Edited by Melinda Dooly and Alistair Ross · What’s Fair? Young Europeans’ Constructions of...
Transcript of Edited by Melinda Dooly and Alistair Ross · What’s Fair? Young Europeans’ Constructions of...
What’s Fair? Young Europeans’Constructions of Equity,
Altruism and Self-interest
Wha
t’s F
air?
You
ng E
urop
eans
’ Con
stru
ctio
ns o
f Eq
uity
, Altr
uism
and
Sel
f-in
tere
stThis book reports on part of the research project Citizens of the future:
the concerns and actions of young people around current European and
global issues, which was undertaken under the aegis of the European
Science Foundation as a collaborative project within the EUROCORES
framework (06_ECRP_FP007). The project investigated the concerns of
young Europeans for the future, focussing on issues such as democratic
processes, poverty, unemployment, human rights, the environment and
conflict.
In particular, this book looks at how young people understand the
concepts of fairness, equity and altruism, and how they reconcile this
with their own self-interests. These concepts were studied through the
lenses of a role-play known as the Ultimatum Game. While the book
is based in part on a detailed study of young people in four European
countries, it is also located in a much wider literature of social justice,
cooperation, competition, civic (or pro-social) behaviour and the
development of identity.
Edited by Melinda Dooly and Alistair Ross
What’s Fair? Young Europeans’Constructions of Equity,
Altruism and Self-interest
Edited by Melinda Dooly and Alistair Ross
What’s Fair? Young Europeans’Constructions of Equity,
Altruism and Self-interest
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What’s Fair? Young Europeans’Constructions of Equity,
Altruism and Self-interest
Edited by Melinda Dooly and Alistair Ross
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First edition: October 2010
Edited and coordinated by:Melinda Ann DoolyDepartament de Didàctica de la Llengua i la Literatura i de les Ciències SocialsÀrea de Didàctica de la Llengua i de la LiteraturaUniversitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Alistair RossAd personam Jean Monnet ChairInstitute for Policy Studies in EducationLondon Metropolitan University Research Institute
Produced by:Universitat Autònoma de BarcelonaServei de PublicacionsEdifici A. 08193 Bellaterra (Cerdanyola del Vallès). [email protected]/publicacions
Printed by:Anmar
Printed in Spain Legal diposit: B-43.223-2010ISBN 978-84-608-1112-1
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WHAT’S FAIR? YOUNG EUROPEANS’ CONSTRUCTIONS OF EQUITY, ALTRUISM AND SELF-INTEREST 7
Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1 Young people’s understanding of equity and fairness Alistair Ross and Melinda Dooly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2 Playing the Ultimatum Game with young people in Poland, Spain, Turkey and the UK Alistair Ross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3 An overview of the findings: what they did, and why they said they did this Alistair Ross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4 Share and share alike: Analysis of the Ultimatum Game exchange in the same countries Melinda Dooly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5 Playing with people in the same country Agnieszka Bojanowska and Wojciech Siegien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6 Over the border: playing unknown people in a different country Melinda Dooly and Claudia Vallejo Rubinstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7 Self-interest, equity and altruism in behaviours and their explanations – psychological perspectives Anna Maria Zalewska and Beata Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
8 Some conclusions, some reflections, and some potential developments Alistair Ross and Melinda Dooly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Appendix 1: Coding frame for the statements made by participants after playing the Ultimatum Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Appendix 2: Explanations offered for making decisions in playing the ultimatum game: different modes of play, country, and amounts offered . . 147
Notes on the Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
WHAT’S FAIR? YOUNG EUROPEANS’ CONSTRUCTIONS OF EQUITY, ALTRUISM AND SELF-INTEREST 7
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WHAT’S FAIR? YOUNG EUROPEANS’ CONSTRUCTIONS OF EQUITY, ALTRUISM AND SELF-INTEREST 9
Preface
ThisbookreportsonpartoftheresearchprojectCitizens of the future: the concerns and actions of young people around current European and global issues,whichwasundertakenundertheaegisoftheEuropeanScienceFoundationasacollabora-tiveprojectwithintheEUROCORESframework(06_ECRP_FP007).EuropeanCollaborativeResearch(EUROCORES)programmesaredesignedas‘bottom-up’researchactivities,inwhichbroadandcomplextopicsarebestaddressedthroughmultinationalcooperationinnewcollaborativeresearchprogrammes.
TheprojectinvestigatedtheconcernsofyoungEuropeans(aged10,14,17)fortheirpersonal,localandglobalfutures,focussingonissuessuchasdemocraticprocesses,poverty,unemployment,humanrights, theenvironmentandconflict.Itaimedtoidentifywhethertheyareoptimisticorpessimistic,andwhethertheyarewillingtoworkforchangeorareuncommitted tosocialparticipation.ThestudywasmadebypartnersinfourEuropeancountries: theUK,Poland,SpainandTurkey-countrieswithdifferentsocial,cultural,educational,economicandpoliticalcontexts.WesoughttoilluminatetheextenttowhichthesecountrieshavesuccessfullypreparedyoungpeoplefortheirroleinarapidlychangingEurope.Itexaminedtheextenttowhichtheyarepro-socialintheirengagementwithothers,committedtoactingforacommongood,inparticularthroughthewayinwhichtheyplayedintheUltimatumGame.
ThisbookreportsspecificallyontheUltimatumGame:onecompanionvolume,Future Citizens: 21st century challenges for young people(editedbyKrzywosz-Rynkiewicz,ZalewskaandRoss,2010)reportsonthesurveyandanalysisoftheyoungpeople’shopesandfearsforthefuture,andasecondcompanionvolume,Their hopes, fears and reality: working with children and youth for the future(editedbyDooly,2010)explorestheprofessionaloutcomesoftheprojectforteachersandschools.
TheprojectwascoordinatedandguidedbytheEuropeanScienceFounda-tion,butfundedbynationalagencies.WearegratefulforsupportfromthePolishMinistryofScienceandHigherEducation (GrantESF/84/2006), theSpanishMinistryofScienceandTechnology(ResearchandDevelopmentProjectsGrantSEJ2007-29191-E),theScientificandTechnologicalResearchCouncilofTurkey(TUBITAK)(Grant107KT66)andtheBritishAcademy(AwardSG49353).
Alargeteamofpeoplecontributedtoaspectsof theresearch,analysisandwriting.InPoland,theteamsfromtheUniversityofWarmiaandMazury,OlsztynandtheWarsawSchoolofSocialSciencesandHumanitieswereledbyDrBeata
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10 ALISTAIR ROSS AND MELINDA DOOLY
Krzywosz-RynkiewiczandProfessorAnnaZalewskarespectively.TheywereassistedbyWojciechSiegien(atWarmiaandMazury)andAgnieszkaBojanowska(inWarsaw).TheSpanishteamswerebasedattheUniversitatAutònomadeBarce-lona(wheretheteamledbyDrMelindaDoolyconsistedofMariaVillanueva,ClaudiaVallejo,EstherColladosandMontserratOller,alongwithDrAntoniLunaattheUniversityPompeuFabra)andtheUniversityofCórdoba(wheretheteamwasledbyDrCarmenTabernero,assistedbyDr.ElenaBrionesPérez).InTurkey,thetwoteamswerebasedatIstanbulUniversity(teamleaderDr.NilüferPembecioglu;teamNadiGüler, IlkayKanık,BurcuAkkay,EceKayrak,CemalUzunogluandGökçenArdıç)andatEskisehirAnadoluUniversity(teamleaderDrErolNezihOrhon).Finally,intheUKtheteamswerebasedattheInstituteforPolicyStudiesinEducationatLondonMetropolitan(teamleaderProfessorAlistairRoss;teamDrKimAllen,SarahMintyandSumiHollingworth)andtheSchoolofEducatonattheUniversityofExeter(teamleaderProfessorCathieHolden,teamHarrietJones).
Wearegratefultothemallfortheirworkandcontributiontotheworkreportedhere.Theprojectrepresentedalearningprocessforusall,aswediscoverednotonlytheeducationalculturesofourpartnercountries,butalsofreshperspectivesonthepoliciesandpracticesofourowncountries.Thepleasuresandpitfallsofaninterdisciplinaryteamofresearchers,bringingvariedresearchmethodologiesandpracticestogether,arereflectedinthepagesthatfollow.
Alistair RossandMelinda DoolyEditors
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WHAT’S FAIR? YOUNG EUROPEANS’ CONSTRUCTIONS OF EQUITY, ALTRUISM AND SELF-INTEREST 11
Chapter 1: Young people’s understanding of equity and fairness
Alistair Ross & Melinda Dooly
“Thereisnothingsofinelyperceived,andfinelyfelt,asinjustice”(thecharacterPip,inCharlesDickens’Great Expectations;quotedinSen,A.(2009) The Idea of Justice)
‘It’snotfair!’
Almosteveryparentandteacherwillhaveheardsuchacommentfromachildoryoungperson,injustabouteverycountryandregionoftheworld.Itwouldappearthateveryone,fromanearlyage,hassomeconceptionofwhat is‘fair’,andanexpectationthattheworldshouldbe‘fair’,and,moreover,thatparents,teachersandotheradultshavesomekindofobligationtomaketheworld‘fair’.
Thisbookisaboutwhatyoungpeopleunderstandbytheconceptsoffairness,equityandaltruism,andhowtheyreconcilethiswiththeirownself-interests.Thestudywascarriedoutbyindividualsengaged,indifferentways,ineducationorscienceofeducation,thuscontributingtorecurrentreferencestotheimportanceoftheseconceptstoeducationandschooling.ThebookisbasedinpartonadetailedstudyofyoungpeopleinfourEuropeancountries,butitisalsolocatedinamuchwider literatureofsocial justice,cooperation,competition,civic(orpro-social)behaviourandthedevelopmentofidentity.It iswrittenfromtheperspectiveofsocialconstructionism:thatis,thepremisethatconceptssuchasfairness,equalityandself-interestinventionsorconstructionsaremadebyandsharedwithmembersofaparticularsocietyinaparticularsocialcontext.AsBergerandLuckmanargueintheirseminalvolumein1966,wesociallyconstructrealitythrougheverydayinteractionswithothers.Thisviewisindirectoppositiontothosewhoarguethatthereissomethingrealoressentialistaboutnotionsofjusticeorfairness:intheargumentthatfollows,allsuchideasonlyexistinourownconsciousness.
Thefactthatthestudyencompasseschildrenandyouthinfourdifferentcoun-triesbegsaquickexemplificationofhow‘culture’isunderstoodinthisbook.Aswiththeconceptsoffairness,equityandaltruism,thisbookdistancesitselffromanessentialistviewof‘culture’.Popularly,‘culture’isunderstoodasanunspecified
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12 ALISTAIR ROSS AND MELINDA DOOLY
mixofdifferentpropertiesascribedtogroupsofpeople.Thesetypicallyincludebeliefsandvalues;customs,religionandlanguageareoftenincludedasculturaltraitsaswell.Withinthisunderstandingof‘culture’,featuresareacquiredorpassedonbytradition.Whilethenotionofwhatmakesup‘culturaltraits’isusuallyquitevagueitis,atthesametime,seenasanimportantandoftendefiningessenceofmembersofdifferentculturalgroups.AsVerschueren(2008)haspointedout,thistypeofcultural“essentialism”isproblematic.
First, itconfusesculturewithnature, that is, itpromotes(ordemotes)culturetoanaspectofnature.Secondly,itplacesclustersofculturaltraitsatthelevelofgroups.Thisattitudedisregardsthearbitrarinesswithwhichcultural traitscanbehandledtoemphasiseorblurdistinctionsbetweengroupsofpeople,dependingonthehistoricalcontext,andinpursuitofspecific(usuallypolitical)goals.(p26)
TheargumentputforthbyVerschuerenagainstthe“essentialistview”isthat“‘iden-tity’isnotapropertyofagroup,notevenofanindividual,butthatitisinteractivelycreatedoverandover(thoughwithadegreeofconsistency)”(op. cit.).Identity(ies)is/areadoptedinreferencetothesocialcontextatthatmoment.
Justasindividualsmayhavedifferent identitiesindifferentcontexts,socialandculturalconceptsaremultipleandvarying,rather thanfixedandstable.Ofcourse,asSchutz(1962)positedinhisseminalworkonethnomethodology,humansunderstandtheworldanditsmeaningsthroughculturallyandsociallysharedmean-ingsystemsandtaken-for-grantedpreconceptionsandvalues.Thisimpliesthatacommonnexusofconceptssuchasfairnessandjusticemayhavesomegroundinsocialandculturalnormsbuttheyare“appropriated”anddeployedin situ,accord-ingtothecontextatthemomentintime.
Thus,wewillexplore,throughyoungpeople’ssocialbehaviourinaparticularsocialcontext,howtheyparticipateinconstructingwhatweconceiveofandacceptassocialreality:theprocessesthatdynamicallycreatetheirsocialunderstandingof‘what’sfair’.Thisisnottoadvocateculturalrelativism:whenourconstructionofknowledgeworksforus,wepragmaticallyacceptitasarealitythatwecan(andmust)livewith.Thefactthatatruthmayonlybespecifictoaparticularplaceandtimedoesnotmeanthatitisnotanecessarytruthforsociallifetoproceedatthatplace,inthattime.Nordoweclaimthat,becausetherearenouniversaltheoriesthatanyoneaccountofrealityisasgoodasanyother.Lyotarddescribespost-modernismasexpressing“incredulitytowardsmetanarratives”(1984:24):Wepresenthereaseriesofmicro-narrativesthattogetherconstituteatenuouslysharedconceptionofthesocialworld.
Thischapteropensthediscussionontheseissues.Itexaminesvariouspossiblemeaningsthatmightbeattachedtofairnessandaltruism,whicharecomplexand
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multi-facetedterms.Theysit,ratheruneasily,withintraditionaltheoriesofself-interestandofindividualsactingas‘economicman’tomaximisetheirownends,andwewillcontrasttheassumptionsmadebytheneedsof‘themarket’withthosewhoargueforasocialcommoninterest,expressedthroughcitizenshiporpro-socialbehaviour,outliningargumentsofcontemporarygametheorists,aswellasthoseofAmartyaSenandJohnRawls.Wethensetthisinthecontextofoneparticulargame–theultimatumgame–thatwehaveusedwithnearly3,000youngpeopleinPoland,Spain,TurkeyandtheUK.Theultimatumgameisdescribedinmoredetailfurtheroninthischapter.
Chapter twosetsoutourworkingmethods in somedetail.Theempiricalresearchtookplace ineightdifferent locations,overa twoyearspan,andwasquitecomplex.Inparticular,weofferaratherdifferentanalysisthanthatprofferedformostiterationsoftheultimatumgame.Whilewepresentourstatisticalfindings(largelydescriptive),wefeelthatourqualitativeanalysisofhowtheseyoungpeopleexplainedtheiractionsandbehaviouroffersaparticularlyoriginalcontributiontopreviousliteraturedealingwiththistopic.
Thethreechaptersthatfollowcompareandcontrastyoungpeople’sbehaviourintheultimatumgameindifferentmodes.Inthefirst,theywereinteractingwithpeersintheirownclassroom,whomtheyknewwellandinteractedwithonaneverydaybasis.Inthesecond,theinteractionswerewithyoungpeoplefromadifferentpartoftheircountry,whomtheydidnotknow,andwithwhomtheyinteractedonthissingleoccasion.AndinthethirdmodetheyoungpeopleinteractedwithpeoplethesameageinanothercountryinEurope,ofwhichtheyknewverylittle.
Besides these threecontexts, therewereotherpotential factors influencingpatternsofbehaviour,suchasage(weworkedwithyoungpeopleof11,14and17yearsofage),gender,andtheirlocalcommunity(someweredrawnfromlargeurbansettings,othersfromruralareas).Thesefactorsareconsideredinchaptersix.
Chapterssevenandeightrecognise thatratherdifferentparadigmsmaybeemployed: first we analyse the potential implications of these findings fromapsychologicalperspective,andinthefollowingchapter, theoutcomesfromasociologicalviewpoint.
Returningtooneofthemainpointsofthisbook,fairnessisnotasimpleterm,andisfrequentlyusedwithverydifferentmeanings.Atitsheartisanotionofwhatisajustdistributionofsomeresourceorgood.Notonlyareresourcesandgoodslimitedinanysociety(andthereforesocietiesneedsomeformofproceduraljusticetoestablishprocessesofallocation),butwithinsocietiesresourcesarenotequallydistributed.Thisunequaldistributiondoesnotnecessarilyimplythatsomethingis‘notfair’;therearemanyinstanceswhere‘fairness’isseenasbeingotherthanequal.
Forexample,manypeoplehold that it isfair torewardmeritoriousbehav-iourandachievementwithgreaterresources.Someonewhohasstudiedhardand
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successfully,whohasspenttimetrainingforaparticularjob,canbesaidtodeservealargershareofthecakethansomeonewhohasnot.Thesamemightbearguedforsomeonewhoispreparedtotakeonresponsibilities:itcanbeseenas‘fair’thattheyarerewardedforthis,incomparisontoapersonwhodoesnothavesignificantresponsibilitiesforothers.
Incontrast to this, thereis thefairnessofneed.Acompassionatesocietyisone inwhich the lessfortunateare treatedfairly,soapersonwith ill-health issupportedwithafairpublicallocationofbenefits,orapersonwhohaslosttheirjobissupported,andsoon.Fairnesshereconsistsofthecommonwealthofcitizenscontributingtothesupportofthosewithspecificneeds,allocatingresourcesthathavebeenearnedbytheworkofthemajoritytoindividualswhohavenotcontrib-utedtothecreationofwealth,initsbroadestsense.
Thirdly,wecanseethefairnessinrewardingthemoreproductiveratherthanthelessproductive.Thisisseeninmanyformsofpubliclife:themoreexperiencedworkerbeinghigheronapayscale;thepiece-workeronaproductionlinebeingrewarded,inpart,asaproportionoftheirindividualoutput.Mostpeoplejudgeittobefairthatanartist–sayamusicianorawriter–earnsroyaltiesontheiroutput,whichisproportionaltothepublic’swillingnesstobuytheirworks.(Thoughmanyofthesamepeoplewillarguethatitisfairtoappropriatethesameworkforfreefromtheweborthroughotherformsofcopying!)
ItisinthiscontextthatthewritingsofJohnRawlsandAmartyaSenareparticu-larlyrelevanttothisdiscussion.
JohnRawls’work,setoutinA Theory of Justice(1971)establishestwoessen-tialprinciplesforjusticetobeeffective:firstly,eachpersonshouldhaveanequalrighttothemostextensiveschemeofequalbasiclibertiesthatiscompatiblewithasimilarschemeoflibertiesforothers.Thesewouldincludethetraditionalliber-tiesofpoliticalactivity,property,speech,assembly,conscience,andsoon.Thesecondprincipleheputsforwardconcernshowsocialandeconomicinequityistobedealtwith:hearguesthattheyshouldbesoorderedthattheyaretobeofthegreatestbenefittotheleast-advantagedmembersofsociety(whichheterms‘thedifferenceprinciple’),andtheremustbeequalityofopportunitytoalltoparticipateinholdingofficeandpositions(Rawls,1971:303).Heisarguingherethatbasicorprimarygoodsshouldbeequallydistributed,andinequalitiesinthisonlytoleratedifthiswouldimprovethelotofthosewhoareworst-offunderthatdistributionincomparisonwiththeprevious,equal,distribution.Chancesofbirthandofinborntalents,heasserts,shouldnotdeterminelifechances.Thesecondelementofhisdifferenceprinciple–equalityofopportunity,isfundamentalinthatitdemandsthatallshouldhavetheopportunitytoacquireallthoseskillsonwhichmeritisjudged.
Sendevelopsthesepositions;hisparticularcontributionhasbeentheconceptofcapabilityasameasureofequality.Thefairnessofagovernment,heargued,
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shouldbeassessedbythecapabilitiesoftheircitizens,ratherthattheopportuni-tiesthatmaybemadeavailabletothem,whichremaintheoreticalopportunitiesorrightsifcitizensdonothavethecapabilitytoexercisethem(Sen,1980).Hearguestherighttovoteisnotreal,ifcitizenslackthecapacitytovote–theeducationtounderstandtheprocess,thepossibilityofgettingtothepollingstation.Senhasledthecritiquesoftheeconomicmodelthatself-interestdrivesallhumanbehaviour.
Senhas recently (2009)setout thedifferences inaparable-likeform.Hecontraststhreechildren’scompetingclaimsforownershipofaflute.Anneistheonlyoneofthethreewhocanplaytheinstrument;Bob,unliketheothertwochil-dren,whoarerich,asksforitonthegroundsofdistributivefairness;whilstCarla’sclaimrestsonthegroundsthatshehad,overmanymonths,madetheflute(pp12–15).Bob’sclaimwouldbesupportedbyeconomicegalitarians,seekingtoreducedifferencesbetweenthe(economic)meansofpeople.Carla’sclaimisbothlibertar-ianandrecognisesthelabourtheoryofvalue.Anne’sclaimisbasedonhedonisticutilitarianism,andontheprincipleofnotwastinganasset.But,asSensetsout,utilitarian,egalitarianandlibertarianswillallrecognisethedilemmaofwhatisfair,andacknowledgethereissomevalidityintheotherclaimants’arguments.
Someof thesedifferentconceptualisationsarebrought together informsoftaxationpolicy.Thuswhatiscalledprogressivetaxationiswherethosewithgreaterincomeorwealtharetaxedatahigherrateonaproportionoftheirwealth,andwherethosewithrelativelylowincomesaretaxedatalowerrate,orevennotatall.Thusthefirst6000unitsofannualincomeforanindividualmightnotbetaxedatall,incomefromsay6001to40,000betaxedat20%,incomefrom40,001to100,000betaxedat40%,andallincomeover100,000taxedat50%.Thisisnotequaltaxation,butiswidelyperceivedofasfair.Itisconsideredtobefairfortherichtocontributemoretothenationalpotofresourcesforpublicspending.Conversely,regressivetaxation–whereeveryonepaysthesameamount,forexample–iswidelyseentobeunfair.TheexampleintheUKofMargaretThatcher’sCommunityChargeinthe1990sisanexampleofthis:allindividuals,howeverpoororwealthy,werechargedthesameflatamountforlocalcommunityprovisions.Thosewhofeltthata£500chargehasaverydifferentimpactontheeconomicwellbeingofapersonearning£5,000ayearthanitdoesonapersonearning£100,000arguethatitisunfairforeveryone,irrespectiveoftheirmeans,toberequiredtocontributethesameamount.Progressivetaxesthusrelatebothtothefairnessofneedand(inversely)tothefair-nessofrewardbasedonmeritandproductivity.
Fairnesscanalso,ofcourse,meanequality.Thisisthefairnessofcuttingthecake,anditistheexperiencethatmanychildrenaresocialisedinto,andoftenbeginswithlearningtosharewithsiblingsandclassmates.Thiscanbequiteliterallycakecutting:manyparentsapproachthedistributionofacake,orabarofchocolate,orwhatever,betweentwochildrenbyaskingonechildtodivideitintotwoportions,
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andallowingtheotherchildtochosetheportiontheywant.Thiscanbearemark-ablyquickandpotentteachingstrategy.However,itisalsoamathematicalproblem,inthatthisprocedureforproportionalandenvy-freeallocationonlyworksinthesimplecaseofa‘cake’thatishomogeneousandequallyvaluedbytheplayers.If–totakeaslightlybizarreexample–acakethatconsistedhalfofaRoscóndeReyesandhalfofaMakowieccake1wastobedividedbyJuanandJan.TheRoscónhaslemonandorangepeelwithanalmondfilling:theMakowiecisfullofpoppyseedsandraisins,withsomeorangepeel.IfJuanandJanbothlikethetwotypesofcakeequally,there’snoproblem.ButifJanpreferstheMakowiec(justlikehisgrand-motherbakes),butdoesnotknowwhetherJuanpreferstheRoscónortheMakoweic,thenJan’sstrategywillbetodividethecakesothateachportionhasequalamountsofeachtypeofcake.Butthismeansthat,whateverJuan’spreferences,Janonlygetshalfofhispreference.If,infact,JuanpreferredtheRoscón,thenthisdivisionwould,ineconomictheory,bedescribedasnotbeingParetoefficient(definedas“thebestthatcouldbeachievedwithoutdisadvantagingatleastonegroup(Schick,1970:32)):therearebetterwaysofmakingadistributionthatwouldmakebothJanandJuanbetteroff,andneitherworseoff(seealsoPareto,1906).ThemostParetoefficientmodel,inthissituation,wouldbeadivisionthatseparatedthetwotypesofcake–butthiswoulddependonJanknowingJuan’spreference,andlikingJuan(oratleast,notwantingtospitehim:ifhedid,thenhemightputalltheMakoweic,andjustunderhalftheRoscóninoneportion,andjustoverhalftheRoscónintheother–butthisrisksJuanspitingJanbackbytakingtheportionthatcontainsalltheMakoweic).
Thisexampleshowsthatfairnessisnotnecessarilysimple,norcanitnecessar-ilybeequatedtoequality(arecentpaperbyBrahms,et al.(2006)hasdescribedaprocessthatwillsolvethiskindofcake-cuttingproblem).Theprocessesthatcanbeobservedinthesesituations,andintheUltimatumGameexperimentsthataredescribedinthisbook,showthatpeoplearenotnecessarilysimplytryingtomaxim-isetheirgains,butalsowantingtoseethattheygetroughlythesameshareasotherpeople.BoltonandOkenfels(2000)havedevelopedthisintoanEquity,Reciproc-ityandCompetitiontheorythatsuggeststhatevenwhenhumanstrytomaximisetheireconomicadvantage(theydonotalwaystrytodothis),theyinvolvesocialconsiderationsintheircalculations(Fehr&Renninger,2004).Trustandreciprocityfigurelargeinmanykindsofsocialandeconomictransactions(Uhlhaas,2007).
Thiscontrastsstarklywiththeneoclassicaleconomist’smodelofeconomicbehaviour.Traditionaleconomictheorypositshomo economicus,economicman(sic),whoalwaysactsrationallytomaximisehisself-interest,workingselfishlyto
1. RoscondeReyesisapopularSpanishcake,frequentlyconsumedduringtheEpiphany;theMako-weicisasimilarconfectionproducedinPolandintheChristmasseason.
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achievethelargestpossibleprofit.Conventionaleconomicsarguesthatthemarket,theubiquitousandmostefficientmechanismfordeterminingpriceandvalue,andgoverningexchange,dependsonall individualsactingrationally,oncompleteknowledge,totakefulladvantageofscarcitytomaximisetheirwealth(egRobbins,1963).Insomesocieties,wholeeducationalprogrammeshavebeenfoundedonteachingschoolpupilsthetruthofsuchpropositions.IntheUnitedStates,forexam-ple,academicssuchasMarkSchugandWilliamWalstadhavedevelopedtestsofeconomicknowledge(Walstad,1992)andprogrammesofinstruction(egSchug,1990,2000,2003)thathave,withproselytisingzeal,soughttoimpressonpupilsthateconomicself-interestcanprovidearationalexplanationforallhumanbehaviour.
Homo economicushasnotbeenunchallenged.Aseriesofeconomicgameshavebeendeveloped that lookathuman interactionsandexchangesbetweenadults, includingcake-cuttingexercises(above)andtheultimatumgame,whichhasprovidedthesubstantialbasisfortheresearchwepresenthere.Inequalitiesinsocietyhaveimportantconsequences.WilkinsonandPickett(2009),inasynopticstudyofawiderangeofsocial inequalitiesacrossover20economicallywell-developedcountries,conclude
Itmayseemobviousthatproblemsassociatedwithrelativedepravationshouldbemorecommoninmoreunequalsocieties.However,ifyouaskpeoplewhygreater inequality reduces theseproblems,much themostcommonguessisthatitmustbebecausemoreequalsocietieshavefewerpoorpeople.Aswellasbeingonlyaminorpartoftheproperexplanation,itisanassumptionwhichreflectsourfailuretorecogniseveryimportantprocessesaffectingourlivesandthesocietieswearepartof.Thetruthisthatthevastmajorityofthepopulationisharmedbygreaterinequality(p181).
Theconceptofcooperationisrelatedtoconceptsofequalityandfairness.Socialorganisation–civilsocieties–arebasedonthepremisethatcooperativebehaviourincomplexsocieties,wherepeopledonotknoweveryoneelseinthesociety,workbetterwhenwecanagreeonregulationsandlimitsonindividualfreedom,tohelpadvancethecommongood.
Competitionandcooperationareoftenportrayedasbeingattachedtoparticularandopposingsystemsofvalues.Societiesandeconomieshavebeenpredicatedandbuiltonideologiesthatarebasedaroundoneortheother.Eachhasclaimedthattheirpreferredcharacteristicoffersaparticularlyvirtuouswayoforganisingsociety,andcriticisedtheother’sapproach.Aswasnotedabove,theconditionsforcompetitiveeconomicbehavioursetoutintraditionalmarketeconomicsarebasedonaseriesofassumptions,includingapsychologicalconstructoftheindividual:theaggregatedbehaviouroftheseeconomicindividualsisheldtogoverntheway
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inwhichmarketsoperate(throughwhatAdamSmith(1776)called‘theinvisiblehand’ofthemarket).Thereisanemergingbodyofliteraturethatnowchallengesmanyoftheseassumptions.Individualsandgroupsdonotalwaysactinawhollyself-interestedorcompetitiveway,andmarketsarerarelyperfect.Self-interestisaparticularlyimportantconcepttoexamineinrelationtocompetitiveandcooperativebehavioursandisrelevanttotheresultsofthisstudy.
AdamSmithiscreditedwithbeingthefirst toexplain theoperationof themarket.Itisoftensuggestedthatheproposedthatindividualsshouldoperateinaself-interestedmanner,developingtheirownwealthattheexpenseofothers.But,infact,heobservedthat‘nosocietycanflourish(where)thefargreaterpartofitsmembersarepoorandmiserable’,andwashighlycriticalofhowthefreemarketaffectedsociety:hearguedforpubliclyfundedmasseducation,andforaroadsystemthatwasfreeforusers,unlikethethencommontoll-roadsystem,andthepublicprovisionofsocialenterprisessuchaslighthouses,acknowledgingthatnoneofthesecouldbeprovidedbymarkets.ForSmith,asocietythatoperatedonlyfromself-interestwouldbeflawed,andthatthemarketneededtobecarefullyregulatedandreinedinbygovernmentinordertoprotectworkers,bothindividuallyandasgroup.
Whenever the legislatureattempts to regulate thedifferencesbetweenmastersandtheirworkmen,itscounsellorsarealwaysthemasters.Whentheregulation,therefore,isinfavouroftheworkmen,itisalwaysjustandequitable;butitissometimesotherwisewheninfavourofthemasters.(Smith,1776,Book1,Chapter10).
Heisnotsuggestingthatpeoplewouldbenefit thecommunityaroundthembysimplyactingintheirownself-interest:theywouldneedaconsciousregardforcommunityservice.Self-interestdidnotnecessarilyequatewithgeneralinterest.Hedidnotarguethatpeopleshouldactintheirownselfinterest,butdescribedhisobservationsthatpeopleappeartoactintheirowninterest.Nordidheclaimthatallself-interesthadabeneficialeffectonthecommunity,orthatitwasalwaysgood;heonlyheldthatself-interestwasnotnecessarilybad.
Historicalstudiesof thegrowthofmercantilismandofcomplexeconomicproduction,tradeandmarketingsuggestthatmuchofthedevelopmentwascondi-tionaluponthegrowthoftrustandcooperationbetweenindividualsandbetweengroupsoftraders(Tilly,1983).Contemporaryeconomicorganisations,andmanymoderncommercialdevelopments,demonstratecooperativeaswellascompeti-tivebehaviour.Forexample, thedevelopmentofopensourcesoftwareallowsanyonetousesoftware,freelyandwithoutcharge,solelyontheconditionthattheyacknowledgethesourcesandmakeanyimprovementstheyaddequallyopentoall.Improvementsarehaphazardandeffectivelydecentralised,andthelackofformal
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organisationallowsdiversityandproductimprovement,allofwhichisbasedoncooperationbetweenprogrammers(Kowabura,2000;Torvalds,2001).
Thisideaofnon-propietorialownershipalsounderpinsmodernscience:
opensource isnot‘like’science, it ispartofscience.Ifweaskwherefreesoftwareflourishedintheperiodfrom1984tothepresent,thentheansweris:aspartoftheinstitutionsofscience....Whenopensourceandfreesoftwareadvocatescomparefreesoftwaretoscience,andthescientificmethod,theyusuallymaketheclaim,oftenexplicitly,thatthroughsomeunspecifiedmechanismthisopen,collaborative,non-proprietarycommu-nityofsoftwaredevelopmentactuallyresultsinbettersoftware,whetherindirectlythroughdebuggingordirectlythroughopennessanddeliberativedesign.(Kelty,2001:1-2)
Studiesofscientificcollaborationssuggestthatthemorefrequentlyascientistworkswithothers,themoreproductiveandbetterknownheorsheislikelytobe:SollaPriceandBeaver(1966)foundthat‘themostprolificman[sic]isalsobyfarthemostcollaborating,andthreeofthenextfourmostprolificarealsoamongthenextmostfrequentlycollaborating’(p1014):
Scienceinfactdependsoncollectiveactivity,andinformationisnothoardedbutmadefreelyavailable.Popperpointsout inThe Logic of Scientific Discovery(1959)thatthisistheverybasisofinductivescientificmethodandadvance,publicationmakingitpossibletorefutehypothesesandfind-ings,andbecomingthebasisotherscanusetoconstructnewhypotheses.Theassumptionis thatsocietyasawholewillendupknowingmoreifinformationisdiffusedaswidelyaspossible,ratherthanbeinglimitedtoafewpeople.(Surowiecki,2003:164)
Government–andthuscitizensintheirrelationshipwithgovernment–haveanimportantroletoplayinthepromotionofbothcompetitiveenterpriseandincoopera-tivebehaviour.AdamSmithrequiredofgovernmentthatitprotectandsafeguardthepooragainsttheexploitationandexcessesofcapitalistgreed.Governmentsregulatetrade,oftentoensurethatcompetitionisequitable.Legislationproscribesmonopolisticbehaviourthatactsagainsttheconsumer,andagainstpricefixingcartels.Legislationprotectsconsumersbyensuringthatgoodsareofquality,thattheyarenotharmful,thattheyareclearlylabelledtoidentifyquantitiesandingredients.Withoutinsistingonconsumersbeinggivensufficientknowledgeandinformationtomakeareasonablyinformedchoice,thenatureofcompetitionwouldactagainstthecommongood.Atthesametime,governmentsactivelypromotecooperation;theyencourage–and
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attimesrequire–citizenstoactinthepublicinterest,ratherthanintermsofself-interest.
Payingtaxesisaclassicexampleofcooperation.Muchofgovernment’sexpend-itureisonwhatarecallednon-excludablegoodsandservices–whicheveryonebenefitsfrom,andwhichitisnoteasilypossibletoexcludepeoplefrombenefit-ing.Smith’sclassicexampleofthiswasthelighthouse,thatprotectedallseafarersfromshipwreck,whethertheycontributedtothecostoferectingandmaintainingthelighthouseornot.Everyonebenefitsfromnationalexpenditureonpolicing,transportinfrastructure,publiceducationandpublichealth,whetherornottheypaytax.Self-interestwouldsuggestthattherationalcourseofactionwouldbetocheat,andavoidpayingtaxes,becausethereisalowlikelihoodofbeingcaught.Butmostpeoplecooperateandpaytaxes.Itmaybeindividuallycostly,butitiscollectivelybeneficial,andworksifnearlyeveryonetakespart.MargaretLeviarguesthatmosttaxpayersare‘contingentconsenters’–theyconsentifeveryoneelseisdoingso(1999).Variousexperimentalgamesineconomicpsychologysuggestthat,inmostadvancedsocieties,thereisasufficientlylargeproportionthatunderstandandaccepttheneedtocontributetaxesforthecommonpurse(Fehr&Gachter,2000).Lessthan15percentareselfish(or‘rational’,intheclassiceconomicsense)–andtrytofree-ride.Altruistsareasimilarsizedminority,whowillcontinuetocontributetothepublicpot,evenwhenothersareclearlyfreeriding.Mostpeopleareconditionalconsenters,andwillcontributetotaxesaslongastheyfeelandperceivethatmostotherpeoplearedoingso.Butiftheirperceptionisthatothersarefree-riding,thentheircontributionswillbegintodecline.
Whereiscitizenshipinthismixofcompetitiveandcooperativebehaviour?Domodernsocietiesseekcivicinvolvementbecauseitgivespeoplecontrolovertheirlivesandthuscontributestostability,orbecauseindividualshavetherighttorulethemselves,orasawayofmakingintelligentdecisionsanduncoveringthetruth?Itcanbearguedthatdemocraticparticipationisacting against self-interest:itisnotrationaltotakepartinelections,becausetheindividualvotingisextremelyunlikelytohaveadirecteffectoftheresult.Yetlargenumbersofpeoplevote,becauseothersvote,andthecollectiveresultdoesinsomewayrepresentacollectivejudgement.Thisisalsoseeninwhatpeoplevotefor.Astudyinthelate1970sintheUSAsuggestedthatpeopledonotvoteonthebasisoftheirownpersonaleconomicwell-being,butonhowtheyperceivethegeneraleconomytobebehaving(Kinder&Kiewiet,1979,1981).Therewasasubstantialcorrelationbetweenhowvoterssawtheeconomyperformingasawholeandhowtheyvote,andvirtuallynocorrela-tionwiththeirownpersonaleconomicposition.SearsandFunk(1990)foundthatvoters’ideologicalpredilectionswereamuchbetterpredictoroftheirattitudesonissuesthanself-interest:theygiveexamplesfromtheUSAofconservativeswhodidnothavehealth insuranceopposingnationalhealth insuranceschemes,and
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liberalswithprivatehealthinsurancewhoneverthelessfavourtheintroductionofanationalhealthinsurancescheme.
Giventhiscomplexity,andthesuggestionbyHenrichet al(2004)thatpro-socialandcooperativebehaviourmaybesociallylearnedandcontingentonthesocio-economiccomplexityofasociety,theroleofeducatorsandschoolsintheprocessofdevelopingcooperative–andperhapscompetitivebehaviour–isclearlyofgreatinterest.Howdoyoungpeopleconstructthemselvesandtheiridentitiesascooperatorsandcompetitors?Indevelopingtheircivicbehaviour,theyoperateinsocialconditionsofbothcooperationandcompetition:theywillhaveanunder-standingofthedifferencesandsimilaritiesinthewaysinwhichtheirneighboursandfellow-citizensconstructtheirownidentities.Anidentityiscompetitivewhenitseekstodistinguishitselffromothers,andbecomescooperativewhenitseekstoalignitselfasamemberofagroup.
Turningfromgroupcooperationtoindividualpro-socialbehaviour,variousrecentstudiesineconomicpsychologyhaveexaminedindividualdecision-makingprocesses,andhavechallengedtheconceptionoftheeconomicallyrationalindi-vidual,whoalwaysoperatesintermsofhisorherself-interest.TheUltimatumGameisanexperimentaleconomicgame.Itwasfirstdevelopedin1982(Güth, et al)andhassincebeenwidelyusedwithadults toexploreconceptsofnego-tiationandreciprocity.Nowak, et al(2000)havedescribeditasoneofthemostcommoneconomicsexperiments,catchingupwiththePrisoner’sDilemma2asaprimeshow-pieceofapparentlyirrationalbehaviour.TheUltimatumGamehasbeenusedinawidevarietyofsocieties,andpresentsaseriouschallengetopureself-interesttheory.Inthisgame,twoindividualswhodonotknoweachotherarebroughttogetherforaone-offencounter.Theyaretoldthatoneofthemwillbeaskedtodivideasinglesumofmoney–typicallyanaverageday’swage–intotwoamounts,inanyproportionthattheychoose.Theotherpersonmaythendecidetoacceptthesumoffered–inwhichcase,bothparticipantstaketheirallottedshare–or toreject theoffer, inwhichcaseneithergetsanything(seeBurnham,2002).Whateverthedecisionortheoutcome,thegameisoverandnotrepeated,sothereisnopossiblecalculatedtrade-offastowhatmighthappeninasecond‘round’ofthegame.Traditionaleconomicrealismwouldsuggestthattheparticipantmakingthedivisionshouldsplitthesuminsuchawaythattheymaximisetheirincome,andminimisethefractionoffered.Homo economicuswouldbehave,iftheywerethefirstplayer,bykeepingthegreatmajorityofthesum,say90%,forthemselves,andonlyoffering10%totheotherplayer.Thesecondhomo economicuswouldrationally,intheirownself-interest,acceptwhatwasonoffer,asbeingbetterthannothing.Unfortunatelyforthiseconomictheory,inpracticethegreatmajorityof
2 Anotherfrequentlyusedrole-playthatexplorestheconceptsofnegotiationandreciprocity.
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peopledonotbehaveinthisway.Mostoffersmadeareofbetween40and50%,whileoffersthataremadeof20%orlessareusuallyrejected(Henrichet al,2004;Oosterbeek, et al,2004).Mostpeoplemakemoregenerousoffersthanwouldbepredicted,andmostpeoplewouldratherhavenothingthanacceptwhatisperceivedasanunfairdistribution.TheUltimatumGamecanthusbeinterpretedasshowingthatpeoplehaveatendencynottotoleratedisproportionatedistributions,anddonotacceptsocialinequalities,andbehavetowardsotherinabroadlypro-socialmanner(Smith,2003;Rothet al1991).
Thesestudies,repeatedwidelyaroundtheworld,haverecentlybeenattemptedinnon-advancedsocietiesofhunter-gathers,pastoralistsandnomads(Henrichet al,2004).Similarpro-socialbehaviourwasobserved,thoughnotasgreatasinthe‘advanced’societiesconsideredinmostoftheearlierstudies.Butthedegreeofpro-socialbehaviourwasgreaterinsituationswheretherewasmoreadvancedsocialandeconomicinterdependenceintheculture.Thiscorrelationsuggeststhatcooperativeandpro-socialbehaviourdevelopswithsocialandeconomicinteraction,injustthesamewaythattheQuakerindustrialistsdiscoveredthattrustintradinganddealingwaseasierandmoreworthwhilethatrelyingonshort-termgainsbasedonlackoftrust.
TheUltimatumGamehasbeenplayedextensively incross-culturalstudies(Rothet al,1991),andalthoughtherearevariationsbetweencultures,thesearegenerallyquiteminimal.Onelargestudydidattemptacross-culturalstudieswork-ingwithpeoplelivinginisolated‘non-market’economies,andfoundrathergreatervariations(butoftenshowingaculturalpredispositiontoofferevenlargersums(Henrichet al,2005).Hill(2003)hasremarkedthat“thegame…simplyprovid[es]counter-evidencetothegeneralpresumptionthatparticipationinamarketeconomy(capitalism)makesapersonmoreselfish.”
Whydopeoplebehaveinthisway?Severaldifferenttheorieshavebeenputforth.Someresearchershavesuggestedthatthereputationoftheproposerissignifi-cant:theydonotwanttoappearmean(Gil-White,2003).Othershaveattemptedtoexplaintheresultsthroughan‘inequityaversion’model,apreferencefor‘fair-ness’(Walster,et al1978).Generousoffers,whicharenotuncommon,havebeenexplainedbyZak,et al (2007)asbeingmotivatedbyempathyorbyperspectivetaking.Rejectionshavebeenexplainedbyadversephysiologicalreactionstomeanoffers(Sanfeyet al,(2002).
Anumberofresearchershavesuggestedthataltruisticbehaviourmaybeanevolutionarytrait,developedtosupportsocialbehaviouramonghumans.Gintiset al(2003),forexample,pointoutthatbehavioursuchasthatshownintheUltimatumGamecannoteasilybeexplainedintermsofkinshiporreciprocalaltruism,andpostulate‘strongreciprocity’asanevolutionarystablestrategyintheearlystagesofhumanevolution(alsoGintis,2003).Carpenteret al (2004)suggestthatsocialreciprocityrequirespeopletopunishthosewhoviolatethenormsofprosociability
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(suchasmakinglowoffers).BénabouandTirole(2006)makeacasethatthereisaheterogeneousmixtureofhumanresponsesbetweenindividualaltruismandgreed,inwhichconcernsforsocialreputationandself-respectcanoperatewithoutextrinsicmotivation,rewardsorpunishments.
Surowiecki(2004)suggested that lowproposalswererejectedbecause thesumsplayedforwererelativelylow:asplitofjust5%ofsaytenmilliondollarsmightbeaccepted.Buttherehavealsobeenexperimentswheretherehavebeenrelativelylargesumsinvolved:Cameron(1999)andHoffmanet al.(2000)havefoundthatwithhighstakesoffersweremoreoftenanevendivision,asina$100gameinIndonesia(wheretheaverage1995incomeperheadwas$670).Offersof$30wererejected,eventhoughthiswasabouttwoweek’sincome.
Pro-socialitybecomesstrongerbecauseitworks.BowlesandGintis(2003)arguethatmanypeopleexhibitacharacteristictheydescribeasstrongreciproc-ity,whichisawillingnesstorewardgoodbehaviourandtopunishbadbehaviour,evenwhendoingsobringsnomaterialbenefittotheindividual.Suchpro-socialbehaviouroccurswhenpeoplegobeyondthenarrowdefinitionsofself-interestanddothingsthatareinthecommongood.Peoplewhoarestrongreciprocatorsbehaveinhiswaybecausetheyreactagainstwhattheyseeasviolationsoftheirpersonalsenseofwhatisjust.Theydoso,notnecessarilyforreasonsofsimplealtruismorhumanitarianism,butbecauseofasenseofequity,thoughtheoutcomewouldbethesameiftheirbehaviourwaspurelyaltruistic.Theeffectisthesame:offersmadearegenerallyequitable,inequitablebehaviourispunished,evenattheexpenseofself-interest(Bowles&Gintis,2003;Hammerstein,2003;Fehr&Gachter,2000).
Inthestudydescribedinthisvolumewehavetriedtoavoidusingtermssuchasaltruismtodescribebehaviours,andtoconfineitsusetothejustificationsandmotivationsusedbyothers.AltruismwasawordcreatedbyComte(1851), theearlysociologist.TakingtheItalianwordaltrui(‘toothers’/’ofothers’),heintendedittobeusedtodescribetheother-regardingattitudesofhumans.Althoughithassometimesbeenusedtodescribebehaviour,wheretheconsequencesofanactareseenasmoresignificantthantheintentions,intheactivitiesthatwesetouthere,wethinkitclearerifwedistinguishpreciselybetweenthetwobyalwaysdescribingbehavioursinneutralterms,thatdonotimplyanyjudgmentastointentions,andreservingtermssuchasaltruismandselfishnesstodescribemotivationsandinten-tions–or,tobemoreprecise,motivationsandintentionsthatweredescribedtous.
Thesestudiesofgroupandindividualcooperativebehaviourandcompetitivebehavioursuggestthatthereisafarmorecomplexrelationshipbetweenthemthanmightatfirstbesupposed,andthatneitheroffersacompleteaccountthatwillexplainbehaviourinacomplexsociety.KnackandKeefer(2001)demonstratethattheadvan-tagesofcommonlyacceptedandagreedpatternsofcooperationarethatindividualsinhighertrustsocietiesspendlesstoprotectthemselvesfrombeingexploitedin
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economictransactions.Writtencontractsarelesslikelytobeneeded,andtheydonothavetospecifyeverypossiblecontingency.Morerecently,BénabouandTirole(2005)haveattemptedtobringthesestudiestogether,developingatheoryofpro-socialbehaviourthatcombinesheterogeneityinindividualaltruismandgreedwithconcernsforsocialreputationorself-respect.Theyarguethatrewardsorpunish-mentsraisequestionsaboutthemotivationofpro-socialdeeds,andthatextrinsicincentivescancrowdoutpro-socialbehaviour.
Atthispoint,weshouldre-establishthattheseterms–altruism,fairness,equality, andsoon–arebeing regardedas social constructs, rather thanasessentialist.BergerandLuckmannhavearguedthatallknowledge,includingcommonsenseandknowledgeofeverydayreality, isbuiltupthroughsocialinteraction.HaroldGarfinkelprovidesanaccountof“normativeassumptions”thatarebasedonsocialandculturalorganisationandwhichallowmembersofsocietytointeractinaknowledgeableand“acceptable”way.Garfinkelproposesthatallmembersofsocietyusewhathecalls“backgroundexpectancies”asa“schemeofinterpretation”(1967:37).Inanysocialdiscourse,theparticipantstacitlyunderstandthattheirperceptionsofeventsandactivitiesarerelatedandlargelyheldincommon.
Whenwetalkabouttheworldwelivein,weengageintheactivityofgivingitaparticularcharacter.Inevitably,weassignfeaturesandphenomenontoitandmakeitouttoworkinaparticularway.Whenwetalkwithsomeoneelseabouttheworld,wetakeintoaccountwhotheotheris,whatthatotherpersoncouldbepresumedtoknow,‘where’thatotherisinrelationtoourselfintheworldwetalkabout.(Baker,1982:109)
Knowledge–andallthetermsusedtodescribeit–arenegotiatedthroughdiscourseandarepresentedasobjective reality.This“situational”aspectofknowledge isusedbydiscourseparticipants to“accomplish”agreementabouttheirrealitythrough“local,shareableandroutinizedconstructionsofconventionallayknowledge”(Järviluoma,et al2003:76).Pinkergivesaseriesofexamplesofsuchsocialconstructions:“theyexistonlybecausepeopletacitlyagreetoactasiftheyexist.Examplesincludemoney,tenure,citizenship…”(2002:202).Theseobjectsarepartof“socialreality”(Searle,1995:63).
Thissupportstheargumentagainstculturalrelativity.Certainproceduralvalues,suchasthoseofjusticeandfairness,maybelocallyconstructedbutneverthelessagreedassociallydesirable,orevenasimperatives.AsBlommaertandVerschuerenhaveargued, therearesomediscursiveresourcesthatbecome“naturalised”andpowerfulenoughtoinfluenceopinionsandbehaviour(1998:25).
Intoday’ssociety,youngpeoplearegrowingup“inasocietythatcanforvari-
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