asia: Mitigation vs. Adaptation

Mitigation, i.e. emissions reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG), in response to climatechange cannot be effective if it is not organized globally. Stabilizing the climatewarming near 2.0°C would require a global target of 50% emissions reductions forcarbon dioxide (or, for GHG, the equivalent ) by 2050. Currently global emissionflows are around 40 – 45 billion tons of each year (Hepburn and Stern 2009:36-57),corresponding to average per capita emissions of seven tons. Reducing aggregateemissions by 50% by 2050 will require per capita emissions to be around two tonssince the world population will be around nine billion by 2050. Even if emissions incurrently rich countries were to fall to zero, people in currently poor countries will stillneed to limit emissions to not more than 2-2.5 tons, because eight billion of the globalpopulation will live in these countries. This basic arithmetic shows that the rapidlydeveloping countries (including China and India) must be at the centre of any effectiveglobal deal. The USA, Canada, and Australia emit around 20 tons of per capita,Europe and Japan around 10 tons, China around 5 tons, and India around 2 tons,while most of sub-Saharan Africa emits much less than 1 ton. At current emissions,and assuming the equity principle, the US, Australia, and Canada would need areduction of 90% by 2050 to achieve emissions at the global average of 2 tons, Europeand Japan would need a downsizing of 80%. Even China would need an emissionsreduction from the present level by 60%. This explains why most countries hesitate tocommit themselves to the consequences of a global 50% reduction by 2050.

The Kyoto Protocol of 1997[20] introduced several mechanisms to achieve mitigation,the most important one being the cap-and-trade mechanism. This mechanism allows“industrialised” countries (as defined in Annex 1 to the Protocol) to buy emissionpermits from other parties to help meet domestic emission reduction targets. Despitethe enormous effort and controversy in agreeing, ratifying and implementing the firstphase of the Kyoto Protocol has proved at best only partly successful in controllingworldwide emissions of greenhouse gases. “Industrialised” countries cover less than30% of global emissions, and if they achieve the goal set, namely 5.2% reduction oftheir emissions between 1990 and 2012, this would be less than modest. It wouldcontribute only about 1.5% reduction to global emissions over a period of more than20 years, which is less than the actual annual increase during the same period. Evenmore important, no binding caps are imposed on big emitters USA (no ratification)and on China and India. While the climate summits in Copenhagen (2009), Cancún(2010) and Durban (2011) did not lead to an agreement on legally binding national

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reduction limits, the real climate continues to heat up. In Durban, the 195 parties toUNFCCC agreed at least on a roadmap for drawing up a legal framework by 2015 andmaking it operational by 2020. This new regime would see the burden of cuttingemission shared by all countries, even if wealthier ones would still be expected to domuch more than poorer countries.[21] The outcomes of international processes aredriven by national politics, not vice versa.

The impact of a changing climate are already being felt with more droughts, floods, strong storms, and heat waves. Even stabilizing the global warming near 2.0°C willrequire substantial adaptation. Since the negotiations have not achieved a stringent,binding agreement on emission reduction, and the two most important emittercountries – the US and China – show few signs of being willing to substantially give in.The world must get ready for a likely global warming going considerably beyond thepresumably feasible limit of 2 degrees. By century’s end, it might lead up to 5°C abovepreindustrial levels and to a vastly different world from today with more extremeweather events, most ecosystems stressed and changing, many species doomed toextinction, and whole island nations threatened by inundation (World Bank 2010:2).[22] Either path will force all countries to face the consequences and developadaptation policies and measures with regard to climatic changes, but theconsequences may be very different from country to country. In fact, each player willestimate and weigh the economic, political and social costs (or perceived gains) of theevolving climate change. This brings a major geopolitical issue in the picture. Not onlyunequal regional distribution of the overall consequences of global warming, but alsowidely differring vulnerabilities and perceived abilities to cope with theseconsequences.

Vulnerability is a combination of impact and capacity to adapt. Countries of the northare generally less vulnerable than those of the South, even where impacts arepotentially serious. The Netherlands, with large parts of the country under sea leveldepend on major coastal engineering structures such as dykes and sluices for theirsafety, and sea level rise is a serious threat to address. However the Dutch have theknowledge, the institutions, the technology and the financial resources to cope withthat. Another low lying country, Bangladesh, were it to be affected by a combination ofsea level rise, increased floods and decreased water flows from the upper Ganges-Brahmaputra River Basin, does not have the capacity to address these changes.

In the coastal zones, three options are often mentioned: protect, adapt or relocate.Hydro-meteorological records and climate projections provide abundant evidence thatwater resources are vulnerable and can be strongly affected by climate change withwide-ranging consequences for human societies and ecosystems. Since water is centralto many different sectors that directly depend on water being available and of highquality, water management, as essential part of governance can limit or enhanceadaptation of water-related sectors. Yet, it is the overall quality of governance whichdetermines in the first place the resilience vis-à-vis natural and man-made disastersin terms of prevention, preparedness for and response to catastrophic developments.This is evident in three recent examples: the 2005 Katrina disaster in the USA, theunprecedented catastrophic forest fires in Russia in 2010, and the floods in Pakistan inthe same year. In all three cases, the measure of disaster was mainly caused bymismanagement.[23] Poor quality of regulations, planning, and emergency responseas well as corruption can aggravate crises that will almost certainly increase as a resultof climate change.

Main Players

In the present article, the positions with regard to climate change of the mostimportant Eurasian governmental players – the EU, Russia, China, and India – areanalyzed. The European Union climate change policy[24] with its 20-20-20 targets isone of the most ambitious in the world. In 2007, EU leaders agreed on climate andenergy targets to be met by 2020, including a reduction in EU GHG emissions of morethan 20% below 1990 levels, 20% of energy consumption to come from renewableresources, and a 20% reduction in primary energy use compared with projected levelsby improving energy efficiency. These targets resulted in a “climate and energypackage” that were adopted as binding legislation in 2009 with the Emissions TradingSystem (ETS) as the key tool to cut emissions. ETS covers only a smaller part of itsGHG emissions. ETS showed that trading in GHG emissions is possible, but selling theconcept has been less successful and hope for OECD-wide carbon market is still faraway. On top of its design weaknesses, ETS has been an open door for crime. Europolestimated 90% of the market volume of emissions traded in some countries could beresult of tax fraud, costing governments more than 5 billion €.[25] Most significantly,EU ETS on its own is globally irrelevant: it covers about 2 billion tons emissions, i.e.around 5% of the overall global GHG emissions: reducing them by 20% means a globalemissions reduction by 1% only.

Most European politicians agree that achieving emission cuts of 80-95% below 1990levels by 2050 requires a process of decarbonizing their economies. However they aredeeply split on the roles of nuclear energy and “clean coal.” Whereas France sticks to

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nuclear as an important option, Germany aims to opt out completely. National policieson renewables and low-carbon technologies look like a mishmash of supportmechanisms, from feed-in tariffs to traded permits for renewables, and widelyvarying levels of market penetration, e.g. for photovoltaic electricity. The mostimportant underlying reason for not coping effectively with climate change is the stilltoo low price for fossile energy. Other important factors limit short- and medium-term introduction of renewables. Variable power generation from solar and windrequires costly development and installation of huge storage capacities,interconnections and smart grids. In densely populated parts of Europe, space forsolar, wind, biofuels is limited due to competition with other needs (e.g. for agriculture,biodiversity, recreation), and because of public resistance.[26] This may reinforce thetendency to outsource unsustainable effects by switching to the harvesting of solarand wind energy abroad (e.g. in North Africa). Given the importance it attaches tohistorical responsibility and development aid, the EU could become a possible bridgebetween developed and developing countries. The EU could exercise leadership bypursuing a global level pricing of carbon. For example, it could impose a tax on thecontent of CO₂ of all goods imported into the EU from countries that do not have theircap-and-trade system or equivalent measures (Gros and Egenhofer 2010). However,such a tariff is likely to face fierce resistance from countries whose economies dependon exports of gas and oil, like Russia, and on goods, China and India.

At the pan-European level, Russia has major significance as there is a clear divergenceof geopolitical interests with regard to climate change policy. Russia has variousreasons to believe it will be a geopolitical winner of climate change and has noproblems to comply with Kyoto Protocol due to the base line year 1990 that wasfollowed by a collapse of its obsolete industry. Moreover, Russia expects that climatechange may increase its agricultural yields and expand its ability to enhance andmodernize its agricultural food production and exports. Climate warming may alsoincrease its ability to explore and exploit fossile energy resources in Siberia and in theArctic Ocean. Russia, already heavily dependent on its exports of oil and gas, has nothesitated to use these resources at the same time as a strategic weapon in the powerplay with its neighbours[27] during a shortage of gas in the world markets. Russia,whose élite is heavily dependent on and personally involved in the main fossil-fuelindustries shows little interest in stopping to earn money by cutting gas and oilsupplies to its energy-hungry neighbours. At the same time, Russia increasinglythinks of itself as also an Asian nation. When President Medvedev chose Kazakhstanand China as his first official foreign visits, he stated: “Russian-Chinese cooperationhas today emerged as a key factor in international security, without which it isimpossible for the international community to take major decisions”.[28] VladimirPutin is pursuing a project to build a “Eurasian economic union” by 2013 (Buckley2011) and there are few signs that such a union will pursue vigorous climate changepolicies.

With China’s meteoric rise as an economic super-power it is working toward creating amajor geo-economic shift that will help it secure a supply of various strategicessentials, including energy, food and diverse industrial raw materials. Sustainedeconomic growth of around or more than 10% has been one of the root causes forChina’s growing contribution to world emissions of GHG. China’s elite is heavily relianton fast GDP growth based on energy-intensive industries to retain power. Severalcounteracting factors may slow down this trend (Helm 2009:32-33). First, a muchlower growth could be caused by a shrinking world demand due to significantadjustment in exchange rates or erosion of China’s competitive advantages, such ascheap land and cheap labour. A second possibility is that an oil-price shock maydisproportionately affect an energy-intensive China. Its strategic responses to higheroil prices include a scramble for resources, notably in Africa, Central Asia, and theMiddle East, and further exploitation of coal reserves. Lastly, a political implosion aspart of a revolt against the communist party oligarchy and authoritarian state powerremains unlikely as long as the attraction of high consumption keeps the widerpopulation calm. None of these possibilities is likely to derail China’s economy in such away as to offset projected emissions growth, at least in the medium term until 2030(Helm 2009:32-33).

However, one important risk remains with environmental degradation caused notonly due to climate change, but by water pollution and scarcity. This may lead to acollapse of economic growth, massive health hazards and ensuing popular unrest. Arecent report by UNDP (2010:99-100) concluded that if the negative impacts ofclimate change and environmental degradation are not adequately addressed in Chinathere is a danger that three decades of social and economic achievements may bereversed. Most energy-consuming assets needed between now and 2020 have yet tobe built. As urbanization rate grows, the country will need to introduce and enforcestrict standards of energy efficiency for building and electronic appliances, reducingcarbon emission from the residential sector. It will also need to vigorously developpublic mass transportation to prevent a massive increase in energy demand andcarbon emissions from the transport sector. The low carbon model may bringtemporary risks such as job losses, higher prices and fiscal revenue shortfalls.Advantages might include long lasting green job opportunities, greater

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competitiveness in new technology, technological innovation, improved standing in theworld, and reduced harm to human health along with the protection of vitalecosystems. The UNDP (2010) China report calls for the introduction of a cap andtrade system based on a national carbon intensity target and an enhanced system ofmonitoring and enforcement.

Can climate-change policies facilitate a benign decarbonisation of the Chinese, Indian,and other rapidly developing economies over the next two decades? The centralchallenge of future negotiations is to achieve a significant and rapid reduction inemissions against a sharply rising trend. Sanwal (2011:1-4) praised China for adoptinggreen growth strategy. Renewables constituted already 9% of the total primaryenergy mix in 2009 (Xie Zhenhua 2010), and are planned to reach 15% by 2020.China’s CO₂ intensity (CO₂ emission per unit GDP) is being reduced annually by 3%,an impressive achievement (Flückiger and Schwab 2010:113), but it should be seen inthe perspective of its even larger average 8% to 10% annual growth of GDP during thelast 30 years. This means that unless there will be a significant slowing down ofeconomic growth[29] there still remains an annual growth of CO₂ emissions of 5% –7%, an awe-inspiring number. These huge emissions are mainly caused by burning ofcoal: China produces 43% of global coal consumption, mostly for domestic use. Eachweek two new 500 MW coal power plants are being built[30] to cope with the stillongoing electricity demand growth of 4.5%.

Despite their presently low energy consumption and emissions per capita even lessdeveloped countries will dominate much of the future growth in total energyconsumption and CO₂ emissions (World Bank 2010:194). The concept of dichotomybetween “industrialised” and developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol hasbecome unrealistic, divisive, anachronistic and ineffective since the so-calleddeveloping countries given a free pass under Kyoto are now responsible for as muchas 58% of global emissions. Rapidly developing economies like China, oil-rich Gulfmonarchies, or the poorest African countries are neither in the same league nor dothey necessarily share identical interests. BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China)are united in their desire to end the economic dominance of the West. At the sametime, they are divided by political concepts and by rivalries (van Staden 2011:177-181). Some of the geographic groupings of developing countries articulate commonconcerns and develop joint positions, especially if they are menaced by the sameclimate-linked risks like the hurricanes in the Caribbean. However, there are intrinsicdivisions within these groups because of varying vulnerabilities with respect to climatechange.

Interventions of outside powers that wish to increase their influence in a specificregion such as Africa or in the Pacific may add to tensions. In general Western donorsimpose conditionalities concerning good governance, respect for human rights,democracy and independent justice. China does not impose this type of conditionalitybecause its primary goal is to win the trust of developing countries and gain access totheir resources. China’s position is that negotiating parties should adhere to theprinciple of common but differentiated responsibilities so as to achieve equitabledevelopment globally (Xien Zhenhua 2010). A 2010 workshop (FIELD 2010)concluded that conditionalities and distrust related to assistance from developedcountries are strengthening the trend towards closer links between Africa and China.In fact, the summit in Durban witnessed a renversement des alliances. It was the EUwhich appeared on the scene united and determined, and succeeded to forge commonposition with the majority of the least developed countries as well as two importantemerging economies, Brazil and South Africa. Their strong support for the EU’sproposals made it much harder for the Indians and Chinese to decry them as adeveloped-world plot against the poor and helpless.[31]

China and India share still a characteristic of developing countries with the very lowstandard of living of their rural populations. According to Kant (2010), the Director ofIndia’s Institute of Green Economy, there were many arguments why China and Indiashould stick together on tackling climate change. Where does India really stand inrelation to China? China has overtaken the US as the largest emitter of GHG[32]while India is the fifth largest. Yet, India’s emissions are just about 1.5 tons per capitacompared to a stable 20 tons in the US while China’s are roughly 5 tons and risingrapidly. Both have large reserves of coal to meet the demand for another 50 years andboth are competing around the world to access secure oil supplies over a long timehorizon. The similarities of large aggregate emissions, large populations, and endlessdemand for energy had persuaded some to put much faith in a common China-Indiastrategy in seeking a fair deal in climate change negotiations. But similarities appearfar fewer than the mismatch. In slowing down the growth of emissions, China isrelying on its evident demographic success in curbing its population growth drasticallywithout parallel outside the developed world. China is adding two nuclear reactors peryear and staying in the forefront of R&D in nuclear technology and nuclear sciences.China has been expanding its forest cover relentlessly for the past several decades, ata phenomenal 4.1 million ha or 2.2% per year, with a sequestration rate of 800 Mt ofCO2/a.

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In contrast, India has no population growth reduction program. In removing carbonfrom the atmosphere, India is not in the same league. The annual sequestration is 38Mt, with an annual increment of only 0.6%. On top of these sharp differences[33], thecentral cause for divergence in the Chinese and Indian approaches lies in what thesetwo countries really want and fear from climate negotiations. China’s one great fear isthe very real possibility of imposition of carbon tax linked to production linkedemissions and on emissions in shipping of both the raw material and of finishedproducts. For a country that sources a large part of its raw material from across theworld to manufacture for consumers everywhere, this would be disastrous. China’snegotiation strategies should thus essentially focus on preventing developed countriesfrom forming carbon barriers around their economies. India’s dependence on exportsis much lower and its exports are also less energy-intensive so carbon tax in not onlyless worrisome, but it might actually make India’s exports more competitive bycreating a level playing field. According to Kant (2010), India on a low-carbon path isnot possible because of deterrent costs unless it is backed by massive financial supportand very liberal technology transfer.

Both China and the US seemed to use the climate negotiations in their pursuit ofdominance in the world as the US wants to preserve its status and China seeks tooverthrow it.[34] In view of this constellation, it is not surprising that the Durbanroadmap for a new treaty was achieved only against strong objections not only fromthe USA, but also from the biggest developing-country polluters, India and China.

Asia: Learning from Europe?

Which successful elements of the European approaches to environmental protectioncould find applicability in Asian countries? One important factor in this regard is thefact that at the pan-European level there are UNECE and OSCE, which areenvironmentally relevant organizations that embraced a number of newlyindependent Asian nations. Since both organizations included the USA and Canada astheir members they could be considered, to some extent, as bridges between threecontinents. On the other hand, Asian countries have been following their owneconomic and political dynamics with corresponding consequences for theenvironment in the case of climate change. The present chapter concentrates on threekey issues: transboundary air pollution, transboundary waters, and publicparticipation.

The Convention on Long-range Transport of Air pollution (CLRTAP) cannot be seenas a simple blueprint for other regions of the world. From its very inception, thistreaty enjoyed comparative advantages due to relative pan-European homogeneityregarding economic and social matters in spite of the deep East-West divide (Air2010:4-5). It also benefited from the politically recognized organizational support ofthe UNECE, and from strong links with European Union policies. The specificities ofthe UNECE region must, however, not deter negotiators in other parts of the worldfrom making use of the European experience as they strive towards advancingmultilateral environmental action in their particular regions.

It must be recognized that not only transboundary concerns drive policydevelopment, but also local and national concerns. The effects-based approach, ofwhich the protection of human health and the environment is the prime objective, isuseful on all geographical scales. In a strictly national context it also benefits frominternational cooperation on exchange of information, standard setting, guidelines,reporting and so on. As a matter of fact, comprehensive arrangements on theinternational scale will ideally trickle down to national programmes, includingdevelopment of laws and regulations applicable to each individual country.

While acid rain was the initial trigger for action in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, therisk for acidification has been judged to be of less general importance in Africa andAsia. However, areas in India and China do suffer from acid rain and a recent estimateby China’s Environmental Protection Agency suggests that annual loss in China due toacid rain impact on forestry and agriculture amounts to USD 13.25 billion, as quoted inAir (2010:11). This calls for continued vigilance regarding acid rain in sensitive areasof Asia and beyond.

Shared international responsibility is now becoming increasingly recognizedworldwide. A case in point is Asia and the Pacific. While the ultimate goal may be theadoption of legally-binding agreements on emission control, as exemplified byCLRTAP, a realistic step-by-step approach has been employed. Building on existingsub-regional programs and networks, the UNEP Regional Resource Centre for Asiaand the Pacific has developed a joint plan for action for the years 2010-2015. Some 60countries in the region have adopted the plan. The Joint Plan is a product of the JointForum on Atmospheric Environment in Asia and the Pacific (UNEP 2010). Itattempts to facilitate action-oriented progress of individual countries but also ofexisting, independent sub-regional networks, such as the Acid Deposition MonitoringNetwork in East Asia (EANET) (13 countries), the Malé Declaration on Control andPrevention of Air Pollution and its Likely Transboundary Effects for South Asia (8

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countries), the Transboundary Haze Agreement under the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN) (10 countries), the Central Asia Environment Convention (5countries) and the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (25 countries). Theserecent sub-regional initiatives have emerged through natural processes and werefuelled by administrative links established early on (Nordberg 2011).

The effects-driven ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution wasconcluded to curb emissions from biomass burning, such as forest fires. In the late1990s, an environmental crisis unfolded in Southeast Asia caused by widespread landclearance via open forest burning in many countries, mainly in Sumatra, Borneo andthe Malay Peninsula. Most of the smoke came from oil palm plantations which usedburning instead of expensive heavy equipment to clear land. Raging forest fires inIndonesia during 1997 were particularly horrifc and sent a pall of small particlepollution over the region for several weeks at an estimated cost of almost US $10billion as well as people’s health. Due to the prevalent monsoon winds, the mostaffected countries were Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei (Air 2010:124).

The participating countries agreed from the start to find an instrument stipulatingthat legal, administrative and technical measures must be taken to reduce pollution.All ten ASEAN countries, forming a logical and well delineated group of countriesconcerned with the haze problem, took part in the negotiations and the agreementwas adopted and signed in 2002. The speed with which it was prepared and concludedwas encouraging since it indicated a concerted determination to take action. In 2003,the agreement entered into force for the ratifying countries when the required sixratifications had been launched by governments. The agreement contains provisionsfor monitoring, assessment and prevention, technical cooperation, scientific research,mechanisms for coordination and lines of communication as well as simplified customsand immigration procedures for disaster relief. More specifically, it provides forcooperation on the development and implementation of concrete measures to preventand monitor transboundary haze pollution, early warning systems and mutualdisaster assistance. Additionally, it calls for the establishment of an ASEANCoordinating Centre on the Control of Transboundary Haze Pollution.[35]

In line with the provisions of the agreement, a Regional Action Plan was prepared withnumerous detailed guidelines and other documents. A Haze Technical Task Forcemeets twice a year within an established cooperative scheme. Progress towardscurbing haze from biomass burning has, however, been modest and serious hazeepisodes have been recorded after entry into force of the agreement. The obstacles tosignificant progress may partly rest with the structure and priorities of ASEAN as apolitical/technical body. However, the less than satisfactory implementation record ismainly caused by Indonesia’s current decision not to ratify and implement theinstrument. Thus, the provisions of the agreement are not legally binding for thecountry which is perceived as being by far the greatest contributor to haze inSoutheast Asia. Another obstacle to progress is the lack of enforcement and liabilityclauses in the agreement. An envisaged future revision of the instrument shouldaddress the weaknesses and quantify required emission reductions based onassessment of effects and damage, including costs for the whole region (Air 2010:125-126).

The ASEAN Haze Agreement is the only one that contains stipulations for concreteemission reductions as the other arrangements so far have concentrated onmonitoring, reporting and assessments (Nordberg 2011). Signficantly, all ongoinginitiatives in Asia make reference to relevant features of CLRTAP and links are beingestablished to improve both science and policy. EANET, the Malé Declaration and theASEAN Haze Agreement have many reasons not only to further link up with eachother but also to seek to incorporate more countries into the respective schemes.Initiatives such as EANET and the Malé Declaration which have their secretariatswithin the same body (AIT/UNEP RRC.AP[36] in Bangkok) may profit from evencloser links with each other by sharing information on monitoring, methodology andpolicy development (Air 2010:95-97).

Whereas progress toward cooperative action on reducing transboundary air pollutionin South-East Asia is getting visible, the corresponding situation on transboundarywaters is still in an embryonic stage of development. One reason for that may be thatthe management and protection of transboundary waters, be it river basins orregional seas, is much more prone to territorial disputes and claims concerning muchsought-after resources mean the unwillingness of several Asian countries toparticipate in agreements on transboundary watercourses. Another case in point isthe South-China Sea, together with its tributaries.

The South China Sea is a strategic body of water surrounded by nations that arecurrently at the helm of industrialization and rapid economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region. Bordered by China to the north, the Philippines to the east; Malaysia,Singapore, Indonesia and Brunei to the south; Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam to thewest; the South China Sea has always been central to issues of economic and politicalstability in Southeast Asia and adjacent regions. Today, it is central to defining

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environmental sustainability and food security for its coastal nations. The coastal sub-regions are home to 270,000,000 people or 5% of the world’s population. About 122major rivers drain 2.5 million km2 of catchment area and deliver materials, nutrientsand pollutants to the South China Sea (Talaue 2000:1).

Wastes from domestic, agricultural, and industrial sources, along with sediments andsolid wastes are the major sources of pollutants that impinge on both freshwater andcoastal systems in the seven countries. Land-based sources play a major role in bothinland and coastal pollution. Ship-based sources contribute relatively small amounts,but may have severe impacts when large volumes are released such as during majoroil spills (Talaue 2000:51-52).

Tributary river systems of the South-China Sea coastal countries, with the exceptionof Cambodia and Malaysia, are moderately to heavily polluted using standard waterquality parameters. This is especially evident in rivers running through denselypopulated urban areas of China, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. Themouths of these rivers are pollution hot spots, and mitigation at the source end fromboth point and diffuse sources will have to be dealt with (Talaue 2000:65).

The UNEP/GEF project “Reversing environmental degradation trends in the SouthChina Sea and Gulf of Thailand” harvested technical and economic insight in thepatterns of environmental degradation. Within this the Regional Task Force on LegalMatters was given the responsibility to review national legislation applicable to coastalhabitats, and the obligations of member states to co-operate regionally that derivedfrom various global environmental conventions. The conclusion was that existingregional co-operative mechanisms are not adequate to deal with transboundaryenvironmental problems in the South China Sea and that a framework for co-operation in the management of the marine environment of the South China Sea andGulf of Thailand should be developed based on four “legs”: Principles and Policies;Regional Strategic Action Programme; Sub-regional and Bilateral Agreements; andExisting National Action Plans (Pernetta 2009).

Another research report, for example, addressed the need of integrated waterresource management in the basin of the Red River, a tributary of the South ChinaSea. The basin is shared by China, Laos and Vietnam. “Many issues arisen from socio-economic development in different parts of the Basin belonging to all three countries,including the reservoir building and waste discharging from the upstream area,belonging to China, affect more and more severely the downstream areas of Vietnam.Thus, integrated water resource management in the Red River basin has to beconsidered as a transboundary issue, requiring the joint efforts of the three countries.Unfortunately, this topic unto now is not appropriately addressed (Van Diep 2007).”

These examples indicate a more general pattern showing a widespread lack ofwillingness, or ability, to cooperate on transboundary water issues, especially if powerpolitics and territorial claims overshadow them. There is a need to establish, both onthe water quality and on water management, a more balanced picture throughexchange and dialogue by crossing hands across the borders. Whether some Asiancountries wish to join the UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use ofTransboundary Watercourses and International Lakes is still an open question.However, such a step would be helpful not only from the point of view of fosteringtransboundary water cooperation, but also in the interest of regional security.

Public Participation, Transparency, and Good Governance

Successful environmental policies must be based on sound science, but that is notenough. As has been pointed out by Radkau (2011:457), “effective environmentalprotection stands no chance without the trio of citizens’ movement, dedicated mediaand environmentally conscious civil servants.” Such an interplay is only possible in acountry with good governance, implying an independent judiciary, high degree oftransparency, and participation of the public in decision-making. There are clearindications that effective governance goes hand in hand with good environmentalperformance.[37] The Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI), developed by aWorld Economic Forum Task Force (2001) and based on 67 variables, is a measure ofoverall progress towards sustainability in 122 countries. A remarkable fact is thatReducing Corruption is the variable that has the highest correlation with the ESI. Thisfact supports the view that good governance, broadly conceived, enhancesenvironmental sustainability. The non-governmental organisation TransparencyInternational (TI)[38] first released in 1995 its Corruption Perception Index (CPI). TIhas been widely credited with putting the issue of corruption on the internationalpolicy agenda. CPI ranks countries by their perceived levels of corruption, asdetermined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. Research by Pellegrini andGerlagh (2005) examined the variance in environmental policies in the enlargedEurope. Stringency of environmental regulations countries were measured by theEnvironmental Regulatory Regime Index (ERRI).[39] Their research concluded thatdifferences in corruption levels across countries appear to be more important thanincome differences. Therefore, the lower environmental standards in pre-accession

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states were not primarily implied by lower income levels but likely reflected lowinstitutional quality. This is a powerful rationale for new and acceding member statesto adjust to EU legislation both in letter and in spirit, meaning more transparency andless corruption, especially at the judiciary level. The EC Directive 90/313/EEC on thefreedom of access to information on the environment, related to the Aarhus UNECEConvention, imposes the duty to ensure that information held by publicly accountablebodies be available to the public.

Most Asian countries are still far from that standard. It is instructive to compare theCPI of selected European and Asian countries, whereby the score ranges between 0(worst corruption) and 10 (no corruption). During the last 5 years, the CPI score ofthe 20 highest ranking countries ranged between 7.2 and 9.6. Among these “leaders”in transparency, 15 were European and American UNECE members, whereas onlythree were Asian: Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japan[40]. For comparison: SouthKorea’s CPI medium-level score was during this period stagnating around 5.4, China’saround 3.5, India’s around 3.4, and Indonesia’s low score was slowly increasing from2.4 to 2.8.

Observations by Bello (2007) about the environmental movements in the global Southare highly relevant for Asian countries. “Among the most advanced environmentalmovements are those in Korea and Taiwan, which were once known as NewlyIndustrializing Countries (NICs). This should not be surprising since the process ofrapid industrialization in these two societies from 1965 to 1990 took place with fewenvironmental controls, if any . . . The environmental movements in both societieswere able to force government to come out with restrictive new rules on toxics,industrial waste, and air pollution. Ironically, however, these successful cases of citizenaction created a new problem, which was the migration of polluting industries fromTaiwan and Korea to China and Southeast Asia. Along with Japanese firms, Koreanand Taiwanese enterprises went to Southeast Asia and China mainly for two reasons:cheap labor and lax environmental laws… Because the environment was not perceivedby authoritarian regimes as “political,” organizing around environmental and publichealth issues was not initially proscribed. Thus environmental struggles became anissue around which the anti-dictatorship movement could organize and reach newpeople. Environmental destruction became one more graphic example of a regime’sirresponsibility.” According to Bello (2007) “the environmental movement in Chinaexhibits many of the same dynamics observed in the NICs and Southeast Asia. Theenvironmental crisis in China is very serious. Water pollution and water scarcity; soilpollution, soil degradation and desertification; global warming and the coming energycrisis — these are all by-products of China’s high-speed industrialization andmassively expanded consumption . . .In terms of public health, the rural healthinfrastructure has practically collapsed . . . Another big public health issue has beenfood safety.” As in Taiwan and Korea 15 years earlier, Bello (2007) sees“unrestrained export-oriented industrialization bringing together low-wage migrantlabor, farming communities whose lands are being grabbed or ruined environmentally,environmentalists, and the proponents of a major change in political economy . . .Indeed, a great many of recorded protests fused environmental, land-loss, income,and political issues. From 8,700 in 1995, what the Ministry of Public Security calls‘mass group incidents’ have grown to 87,000 in 2005, most of them in the countryside. . . But the strength of China’s environmental movement must not be exaggerated.Its failures often outnumber its successes. Alliances are often spontaneous and do notgo beyond the local level . . . A national ‘red green’ coalition for change remains apotential force, one that is waiting to be constructed. Nevertheless, the environmentalmovement is no longer a marginal actor and it is definitely something that the stateand big capital have to deal with.”

No Asian country has seen the emergence of a powerful Green Party as is the case inmany EU countries. Nonetheless, the environment is firmly on the agenda of themajor Asian powers, and the call for more openness and transparency cannot gounheard in the long term. Political modernization will necessarily follow economic andtechnological modernisation. Gorbachev’s bon mot “He who comes too late is punishedby life” was based on his own experience, not the least after the Chernobyl nuclearaccident. Before being able and willing to join the Aarhus convention, many deficitsneed to be overcome by most Asian countries in the area of the quality of governance.As an intermediate step, it would make sense for a number of emerging Asianeconomies to join or set up a system of Environmental Performance Reviews (EPR)using the experience of those countries that are already part of such a system, eitherwithin the UNECE or within the OECD. Experience collected during EPR exerciseswould be invaluable for fostering self-critical and cooperative attitudes that areindispensable in the field of environment.

Conclusion

A comparison of the environmental policy approaches of the EU, and to some extent ofUNECE, with those of Asian countries reveals numerous differences. Some are clearlyrelated to socio-economic factors such as the GDP and income inequalities. Whileothers are connected to how governments make and implement decisions in both the

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domestic and transboundary contexts. The present chapter has highlighted twodecisive factors: the quality of domestic governance, which includes such elements astransparency and public participation in decision-taking, and the ability to cooperateand find negotiated solutions for environmental problems with transboundarycharacter.

The successes of EU environmental policy are largely due to a strong environmentalmovement that exercise a considerable political influence in parliaments andgovernments. This ascent of the “Greens” would not have been imaginable withoutEuropean democratic traditions. History shows that non-transparency inenvironmental matters can seriously backfire on the political and industrialestablishment, especially if a serious accident occurs. A case in point is the aftermathof the nuclear accidents in Chernobyl in 1986 and 2011 in Fukushima. Accidents withenvironmental and public health consequences mobilize public indignation and protestnot only because they generate fears, but also because they reveal mismanagementand corruption that had been concealed through lack of transparency. It seems thatsome authoritarian leaderships increasingly realize the importance of quick responseto public protests, such as after a recent accident with a chemical plant in Dalian,China.[41]

With GHG emissions continuing at present pace, nations will have no choice but toadapt to a considerably modified climate. The resilience with regard to theconsequences of climate change will be strongly determined by the quality of domesticgovernance. The Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), a Japan-basedscientific establishment, concluded in 2001 that “environmental problem solving inthe Asian region is made complex by differences in economic, political and culturalconditions. A challenge for the region is to develop governance mechanisms that canaddress both regional and global environmental problems” (Air 2010:122-123).

The interplay of UNECE and CSCE towards the end of the Cold War was a decisivefactor in developing the pan-European environmental architecture. Such a “window ofopportunity” and corresponding interplay of organisations may or may not arise in theAsian/Pacific contexts. European experience with negotiating and implementingagreements on transboundary air pollution and water issues, both at the regional andbasin level, resulted in important “lessons learned,” as elaborated in previouschapters. Prerequisites for successful negotiations include that the environmentalissue be addressed at the appropriate geographic level. There must be a high level ofinternational scientific consensus, knowledge of measures to alleviate the burden andinternational action that adds value to domestic measures. In case of transboundarywaters and seas, mutual trust and motivation to cooperate through joint bodies are ofprime importance. Even when such trust does not exist, the cooperation may startwith joint activities of national authorities on technical issues or in specific areas ofcooperation. Several important Asian nations have been reluctant to enter into suchnegotiations, even where it seemed plausible that cooperation might contribute toconflict prevention and would alleviate problems of affected parties related toenvironmental degradation. The negotiations between India and Bangladesh duringthe last few years for a comprehensive water agreement could be seen as a catalyserto improve their overall relationships.[42]

While the initiative and determination to take action and negotiate multilateralagreements generally originates in the governments themselves, the fora necessaryfor coordinated support, such as regional UNEP offices, regional United NationsEconomic Commissions and non-UN intergovernmental bodies, may proposecooperation on commonly shared issues such as transboundary air pollution. Countriesshould take advantage of such opportunities (Air 2010:80-82). The prospect of manyAsian countries to join UNECE conventions seem uncertain at this time. Especially tojoin the Aarhus Convention would require an acceptable level of respect for humanrights, good governance principles and an independent and effective judiciary. Joiningthe Water Convention would require readiness to cooperate, eventually through jointbodies. But the umbrella of the Water Convention would open also numerous “soft”ways to cooperate, e.g. through assessments of transboundary rivers, lakes andground waters.

The interplay between domestic and foreign policy is also key for environmentalprotection. Zelikow (2011) described how this interplay is evolving: “In the pastforeign policy mainly consisted of adjusting relations between states – what they willdo with each other. Now foreign policy mainly consists of adjusting the domesticpolicies of different states . . . Foreign policies should focus on how to harmonise´domestic´policies . . .The most pressing concerns of global firms, beyond formal traderules, are . . . government procurement, competition policy, product safety andintellectual property law . . .Then there are the great issues of energy, ecology, orpublic health . . .The diplomats on the front lines working on these topics rarely arethe officials who, back home, have the authority or expertise to act . . .This implies amodel of distributed foreign policy making, in which many ministries and NGOs willmove into the foreground of diplomacy . . . Rather than being coordinated by a centralauthority, policy will mainly be concerted in loose, common frameworks that

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sometimes defer to ‘sovereignty hawks’. These birds are at least as numerous inChina and India as they are in the US . . . But our world has changed in deep ways . . .Crises can be an occasion to change older ways of doing business.”

Similiarly, Radkau (2011:465) was referring to the influential German sociologistNiklas Luhmann who realized how modern society is differentiated into a variety ofsub-systems with proper language, proper communication networks, and havingproper blinders on, which obstruct a grand synthesis. As great Asian nations arepropelled forward, and develop into motors of global modernization it becomes anurgent task to overcome thinking in sub-systems and to strive for a synthesis forsustainable development.

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Notes

[1] See the European Environment Agency at www.eea.europa.eu/environmental-time-line/a-europe-of-firsts-environmental-achievements (accessed 20 February2012).

[2] Civitas EU Facts at www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSENV/ENV1.htm (accessed 20February 2012; corrected 14 April 2014).

[3] Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands.

[4] Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

[5] Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German DR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania,USSR, and Vietnam.

[6] CSCE became OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) onJanuary 1, 1995. OSCE´s agenda addresses politico-military; economic andenvironmental; and human dimensions. Environmental activities address ecologicthreats to security. www.osce.org/ (accessed 20 February 2012).

[7] There were 19 signatures; the US and the UK did not sign.

[8] For an early analysis, see Bošnjaković (1993).

[9] Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation,Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

[10] Including: nuclear and thermal power stations; road and railway construction;chemical installations; waste disposal facilities; oil refineries; oil and gas pipelines;mining; steel production; pulp and paper manufacturing; construction of dams andreservoirs; ground water abstraction; construction of ports and water ways.

[11] Aarhus Convention websitehttp://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.html (accessed 20 February 2012).

[12]UNECE website: http://www.unece.org/env/epr/welcome.html (accessed 20February 2012).

[13] UNECE website: http://live.unece.org/env/water.html (accessed 20 February2012).

[14] For a most recent and complete overview, see Chellaney (2011).

[15] UNEP Regional Seas Programme website: www.unep.org/regionalseas/(accessed 20 February 2012).

[16] ICPR website: www.iksr.org/ (accessed 20 February 2012).

[17] OSPAR is the mechanism by which fifteen Governments of the western coastsand catchments of Europe, together with the European Community, cooperate toprotect the marine environment of the North-East Atlantic. Starting with the OsloConvention against dumping at sea, it was broadened to cover land-based sources andthe offshore industry by the Paris Convention of 1974. These two conventions wereunified, up-dated and extended by the 1992 OSPAR Convention. OSPAR website:www.ospar.org/ (accessed 20 February 2012).

[18] Helsinki Convention website: www.helcom.fi/ (accessed 20 February 2012).

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[19] One of the reasons for the successful functioning of HELCOM is that there is anoverarching political forum for regional intergovernmental cooperation in the BalticSea region in the form of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), established in1992. www.cbss.org (accessed 27 February 2012).

[20] Under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change ( UNFCCC).www.unfccc.int/ (accessed 28 February 2012).

[21] A deal in Durban. The Economist, December 11, 2011.

[22] The recent Pacific Islands Forum in Auckland described climate change as thelargest threat to the region and demanded financial support for the process ofrelocating the inhabitans of some of its member States, reported Neue ZürcherZeitung, 9 September 2011, p. 2.

[23] For a more detailed discussion, see Bošnjaković (2010), footnotes on p. 15.

[24] European Commission Climate Action website:http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm (accessed 20 February 2012).

[25] Tax fraud loses EU carbon trading billions: Europol. EUbusiness, 10 December2009 : see also : Steuerbetrug weitet sich aus, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 8 March 2011,p. 9.

[26] Öko-Strom im Gegenwind, Neue Zürcher Zeitung am Sonntag, 10 April 2011, p.17.

[27] Russian gas and oil politics was used to exert political pressure in various ways onits neighbours or nearneighbours including Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic,Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia and Turkmenistan.

[28] Medvedev says Russia-China force to be reckoned with, Agence France-Presse,May 24, 2008.

[29] According to the recently adopted Five Years’ Plan, the growth should be sloweddown to 7% per year. China verordnet sich langsameres Wachstum. Neue ZürcherZeitung, 15 March 2011, p. 25

[30] The Future of Coal. 2007. MIT, as quoted by Flückiger and Schwab (2010:107).

[31] A deal in Durban. The Economist, December 11, 2011.

[32] In 2010, China hit two more records: it displaced Japan as the second economicpower in the world and became number one in energy consumption.

[33] There has been continuing rivalry and tensions between the two countries inmany theaters, including several military clashes because of China’s claims onterritories in Kashmir. Significantly, the contested area includes glaciers in theHimalayas, one of the largest storehouses of fresh waters outside the Polar regions.

[34] According to Schmidt-Glintzer (2008:153-163, 266-267), contemporary China,in its process of modernization, cannot escape its historic reminiscences of the deeplytraumatic humiliations imposed by Western powers during the 19th century.

[35] For full text of the agreement, see www.aseansec.org/agr_haze.pdf (accessed 20February 2012).

[36] AIT/UNEP RRC.AP stands for Asian Institute of Technology- United NationsEnvironment Programme Regional Resource Centre for Asia and the Pacific.

[37] See Fig. 8.6 in (World Bank 2010).

[38] TI website: www.transparency.org (accessed 20 February 2012).

[39] For the definition of ERRI, see Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2005) and referencesquoted there (Esty 2002).

[40] These scores are in line with the observation of Radkau (2011: 454 – 455) aboutthe pioneering role of Japan in sustainable forestry and environmental policy, whichwas later picked up by Singapore and Hong Kong.

[41] Chemiewerk schliesst nach Protest. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, August 17, 2011, p.6.

[42] These negotiations were useful even if a final agreement failed due to resistance

Bošnjaković, GSJ (26 July 2013), page 22

of a provincial government in India. See: Indien nähert sich dem östlichen Nachbarn.Neue Zürcher Zeitung, September 8, 2011, p. 3.

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