NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,Petitioner,

- versus -

SPOUSES BERNARDO ANDMINDALUZ SALUDARES,Respondents.

G. R. No. 189127

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,BRION,PEREZ,SERENO, andREYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 25, 2012x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NSERENO, J.: This Rule 45 Petition questions the 21 July 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), [1]  which affirmed the 10 September 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), [2]  Branch 31, Tagum City. The RTC had ruled that respondent spouses are entitled to ₱4,920,750 as just compensation for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR).Sometime in the 1970s, NAPOCOR constructed high-tension transmission lines to implement the Davao-Manat 138 KV Transmission Line Project. [3]  These transmission lines traversed a 12,060-square meter portion of a parcel of agricultural land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-15343 and owned by Esperanza Pereyras, Marciano Pereyras, Laureano Pereyras and Mindaluz Pereyras. In 1981, NAPOCOR commenced expropriation proceedings covering TCT No. T-15343 in National Power Corporation v. Esperanza Pereyras, Marciano Pereyras, Laureano Pereyras and Mindaluz Pereyras . [4]  These proceedings culminated in a final Decision ordering it to pay the amount of ₱300,000 as just compensation for the affected property. [5]

 The trial court issued an Order [6]  subrogating Tahanan Realty Development Corporation to the rights of the defendants in  National Power Corporation v. Pereyras.Pursuant to this Order, NAPOCOR paid the corporation the judgment award of ₱300,000 [7]  and Tahanan Realty Development Corporation executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the former. [8]  This Deed covered Lot 481-B, Psd-11012718, which was a portion of Lot 481, Cad. 276 of Barrio Magugpo, Municipality of Tagum, Davao. [9]

 Respondent Spouses Bernardo and Mindaluz Pereyras-Saludares are registered owners of a 6,561-square-meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109865, [10]  more particularly described as follows: A parcel of land (Lot 15, Pcs-11-000704, Amd.), being a portion of Lots 481-D, Psd-11-012718; 480-B, Psd-51550; H-148559 & 463-A-2 (LRC) Psd-150796, situated in the Barrio of Magugpo, Mun. of Tagum, Province of Davao, Island of Mindanao. x x x [11]

 On 19 August 1999, respondents filed the instant Complaint against NAPOCOR and demanded the payment of just compensation. They alleged that it had entered and occupied their property by erecting high-tension transmission lines therein and failed to reasonably compensate them for the intrusion. [12]

 Petitioner averred that it already paid just compensation for the establishment of the transmission lines by virtue of its compliance with the final and executory Decision inNational Power Corporation v. Pereyras. Furthermore, assuming that respondent spouses had not yet received adequate compensation for the intrusion upon their property, NAPOCOR argued that a claim for just compensation and damages may only be filed within five years from the date of installation of the transmission lines pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6395. [13]

 Pretrial terminated without the parties having entered into a compromise agreement. [14]  Thereafter, the court appointed Lydia Gonzales and Wilfredo Silawan as Commissioners for the purpose of determining the valuation of the subject land. [15]  NAPOCOR recommended Loreto Monteposo as the third Commissioner, [16]  but later clarified that its conformity to the appointment of commissioners was only for the purpose of determining the exact portion of the subject land, and that it was not admitting its liability to pay just compensation. [17]

 After the proceedings, the Commissioners recommended the amount of ₱750 per square meter as the current and fair market value of the subject property based on the Schedule of Market Values of Real Properties within the City of Tagum effective in the year 2000. [18]

 Trial on the merits ensued. On 10 September 2002, the Court rendered judgment in favor of respondent spouses, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, and against the defendant-National Power Corporation, ordering the latter to pay the plaintiffs the Just Compensation as herein fixed which they claimed for the use, occupation and utilization of their land from which it benefited and profited since January 1982 , as follows: First : To pay plaintiff Spouses Bernardo and Mindaluz Saludares as just compensation of their 6,561 square meters, more or less, titled land covered by TCT No. T-109865 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao del Norte hereby fixed in the amount of FOUR MILLION NINE HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY (₱4,920,750.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum reckoned from January 01, 1982, until said amount is fully paid, or deposited in Court; Second : To pay plaintiffs-spouses Bernardo and Mindaluz Saludares attorneys fees of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos, Philippine

Currency, plus appearance fee of ₱2,000.00 per appearance and litigation expenses which shall be supported in a Bill of Costs to be submitted for the Courts approval; Third. To pay the costs of the suit.Fourth. For utter lack of merit, the counterclaim is dismissed.SO ORDERED. [19]

 NAPOCOR appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA. [20]  After a review of the respective parties Briefs, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision on 21 July 2009, denying NAPOCORs appeal and affirming the trial courts Decision, but reducing the rate of interest to 6% per annum. [21]

 Aggrieved, petitioner then filed the instant Rule 45 Petition before this Court. The IssuesThe pivotal issues as distilled from the pleadings are as follows: 1.     Whether NAPOCOR has previously compensated the spouses for establishing high-tension transmission lines over their property;2.     Whether the demand for payment of just compensation has already prescribed;3.     Whether petitioner is liable for only ten percent of the fair market value of the property or for the full value thereof; and4.     Whether the trial court properly awarded the amount of ₱4,920,750 as just compensation, based on the Approved Schedule of Market Values for Real Property in Tagum City for the Year 2000. The Courts Ruling We uphold the Decisions of the CA and the RTC. I NAPOCOR failed to prove that it had adequately compensated respondents for the establishment of high tension transmission lines over their property NAPOCOR argues that the parcel of land involved in the instant Petition had already been expropriated in National Power Corporation v. Pereyras. [22]  In support of this argument, it alleges that one of the sources of the spouses TCT No. T-109865 is TCT No. 39660; and that TCT No. 39660 is a transfer from TCT No. T-15343, the subject land inNational Power Corporation v. Pereyras. [23]  Thus, having paid just compensation to Tahanan Realty Development Corporation, the successor-in-interest of defendants Pereyras in the aforementioned case, petitioner submits that it should no longer be made to pay just compensation in the present case. We disagree. While it is true that respondent spouses TCT No. T-109865 was indeed indirectly sourced from TCT No. T-15343, the CA correctly ruled that NAPOCOR failed to prove that the lands involved in National Power

Corporation v. Pereyras and in the instant Petition are identical. One cannot infer that the subject lands in both cases are the same, based on the fact that one of the source titles of TCT No. T-109865 happens to be TCT No. T-38660, and that TCT No. T-38660 itself was derived from T-15343. Furthermore, the evidence before us supports respondent spouses contention that the lands involved in both cases are different.  National Power Corporation v. Pereyras involved Lot 481-B, Psd-11012718, which was a portion of Lot 481, Cad. 276 of Barrio Magugpo, Municipality of Tagum, Davao. [24]  On the other hand, the instant Petition involves Lot 15, Pcs-11-000704, Amd., which is a portion of Lots 481-D, Psd-11-012718; 480-B, Psd-51550; H-148559 and 463-A-2 (LRC), Psd-150796, in Barrio Magugpo, Municipality of Tagum, Davao. Clearly, these lots refer to different parcels of land. [25]

 We rule, therefore, that NAPOCOR failed to prove its previous payment of just compensation for its expropriation of the land in question. IIThe demand for payment of just compensationhas not prescribed  Petitioner maintains that, in the event respondent spouses have not been adequately compensated for the entry into their property, their claim for just compensation would have already prescribed,[26]  pursuant to Section 3 (i) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 380, 395, 758, 938, 1360 and 1443. This provision empowers the NAPOCOR to do as follows: x x x [E]nter upon private property in the lawful performance or prosecution of its business or purposes, including the construction of the transmission lines thereon; Provided, that the owner of such private property shall be paid the just compensation therefor in accordance with the provisions hereinafter provided;  Provided, further, that any action by any person claiming compensation and/or damages shall be filed within five (5) years after the right-of-way, transmission lines, substations, plants or other facilities shall have been established; Provided, finally, that after the said period no suit shall be brought to question the said right-of-way, transmission lines, substations, plants or other facilities nor the amounts of compensation and/or damages involved. (Emphasis supplied.) NAPOCORs reliance on this provision is misplaced. The right to recover just compensation is enshrined in no less than our Bill of Rights, which states in clear and categorical language that [p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. [27]  This constitutional mandate cannot be defeated by statutory prescription. [28]  Thus, we have ruled that the prescriptive period under Section 3 (i) of R.A. No. 6395 does not extend to an action to recover just compensation. [29]  It would be a confiscatory act on the part of the government to take the property of respondent spouses for a public purpose and deprive them of their right to just

compensation, solely because they failed to institute inverse condemnation proceedings within five years from the time the transmission lines were constructed. To begin with, it was not the duty of respondent spouses to demand for just compensation. Rather, it was the duty of NAPOCOR to institute eminent domain proceedings before occupying their property. In the normal course of events, before the expropriating power enters a private property, it must first file an action for eminent domain [30]  and deposit with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property. [31]  Due to its omission, however, respondents were constrained to file inverse condemnation proceedings to demand the payment of just compensation before the trial court. We therefore rule that NAPOCOR cannot invoke the statutory prescriptive period to defeat respondent spouses constitutional right to just compensation. IIINAPOCOR is liable to pay the full market valueof the affected property NAPOCOR submits that it should pay for only ten percent (10%) of the fair market value of the landowners property because, under its Charter, [32]  it is only authorized to acquire easements of right-of-way over agricultural lands. [33]

 Petitioners arguments fail to convince. We have ruled that when petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts. [34]

 In National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez , [35]  the petitioner likewise argued that it should only be made to pay easement fees instead of the full market value of the land traversed by its transmission lines. In striking down its argument and ruling that the property owners were entitled to the full market value of the land in question, we ruled: x x x While it is true that plaintiff [is] only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property. [36]

 Similarly, in this case, while respondent spouses could still utilize the area beneath NAPOCORs transmission lines provided that the plants to be introduced underneath would not exceed three meters, [37]  danger is posed to the lives and limbs of respondents farm workers, such that the property is no longer suitable for agricultural production.[38] Considering the nature and effect of the Davao-Manat 138 KV

transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NAPOCOR perpetually deprives respondents of the ordinary use of their land. Moreover, we have ruled that Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding upon this Court. [39]  [T]he determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and . . . any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. [40]

 We therefore rule that NAPOCOR is liable to pay respondents the full market value of the affected property as determined by the court  a quo. IVThe trial court did not err in awarding just compensation based on the Approved Schedule of Market Values forReal Property for the Year 2000 As its final argument, petitioner contends that the amount of just compensation fixed by the trial court is unjust, unlawful and contrary to existing jurisprudence, because just compensation in expropriation cases must be determined from the time of the filing of the complaint or the time of taking of the subject property, whichever came first.[41]  It therefore posits that since the taking of the property happened in the 1970s, the trial court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation with reference to real property market values in the year 2000. [42]

 Petitioners contention holds no water. We have ruled in National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay [43]  that the reckoning value of just compensation is that prevailing at the time of the filing of the inverse condemnation proceedings for the following reason: [c]ompensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered x x x would not be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPC's entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land x x x. NPC's entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted.  Indeed, respondent spouses would be deprived of their right to just compensation if the value of the property is pegged back to its value

in the 1970s. To reiterate, NAPOCOR should have instituted eminent domain proceedings before it occupied respondent spouses property. Because it failed to comply with this duty, respondent spouses were constrained to file the instant Complaint for just compensation before the trial court. From the 1970s until the present, they were deprived of just compensation, while NAPOCOR continuously burdened their property with its transmission lines. This Court cannot allow petitioner to profit from its failure to comply with the mandate of the law. We therefore rule that, to adequately compensate respondent spouses from the decades of burden on their property, NAPOCOR should be made to pay the value of the property at the time of the filing of the instant Complaint when respondent spouses made a judicial demand for just compensation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81098 dated 21 July 2009 isAFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.  MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOAssociate JusticeNATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,Petitioner,

- versus -

YUNITA TUAZON, ROSAURO TUAZON and MARIA TERESA TUAZON,Respondents.

G.R. No. 193023

Present:

CARPIO, J.,Chairperson,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*

BRION,PEREZ, andSERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 22, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x D E C I S I O N BRION, J.: This is a petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the decision [1]  (dated March 15, 2010) of the Court of Appeals (CA)[2]  in CA-G.R. CV No. 82480, which set aside the order [3]  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarangnan, Samar, Branch 40, and remanded the case back to the RTC for determination of just compensation. The RTC had dismissed the complaint of respondents Yunita Tuazon, Rosauro Tuazon and Maria Teresa Tuazon against the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for payment of just compensation and damages. ANTECEDENTS The antecedent facts are not in dispute.

 The respondents are co-owners of a 136,736-square-meter coconut land [4]  in Barangay Sta. Cruz, Tarangnan, Samar. The land has been declared for tax purposes in the name of the respondents predecessor-in-interest, the late Mr. Pascual Tuazon. Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR [5]  installed transmission lines on a portion of the land for its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power TL Project. In the process, several improvements on the land were destroyed. Instead of initiating expropriation proceedings, however, NAPOCOR entered into a mere right-of-way agreement [6]  with Mr. Tuazon for the total amount of TWENTY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT and 21/100 PESOS (P 26,978.21). The amount represents payments for damaged improvements (P 23,970.00), easement and tower occupancy fees (P 1,808.21), and additional damaged improvements (P 1,200.00). In 2002, the respondents filed a complaint against NAPOCOR for just compensation and damages, claiming that no expropriation proceedings were made and that they only allowed NAPOCOR entry into the land after being told that the fair market value would be paid. They also stated that lots similarly located in Catbalogan,  Samar, likewise utilized by NAPOCOR for the similar projects, were paid just compensation in sums ranging from P 2,000.00 to P 2,200.00 per square meter, pursuant to the determination made by different branches of the RTC in Samar. Instead of filing an answer, NAPOCOR filed a motion to dismiss based on the full satisfaction of the respondents claims. The RTC granted the motion in this wise: ORDER Acting on the Motion to Dismiss and the Opposition thereto and after a very careful study of the arguments raised by the Parties, the court resolves in favor of the Defendant. Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of this case without costs. IT IS SO ORDERED.Tarangnan, Samar, Philippines, February 3, 2004.(Sgd.) ROBERTO A. NAVIDADActing Presiding Judge [7]

 The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals The respondents filed an ordinary appeal with the CA. In its Appellees Brief, NAPOCOR denied that expropriation had occurred. Instead, it claimed to have lawfully established a right-of-way easement on the land per its agreement with Mr. Tuazon, which agreement is in accord with its charter, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6395. NAPOCOR maintained that Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 gave it the right to acquire a right-of-way easement upon payment of just compensation equivalent to not more than 10% of the market value of a private lot traversed by transmission lines. [8]

 

The CA disagreed with the RTC. Citing National Power Corporation v. Hon. Sylvia G. Aguirre-Paderanga, etc., et al. [9]  and National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation,[10]  the CA pointed out that the demolition of the improvements on the land, as well as the installation of transmission lines thereon, constituted taking under the power of eminent domain, considering that transmission lines are hazardous and restrictive of the lands use for an indefinite period of time. Hence, the CA held that the respondents were entitled, not just to an easement fee, but to just compensation based on the full market value of the respondents land. Citing Export Processing Zone Authority v. Hon. Ceferino E. Dulay, etc., et al., [11] the CA maintained that NAPOCOR cannot hide behind the mantle of Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 as an excuse of dismissing the claim of appellants since the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. No statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings,[12] the CA added. The dispositive of the assailed decision reads: In sum, after establishing that NAPOCORs acquisition of the right-of-way easement over the portion of the appellants land was a definite taking under the power of eminent domain, NAPOCOR is liable to pay appellants [referring to the respondents herein] just compensation and not only easement fee. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Order dated February 3, 2004 of the RTC, Br. 40, Tarangnan, Samar is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is hereby REMANDED to the RTC, Br. 40 of Tarangnan, Samar for the proper determination of just compensation.[13]

 The PetitionThe present petition reiterates that by installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR did not expropriate the respondents land, but merely established a right-of-way easement over it. The petition relies heavily on the lack of transfer of the lands title or ownership. NAPOCOR maintains that since the respondents claim involved an easement, its charter a special law should govern in accordance with Article 635 of the Civil Code. [14]  NAPOCOR insists that its agreement with the respondents predecessor-in-interest and the easement fee that was paid pursuant thereto were authorized by its charter and are, thus, valid and binding. Finally, the petitioner alleges that establishing right-of-way easements over landstraversed by its transmission lines was the only mode by which it could acquire the properties needed in its power generation and distribution function. It claims that  R.A. 8974,[15] specifically its implementing rules, supports this position.THE COURT RULING  We find the petition devoid of merit and AFFIRM the remand of the case to the RTC for the determination of just compensation.  The petitioner pleads nothing new. It essentially posits that its liability is limited to the payment of an easement fee for the land traversed by its transmission lines. It relies heavily on Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 to support this position.  This position has been evaluated and found wanting by this Court in a plethora of cases, including Manubay[16]  which was correctly cited by the CA in the assailed decision .

 In Manubay, [17]  NAPOCOR sought the reversal of a CA decision that affirmed the payment, as ordered by the RTC in Naga City, of the full value of a property traversed by NAPOCORs transmission lines for its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project.  Through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, the Court  echoing the 1991 case of National Power Corporation v. Misericordia Gutierrez, et al.[18]  formulated the doctrinal issue in Manubay, [19]  as follows: How much just compensation should be paid for an easement of a right of way over a parcel of land that will be traversed by high-powered transmission lines? Should such compensation be a simple easement fee or the full value of the property? This is the question to be answered in this case. [20]

  In holding that just compensation should be equivalent to the full value of the land traversed by the transmission lines, we said:  Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondents property was purely an easement of a right of way, still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and not the full value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. This conclusion finds support in similar cases in which the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. Republic v. PLDT held thus:  x x x. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way.  True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of a condemned property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner

willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefore. [21]  (Emphasis ours; citations omitted.)  We find it significant that NAPOCOR does not assail the applicability of Manubay [22]  in the present case. Instead, NAPOCOR criticizes the application of Gutierrez [23] which the CA had cited as authority for the doctrine that eminent domain may also be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. [24]  NAPOCOR assails Gutierrez [25]  as irrelevant on the ground that the expropriation proceedings were instituted in January 1965, when the NAPOCOR Charter had not been amended with the insertion of Section 3-A(b) in 1976. [26]  To NAPOCOR, Section 3-A(b) provides for a fixed formula in the computation of just compensation in cases of acquisition of easements of right-of-way. Heavily relying on Section 3-A(b), therefore, NAPOCOR argues: Absent any pronouncement regarding the effect of Section 3-A (b) of R.A. 6395, as amended, on the computation of just compensation to be paid to landowners affected by the erection of transmission lines, NPC v. Gutierrez, supra, should not be deemed controlling in the case at bar. [27]

 We do not find NAPOCORs position persuasive.The application of Gutierrez [28]  to the present case is well taken. The facts and issue of both cases are comparable. [29]  The right-of-way easement in the case similarly involved transmission lines traversing privately owned land. It likewise held that the transmission lines not only endangered life and limb, but restricted as well the owners use of the land traversed. Our pronouncement in Gutierrez [30]  that the exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily includes the imposition of right-of-way easements upon condemned property without loss of title or possession [31]  therefore remains doctrinal and should be applied. [32]

 NAPOCORs protest against the relevancy of  Gutierrez, heavily relying as it does on the supposed conclusiveness of  Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 on just compensation due for properties traversed by transmission lines, has no merit. We have held in numerous cases that Section 3-A(b) is not conclusive upon the courts. [33]  In National Power Corporation v. Maria Bagui, et al., [34]  we categorically held: Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding on the Court. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. (Citations omitted.) The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. [35]  This judicial function has constitutional raison dtre; Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. In  National Power

Corporation v. Santa Loro Vda. de Capin, et al., [36]  we noted with approval the disquisition of the CA in this matter:The [herein petitioner] vehemently insists that its Charter [Section 3A (b) of R.A. 6395] obliges it to pay only a maximum of 10% of the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.  To uphold such a contention would not only interfere with a judicial function but would also render as useless the protection guaranteed by our Constitution in Section 9, Article III of our Constitution that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. The same principle further resolves NAPOCORs contention  that R.A. 8974, specifically its implementing rules, supports NAPOCORs claim that it is liable to the respondents for an easement fee, not for the full market value of their land. We amply addressed this same contention in Purefoods [37]  where we held that:While Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended,  and the implementing rule of R.A. No. 8974 indeed state that only 10% of the market value of the property is due to the owner of the property subject to an easement of right-of-way, said rule is not binding on the Court. Well-settled is the rule that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. In  Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay , the Court held that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "justness" of the decreed compensation. (Citations omitted.) That the respondents predecessor-in-interest did not oppose the installation of transmission lines on their land is irrelevant. In the present petition, NAPOCOR insinuates that Mr. Tuazons failure to oppose the instillation now estops the respondents from their present claim. [38]  This insinuation has no legal basis. Mr. Tuazons failure to oppose cannot have the effect of thwarting the respondents right to just compensation. In Rafael C. de Ynchausti v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., et al., [39]  we ruled: The owner of land, who stands by, without objection, and sees a public railroad constructed over it, can not, after the road is completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith of his apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the railroad company. In such case there can only remain to the owner a right of compensation. (Goodin v. Cin. And Whitewater Canal Co.,  18 Ohio St., 169.) 

One who permits a railroad company to occupy and use his land and construct its road thereon without remonstrance or complaint, cannot afterwards reclaim it free from the servitude he has permitted to be imposed upon it. His acquiescence in the company's taking possession and constructing its works under circumstances which made imperative his resistance, if he ever intended to set up illegality, will be considered a waiver. But while this presumed waiver is a bar to his action to dispossess the company, he is not deprived of his action for damages for the value of the land, or for injuries done him by the construction or operation of the road. (St. Julien v. Morgan etc., Railroad Co., 35 La. Ann., 924.)  In sum, we categorically hold that private land taken for the installation of transmission lines is to be paid the full market value of the land as just compensation. We so ruled in National Power Corporation v. Benjamin Ong Co , [40]  and we reiterate this ruling today :  As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, substantially provides that properties which will be traversed by transmission lines will only be considered as easements and just compensation for such right of way easement shall not exceed 10 percent of the market value. However, this Court has repeatedly ruled that when petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts. (Citations omitted.)  WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the present petition for review and AFFIRM the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on March 15, 2010, in CA-G.R. CV No. 82480. SO ORDERED.  ARTURO D. BRIONAssociate JusticeTHIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 155065. July 28, 2005]NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. SYLVA G. AGUIRRE PADERANGA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25, PETRONA O. DILAO, FEDIL T. OSMEA, ISABEL T. OSMEA, CELESTINO O. GALON, POTENCIA O. BATUCAN, TRINIDAD T. OSMEA, LULIA T. OSMEA, LOURDES O. DAFFON, VICTORIA O. BARRIGA and JUAN T. OSMEA, JR., and ESTEFANIA ENRIQUEZ, respondents.D E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES, J.:The Court of Appeals Decision [1]  dated June 6, 2002, as well as its Resolution [2]  dated August 30, 2002, affirming the decision [3]  of the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25 which granted the complaint for expropriation filed by herein petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) against herein respondents Petrona Dilao et al. are being assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.To implement its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, the NPC filed on March 19, 1996 before the Regional Trial Court of Danao City a complaint for expropriation [4]  of parcels of land situated at Baring and Cantumog, Carmen, Cebu [5]  against the following defendants:NAMES ADDRESS1.  Petrona O. [6]   Dilao  Poblacion, Carmen, Cebu

2. Fidel T. Osmea -do-3. Isabel T. Osmea -do-4. Celestina O. Galon -do-5. Potenciana O. Batucan -do-6. Trinidad T. Osmea -do-7. Lulia T.Osmea -do-8. Lourdes O. Daffon -do-9. Victoria O. Barriga -do-10. Juan T. Osmea, Jr. -do-11. Estefania Enriquez  Marijoy Realty Corp.Natalio Bacalso Ave.Mambaling, Cebu City [7]

(Underscoring supplied)The complaint covers (a) 7,281 square meters of the 25,758 square meters of land co-owned by herein respondents Petrona O. Dilao (Dilao) and the above-listed defendant Nos. 2-10 who are her siblings, and (b) 7,879 square meters of the 17,019 square meters of land owned by Estefania Enriquez (Enriquez). [8]

A day after the complaint was filed or on March 20, 1996, NPC filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of writ of possession of the lands.Dilao filed her Answer with Counterclaim on April 19, 1996 . [9]  Enriquez did not. [10]

On May 9, 1996, Branch 25 of the RTC Danao, issued an Order [11]  granting NPCs motion for the issuance of writ of possession. It then appointed a Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation. [12]

The commissioners submitted on April 15, 1999 their report [13]  to the trial court containing, among other things, their recommended appraisal of the parcel of land co-owned by defendants Dilao and her siblings   at P 516.66 per square meter.To the Commissioners Report, the NPC filed its Comment/Opposition [14]  assailing the correctness of the appraisal for failing to take into account Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6395 (AN ACTREVISING THE CHARTER OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION), as amended, specifically Section 3A [15]  thereof which provides that the just compensation for right-of-way easement (for which that portion of the Dilao property is being expropriated) shall be equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the market value of the property. The traversed land, NPC asserted, could still be used for agricultural purposes by the defendants, subject only to its easement. It added that the lots were of no use to its operations except for its transmission lines. [16]

By Decision of November 10, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision on the complaint, adopting the commissioners recommended appraisal of the land co-owned by Dilao and her siblings . The dispositive portion of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered condemning the property of Petrona Dilao et al. which has been affected by   7,281 square meters   in favor of plaintiff; declaring in favor of defendants for plaintiff to pay the fair market value of said area affected at P 516.66 per square or a total of P 3,761,801.40 plus P 250,000.00 for the value of the improvements affected by herein expropriation.SO ORDERED. [17]  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).Copy of the decision was received by NPC on November 18, 1999. [18]

NPC filed a Notice of Appeal [19]  but the trial court, by Order of January 17, 2000, denied the same for NPCs failure to file and perfect it within the reglementary period, it having failed to file a record on appeal.[20]  To the Order, NPC filed a motion for reconsideration, [21]  contending that a record on appeal was not required as the trial court rendered judgment against all the defendants including Enriquez as shown, so it claimed, by the dispositive portion of the decision referring to Petrona Dilao et al.By Resolution [22]  of March 7, 2000, the trial court denied NPCs motion for reconsideration, clarifying that the reference to Petrona Dilao et al. in the dispositive portion of its decision was meant to cover only Dilao and her co-owner-siblings. [23]

NPC subsequently filed before the trial court a petition for relief from the denial of its appeal on the ground that its failure to file a record on appeal was due to honest mistake and excusable neglect, it having believed that a record on appeal was not required in light of the failure of the other defendant, Enriquez, to file an answer to the complaint. [24]

The trial court denied NPCs petition for relief for lack of factual and legal basis. [25]

On August 17, 2001, the trial court granted Dilao et al.s motion for execution of judgment. [26]  NPC thereupon filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals with prayer for temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction [27]  assailing the trial courts order denying its appeal and other orders related thereto, as well as the order granting Dilao et al.s motion for execution. The appellate court, however, denied NPCs petition, [28]  it holding that under Rule 41, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the filing of a record on appeal is required in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals, as in an action for expropriation in which the order determining the right of the plaintiff to expropriate and the subsequent adjudication on the issue of just compensation may be the subject of separate appeals. [29]

Aggrieved, NPC challenged the appellate courts decision via the present petition, [30]  it contending that the trial courts questioned orders effectively deprived it of its constitutional right to due process.NPC argues that a complaint for expropriation is a Special Civil Action under Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, not a special proceeding as contemplated under Rule 41, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; that there is no law or rules specifically requiring that a record on appeal shall be filed in expropriation cases; and of the two sets of defendants in the present case, the Dilaos and Enriquez, the first, while they filed an answer, did not appeal the trial courts decision, while with respect to the second, there is no showing that summons was served upon her, hence, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her and, therefore, no appeal could arise whatsoever with respect to the complaint against her.  Ergo, petitioner concludes, no possibility of multiple appeals arose from the case.The petition fails.Rule 41, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, clearly provides:SEC. 2. Modes of Appeals.(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original

jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals   where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases , the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).While admittedly a complaint for expropriation is not a special proceeding, the above-quoted rule requires the filing of a record on appeal in other cases of multiple or separate appeal.Jurisprudential law, no doubt, recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in a complaint for expropriation. [31]  The case of Municipality of Bian v. Garcia [32]  vividly expounds on the matter, viz:1. There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation.  The first is concerned with the determination of the authority   of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation   for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously,  one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom . (Underscoring supplied).Thus, in Municipality of Bian, this Court held that in actions for eminent domain, since no less than two appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is thirty days counted from notice thereof and not the ordinary period of fifteen days prescribed for actions in general. [33]  As such, the complaint falls under the classification of other cases of multiple or separate appeal where the law or these rules so require in above-quoted Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in which a record on appeal is required to be filed and served.Respecting NPCs claim that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the other defendant, Enriquez, there being no evidence that summons was served on her and, therefore, no appeal with respect to the case against her arose, the trial courts Order [34]  of May 9, 1996 belies said claim:

x x xIn the letter-appeal by defendant  Estefania V. Enriquez   addressed to the Court, defendant did manifest no opposition to the right of plaintiff to the use of her land but only wich (sic) that payment be based on the actual market value of the property sought to be expropriated . In comment to said letter-appeal, plaintiff stressed that the amount deposited was purely to secure a writ of possession as provided under PD 42. It agreed with defendant that the fair market value or actual market value shall be the basis for the just compensation of the property.x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)That the defendant Enriquez did not file an answer to the complaint did not foreclose the possibility of an appeal arising therefrom. For Section 3 of Rule 67 provides:Sec. 3. Defenses and objections . If a defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the taking of his property, he may file and serve a notice of appearance and a manifestation to that effect, specifically designating or identifying the property in which he claims to be interested, within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading.A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial of the issue of just compensation,   whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his property, and he may share in the distribution of the award . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).In other words, once the compensation for Enriquez property is placed in issue at the trial, she could, following the third paragraph of the immediately-quoted Section 3 of Rule 67, participate therein and if she is not in conformity with the trial courts determination of the compensation, she can appeal therefrom.Multiple or separate appeals being existent in the present expropriation case, NPC should have filed a record on appeal within 30 days from receipt of the trial courts decision. The trial courts dismissal of its appeal, which was affirmed by the appellate court, was thus in order.En passant, glossing over NPCs failure to file record on appeal, its appeal would still not prosper on substantive grounds.NPC anchored its appeal [35]  on the alleged overvalued appraisal by the commissioners of the compensation to be awarded to Dilao et al., the commissioners having allegedly lost sight of the already mentioned 10% limit provided under Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395.

In National Power Corporation v. Chiong , [36]  petitioner similarly argued therein that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in upholding the RTC order requiring it to pay the full market value of the expropriated properties, despite the fact that it was only acquiring an easement of right-of-way for its transmission lines. It pointed out, as it does in the present case, that under Section 3A of RA No. 6395, as amended, where only an easement of right-of-way shall be acquired, with the principal purpose for which the land is actually devoted is unimpaired, the compensation should not exceed ten percent (10%) of the market value of the property. Upholding the trial court and the Court of Appealss approval of the commissioners recommendation in that  case, this Court declared:In fixing the valuation at P 500.00 per square meter, the Court of Appeals noted that the trial court had considered the reports of the commissioners and the proofs submitted by the parties. This includes the fair market value of P 1,100.00 per square meter proffered by the respondents. This valuation by owners of the property may not be binding upon the petitioner or the court, although it should at least set a ceiling price for the compensation to be awarded. The trial court found that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are agricultural land, with minimal improvements. It is the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking that is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner . Hence, the trial court accepted not the owners valuation of  P 1,100 per square meter but only P 500 as recommended in the majority report of the commissioners.x x xIn finding that the trial court did not abuse its authority in evaluating the evidence and the reports placed before it nor did it misapply the rules governing fair valuation, the Court of Appeals found the majority reports valuation of P500 per square meter to be fair.  Said factual finding  of the Court of Appeals, absent any showing that the valuation is exorbitant or otherwise unjustified, is binding on the parties as well as this Court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).Indeed, expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within the ambit of the term expropriation. As explained in National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, [37]  viz:The trial courts observation shared by the appellate court show that x x x While it is true that plaintiff [is] only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights  as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said transmission lines,  danger to life and limbs   that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property.The foregoing facts considered,  the acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain . Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of easement of

right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use (See National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665, 1984; Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 597, 1981). The Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs. PLDT, thus held that:Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession . It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way.In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines,the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).From the Commissioners Report [38]  chronicling the following findings:x x x1. The parcel of land owned by the defendant PETRONA O. DILAO, et al. is very fertile, plain, suited for any crops production, portion of which planted with coco trees and mango trees, portion planted with corn, sometimes planted with sugar cane, the said land has a distance of about 1 kilometer from the trading center, about 100 meters from an industrial land (Shemberg Biotech Corp.) adjacent to a Poultry Farm and lies along the Provincial Road.x x xIMPROVEMENTS AFFECTEDPer ocular inspection made on lot own by PETRONA O. DILAO, et al. traversed by a transmission line of NPC and with my verification as to the number of improvements, the following trees had been damaged.1. 55 coco trees productive 2. 10 mango trees productive 3. 30 cacao trees productive4. 110 bananas 5. 400 ipil-ipil treesx x x, [39]

it cannot be gainsaid that NPCs complaint merely involves a simple case of mere passage of transmission lines over Dilao et al.s property. Aside from the actual damage done to the property traversed by the transmission lines, the agricultural and economic activity normally undertaken on the entire property is unquestionably restricted and perpetually hampered as the environment is made dangerous to the occupants life and limb.The determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings being a judicial function, [40]  this Court finds the commissioners recommendation of P 516.66 per square meter, which was approved by the trial court, to be just and reasonable compensation for the expropriated property of Dilao and her siblings.In fine, the appeal sought by NPC does not stand on both procedural and substantive grounds.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.SO ORDERED.