ttI -¡+ Roser Paul

I lbUnfvrersit y ot Arizona

I University- Microfilms

f htgfnatiOnal s00N.zeebRoad,AnnArbor,Ml4El08

8405494

t BcuADoR ,NDER GRAN coLoMBrA, l.zo-r'so: REGroNALrsM,LOCALISM, AND LEGITIMACY IN THE EMERGENGE OF AN ANDEAN

I REPUBLIc

Pn.D. 1983

Copyright 1983

by

Davis, Roger Paul

All Rights Reserved

ECUADOR UNDER GRAN COI,OMBIA, ].820.1830

REGIONALISM, LOCALISM, AND LEGITIMACY

IN THE E}TERGENCE OF AN ANDEAN REPUBLIC

by

Roger Paul Davis

A Dissertation Submitted to the FacuLty of the

DEPARTI,IENT OF HISTORY

In Partial Fulfillnent of the RequirementsFor the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Graduate Col-I-ege

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1983

@ aonrright L983 Roger Paul Davis

PRXFACE

The historiography of the RepubLic of Ecuador is pri-marily biographicaL in nature. For the nineteenth century inparLicuLar, historicaL schoLarship is dominated by polemical.

debates over the virtues of such men as Juan Josd Flores,Vicente Rocafuerte, Gabriel Garcla Moreno and Eloy Alfaro.Ihis unfortunate trend was noted in 1964 by Adan Szíszdi inhis authoritative article on Ecuadorian historiography.

Seventeen years later Jairne E. Rodrlguez O. repeated thatobservation in his essay on Ecuador in the Research Guide to

Andean Hi.story, Both authors lamented the absence of broader

treatmenüs of Ecuadorian history. In particul.ar, Szdszdi and

Rodrfguez emphasized the need for an examination of the his-tory of Ecuador under Gran Colombia.l

In his article, Szászdí cites the writings of two of

Ecuadorte presidents, Josd Marla Velasco lbarra and Camilo

Ponee Enríquez, to demonstrate the prevailing view of -.he

legacy of Gran Colombia. These politicians wistfuLly regret

the failure of Bollvar's regionaL confederation and condemn

the destructive forces of caudillismo that it spawn"d.2 In

more conüeüporaty terms, the current president of Ecuador,

Osvaldo Hurtado, has echoed that assessment in his analysis

of politics in Ecuador. In hÍs book, Pol-iticaL Power inEcuádor, President Hurtado coneludes that the events of L820

iii

IIIIt¡

I

Ívthrough 1830 I'did not signify the independence of an Ecua-

dorian Ination; t indeed, the majority of the popu1atioD...

atas totally i5¡norant of the significance of these iristorLcalevents." 3 Demographically, the statement is correct, How-

ever, with regard to the formation of Ecuadorian nationalism,

the following study of the era of Ecuador under Gran Colombia

demonstrates that the history of that decade can stand apart

as a period of national deveLopment.

The suecessfuL completion of this project would not have

been possibLe without the assistance of many institutions and

individuals. I wish to thank the adninstrators of the Edwin

S. Turvill FeLl-owship in History and the Graduate Student

Development Program at the University of Arizona for partiallyfunding the travel required by my research. lfy appointments

as a Teaching Assistant and Teachin! Associate in the History

Department offered not only financial support but valuable

teaching experience. My üask would have been almost Ímpos-

sible without the gracious assistance of the uany librarians,archivists, secretaries and administrators I encountered inthe course of my research. ParticuLar thanks go to CharLes

J. Ermatinger and Father Lowrie J. Daly S.J., adminstrators

of the Vatican Fil¡n Library in the Pius XII Memorial Library

at Saint Louis University. At the Lilly Library on the cam-

pus of Indiana University, Ms. Rebecca Campbell MLrza guided

me through a rich coLlection of Latin American manuscripts.

the Letters and comments of Dr. MichaeL T. Hamerly and

I

I

I

I

I

V

Dr. Jaime E. Rodrlguez 0. directed me to valuable biblio-graphic sources and further encouraged my efforts. Much

appreciation also goes to the many fine employees of the

libraries of Dr¡ke Universi.ty, Indiana UniversLty, and the

University of Arizona. In particular, the Inter-Libraryloan staff at the University of Arizona provided excelLent

and friendly assistance. In Quito, Ecuador, a special note

of appreciation goes to Lic. ALfredo Costales, the directorof the national archives, and to his staff for their coopera-

tive and personaL attention which made my research in Quito

enjoyable. My thariks also go to Father Jorge VillaLba_ S.J.,

director of the Juan Josd Flores Archive at the Catholic

University of Quito for his assistance.

Dr. George A. Brubaker, a Latin Americanist in the fir.-est tradition of the artes liberales, has served as mentor

and friend over the course of ny graduate education. His

various seminars, colloquia, and lectutes Led me üo a scholar-

ly understanding of Latin American history. HÍs eurpaühy with

the people and culture of Latin A¡nerica presented me with asustaining vision of the beauty, the complexity, and the

drama of their hr¡man experience. For all of that and for the

Lengthy and tedious hours spent on ühis dissertation, I am

grateful. My th¿r¡ks to Dr. lfichael. C. Meyer and Dr. PauL A.

Carter for reading the dissertation and offering their com-

ments and observations. For many years of employment and

good will, special acknowledgement goes to Dr. Charles tü.

tIIII

viPolzer, S.J., director of the DocumenLary Relations of the

Southwest projeet in the Ari-zona State Museum. Finally, to

my family and friends who suffered my presence with patience,

understanding, and no smalL amount of restraint I offer ury

sincere appreciation.

Chapter

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

L2.

TABTE OF CONTENTS

THE REPUBLTC OF GUAYAQUTL -- 1820-1"821 . .

COLOI4BIA AT{D I]TIE SECOND CAMPAIGN -- 1821

THE LTBERATTON OF QUITO -- 182L-L922 . , .

IIIE CONFERENCE OF GUAYAQUTL -- L822 .

1TTE INCORPORATION OT fiTE SOUTII L822 . .

T}IE BURDEN OF }JAR: PASTO AND PERU -.L822-1825..,...NTE BURDEN OF IlIE STATE -- 1823-L826 . .

UiE CALL FOR REFORM -- L826 . .

rHE FAILURE OF REFOR}Í -- L827-1828

THE KNOT UNTIED: THE END OF GRAN COLOMBIAAND TITE EMERCENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OFECUADOR--l-828-1830.... .

coNcl.usroN........NOTES . . o . . . . . . . . . . . . t

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . .

BIBLIOGRAPHY . .

Page

. vl-¡-r-

1

L4

29

48

69

82

103

L28

161

L79

]i

200

230

234

285

287

var-

ABSTRACT

Ttris study of Ecuador unde¡ Gran Colonbia crmprises more

than a catalogue of the obstacLes underlying the faiLure ofSimon Bolfvar's experiment in statecraft. I{hiLe the distinctnature of the regional and local probLems of the southern

departments add to that diagnosis, they also stand apart as

factors in uhe foruration of the RepubLic of Ecuador. Ttre

Liberator t s detemination to maintain the territorial inte-grity of the audiencia of Quito as a part of the viceroyalty

of New Granada prevented the potential partitioning of that

region between Peru and Colombia. Colombian miLitary assis-

üance enabl"ed the fleeting Republic of Guayaquil to play a

crucial roLe in the liberation of the audiencia. This en-

sured a patriotic legacy for Guayaquil compatible with that

of Quito in the formation of Ecuadorian national i-dentity.

The special treatment accorded the Southern Departments by

Bollvar' s use of his extraordi.nary facul-ties and his laterauthority as dictator maintained the regional identity of

Ecuador.

The inability of the Colonbian governnent to respond

effecti-veLy to the local problems of the Souttrern Departments

undermined the legitiuacy of that regime. In contrast, the

efficiency of the milltary administration imposed upon the

departments by BoL/var enhanced his personal authority.

viii

Lx

A1so, at the expense of Gran CoLombia, the Liberator fostered

an embryonic administrative centraLisrD around the leadership

of one of his most Loya1 officers, General Juan Josd Flores.

The era of Eeuador under Gran Colombia witnessed the contin-

uation of the colonial economic system beneath the super-

structure of republican politics. In recognition of the dis-tinct nature of southern society, BoLfvat fornally sanctioned

that continuity, ultimaüely replacing the few liberaL refoms

attempted in the south with a return to colonial institutions.!{ithin this framework the local elites of Quito, GuayaquiL,

and Cuenca remained secure in their society.

Ilithin the decade of its existence as part of Gran

Colombia, Ecuador demonstrated its own dynamic elemerrts,

both l-ocal and regional in nature, that gradually coalesced

to for¡r an embryonic national- identity. Ttre emergence of the

RepubLic of Ecuador in May L830 was an affirmation of thathistorical development

"._

CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

On September 23, 1830, the Republic of Ecuador joÍned

the world cosmunity of independent states. On that date de-

legates to the constituent congress of Rlobanba promulgated

the first constitution of Ecuador. And thus another republic

emerged from the tu:luoil generaced by the fall of the Spanish

colonial empire. The deLegates at Riobamba !üere not, however,

decl-aring the establ-ishment of their state as the cuLmÍnation

of a military victory over ühe Spaniards. the delegates/from Guayaquil, Cuenca, Loja, and Quito declared their inde-

pendence rather from the Republic of Gran coLombia.l In 1820

the city and province of Guayaqull declared freedom from

Spanish domination. From L820 to L822 Guayaquil mainüained

a precarious autonony before accePting incorporation into

Gran Colombia. From L822 to 1830 Guayaquil, Quito, Cuenca,

and the remainder of che coLonial audiencia of Quito existed

as three southern departments of Gran Colom'bla. Ttle decade

of 1820 to 1830 was a period of republ-ican tutelage which

added its own unique elements üo ühe formation of the nation

of Ecuador.

The struggle against Spanish dornination stas initiatedby the NapoleonÍ.c invasion of Spain in L808. tlith the Spanish

monarch, Ferdinand VII, held captive, and with a French pre-

2

tender on the throne, regionaL juntas ühroughout Spain

assr¡med responsibility for resisting the invaders. Ttre

various juntas evenüual1y consol"idated themselves into the

Supreme Junta of Seville. Ttris body in turn gave nay to a

Regency Council and to a Cortes.2

Taking advantage of the turmoil in Spain, the creoLes of

the New l{orld began to air their grievances. They quickLy

organized their own local juntas, disavowing the authority of

the Spanish officials. In the viceroyalty of New Granada,

which incorporated the audiencias of Quito and Santa Fé de

nogotJ, and the capüainey-general of Venezuela, the year 1810

marked the beginning of effective resistance to the royal

regime. In Venezuela the creoLe patriots of the capital cityof Caracas took action on April 19 when they arrested the

Spanish officials and established a governing junta. Three

months later on July 20 che cabildo of BogotJ ímitated the

events of Caracas.

Siu¡o'n Bollvar, the son of a wealthy landowning famiLy of

Caracas, supported the Caracas junta and received the rank of

colonel in the nilitia. Soon thereafter he was appointed to

a diplomatic mission to London in search of assistance forthe rebell-ion, Although his mission fail-ed, he returned to

play a major role in the cont.inuing struggle and brought with

him a new vision of the future.3

In London, Bollvar met and befriended the great Precur-

sor of Latin American Índependence, FrancÍsco de Miranda.4

3

An international-ist and pol.itical gadfly, Miranda had pro-

moted the cause of emancipation from Spain since 1790. A

native of VenezueLa, Miranda attenpted tr¡o invasions of thatcountry in 1806. Both faiLed. Ttre precursor was now anxious

to return to caraca-e, and Bol_ívar encouraged hin to do so.

Bolívar also became aware of Mirandats vision of a unÍted

Latin Am'erica dedicated to the spirit of the díscoverer ofthe New lforld. Miranda proposed that aLl of the Americas be

named the continent ttCoLombia" and that it be composed offour regional groupings, one of which woul-d be the entirearea of the viceroyalty of New Granada. Bollvar adopted thisidea with enthusiam.5

Mirandars return to hís homeland proved to be a tragedy.

Ilelcomed as a hero, he assumed the comand of the patriot amy

of Venezuela, lnitially successful. he captured the city ofValencia and caLled for a eongress to write a constitutíon.This success colLapsed quickLy. In a literal sense, the

patriots rilere jolted by one of history's rúorst, earthquakes

which struck Garacas in llarch LBL2, leaving over 20,000 people

dead. The conservati.ve el.ergy proclaimed that the event de-

monstrated the Alnightyrs disapprovaL of the Republic. lüithin

a monLh, Valeircia was retaken by the Spanish. I{ith the enemy

advar¡cing on Caracas, Miranda assuned dictatorial porrers. He

recruited men and suppLies for his army, but surprisingly he

did nothLng to counter the Spanish offensive. FolLowing the

loss of the city of Pue¡to CabelLo, Miranda opened negotia-

4

tions for terms of surrender. Feeling betrayed by theirleader, a group of young officers, including Bollvar, arrest-ed Miranda and handed him over to the Spanish. Ttre firstrepublic of VenezueLa came to an abrupt end in July 181-2.

Ttris defeat did not end the struggle for independence

nor did it discourage Bollvar. Seeking refuge in the Granadan

port of'Cartagena, Bollvar offered his services to the pa-

triots there. The territory of the audiencia of Bogotd, also

known as New Granada, was undergoing ühe frustrations of a

five-year period knorsn as the Patria Boba or the ttFoolish

FatherLand" (1810-1815). In addition to fighting the Spanish,

the patriots of New Granada rúere engaged tn their own civil,war, Ín ¡shich the majority of the provinces qrere represented

in the federal government of the United Provinces of New

Granada. Ttre province of Cundinamarca which had its center

in the capital city of Bogotd, sought a centraList government

under its own leadership and thus opposed the United Provinces.

Ttre city and province of Cartagena maintained a stance inde-

pendent of both and looked primarily to their o$¡n security.

Tlris internal strife eventually destroyed any hope for inde-

pendence, and by 18L5 the Spaniards under General Pablo

Morillo reconquered the entire area.

Bollvar envisioned such an end when he arrived inCartagena. In a manifesto to the publ"ic he warned of the

dangers of federalism and called for alL Americans to work

together to expeL the Spanish.6 Bollvar soon had an oPpor-

5

tunity to plove the wisdom of his advice. Iütrile serving inCartagena, Bo1fvar freed the Magdalena River vaLley from

Spanish control-. The llnited Provinces then offered him citizer.-ship and the rank of Brigadier General. He used this oppor-

tunity to organize an expedition to free Venezuela. Exceed-

ing his orders to expel the Spanish from two bordering pro-

vinces, Bolívar continued his advance declaring that the best

guarantee of independence for New Granada was the liberationof Caracas. The expedition proved initially successful when

Bolfvar captured Caracas in August L813. Ttre víccory earned

for Bollvar the Litle of trThe Liberator.r' Once again the

success of these early republican ventures was fleeting. As

a result of the continuing strife in New Granada along witha royalist counter-offensive, Bollvar again fled his homeLand

in September 1814.

The years from l-8L5 to 18L7 belonged to the Spanish.

The independenee movenents in Venezuela and New Granada were

defeated and the republican leaders were either killed or

forced into exile. Despiüe these desperate circr¡mstances,

Bol{var remained optirnistie. !ütrile in exile in the Caribbean

he presented t¡is vision for the future of Latin America in an

open letter to the public which has become known as the

"Jamaican Letter." Disparaging the colonial e:rperience of

Spanlsh America, Bollvar wrote that the reconquest, woul-d

eventually give rüay to an incessanü struggle for freedom.

Ttre final victory would eome about through the uniüed effort

tt

6

of alL Americans. Continuing his enthusiasm for the concept

of a Large regional republic for northern South America, he

declared that New Granada must unit.e with Venezuela to forur

a nen naüion which should be caLled Colombia. Ttro years

passed before the LÍberator was abLe to move toward the ful-fillment of that dre"m.7

In L817 Bollvar changed his tactics for another attempt

to free Venezuela. Forsaking further assauLts on Caracas and

the northern coastal cities, the republican strategy now

aimed to gain control of the rugged southern p1-ains. Ttrere-

fore, in March L817, Bollvar landed his army in eastern

Venezuela at the mouth of the Orinoco River. By the end of

August the few Spanish garrisons along the waterltray had sur-

rendered and the srnalL rivertown of Angostura became the

Liberatorrs headquarters. Over the next two years the nehl

strategy proved successful. The vast marshy plains, Q'Í lLanos,

fo:med an effective barrier of difficuLt terrain between the

Spanish forces on the coast and the republican contingent

along the Orinoco. Secure from attack, the patriot army or-

ganízed and expanded. the leader of ühe fa¡rous horsemen of

rhe pLains, Josd Antonio Páez, brought these llaneros into the

republican ranks. Appeals were also made overseas and over

4r000 foreigners--Englishmen, Irishmen, Spaniards and Germans--

enlisted in the struggle for independence.S

By Late L8L8, Bollvar was prepared to launctr an offensive.

General Francisco de PauLa Santander, a native of New Granada

7

and a veteran of the United Provinces, had successfully cap-

tureci control of the southern plains of that territory.General Plez held the eastern half of Venezuela while Bollvarcomanded ühe centraL region and coordinated overall strategy.Confident of str.ciess, the Liberator caLled together the Con-

gress of Angostura in February 1819 to begin the process offo::urally est.abl-ishing ühe new nation of Gran Colombia. As

the represerrtatives Labored to produce the governmental frame-

r.rork for the nation, Bollvar opened hÍs s¡ilitary canpaign.

Choosing to free Fogotá before attempting to liberaüe Caracas,

he crossed into New Granada. On August 7, L819, ühe repub-

lican army met the Spanish at the bridge of Boyacá which

crossed a smal-l ravine near the city of Tunja. Ttre patriotforces rüon a decisive vi-ctory, when they trapped and complete-

ly routed the Spanish army. Ttre road to the eapital city lay

open. Three days later throngs of citlzens r¡elcomed Eolfvar

as he entered trogotd through triu$phaL arches. the victoryaü BoyacJ effectiveLy ende,J the Spanish threat in New Granada.

Bolfvar, Leaving Santander in coumand, reüurned to Angosüura

to witness ühe courpletion of the delegates' work.

On December Ur, 18L9, BoLlvar addressed the congress.

In addition to reporting his recent niLitary success, he re-ninded the delegates of his desire to 6ee the union of Vene-

zueLa and New Granada, and he urged them toward finaL acüion.

Three days later his r¡ishes lrere fulfiLled when the congress

announced the promulgaüion of the Fundamental Law of the

irt

8

People of Colombia. The Fundamental Law declared the exist-

ence of the nation of Colombia, and declared the union of the

citizens of the Captaincy-General of Venezuela and the Vicero-

yalty of New Granada. It mandated a centralized government

directed by a president and a vice-president. The territory

of the nation was divided into three departments -- Venezuela,

Cundinamarca, and Quito. The first congress of the new nation

was to assemble in 1821 at the Granadan city of Cúcuta, near

the Venezuelan border. Its task was to review the Fundamental

Law and write a more complete constitution. Bolivar was un-

animously elected president and he retained General Santander

as the governor of Cundinamarca. 9 With Bogota' secure and the

republican armies closing in on the Spanish in Caracas, the

establishment of the new nation seemed assured. However, the

Fundamental Law failed to address one crucial fact. The ter-

ritory of the audiencia of Quito, designated as one of Colom-

bia's departments, remained firmly under the control of the

enemy.

The audiencia of Quito extended from the Cauca valley in

southern New Granada, westward to the Pacific Ocean, and

southward to the border with Peru. Divided by the Andes

mountains, the territory exhibited three distinct geographi-

cal regions -- the coastal lowlands, the sierra, and the trop-

ical lowlands of the Amazon basin. The population of the

audiencia, estimated at 600,000 on the eve of the independence

movement, was over fifty percent Indian, the majority of whom

9

inhabited the communities of the sierra. Quito, the capital

city at an altitude of over 9,000 feet, was the major city of

the highlands. To the north were the communities of Ibarra

and Tulcañ; to the south. Latacunga, Ambato, Riobamba, Cuenca

and Loja. On the Pacific coast the port city of Guayaquil

dominated the towns of Portoviejo and Esmeraldas further up

the coast. 10

A northern stronghold under the Inca Empire, the area

was conquered and colonized by the Spanish in the first de-

cades of the sixteenth century. The crown erected the au-

diencia of Quito in 1563 as a component of the viceroyalty of

Peru. During the eighteenth century, jurisdiction over Quito

shifted between the viceroyalties of Peru and New Granada.

By 1739, the audiencia was finally established as a permanent

part of New Granada, although royal officials in Lima con-

tinued to exercise influence particularly in Guayaquil.

Peruvian officials coveted the major shipbuilding i ustry

located there while Lima's merchants sought to m nopolize the

lucrative cacao trade of the province. Many of Guayaquil's

merchants and royal officials had stronger ties to Lima than

to Quito or Bogota and supported Lima's ambitions. In 1803

the crown responded to these interests by declaring Guayaquil

separate from the audiencia and under the authority of Perú.

This decree was never fully implemented and in 1819 the crown

reversed its decision in the face of protests from Quito and

Bogota. By then, however, events both within the audiencia

10

and elsewhere left the royal decree meaningless. 11

While the creation of the junta of Caracas in 1810

marked the first effective rebellion against Spanish hege-

mony, events in Quito actually preceeded those in Venezuela.

At the time of the French invasion of Spain, the creole

leadership in Quito voiced their own complaints about the

arbitrary rule of the audiencia's president, Count Ruiz de

Castilla. Angered over the appointment of peninsular favor-

ites to political offices, the local aristocracy objected to

the royal policy of discriminating against creoles, and con-

demned peninsular insensitivity to the needs of the local

community. Encouraged by events in Spain, the creole cabildo

and local aristocrats deposed the president and his officers

on August 9, 1809. Led by Juan Pio de Montúfar, the Marques

de Selva Alegre, the new junta declared its support for

Ferdinand VII, condemned the French, and endorsed local con-

trol of political affairs. It also invited Guayaquil and

Cuenca to join this movement. These cities failed to assist

Quito. The viceroys of both Lima and Bogota' opposed the re-

bellion and dispatched troops to the area. In October the

Peruvian forces occupied Quito and suppressed the junta. 12

Royal action notwithstanding, opposition to the penin-

sular officials did not end. President Castilla, having been

reinstated in office, conducted a campaign to punish the reb-

els. Over a dozen of the patriot leaders were murdered in

their prison cells on August 2, 1810. This incident generated

■

11

even more disapproval of Castilla's administration. In early

September the citizenry gave a warm welcome to the arrival of

a commissioner from the Regency Council in Spain. Ironically,

the commissioner was Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Montúfar, a

nephew of the Marquis of Selva Alegre. Capitalizing on the

discontent of the populace, Colonel Montúfar authorized the

creation of a new Superior Junta of Government on September

20, 1810. While swearing allegiance to the king and to the

Regency, the Junta declared for autonomous local rule and

called for a congress to write a constitution. Promulgated

on February 15, 1812, the document, known as the "Solemn Pact

of Society and Union between the Provinces that Form the

State of Quito," declared independence from Spain. It des-

ignated the audiencia a separate kingdom under the authority

of Ferdinand VII. 13

For nine months the new regime struggled to make secure

its existence. Initial military victories gave the Junta

control of the sierra, but strong opposition from the viceroy

in Lima finally overcame this second attempt at independence

in the Kingdom of Quito. Guayaquil once again refused

support Quito and troops from that garrison joined forces

from Peru in defeating the rebels. On November 8, 1812, the

Superior Junta fell and Quito was once again occupied by

royalist forces.

Support for the independence movement did not end with

these defeats. From 1812 through 1820 a patriot underground

12

stockpiled supplies, protected republican fugitives, and

awaited the progress of external events. In February 1816 a

fleet of republican ships from Buenos Aires appeared off the

coast of Guayaquil. The commander found the city too well

defended to attack but he did manage to distribute revolu-

tionary propaganda to the citizenry of Guayaquil and other

coastal towns. More important, the appearance of the patriot

navy signaled that the Spanish no longer controlled the sea

lanes of the Pacific coast. By the end of 1817, Chile was

liberated and Bolivar's Orinoco campaign was well under way.

The summer of 1819 brought the defeat of the Spanish at

Boyaca. In early 1820 elements of the Chilean navy under the

English commander John Illingworth freed the coastal towns of

western New Granada. Finally, in September of that year,

Bolivar's counterpart in the southern half of the continent,

General Jose de San Martin, landed a joint Chilean-Argentine

army at Pisco, Peru', and announced the opening of a campaign

to free the viceroyalty. 14

Encouraged by these events, the patriots of the audiencia

of Quito initiated another attempt at independence. This time

it was Guayaquil rather than Quito which inaugurated the final

struggle by ousting the Spanish authorities and declaring

independence on October 9, 1820. The significance of this

act went beyond the liberation of the city. The leadership

of Guayaquil sought to establish the autonomy of their pro-

vince from control dy Quito and to preserve the option of

13

incorporation into Peru if they did not achieve full indepen-

dence. To Bolivar and the citizens of Quito, the insurrec-

tion of Guayaquil signaled the beginning of the military cam-

paign to free the southern department and to complete the

creation of Gran Colombia. Ultimately the events of 1820 led

to an even more significant conclusion: The emergence of an

incipient nationalism and the creation of the Republic of

Ecuador.

CHAPTER 2

THE REPUBLIC OF GUAYAQUIL, 1820-1821

Although Guayaquil did not support the sierra revolts of

1809 and 1812, the city was far from a royalist stronghold.

The creole elites of Guayaquil were fully aware of patriot

successes in other parts of the continent. They were equally

familiar with the intellectual currents underlying the inde-

pendence movement. In October 1820 this clandestine support

for independence led to the formulation of plans to overthrow

the Spanish authorities in Guayaquil. 1 The catalyst for this

activity was the arrival of three Venezuelan officers trans-

ferred to Guayaquil from Lima. These men favored the inde-

pendence movement and their transfer was due in part to sus-

picions of their disloyalty. Captain Luis Urdaneta Faria,

Captain León de Febres Cordero y Oberto and Sergeant-Major

Miguel de Letamendi González were not unknown in Guayaquil.

In the course of their earlier trip to Lima, the officers had

made contacts with many of the local patriots. Renewing

these associations, they now urged immediate action against

the Spaniards. 2

On the evening of October 2, 1820, the officers presented

their views to their civilian compatriots. They met secretly

in the home of Jose de Villamil, the municipal attorney. Of

primary concern to the civilians was the disposition of the

14

15

1,500 royalist troops garrisoned in the city. Many of these

were local militia, but the largest contingent was a battal-

ion of Peruvian recruits. The civilian conspirators had se-

cured promises of support for an insurrection from the ser-

geants of the battalion, but they hesitated to act without

also securing the cooperation of the officers. Captain Febres

Cordero now assured them of such support. The Venezuelans

had convinced the second in command of the battalion, Lieu-

tenant Colonel Gregorio Escobedo, to join the conspiracy.

Now determined to proceed with their plans, Villamil contacted

several community leaders seeking a prominent figure to lead

the movement. Despite widespread sympathy for independence,

the local men of wealth and position were understandably re-

luctant to accept such a dubious honor. The conspirators

finally determined to continue their efforts simply in the

name of the patria. 3

A week after their original meeting, the conspirators

gathered once again in Villamil's home. Their activities had

not gone unnoticed by the Spanish officials. The governor

was aware that something was afoot. Villamil feared that

their arrest was near. Debating their next move, the civil-

ians argued for caution while the officers maintained their

plea for action. Villamil noted that in addition to the Gua-

yaquil garrison, the President of the Audiencia, General

Melchor Aymerich, also commanded 3,500 troops stationed in the

sierra, as well as 2,000 men in the Cauca valley, north of the

16

audiencia. With no clear assurances of the success of the

Chilean expedition to Peru, no intelligence on Bolivar's

progress in Venezuela, and with a Spanish army of 22,000

veterans in Peru, Villamil concluded that even if the local

officials could be ousted, victory would be precarious at

best.

Acknowledging the strength of the royalist forces in

the sierra and in the Cauca valley, Cordero turned Villamil's

argument around. The threat of the Colombian army would draw

the attention. of Aymerich and his troops. A successful re-

volt in Guayaquil could then offer crucial assistance to both

San Martin and Bolivar. In the event that the Chilean expe-

dition suffered a reverse, Guayaquil would provide a safe

harbor. With the city open to receive Colombian troops,

Bolivar would be able to initiate a flanking movement and

advance upon Aymerich from the south. Cordero's argument

carried the meeting. It gained support the following after-

noon when word arrived of a meeting of Spanish officials at

the governor's palace to plan actions against a possible

uprising. 4 Preparations for the coup went forward and were

carried out with complete success. As dawn broke over Guaya-

quil on October 9, 1820, the governor, his second in command,

and the loyal officers of the garrison were arrested. Control

of the city passed into the hands of the revolutionaries. 5

The leaders of the coup organized a war council headed

by Captain Cordero to secure their control of the city and

17

to maintain public order. The council also invited the

municipality to call a cabildo abierto to discuss the reorga-

nization of the government. 6 In conjunction with the war

council, the cabildo abierto declared the province of Guaya-

quil to be free and independent from Spain. The cabildo also

created a provisional government for the province. Captain

Febres Cordero was offered the . joint military and civilian

command with the title of Superior Chief, but he declined the

nomination citing his lack of experience as well as his desire

to remain a field commander. The cabildo then named Colonel

Gregorio Escobedo to oversee the military affairs of the pro-

vince and to choose one of its own members, Jose Joaquin de

Olmedo, to preside over political matters. The cabildo named

new officials to direct the city treasury, to administer the

port operations, to handle the mail and to oversee the state

tobacco monopoly. The cabildo ordered that proclamations of

their success be dispatched to Quito, Cuenca, and to the other

communities of the audiencia. To further establish the legi-

timacy of the new regime, the cabildo finally called for pro-

vincial delegates to meet in Guayaquil on November 8, 1820,

with the purpose of drafting a constitution. 7

Within the following month, Colonel Escobedo reorganized

the armed forces under his command. Aided by the confisca-

tion of 150,000 pesos from the royal treasury, Escobedo en-

larged and divided his original battalion and established two

new battalions of volunteers. Totaling nearly 2,000 men and

18

christened the "Protector of Quito" Division, the army was

well outfitted, well paid and well prepared to liberate the

rest of the audiencia. Escobedo's authority was further en-

hanced when Joaquin de Olmedo resigned as the civilian chief.

Olmedo complained of the Colonel's harsh treatment of the

prisoners taken during the coup and of Escobedo's increas-

ingly authoritarian manner. 8

Colonel Escobedo had reason to feel confident about his

personal success and that of the incipient revolution. During

the first two weeks of November, word arrived from the sierra

of a series of proclamations pledging solidarity with Guaya-

quil. Cuenca, Riobamba, Latacunga and Ambato all declared

independence. The royalist forces of General Aymerich were

concentrated primarily in Quito and the Cauca valley and thus

were not an immediate threat to Guayaquil. In addition, on

November 9, the Protector Division scored its first military

victory. Led by León de Febrés Cordero and Luis Urdenata,

both of whom had been promoted to the rank of Colonel, the

army defeated a small garrison of Spanish troops who were

defending the town of Babahoyo. A trading center east of

Guayaquil, Babahoyo served as the entryway for commerce to

and from the highlands. With Babahoyo liberated, Febrés

Cordero and Urdaneta then ascended the cordillera with plans

to occupy the town of Guaranda, Babahoyo's counterpart on the

trade route. The liberation of the audiencia appeared to be

close at hand. 9

19

In Guayaquil, the provincial assembly initiated its ses-

sions on the designated day and began its labors by renaming

itself the Electoral Junta. On November 11, 1820, the Junta

promulgated a constitution for the newly independent province.

The Provisional Ordinance of Government established a tri-

partite executive junta to direct the affairs of government.

The constitution further established a supreme military com-

mand responsible to the executive junta, a judicial system,

a commission to regulate commerce, and procedures for bi-

annual elections for the Electoral Junta. The latter assumed

the authority of a legislature. The constitution declared

the province and city of Guayaquil free and independent of

Spain, Catholic in religion, and republican in government. 10

The constitution, as reflected in its official title,

also responded to a unique feature of the political reality

of Guayaquil. The members of the Electoral Junta recognized

the precarious nature of their province. As a component of

the audiencia of Quito, Guayaquil was already designated as

a part of Colombian territory under the terms of the Funda-

mental Law. Similarly, General José de San Martin, as well

as many Peruvian leaders, considered Guayaquil a component

of the viceroyalty of Peru. Opinion within Guayaquil was as

equally divided. Familial, business, and social ties pro-

vided partisans for both Peru and Colombia. In addition, some

citizens of Guayaquil favored complete independence for the

province and possibly the entire audiencia, under the pro-

20

tection of either or both of her larger neighbors. Thus the

second article of the new constitution stated that, "The Pro-

vince of Guayaquil is declared to be in full liberty to unite

with whatever grand association it finds advisable of those

that may form in South America." 11

The Electoral Junta selected Jose Joaquin de Olmedo,

Lieutenant Colonel Rafael M. Jimena, and Francisco Maria Roca

to comprise the Executive Junta. All three were natives of

Guayaquil. Roca, whose family owned one of the leading com-

mercial houses of the city, was a partisan of Peru. Jimena,

a retired artillery officer, more notable for his cultured

tastes than military expertise, favored autonomy while sympa-

thetic to Peru. Olmedo, a lawyer, cabildo member, and poet,

favored complete independence while also sympathetic to Peru.

The most energetic and experienced of the three, Olmedo

quickly emerged as the leader of the executive junta and was

designated its president. 12

Born in Guayaquil in 1780, José Joaquin de Olmedo was

educated in Quito and Lima. Graduating with degrees in both

civil and canon law, Olmedo established a respectable law

practice in both cities. In 1810, he was elected as American

delegate to the Spanish Cortes. As a political liberal and

critic of the monarchy, Olmedo joined a branch of the clan-

destine Lautaro Lodge in Cadiz where he shared revolutionary

ideas with his fellow Americans. Returning to Guayaquil in

1816, Olmedo quietly cultivated his ideas while serving as a

21

respected member of the town council. 13

The first act of the new government was the arrest of

the province's military commander, Colonel Escobedo. The ex-

cesses which prompted Olmedo's earlier resignation had con-

tinued. Escobedo arrested over eighty foreigners, confiscat-

ing their goods and property. Not all of the arrests were

justified, nor were all of the confiscated funds delivered to

the public treasury. President Olmedo condemned Escobedo's

actions as "excessive indignities for a gentleman, an Ameri-

can and a Minister of Liberty. "14 When it became clear that

the Colonel also planned to overthrow the Electoral Junta,

the government acted quickly by jailing Escobedo and by nam-

ing Colonel Juan de Dios Araujo to replace him. 15 By mid-

November, the independence movement in Guayaquil appeared

secure. Without outside assistance, the city had been liber-

ated, a constitutional government established, and an effec-

tive army organized. Colonel Febre's Cordero's earlier pre-

diction that Guayaquil could provide assitance to both Gene-

ral San Martin in Peru and General Bolivar in Colombia seemed

justified.

Following the success of the October 9 coup, the provi-

sional junta sent delegates to both San Martin and Bolivar to

announce the independence of Guayaquil. Miguel de Letamendi,

promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, and Jose de Villamil, com-

missioned a Captain, were sent to Peru. They took with them

the flag of the Peruvian battalion and letters to San Martin

22

from President Olmedo and Colonel Escobedo. Captain Francis-

co de Paula Lavayen carrie a similar cargo northward des-

tined for the headquarter of General Bolivar. Communication

with Peru was quick and ecure, and before the end of Novem-

ber a ship returned with San Martin's answer. The Colombians

did not respond for over three months. 16

Villamil and Letamendi were cordially received at San

Martin's headquarters on the first day of November. In their

letters to the General both Olmedo and Escobedo announced the

success of the coup and requested military assistance to main-

tain their independence. San Martin was happy to provide aid

for them. The liberation of Guayaquil was a benefit to his

campaign because it denied an important coastal port to the

Spanish navy while offering secure harbor for republican ves-

sels. San Martin also intended to gain further benefits from

the new republican province by requesting the use of the

city's excellent shipyard facilities. He also stressed his

own need for revenues and supplies and prepared a shipment of

150 rifles. He also named two representatives to return to

Guayaquil. 17 Colonel Tomás Guido, an Argentine, was design-

ated the diplomatic representative to the junta, and Colonel

Toribio Luzariaga, a Peruvian, was named the military attaché.

The object of the mission was twofold. Primarily, the re-

presentatives were to establish friendly relations with the

new government to allow for cooperative efforts in the con-

duct of the war. More importantly, the representatives were

23

to promote the formation a formal alliance with the junta

which would place the provi ce under San Martin's direct

command. 18

Specifically, the diplomats' instructions included pro-

posals for five major concessions from the junta. The first

was a military accord placing Guayaquil's armed forces under

the direct command of General San Martín with full authority

to appoint and dismiss all officers. Second was the organi-

zation of a military expedition under Colonel Luzariaga's

command to occupy Cuenca and thus threaten a division of ro-

yalist troops stationed in the northern Peruvian intendancy

of Trujillo. Third, the junta would be asked to open Guaya-

quil's shipyards and bear the expense of repairing and main-

taining the vessels of the Chilean navy. Fourth, the junta

should provide financial aid to the Peruvian campaign from its

normal revenues and, if necessary, through forced loans.

Finally, the junta should ágree to aid a possible expedition

to Panama. 19 Insuring the cooperation of Villamil and Leta-

mendi by granting them military promotions, San Martin dis-

patched the arms and diplomats for Guayaquil. Arriving in

the city on November 20, 1820, Guido and Luzariaga immediate-

ly presented their credentials and requests to the junta. 20

President Olmedo responded to the diplomats' proposals

in two letters written directly to San Martin. He informed

the General of the establishment of the constitution, of

Colonel Escobedo's arrest, and of the victory of the armed

24

forces at Babahoyo. He urther noted that most of the towns

of the sierra had declare independence and support for Gua-

yaquil and that the Prote for Division was only twelve .

leagues.from Quito. Conclu ing that "the circumstances of the

moment combine to create a government without formal obliga-

tions" Olmedo then outlined his own terms of cooperation with

San Martin. Avoiding any discussion of a formal alliance, he

agreed to join with Peru in an expedition to Cuenca, but in-

sisted that San Martin supply 1,000 rifles and the munitions

necessary for the mission's success. Citing the economic

hardships of the province due to a decade of disrupted com-

merce, he concluded it would currently be impossible to aid

the Liberating Expedition in Peru or to open the shipyards to

the Chilean navy. He further rejected the proposal to ini-

tiate forced loans as a measure that would damage both the

credit and public confidence of the government. Clearly

Olmedo reflected the optimism of the moment which suggested

that Guayaquil could secure the independence of the audiencia

with minimal assistance and place her political leaders on an

equal footing with San Martin and Bolivar. 21

Ironically, while President Olmedo was assuring San

Martin of the prowess of the Protector Division, that body

suffered a major defeat. Following the occupation of Guaran-

da, the republican army advanced further along the sierra and

occupied the town of Ambato. Responding to this threat,

General Aymerich ordered a battalion of troops southward from

25

Quito to counter the pa riot force. That column, under the

direction of Lieutenant olonel Francisco Gonzalez, met the

republican army on the pl ins of Huachi just outside of Amba-

to on November 22. The 1,800 republicans outnumbered the

1,000 men under the command of Gonzalez, but the victory went

to the experienced and disciplined troops of the crown. Leav-

ing nearly 1,300 dead or wounded on the battlefield, the rem-

nants of the patriot division made their way back to Baba -

hoyo. 22

The defeat shook the new government and dramatically

changed the circumstances of the war. While some guerrilla

activity continued, and while Cuenca was remote enough to sus-

tain its independence for another month, the sierra towns of

Latacunga, Ambato, Riobamba and Guaranda returned to royalist

control. In Guayaquil, confidence in the military leadership

of Urdaneta and Cordero was shaken. A quickly convened coun-

cil of officers condemned the operations of the two Venezue-

lans and placed them under arrest for failing to preserve

their forces. Colonel Cordero's protests to the junta man-

aged to secure their release but they faced a hostile city.

The officer's council also requested the provisional appoint-

ment of the Peruvian military representative, Colonel Toribio

de Luzariaga, as commander of the province's forces. The

junta readily complied and Olmedo commissioned Luzariaga to

prepare the defense of the country. Under the circumstances,

Urdaneta and Cordero decided to leave the province, sailing

26

to Peru where they joined i that campaign. 23

With the military contro of the province in the hands of

his colleague and the governme t fearful of an invasion by ro-

yalist forces, the Peruvian di lomat, Colonel Tomas Guido, de-

cided to press for a political advantage. He immediately sent

a warning to General Aymerich to treat the prisoners of the

Huachi defeat humanely or face eventual punishment at the

hands of General San Martin. This prompted an appreciative

response from the Guayaquil junta which acknowledged the deed

as proof of the benefits gained from a close association with

the Liberating Army of Peru. Guido also encouraged the local

partisans of Peru to organize and to place pressure upon the

government to sign a treaty with San Martin. Another cir-

cumstance favored Guido's efforts when Cuenca finally capitu-

lated in late December. San Martin himself provided Guido

with his ultimate element of leverage. Aware of the pro-

vince's strong desire for autonomy, he instructed Guido to

assure the junta that he desired only the independence of

America from Spain. He added that the people should have the

right of self-determination as to the form of government. 24

On December 30, 1820, a formal accord was drawn up and

signed. The first article of the document recognized the

right of Guayaquil to maintain its independent government

under the provisional constitution until both Colombia and

Peru were free from Spanish control. At that time, Guayaquil

could join whichever state it desired. The remaining pro-

27

visions pertained to the military organization of the pro-\

vince. The junta d'clared the province to be under the pro-

tection of General San Martin nd named him General-in-Chief

of their armed forces with aut ority to name the commanding

general of the province and to fill all vacancies for mili-

tary posts. The organization and strategy of the army would

be drawn up in accordance with operations in Peru. As soon

as feasible, 300 to 400 troops of the Liberating Army would

be transferred to Guayaquil at that government's expense.

Finally, the accord officially recognized Colonel Luzariaga

as the commanding general of the province. 25

Since the departure of Urdaneta and Cordero from the

province, Colonel Luzariaga had been directing the reestab-

lishment of the defenses of the province and rebuilding the

army. With the fall of the sierra towns, many of the patriots

from those communities made their way to his headquarters in

Babahoyo where they enlisted in the ranks. By the first week

of January 1821 the Colonel felt sufficiently confident to

authorize another offensive under the command of his chief

cavalry officer, Colonel Jos‘ Garcia. The objective was to

recapture Guaranda and secure a foothold in the sierra before

the seasonal rains began.

At that crucial moment, General San Martin requested

Guido and Luzariaga to return to Peru to serve elsewhere in

his campaign. With the accord signed and preparations under-

way for the offensive, the two diplomats heeded their Gen-

28

eral's call. As they prepared to depart, Colonel Garcia ad-

vanced upon Guaranda in at proved to be an ill-fated expe-

dition. Encountering the nemy just outside of town, the

patriot army suffered anoth r disastrous reverse. Over two

thirds of the republican so diers were casualties. Colonel

Garcia himself was captured and in one of the cruelest inci-

dents of the war, General Aymerich authorized his decapita-

tion and the display of his head upon a pike in the capital

as a warning to quiteños who held republican sympathies. 26

Fortunately for Guayaquil, the Spanish forces were un-

able to further capitalize on their victory. The beginning

of the seasonal rains made travel across the cordillera dan-

gerous. In addition, sufficient army units remained in Gua-

yaquil to defend the city. For the moment, President Olmedo

and his government felt secure from invasion. The rains

would pass, however, and the junta needed continued military

aid to rebuild the army. With the Peruvian representatives

gone, President Olmedo and his colleagues turned their atten-

tion to Colombia.

CHAPTER 3

COLOMBIA AND THE SECOND CAMPAIGN: 1821

From January through September of 1821, the government

of Guayaquil wrestled with the difficulties of accepting Co-

lombian military assistance while simultaneously avoiding the

consequent political pressures to abandon the provisions of

the provincial constitution and accept incorporation into Co-

lombia. Militarily, the drama of the ten months of 1821 en-

compassed both victory and defeat for the fledgling republic.

Politically, President Olmedo and the junta effectively main-

tained the autonomy of their province as the second campaign

to liberate Quito unfolded.

Word of the liberation of the province was sent to the

Colombian commander in the Cauca Valley at the same time that

Villamil sailed southward to inform General San Martin. The

message to Colombia contained no request for aid, but simply

reported the success of the event of October 9 and offered

the cooperation of the province in the struggle for independ-

ence. Following the defeat at Huachi, President Olmedo ad-

dressed the Colombian commander differently. Citing the need

for unity and fraternity among all Americans, he requested

assistance in arms and troops and asked that operations north

of Quito be accelerated to divert the enemy's attention from

Guayaquil. 1

29

30

In Colombia, the war was being conducted on two fronts.

The majority of the Colombian army, led by Bolivar, was

poised to advance on Caracas and the other coastal towns of

Venezuela. A second army, under the command of General Manuel

Valdés, occupied the Cauca Valley and was preparing an offen-

sive against the royalist city of Pasto as the first step in

the liberation of the Department of Quito. In December of

1820, however, the war was at a temporary standstill. As a

result of a liberal revolution in Spain which reestablished

the Constitution of 1812, General Pablo Morillo, the Spanish

commander in Venezuela, agreed to open armistice negotiations

with Bolivar. On November 25, a document was signed which

regularized the conduct of the war and declared a cease-fire

for six months, extending to the entire territory of Colombia. 2

General Valdés received word of the Guayaquil revolt in

early November and immediately relayed the information to

Vice-President Santander and to General Bolivar. Receiving

the announcement as welcome news, the Liberator nevertheless

detected two problems posed by the situation. First, that

despite Guayaquil's inclusion within the territory of Colom-

bia, the junta did not acknowledge its subordination to Bogo-

ta'. Second, the signing of the armistice proved a possible

threat to that province. Guayaquil's insistence upon its

autonomy implied that it existed outside Colombian territo-

rial limits. Consequently, the terms of the armistice

threatened to prevent General Valdés from aiding the province

31

while simultaneously allowing General Aymerich to continue

operations against Guayaquil. 3

Capitalizing upon the fact that Aymerich had yet to re-

ceive word of the armistice, Bolívar ordered General Valdés

to continue offensive maneuvers and keep the Spanish com-

mander's attention on the Cauca Valley. He also ordered two

diplomatic initiatives designed to assist-the province while

promoting Colombian interests. In early January 1821 Briga-

dier General José Mires was dispatched to Guayaquil with

1,000 rifles and orders to secure the junta's cooperation to

organize a division of troops. Informing President Olmedo of

this mission, Bolivar assured the junta that he respected the

rights and liberty of the province of Guayaquil and wished

only to promote a cooperative effort to liberate Quito. Out-

lining this objective to General Mires, Bolivar included an

order to impede any Peruvian influences that might jeopardize

the common goal. The Liberator then dispatched two represent-

atives, one Spanish, one Colombian, to inform General Aymerich

of the terms of the armistice. In his instructions to Colo-

nel Antonio Morales, the Colombian delegate, Bolivar insisted

that the armistice be explained with the understanding that

Guayaquil was a province of Colombia and thus included in the

cease-fire. 4

As General Mires and the delegates prepared for their

separate journeys, word arrived of the failure of General

Valdés' offensive against the Spanish. Thus, as the delegates

32

to Aymerich traveled toward Quito, they were accompanied part

of the way by a new commander of the Colombian army in the

South, General Antonio Jose de Sucre. As General Sucre began

to reorganize the army, the delegates continued toward Quito,

arriving there in late February 1821. Soon after they began

their discussions with General Aymerich, General Mires ar-

rived in Guayaquil and opened negotiations with President

Olmedo and the junta. 5

The fortunes of the province had improved over the first

two months of 1821. Announcing the fall of Cuenca to San

Martin in early January, President Olmedo warned of fatal

consequences that could befall Guayaquil without forthcoming

aid. In Peru, the republican army benefited from the defec-

tion of the Spanish veteran battalion Numancia and a series

of battlefield victories. The feasibility of sending troops

to Guayaquil improved with these successes but by late Feb-

ruary, President Olmedo discouraged such a move. The se-

verity of the seasonal rains had discouraged an immediate in-

vasion of the province. Behind this natural defense, the

government had recruited 1,200 reinforcements for the army.

With the additional information that Colombia was sending

arms and a representative, Olmedo felt confident enough to

assure San Martin that the defenses of the province had im-

proved to such a degree that Guayaquil was no longer in dan-

ger. 6

On February 23, General Mires presented his credentials

33

and the cargo of rifles to the executive junta of Guayaquil.

While congratulating the members of the junta for the success-

ful coup and promising further Colombian aid, Mires also

broached the subject of Guayaquil's incorporation within Co-

lombian territory. Mires counseled that recognition of Co-

lombian hegemony would allow the extension of the armistice

to Guayaquil. This would insure the province from invasion,

allow sufficient time for more local recruitment and training,

and permit the safe transportation of men and material from

the Colombian port of Buenaventura. Mires neglected to inform

the junta that Colonel Morales was already presenting that

position to General Aymerich. 7

Responding on behalf of the junta, President Olmedo care-

fully elaborated the government's position. Rejecting General

Mires's arguments, Olmedo pointed out that the rainy season

provided an effective obstacle to invasion and allowed the

government sufficient time to improve its military. Olmedo

assured Mires that the current forces were more than suffi-

cient to defend the province. In fact, with the addition of

some Colombian troops, the President told Mires that once the

rains ended, the entire audiencia could be liberated. With

this in mind, Olmedo concluded that an extension of the ar-

mistice would actually prove harmful to the republican

strategy by prohibiting such an offensive. 8

Addressing the issue of incorporation, Olmedo acknowl-

edged the province's shortcomings but in such a way as to under-

34

score the right of the electorate to determine its own course:

From the beginning we have understood that thisprovince by its small size, small population, lackof resources and lamentable condition of the agri-culture and arts could not, nor should be an inde-pendent and isolated state, and that it needs theaid and protection of a more powerful and strongerstate to progress upon the road of prosperity andliberty. As such, in the Reglamento de Gobiernoapproved by the junta general of the province as aprovisional Constitution it was declared that thisprovince is at liberty to aggregate to whatevergrand association it finds convenient of those thatform in meridional America.

Reminding the General that the only vote of the province thus

far was to sustain its independence and cooperate in the

cause of American emancipation, Olmedo concluded that the

primary objective of both parties should be the liberation of

the remainder of the audiencia.

In early March, Colonel Antonio Morales arrived in Gua-

yaquil from Quito. President Olmedo then learned that the

Colombian agent had tried but failed to convince General

Aymerich that Guayaquil belonged to Colombia. Ironically,

while this failure conformed to the junta's desire to remain

free from the armistice, the understanding that was reached

with Aymerich forced President Olmedo to further define the

status of the province. General Aymerich insisted that the

junta's acceptance of aid from San Martin demonstrated that

the province lay outside of Colombian jurisdiction and thus

belonged to the territory of Peru. President Olmedo formally

dismissed that assertion. Informing Colonel Morales of the

junta's objections to the accord with Aymerich, he condemned

35

as ridiculous the claim that the province belonged to or had

decided to incorporate into Peru. Olmedo followed this pro-

test with a formal letter to Vice-President Santander, in

which he again rejected the suggestion that Guayaquil was

part of Peru describing it as, "a strange idea and very far

from the truth."10

On April 12, President Olmedo presented his own terms of

assistance to General Mires. Encompassing political as well

as military objectives, the proposal stated that, in exchange

for a promise from the Liberator to respect the rights and

liberties of the province, the junta would provide the ships

to transport Colombian troops to Guayaquil and pay for their

provisions. The junta also agreed that General Mires could

exercise command of the joint expedition to liberate Quito,

but only with the understanding that the expedition remain

under the authority of the government of Guayaquil. 11 Aware

of the political implications embodied in the draft accord,

General Mires responded that while he was prepared to accept

the military command he lacked the authority to sign the

agreement. Refusing to be put off by this rejection, Olmedo

requested that the General forward an unsigned copy of the

treaty to the Liberator. In addition, the junta took the

initiative to send a separate copy to Bolivar for his exami-

nation and approval. 12

Throughout April, the junta recruited more men for its

armed forces, prepared a convoy of five ships to transport

36

Colombian troops from the port of Buenaventra, and adminis-

tered two forced loans to cover the expenses. The province's

military now numbered 1,700 men; an additional 1,000 were ex-

pected to eventually arrive from Colombia. The expense of

the new troops and the convoy exceeded the 80,000 pesos raised

primarily by forced loans. 13

On April 30, the first of returning transport ships

dropped anchor in the Pacific port of Santa Elena, west of Gua-

yaquil. The ship carried 300 Colombian troops. Also on board

was the new commander of the Guayaquil expedition, General

Antonio José de Sucre. A Venezuelan who had joined Miranda's

army in 1810, Sucre rose rapidly through the ranks to become

one of Bolivar's most trusted officers. Courageous, intelli-

gent, and personable, Sucre displayed not only the talents of

an efficient military leader but also embodied a politician's

inclination toward compromise and conciliation. These latter

attributes figured strongly in the Liberator's selection of

Sucre to assume command of the Guayaquil expedition. 14

Specifically, the Liberator's instructions to General

Sucre directed him to present to the junta Colombia's justi-

fication for the incorporation of Guayaquil. The colonial

ties of the audiencia to Bogota, the preeminence of the Fun-

damental Law, the obvious military advantages and the dire

international ramifications of trying to maintain an autono-

mous province formed the basis of Bolivar's argument. As

part of the ancient audiencia of Quito, which belonged to the

37

jurisdiction of the viceroyalty of New Granada, Guayaquil ex-

isted within the territorial limits declared by the Congress

of Angostura. Clearly Guayaquil could neither maintain its

own independence nor liberate the rest of the audiencia with-

out Colombian military assistance. And, if the leaders of

Guayaquil maintained a hope for independence for the province,

they ignored the realization that neither Spain nor the Euro-

pean nations would recognize such small republics and that

ultimately Guayaquil would thus become the object of war be-

tween Colombia and Peru. While presenting these arguments to

the junta, General Sucre courted public opinion and sought to

gain popular support for incorporation into Colombia. Should

President Olmedo and his associates fail to respond favorably

to these overtures, Bolivar authorized Sucre to withdraw all

Colombian aid and seize some other coastal town such as Esme-

raldas in order to proceed independently with operations to

free Quito. Despite the confident rhetoric, Bolivar clearly

realized that Guayaquil's current success and potential for

assistance from Peru could cut the province's weak ties to

Bogota. 15

Leaving the Colombian contingent at Santa Elena, General

Sucre traveled to Guayaquil to open negotiations with the

government. Arriving in the capital, he found political opi-

nion in the city divided. Some citizens favored aggregation

with Colombia, others with Peru. A third group, which includ-

ed many of the members of government, sought complete indeperd-

38

ence for the province.• A fourth=faction'of royalists prag

matically accepted the republican regime while patiently a-

waiting its demise. Sucre viewed these political divisions,

and particularly the royalist faction, as the basis for the

junta's cautious policy. Reporting to the Colombian Minister

of War, the General announced that he would insist upon an

autonomous military command in the province. With the pres-

ence of Colombian troops and some active encouragement of pro-

Colombian opinion, the junta would soon find broad public sup-

port for a decision to incorporate. 16

President Olmedo and his colleagues proved to be more

recalcitrant than Sucre thought. The General's original pro-

posals to the junta were rejected outright and when an agree-

ment was finally signed on May 15, 1821, both parties acknowl-

edged that the junta had scored a diplomatic victory. The

terms of the accord were carefully drawn to maintain the gov-

erment's policy of postponing the question of incorporation

by establishing the priority of the liberation of the entire

audiencia. The preamble acknowledged the objective of the

Colombian government to be the establishment of the Fundamen-

tal Law, which declared the audiencia of Quito a part of that

nation. However, the language also asserted that the imple-

mentation of the law depended upon a free vote of the people

and that the citizens of Guayaquil were separately invited to

participate in that decision. While the junta agreed to rec-

ommend the advantages of the Fundamental Law at the next

39

meeting of the provincial assembly, they noted that the con-

stitution prohibited the government from directly deciding the

issue and that the provincial assembly would be called only

after the liberation of Cuenca and Quito. Without reference

to the accord signed with San Martin's representatives, the

junta declared the province under the protection of Colombia.

It authorized the Liberator to represent Guayaquil in all ne-

gotiations and treaties of alliance, peace, and commerce.

Sucre received authority to negotiate a separate armistice

with General Aymerich. The junta agreed to pay for the trans-

portation and maintenance of Colombian troops and pledged the

assistance of an auxiliary force of 800 local recruits. The

Colombian government was obligated to provide the troops and

material to defend the province and liberate Quito. In addi-

tion, the expenses incurred by the junta would be assumed as

part of the Colombian national debt. 17

President Olmedo immediately sent a communiqué to Bolivar

inviting his acceptance of the document. General Sucre ac-

knowledged to his superiors that the treaty was far from satis-

factory, but at the moment little else could be accomplished.

The government refused to discuss incorporation. There were

Colombian factions among the populace but any attempt to force

a favorable decision from the junta with this limited public

support might unite all of the anti-Colombian elements into

a pragmatic alliance. Sucre concluded that a successful mil-

itary campaign to liberate Quito offered the greatest hope

40

to obtain political leverage. 18

The new allied division under General Sucre's command

combined his 300 Colombian veterans, the 800 auxiliary troops

promised by the junta, and a number of emigres from the sierra

communities. These recruits assured the General that an

active underground existed in the Spanish-held territory where

food, clothing and livestock were hidden to aid in the future

campaign. Sucre also looked to General San Martin for assist-

ance. From December 1820 through May 1821 the northern pro-

vinces of Peru declared independence and pledged allegiance

to San Martín. This development presented the republicans

with a detachment of troops in the port city of Piura near

the border between Ecuador and Peru. Proposing to open an

offensive against Cuenca, Sucre requested that San Martin

move those troops against Loja to divide the attention of the

enemy, and then join the allied division in its march. 19

A series of reverses then plagued Sucre's efforts to pre-

pare a military campaign. His request to San Martín went un-

answered which in effect denied the cooperation of those for-

ces. Aware of Sucre's appeal to Peru and confident of a posi-

tive response, Vice-President Santander halted a scheduled

transfer of troops to Guayaquil in order to bolster the army

in the Cauca Valley. Aware of the arrival of the Colombian

contingent at Guayaquil, General Aymerich complained that

the Colombians had jeopardized the armistice. Unless they

withdrew, he would commence hostilities on the northern front.

,41

Aymerich underscored this statement by arresting a represent-

ative sent by General Sucre to argue the legitimacy of the

Colombian presence under the terms of the new accord. 20

In addition to these difficulties, Sucre faced a royalist

revolt. On July 17, a captain of the city guard declared for

the crown. With a band of royalists he seized a warship in

the harbor. The rebels fired upon the city and damaged other

ships at anchor. General Sucre was twenty miles northeast of

the city, near the town of Babahoyo, directing the organiza-

tion of his division. President Olmedo notified Sucre of the

revolt, requested him to return to Guayaquil, and warned the

General of rumors of a larger conspiracy. As Sucre reached

Guayaquil, Olmedo's warning proved correct. In Babahoyo, the

commander of the first battalion announced for the king and

began to march his unit toward enemy headquarters at Guaranda.

Sucre immediately ordered a detachment of cavalry to intercept

the battalion. Following a skirmish which scattered the re-

bellious troops, the turncoat commander delivered less than a

third of his unit to the Spanish. In Guayaquil, General Su-

cre closed the harbor and placed greater security on the ship-

yards. The junta arrested over fifty Spaniards and began re-

cruitment for another battalion to protect the city. 21 The

government weathered the revolt with confidence. The assault

on the city resulted in relatively little damage. In the

midst of the turmoil, President Olmedo proudly reported to

Sucre that the population remained orderly and united in sup-

42

port of the patria. 22

General Sucre felt differently. From the moment of his

arrival, he voiced complaints to the junta of royalist in-

fluence in the city. The fact that the junta permitted many

Spanish bureaucrats to maintain their positions proved frus-

trating. Sucre protested that the province was plagued with

"revolutions on the land and sea, rebellion, intrigue and

evils of every kind. "23 Reporting to Vice-President Santan-

der, the General confided his growing impatience with the

"neutral system" of the junta. If circumstances did not soon

present an advantage to promote Colombia's claim, Sucre threat-

ened to withdraw from the province. 24

As July gave way to August, the rains subsided and the

opportunity Sucre hoped for materialized. Information from

the sierra warned that General Aymerich was planning to in-

vade the province. From his headquarters in Babahoyo, Sucre

decided to use the urgency'of the moment to achieve his polit-

ical goals. On August 6, he convoked a military council of

the officers of the division, ostensibly to seek their advice

for the coming campaign. Criticism of the "prejudicial slow-

ness" and the "timidity and apathy" of the junta dominated

the discussion. In a unanimous vote, the officers requested

that General Sucre, or his designate, be given complete mili-

tary authority over the province and that the provincial assem-

bly be convoked within twelve days to decide the issue of in-

corporation. To add urgency to the message, its contents were

43

divulged to the public before the junta received official no-

tification of the vote. Sucre soon learned that he had under-

estimated both the resolve of the government and the political

sensibilities of the populace. 25

Far from being forced into action, the junta delayed a

week before responding to the officers' requests. President

Olmedo chided General Sucre for allowing matters of secrecy

to become public knowledge and concluded that while the gov-

ernment appreciated the General's concerns it nevertheless

found the message regrettable. The junta rejected the propos-

al to convene the assembly. They did name Sucre's designate,

Colonel Antonio Morales, as Commander-in-Chief of the prov-

ince, but with so many qualifications that Morales felt ridi-

culed and without authority. Public reaction also fell short

of General Sucre's expectations. Rather than evoking an out-

pouring of sympathy for the Colombian cause, the proposals

caused the citizenry to view the action as a provocation

against the government. Accepting the truncated command, Col-

onel Morales remained silent on the issue of incorporation.

He explained to Vice-President Santander: "Colombia would have

lost much if in these moments they had not seen in my conduct

and my silence, ideas of moderation and not ambition, and

measures only directed to the defense of the country. "26

General Sucre had little time to reflect upon the short-

comings of his political maneuverings. Spies from the sierra

brought word that the enemy was advancing. In a move designed

44

to outflank the republican forces at Babahoyo, General Ayme-

rich advanced from Guaranda with 1,000 troops while Colonel

Francisco González departed Cuenca with a second column. If

the two forces were permitted to join, they would outnumber

the allied army of•1,200 by more than two to one. In a bold

move, General Sucre decided to abandon Babahoyo and strick at

González. 27

In Guayaquil the junta implemented a 50,000 peso forced

loan to prepare for the defense of the city. An urgent appeal

was sent to San Martin requesting that the troops in Piura now

advance upon Cuenca. Informing Sucre of these preparations,

President Olmedo cautioned the General to save the division

at all cost for it was the key to the salvation of the prov-

ince. 28 On August 19, the allied division met the enemy near

the village of Yagauchi and won a decisive victory. Of the

1,000 veterans under Colonel González, nearly 200 became ca-

sualties and 600 were taken prisoner. The Spanish commander

narrowly escaped with a force of 150 men. General Aymerich's

vanguard, which had occupied Babahoyo, quickly abandoned the

town shortly ahead of Sucre's returning troops. Shaken by

the loss, the Spanish leader avoided further conflict and re-

treated to the sierra. Sucre reestablished his defenses. He

also decided to return to Guayaquil and capitalize politically

from his military success. 29

The circumstances of the moment appeared encouraging.

In addition to the victory at Yagauchi, the division unexpectedly

45

acquired an additional 600 troops when the prisoners taken in

battle decided to join the republican cause, declaring their

allegiance to Colombia. President Olmedo congratulated Sucre

and promised eternal fraternity and gratitude to Colombia.

The junta decreed the erection of a monument on the battle

site and ordered medallions to be awarded to the victors. 30

But despite the overt expressions . of good will, the junta res-

olutely refused to admit Sucre's request that they convene

the provincial assembly to determine the issue of incorpora-

tion. As a conciliatory gesture, President Olmedo invited

Sucre to address a meeting of the city council. 31 Olmedo

spoke first. He reminded the municipal officials of the terms

of the constitution and acknowledged that as the circumstances

of the war improved the time was approaching to call the pro-

vincial assembly. Responding to these cautious remarks, Gen-

eral Sucre insisted that the decision on incorporation be made

without delay. In addition to stressing the ancient ties of

the audiencia of Quito to Bogotà and the new dimensions of the

Fundamental Law, Sucre claimed that an enthusiastic vote to

join Colombia would fire the spirit of the patriots and great-

ly enhance his efforts to liberate Quito. Aware of the ill-

will his earlier effort had generated, Sucre concluded his re-

marks with assurances that he was dedicated solely to the lib-

eration of the audiencia and would never use the forces at his

command to challenge the decision of the assembly. Al-

though some members of the council offered statements in sup-

46

port of the General, no date was set to call the assembly into

session. In the only vote taken to determine the constituency

of the assembly, the council resolved that the deputies of the

original body be retained. This represented another disap-

pointment for Sucre, who hoped that the election of new repre-

sentatives would have resulted in Colombian supporters con-

trolling the final decision. 32

General Sucre returned to the army at Babahoyo. His

first victory did result in a formal discussion of incorpora-

tion even though the results were disappointing. Another vic-

tory would surely tip the scale in his favor. Sucre therefore

launched an offensive against the enemy. General Juan Illin-

grot with a force of 300 men left Babahoyo for Latacunga, a

village just south of Quito. With Illingrot feigning an at-

tack on the capital city, Sucre led the main body of his army

directly east toward Ambato. Receiving assistance from the

patriot underground, General Illingrot proceeded with little

resistance. Inspired by his approach, republican supporters

in Latacunga declared open rebellion on September 8. Three

days later, General Sucre halted his advance on the outskirts

of Ambato. Encouraged both by Illingrot's progress and by the

revolt in Latacunga, Sucre's officers insisted upon an imme-

diate confrontation with the enemy. Despite his personal res-

ervations about entering the field of battle so quickly, Gen-

eral Sucre accepted their advice. On September 12 the repub-

lican army advanced to the plains of Guachi just outside the

47

city. The results were disastrous. The Spanish cavalry

proved ruthlessly efficient and when General Mires recklessly

attempted an uncoordinated advance, the allied army was di-

vided and thoroughly defeated. Of the 1,200 republicans en-

gaged in battle, over 300 were killed or wounded and 500 were

taken prisoner, including General Mires. General Sucre him-

self was twice wounded but managed to retreat with only a

small contingent of 100 men. As word of the defeat spread,

the revolt in Latacunga collapsed and General Illingrot began

a precarious return to Guayaquil. 33

The political advantage that General Sucre hoped to gain

was now lost. The government of Guayaquil once again readied

the provincial defenses in anticipation of a royalist invasion,

while President Olmedo dispatched urgent requests for assist-

ance to both San Martin and Bolivar. The junta's stubborn

refusal to decide the issue of incorporation now proved to be

the greatest asset for the future. A decision to join Colom-

bia on the eve of the Guachi defeat would have divided the

population of the city. It would also have complicated govern-

ment efforts to raise money and new recruits. Any request for

assistance from San Martin would be compromised and possibly

denied. Staunchly adhering to the terms of the provisional

constitution, the junta avoided those potential calamities

which ultimately allowed for an effective cooperative action

by all three governments which would reverse the dismal out-

come of the second campaign to liberate Quito.

CHAPTER 4

THE LIBERATION OF QUITO: 1821-1822

Eight months after the defeat of Guachi, an allied repub-

lican army captured Quito. During the intervening months,

President Olmedo successfully maintained the autonomy of his

province while accepting military assitance from both Peru and

Colombia. Ironically, the liberation of Quito signaled the

demise of Guayaquil's autonomy.

Reacting to the news of the Guachi defeat, the Guayaquil

junta quickly secured the defenses of the province. Martial

law was declared, a forced loan instituted, and local militia

units ordered to prepare for battle. President Olmedo once

again sent urgent requests for assistance to General San

Martin and to the Liberator, Simón Bolivar. General Sucre re-

quested immediate aid from the Colombian Vice-President, Gen-

eral Santander. In addition, he wrote to the Peruvian Minister

of War seeking troops to preserve the independence of the

province until Colombian reinforcements could arrive. 1

While the threat of invasion was potentially acute, the

enemy was not prepared to capitalize upon their victory. The

Yaguachi defeat deprived the Spanish forces of a large number

of men and munitions. General Aymerich lost over 400 men and

much equipment during his retreat form Babahoyo. The victory

of Guachi resulted in an additional loss of some 250 men.

48

49

Finally, General Illingrot's advance to Latacunga and the ac-

companying revolt emphasized the need for greater security

around Quito. Responding to these concerns, General Aymerich

returned to Quito. He named Colonel Carlos Tolrá to command

the battalion at Riobamba. Once in Quito, Aymerich received

word of another development that promised to delay Spanish

planning. General Juan de la Cruz Mourgedn, the newly ap-

pointed Governor and Captain-General of New Granada, had ar-

rived in Panama and was on his way to Quito to assume command. 2

In mid-October 1821 Guayaquil received assistance from

both Peru and Colombia. The Chilean fleet, serving under San

Martin and commanded by Admiral Lord Cochrane, arrived in port

with a shipment of 1,500 rifles. The junta received 1,000

rifles. The remaining 500 were sold to the Colombian offi-

cials. Within another week, transport ships returned from

Buenaventura with an additional 489 Colombian troops. Colonel

Diego Ibarra, a personal envoy from General Bolivar, accom-

panied the reinforcements. Colonel Ibarra carried a message

from the Liberator for President Olmedo and the Peruvian of-

ficials. With their cooperation, Bolivar proposed the trans-

fer of 4,000 Colombian troops to Guayaquil. Following certain

victory in the audiencia, the troops would continue to Peru

for a final assault on the Spanish. Bolivar, himself, would

join the expedition and coordinate the campaign. 3

The executive junta gladly welcomed the shipments of arms

and men. They were less enthusiastic about the Liberator's

50

proposal. President Olmedo informed Colonel Ibarra that due

to past expenses and the continuing disruption of commerce,

the junta had no funds to provide for the transportation and

provisioning of such a large force. General Sucre reinforced

these claims by reporting to Vice-President Santander that he

was forced to spend 10,000 pesos of the division treasury to

secure the continued use of the transport ships. Financing

problems also plagued the Peruvians. The payment of the Chi-

lean fleet was in arrears resulting in a personal dispute be-

tween San Martin and Lord Cochrane. The Admiral now refused

to offer transportation for any Colombian troops or the Lib-

erator. The scarcity of funds and transportation also pro-

hibited the transfer of troops from Peru. The Numancia bat-

talion in Peru, which had joined the republican army, was com-

posed primarily of men from New Granada and Venezuela. Their

commander, Colonel Tomás de Heres, informed General Sucre that

they wished to join him in Guayaquil. Sucre asked San Martin

to transfer the battalion. Emphasizing his own need for

troops and the difficulties and expense of transportation,

San Martin refused the request. 4

Both General Sucre and his second in command, Colonel

Antonio Morales, suspected that the disparate politics of

Guayaquil were adding to the difficulties of securing aid.

Colonel Morales complained that many of the merchants favored

Peruvian domination over that of Colombia and were thus, "by

a thousand low and ridiculous ways," undermining Colombian

51

credit. General Sucre agreed. They both complained that

Peru was being represented as having a more liberal and tol-

erant government than did the Colombian regime. Morales in-

formed Vice-President Santander that future reinforcements

should include many Negro or pardo officials to offset claims

that Colombia held those of color in disregard. Sucre re-

quested copies of Colombian laws and the constitution. 5

Writing to Vice-President Santander, General Sucre compared

the environment of political factionalism in Guayaquil to the

Colombian period of the Patria Boba. Those seeking indepen-

dence for the province received the harshest criticism:

Some wish to be independent (poor devils), sovereignand absolute and to form a nation in between twostates. There are very good men among this group,as we had during that time. I see that betweenjests (of the factions) the godos (Spanish) willcome and demolish them, but they do not yet wish tobelieve this. If in place of the instructions Ibrought I had been commanded to incorporate the prov-ince into the Republic perhaps things would not bein such turmoil. I assure you that I am in the egg-plant patch of the Devil. 6

In early November, the anticipated royalist invasion ap-

peared to materialize when Colonel Tolrá advanced from Rio-

bamba to a location only a day's distance from Babahoyo. Ill-

prepared for another major engagement, General Sucre abandoned

the town and retreated to Guayaquil. Suprisingly, Colonel

Tolrá initiated not an invasion but rather a truce. The po-

litical uncertainties that Sucre lamented were not unique to

the republicans and as the province had awaited an invasion,

the royalists experienced their own political schism.

52

In June 1820 the Riego revolt in Madrid reestablished

the Spanish Constitution of 1812. With regard to the audien-

cia of Quito, the constitution called for the creation of a

provincial assembly to assist in the administration of local

political affairs. In the midst of the military challege

facing him, General Melchor Aymerich looked unfavorably upon

this reform. He did authorize the election of deputies in

late July 1821. Citing the delicate military situation, he

then announced an indefinite postponement of any meeting of

the provincial assembly. Aymerich maintained for himself

both the military and political commande 7

Protests were lodged by the various town councils, civil

officials, and military officers. One of the most outspoken

was Colonel Francisco Gonzdlez, the commander of the illfated

column at Yaguachi. González twice questioned General Ayme-

rich's decision. In late October, following the victory of

Guachi, González registered a third protest through the Quito

municpality. With the Colombian offensive ineffectual in the

Cauca Valley and Guayaquil on the defensive, Colonel González

maintained that the military situation was sufficiently sta-

ble to permit the meeting of the assembly. The Colonel

charged that Aymerich was using the "pretext" of circumstances

to maintain his absolute command. Sounding very much like a

republican_spokesman, González warned that:

To maintain himself with all of the attributes isnothing other than to defraud the citizens of theirrepressible right that they have to elect for

53

themselves representatives of authority that bynatural law resides in the individuals that com-pose society. 8

General Aymerich rejected Colonel González' assertions.

The resulting political tension directly affected military

operations. The desertion rate increased. Rumors spread

that many officers had decided to disobey all orders until a

resolution was reached. The officers of two battalions even

threatened to march to Quito and forcibly implement the pro-

visions of the constitution. At this juncture, Colonel Tolrá

moved to moderate the situation before the republicans could

capitalize upon it. Tolrá ordered a complete amnesty for all

deserters who returned to the ranks. He then proposed a tem-

porary armistice to the Guayaquil junta. 9

President Olmedo and General Sucre welcomed the unexpect-

ed truce. On November 20, 1821, they signed the accord. The

document guaranteed safe passage for three Spanish officials

to travel to Cartagena, Panama, and Peru in order to communi-

cate with Spain to assess the state of affairs. Fighting was

suspended for ninety days. Prisoner exchanges and regular

commerce were permitted within that time. The truce allowed

both sides time to deal with their internal political con-

cerns. The Spanish awaited the arrival of their new commander.

General Sucre and President Olmedo turned to the issue of

incorporation. 10

Sucre was frustrated at the intractability of the junta

and surprised at the growing support for local independence.

54

Reporting to Vice-President Santander he lamented:

I am infinitely tired of the conduct of the Govern-ment toward us. Some of its members, animated by aspirit of domination and command, take advantage ofthe influence they have in the city to aid a partythat, renouncing the obligations of their own pro-visional constitution, desires and nourishes theopinion that this Province ought to be independentof Colombia and Peru, to form a small central Re-public of 70,000 souls, under the protection ofthe two states. Although all reasonable men haveridiculed the invention, it gains day by day amongthe factions and we count six caudillos who disturbthe march of public negotiations and present thefatal character of division and discord. 11

Sucre proposed three measures that might swing opinion

to accept incorporation into Colombia. He advised Santander

to forward sufficient funds to enable the Colombian division

to pay cash for its food, clothing, and munitions. This

would ensure the support of the merchants of the city. To

placate the politicians, Sucre advocated a guarantee from the

Colombian congress that the province would become a separate

department with Guayaquil as its capital. Finally, the pres-

ence of the Liberator would be sufficient to insure incorpo-

ration, even in lieu of the other proposals. 12

Colonel Morales shared Sucre's frustration. He found

the members of the junta to be "stupid, vain and presump-

tuous," and condemend the province as a "patria boba, bobfs-

sima. "13

The junta evidently held a reciprocal opinion of Morales.

In mid-December, a commission of representatives from General

San Martin arrived in the city. Their stated purpose was to

55

assess the needs of the government. Rumors reported that

their mission was to promote incorporation into Peru. These

rumors gained credence when the junta relieved Colonel Mora-

les of military command of the province. In his place they

named a member of the commission, General Josd de la Mar, a

native of Cuenca. 14

With the removal of Morales, the political tensions be-

tween the partisans of Colombia and those supporting Peru or

outright independence increased. On December 16, these ten-

sions erupted in a challenge to President Olmedo and the jun-

ta when the cabildo of the canton of Porto Viejo declared for

annexation to Colombia. Meeting in extraordinary session,

the cabildo dismissed the idea of independence for the pro-

vince as "a political delirium." Wary of the reaction by the

new Commander-in-Chief, the cabildo also declared that any

attempt to remove the local commandant, Juan Francisco Elizal-

de, would be resisted with force. In the following two weeks,

four adjacent pueblos declared their support for the pro-

nouncement. 15

The city of Guayaquil also experienced tumult. The

elector of the parish of Palenque openly urged General Sucre

to seize the government in order to prevent the factions from

reaching their "depraved ends." When word of the Porto Viejo

pronouncement reached Guayaquil, it was echoed by a declara-

tion from the officers of Guayaquil's Vengadores battalion

which garrisoned the city. The officers condemned the "heat-

56

ed and unruly opinions" disrupting the city. They declared

their separation from the authority of the government and

requested Sucre's permission to serve under his orders. 16

The Guayaquil junta responded to these incidents in a

firm manner. President Olmedo condemned the Porto Viejo pro-

nouncement as a criminal act and dispatched government troops

to restore control of the canton. Failing to dissuade Olmedo

from this military action, General Sucre sent an aide, Captain

Eusebio Borrero, to accompany the expedition in the hope of

negotiating a settlement. 17 Responding to the pronouncement

of the Vengadores officers, the junta immediately created a

new volunteer battalion to garrison the city. The Vengadores

battalion was simultaneously disbanded. Over two thirds of

the men and officers of the now extinct battalion elected to

join the new unit, leaving only six officers and ninety men

to seek enrollment in the Colombian division. 18

Public reaction to these events demonstrated broad sup-

port for the junta and provided an opportunity for the anti-

Colombian factions to criticize that nation. Street demon-

strations and slogans on walls charged Colombians with perfidy.

General Sucre lodged a protest with President Olmedo, but even

he responded that those incidents were "not without guilt on

the part of schemes of Colombians." 19 Olmedo noted that the

junta had evidence of conspiracy on the part of some Colombian

officials to disrupt the public order. Two aides of Colonel

Morales were arrested attempting to disrupt a local military

57

unit soon after the Vengadores pronouncement. Later, two Co-

lombian officers led a unit of troops into the city with

cheers for Colombia and exhortations to the populace to join

in. The President noted with pride that the officers re.,

ceived a cool reception. No one accented the invitation and

the troops quickly returned to their barracks. 20

Colombian involvement in the Porto Viejo incident was

equally as clear. Follot -' .ng the defeat of Guachi, the junta

ordered the organization of militia units in all of the out-

lying cantons, including Porto Viejo. General Sucre took ad-

vantage of this development. He instructed the commander,

Elizalde, to organize the militia through the forum of a gen-

eraljunta of all the cabildos of that area. Elizalde received

supplies and assistance from Colonel Morales. Even in the

tense days after the defeat, this activity was sufficiently

suspicious to provoke a stern warning from the junta. Presi-

dent Olmedo informed Commander Elizalde that the extraordi-

nary reunion of the town councils was neither sanctioned by

the laws nor approved in the cù_,stitution. The commander was

warned against any further meetings. 21

Whatever the degree of Colombian involvement in these

disturbances, they ultimately demonstrated the strength of

local support for the junta. In Porto Viejo, Commander Eli-

zalde maintained his position, but the cabildos withdrew

their request for incorporation. The Colombian sympathizers

from the disbanded Vengadores battalion were accepted into

58

the Colombian division and stationed outside of the city. The

new battalion defending the city had proven its loyalty.

Commander Elizalde, while retaining his command, was now a

recognized partisan of Colombian interests. As the year 1821

came to a close, an uneasy peace prevailed for both royalists

and republicans from Guayaquil to Quito.

Within the first month of the new year, the armistice

dissolved and the fires of war were stoked once again. Gen-

eral Juan de la Cruz Mourgeón, the new Spanish Governor and

Captain-General, arrived in Quito with 700 reinforcements for

the Spanish army. Assuming command from General Aymerich,

General Mourgeón displayed a greater degree of political sen-

sitivity. Mourgeón established his authority by sympathizing

with the critics of his predecessor. He promised to respect

the law. He treated the concerns of Colonel Gonzalez and

others with respect. He did agree with Aymerich, however,

that the military situation precluded calling the assembly.

He therefore ordered that preparations proceed for the inva-

sion of Guayaquil. 22

Aware of the arrival of Mourgeón and the fresh troops in

Quito, General Sucre began planning his own offensive stra-

tegy. General La Mar oversaw the defenses of the province

and directed the garrison of the city. Sucre then received

word that his past call for assistance from Peru would final-

ly be fulfilled. Over 1,000 men under the command of Colo-

nel Andres de Santa Cruz were stationed at the city of Piura.

59

In exchange for compensation for expenses and losses in battle,

the Peruvian Minister of War offered their services to help

liberate the audiencia. Sucre accepted the proposal. He ins-

tructed Colonel Santa Cruz to proceed to a point north of Loja

where the two armies would unite for an assault on Cuenca. 23

On January 20, the Guayaquil junta declared the armistice

no longer in effect. Three days later, General Sucre issued

a proclamation to the citizens of the Department of Quito prom-

ising, in heroic terms, their liberation from the Spaniards.

To mask his operation and to keep the royalist forces spread

out, Sucre ordered guerrilla leaders to conduct raids around

Quito, Latacunga and Riobamba. In the second week of Febru-

ary, the allied division and the Peruvian division joined

forces. The united allied expedition of Colombian, Guayan,

and Peruvian forces now numbered over 2,500 men. Sucre's

guerrilla strategy proved effective. The Spanish officials

were unaware of the republican maneuvers until it was too late

to move troops to the south. The allied expedition outnum-

bered the Spanish forces in Cuenca by two to one. As the pa-

triots advance-1 on that city, the Spanish commander withdrew,

pulling his forces back to Alausi. On February 23, General

Sucre and Colonel Santa Cruz entered Cuenca without a fight. 24

The allied expedition remained in the city for over a

month. General Sucre wanted to coordinate his advance with a

simultaneous offensive by Colombian forces in the Cauca Valley.

Word of that offensive arrived in mid-March. Sucre was pre-

60

paring to advance when Colonel Santa Cruz delivered another

crucial message. The Colonel had received orders from Lima

to leave the expedition and return to Peru. The planned ad-

vance was stopped. 25

This surprising directive was the result of a diplomatic

clash between San Martin and Bolivar over the fate of Guaya-

quil. In early February, President Olmedo received three mes-

sages from the Liberator directly addressing the question of

the political future of the province. Anticipating a quick

victory over the Spanish in Quito, Bolivar announced plans to

come to Guayaquil. He also informed the junta that he expect-

ed them to declare for Colombian incorporation before his ar-

rival. In clearly intimidating language Bolivar warned the

junta:

You surely know that Guayaquil is a complement ofthe territory of Colombia; that a province doesnot have the right to separate from an associationto which it belongs and that it would be a failureof the laws of nature and politics to permit anintermediate people to become a battleground be-tween two strong states. Colombia will never per-mit any power in America to divide her territory.2 6

In a separate message to President Olmedo, the Liberator rid-

iculed the idea of Guayaquil becoming a miniature republic.

Insisting that Olmedo accept Colombian hegemony, Bolivar con-

cluded: "You know my friend that a city on a river can not

form a nation."27

The Peruvian representative in Guayaquil immediately re-

layed word of the Liberator's claims to General San Martin.

61

The General received the message just as he prepared to depart

for Guayaquil. San Martin had anticipated meeting Bolivar in

that city. He now canceled his trip and convoked a council

of state to respond to the Colombian policy. 28 Writing

directly to the Liberator, General San Martin stated that the

issue of incorporation must be settled by the free vote of

the province of Guayaquil. Neither Colombia nor Peru should

use force to determine the decision. Emphasizing the priority

of the common struggle for independence, he urged Bolivar to

accept the proposition that neither leader should use military

coercion to determine the fate of the province. 29 Recogniz-

ing, nevertheless, that such might ultimately be the case, the

General also sent new orders to General La Mar and Colonel

Santa Cruz. La Mar, the acting Commander-in-Chief of the pro-

vince was told to anticipate a request by the junta for aid

in its defense against the Colombians:

When the government, in accord with the majorityof the inhabitants of this province sincerelysolicit the protection of the arms of Peru toconserve their independence from Colombia, in .

such case, employ all the forces at your commandin aiding the people. 3"

Colonel Santa Cruz was ordered to withdraw, at least for the

moment, from the allied expedition in Cuenca. 31

While San Martin and Bolivar debated the fate of the prov-

ince, President Olmedo and his associates labored to main-

tain their autonomy and thus insure a role in the final de-

cision. Following the departure of the allied expedition,

62

President Olmedo received an order from Peru that General La

Mar replace General Sucre as the leader of the republican army.

Olmedo refused to comply with the directive. He warned San

Martin that the Colombian division would certainly not accept

the change. Such a move would also provoke the Colombian sup-

porters of the city leading to inevitable political turmoil. - 2

Two further incidents challenged the ability of the Gua-

yaquil junta to maintain its own security while balancing the

interests of Peru and Colombia. In early February, three

Spanish ships entered Guayaquil's harbor. The captains of the

vessels wished to negotiate the sale of their ships. In No-

vember 1821 Panama fell into patriot hands. With this last

Pacific seaport now closed to them, the Spanish ships and

crew became orphans of the war. Lacking safe harbor and run-

ning low on supplies, the Spanish officers decided that their

only option was to sell the ships and seek safe passage to

Spain. An intercepted communiqué from General Sucre to the

newly appointed minister to Guayaquil, Joaquin Mosquera, en-

couraged such a course. Sucre proposed that the diplomat make

an offer of 100,000 to 150,000 pesos for the surrender of all

Spanish vessels along the coast. 33

To the Spaniards' dismay, they arrived in port only to

find General Sucre absent. The Peruvian representative, in

conjunction with the junta, moved quickly to reach an agree-

ment for the purchase of the ships. On February 15, an agree-

ment was signed between the Peruvian delegate, Francisco

63

Salazar, and the Spanish officials, thus transferring owner-

ship of the vessels to Peru in exchange for 80,000 pesos.

This purchase strengthened the Peruvian dominion of the Pacif-

ic coast while simultaneously denying Colombia a naval pre-

ence. The role of the junta in this transaction proved cru-

cial. It oversaw the negotiations for the sale of the ships

and one òf its members, Francisco Roca, provided an immediate

payment of 8,000 pesos to secure the contract until sufficient

Peruvian funds arrived. Recognizing that role, General San

Martin expressed his appreciation to the junta and promised

to work with great interest in furthering the independence

and prosperity of Guayaquil. 34

The junta soon faced another challenge. In early March,

the Chilean fleet, commanded by Admiral Lord Cochrane, ap-

peared. in port in pursuit of the recently sold Spanish ships.

Informed - of the transaction, Admiral Cochrane protested the

purchase. Declaring that the fleet would not be cheated of its

prey, the Admiral seized two of the ships and ran up the

Chilean flag on each. The Peruvian delegation was powerless

to respond. Once again, the junta played a crucial role.

Warning the Admiral to abandon the ships, President Olmedo

ordered the shore batteries trained on the Chilean fleet.

Three days of tense negotiation finally brought an agreement.

One ship remained in the custody of Guayaquil authorities

while Peru and Chile negotiated its ownership. During this

time, the junta pledged to destroy the ship before allowing

64

it to fall into other hands. The second vessel had been sto-

len from Guayaquil during the attempted royalist coup. It

was returned to its original owner, the patriot Jose Villamil,

who was an open partisan of Colombia. 35

While the junta labored to resolve the above situations,

General Scure and Colonel Santa Cruz worked to overcome their

impasse. Sucre appealed to San Martin to allow the Numancia

battalion to replace the Peruvian troops being recalled.

Colonel Santa Cruz proposed to delay his departure and remain

in Cuenca until further orders arrived. The confusion was

finally resolved as quickly as it had begun. Apparently re-

acting to the junta's favorable action with regard to the

Spanish ships, the Peruvian Minister of War countermanded the

order to withdraw. The allied expedition was again intact and

prepared to advance on Quito. 36

During the period of delay, the Spanish leadership re-

turned to General Aymerich. In early April, General Mourgedn

died from an illness developed during his trip to the Capital

city from Esmeraldas. General Aymerich now shifted Spanish

strategy to the defensive. Colonels Tolrá and López were or-

dered to initiate a gradual retreat to Quito, slowing Sucre's

advance while preserving royalist strength for the defense of

the capital. Facing only occasional skirmishes from the ro-

yalists' rear guard, the allied expedition began its advance.

On April 22, the patriot forces entered Riobamba. A week la-

ter, Ambato welcomed the allies. On May 2, Sucre secured

65

Latacunga and began planning his approach to Quito. 37

The allied army, bolstered by fresh recruits and the

arrival of an additional Colombian battalion, numbered nearly

3,600 troops. General Aymerich commanded slightly over 2,200

men. The Spanish General anticipated reinforcements from

Pasto. Unfortunately for Aymerich,General Sucre was informed

of the move and a republican cavalry column successfully

intercepted the Spanish troops preventing their arrival in

Quito. From May 15 to May 24, the royalist defenders consis-

tently blocked all access to the city from the south. The

allied expedition was forced to circumvent Cotopaxi volcano

and approach Quito over difficult terrain from the east. If

Aymerich hoped that the hardships and delay of the operation

would demoralize and thin the ranks of the patriot army his

hope was in vain. Within view of the city, Sucre maneuvered

his forces around the southern perimeter approaching now from

the west. At 9:30 a.m. on . the morning of May 24, the republi-

can army appeared on the slopes of the Pichincha mountain

overlooking Quito. As the population of the city looked on,

the two armies finally met in battle to decide the fate of

the audiencia. The Spanish forces fought well and appeared

to gain the advantage as the republicans used up their muni-

tions. Finally, however, the superior numbers and determined

effort of the republican army decided the outcome. Two hours

after its start, the struggle ended. Over 900 casualties re-

mained on the battlefield. The Spanish withdrew into the

66

city and General Sucre claimed one of his greatest military

victories. 38

The following day, representatives from both sides for-

malized the terms of surrender. The capitulation was generous

and humane. The city of Quito and all areas of the ancient

audiencia were officially turned over to republican control.

Royalist officers were permitted to retain their horses,

swords and equipment. All members of the surrendering forces

were free to leave for Europe or any location outside of

Colombia. The Colombian treasury even offered to assist in

financing the travel. General Aymerich and his family were

allowed complete freedom of movement and commerce. A general

amnesty was granted to all deserters from both armies. The

republican forces then occupied the city. At noon on May 25,

1822, nearly 300 years of Spanish rule over Quito came to an

end. The audiencia was liberated and with its liberation, it

passed into history. The Colombian constitution proclaimed

in its place a department of the republic, which included

Guayaquil. 39

In Guayaquil President Olmedo prepared for the final

struggle for the integrity of his province. In an earlier

letter to General San Martin, President Olmedo described the

divided politics of the city as "a fire covered with deceiv-

ing ashes. „40 With the common struggle to oust the Spanish

now over, the flames of partisan politics began to arise.

Olmedo supported independence for the province and personally

67

informed Sucre that he stood strongly for the independence of

Guayaquil. 41 Francisco Roca, another member of the junta,

favored annexation with Peru. He wrote and financed the pub-

lication of an essay strongly arguing the economic benefits

of joining Peru. The director of the government's combined

bureau of police, printing, and finance also favored joining

Peru. 42 The city was not without Colombian supporters, but

as Joaquin Mosquera, the Colombian diplomat, observed:

The opposing factions, which include the men ofgovernment, the controllers of force and print,are preponderant. The friends of Colombia, whohave no such assistance,:can do no more than ex-press their opinions in our favor.43

President Olmedo saw things differently. He reported to

San Martin that Colombian agents were trying to upset the pub-

lic order and discredit the government through a campaign of

lies and innuendo. With the victory in Quito, the Colombia

partisans also enjoyed the knowledge that General Sucre and

the Colombian division could focus their attention upon Gua-

yaquil. Olmedo informed San Martin that the time had arrived

to comply with his pledge to sustain the liberty of the pro-

vince. 44

In the pages of the official newspaper, El Patriota de

Guayaquil, President Olmedo announced the victory at Quito as

a moment of glory that assured the independence of Guayaquil.

The official proclamation from the junta predicted a prosper-

ous future for an independent Guayaquil, "The Star of the West,"

68

protected by the strength of her allies, Peru and Colombia.

These were brave words in the face of the proximity of the

Colombian military presence, now flush with victory. 45

CHAPTER 5

THE CONFERENCE OF GUAYAQUIL - 1822

The liberation of the audiencia of Quito brought the

issue of incorporation to the forefront. In the months of

May through August 1822, President Olmedo watched helplessly

as General Bolivar capitalized upon the Colombian military

advantage to force a determination of the issue from the

Electoral Assembly. The ultimate arrival of General San Mar-

tin and the meeting of the two leaders of the independence

movement aligned the fate not only of Guayaquil, but of the

entire audiencia with the designs of the Liberator and the

Republic of Gran Colombia.

From Quito, General Sucre announced that the victory of

Pichincha had "decided the fate of [those) countries, incor-

porating them into the great family of Colombia." 1 On May 29,

he invited the corporations and principal families of Quito

to assemble and ratify that proposition. For the quiteños,

a decision to join Colombia posed few problems. In the colo-

nial era, the sierra economy increasingly served the markets

of New Granada more than those of Guayaquil or Peru. As a

colonial administrative capital, Quito was an adjunct of the

viceroyalty of New Granada. The politicians and administra-

tors of Quito were more familiar with the leadership of Bogo-

tá then Lima. The quiteños were also accustomed to exercis-

69

70

ing authority over the other cities of the audiencia. They

had no desire to see their rivals in Guayaquil divide the ter-

ritory of the ancient jurisdiction and ascend to an equiva-

lent political position. Finally, the heritage of bitterness

against the Peruvians for their role in suppressing the jun-

tas of 1809 and 1812 insured against any desire to join Gua-

yaquil in her appeals to Peru for annexation. 2

In accordance with General Sucre's wishes, the town coun-

cil, ecclesiastical and business representatives, and members

of leading families assembled on the assigned day and declared

the ancient kingdom of Quito independent from Spain and part

of the Republic of Colombia. The pronouncement further au-

thorized the striking of medallions for the liberating armies,

the erection of a memorial on the site of the victorious bat-

tle, the commissioning of busts of Bolivar and Sucre, and,

finally, the publication of the Colombian constitution. 3

On June 16, the quiteños welcomed Bolivar to their city

with an enthusiastic reception. A detachment of 300 military

officers and public officials escorted him to the main plaza

where another 700 horsemen joined the procession. On a rich-

ly decorated platform the Liberator was greeted by the lead-

ing figures of the city while a dozen "nymphs" extolled his

virtues and presented him with a laurel wreath. The congre-

gation then ceremoniously entered the cathedral for a special

Mass in Bolivar's honor. That evening, over 1,000 citizens

vied for the Liberator's attention at a gala victory ball. 4

71

This flurry of activity did not distract Bolivar from

the urgency of settling the question of the status of Guaya-

quil. He officially declared the entire area of the old au-

diencia to be the Department of Quito. General Sucre became

the department's first Intendant as well as its Commanding

General. Along with praise and congratulations for the Peru-

vian troops, Bolivar commissioned Colonel Santa Cruz a Brig-

adier General in the Colonbian army. The Liberator then in-

structed bis new General to return to Peru by way of Cuenca

and Loja, thus denying their potential support for the junta

in Guayaquil. 5 In personal letters to President Olmedo and

General San Martin, Bolivar announced his determination to

resolve the question of Guayaquil's status. He informed Olme-

do that he would soon arrive in Guayaquil accompained by the

Colombian army. He expected the junta to provide supplies

for the troops. He also expected to be officially received

as the President of Colombia and "protector" of Guayaquil. 6

In much stronger terms, Bolivar wrote to San Martin that Co-

lombia would no longer tolerate "political absurdity" in

Guayaquil. Dismissing the junta's contribution to the success

of the liberation of Quito, he warned that he would no longer

permit "the spirit of faction that has retarded the success

of the war and has threatened to inundate all of the south of

Colombia into disorder." 7 Bolivar denied San Marti'n's asser-

tion that the province should decide its own future by popular

72

vote. Guayaquil belonged to Colombia. The Colombian con-

stitution offered them sufficient liberty, security and popu-

lar representation. The Liberator confided to San Martin

that the provincial assembly would be permitted to meet, but

only "so that the world will see that there are no people in

Colombia who do not wish to obey her wise laws." 8

In Guayaquil, the junta reacted to Bolivar's overture

with the announcement that the provincial assembly would ini-

tiate its meetings on July 28. The month-long delay allowed

time for the arrival of Peruvian support. In the event that

such aid was not forthcoming, which appeared increasingly

likely, the junta also declared that under no pretext should

the army or navy of any other nation be stationed in the pro-

vince at the opening of the assembly. 9 In his own letters to

General San Martin, President Olmedo insisted that the time

had arrived for Peru to declare its defense of the province.

Olmedo appealed to the Genéral to appreciate the urgency posed

by Bolivar's statements which,_.he noted, were sustained by

3,000 bayonets. As President Olmedo waited for a reply, the

Liberator and his army reached the banks of the Guayas River. 10

At five o'clock in the evening of July 11, the firing of the

shore batteries announced the Liberator's arrival to Guayaquil.

President Olmedo, the Peruvian delegation, and representatives

from the municipality welcomed the Colombian President and

Liberator beneath an elegant arch erected along the riverbank.

The streets and balconies were filled with observers noisily

73

enjoying the celebration of independence and the arrival of

a hero to their shores. In the plaza, a second triumphal

arch bore the words "Simón Bolivar, the Lightning Bolt of War

and the Rainbow of Peace." 11

The junta declared three days of public celebration sanc-

tioning street dances, music, and "honest diversions," but

political overtones immediately colored the festivities. The

cheers in the streets and slogans on the walls illuminated

the divisions between support for incorporation with Colombia,

annexation to Peru, or complete independence for Guayaquil.

At the public ball held in honor of the Liberator, partisans

of each political view demonstrated their presence with argu-

ments and symbols. The more colorful dress of the women pro-

vided the most obvious example of the latter. The ladies from

families favoring independence displayed dresses, belts, and

bows in the distinctive blue of the Guayaquil flag. Those

favoring Peru adorned themselves in red. The supporters of

Colombia arrived with yellow, blue, and red, the colors of

that nation's flag. 12

The following day, the partisans of Colombia increased

their activities. Various representatives met with Bolivar to

pledge their support. The flag of Guayaquil in front of the

Liberator's residence was removed and replaced with the Colom-

bian banner. Throughout the day, street demonstrations prais-

ing Bolivar and the Colombian republic materialized. Leaders

of the Colombian faction circulated a petition calling upon

74

the city council to declare immediately for incorporation. 13

On July 13, the town council met in extraordinary ses-

sion to consider the request. As the representatives debated

the merits of the petition, demonstrators clamored outside of

the council chamber doors. The Procurator General of the

Council, Jose Leocadio Llona, known for his support for Co-

lombia, gave the document his firm endorsement. The majority

of the council disagreed. Reviewing the petition and its 193

signatures, they rejected it as illegal. The majority com-

plained that many.of the signatures were duplicated and that

most who signed were not citizens. They concluded that the

few valid signatures did not represent the will of the pro-

vince and that, in any event, the Electoral Assembly was the

only body which could act upon the issue of incorporation.

Reacting to this decision, the Procurator General rose to

address the council. Dismissing the arguments of his col=

leagues as "excuses" he warned the body that their action was

a provocative abuse of the moderátion of the Liberator. 14

As the Procurator General spoke, that moderation came to

an end. In another meeting hall, President Olmedo and his

associates granted an audience to Bolfvar's private secretary.

The secretary presented the junta with a brief note from the

Liberator which confirmed their worst fears. In order to

save Guayaquil from the "spontaneous anarchy" in the streets,

Bolivar informed the junta that he was placing the city and

province under the protection of the Republic of Colombia and

75

that he was assuming full political and military command.

Simultaneously, a Colombian military decree announced the coup

to the public. The document declared that the flags and sym-

bols of Colombia were now those of the province. In all pub-

lic acts both military and civilian, the name of Colombi a .

was to be "cheered and applauded." 15 In a separate statement

to the citizenry, the Liberator thanked them for their support

while informing them they had no other choice:

Guayaquileños! You are Colombians at heart becauseall of your votes and shouts have been for Colombiaand because from time immemorial you have belongedto the territory that toOay bears the name of thefather of the New World. 16

In similar fashion, Bolivar informed the junta members that

despite the coup, he felt confident that it would not "dimi-

nish the absolute liberty of the people to present frankly

and spontaneously their will in the next gathering of the .

representatives. .17

Nearly 3,000 Colombian troops surrounded the city. The

nearest contingent of Peruvian troops was on its way to Cuen-

ca. The garrison of the city was outnumbered two to one.

The population of the city was clearly divided along diverse

political lines. Quite possibly, the local military would

reflect those divisions if ordered to challenge the Libera-

tor's action. President Olmedo and the other members of the

junta bitterly accepted the Colombian dictum. Announcing

their decision to the public, the junta underscored the na-

ture of the change by declaring it was "ceasing immediately

76

in the functions that had been confided to it by the people, "18

Outside the city, Colombian partisans moved quickly to dis-

lodge local officials who remained loyal to the junta. The

pages of the official newspaper, El Patriota de Guayaquil,

were filled with pledges of support for Colombia. 19 In a can-

did, if understated, assessment of the situation, Bolivar re-

ported to Vice-President Santander that the change in command

"was absolutely not violent and I did not employ force, al-

though it could be said that it was due to the respect of

force that the gentlemen yielded."20 For those citizens of

Guayaquil who wished a fate for their province other than in-

corporation into Colombia, one hope yet remained. They too

had a hero and they anxiously awaited the arrival of the

liberator of the south, General José de San Martin.

On the afternoon of July 25, the Peruvian fleet appeared

in Guayas River and anchored at Puna island. Ex-President

Olmedo, General La Mar and various officials of the city,

along with the Peruvian delegation welcomed General San Martin.

The greetings they offered him could not have been more in-

auspicious. The Liberator and his army were not in Quito but

already in Guayaquil. The Peruvian division of Colonel Santa

Cruz was not in the city awaiting orders, but somewhere up in

the sierra on its way to Cuenca. And finally, the coup of

July 13 placed the city firmly in the control of Colombians.

Lacking the resources to challenge the Liberator's command of

the province, San Martin realized that the fate of Guayaquil

77

had been decided. 21

The following morning, two Colombian officials arrived

to escort San Martin to shore. Stepping onto land, two more

Colombian aides greeted the General as did a full battalion

of infantry in dress uniform forming a corridor from the land-

ing site to the Liberator's residence. To the accompaniment

of cheers and cannon fire, General San Martin and his entour-

age crossed over to the house and entered the salon. There

stood the Liberator and his staff of generals waiting to offer

their greetings. Following the abrazos of the two liberators

and introductions among their staff, representatives from_the

city council and other social bodies offered their welcome to

the Protector of Peru. The two leaders then dismissed the

crowds and retired to a separate room. Choosing to keep their

discussions private, they met completely alone for an hour and

a half. Following this interlude, San Martin traveled to his

residence and remained busy throughout the afternoon and

evening receiving visitors from the city. 22

The following day, the two leaders continued their pri-

vate discussions for over four hours. The general substance

of these talks was later revealed by both San Martin and Bo-

livar in accounts prepared by their aides and in letters to

various officials. All accounts agree that San Martin ac-

knowledged the Colombian control of Guayaquil and accepted it

as a fait accompli. He told Bolivar that he had nothing to

say about Guayaquil and that any confusion over the issue

78

only reflected that of the factions within the city. Of more

immediate concern to San Martin was the nature of future Co-

lombian aid in the liberation of Peru. With the Spanish de-

feated in Colombia, San Martin anticipated the commitment of

the majority of the Liberator's army to Peru. With regard

to the command of such a united force, San Martin even volun-

teered to serve under the Liberator's orders. Bolivar was

wary of the military widsom of the offer. He was also unwill-

ing to share the command. Bolivar was determined to aid the

Peruvian campaign but on his own terms. Despite the victory

of Pichincha, resistance to the republican regime still con-

tinued in such areas as Pasto and Popayán. The Colombian army

was still needed at home. Bolivar agreed to assist in the

struggle in Peru but, for the moment, on a smaller scale. He

offered to send four battalions, totaling 1,800 men, to Lima.

Avoiding San Martin's request that he accompany that force,

Bolivar noted that as President of Colombia, he needed Con-

gressional approval to leave the territory, which would take

time and might be refused. As in the case of Guayaquil,

General Son Martin saw no option but to accept what Bolivar

offered and to acknowledge his exclusive authority. 23

Following these talks, both leaders attended a formal

dinner followed by a gala ball given in their honor. Bolivar

enjoyed the music and honored many of the local ladies with

a dance. San Martin observed the festivities without taking

part. Within the first hour of the new day, the Peruvian

79

leader called his aides together. Leaving by a secret pas-

sageway, they returned to their ships and departed for

Callao. 24

With the departure of San Martin, went any hope for a

challenge to Colombian control over Guayaquil. All that re-

mained was for the Electoral Assembly to offer political le-

gitimacy to that control by formally accepting incorporation.

The assembly opened its sessions on July 28. Colombian par-

tisans clearly dominated the meetings. The first act of the

body was to review the credentials of the delegates and re-

move potential dissidents. The assembly then ordered a for-

mal review of the actions and policies of the ex-junta. 25

This was essentially an empty gesture inasmuch as President

Olmedo and his colleagues were already preparing to sail to

Peru. Announcing his departure to Bolivar, a disillusioned

Olmedo acknowledged "that our charges are prepared and even

the sentences written. My country does not need me, T can do

no more than abandon myself to my destiny. "26

The assembly provided ex post facto authorization for

the Colombian coup. They recognized the action as a legiti-

mate measure taken to insure public security until the assem-

bly concluded its deliberations. The representatives stopped

short, however, of accepting incorporation. While undoubted-

ly favoring such a move, the delegates were still guayaqui-

leftos and, as such wanted to insure that their loyalty to

Colombia brought some advantages to their province. They,

80

therefore, established a commission to decide upon the most

favorable terms to present to the Liberator in exchange for

the final resolution. 27

The above deliberations provided the assembly with three

days of an active political life. This was two days longer

than the Liberator expected their debates to last. At the

opening of the assembly on July 31, the President of the body

announced that all provincial business was suspended in order

to allow for a vote on the question of incorporation. The

representatives declared by acclamation that Guayaquil was

"forever restored" to the Republic of Colombia. The assembly

reaffirmed the establishment of their commission on incorpo-

ration, but its membership suddenly changed reflecting a much

less independent body. Clearly, the wish of the Liberator to

conclude the formalities of incorporation was explained to

the representatives during the evening's recess. 28

Informed of the assembly's vote, Bolivar announced his

happiness over their decision and promised the citizens of

Guayaquil the "eternal right of protection and gratitude"

from Colombia. 29 Those guayaquileños who were responsible

for the Liberator's joy exhibited less enthusiasm: Winning

the struggle for incorporation was not going to guarantee

them control within their own province. There were citizens

in Quito who also worried about the future under Colombian

rule. During Bolivar's visit to that city, many of the walls

were decorated with a slogan that read: "The last day of des-

81

potism and the first day of the same." As the delegates of

the Guayaquil assembly prepared to return to their homes,

similar thoughts undoubtedly crossed their minds. 30

CHAPTER 6

THE LNCORPORATION OF lItE SOImt I L822

On the first day of August L822 the residents of the an-

cient audiencia of Quito faced an uncertain but hopefuL fu-ture as citizens of the Republic of Colombia. GuayaquiJ.'s

declaration for incorporation ended the threat of the Loss of

that province. The territory of the oLd audiencia remained

intact and the legitimacy of Colorobia's FundamentaL Law was

acknowledged. As declared by the Congress of Angostura inL819 and sanctioned by the Congress of Cricuta in 182L, the

FundamentaL Law designate.d the territory of the audiencia of

Quito to be one of eight ttdepartments" conprising the repubLic.

Alchough the delegates at both congresses J-abored to create

a representaLive foro of government, the absence of delegates

from Quito, Guayaquil, or Cuenca did not prevent them from

unilateral-ly deciding the fate of the audiencia. lhe Libera-

torrs vislon of the new republic was based upon the iurisdic-tional lines of the old viceroyal-ty of New Granada, which in-cluded the audienci.a of Quito. This vision prevailed in both

legisl-atures. Ttre vote of the Guayaquil assesibly to accePt

incorporati.on secured the creation of the southern department

of Colombia. Ttre Department of Quito now joined those erected

in Cundinamarc3 (New Granada) and Venezuela to form the new

trePuDlt c.

82

83

The institutional framework of Colombia was embodied inthe Constituti,5i$ Cdcuta.2 Promulgated in August 1821, the--___--_

Constitution mandated a-highly centralized republican govern-

ment. The delegates at Cdcuta shared the Liberator's beliefthat the faiLure of the earlier republican governments proved

the failure of federalism. Consequently, the Constitution of

L82L extended the authority of the executive branch of govern-

ment into every province of the nation. The departments were

subdivided into provinces, cantons and parishes" Loeal au-

thority was limited to the glcaldes. and Egi1lge who composed

the town councils, All other administrative officials repre-

sented and exercised the authority of the centraL governnent.

Political justices served on the to!,rn cor:ncils and oversalu the

propriety of local affairs. With regard to national policy,

the Governor administered the affairs of the province, and the

IntendanE serve.d as the executive authority for the department.

Both the Intendants and Governors were appointed by the Pres-

ident witlr tire consent of the Senate. .

The Senate and House of Representatives formed the 1e-

gislative branch of the national governnenf. Senators hTere

apportioned at four for each department and served eight year

terms. Representatives Lrere proportioned at the ratio of one

for every 30,000 citizens and served for four years. Under

these terms, the new department of Qrrito was eligible to send

twenty representatives and four senators to Bogotd.3

Elected officials were chosen by an indirect process.

t*

8/+

Qualifications to vote and hold office trere increasingLy re-

strictive in terns of literaey requirenents, aB€, and j.ncome.

--------To determine an election, voters at the local level chose---\reprbsentatives to attend a departmental electoral assembly.

Ttre assembly in turn reviewed nominations for office and cas:

their ballots accordingly. ttre Intendant chen reviewed the

vote and declared the outcome. In addition to casting ballo:sfor Senators and Representatives, the departmental electorsvoted t,o fill the office of President and Vice-President.

Although the Department of Quito rilas nor,r free to choose itsolrrTn congressmen, its citizens had to wait for a true opportu-

nity to cast ballots for the executive offices. General Bo-

lfvar and General Santander had been elected President and

Vice-President respectiveLy in 1821. Their Lerms of officeextended through L824.4

The constitution created a judicial system which estab-

lished .regional Suprerne Couf,ts of Justice whose decisions

could be appealed to the ultimate judieial authority, the

High Supreme Court, in Aogot.d. Finally, the constitution prc-

vided for the exercise of special authority by the. President

that could override the other two branches of governtrlent.

As an acknowledgeurent that the wars of independence were not

yet over--indeed, Quito had yet to be Liberated--the dele-

gates at Cdcuta declared that the President could exercise

"extraordinary faculti-es" in areas of military operations, inareas ttrecently liberated, " and during times of internaL

85

strife that endangered the security of the Republic. I'he

citizens of the new department soon realized that for then,

this provision, more than any other element of the constitu-tion)\quld stand as the halLmark of Colombian Law.5

\By the\Qe of the liberation of the Department of Quito,

colonbian law also included many social and economic reforms

enacted by the congress of ct{cuta. rn addition to establish-ing the constitutional framework, the congress abolished the

colonial sales tax, the alcabala, and ended the aguardiente

monopollr. Indian tribute was also abolished in favor oftreating the natives as economic equals by making them le-gally responsible for all other taxes charged to the citizenry.The congress unified and standardized import and export tar-iffs at rates lower than coloniaL levels. coLombian law cle-

creed all further children born of slaves to be free, a meas-

ure directed toward the eventuaL abol-ition of -slavery. Inmatters of education, the iaw mandated the establishment ofa primary school in every tolrn of 100 or uore fastil-ies, or-dered compulsory attendance of children from six to twelve

years of age, and also called for the creation of : secondary

school in each province. The latter reform was to be aided

by the suppression of all convents housing eight or fewer

inhabitants. The building, property, and any entitlementfunds of these convents nere earmarked for the establishment

of the schools.6

This mantle of Colombian Law and reforur did not'suddenly

86

blanket the new department upon the pronouncements accePting

incorporation. The process was piecemeal and ultimately... cf,eated a hybrid legal and administrative situation in the

'\south. The result was often a pragmatic approach to public--\_adrnhlstration. Some elements were imposed in the wake of

the advance of the alLied expedition to Quito. Others fol=

Iowed the triurirphant -route of the Liberator from Quito to

Guayaquil.

During his de13y in Cuenca, General Sucre established

the first Colombian political institutions in the soon-to-be

Liberated southern department. Even before the Cuenca tovrn

council had formally voted for incorporation, Sucre named Col-

onel Tomds de Heres Governor and Connnanding General of Cuen-

ca and its surrounding provinces. Sucre then decreed the es-

tablishnent of the Supreme Court of Justice of the South, to

reside i.n Cuenca untiL the liberation of Quito. In Riobarnba

and Aobato, Sucre made furiher appointments. Colonel Ledn de

Febres Cordero became Governor of Riobanba. In Anbato, Gol-

oneL Nicola/s Bascones recei.ved the appointment.T

Following the occupation of Quito and the entrance of

the Liberator into the city, BoL{var took the initiative forreordering the affairs of the old audiencia. At this tine,prior to his visit to Guayaquil, Bol{var envisioned the en-

tire territory of the audiencia as one department. He re-viewed his reasons for a single department in a letter toVice-President Santander :

rI

i

i

i

iiiI

iI

I

i

i

87

' The department of Quito ought to, in my opinion, beall of the provinces of the South. First, becauseit is on the border; second, to remain strong; third,because it will be better administered by a singleIntendent rather than two; fourth, because it is farfrom the capital; fifth, because Quito should notIose her importance; sixth, for economy; seventh,becalrse Guayaquil should not be the capitaL of a de-

--ffi::St and nor have influence in subordinare prov-

lJith these concerns in mind, the Liberator officially declared

all of the area of the ancient audiencia to be the Department

of Quito. General Sucre became the departmentrs first lntend-

ant and Couuranding General.9

Bolfvar sanctioned the transfer of the Supreme Court

from Cuenca to Quito and appointed new ministers to that body.

Dozens of niLitary and political appointments received the

Liberatorts approval. He ordered the pubLication and circu-lation of the Colombian constitution. Finally, declaring hisappreciation for the 1oyal suppof,t expressed by the gglgqfrog,

Bol{var promised his support for a project dear to the hearts

of the Local elite--the construction of a road from Quito tothe Paeific port town of Esmeraldas.l0

Traveling to Guayaquil, the Liberator successfully over-

came Local pretensions for independence or annexation to Peru.

In the process of coercing Guayaquil to accept i-ncorporation,

Bol{var abandoned his oriln reasoning regarding the composition

of the southern department. I,Ihile forcing the provincial

assembly to declare unconditionally for incorporation, he

permitted their comrission on incorporation to submit a list

88

of requests of the new government. Reflecting a stong sense

of regional identity the cosmission asked that Guayaquil be

established as a separate department with its own Intendant

and Supteme Court. The comrlssion also requested the support

of the CoLombian government for the transfer of the Bishopric,-"'.-,.-' of Cuenca to Guayaquil or the creation of a separate Bishopric

' for Ehe province. The comrission requested that the public

debt of the s:(-gov€rnnent be recognized and paid by the Co-

lombian treasury. Finally, they asked the Liberator to au-

thorize a separate admiralty court for Guayaquil to regulatethe cormerce of the port.11

Despite his orrn reasoning as presented barely two weeks

earlier to Vice-President Santander, Bol{var now decided tohonor these reguests. The deterrni-nation of the Ruayaquilefios

to elevate the status of their province, even while they fa-vored incorporation to Colombia obviousl,y impressed Bollvar.Determined to comnit Colonbian forces to the Peruvian campaign,

Bolfvar realized that further sacrifices would be required.ofttre south. The loyalty of Guayaquil was necessary to insure

revenue as weLl as a major port for the expedition- Another

concern sternured from the discussions with General San Martfn,who informed Bol,{var of rumors that an informal cabal of law-

yers in Quito vrere prepared to oppose Colombian controL and

seek complete independence for all of the audiencia as a sep-

arate state. Although the existence of such a group re-mained speculation, currying the favor of the Guayaquil elite

1---

89

iountered the leadership of Quito and prevented the coastal

from seeking an alliance with those dissatisfied412tEenos.

Under the aegis of extraordinary faeulties, Bolivar des-

igr\ated Guayaquil and'its province a separate department.

Thercity of Guayaquil became its capical and General Bartol-o-

nd Saldn its first Intendant. Bol{var ordered the Colombian

treasury to begin payment on the outstanding debts of the ex-

government. He promised to peLition Congress to authorLze a

Supreme Court for Guayaquil-. The Liberator also assured the

Guayaquil comrission that uheir requests for a Bishopric would

be officially formarded to Ehe Vatican. He denied the request

for an admiralty court. In its place, however, BoL{var sus-

pended constitutional provisions prohibiting commercial tri-bunals and authorized the reestablishment of the colonial Tri-bunal of Coumerce to regulate the trade of the port. Review-

tng his deeisi.on in a letter to Vice-President Santander, Bo-

l{var acknowledged rhat, "this is unconstitutional, but we

will see if it can placate Ehese gentlemeo."l3

Concluding these arrangements in Guayaquil, Bol{var

turned his attention to the southerrutrost provinces. nuring

all of September and October Ln L822, the Llberator traveled

Lo Loja and Cuenca and their surrounding vilLages. He fot-malized the political orgaaLzation of these cities within the

Department of Quito. Cuenca and Loja lrere designated as sec-

gnd ;and,'thi.rd degree jurisdictions respectively, wJ.th' Loja

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90

subject to Cuenca i.n military and econonic affairs and both

equally subject to Quito for political direction. Both cit-

ies received Bolivar with enthusiasm and honors. The tibera-tor, in turn, granted these couununities various privileges

some of whieh, again, would be unconstitutional under Colom-

bian law. In Cuenca, Bol{var authorized the reestablishment

of the colonial couunercial- tribunal. In toJa, he granted the

municipality the right to conduct an annual trade fair, He

also reinstated the quinine rorropoLy.14

Throughout both of the departments of the-South, Quitoand Guayaguil, copies of the CoLombian constitution circulat-ed and oaths were taken to uphold the Law. Local officialsthen faced the daily task of determining how to fulfi11 theirduties. The town councils faced a variety of demands includ-

ing the establishment of police forces, hospitals, and schools.

They received orders for the census of barrios, updated ac-

counts on debtors, public lands and public revenue. In addi-

tion, they faced the obligation of provi.ding men and money

for local militia units as well as regular army units. At-

tempting to meet these obligations, Local officials repeatedly

found that a lack of funds plagued their efforts. The tovrn

council of Otavalo presented a faniliar refrain of fiscal in-sol-vency in a report to the Intendant. The councilmen laoent-

ed that in addition to lacking funds to pay their olrn secre-

tary, no money Iras available for pens or paper nor for renL

to secure a reguLar meecing pk"..15

4-

91

' The eeonomy of the southern departments htas a probLe.m

at all levels of government. From Quito, Guayaquil, and

Cuenca, Bol{var reported to Vice-President Santander abouc

the dismal. fiscal- situation, concluding with the observation

that a great "chasm" existed between the revenues and the fis-cal needs of the new departmerrr".16 The linitation of funds

available for the rnilitary resulted in decreased pay forsoldiers and the suspension of rations. Disorder and grttf-

bfing in the rantks soon led to rePorts by civilians that foons

were engaged in stealing and rowdy behavior. In the mo{t ex-l

treme case, a detachment of troops in Cuenca protested fheirlow wages and a second cancellati-on of rations and conspired

to kill" their officers and sack the to!'rn. TAe plot was

thwarted, but not before eighteen of the conspirators were

killed in the struggle'.17 From Quito, General Sucre reportecl

that incidents of lawlessness by the troops h?ere increasing

despite the harsh punishments he felt compelled to lmpose.

The lack of sufficient funds to pay and feed the troops added

t,o the difficulties of transporting them from one province to

another. Journeying through smal1 villages and totms, the

soldiers often compensated for the lack of rations by raiding

the local, farms. Sucre compLained that, "upon leaving Quito,

they believe that it is a conquered country."l8 In Guayaquil,

Bol{var noted that prices loere much higher than in Quito.

Here the difficulties of rationing the troops was eased onLy

by the abundance of inexpensive plantain and ri.e.19

92

Reporting his observations on Lhe economy of the south

to Vice-President Santander, the Liberator drew a distinctionbetween Quito and the other towns of the sierra and Guayaquil..

Quit,o and the sierra ltas unptoductive and poor. Guayaquil

offered revenues from maritime cormerce, bul the cost of liv-ing in the city was high.2o The Liberator was observi.ng the

result of an economic cransformation that had begun years be-

fore independence. In the early colonial- era, the economy of 1

Quito dominated that of Guayaquil. The highland comuniries

produced abundant agricultural goods such as wheat, corn,

cotton, cattl-e, and sheep, but the main industry of the high-

lands was textile production. During the sixteenth century,

Quito provided fine and coarse cLoth to the markets of both

Lima and Bogotd. Quito ranked as a dominant trading center

along with the two viceregal capitals. The econony of Guaya-

quil developed around shipbuilding and maritime cotmerce, and

was augmented by the exportation of salt., sugar, wood, and

2Icacao.

With the liberali,zatLon of trade in the eighteenth cen-

tury, a major transforuarion occurred in the audiencia. The

importation of cheaper foreign textiles almost, iumediateLy

closed the Lima and BogotJ markets. By 1800, Quitors textilerevenues had plunneted by over fifty percent. Further trade

embargoes in 1809 and 1810 hastened the decline of the si.erra

textile industry. By the time of independence, the produc-

tion of fine cloth had literally ceased. The reuaining Pro-

.i.4--

93

.duction of coarse cloth continued primarily because Derchants

from New Granada, who sold the cl,oth to mining oPerations in

the Cauca Valley, assumed the costs of transPorting theirpurchases. This decline resulted in a drastic loss of re-

venue for the sierra economy. From an income in the seven-

teenth century of over L,500,000 Pesos annually, the sierraeconomy by 1822 produced no more than 200,000 to 300,000 pesos

per year. The depressed economy also created a serious and

chronic scarcity of currency. As a consequence, the quitefios

guarded their funds closely.22

While the liberalization of trade hurt Quito, it bene-

fited Guayaquil. Increased coumerce combined with the expan-

sion of Guayaquil's cacao production to produce unprecedented

prosperity for the coastal province. By 1820, Guayaquil was

one of the major suppliers of cacao to the world market, sec-

ond only. to Venezuelb in quality and volune. The economy of

the province produced over 800,000 pesos a year in general

revenue. The prosperity of Guayaquit did not offer relieffor the sierra, but rather aggxavated their situation' An

increasing conlnerce in North American cloth and agricul.tural

goods undercut the sale of quitefio textiles and fLour even in

Guayaquil, The international commerce also continued the

drain of currency from the sierra economy by requiring cash

for necessary and luxury purchases. The prosperity of Guaya-

quil diminished somewhat from 1820 to L822 due to the disrup-

tions of the war, but it st,iLl provided a significant source

-'-"*-

94

of revenue for the new departuent.

In Quito, Indian tribute provided the main source of in-come for the public treasury. On the eve of independence,

with the population of the audiencia estimated at 600,000,

the Indians composed sixty-six percent of that number. In-dian tribute thus provided over thirty percent of the audien-

cia's total income. At the same time, Lndian tribute never

exceeded two percent of revenue in New Granada and Venezuela.

The tribute, together with the colonial sales taxes, internalcustoms tax, and aguardiente monopoly provided over two thirdsof the total income to the Quito treasury. All of these re-venue sources lrere destined to be abolished under Col-ombian

law.

Bolfvar exercised his extraordinary faculties to assure

that loss of revenues did not occut. From Cuenca, he suspend-

ed all provisions of Colornbian 1aw which had been designed to

end the colonial. taxes. H; ordered the fiscaL procedures to

continue as they had under the Spanish as the only effectiveway to collect revenue for the new departmencs.23 Import and

export tariffs at Guayaquil rdere naintained at thirty percent,

in excess of levels estabLished by Colombiao Lrr.24 Finding

the treasury' in Guayaquil unable to pay for a shipment of

uni.forms from a foreign firm, the Liberator again skirted the

law. He informed General Sucre that although ganbling r,ras

unconstitutional, a representative of the company !,ras to be

pernitted to col,lect this debt by operating a gambling house

;fl--

95

featuring rou1ett..25 In a more serious move, Bollvar per-

mitted the conti.nuation of Guayaquil's lucrative salt monop-

o1y. Established by Guayaquil's independent government, the

mines supplied sal-t for Chile as welL as for Quito and the

sierra. Bolivar maintained the uonopoly as a direct source

of revenue for rnilltary expenses, Itris move proved quite un-

popular in Quito. In a letter to Vice-President, Santander,

General Sucre expLained the dileuura he and Bolfvar faced try-ing to establish the government of the south:

The governrnent of findependent-/ Guayaquil orderedthe monopoly of salt and this measure was seen asa direct attack by Quito to ruin it; we have a-larned everyone,'wich a sirrrilar decree, which-haspublicly upset the people against GgayaquiL I Lt isunderstood that it is only for thi_s province, as inthat province it is not reguLateU and in truththey have reason. Everyone hoped that upon Guaya-quil becoming part of Colombia this monopoly, whichl-asted under the independent government only fortyor fifty days, would be destroyed, but this is notso. The monopoly exists and the province of Quitois charged by this single account tlrenty-five tothirty thousand pesos....and the citizens that be-fore purchased an arroba of salt for six reales nowpays four, five or six pesos. In Quito the aguar-diente monopoly, tributes and the alcabala stillexist; and now added to these burdens of the Spanishgovernment is the monopoly on salt that is the mostcruel of them all. I cannot say that they will endnow bec4gse of the public necessities will not per-mit it.26In both departments, the Liberator ordered forced loans

and the confiscation of up to one third of the value of allroyalist properties. The treasury of Guayaquil was instruct-ed to send 16,000 pesos a month to Quito and the church was

requested to donate over 55,000 pesos to keep the sierra

96

treasury solvent.2T

. Fol-lowing an initial confrontation with the Bishop of

Quito, BoL{var and Sucre found the officials of the Church to

be very cooperative. From the time the liberal Bishop of

Quito, Josd Cuero y Caicedo, served in the 1809 and 18L0 jun-

tas, the leadership of the Church in the audiencia favored

creole rights and sSrrnpathized with the struggle for independ-

ence. Unfortunately, at the time of the liberation of Quito,

the Bishop of that diocese hras an i.ntractable royalist.28Bishop Leonardo Santander y Villavicencio htas extremely un-

popular. He was a European, a staunch royalist, and someone

who matched a gaudy display of wealth with an iLl--tempered

personality. Following the battle of Pichincha, the Bishop

irnnediately requested his passport to depart for Spain.

llhile General Sucre and many quitefios, both the cLergy and

civilians, were anxious to grant the Bishop his request, Bo-

lfvar wanted the prelate to stay. The Liberator beLieved that

the Bishop's acceptance of the new regine would strengthen

its legit.imacy. Perauading Bishop Santander to reconsider,

Bol/var granted him tris personal assurances of protection and

"rrpport.29Accepting the Liberator's protection, Bishop Santander

remained in Quito. He also maintained his hostili-ty to the

new regime. Responding to General Sucrers request to shrear

alLegiance to the consticution, Bishop Santander announeed he

wouLd do so only upon certain conditions. The Intendant and

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97

his civilian officials must adninister the oath in the Bish-

op's palace. Ttre Bishop and his officials nust be granted

complete annesties for their past actions. Finally, the Bish-

op insisted that he and his officials be granted -full Co-

lombian citizenship upon swearing the oath. General Sucre

flatly rejected the Bishopts terms. In addition to the above

affront,' Bishop Santander restructured Sucrets proposals forthe coLlection of a contribution frour the cLergy. The prelate

substituted a plan that diminished the total amount collected.

He redistributed the burden in favor of those priests with

known royalist sympathi"".30

General Sucre complained bitterly to Vice-President San-

tander that the Bishop hras creating animosity among the pa-

triotic clergy, encouraging poLiticaL criticism of the Colom-

bian regime, and even undermining the popularity of the Lib-

erator. Bol{var was welL aware of the truth of these remarks.

In his own report to the Vice-President, Bolfvar acknowledged

that the "cultured" people of Quito rilere disgusted with hiur

due to the protecti-on offered the Bishop. He had received

anon1mous letters denanding the removal of the Church leader.

On July 2, L822, the eccLesiastical cabiLdo assembLed in Quito

to declare thelr authority Eo fill all vacant offices in the

diocese. Soon thereafter they petitioned General. Sucre to

remove the Bishop from his post,3l

Responding to these pressures, Bolfvar ordered the Bishop

exiLed. On July 3L, GeneraL sucre sent Bishop Santander a

98

passport ririth orders to leave the country. Ttre ecclesiasti-cal cabiLdo received word that the bishcpric was now vacant.

On August 2, that body named Dr. Cal-ixto Miranda, the head-

master of the cathedral, to be the governor of the diocese

pending papal appointment of a new bishop.32

Dr, Miranda was a native of lbarra and an ardent supporr-

er of the republican order. Following his eLection, he prom-

ised Boly'var to aid in the consolidation of the government..

Soon thereafter, he Led the eeclesiastical cabildo in uncon-

ditionally swearing allegiance to the Colouribian constitution,Miranda followed his oath with actions. He ordered aLl ofthe regular and secular clergy to accept the new regime and

he punished those who resisted with internal- exile and threats

of excomunication. Nearly a dozen royalist priests rdere ex-

cLuded from their benefices and replaced by republican cle-rics. Wtren the circumstances later demanded, Miranda did not

hesitate to exile various priests from the Pasto and Popay/n

comrunities and repLace them with more loyal cLergynen, To

the extent that the ecclesiasticaL treasury could manage, the

governor also complied with all reguests for contributions

and loans sought by the civilian governmerrt.33

The cooperation of the Church in the process of incor-poration was a significant benefit for Bolfvar and Sucre.

Generally, the initial transfor:mation from audiencia to de-

partment went smoothly over the latter half of L822. Ihere

were, however, some discordant notes that deoonstrated a Lo-

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99

cal. or regional sense of identity which clashed n:ith Colombian

imposed control. Following the declaration of independence

and incorporation by the Quito assenbly, Bol{var announced

that the honors awarded therein would not be accepted unless

the Congress granted its approval of the document. Taking

the Liberatorrs words as a rebuff, the Quito cabildo issued a

statement defending the region's patriotic credentials and

affirming its equality with the remainder of Colombia. The

cabildo reminded Bolfvar of the L809 and 18L0 revolts which

rrere dlefeated t'under torrents of blood from Tulcdn to Alausi.t'Despite these losses, the patriots of the sierra left theirhomes to join the republican armies or to work clandestinely

against the Spanish. Such sacrifice entitled Quito to offerher support independent of any forroal permission suggested by

Bol{var. The cabildo concluded with the assertion that,

"Venezuela, Bogotd, and the other constituent provi.nces are

the same as Quito, and Quito is nothing less than the glorious

regions of Bogotd, Venezuela, and the intermediate areas."34

Duri.ng Colonel Herest tenure as Governor of Cuenca, the

city cabildo twice criticized him for failing to report tothat body, The Governor also ran afoul of the Supreme Court

during its brief existence in that eity. tthen Heres cLosed

an Augus,cinian monastery, the monks appealed his action.

Failing to the courE's order to produce the docrmrents tojustify his action, the court fined hin 500 pesos for diso-

bedience and resistance to its authority.35 In Riobamba, the

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1,0c

local poLice chief charged Governor Ledn de Febres Cordero

with corrupt.ion. General Sucre found the charges serious

enough to warrant a for:mal investigation. The Governor was

ultimately vindi".t"d.36 In Quito, the reconstructed Supreme

Gourt challenged an interpretation of the Liberator's generai

amnesty which brought a sharp retort from Bolfvar. During

the Spanish occupation, jewels deposited in the Franciscan

monastery had been confiscated to pay for the war. The owner:

now sought compensation from knovm royalists in spite of Bo-

lfvar's general amnesty. The CoLombian assessor of the treas-

ury refused the cLaim. The Supreme Court upheld an appeal.

Informed of the Court's decision, Bol{var sent the justices

word that their decision was unjust and despite their judge-

ment, the terms of the annesty would remain in force untilCongress could deterurine the i."r-r."37

Overt politicaL criticism appeared as the souEhern de-

partments proceeded with their first departmental elections.

FoLlowing the parish balloting in July and August of L822,

the delegates to the ElectoraL Assembly met in Quito in early

Oetober to select congressmen and cast an honorary vote forPresident and Vice-President,38 During the course of the

elections, Colombian views critical of the administration

found an audience in the south. T'hese consisted primarily of

federal,ist argrrmencs presented by the distinguished patriotAntonio Narifio and by one of his most eLoquent supporters,

Dr. .losd lgnacio Sanrniguel, a skilled lawyer and theologian.

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Their broadsides were critieal of the preponderance of Vene-

zueLans in the government. Blending a sense of regionaLism

with reLigious and economic conservatism, they criticized the

centralist government and argued for a federal form of govern-

ment more responsive to local demands,39

From Guayaquil, the Coumranding General, Antonio lIorales,

reported that the circulars of Sanmiguel and Narifio received

much discussion and were causing some "evils.t' In Quito, Su-

cre also noted that the federalist propaganda was generating

great interest and was partly responsible for some I'intrigues"

which occurred during the elections, This fledgling sentiment

of federalism and opposition to the centrlism of the adminis-

tration was not sufficiently serious to chalLenge Colombian

incorporation or to undermine the popularity of the Liberator.By acclamation, lhe assembly endorsed Bolfvar for President

and Santander for Vice-President. the federalist sentirlrerr€ was suf-

ficient, hovever, to send ttrree iederalist representatives to Congress.4

I^Iith the conclusion of the October 6Lections, the pro-

cess of introducing the basic elements of the CoLombian repub-

lic into the south was essentially complete. By the end of

L822, the colonial. audiencia of Quito had been transformed

into two Colombian departments administered by niLitary Inten-

dants and Governors and garrisoned by an anny composed pri-oarily of Venezuelans and Granadans. Under a confusing and

often contradictory patchwork of Constitutional Law and ex-

traordi.nary decrees, the citizens of the south witnessed the

10.

creation of a republican Political structure based uPon an

econonic system that continued most aspects of the coLonial

era. This hybrid formul-a prevented the compLete ineorporati::of the south under the full auspices of the constitution and

Colombian Law. With the exeeption of some minor dissent ano

apprehension, the citizens of the departments of Q.uito and

Guayaquil found the formuLa quite acceptable.

From nogoti the Minister of the Interi.or welcomed the

new departments with assurances thet thei.r future within the

Colornbian fanily promised security and prosperity:

You will never have a motive to repent havingembraced the rest of your brothers. Your rep-resentation in the Congress will give you allof the infl.uence and authority necessary tosee to your prosperity in the bosom of thataugust national representation and the govern-ment will be just with the peop[e faithful tothe laws and public authority.4r

In his letters to Vice-President Santander, the Liberator of-fered his personal assessment of the new departments and the

prospects for their future. From Guayaguil, Bol{var observed,

llere everything is new, brand neril; we are notknown except by reputaLion and if we mustspeak the truth it is a liberal conquest vrehave to make in this country and in four days.we cannot conquer the hearts of men...in spiteof the apparent tranquility which we find inthe south. I compare this country to Chisrbora-zo which is very. gold on the exterior whiLe itsbase is burning.'+1

CHAPTER 7

Tt{E BURDEN OF WAR: PASTO AND PERU: L822-1825

In the months of Septernber and October of 1822, as he

toured the southernmost provlnces of the Department cf Quito,

Bolfvar made two observations regarding the entire south. InIetters to Vice-President Santander, the Liberator used a mil-

ltary analogy to describe the new departnents. Revierving

the struggle of the past tnenty years of the independence

movement, Bolfvar characterized Venezuela as the vanguard,

Gundinamarca as the battl.e corps, and now Quito as the re-serves. Iaclcing unity under their new and unfamiliar chiefs, the

fresh recruits required discipline to shoulder the burden of

war that was now theirs, The Liberator and rDany of the Ve.ne-

zuelan offi-cers viewed the .south as an area that Languished

for a decade, relativeLy untouched by the scars of war, where

liberation occurred quickly and at little expense. Bolfvar

concluded that this experience l-eft the citizens without asense of unity. In a concise surnation to Santandgr, Bol/var

reported that he found that "love of country is not under-

stood and for the moment neither are heroic sacrifiees."lThe opportunity to offer those heroic sacrifices ma-

terialized with the Liberatorrs campaign to secure the inde-

pendence of Peru. From L822 to 1825 the southern departments

rtere call.ed upon to supply men, money and materiaL for that

103

104

endeavor. In addition, the citizens of the south faced the

expense of ending two royaList rebellions in the neighboring

northern provinces of Pasto and Popayin.

In July L822, 8t the time Bol{var arrd San Martfn dis-cussed Oolcrnbian. aid for Penr, the combined Colombian army in the

south numbered over 4,500 men divided into ten infantry bat-talions and five companies of cavalry. Even before the arriv-aL of San l4art/n, Bol/var ordered preparation for the trans-fer of troops to Peru. Following the conference of Guayaquil,

three batLalions of Colombian troops total,ing over L,500- men

sailed for the Peruvian port of Callao. Once in Lima, the\\

battalions were to join the Numancia Battalion, renamed Volti-'rageros, to comprise the Colombian auxiliary division. Bolfvarnamed Generai. Juan Paz deL Castillo Comrander-in-Chief of the

enLire unit. The Liberator envisioned sending even more

troops to Peru, and in Late September L822, as he toured the

provinces of Cuenca and Loja, Bol{var offered the Peruvian

government an additionaL 4,000 troops.2 Before the Liberator

could proceed further with this planning, events in the prcv-

ince of Pasto demanded his irmnediate altention,.The northern border of the Department of Quito was marked

by the Guaitara River and the border torrn of TulcJn. Beyond

the Guaitara lay the mountainous terrain of the province and

city of Pasto. The citizens of Fasto hrere conservative intheir religion and politics and had offered fierce resistance

to the advance of the Colombian army. The surrender to the

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105

republican army nas due more to the neqrs of the capitulation

of Quito and the decision of the Bishop of Pasto to accept

the new regime then it was to the actual military conquest of

the area. Following his entrance into Pasto, Bol{var acknowl-

edged the precarious nature of his victory in a report toVice-President Santander :

The capitulation of Pasto is an extraordinarily for-f,unate event for us, because these men are the mosttenacious, most obstinate, and, the worst is thattheir country is a den of precipices and there isnot a pass where they don't bear down on you. Eachposition is an impregnablg castle and the will ofthe people is againsE us.3

The Liberatorts assessment of the pastusos was echoed by

General Sucre in Quito. Prior to Bolivarts arrival in that

city, Sucre sent a detachment of troops to Pasto to assist inthe pacification of that province. Sucre prefaced his in-structions to the cournanding -officer with a concise statement

of the situation there:

The capituLation accepted by the pastusos ought notto vary our resolutioir in tlris relEffiFwe [avemore than sufficient reason to distrust their goodfaith and even the entrance of His ExcelLency toPasto is not sufficient proof to set aside our fearsand beLleve ourseLves frle from care'.4

By late October L822 these fears had become justified.Following the capitulation of Quito, one of the Spanish offi'cers, Lieutenant CoLonel Benito Boves, fled Eo the hiLls of

Pasto determined to carry on the fight, Boves was joined by

another Lieutenant Colonel, late of the royal army, Augustfn

Agualongo. Together the two men gathered arms and followers

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106

and prepared to cast out the republican forces. They were en-

couraged by exaggerated reports of Spanish successes in Peru

and the departure of a large part of the Colombian troops toPeru. With an afiny of 1,500 men, Boves and Agualongo decided

to act. In a series of q.uick rrictories, they dispersed repub-

Iican forces at the Juanambti and Guaitara Rivers and forced

the Colombian coumander, Colonel Antonio Obando to retreat toTulcdn. The rebels then recLaimed Pasto for Spain.5

Bol{var inurediateLy suspended Sucre from his duties as

Intendant and ordered the General to Tulcin at the head of a

battalion of veteran troops. The tlro remaining reguLar bat-

talions in Cuenca and Guayaguil began uroving to Quito. Colo-

nel Vicente Aguirre, an officer in the Quito rnilitia and a \native quitefio, sras narned interim Intendant with orders to

call up the l.ocal uilitia and prepare military hospitals inthe city. At Guayaquil, Co.Lonel Juan lllingrot, who replaced

General Salou as Intendant, remitted 16,000 pesos to Qulto

and organized the loca1 niLit,ia to garrison the city. I'Iili-tary cornslanders in all of the tonns of the sierra fuLfilledreguests for fifty to 100 rbcruits to augment militia unitsand fili the ranks of the regular corps. By mid-November,

General Sucre cormanded a complete veteran battalion and two

companies of militia.6Facing the buildup of republican forces, Boves and Agua-

longo positioned their army at Taindala, a strong defensive

location of rocky cliffs overlooking the Guaitara River.

107

General Sucre advanced to that position and on November 24

decided to attack. I{ampered by sto::ury lreather and difficuLtterrain, Sucre suffered one of the few losses of his militarycareer. Failing to capture the hills, the republican anny re-

treated to the village of Tuquerres to await reinforcements.

In the following four weeks, Bol{var ordered another veteran

battaliori and a battalion of militia from Quito to join Su-

cre's forces.T

Returning to the offensive two days before Christmas,

General Sucre pressed a vigorous attack which this time not

only captured the high grounri, but drove the enemy from Tain-

dalJ. Colonel Boves rejected a call to surrender and began

preparation for a final confrontation in Pasto. Barricading

themselves ln the town curch, the rebels displayed the image

of Saint James, the patron saint of Spain, and awaited the

republican army. tlhen the battle was joined it was hard

fought but futile, Aecording to a contemporary account:

There for more than an hour they defended themselveswith the valor and tenacity that distinguished theinhabitants of that region; but finally they gave hrayand in the horrible slaughter that folLowed, sol-di.ersand countsacrific;;3t"'

men and women' rdere promiscuously

Colonel Boves escaped the slaughter and eventuall-y made his

rilay to BrazLL. Colonel Agualongo and the remainder of the

rebels dispersed into the sanctuary of the mountains. With

the enemy scattered and the city generally abandoned by itscitizens, GeneraL Sucre occupied Pasto and waited for the ar-

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108

rival of the Liberator.9

nolfvar arrived in Pasto in earLy January L823. He im-

mediately decided upon a harsh peace for the province. Not

only did the Pasto revoLt demand men and material from the

south and the attention of the Liberator, but it al-so drew

those elements a\day from the larger task of the Peruvian cam-

paign. Bclfvar ordered aLl of those who had taken up arns

against the government to be exiled and their goods and pro-

perties confiscated. Those citizens who remained in the Prov-

ince instea,.i of fleeing the insurgency were deemed guilty by

association, They al-so suffered the confiscation of theirgoods and property. Bolfvar exiled the majority of the cler-ics of the province and o'rdered twenty-five priests of sound

republican principle transferred from Quito to replace-lhem;===.--==

To reimburse his treasury for the expense of ending the re-

bel,lion, Bolfvar ordeted the confiscation of 3,000 cows and

2,500 horses and irnposed an irrrrediate tax of 30r000 pesos

upon the general populace. A coumission of reparations ltas

also established to award ownershiP of confiscated lands,

mines and buildings to the soldiers and officers of the ex-

pedition. lo

Upon his departure, Bol{var placed General Bartalomd

Salom in charge of Ehe province as its nilitary governor with

instructions to continue the pacification. ImrediatelY,

General Salou began a recruitmenE campaign that insured corl-

tinued animosity toward the republican regime. In one inci-

E

109

dent, the General called for all of the men of Pasto to gather

in the main plaza to swear allegiance to the constitution.Despite promises of security, the ceremony was folLowed by

the appearance of troops circling the plaza. Over l-,000 pas-'

tusos found themselves captive. Most were exiled to Guayaquil

for impressment in the ranks to be shipped to the battLefieldsof Peru.11

Returning to Quito in late January L823 the Liberator re-ceived the disturbi-ng news of the return of the CoLombian aux-

iliary division to Guayaquil. FoLLowing the resignation ofGeneral San Mart{n, the Peruvian congress placed control ofthe governnent in the hands of an executive junta led by Gen=

eral Josd de La t'ter " Susceptible to the influence of those

Euayaquilefiog who fled to Lima after Bol/var's coup, La Mar

and his associates hesitated to accept the Colombian militaryassistanee. The government refused money and supplies to the

auxiliary division and questioned Bolivar's claim on the Nu-

mancia, nor{ Volti,geros, battalion. Under a cloud of criticismand suspicion, General Juan Paz del Castillo led his troops

back to colombian soil.12To the degree that the return of the auxiliary division

rras a disappointment to the Liberator,' its return also created

a financial- crisis for the economy of the south. In addition

to the veterafl troops stationed in Guayaquil, Cuenca, and

Quito, the rebellion in Pasto resulted in the activation ofnumerous nilitia units and finally the expense of hundreds of

110

theprisoners. Added to this cost was the further expense of

1,500 rnen returning from Peru. Even at half paY, militaryrirages alone exceeded 60,000 pesos a month.l3

Moving to reduce this drain upon the treasury, BoLfvar

ordered military wages reduced to one-third of normal and cut

civilian r,rages in haLf . He ordered the deactivation of non-

essentiai nilitia units and issued temporary leaves for those

soldiers recruited from the southern departments. Along with

these measures of economy, the Liberator reaffirmed his com-

plete authority over the south. He circulated notices to allof the municipalities rernindlng local officials that the de-

partments remained under the dictr:ur of his extraordinary pc'hr-

ers. Any law, order, or decree emanating from the centraL

government which conflicted with his orders $tete to be ignored.

To further insure his control of the south, Bolfvar estab-

lishe<l the office'of Superior Chief to administer all of the af-

fairs of the two departments. Second only to the Liberafoilthe Superior Chief exercised complete authority over aLl ci-vilian and miLilary officiaLs. GeneraL Sucre became the firstSuperior Chief of the south.l4

In earLy February, the erratic situation in Peru again

changed. Fol-lowing a serioris defeat of republican forces, the

government of General, Josd de La Mar gave way to a new admin-

istration headed by Josd de 1a Riva Agtiero.. Less suspicious

of Colombian interests and desperate for assistance, the Riva

Agiiero administration issued an urgent appeal for Colombian

L

111

aid. On March J.5, L823, General Mariano Portocarrero arrivedat Guayaquil with a fleet of eight Peruvian ships and iure-diately initiated negotiations. Three days later, Bn agree-

ment eras signed. In exchange for the aid of a CoLombian force

of over 4,000 men, Peru guaranteed to maintain the i-ntegrttyof the Coloubian units, repLace all troops lost in battle,and provide reimbursement for the expenses of transportation,maintenance and r"g"".15

Anxi,ous to comit the Colombian army to the Peruvian cam-

paign before another reverse rnaterialLzed, the tiberator now

called upon the southern departuents to make heroic sacrifi-ces.Bolfvar canceled all previousl-y issued leaves. Mil-itia unitsarere recalled to active duty, and a vigorous recruitment cam-

paign was initiated to raise 2r000 new troops. Orders rsent

out to merchants and manufacturers to provide ar:ms, munitions,

and uniforms. To ureet the expense of this mobilization, Bo-

tivar decreed a contributioir of 100,000 pesos from each de-

partment. 16

Guayaquil-ts custous house provided an imnediate payment

of funds toward the contribution. The transfer of the major:

ity of the portrs income to the military expenses made possi-

ble the departure of the first Colombian troops soon afterthe signing of the treaty. The three battalions, encamped at

Guayaquil since their return in January, now boarded the Pe-

ruvian ships for the journey southtrard.lT

In Quito, General Sucre agonized over the burden of the

LL2

contribution placed upon the fragile economy of the sierra.He called for the paJ4nent of all outstanding debts to the pub-

lic treasury, Establishing a collection comission, he gave

all debtors three days to acknowledge their obllgations and

deci.de upon the terms of payment. Failure to cooperate re-

sulted in the confiscation of goods and property to the value

of the debt. At General Sucre's insistence, the Liberator

allowed two months for the settlement of these accounts. Su-

cre also received authorization to order the public sale ofthe municipal cormon l-ands (Sj-idog) in and around the city of

Quito. The city counciL was instructed to evaluate the proo-

erties and to. prepare for their ,.1..18Over April and [Iay, two further battalions of troops r{ere

brought to fuLl strength and transported to Peru. These units

compLeted the Colourblan auxiliary division. A11 together over

5,400 Colornbian troops were transferred in the short time of

two and a half months. Trso'veteran battalions and the lodel\'omilitia remained behind to garrison the southern departurents.^'

Bol{var ordered General Sucre to follow the expedition

to Peru and serve as the Colombian Corrnnander-tn-Chief. Colo-

nel Juan Illinerot. the Intendant of Guayaquil. also ieceived

orders to assist the auxiliary division. In Quito, Dr. Sal-

vador 0rtega Sotomayer, another narive of the city and the

auditor of the department became Quito's nevr chief administra-

tor. Colonel Vicente Aguirre now became the Connnsndgr General

of the province. In Guayaquil, General Juan Paz del- CastiLLo

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repLaced ll-lingrot as the Intendant of that departuent. To

replace General Sucre in the office of Superior Chief, Bolfvarrecalled General Bartalomd Salom from Pasto. Replacing Salom

as military governor of Pasto was a young colonel named Juan

Josd Flores.2o

The success of this rapid mobilization of men and mate-

rial pLaied definite burdens upon the citizens of the south.

In the process of raising funds in Quito, General Sucre !cor-

ried that his neasures would create two discontented citizensfor every peso colLected, In Guayaquil Bolfvar carelfullymaintained a garri3on of veteran Colombian troops in antici-pation of adverse public reaction to the demands being pLaced

upon them. These concerns were heightened by one of General

Salom's first acts as Superior Chief. Capital.izing upon the

public execution of two Spanish officers in the Santo Domingo

plaza in Quito, Sal.om repeated the recruiting tactics he had

employed in Pasto. Following the executions, the crowd thaE

had gathered to witness the event found the entryways to the

pl,aza blocked by sguadrons of troops. As the soldiers began

"recruiting" young rDen, the crowd panicked and in the ensuing

turmoil, over thirty men, women and children rrere killed.Responding to che reporcs of the incident, even Bolfvar con-

demned it as a "horribl-e scandal. "21

Although he acknowledged the severity of the methods em-

ployed to prepare and meintain the expedition, BoLfvar never-

theless viewed them as a sacrifice required of the popul^ation.

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114

Irlriting to Vice-President Santander he expl-ained:

Everything has been violence upon vioLence. Thecountryside and cities are deserts from which wetry to take 3,000 men and 200,000 pesos. I knowbettet than anyone how far one can go with vio-lence and I have enployed everything. In Quitoand Guayaquil they have taken alL of the men Lnthe temples and the streets to meet the need forrecruits. l'loney has been taken at the point of abayonet. The reason for this is that this peopleare not accustomed ro makine sacrifices and theenemy is 300 leagues from hZre.Z2

The Liberator soon found that the eneuy was even closer

at hand. In early May, a contingent of conscripts from Pasto

departed Guayaquil for Peru. Just outside of the harbor they

mutinied, seized the ship and steered a course to Atacamas on

the Esmeraldas coast. The mutiny was subsequentLy defeated

and the ship reLaken, but seventy of the rebels escaped to the

mainland. Aggravating the situation were reports that roorkers

at a nr.mber of the coastal salt mines were also in rebellion

over the corrupt administration of the coqnnanding general of

the province. An anphibious expedition was sent norEhward /from Guayaquil, and Bolfvar directed the cormanding Genera/.

of Quito, Colonel Vicente Aguirre, to dispatch a force of/fOO

men to Esmeraldas. This activity pronpted the Liberator tocommand General Salom to begin procuring more men and material

for a new battalion to garrison the "outh.23

tlhile these operations were underway, even more disturb-

ing news arrived from Pasto. On June !2, Colonel Agustfn

Agualongo emerged from the mountains with a new army of nearly

2,000 men surptising and defeating the forces of Colonel Juan

115

Josd Flores. Flores, with onlf 600 remaining trooPs, retreat-ed to Popaya'n. With the majority of rhe Colombian army inPeru, Bol{var and Salom in GuayaquiL, and over 200 CoLombian

veterans on their way to Esme=aldas, the road to Quito ap-

peared qpen. Follor'ring his victory at Pasto, Agualongo marched

his ar:ury southlrard capturing lbarra. From that base, he is-sued an invitation to the citizens of Otavalo to ioin the re-

bellion and march in victory to quito.24

Ttre quirefios responded to this chaLLenge with courage

despite the precarious circumstances. Rather than await or-ders from the Liberator, which urighr arrive too late, Colonel

Vicente Aguirre, the coumanding generaL of the province, took

the initiative. On June 19, Aguirre called to duty the cityurilitia threatening latecomers with fransfers to Peru and de-

serters with execution, Two days later he issued a general

call for all men between the ages of sixteen and forty-nine

to report for t,emporary duty. A11 arms and munitions in pri-vate hands were to be turned over to the government. Anyone

giving false information bbout the progress of the enemy or

in any way retardtng the defense of the city was subject to

arrest. The response to these orders was imrediate and en-

thusiastic, The nobility of the city, led by the Marques de

San Josd, Josd Manuel de Larrea, aird by Pedro Montdfar , or1a-

nized a volunteer corps of 150 men, The lawyers and student

guilds combined to form another corps of L00 men. Government

employees also formed a volunteer body of equaL nrunber. Added

116

to the strength of the regular nilitia, Colonel Aguirre com-

manded over 500 men in defense of the capital. He proudly

sent word to the Liberator that Quico was prepared to defend

itself and that the population was providing ample enlistments

withouth the intervention of the governmerrt.25

Bolivar received word of the Pasto revolt on June 21.

He imediately recalled the troops sent to the Esmeraldas

coast. He issued instructions for the recruitment of 700 uen

from Riobamba. Ambato. and Lataeunga. He also ordered the ve-

teran battalions in Guayaquil and Cuenca to march to Quito.26General Salom arrived in Ouito on June 23 and confirued

all of Col-onel AeuirreIs actions. Salou issued a procLamation

praising the loyalty of the quitefios. he offered the antici-pated vicfory over the enemy as a testament to the city. With

the arrival of the two regular battaLions and the for:nation ofa third from the coubined uilitia, Bolfvar organized an army

of over 2,000 ruenr On July 15, the Liberator confronted Col-

onel Agualongo and the royalists at San Pablo,,near Ibarra,

and won a decisive victoty"2T

During the course of these operations, representatives

from the Peruvian congress arrived in Quito and urgentl.y re-quested the Liberatorts presence in Peru. Over the last month

and a half, the tide of events had turned against the repub-

lican regime, Lima rilas occupied by the Spanish, thus forc-ing the republican government to retreat to Call-ao. The con:

gress then deposed President Riva Agiiero and named General

tL7

Sucre interim chief executive pending Bol/varts arrival.WLth no littLe amount of irony, Josd Joaqu{n de Olmedo, now a

congressnan in Peru and menber of the deLegation, beseeched

Bol{var to travel to Callao and take comnand of the alliedarmy as the only one capable of saving Peru. Bolivar was anxious

to compLy with these wishes but insisted uPon wditing for for-maL permission from Congress to Leave Colourbian soil. In the

meantime, he turned his attention to the pacification of pasto?B

Bol{var teinstated Colonel Flores as governor of the ptov-

ince of Pasto but gave General Salom, €ts Superior Chief, the

main responsibility for ending the opposition to the govern-

ment. Bol{var ordered Salom to exile all rebels who were cap-

tured or surrendered, including their fanilies. Those refus-

ing to surrender faced execution and the iurnediate confisca-

tion of all their fauily property and goods, No specie inany form vras permitted to circulate. ClergJmen faced a review

of their republican credeirtials. Anyone susPected of disloy-

alty was to be exiled. Even the rromen of the province were

suspect and would be exil-ed for disloyaLty to CoLombia. Allconfiscated property was to be divided between the army and

national ,r""rnty.29The pacification Progran and the alarming sicuation in

Peru'now placed increased demands upon the southern depart-

rients. Bolfvar determined that the tine had come to nobilize

his ttreserves," On July 23, he addressed a lengthy connuniqud

to the Intendant of Quito outlining the nel'r requirements.

118

Bolivar began his statement with a justification for demanding

the sacrifices. lie reminded the ggllgfigg-of their debt to the

rest of the nation. Cundinanarca (New Granada) and Venezuela

had already suffered thirteen years of war, J.abored to estab-

Lish a national government and economy and to gain recogni-

tion by foreign povrers. In order for the southern departments

to gain parity with the other areas of the nation, the citi-zens of the south must now accept the burdens of the Peruvian

campaign and the pacification of Pasto.

To serve those ends, Bolfvar ordered the creation of ..two

civil_ian commissions. The duties of the first cormnission were

to revierv the patriotism of the general populace dnd ferretout dissidents. The definition of a dissidetrt ttas broad, oD-

compassing anyone with past ties to the Spanish governnent

through famtly or employment, and anyone who suffered suspi-'

cion or persecution by the republican goverrrment for actions

or public opinions. Those individuals deter:urined to be dissi-dents faced exile and the confi.scation of their goods and prop-

erty. The second conmission was to administer a 25'000 Peso

monthly contribution from the departnent of Quito. .This com-

mission was to disttibute equitabLy the burden throughout the

comnunities of the department. Citizens refusing to pay theirallotted shares risked imprisonment and confiscation of theirgoods to the value of their debt. Continued opposition meant

exile and the loss of all property.

In addition to ihese measure. Bol{var ordered various nil-

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3-'-

119

itary preparations. Fresh recruits qtere needed to restore

tlso veteran battalions to full strength. Bol{var also ordered

extra rniLitia for duty in Pasto. A further battalion riras to

be raised in Cuenca and Evto companies of recruits were or-

dered for Loja, to protect that frontier area. In addition tothe 25,000 peso monthly palments, the Liberator aLso decreed

the collection of a separate 10,000 pesos as a bonus for the

arny for the vietory at lbarr".30The Liberator ended his communiqud to the Intendant of

Quito with a threat. While promising to defend Quito with his

sword and blood as long as the citizens responded to his call,Bolfvar warned that if they refused his requests, he would

abandon the South to the threat of the Spanish, return to Bo-

gox1. and announce to the world that Quito did not wish to be

ft"".31 Behind the theatrical nature of this threat was Bo-

lfvar's frustration l,rith the quitefros, whieh was primarily a

result of the poor economy of the sierra. Experiencing his

frustrations to Vice-President Santander, Bol-fvar rrrote:

No one gives anything and no one wishes to serve.Cheers, speeches and words are al"L the aid theyoffer the government and after that, nothing....This is a people apart frorn the rest of Colombia.As of y€t, Ehey have given nothing for f.iberty andyet they are weary. The godos of Guayaquil-serveLs much-better than the pEE[6'ts of Qirido.32

With General SaLom overseeing the pacification of Pasto

and the above commissions established, Bolfvar left Quito and

traveled to GuayaquiL. There on August.2, he received noti-fication that the Colombian Congress had authorized his de-

120

parture for Peru. The following day, Bol{var moved to insure

the obligation of the South to support the Colombian auxiliarydivision. He reviewed his declaration of extraordinary fac-

ulties over the depattments of Guayaquil and Quito.. He aLso

reaffirmed the appointment of General Saloa as Superior Chief.

At least for the durauion of the rrar in Peru, the southern de-

partments rilere to remain jurisdictions apart from the rest ofCol-ombia, governed not by the dictates of the ccnnstltution and 0on-

gress , but by rhe decrees of ttre liiberacor and his a:xiliary, the Stp-e-

rior Chief . tllrile Ccneral Salqnts autlrority vras formally restricted to

riatters of the military and related treasury affairs,'Bolfvarlicensed the General to also intervene in civilian affairswhenever necessary. With these final_ provisions in place,

BoLfvar departed for Peru on August 7, LBi3.33

For the next two and a half years, the demands of Pasto

and Peru continued to dominate the affairs of the southern

departments, The pacification of Pasto was soon interrupted

by a renewed outbreak of hostilities. Despite the defeat at

Ibarra and the presence of General Salomts forces in Pasto,

CoLonel Agualongo returned to the offensive. The CoLombian

policy of a harsh peace continued co drive many Pbsto men to

Agualongo's flag of rebellion. On August L9, the rebeL Leader

appeared south of Pasto with an army L,500 strong, Threaten-

ing to cut General Salomrs ties with Quito, Agualongo engaged

the Colombians i.n a seri.es of inconelusive skirmishes. Salon

returned to Quito in early Septeniber but the rebeLlion was fat

.----==-.--

121

from over. The Superior Chief named General, .rosJ Mires the

comnanding general of the provirr"".34

In Salom's absence, the rebels returned to the offensive.

General l"lires and CoLonel Juan Josd Flores, Governor of Pasto,

suffered from diminished supplies of men and material. In

such circr.rmstances, they abandoned Pasto and moved the Colom-

bian fories southward to Tuquerres, on the border of the de-

partment of Quito. Throughout October and November General

Salom sent new recruits and supplies northward. Finally, inmid-Dicember, General Mires returned to the battlefieLd witha fresh army of over 1,500 men. In the face of this threat,CoLonel Agualongo divided his forces and initiated an exten-

sive guerilla compaign against the Colombians. The protracted

struggle continued into the netl year. In January L824 General

I.{ires left the campaign to serve in Guayaquil-. CoLonel Flores

continued the campaign singlehandedly. By the end of May, the

rebels faced their own shortage of supplies. The coastal town

of Barbacoas was defended by a small garrison of troops and

appeared to offer an easy target to the rebels. Despite the

few troops defending the town, coumanded by CoLonel TomJs Ci-

priano de Mosquera, they successfully repelled a rebel assauLt.

FinaLly, oD June 24, 1824, Colonel Agualongo and his lieuten-ants were captured, Following a mandatory trial in Popaya{r,

the rebel leaders rilere "*""rrt.d.35

The paeification of Pasto took ten months and requi.red

men and materiaL from the deparLment of Quito, Although the

L22

fight,ing came to an end with the capture and execution of the

rebel Leaders, Quito faced further requests for recruits,

supplies, and money to garrison the unruly Provinc.e. Whil-e

shouldering this burden, both Quito and Guayaguil nere simul-

taneously responding to the requirements of the Peruvian cau-

paign.

During the four months since the departure of the auxil-iary division in May, an additional 1,600 men rtere recruited

for the Peruvian campaign. In early Septetfuer 1823.'they sailed toCallao where they increased the size of the Colombian

contingent to over 7,000 trooPs. The expense of the expedi-

tion at that point, totaled over 900,000 pesos. Fron Peru,

Bol-{var constantly exirorted General Salom a:rri General Paz deI

CeatLllo, the Intendant of Guayaguil, to be rigorous in coL-

lecting contributions. Orders arrived for thousands of pesos

worth of corn, meat, lnd flour. The obra-ie or.rners of the

sierra towns received instiuctions to produce bLankets, shirts,and pants for the ,toop".36

The war was not going wel-l for the republican aLlies.In August 1823 General Santa Cruz lost a najor battle insouthern Peru. In early February L824 the rebEllious garri.-

son at che port of Callao declared for Spain. The civilianpopulation of the city sided with the troops and the republ-i-

can forces l.ost eontrol of that major port. This grave turn

of events placed a neer urgency upon the requests for rren and

Doney from the southern departments. Bol/var ordered General

G

L23

SaLom to establish martial law throughout the rwo departments

and authorized him to divide the teritories into military dis-

tricts if necessary to insure a rapid response to the needs

of the auxiliary expedition. Guayaquil was to prepare itselffor a possible invasion. In blunt terms BoL{var instructed

General Salom to f'disgust whom you must, but collect money by

the contribution and by forced loans."37

On March 16, L824, General- Salom decreed martial law

throughout the south. A11 men from the ages of 15 through 50

rilere ordered to present themselves for enlistment into the

ranks. Debtors to the state were ordered to settle theirobligations iuurediately. Those short of funds rilere ordered

to provide recruits fully equipped for service in lieu ofcash. In August these measures lrere reinforced by two furtherdecrees. The first levied another forced loan upon the clergy

of the Department of Quito. The second, also specificallyapplied to Qulto, condemned the poor response of the citizensto the call for recruits and ordered, as a result, that allnen within the terms of the decree were now to be taken by

fot"".38In addition to providing men and materiaL for the mili-

tia and the Colombian division in Peru, the southern depart-

ments shouldered the burden of providing transportation, wages,

supplies, and rmrrritions for further detachments of Colombian

troops who were on their way to Peru. From January through

August L824 General Paz del Castillo, the Intendant of Guaya-

1,24

quil, supervised the transport and provisioning of over 3,500

additional troops for Peru. Of this nr:mber, 850 were drawn

from either Guayaquil or Quito.39

In May L824 the Colombian national government formall-y

responded to the growing requirements of the Peruvian campaign,

0n May 11, the Congress authorized Vice-President Santander

tb provide aid to BoLivar thus sharing the burden'that had

been primarily the responsibility of the southern departments

with the rest of the nation. The Vice-President issued two

decrees pertaining directl.y to the Peruvian capaign. On May

25, Santander ordered the recruitment of 8,000 men specifical-ly for Bolivar's auxiliary division. Three days later, San-

tander authorized all Intendants to issue letters of credit toaid in financing the transportarion and provisioning of troops

for Peru. The Intendant of Guayaquil was specifically auth6-

Lzed to issue up to 500,000 Pesos worth of these pronissory

notes .40

These decrees actually did little to lighten the burden

on the southern departments, The letters of credit were

worthless without buyers willing to invest in their. purchase.

Consequently, the 500,000 peso line of credit provided few

funds and the entirety of the expenses for ships, soLdiers,

and provisions were nret by Local revenues and forced loans.

The official auxiliary corps of troops called into existence

b1r the Vice-President actual.ly added to the difficulties inGuayaquil, Throughout August and September, over 4,000 men

G

L25

arere recruited from Venezuela and Cundinamarca. With no ac-

companying funds to provide for the transportation and quar-

tering of these reserves the economies of Quito and Guayaquil

had to accept this further drain on their resource".4l

Ironically, the efforts of nationaL mobil-ization reached

their peak just as the war in Peru reached its conclusion.

On August 6, L824, the republican army rron a major victory at

the battle of Junfn and on December 9, the combined republi-

can army decisively defeated the Spanish at Ayacucho, effec-tively ending the Spanish challenge to independence in South

America. The port of Gallao remained in Spanish hands forover a month before its eventual surrender in January L825.

This determined opposition prompted one last transfer oftroops from Guayaquil when 1,518 troops sailed to Peru on

January 15. They were the final elements of the Col-ombian

auxiliary division and their departure marked the end of'theColombian campaign in P""rr.42

The Colombian conmitment to insure the independence of

Peru htas now fulfilled.. The two-and-a-ha1f year effort was

concluded successfuLly but at a tremendous cost, particularlyfor CoLombia's southern departments. Over 14,800 troops had

been sent to the Peruvian campaign. Over 71000 of that number

rrere drawn from the jurisdictions of Quito, Guayaquil, and

Cuenca. The expenses of the war totaled approximately

2,256,L03 pesos. The amount paid by the south lras extremely

disproportionate. They paid out and accepted indebtedness

L26

totaling L,66g,220 pesos, a figure ten times greater than

that of Venezuela and four times greater than the contribu-

tions from New Granada. The value of the textile goods and

uniforms produced in the provinces of Quito alone totaled

over 79,547 pesos. In addition to these expenses for the Pe-

ruvian campaign, the department of Quito in particular also

paid the expenses for the pacification of Pasto. Over 4,500

uen eventually served in that province and most of them \itere

recruited in the southern departmerrr",43

In general, the citizenry of the provinces of Ouito,

Cuenca, and Guayaquil accepted these sacrifices as their le-gitimate responsibiLity to aid in the defense of the homeLand

and bring the struggle for independence to a successful con-

clusion. In fact, the Liberauor's eormitoent to Peru result-ed in the southern departments exi.sting as an occupied nation

under the hybrid structure created by the extraordinary fac-

uLties. General Salom had not chosen to divide the south

i.nto military districts. There was no need for such a dis-tinction when, in fact, Colombian military officers already

held most of the important public offices and determined the

affairs of the departments. OnIy the Intendancy of Quito re-

mained in civilian hands. Dr. Salvador Ortega resigned the

post in January 1824 and General. Salom named Doctor Jose'

fdtix Valdivieso, a minister of the Supreme Court, to assume

the office. In Guayaquil., General Juan Paz del Castilloserved as Intendent. In April L824 a national Law of terri-

]-

L27

torial division created a new department in the south. The

department of Azuay encompassed the southern haLf of the

sierra with Cuenca as its capital. A military man, Colonel

Ignacio Torres , became the f irst Intendant of Azuay. E\uen in

Quito, Doctor Valdiviesots authority roas overshadowed by thatof the departmentaL couunanding officer, General Antonio Mora-

1es, Wtren the opportunity arose in September 1824 to name a

new Intendant for Guayaquil, another military man, Colonel

Juan .Iosd Flores, received the appointment.44

The citizens of Quito, Guayaquil, and Azuay complained

when they could about excesses and unjust treatment, but

generally they accepted the Liberator's-€ssessment that itwas their turn to pay their share o-f the costs for independ-

ence. They also had'few other options.

CHAPTER 8

IIIE BURDEN OF TIIE STATE: 1823-1826

From 1823 through the first half of 1826 the citizens ofthe southern departments of colonbia participated in two dis-tinct forms of republican government. under the .auspices ofthe Liberator's extraordinary faculties, Quito, Guayaquil,

and Azuay operated under a mix of law and decree that main-

tained the south as a region apart from the rest of the nation.The basic erements of the colonial economy, although unconsti-

tutiona1byrepub1ican1aw,continuedinforcebydebree.ofthe Liberator. under the authority of Bol{var and his appoint-ed superior chief, the southern departrnents experienced the

colosrbian "state" as a benevolent dictatorship. with the con-

clusion of the war in Peru,. the southern departments felt the

implementation of the l-aws and constitution of Colombia. The

constitutional regime promised greater political representa-tion. rt also altered or eriminated many elements of the co-

roniar economy and society, rn addition, the focus of autho:r-

ity shifted from the Liberator to the central administration,in Bogotd. By July L826 the nilirary and civilian Leadership

of the south found itself confronting the opportunity ofchoosing between the two. Throughout this short period oftime, the confusing and often contradictory manifestations of

r28

-

L29

the authority of the "state[ htere as much if not more of a

burden on the south than the sacrifices for the war.

The demands on Ehe south for the campaigns in Pasto and

Peru did provoke a natural degree of resistance. The lack of

volunteers to work paid positions in the gunpowder works at

Latagunga resuJ-ted in the temporary reimposition of the an-

cient q.Ltgfg system of forced Indian labor. The town council

of Guaranda protested to the Intendant of Quito that the mili-tary demands for men and food rilere ruining its economy by de-

vouring its resources while simultaneously recruiting those

men needed to provide the labor to insure future harvests.

Local officials regularly reported difficuLties in complying

with recruitment guotas. Government officials also condeuned

an increasing rrapathy" with regard to the payment of contri-butions decreed for the viar effort. Compared to the enormous

cost the south paid into those campaigns, these protests re-mained i.nconsequential, 1

Orer the war years of 1823 through 1825, the element ofthe new regime that provoked the greatest opposition rras itscentraLism. The Colonbian constitution mandated national con-

trol of l,ocal affairs down to the provinciaL level. The ex-

traordinary faculties enhanced this centralism under the Li-berator and his proxy, the Superi-or Chief. Neither Bogotd

nor BoLfvar encouraged local autonomy. Both the central gov-

ernment and the Liberator discouraged any degree of munici-

pal activity that night have seriousLy questioned national

130

authority. The greafest challenge had been the government of

the Republic of Guayaquil, ltself a product of municipal ini-tiative. Bolfvar's adept use of force and diplomacy ended

that experiment in autonomy. Ironically, even though the ac-

tions of the cabildos of Quito, Bogotd, and Caracas spear-

headed the general movement for independence, these bodies

wete now looked upon with some suspicion, particuLarly if they

guestioned their subservient ro1e in the new political order.2,'"iln early 1823, haphazard conspiracies against Colombian

official-s were uncovered in Guayaquil and Esmeraldas. They

!'rere easily suppressed.3 As the administrative center forthe Peruvian campaign, Guayaquil experienced a constant mili-tary presence that exerted clear control over all of the af-fairs of the city" Equally as important, those Local leaders

who uay have disputed the regine departed Guayaquil rrrith the

fall of the independent goverrunent. The situation was dif-ferent in Quito. Although the q-ujtefi6s gave a lrrarm welcome

to Bolfvar and readily accepted incorporation, a spirit oflocal autonomy also existed. In addition to the slogans on

the walls warning of Colombian despotism, municipal- and even-

tually congressionaL representatives of Quito challenged the

authority exercised by the agents of the central governnent.

In late September L822 General Sucre, acting as Intend-

ant of Quito, ordered the reenListment of all criolLo oen who

served in either the Republican or Spanish army in the pre-

ceding year. Despite Sucre's popularity as the Liberator of

if!

13L

Qgito, the city cabildo chalLenged his decree and sent a re-quest for its repeal to the Liberator. The outcome of the

request is unknown. What was apparent, however, lras a new

Ecnse of criticism among the cityts Leadership. Returning to

Quito from Pasto in early January, Sucre observed "a great

change in the ideas and disposition of the people."4 This

change riras most pronounced in the relations between the munic-

ipalicy of Quito and the interim Intendant, Col-onel Vicenteq

Aguirre. -

Throughout the first three months of 1823, the Quito mu-

nicipality clashed with the authority of the Intendant over aseries of 1ocal issues. CoLonel Aguirre rras a native guitefio

sith farnilial ties to the prestigious and patriotic Montrifar

farnily. These facts may have lulled the municipblity intoexpecting cooperation or only slight opposition to their ac-

tions from that office. Neverthel-ess, Aguirre rras an avid

supporter of the Liberator,'anxious to prove his loyalty by

reacting strongly to any criticism of his authority.6Early in January, Colonel Aguirre requested a daily con-

tribution of fifty pesos from the municipality treasury tosustain the city mititia, no:mally a force of 400 men, In a

carfulLy worded response, the municipality refused. Pointing

out to the Intendant that the nilitia in fact nunbered onLy

300 men, the council- suggested a substantially lower pa)rment.

Ttre municipality then turned the tabLes and placed their own

demand upon the Intendant. Referring to a widespread public

L32

concern over the legitinacy of recent expenditures, the couo-

cil insisted that Aguirre order the publication of the depart-

mental treasury accounts.T Aguirre's response was vitriolic.He condenned the "degrading egoism" of the counciluen and re-jected their request for a reduction i-n the militLa payments,

branding it a dishonorable gesture which ignored the patri-otie sacrifices made by the other departments of the repubLic.

He continued this theme while rejecting ther,eq.uest for a"pub-

1ic aecounting from the treasury. Lecturing them on both

patriotism and the law, Aguirre denounced the councilmen fordemagoguery and selfishness :

Does the era of confusion and disorder yet existamong us in which a faction of discontents cangive the name of t the voice of the peopl-e' totheir paticular pretensions in order to upsetthe social grder and bury the people in a chasmof anarchy?8

The Intendant challenged the municipality to interview the dead

on the hills of Pichincha a.nd visit the battalions in Pasto

t,o determine if the public funds had been well spent. In con-

trast, Aguirre criticized the lamentabLe condition of nunici-pal finances which barely paid for police and pubLic works.

Finally, as a reminder to the municipal-ity of the new order,

Aguirre poi,nced out that only the national congress and not amunieipality could deoand such accountabiLity from an agent

of the execucive authority.9This rubuke of the municipality vras accompanied by an-

other order which further provoked that body. Citing an

il

p-

133

opinion of the Suprene Court that the expenditrrre of munic-

ipal funds for the purchase of candles for religious festivalswas a colonial practice that shoul-d be abandoned. CoLonel

Aguirre ordered that those funds now be applied to more use-

ful projects such as support for education or publich health

programs. The eouncilts response declared that the candle

fund was a traditional program under the authority of the mu-

nicipality. They flatly denied that the Supreme Court had any

authority to meddle in the city accounts and informed Aguirre

that his order to divert the funds to other projects was

therefore invalid. The following day, Aguirre warned the

counciL to obey his order. He condemned the councilmen fortheir blatant disregard for the public good and accused them

of promoting a spirit of confusion that threatened to paralyze

municipal affairs. The Municipality now openly denied the

authority of the Intendanc .to interfere with rnunicipal ac-

counts. Citing various provisions of the Rg!:opilqc_ion de .lgg

leye_s de las Indies which expressly prohibited royal officialsfrom interfering with the economic prerogatives of the munici-

palities, they condemned Aguirre for his ignorance.of the law.

Ttre eouncilmen further inferred that the Intendantrs contin-

ued abstinence in the matter threatened to dainage the deli-cate ties of Quito to the Colonbian republi".10

The dispute between the Intendant and municipaLity now

assuned greater proportions which eventually brought into the

conflict the congress, the Liberator, and, once again, the

134

Supreme Gourt of the South. The aggressive tone of the muni-

cipality's repLies to Aguirre Provoked not only the Intendant

but the Secretary to the Intendartt, Eusebio Borrero. On Jan-

uary 18, L823, Borrero sent a hostil-e note to the munl-cipalt-

ty condemning them for their thinly veiled I'rLdiculous and

seditious ideas of independence and separation from Colom-

bia."11 Calling the councilmen's actions stupid and foolish,he argued that they deserved to be treated as conrnon streetdog".12 Aguirre followed his secretary's words with deeds by

promptly arresting five of the councilmen, jailing them foran evening and then sending them under guard to face the Lib-

erator himself.13

The remaining members of rhe municipality issued an im-

mediate protest to Bolfvar. They reaffirmed their own actions

with regard to Aguirrets past demands and condernned the In-tendantrs arrest order as the response of a despotic personal-

ity incapable of functioning properly in a representative gov-

e,rnment. They requested the release of the j aiLed council-

men and suggested the removal of the Intendant and his secre-

tary, Bol{var did order the imediate reLease of the captive

councilmen, but he took no action against Colonel Aguirre.

To the contrary, in a Letter to Vice-President Santander, Bo-

L{var confided that he found the Colonel to be a "good Colom-

bian" and that he appreciated Aguirrers zeaL in dealing with

the rnunicipality. While acknowledging that the jailed men

$/ere past patriots of the city, he concluded that they now

tilil|p-

fi

tl

trr

ilr

tr

)r

;i

;r

ilr

135

acted only as discontented job seekers. Al-so writing to the

Vice-President, General Sucre agreed with BoLfyarts assess-

Eent of the councilmen. Sucre described them as men without

families, fortune, or influence who could offer only patri-otic speeches in the pl"ru.14

The confrontation continued throughout February and

Mareh 1823. In early February, Colonel Aguirre forwarded to

the municipality a general order by the Secretary of the In-terior for a complete account of the cityrs finances. The

council ignored the request. A lseek later, Aguirre repeated

the order and criticized the council for undue delay. The

municipaLity finally provided a report in early I'larch, but itvas incomplete and was iuunediately returned. Following an-

otherdelay of two weeks, Aguirre again took action, placing

the municipal secretary under house arrest until an acceptable

report lras subriritted. The councilmen then provided Aguirre

with the requested accounts. They aLso filed formal protests

against the Intendant's actions with the Supreme Court in

Quito and with the department's representatives in Congr"rr.15

Although the struggle wiLh Aguirre clearly reflected

some personal animosities, the issues of municipal, autonomy

and the abuse of executive authority hTere predorninant. Pos-

sibly as a resuLt of the munictpalityrs protests, Bol/var re-

moved Aguirre from the Intendancy in llay 1823, naming him the

miLitary coumander of the province. Doctor SaLvador Ortega y

Sotomayor, a civilian and native quitefro, held the office of

)l

ilr

il|,

Itt

:r

m

r.36

Intendant for the remainder of the year. Soon after thischange, the charges filed against the ColoneL reached the

Corrgt""".16

In early June 1823 a representative of Quito introduced

two bills into the lower house of Congress. One called for a

formaL reduction in the authority exercised by the agents ofthe executive branch in the southern departments. T'he other

leveLed charges of abuse of authority and infractLon of the

constitution against Colonel Vicente Aguirre during his ten-

ure as Intendant. Aguirre's secretary, Eusebio Borrero, Iras

incLuded in the indictment. The House members found the

charges substantiaL enough to warrant a for:ural hearing. They

appointed a prosecutor and sent the case on to the Senat..l7

Deliberation in the Senate continued throughout July and intoAugust. The accusations were ultimately dismissed as an un-

fortunate but not il1egal consequence of the exercise of ex-

ecutive authority und.er the extraordinary faculties in force

in the southern departmeotr.lS

During the course of these hearings, the three represen-

tatives of the south initiated another action which proved

more controversial. Undoubtedly responding to a series ofcomplaints from their deparLrnent, the congressmen sent an of-ficial inquiry to the municipaLity of Quito. Condeuning the

"arbitrary and vexingt' actions by many of the agents of the

governnent, the congressmen cautioned the municpality to a-

void intinidation by the "military cLamor" engulfing the de-

t

L37

Partment. The representatives reminded the municipality that

the Congress lras responsible for affirming the authority ofthe law and that even the President had to answer to Congress

for any transgressions. The congressmen concLudeil their note

with a request that all accusatl-ons, petitions, and testimo-

rries concerning the government and its agents be transmitted

to Bogotf. They also requested that the Quito muni.cipality

circulate their letter to the other cabildos in the depart-

me.,t,19

The congressional request arrived in Quito in urid-August

1823 and was iumediateLy circulated to the other cities ofthe department and displayed in the plazas. The municipalityof Quito prepared four reports to send fo Bogota', The firsttwo criticized General Sucre's earlier recruitment decree

and the arrest of the cabildo members by Colonel- Aguirre.

Ttre third report condemned the excessive recruitment proce-

dures which led to the riot in the Santo Domingo plaza. The

fourth report requested the congressional delegation to re-view the docunentation regarding Quitors incorporation intoColombia, inferring once again that the association was a

tenuous orr".20

As the municipality prepared its reports, one of the

councilmen decided to express his disdain for the CoLombian

regime in more clandestine fashion. Reports of conspirato-

riaL activity against Colombia had surfaced soon after Quitouas incorporated. General San Mart,{n warned Bolfvar about a

;

ttr

tr

llltrlr

ll.

1.38

cabal of disgruntLed Quito Lawyers. In Decenber 1822 at

least one member of the cabiLdo was reported to the Intendant

for carrying on suspicious conversations with an'officer of

the nilitia. In mid-February 1823 another subversive meeting

was reported. A Leading councilman and four other quitefios

condeumed Col-oubian rul-es as more despotic than that of the

Spanish and expressed hopes for the independence of Quito.In late Noveuiber, the Superior Chief, General Salorn, received

word that the conspirators soon planned to take action against

CoLombian officials. Salom moved quickly ordering the arrestof these men. IncLuded in this group were Antonio Pineda, a

member of the cabiLdo, Doctor Antonio Ante, a local Lawyer

and treasury official, and Francisco Angu1a, a member of one

of the principal families of Quito. The reuraini.ng seven con-

spirators were Spaniards with no significant social or polit-

ical ties in the city. I{hile it is difficult to imagine

that this group posed a credible threat to the government, the

act of posturing so proved sufficient to wanant the exile ofthe seven Spaniards. t^lith regard to the quitefios, General

Salom adopted a l-enient and prudent policy. Doctor Ante re-

mained under house arrest in Quito while Pineda traveled to

Peru under guard to seek a judgement from the Liberator.2L

In Peru, Bol{var received reports concerning both the re-quests of the congressmen and the arrests. He carefullyweighed the political implications of each. He ordered the

release of Pineda and Ante. The Liberator dismissed the con-

139

spirators as misguided patriots who were basically harroLess.

Mindful of the sacrifices being requested from the Department

of Quito, Bol{var instructed General Salom to file a civiJ.

suit against the conspirators to publicly demonstrate a rer

spect for the law and avoid alienating the citizens of quito.22

Recognizing the greater chal-Lenge Ln the congressional,

letter and the cabildors reports, Bolfvar responded to those

events in more forceful and emotional terms. In simiLar Let-

ters to the Vice-President, the Secretary of the Interior,the Superior Chief, and to the military comrander of the pro-

vince of Quito, the Liberator condemned the egoti-sm and in-gratitude of the congressmen and the Quito municipal-ity. He

charged that these leaders ignored the sacrifices of Venezuela

and New Granada and exaggerated Ehe hardships in the south.

Angrily rejecting the challenge to the executive authority

and the offense to his honor, Bollvar ordered Vice-President

Santander to condemn the actions of the southern representa-

tives as irregular and illegaI. In Quito, Bolfvar directed a

fonnal petition to the Supreme Court charging the city council

with libel and naming Colonel Aguirre his representative in23Ene case.

From February through June L824 the court justices

weigfied the ctrarges of libel- leveled against the councilmen. Two

issues were central to the case; whether the cabildo comtitted

a Libelous act by publishing and circul,ating the congressional

letter and whether or not references to abuses of power by

.iirililll i , i

ll.l',:1. ., i

ll;ll,]i'.t. .:

ri;.';l r ,j.'r ri..l'l

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t'the authorities" automaticalLy included Bolfvar. Colonel

Aguirre argued that the actions of the municipality were de-

signed both as a personal attack upon him and as a libelousassault upon aLl of the agents of the state including the Lib-erator.. Reacting to a suggestion of the Court that a dis-tinction be made between the two charges, Aguirre protested:

It is clear I Those who have directed fctrarges]against the authorities have direited themagainst the name of IIis ExcelLency, and it isnecessary to confess that thgre is no reason topermit tiris separation now.24

The spokesrnan for the councilmen countered that the municipal

body held great respect for the Liberator. They requested

the Liberatorrs judgement during the initial protests against

the Intendant. It vras through the Liberatorrs charity and

understanding that the arrested members had been released.

Regarding the congressional letter, the spokesman contended

that the municipality was obligated by 1aw to obey the repre-

sentativet s request. 25

The decision of the Supreme Court gave the councilmen a

Pyrrhic victory. The justices ruled agai.nst the'Liberatorand declared the charges of libel to be illegaL and. unfounded.

The courE also upheld the right of both the congressmen and

the council members to solicit public opinion frou the constit-uencies. This decision freed the defendants from the threatof prosecution but offered little else of substance. The 1e-

ga1 maneuvering consuned a great deal of time, and in the

process of denying the charges the counciLrnen issued words of

141

respect not only for Bol{var but also for GeneraL salom and

even for Colonel Aguirre. In addition, the defendants found

themselves returned to private Life. The municipaL elections

of January 1.824 replaced the entire cabiLdo with a new body

of elected officials more conservative in tone and headed by

JosdManuel Larrea, the Marquis de San Jose', an old patriotand avid supporter of gol{var.26

Ttre members of the Quito municipality of 1823 attempted

to exercise a degree of autonomy that confLicted with the

consttaints of the neril state, particularly during the course

of the war in Peru. Their particular failure did not signalthe demise of the infLuence of municipalities, but illuminat-ed a new rel-ationship of these corporations to the state.They remained a focal point for expressing Local concerns to

the cerrtral government, but fuLure protests were lodged inconjunction with or at the instigation of the intendants,

governors or generals o '

One of the few acts of congress that received the Libera-

tor's approval for application to the southern departments,

despite the reign of the extraordinary faculties, was the law

of territorial division promulgated on June 25, L824.27 The

law divided the territory of the ancient audiencia into three

departments and eight provinces. IronicalLy, this demonstrat-

ed onc,e again the centralism of the Colombian regime. Both

Vice-President SanEander and Secretary of Interior Restrepo

saw the division of the south as an effective counter to the

.W

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L42

porential influence of federalist ldeas. They reasoned that

these divisions established a I'grand countertreighr" to feder-

alism by creating LocaL bureaucracies with a vested interestin the success of the central government. Ttre eLevation of

various cities to the status of provincial capitals flatteredLocal pride and regional interests without the need for fed-

eralism at the national leveL. Santander areued that the

law did not interfere with the Liberator's exercise of the

extraordinarv faculties. On the contrary. he said it in-creased governmental control at the local le',rel.28

Bolfvar had provisionally divided the south with his de-

cree establishing Guayaquil as a separate department in July

L822. The Senate opened debate on the proposal a year later.The Senate accepted \'Tithout question the division of the

south into two departments. Initial debates centered around

the proper naming of the two jurisdictions. The Senators pro-

posed assigning to theu the nanes of nil.itary victories.

Quito would become the capital of the department of "Pi.chincha'r

and Guayaquil the capital of the department of fYaguachi."

This initial proposal- also pLaced Cuenca and Loja urder the

authority of Guayaquil rather than Quito. Another territo-rial designation decreed by BoL{var in 1822 and now approved

by Congress was the establishment of a separate province forPasto and its incorporation into the Department of C"uc^,29

Neither of these territorial divisions was well received

in Quito. Undoubtedly the removal of Guayaquil from the ju-

L43

risdiction of Quito offended the sensibilities of the Quito

elite. Nevertheless, the precarious coLonial history of the

area, the thro years of Guayaquilts independence and the in-sistence of the Liberator upon the creation of a department

for Guayaguil precluded any serious suggestions that the de-

partment should not be sanetioned. The quiteffog complained

more about the other proposed division. In earLy September

L823 the Intendant of Quito, Doctor Sotomayor, sent a protest

to the Secretary of Interior. Sotomayor argued that the aL-

ienation of Cuenca, Loja, and Pasto from the authority of

Quito reduced the city from its "ancient dignity" and severely

jeopardized the department's economic well-being. With parti-cular regard to Pasto, the Intendant argued that Quitots con-

tributions of men and naterial to subdue the rebellions inthe area and maintain a garrison there established a legiti-Eate claim to the province., The Secretary rejected these

claimi 'pointing out that even without Guayaguil or the north-

ern province of Pasto, Quito formed a vast area with over

350,000 citizens encompassing the coastal area of Esmeraldas

and the Anazon lowl-ands as well as part of the sierra.

Quitots claim on Pasto due to the military assistance sent to

that province was similarly set asitld. The Secretary renind-

ed the Intendant that by such logic Quito must then "belong"

t.o New Granada and Vene"r"l".30

As the proposed law of territorial division received itsseeond reading in the Senate, Vice-President Santander sub-

144

mitted his olrn modif icati.ons. The Vice-President called for

Cuenca and Loja to form a separate department from Quito and

Guayaquil. Accepting the suggestion, the Senate once again

Iabored to properLy nane them.. The Department of Quito was

temporarily called the Department of "Los Andes" before final-ly becoming ttEcuador." The department of Guayaquil retained

that sane name and the new department of Cuenca and Loja re-

ceived the tit1e of "Azuay" with Cuenca as its capital "ity.31By the end of L824 the old audiencia of Quito tras transfonned

into the Deparcment of Ecuador, Guayaquil, and Azuay.

The division of the south into three departments and

eight provinces provoked numerous protests to the government.

None of the complaints threatened hostile action but they did

illuminate the Local difficulties of meeting the requirements

of the law" The cabildo of Quito maintained its protests over

the "loss" of tbe province of Pasto. The councilmen'of Amba-

to and Otavalo recorded their displeasure at not being desig-

nated provincial capitals. In an unoffieial evaluation of

the impact of the new law, the Superior Chief, General Bar-

tolomd Salom, noted a nr:mber of difficulties caused by the I

divisions. Agreeing with the quiteffos, he questioned the fis-dom of diminishing the administrative authorit y of *e caf*tal city to inelude only Latacunga and itself. The suU5/ction

of Loja to Cuenca, Ambato to Riobamba, and Otavalo to Ibarra

agitated local rivalries. The creation of the nelv provincial

capitals calLed for separate provi.ncial bureaucracies requir-

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145

ing more trained personneL and wages than were realisticallypossible. Most of the principal landormers of Quito and the

other cities held properties non divided by provincial boun-d-

aries. This created confusion in adoinistrative and fiscalaffairs that slowed the procedure of government and created

hardships for the owner".32

Another aspect of the territorial division which caused

a reaction from Quito was the inclusion of the port of Ataca-

mas within the province of Manabt'. That disposition placed

Atacamas under the authority of Guayaquil. The concern over

Atacamas was part of the Larger issue of the developnent of

the Esmeraldas road. The businessmen of the sierra envis-

ioned a road frorr Quito to Atacamas on the Esmeraldas coast as a

crucial element for the restoration of their ."orrory.33

Bol{var twi-ce gave his official blessing to the develop-

ment of an EsoeraLdas road. On June 25, LBZL, the Liberator

declared all. citizens settling along the future road woul-d be

free from nornal taxation. He declAred the port of Esmeraldas

a free port for ten years. At the end of that decade the port

would enjoy reduced duties for another decade. Bol{var named

Colonel Manuel Larrea to o\rersee the project wittr fu1l coopera-

tion from the Intendant of Quito. The Liberator promised the

"imediate and special protection" of the government for the

corrpletion of the road. A year later on July L, L823, Bol(var

issued another decree to assist in the development of the road.

He authorLzed the est,ablishnent of two vilLages and a series

I

L46

of roadhouses along the route. This included the construc-

tion of new church parishes roith prorrise of funding f,or the

local priests. Fugitive sLaves wiLling to settle along the

road would be granted freedour. The department treasury rtas

to pay for the road, the buildings, and saLaries until the

comnunities were selfsufficient. 34

Despite these incentives, the Esmeraldas road project

went nowhere. Some of the problems were Iocal. The main con-

tractor for the road was arrested for treason and stealing.

A crucial section of the route was blocked by a local hacen-

dado's property rights which he refused to relinquish. In

addition, the stagnant economy of the department coupled with

the demands of the miLitary left no funds for the project.Local leadership thus looked to the national. government to

overcome these difficulties. I,lhen the Congress in Bogot/ aia

finally act upon this issue it was with too little too 1ate.

In April L826 the Congress did aLLoh7 a change in the territo-rial law moving Atacamas into the jurisdiction of Esmeraldas

province. The congressmen also sanctioned the Liberator's

earlier decrees, but in a diminished form. Citizens settlingalong the route were st,ill to be exenpt from Eaxation but the

regulation of the port changed. Congress rejected the Liber-

atorts proposal to make Atacanas a free port for the first ..,a"

decad,e. Instead, the Congress authorized fifteen years of

conmerce at hal-f the normal duties. The most crucial- aspect

of the congressional action was the absence of any funding

, ]iim

L47

for the project. The governmentrs t'irmediate and speciaL pro-

tection" took four years to confirm and offered essential.ly

nothing but word".35

Following the triunrph of Republican arns in Peru, Vice-

President Santander on December 21, 1825, declared the Con.-

stitution and all national Laws to be in full effect for the

departments of Ecuador, Azuay, and Guayaqu5.l. Over the fol-lowing year and a half, various issues of concern surfaced inthe south either in reaction to the application of new laws

or by way of appeaLs to the national government for actionupon specific problems.36

't'he new laws abolished the colonial economic foundation

which had continued to operate under the extraordinary facul-ties. The alcabala, aguardiente monopoly, and Indian tributesrilere all officially ended. Colombian law replaced these

sources of revenue with a new system of taxation calLed the

direct contribution. The law also called for the suppression

of alL minor convents, those housing eight or fewer monks.

The constitution authorized a new institution at the local1eveI. The law mandated provincial juntas composed of Local

electors to suggest needed reforms and to report to both the

IntendanE and the Congress upon conditions in the province.

In addition to concerns about the direct contribution and Ehe

attendant demise of the tribute and al-cabala, the provincialjuntas sought a reduction in the censog, the interest rates

paid to the church on borrowed capital. They also forwarded

148

requests for national assistance to revitalize the Ecuadorian

textile industry.3T

These issues affected the sierra departments of Eeuador

and Azuay more than the coastal department of Guayaquil. The

port city was financialLy more secure than Quito or Cuenca.

Lacking a sizeable Indian population, Guayaquil did not reLy

upon the tribute system. Although CoLourbian law threatened

to lower tariff rates and to ban the inport of such items as

sugar and indigo, the Congress approved the Liberatorts ear-

lier concessions exempting GuayaquiL and Esmeraldas from those

provisions. Guayaqui-l- received two innediate benefits from

the national government. First, it sanctioned Guayaquil's

existence as a department. Seeond, the Congress authorized a

Superl.or Court of Justice for Guayaquil which was installedin April L826. The legislators in Bogotd also approved a

measure to promote the development of the coastal area grant-

ing a ten-year suspension of diezmo taxes for all new cacao,

coffee, and indigo planuations. Petitions to the Congress

from the Guayaquil municipality and the provinci.al juntas con-

centrated on ninor assistance for local projects. .They sought

aid to establish a publie hospital" for women, a fire depart-

ment, more schools, and licenses for steamship cotmrerce on

the Daule River.38

In Ecuador and Azuay, the new revenue system proved un-

popular and counterproductive. The direct coniributionplaced turo to t€n percent tax rate uPon all property and per-

l-rc

149

sonal income.' Citizens earning less than J.50 pesos a year,

owning no property or less than 100 pesos worth of property,

were exempt from p.1*r.ot.39 As a replacement for the alcaba-

la, aguardiente, and Indian tribute, the new tax failed mis-

erabl-y. The direct contribution not only ended the collec-tion of those colonial revenues, but in a large part also re-moved those taxpayers from the roLLs. The direct contribu-

tion clearly shifted the tax burden from the Indians and gen-

eral public to the merchants, professionaLs, and landowners.

In addition to regular municipal taxes, these groups had a1-

ready been required to prematurely settle their debts and pay

extraordinary contributions. The new tax required a change of

fiscal administrative procedures and new personnel-. The col--

lection of the direct contribution did not get underway untilApril L825, and as late as November some towns r^rere stil1 nom-

inating collectors.. By May L826 only one of the three prov-

ince of Ecuador reported any success in collecti-ng the new

tax. Even in that case, a majority of the pa)rments were made

in vales or governnent script issued to citizens in Lieu ofcurrency for confiscated goods and governmental sal.aries.

The provincial junta of the Province of Pichincha petitioned

the government to rej.nstate the Indian tributes. In AprilL826 the Secretary of the Hacienda in Bogotd noted with dis-

may that the colLections in the southern departnents appeared

"abandoned.t' The direct contribution vras a national failure.Of an anticipated national annuaL collection of over 3,000,000

___J

150

Pesos, the fiscal year L825-1826 netted only 195,000 Pesos or

only sixteen percent of the expected income. This was less

than the national tevenue from the old alcabala alone. In

Ecuador and Azuay, the new tax result.ed in a reduction of pub-

lic revenues while it confused aduinstrators and required

further additi-ons to the bureaucr a"y.40

As the clirect contribution aggravated the dismaL economy

of the sierra, the local Leaders of Quito challenged the na-

tional government to take positive steps to promote an econom-

ic recovery for Ecuador and Azuay. Reacting to the pressures

of the llar expenses, the nerp tax and continuing requests from

che government to settle their debts, the landowners of the

thro departments requested a reduction in the traditionaL in-terest rate charged on borrowed capiral. They aLso argued

that the obLigation to pay in specie !ilas unreasonable given

the shortage of currency in the local economy.

In late 1823 the uunieipaLity of Quito sent its firstpetition to Congress dealing with this issue. Generally, the

church served as the source of lending capital, charging an

annuaL interest or censos race of three percent to.be paid in

currency. The municipality of Quito charged that three Per-

cent was excessive considering the poverty of the department.

They requested the censos rate be reduced to two percent.

I,lhile the department lacked suffieient specie for its econouy,

it did produce an abundance of agricultural goods. The munic-

ipality thus argued for payment in kind rather than cash.

f

L5L

ELaborating upon the reasons for the request, the councilmen

outlined the basic problems plaguing the sierra economy. Free

trade in foreign textiles and foodstuffs continued to under-

mine the loca1 lndustry and deny profits to the department.

The disruptions of war i.n Pasto and Popaydn closed the mining

qarket for the poorer grade cloth which had served as the

mainstay for the reuraining obrajes. Continuing contributions

to the war effort, including pa)nnents for the inflated price

of salt charged by the Guayaquil salt monopoly, drained goods

and currency away from the sierra. With unemployed textiLeworkers laboring in the fields, the production of agriculturalgoods exceeded the needs of the citizenty, In this situationthe municipality argued that the reduction of the censos and

their payment in agricultural, goods would provide significantaid to the economy of Ecuador. l

Over the first three months of L825, the Congress re-

ceived petitions from Quito and other municipalities request-

ing the above changes. Petitions also arrived from cLergyuren

protesting the proposed reform. In late January and early

March L825, the Senate took up consideration of the censos

issue. Spokesmen for the clergy condeured the proposal-s as

an attack on private properEy. They argued that governmental

regulation of such a basic economic relationship would dis-

courage foreign investors, undermine public confidence in the

economy and retard the efforts of the church in education and

humanitarian endeavors. EcuadorIs two Senators, Josd Larrea

].,52

y Villavicencio and ManueL Espinosa y Ponce, repeated the ar-

guments presented by the municipality of Quito. The Senate

decided against lowering the censos and against permitting

their palrnent in kind.42

As part of his argument in favor of the reform of the

qensos, Senator Larrea demonstrated that the sierra economy

suffered unjustly from the effects of free trade. He pointed

out to his coLleagues that in Guayaquil it was cheaper to buy

imported fLour from Baltimore and Mexico than to purchase the

same item from Quito or Cuenca. North American "domestic"

textiles also arrived cheaper than the simiLar coarse clothproduced in Ecuador.A3 The issue of free trade was another

concern which the municipality of Quito and the Provj.ncial

Junta of Pichincha brought before the national government..44

Both the Congress and the executive administration were com-

mitted to free trade and turned a deaf ear to any suggestion

of protection for Ecuadorian good".45 Quitefio Leaders partic-

ular1y chastized the war department for purchasing unifoms

fron England. Responding to the crlticism, the Secretary of

War investigated the matter. His report noted that imported-

uniforms from England were fifty percent cheaper and of bet-

ter quality than those produced by the obrajes of Ecuador.

He chastized the loca1 producers for attenpting to engage inspeculation at the goverrrnent I s "*p"r,"..46 The municipality

of Quito defended the prices charged by locaL manufacturers.

The remarks of the Secretary of War demonstrated the central

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153

governmentrs ignorance of the seriousness of the issue forthe quite{os and the lack of desire to Promote an economic

recovery in the sierra. Speaking directly to the issue of

English textiles, the urunicipality noted that the British in-dustry enjoyed many years of protection untiL it reached a

high degree of quality and productivity. Writing to Vice-

President Santander, the municipality argued for tariff pro-

tections of national goods, They admonished the Vice-Presi-

dent to realize that "this is the true love of national glorv

and that which Your Excellency shouLd be obligated to inspire

in Colombians. tt47

Another element of the national law soon aroused the

clergy and laynren of Ecuador. In 1821 the Congress of Cdcuta

declarecl the srppression of all- convencs housing eight or'few-

er reguLar clergy, The buildings, property, and income of

the suppressed convents nere designated for the support of

the pubLic education. In early April L826, the 1aw took ef-

fect in the southern departmeoa".48 Again this issue per -

tained prlnarily to ttre siena departments and mainly to Ecuador.

A large number of regular clergy l-ived in the south but they

rrere unevenly distributed. The nunber of Mercedarians, Domin-

icans, Franciscans, and Augustinians in the three depart-

ments totaled approximately 527 souls. Of this number, 412

or seventy-eight percent of the total Lived within the de-

partment of Ecuador. 0f that ntmrber, approxinately 350 livedwithin the jurisdiction of the city of Quito. This nunrber

Ls4

of reguLar clergy rilas so large that far from there being many

convents of eight or fewer members, most of them Lacked space

for their membership. Consequently, many of the monks and

friars of the orders Lived uncloistered lives in the princi-pal cities.49

The order to suppress the minor convents did not aLarm

the church hierarchy. Few convents feIl into the category.

Doctor .losd Manuel Flores, the ecclesiastical treasurer, rilas

serving as interim governor of the dioceses when the notifica-tion of the law arrived. Flores instructed the abbots of

each of the convenLs to forward to his office inventories and

membership lists. The only province to report the suppression

of convents was that of hubabura, In late 1825, the provin-'

ciaL Junta of Imbabura soLicited the closing of three con-

vents in Ibarra and one in Otavalo" In early June 1826 the

Governor, Eusebio Borrero, decreed the closing of the four

establishments even though they did have more than sufficientmembership. The buil-dings nere stripped of all furnishings

which hrere then stored in a Local church in lbarra. The e-

victed elergy were ordered to uove to Quito to seek shelter

and ernplo)tnent. Ttre governor also ordered inventories of the

haciendas belonging to the convents and instructed those ow-

ing debts to the orders to nout make their pa5ments to the

provincial treasury. Although the earLier petitions of the

provincial junta suggested popular support for the suppr€s-

sion of the convents, such was not the case. Soon after the

llilll-

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155

governorts decree, street demonstrations erupted in Ibarra and

Otavalo protesting the closing of the convents. In support ofthe demonstrators, the municipality of Otavalo petitioned the

Intendant to overEurn the governorts orders. The Otavalo

eouncilmen argued that the Local Franciscan convent had

served tlre cmrrurrity for over 200 years and was essentiaL to the

spiritual well-being of the citizens. Ttrey also reminded the

Intendant that local loyalty to the republic was supported to

an important degree by the reguLar "L.tgy.50

The closing of the convents of lbarra and Otavalo drew a

protest from the ecclesiastical governor, Doctor FLores.

Other protests from the clergy nere sent to the Intendant, the

Congress, and even to Bolfvar. The subject of these eom-

plaints demonstrated that the fears of the churchmen did not

center around the suppression of the convents per se, but

rather around attempts by civiLian officials to gain controlof the eeonomic resource" oi the regular cl"ergy. In October

and November 1825 the Provincial Junta of Pichincha petitioned

Congress and the Intendant of Ecuador for a major reform ofthe regular clergy in the department. Ttrey condemrrcd the

friars and monks for 1ax discipl,ine, ecclesiasti.cal abuses inuarriage and buriaL practices, and a general corruption that

threatened the sanetity of the faith. They aLso charged that

the orders were hoarding and hiding currency to the detriment

of the local economy. To remedy these abuses, the junta pro-

posed the irnsrediate creation of civilian cowrissions to admin-

156

ister the eccLesiastical stipends, properties, and revenues.

This poorly concealed attempt to expropriate the weAlth of

the Catholic orders was tbo bLatant a move even for the ad-

ministration in Bogot/. The Minister of Interior quickly in-for:rned the Lntendant that the junta had overstepped its au-

thority and that he should ignore the proposals. Although

few convents rrere ever suppressed in Ecuador and Azuay, the

introduction of the national 1aw into the south was unfortu-nate because it generated suspicion between the local cLergy

and the civilian leadership, adding an unstable ei-enent intothe society of the southern departmeot".5l

All of these issues generated appeals to the Congress on

behalf of the southern departments. AE times, the nationallegislature responded favorably to the requests of Ecuador,

Azuay, and Guayaquil. The Congress aLso rejected some of the

southernersr appeals. Most. often, however, the southerners

waited in vain for any response. Typical of any legisLativebureaucrdcy, the processing of petitions was a lengthy affair.Conmunication with the south was difficult and time consuning.

In addition to these factors, the interests of the.southern

departments were of secondary importance in the congress. Inthe three regular congresses held from L823 through L826, the

southern departments rilere consistentLy underrepresented.

I'Iith few voices to promote southern interests, the local. and

regionaL concerns of these departments sel-dom gained the fullattention of the national legislature.

L-

Pt

L57

Varlous reasons, separately or combined, rrere responsible

for the poor attendance by southerners in the congress. The

distanees fron Cuenca, Guayaquil, and Quito were long and the

terrain was dlfficuLt. The journey to Bogotf, required both

good health, which many of the eLected denied, and money and

expenses for the round trip and resi-dence in Bogot/. The gov-

ernment vras to provide funds to those elected but due to the

penury of the treasury, those funds rilere rarely forthcoming.

The rebellions in Pasto and Popaya'n pronided another obstacle

to southern congressmen, slowing travel through those terri-tories and discouraging most of them from even attempting the

journey. A major reason for the dearth of southerners in Bo-

gotJ was the obvious instability of affairs in the south.

Few members of the elite felt secure enough to leave the ad-

mi-nistration of faurily property and business in the hands ofothers to embark upon a six month absence every year for four

52years.

In 1823 the departments of Quito and GuayaquiL were al-iotted seventeen seats in the House and eight seats in the

Senate. Only four representatives and one Senator.arrived infogot/ from the south. In the House, the four spokesmen forthe southern departments competed with thirty-six congressmen

from New Granada and ten from Venezuela. The southern con-

gressional representation remained the same in L824. In L825

and 1826 the numbers of congressmen from the southern depart-

ments increased considerably. Ln 1825 ten representatives

158

arrived in Bogotd. The followin1 year that number rose to

twelve. The number of senators increased from two to four.

Nevertheless, this was stiL1 onLy four of the twelve expected

senators and twelve of the authorized twenty-five representa-

tives. In the 1826 Congress, these twel,ve representatives

faced the conpetition of fifty-three other congressmen repre-

senting the interests of New Granada and Venezuela, The four

southern senators faced a fieLd of nineteen competitors from

the other departments of the nation.53

Frorn May 1822 to July L826 the Colombian governnent

touched the li.ves of the citizens of the south in a bewilder-

ing way. I{hile sanctioning elections and congressional re-

presentation, it also authorized what amounted to a virtualmilitary dictatorship that kepL the south apart from the rest

of the nation. The ruLe by decree provided for the continua-

tion of the colonial economic base and suspended congression-

al- and constituti.onal reforms. Ironically this pleased most

of the southern e1ite, despite .the accorlpanying sacrifi.ces de-

uanded for the nilitary campaigns.

The Law of Territorial Division reduced the audiencia to

a collection of departments and provinces that required a

small army of administrators trying to collect new taxes and

enforce new laws Lhat lrere often openly resisted. The consti-

tutional regime changed the revenue system and introduced re-

forms such as the suppressi-on of convents that forced the cit-l.eens to de,';ide upon issues that divided them and weakened

ls9

the credibil,ity of the regime. The new state demanded nuch

of the south but offered little in return. Under the regime

of Bol{var's extraordinary faculti.es, requests for local re-

forms were quickly answered. In contrast, congressional ac-

tion under the constitution was slow and ofEen disappointing.

It took the congress two years to finally ratify Quitors de-

claration of incorporation. In the course of that debate,

Ecuador's senator, Josd Larrea y Villavicencio, protested the

delay with a warning that sounded Like a memori:.l ,jl:1t, tn"old independent junta of Guayaguil-. Declaring that there

should be no question of the sincerity or legitimacy of the

act, Senator Larrea reminded his coLleagues that once the

Spanish \ilere defeated Quito had recovered her sovereignty as

a free and independent nation and arbitrator of its own fate.Peru, as well as Colombia, had aided in the independence

struggle and Quito could as easiLy have joined that nation.

The action taken by the citizens of O.uito reflected a respect

for the Colombian consEitution and laws, but Larrea warned

that failure to ratify the act could break the ties which

bound that department to Co1ombi".54

Although the congress did ratify Quito's act of i.ncorpo-

ration, the ties of the south to the rest of Colombia remained

weak. The Secretary of Interior, JosJManuel RestrePo, te'flecting upon these concluded:

160

This part of Colombia was the most eccentric.In finance and in all other departments of PublicAdninistraEion, nothing which would be convenienEfor the Venezuelans and Granadans eras adaptableto the inhabitants of the south....55By July 1826 the burdens of the war and the state led to

public support for a reform of the entire system. Sparked by

events in Veneztrela and Peru, the citizens of the southern

departoents turned to the Liberator to save them from his own

creation, the state of Gran Colombia.

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C}IAPTER 9

THE CALL FOR REFORM -- 1826

In the latter half of L826 the citizens of the southern

deparCments hrere presented with an opportunity to choose be-

treen the two forms of republican government they had thus

far experienced under Colombian ruLe. In July 1826 Guayaquil,

Ecuador, and Azuay remained under the direct control of CoLom-

bian mi1-itary officers. In Guayaquil, General Juan Paz del

Gastillo served as Intendant with General I'Ianuel Valdds the

departmental comnanding general. In Quito, Golonel Pedro

lfurgueytio served as Inuendant. Colonel Juan Josd Flores was

the comranding generaL. In Azuay, CoLonel Ignacio Torres

served as Intendant. General Jestis Barreto was the coruranding

general. The inplementation of the constitution in the south

abolished the office of Superior Chief, In their capacity as

civil administrators, these officers found themselves in league

with the members of 'the-munic.ipalities and provincial jun-

tas in their attempts to reconcile Local problems with inade-

quate national law and legisLation. Finally, in July L826

events in Venezuela and Peru sparked a direct confrontationyith the adrninistration of Vice-President Santander which Pro-

duced a cal-l for the reform of the constitution of Golombia.

In i"Iarch L826 the Senate suuuroned the Gommanding General

of the Department of VenezueLa to Bogot/ to face criminal

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charges. General JosJ Antonio Pd,ez eras accused of abuse of

authority steuming from the use of excessive force in recruit-ment procedures. These charges were viewed with suspicion by

the Venezuelans. Discontent with the central government !ilas

widespread in the northern departments. They ciriticized the

centraLism of the Colombian constitution, the designation ofBogotf as the national capitaL, and the predominance of Grana-

dinos in the government. Bol/var's preoccupation with the

creation of Gran Colourbia and the war in Peru disiLlusioned

the Venezuelans. Many citizens of the northern departments

now recognized General Pdez as their liberator and dramryrion of

Iocal righ.ts, On April 30, L826, General Pdez defied the na-

tional congress by refusing to travel to BogotJ. The munici-

paLity of VaLencia imnediately declared its support for P{ez.

It also called for the reform of the constitution. Over the

following four months, other towns declared allegiance toPd.ez and support for reform of the constitution. In spite ofthe Generalrs popularity, the military general-Ly supported

the national government. By the end of August the VenezueJ-an

challenge was reduced to another regional problem that wouLd

Derit the Liberatorfs attention when he returned frour Peru,

l{evertheless., an example of open resistanee to the government

which called for the reform of the constitution was estab -

lished.lThe nilitary administrators of Ecuador, Azuay, and Guaya-

quil undoubtedLy recognized in the charges leveled against

163

Piez as potential difficulties for themselves. Moreover, in-formation that the Liberator himself now advocated a new po-

litical framework for Colombia caused further anxiety through-

out political circles in the south. In early June L826 Colo-

ne1 Juan lllingrot and Colonel Carlos Demarquet, Bolfvar'saide-de-canp, arrived in Guayaquil from Peru. In a friendlymeeting with Intendant Paz del Castillo and GeneraL'Valdds,

Col-onel Illingrot informed the officials that the Liberator

had recently written a constitution for the new Republic ofBolivia. Pubt-ished by Bolfvar in May 1826, the document

blended elements of monarchism, federalisn, and eentralism

into one government. The Bolivarian code created a lifetimepresidency and board of censors, a Senate and Chamber of Trib-unes, and Local assemblies wLth authority over Local offi-

tcials.' Although he drafted the constitution for BoLivia,

the Liberator also consider.ed it a viable alternative forCoLombia, Referring to the recent events in Venezuela, Colo-

nel Illingrot assured his Listeners that Bolivar understood

the need for reforms. As l1lingrot conducted hls meeting,

Colonel Demarguet delivered a letter from BoL{var to Colonel"

Juan Josd Flores, the Comranding General of Ecuador. ALong

with the Letter was a copy of the Bolivian constitution,Soon thereafter, Flores inserted in the local nerrspaper an

article extolling the virtues of a lifetime presidency.3

A11 of these elements contributed to the growing dis-satisfactlon with the centraL government. On July 6 Ehe mu-

t64

nicipaLity of Guayaquil, 1ed by the Intendant and Corrmanding

General-, issued a pronurrciamiento calling for the early amend-

ment of the CoLombian constitution. tJhile acknowledging that

the constitution of Cdcuta provided for its orm review in 1831,

the Guayaquil assenbl-y nonethel.ess insisted that the extra-

ordinary circrrmstances of the moment demanded irrmediate at-

tention. They neither endorsed nor condeuned the Venezuelan

situation. No specific political progran rf,as proposed. For

the mouent, the el"ite of the department announced continued

support for the law while awaiting an officiaL response to

their request frorn the central administration. On July 14

the municipality of Quito endorsed GuayaquiLrs action. Cuenca

offered its approval on July 21. These pronouncements demon-

strated tLrat a consensus for reforu existed in the southern

departments. However, beneath this apparent uniformity rilas an

emerging sense of political. confusion.4

That the authors of the Guayaquil pronouncement acted inthe belief that they nere fulfilLing the Liberator's wished

r,ras evident in a Letter General Valdds sent to Bol{var trilodays after the event. The General also included eqme discord-

ant observations in his correspondence. Despite the modest

nature of the pronouncement, the aLarm it generated had

prompted calLs for federalism from some factions in the city.Anticipating that Bol{var night soon wish to use the public

forum once again, Valdds grudgingly refrained from suppress-

ing the federal"ists. He nevertheless recorded his fear that

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the sltuation might get out of hand. The General's words

proved to be all too accurate.5

The pronouncement on July 6 was calcul,ated to occur be-

fore the arrival in Guayaquil of the new intendant, Lieuten-

ant Colonel Tonds C. Mosquera. I{hen Mosquera did enter Gua-

yaquil three days later he observed crowds in the streets de-

clarlng rrDeath to the Congress, long live federaLism. " tr'lhen

he announced his arrival to GeneraL Paz del Castillo, the out-going Intendant, Mosquera discovered that the General claimed

to have no knowLedge of the appointment. The following day,

July 10, the municipality convoked a cabildo abierto ostensi-

bly to discuss whether or not, to acknowledge l"losquera's cre-

dentials. The gathering quickly turned into a federalistrally" Escorted by General Paz del Castillo and two council-

uren, l,Iosguera was finally called to the meeting. There he

found it expediEnt to declare his support for federalism lnexchange for a public vote to recognize him as Intendant.

The foLLowing day, GeneraL Paz deL CastiLlo conveniently dis-covered the papers announcing Mosquerots appointment.6

The events surrounding Quito's endoisement of.the Guaya-

quil call for reform also demonstrated some confusion of

leadership. The Intendant of Quito, ColoneL Pedro Murgueytio

was surprised by the meeting of the cabil-do abierto. Ile at-tended the session with little enthusiasm. The Coumanding

General, Colonel- Flores, ordered his troops to remain in theirbarracks and not to interfere with the proceedings. FLores

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publicly stated that as a military man, he would offer no po-

litical opinions. Nevertheless, his loyalty to Bolivar and

his support f,or the Bolivian code rrere well known. As in Gua-

yaquil, the proceedi.ngs of the Quito assembly quickly turned

to local affairs. Rather than discussing federalism or any

other policical ideology, the members condemned the directcontribution tax and argued for a return to the colonial eco-

nomic system. Colonel Murgueytio insisted upon a simple en-

dorsement of the Guayaquil pronouncement. The assembly com-

plied. They also dispatched conrrrissioners to Bolivar and

Vice-President Santander with details of the grievances of

the departme nt .7

In Cuenca, the reaction to the events in Guayaquil and

Quico resulted in a confrontation between the Intendant of

Azuay, Colonel lgnacio Torres, and the Corrnranding General of

the department, General JesG Barreto. Early in the morni.ng

on July 30, a crowd appeared on the streets shouting. "Long

live Boly'var, long live federalism, long live the friarswhose convents shouLd not be suppressed, sovereignty resides

in the peop1e," Repeating this interestingly eclectic and

Lengthy chant, the crowd marched to the headquarters of Gen-

eral Barreto. There they caLled for the Conrrnanding General

and the Intendant to sanction a cabildo abierto. Barreto,

who apparently had a hand in the entire affair, guickly a-

greed. Golonel Torres, the Int,endant, Iras surprised and out-

raged by the demonstration. Torres refused to auLhorize an

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assembiy. He ordered Barreto to arrest the leaders of the

demonstration. Wtren the General refused, Torres ordered Bar-

reto to rellnquish his comtand. Again the General refused.

In the face of this opposition, Torres grudgingly acceded to

a public gathering, The following day, the cabildo abie_rto

of Cuenca endorsed the actions of Quito and Guayaquil and ap-

pointed representatives to infom the Liberator. In his own

report to Bol{var, Colonel Torres condenned General Barreto's

conduct and warned the Liberator that under such circumstan--

ces , the fate of the department was ,rncertain. 8

The actions of the departmental- capitaLs prompted two

other movements. In Portoviejo, the capital of the coastal

province of llanabi and a natural rival of Guayaquil, the town

council met on July 16 and eondemned federalism and the events

in VenezueLa. The council then declared strongly for the Co-

lombian constitution, At almost the same time, the militiaof the village of Guallabamba on the route between Quito and

Guayaquil, demonstraLed in the streets chanting rrDeath to Co-

lombia.tt Less concerned with the larger political issues,

the protestors condemned the government's practice of using

them to transport the mai1.9

In this atmosphere of demonstrations and pronouncements,

the leaders of the three southern departments waited for Bo-

L{var's reaction. In earLy August letters from the Liberator

arrived in Guayaquil. !'lriting to the municipality, General

Paz del Castil"lo, Intendant Mosquera, and in general to

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"persons of influence," Bol{var not surprisingly expressed

synpathy for the calL to refor:ur the constitution. He includ-

ed copiies of the Bolivian code and endorsed its adoption forColonbia, procLaiming that it encompassed the charns of feder-

alism, the solidity of centralism, and the stability of mo-

narchical governn.rrt. 10

Support for the new constitution hras previously expressed

by Colonel lllingrot and Colonel Flores. Now the Intendants

of Guayaquil and Azuay joined in that opinion. Mosqueratemed

the code a gift from heaven that all of America shoul-d en-

thusi.astically endorse. Torres declared the docr:ment to be a

"sacred tablet" that would serve as the salvation for Col-ombia

and eternalize Bol{var'" ,,"*".11 Once again General Va1dds

added a cautionary note to the chorus of praise. Writing toBolfvar he concluded that the Bol"ivj.an code wouLd find sup-

port in neither Venezuela nor New Granada. In the south, po-

litical opinions divided between uonarchism and federaLism

became joined by a conmon respect for the Liberator. Valdds

soberly concluded that in general the people wished onLy a

soLid and clearly understood regime. In all other details he

said "they will be whatever lre wish them to be.t'12

The central government also responded to the events of

July. 0n August 2L the secretary of War dispatched lettersto the officers in command of the three departments. The

Secretary sternly aduronished the officers to remember theirlegal obligation to uphold the law and defend the constitu-

t69

tion.13 In early September the Mlnister of Interior, Josd

Manuel Restrepo, sent lengthy statements to Guayaquil and

Quito. Restrepo diminished the significance of the Venezue-

J.an events by pointing out that the rebellion had encompassed

Less than one seventh of the Republic. The majority of Co-

loubians.supported the government. He reminded the municipal-

ities that their authority nas linited to presenting peti-tions to Congress; anything else was rebellion. With regard

to the caLls for federalism, Restrepo pointed to the failuresof the early federal governments of Venezuela and New Granada.

The l.Iinister also responded directly to specific complaints

from the municipality of Quiro.14

Followins their pronouncement, the Quito municipalitysent Captain Francisco ltonttifar to Bogot/ with a list ofgrievances. They condemned the new economic Laws as a "calam-

ity" for Ecuador. The direct contribution was so despised

that it remained uncollected. Lacking an effective program

of taxation, neither civilian nor military wages were paid.

Lamenting the decline of the local textile industry, the qul-

tefros criticized the administration's apparent lack of con-'

""rrr.15 The Minister reninded the municipal"ity that the Con-

gress directed economic policy. The executive branch could

not readily interfere or sanction the breaking of laws. Ifthe citizens of the south paid their taxes, the revenues

needed for wages would exist. Restrepo rejected an inference

that the decline of the textile trade lras due in part to the

r70

free trade policy of the administration. Only selfish monoP-

olists argued against the benefits which oPen trade brought

to the citizenry. l{e advised the quitefros to invest in up-

dated machinery.16 In a series of private letters to various

Leaders of the south, Vice-President Santander expressed s5rm-

pathy for the hardships they faced. Nevertheless, he remind-

ed them that the administration bareLy had sufficient funds

of its oern, He aLso admonished them to recognize that the

separation of powers prohibited the executive from broadly

sanctioning major reforms in the government. Ironically, he

appeared to confirm the proposition that he, himself, hras a

prisoner within a deficient "y"r"r.17As the Vice-President and his ministers prepared these

letters, further developments occurred in the south" In lateAugust, Bol{var's personal envoy, Golonel Demarquet, held a

second series of meetings in Guayaguil and Quito, As a re-sult, on August 28 the authorir,ies of Guayaquil issued an-

other pronouncement. They openly endorsed the Bolivian code

as a repiacement for the Constitution of Ctfcuta and called

upon the Liberator to assume dictatorial Po!ilers to lnsure the

reform. Quito issued a siuilar manifesto on September 6.

Cuenca joined the call for dictatorship a week later.18 Not

surprisingly the three documents cited similar reasons forthe events in Venezuela, the pronouncements eondemned the in-sufficiency of current institutions to deaL with l-ocal prob-

lems. Condemning recent legislation as both inadaptable and

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premature, the leaders of Quito declared, "We are lost if

conform to the law.t'l9

I{ord of these declarations reached Bogotd in earl-y Octo-

ber L826. The governmentfs response was vitriolic. In an

official statement issued to the Intendant of Ecuador, and to

be circulated throughout the south, the Mlnister of InteriorfLatLy rejected the pretentions of Quito, Guayaquil, and

Cuenca. He condemred the acts as sins against the constitu-tion, the congress, and the peopLe of the nation. Ihe Minis-

ter rrarned the leaders of the south that posterity as we1L as

the public would judge and castigate those disloyal to the

constitution. In a private letter to Colonel Flores, Vice-

President Santander charged that the acts were based upon

false and exaggerated claims, He also inferred that Flores

may have cornmitted high treason against the state by endors-

ing the Quito pronouncement.20

As the political situation in the south grew more com-

plex, many of the local officials found themselves torn be-

tlreen the demands of their local reality and the politics of

the central government. On September 8, foLlowing the decla-

ration of Quito, a cabildo abierto in Ibarra also offered

dictatorial powers to the Liberator. The meeting was presidJ

ed over by the governor of Imbabura province, Basilio Pala-

cios Urqu{jo. An ardent supporter of the Vice-President,

Urqu{jo did not enjoy his role and soon after sent a lengthy

expLanation of the events to Santander. Urqu{jo described

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L72

the citizens of lbarra as siurple spectators of events in the

capital. Word of the declaration in Quito excited the citi-zens and the invitation from the Lntendant to support the de-

cLaration created an "unexpected torrent" that the governor

could not resist. Trying to maintain some equilibrirrm insuch confused circuurstances, Urquij o chaired the cab$,do a-

bierto and supported the endorsement of dictatorship, but he

also insisted upon the continuation of strict adherence to

the constitution and he called for respect for the goverrrnent.

He later issued orders to the other cities in the province

announcing the events in lbarra but also insisting prinarilythat all officials obey the 1aws. The governorts concern

over the unpredictability of recent events was sincere. Re-

questing advice from the Vice-President, Urqu{jo stated that

"prudence is my only guide in this state of things."2l Inaddition to the recent turn of events, the governor wiselyanticipated that rDore was to come. Expressing this to San-

tander he wrote, t'I fear, with sufficient foundation, thatafter the Liberator passes here, I will be buried under

another torrent of irreguLar ^cEs.22

Further evidence of the diLermna faeed by Loca1 officialssurfaced in l-etters to the Vice-President from the Intendants

of Quito and Guayaquil. In his first appeal to Santander,

Intendant Murgueytio of Ecuador informed the Vice-President

of the widespread unpopuLarity of rouch of the legislationfrom Congress. Forced to act in these circrmrstances he de-

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clared: "I pledge to God and to the government the rectitude

of my intentions. I could find no other way of conserving

the department."23 Reacting to continued criticism from Bo-

gott, Murgueytio sent a second Letter in which he bitterlyinsisted that the government failed to appreciate his situa-tion. Refusing to apologize for his actions, the Intendant

reviewed the challenges he faced, including a short-lived re-volt by the Araure battalion in Augirst:

I respect and appreciate the high opinion of l{isExcellency the Vice-President but if our fates werechanged, what would be the resolution of his ExceL-lency? In view of the demoraLizati.on of the peoplewith_respect to the administration of the republ-ic,carried to regrettable extreme by stories in- variouspresses; of the ominous happenings of the north thatwere its imnediate consequence; of the unfortunateinternal and external state of Colombia, representedby the authentic action of Guayaquil and other areas;at the head of a department where legitimacy of thepresent system is hardly cemented; where the princi-ple of disassociation is questioned with vigor...where the necessity of civil and poLitical reform isa dogma; at the head of a Department entering des-peration for the lack'of funds to cover the publtcneeds; cruelly agitated by the terrible anticipationof a deoravation at armed hands, such as rras suf-fered on August 22 by'the revolt of the battalion.Araure; what could any other l4tendant encharged bythe Law of public secirrity do?24

From Guayaquil, Intendant }tosquera defended his change

of alLegiance in similar terms. Citing the political turmoilwhich preceded his arrival and which he continued to face,

the Intendant concluded that the sociaL pact had been tornapart forcing him to follow the measures he judged best forpreserving order. The Governor of the Province of Pasto

voiced even more ominous concerns generated by the uncertain

L74

politics of the day. Speculating to Santander that neither

the governuent nor the Liberator could end the crisis, he

feared the dissolution of the republic. In such a case, he

warned that from the time of their earl"y revolution, the qui-

tefios had planned to form their own state which would prove a

direct tshreat to a dininished Colombi".25

On September !2, Bol{var returned to Colombia, arrivingin Guayaquil from Peru. The fol-lowing day he issued a decla-

ration to the citizens of the nation. Apparently rejectingthe offer of dictatorial authority, he urged all Colombians

to recoqnize their conmon identity by respecting the consti-tution and obeying the laws. Departing Guayaquil, Bolfvar

traveled to Quito where he remained from September 28 through

October'8. Wtrile in the south, he initiated a series of ac-

tions which contradicted his initiaL declarat1-.on,26

In Guayaquil, BoL{var named Colonel Ledn de Febre's Cor-

dero as the new Jefe de Estado Mayor of Ecuador, disregard-

ins the sentenee of the Hieh Military Tribunal in Boeor/

which had earlier convicted Cordero of insubordination and

suspended him from active duty for two years. Unofficial-lyexercising the authority of extraordinary faculties, the Lib-

erator granted a nnilitary promotion to Intendant Mosquera.

Turning his attention to Cuenca, he united the political and

miLitary codrand of that department under Intendant Torres

and called General Barreto to Quito. offerins him a new as-

signment alons with an hacienda in Pasto.27

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In Quito, Bol{var promoted Colone!. FLores to the rank of

Brigadier General. He named his aide, General Josd GabrieL

P{rez, the de facto Superior Chief for the entire south. Ac-

knowledging the dismal economic conditions of the area, the

Liberator created separate couunlssions for each department to

examine their problems and offer suggesti.ons for reforms.

Reassigning Colone1 I'turgueyti o to nilltary duties, Bolfvarchose a new Intendant for Ecuador. He named Josdltodesto

Larrea, a quitpfrg and a staunch supporter and son of the I'tar-

ques of san Jose'to the post. Finally, in a dramatic altera-tion of fiscal policy, the Liberator initiated a new system

of taxation. Reacting to the complaints of uhe wealthy and

professionals who condemned the direct contribution as a taxthat weighed heavily upon their shoulders, BoLfvar decreed

the collection of a personal contribution. Returning to a

broad tax base, the personal contribution required a paynent

of two reales per month for all nen from the ages of fourteen

through sixty regardless of "1""..28

The Liberator Ehen directed his att.ention to two other

matters, The first concerned an appeal from JosdOyarbide, &D

eleetor from Guayaquil, for release from unjust imprisonment.

Followlng the call for dictatorship Oyarbide wrote a pamphLer

condemning the illegal action and arguing for support of the

constitution. within days of its release the municipality ofGuayaquil declared the pamphlet to be sedirious. They also

arrested oyarbide. A poritical move of guestionable legality

L76

the Liberator nevertheLess concurred with the acti.on. How-

ever, when he arriyed in Bogot!,, the Liberator ordered the

author's release with the stipuLation that he renained out-

si.de of Guayaquil.29 The second natter which BoLlvar con-

fronted cencerned Doctor Manuel Landa, the rector of a col-Iege in Cuenca and Lieutenant Colonel Eugenio Tamarez, Seere-

tary to General Barreto. In the turmoil surrounding that

city's pronouncementsr Landa opposed such extreme action.

Tamarez, oo the other hand, openly parti.cipated in the move

to deelare f,or reforms, Bol{var ordered both rDen arrest,ed

and brought to Quito. Tamarez was soon released. Doctor

Landa }anguished in captivity for nearly three uronths.30

On his r,.7ay to logotJ the tiberator assured Vice-President

Santander that, &t least with regard to the southern depart-

ments, the current difficuLties enanated not from the sacri-

fices of the war but as a reaetion to the "absurdrr laws ofthe Congress. Arriving in the capital in November L826, Bo-

L{var forrrall-y invoked extraordinary faculties. He then is-sued over a dozen decrees effecting najor changes in Guaya-

quiL, Ecuador, and Azuay.3l

By executive decree, Bol/var formalized the creation of

a Superior Chief for the south. He abolished the Superior

Court of Guayaquil and reconstituted the Quito court into the

Superior Court for the District of the South, He suppressed

the provinces of Manab{, Imbabura, and Chimborazo thus reduc-

ing the local bureaucracy and their drain upon the treasury,

177

He formally abolished the post of Corrrmanding General for the

Department of Azuay, placing that authority in the office of

the Intendant. Continuing the fiscal reform begun in Quito,the Liberator established the personal eontribution as a na-

tional tax. He initially reduced the amount of the directcontributlon, and then repLaced it with a return to the coLo-

nial alcabala sales t^*.32

The leaders of Ecuador, Azuay, and GuayaquiL sent con-

gratulatory messages to BoL/var and expressed their hopes forfurther reform from his hand.33 In his earlier letter to

ColoneL Flores critieizing the pronouncement of Quito, Vice-President Santander condemned the act for demonstrating "themost crass ignorance of the most obvious principles of polit-ical rights and. laws '"34 As reflected in the coments of

Intendant l,Iurgueytio and Governor Urqufjo, Ehe leaders of the

southern departments faced.a myriad of locaL probLems which

held their irrurrediate attention precLuding much reflectionupon poLiticaL theory. Reflecting the general attitude of

the leaders of the south both toward the government and the

Liberator, General Fl,ores concluded a letter of support with

the observation that, "there [in gogot/J tney cite Vattel,Constant, Tracy, LeSage, Fritotr...but here i.s invoked the

name of BoL{var. Wtrat a differencet l{hat satisfaetionl"35That satisfaction was soon dispelled, however, wi.th the ar-

rival of the new year. On January 26, L827, in Lima, Peru,

178

the Colombian Ttrird Division declared against the Boliviancode and against the Liberatorrs dictatorship. Ttrey pre-

pared to sail to Guayaquil to save the constitutional regime.

CHAPTER 10

THE FAILIIRE 0F REFORM: L827'L828

The demands for the reform of the Coloubian state brought

unexpected consequences to Guayaquil, Azuay, and Quito. Far

from the satisfying results anticipated by General Flores,

the reforns brought years of warfare, militarism, popular re-

sistance to the new tax system, and further disillusionment

with the state. The most dramatic of these events was the

invasion of Azuay and Guayaquil by the Third Division, the

Colombian auxiLiary force in Peru. Following Bolfvar's de-

parture from Peru, his opponents in Liura seized control of

that governmenc. Naturally fearing the continued presence of

the Third Division, the new government encouraged its depar-

ture with offers of money apd warnings of irrpeding dictator-ship in Colombia. The declarations of GuayaquiL, Quito, and

Guenca appeared to justify these claims. To some officers of

the southern departments, and, in the event of Col-ombia's de-

nise, an opportunity to bring Guayaquil, if not all'of the

south, into the Peruvian republic.l On January 26, 1827, the

junior officers of the Third Division, led by the $enrmanding

General, Josd Mar{.a Bustamante, arrested their superiors and

began preparations to return to Colourbia. Bustanante de -

clared his sr-pport for the Colombian constitution and condemned

t79

180

the pronouncements calling for dictatorship. He sent copies

of this declaration to Vice-President Santander, Ttre Peru-

vian government gladly assisted the renegade division and, inmid-llarch, General Bustamante and his army sailed from the

port of Ca1lao. The General with half of his force landed at

Piura in northernmost Peru and began an advance on Guenca.

The rest of the division, under the comand of GeneraL Juan

Francisco Elizalde, continued northward toward Guayaquil.2

These events did not go unnoticed in Guayaquil, and Quito,The Superior Chief of the South, General Josd Gabriel P{rez,called the three departments into assembly, giving firstpriority to all- military operations and activating aLL miLi-

tia units. He also dispatched two ships to intercept Busta-

mante. Intendant Mosquera, aboard the first ship, rrras to as-

sure Bustamante that constitutional order was being observed

in the south and that the division should sail- onward to Pa-

nama. Should this overture be reJected, General llLingrot,comnanding the second vessel, v'ras to prevent a landing by the

rebelLious troops. Both missions proved futile. Mosquerats

overture was rejected and llLingrot was unable to delay the

advance of the shlps. The departments of Azuay and Guayaquil

faced invasion.3

On April 4, L827, General Bustamante entered Golombian

territory, occupying the town of Sapotillo, The Intendant

and Couupnding General of Azuay Lacked the men and resources

to face the weLl-equipped veteran force, Faci.ng no opposi-

181

tion, General Bustamante advanced steadily, occupying Loja on

April 14 and finally capturing Cuenca on April 29. Bustaman-

te's success was greeted with complete silence. Despite his

declarations of support for the constitution, none of the

cities or villages offered displays or pronouncenents in his

favor.4

Events in Guayaquil proceeded in a more compLex fashion.

Landing his forces at l4anta in Manab{ province, General Eli-zaLde advanced inland occupying the town of ltonticristi on

April 6. Announcing his arrival to the Superior Chief, Gerr

eral Pdrez, and to the municipality of Guayaquil, Elizalde

condemned the Bolivian constitution and the pronouncenents

for dictatorship. He declared the rernoval of the Superior

Cirief and requested the municipality of Guayaquil to select a

new Intendant for the department. Elizaldets words gained

arided weight when the provincial corrmpnder of Manab{ joined

the rebellion and pleaded with the citizens of Guayaquil to

avoid a civil war and to open the city to the Ttrird Division.S

Within Guayaquil Generals Pdrez, Vatdds, and Intendant

I'Iosquera attempted to organize a defense for the city. A num-

ber of elements combined to undermine their efforts. The a-

vailable forces litere linited to the 200 men of the locaL Gua-

yas battalion and one squad of cavaLry, most of whom were

without horses. One of the chief officers of the city guard,

Colonel Antonio Elizalde, was a brother of the threatening

General. As the events of Jul,y and August demonstrated, many

,G

18:

of the cities' leaders supported the call for federalism more

than the riictatorship and they now welcomed an endorsement o:

their authority. Finally, residing Just outside of the citl'was the uncle of the Elizalde brothers whose presence acted

as a further cataLyst to unite these elements. A militaryhero, a past supporter of Guayaquil's earlier struggle forautonomy, and a past president of the Peruvian governrnent

counciL General Josd de ta ltar offered leadership and legiti-macy to the federalist and Peruvian factions of the .ity.6

As dawn broke over Guayaquil on April 16, cannon ap-'peared in tJ:e streets and ttre troops of the Guayas battalion sur-

rounded the government building. Colonel Antonio Elizalde

and Lieutenant ColoneL Rafael Merino, second in command oftire battalion, Ied the rebell-ion and declared support for the

Tirird Division. ElLzalde ordered the arrest and expulsion

from the department of GeneraL P6tez, Intendant Mosquera and

trilenty-two other officers, 7

Later that day, the municipality held a cabildo abierto

which endorsed the coup. The municipal-ity called General La

Mar to the city Eo serve as the urilitary and political chief

of the department. It al-so recouulended proraotions for Eliza;-

de and Merino. Accepting the nomination, General ta l{ar

granted Merinots promotion from Lieutenant ColoneL to Colonel.

Citing his faurily ties to Elizalde, La l{ar refused the promo-

tion for his nephew, but he did name him the comnanCer of the

city's military forces.S

183

On ApriL 20, the municipality dispauched a report to the

Colombian Secretary of Interior defending its action. Noting

that the incorporation of ttre department had cost the Colom-

bian government very little while the sacrifices of the de-

partuent for the war in Peru had been extensive, the munici-

pality protested that their reward consisted of harsh treat-ment by Colombian laws and officials. They disavowed the

earLier pronouncement endorsing the Bolivian code and a dicta-torship. The councilmen presented the act as an example ofthe tyranny of Colonbian officials. The local leadership

favored reasonable reforms of the laws and constitution.They favored a federal form of government. These opinions

were suppressed by the now'exiled Colombian officials. By

devious and clandestine ways, these officials had perverted

the locaL desire for reform into the declaration for dicta-torship. I{hen their actions provoked the current crisis,these officials proved quite willing to sacrifice the ciryand its citizens to the horrors of civiL war. Despite the

polemical nature of the report, it is clear that the munici-

pality was correct in its accusations of complicity by the

Colornbian leaders. The threat to the weLfare of the city wasoalso genuine.'

The fear of civil. war and the iurplication that more couLd

be done to avoid the confrontation also surfaced in Quito.The Intendant of Ecuador, Josd Modesto Larrea, voiced these

concerns in a letter to General Flores who was directing nil-

- -L-

184

itary operations at Riobamba. Cautiously suggesting that

the concerns of rhe Third Division were reasonabLe, he warned

that it would be unjust to drain the treasury and aLa:m the

citizenry on the basis of suspicion and misunderstanding.

Proposing that negotiations night succeed in averting war,

Larrea offered to travel to Cuenca to meet wiCh General Bus-

tamante. l0

General Flores approved Larreats proposal. An atternpt

to negotiate would insure more time to organize the forces inEcuador. More importantly, they would allow Flores to take

advantage of the fortuitous arrivaL of Captain Josd Raurdn

Bravo. Captain Bravo had been sent to Bogot6, Ay General Bus-

tamante iurmediately following the rebellion in Lima. Attempt-

ing to reach Cuenca with the governmentts response to the ac-

tion of the Third Di.vision, he was intercepted by General

Flores. The General tried to convince Bravo that Bustamanters

intentions were far more sinister than his pubLicly stated

concern for the constitution. Captain Bravo remained skepti-cal. The message from Bogotd was an encouraging one. Vice-

President Santander praised the rebellious officers. for theirsuppof,t for the constitution and indicated he would send Col-

onel Antonio Obando as his personal representative to assume

overal-I couurand of the Third Division.llCaptain Bravo continued his journey to Cuenca. Intend-

ant. Larrea and two officers named by GeneraL Flores accom-

panied the Captain. Flores' assessment of hls foe proved to

185

be correct. Bustamante flatLy rejected the proposals for ne-

gotiations put for-ward by Larrea and the officers sent by

FLores. He also cast aside the message deLivered by Captain

Bravo and refused to reLinquish comrand to Colonel Obando.

This reaction cost Bustamante the Loyalty of Bravo and other

junior officers. In early May the Rifles Battalion, 1ed by

Bravo, arrested Bustarnante and his foll-owers. They then

turned comnand over to GeneraL Flores. Hoping to rePeat thissequence of ev1ncs., flores released Bustauante uPon the prou-

ises that he would traveL to Guayaquil- and convince General

Elizalde to surrender. This gambit failed. Upon entering

Guayaquil, Bustamante recognized the authority of General La

Mar and in return received a nilitary "oor,"rrd.12

General Flores now focused his attention upon Guayaquil.

Free from the threat in Cuenca, his army of 1300 men began

their advance from Riobamba.. A military confrontation ap-

peared near at hand but political developments soon added

further complications to the situation. Colonel Obando now

arrived upon the scene and met with General pdtez, who had

managed to return to Quito, Recognizing Obando's appointment

as the new comrander of the Third Division, ?drez added to

Obando's authority by.naming hin the interim Intendant and

Goumanding General of the department of Guayaquil. He further

ordered Obando to ttansfer the troops of the Third Division

to Panama once he assumed cosmand in Guayaquil. Should Gener-

al La Mar and the others resist this move, General Flores

186

was authorized to attack the city.13On June 6, Florest arny occupied the town of Babahoyo,

thus posing an imnediate military threat to Guayaquil. The

same day, Colonel Obando entered Guayaquil and met with Gener-

al La Mar. An earlier statement from La }tar granting obando

entrance to the city recognized the Colonel only as an "aux-

lliary officer" under La Mar's cormand. General FLores was

prepared to make a rapid advance in antiticipation of the

formal rejection of obando's authority. wtren word from colo-nel Obando finally arrived, it was surprising. Far from re-jecting La l4arrs contentions, Colonel Obando not only re-mained in Gr:ayaquil, but also announced that constitutional order

and lcryalty Lo the government prevailed. He ordered all mili-tary operations against the city to cease. Acknowledging

obando's authorit',' as rntendant and departmenEal couuraDder,

as conferred by General Pdrez, GeneraL Flores halted opera-

tions.14

A delegation frorn General La Mar then arrived in Babaho-

yo and proposed a settlement. They suggested that the situa-tion in Guayaquil remain unaltered.pending later resolu-tion by the central government, Wtrile FLores and Pe'rez a-

greed to La Mar's continuation in office pending a resolutionfrom Bogotd, they insisted upon the dissolution of the Guayas

Battal-ion, the transfer of the Third Division forces to Pana-

D4, and the occupation of Guayaquil by Florest army. That

response convinced La Mar and the municipality of Guayaquil

187

that negotiations rilere f,ruitless. They rejected the proposal.

Superior Chief ?drez ordered GeneraL Fl-ores to continue his

advance. On June 22, his forces scattered a small vanguard

and occupied the tolrn of Daule, thus drawing closer to Guaya-

quil.15

The citizens of Guayaquil feared the worst from the ad-

vancing army, They saw the nil,itary movement as an invasion

of revenge directed by General P{rez in response to the humil-

iation of his removal from the city. Women and childrenwere sent to the island of Puna and the men began to buildbarricades in the streets.l6 At this crucial momentl :t s€-

ries of political changes rapidly altered the situation. As

both sides braced for the inevitable cIash, word arrived from

OogotJ that the Congress had revoked the Liberatorrs extra-ordinary faculties and consequently tenninated General Pdrez'

authority as Superior Chief of the South. A follow-up direc-

tive from the Secretary of War ordered General Flores to rec-

ognize ColoneL Obando as Corn'qanding General" of the depart-

uent of Guayaquil and to return his forces to Ecuador. The

invasion ended.17

This sudden Lurn of events r,ttas followed by further un-

expected developments. These added to a growing confusion of

authority and prompted a more radical development in Guaya-

quiL. Attempting to capitalize on his recent endorsement,

Colonel Obando issued an order to the principal unit of the

Third Division, the Vencedor Battalion, to saiL to Pananna.

188

The officers of the battaLion refused the corutand. ColoneL

Antonio Elizalde and the municipality, fearing that Obando

wanted to weaken the defenses of the city, supported the of-

ficers and arrested Obando, Adding to the complications ofthe moment, representatives from the Peruvian government ar-

rived in Guayaquil announcing the eLection of General La Mar

as president and requesting his iumediate departure. On July

24, La Mar sailed for Lima.l8

The civilian leaders of Guayaquil did not lament the Gen-

eral's departure. The municipality made no requests for pro-

tection or annexation from the new Peruvian president. Il're

general and the pro-Peruvian faction that had developed around

him failed to impress the guayaquilefio leadership. General

Juan Illingrot, who had been permitted to live in retirement

in the city, reported these observations to General Flores"

Ttre republiquistas of the past no longer trusted Peru. They

still heLd to the dream of independence for Guayaquil but due

to the popularity of the Liberator and the possibility of

conscitutional reform in Colombia, they believed their drearn

would be best served by supporting federali"r.19Ironically, General Flores figured significantly in this

development. After the halt of his military advance and

prior to General La Mar's departure, Flores accepted an invi-tation to visit the city. In addition to meet,ing Colonel

Obando and General La Mar, Flores spoke with a nnmber of the

city's civilian leaders. Responding to their arguments in

189

favor of federalism, he assured thern that he f,ound their con-

cerns for the welfare of their department reasonable. More

importantly, he aLso inplied that a federal system of govern-

ment might be accepted providing it did not threaten the dis-memberment of Colombia. The Guayaquil politicians wa:med to

the Generalts remarks, sone going so far as to suggest thatthe three southern departments federate with Flores as theirpresident, Reports of these conversations provoked a tempo-

raxy fear in Ecuador thaE their General had joined the fede-

ralists. Flores' return to Ecuador quieted that anxiety.Once in Quito, the General temporarily retired from his com-

mand, ostensibly for reasons of health.20

On July 26, the municipality of Guayaquil called a cabil-do abierto to determine the course for the department. The

assembled city fatheirs issued an endorsement of federalism

within the Colombian union.. Until the convocation of a na-

tional convention to determine the issue, Guayaqui-l reserved

for itself fulL control of ics own affairs in all matters ofjustice, police, economy, and war. The assenbly then created

corresponding offices to handle those concelns. If a consti-tutional convention was noc held r'rithin a year, Guayaquil

would reassume its independence. Finally, General Antonio

Elizalde wa6 named Conmanding General of the armed forces and

Diego Novoa, a moderate federalist, became the Intendant of

Guayaquil. Reporting these events in a letter to Bolfvar,

General lllingrot concl,uded that, "the flag is now the only

-

190

sign of Colonbian dominion in this country,"2l

GeneraL l'lores reacted to these events with patience,

assuming correctly, that internal political divisions would

undermine Guayaquilrs temporary autonomy. As July turned to

August and August to September, such divisions did appear.

Reporting this observation to Vice-President Santander, Gener-

al Bustamante wrote that, "Guayaquil is today a Labyrinth;

there are as many opinions as people; if there exist support-

ers of Colombia their adhesion is more to the Liberator, be-

cause he is considered the protector of any reforms, or forother particular views."22 The turn of events in Guayaquil

bore out Bustamante's view. The pro-Peruvian faction which

controlled the 1ocal press, attacked the reputation of the

Liberator and sharply criticized the members of the municipal-

ity who were knorsn to be loyal to him. The Comranding Gener-

al AnEonio Elizalde then o:cdered expelled from the province

anyone openly critical of Bo1{var. Seeing their influence

diminish, the politicians of the Peruvian faction then turned

to the nilitary and provoked an attempt by the officers of

the Guayas battaLion to seize the government. The.coup, ini-tiated on September 10, was quickly suppressed by General

ElizaLde.23

The end of Guayaquilrs autonomy followed soon thereafter.

Disenchanted with the politics of the city, GeneraL Elizalde

opened secret negotiations with General. Flores. Assured by

Flores that his demonstration of loyaLty to Bol{var would be

191

rewarded , ELLzaLde named CoLonel ltanuel rcJn, a Flores agent,

to connand the Vencedor Battalion. On September 22, the

battalion condemned the divisive politics of the city and de-

clared their l-oyatty to Bollvar. Then they occupied Guaya-

quil. Generals Bustamante, Juan Francisco Elizalde, and

others fled to Peru. Intendant Novoa resigned his office.The municipality, noril honoring an earlier order sent from the

Secretary of War, turned the nilitary comand over to General

ManueL Valde/s and named General lgnacio Torres interim Lntend-

ant. A week later, General Flores tritrmphantLy entered the

city" Assuming the military comrand, Fl-ores then appointed

General Juan llLingrot Lhe new Intendant of the Colombian de-

partment of Guayaq,ril.24

The crisis of the Third Division placed economic and so-

cial strains on the southern departments. It exhibited an

obvious confusion in authority, both nilitary and civil, and

enhanced the crucial role of the rnilitary in the south. Con-

current with that concern, another criti.cal" situation plagued

the south as a result of ttre past pronouncements .and the Lib-

erator's return. From the time of its implerrentation, in

January 1827, the new head tax imposed by Bol{var provoked

videspread and sometimes violent opposition throughout Ecua-

rior and Azuay.

The capitacidn, or private contribution, required aL1

citizens between fourteen and sixty to pay a tax of three

pesos per year. Collection nas left in the hands of munici-

qi|ll1il

L92

pal and parochial alcaldes, or councilmen. The wealthy and

professionals welcomed this reform. It lifted the burden of

the direct contribution from their shoulders by requiring

taxes from all citizens no matter what their income. The

significance of this shift was demonstrated when popular pro-

tests erupted, condemning the age liurits of fourteen to sixtyyears oLd and the appLication of the tax to lromen. Another

problem sterurned from placing the collecEion in the hands of

the local alcaldes who were either incapable or unwilling tofulfill, their duties.25 From lbarra, the Political Justice

of the city complained to the Intendant that the plan to ad-

minister the tax through the alcaldes was madness, In addi-

Lion to the fact that most of the 1ocal alcaldes lacked a

formal education, he questioned the wisdom of giving men who

did not possess 100 pesos the responsibility for over L,000

pesos. Reports from Quito,. Latacunga, Guaranda, and Aubato

echoed the same theme. The aLcaldes were variously described

as unable to read or r'rrite, inept, fully lacking in responsi-

bility and finaLly, as sirnply stupid.26

While many of these officials lilere undoubtedl-y unlet-

tered, it is clear ttrat ttrey $tere far from stuPid. Protesting

their assignments to the Intendant, the alcaLdes of Otavalo

correctly described the unpopuLarity and injustice of the tax.

Even the tyrannicaL Spanish recognLzed the unfairness of tax-

ing the young and the elderly, and thus collected revenue

only from those aged eighteen through fifty. The nerr age

I"is'its not

tradition.

193

only proved burdensome, but ignored a century of

A "general- repugnancet' to the caDit-acidn was r€-

lnrted in Latacunga and Anbato as the general- pubLic failedto cooperate in efforts to draw up the tax ro11s.27

One of the sharpest reactions occurred in the vilLage of

Ghambo, in the vicinity of Riobannba. On January 29, the ma-

gistrate of the viltrage published the ta:< decrees. In a

chort period of time, numerous Indians and other "rustic per-

sons" gathered in the streets. Chanting eondemnations of the

decree for taxing the young, elderly, and women, the gather-

ing threatened to burn down the official's home. Attempts by

che local priest to calm the crowd proved futile and a callfor aid was sent to Riobamba. The following afternoon, a mi-

litia unit of twenty five to thirty veterans faced a mixed

crowd of Indians and whites arned with clubs and knives, A

voL1ey of gunfire took a do.zen lives before order was graduaL-

ly restored to the vilI age.28

Even before its implementation, General P€rez and the

Intendant of Ecuador suspected that the capitacidn would not

be well received. Consequently, they hrere prepared to modify

the law; ironicaLly, they issued new orders a few days before

the incident at Chirnbo. As a tenporary reform pending the

Liberator's approval, P€tez exempted rromen entirely frbm the

collection. He also adjusted the age linits to eighteen

through fifty years oLd. Despite these modifications, the

tax remained unusually unpopular and almost uncollectabl"e.29

qflilr

L94

The modifications directly answered the two most legitimate

criticisms of the capitacidn. The fact that resistance con-

tinued, often repeating the nolrr empty charges, demonstrated

that the poorer classes of citizens rdere resisting not only

the earLier provisions but the Larger shift of the tax burden

to their shoulders. In lbarra, the al,caldes assigned to

gather the revenues consistently resigned their office or

openly refused to fulfill their obLigations. By the end ofApril, the Intendant received word that the eoLlection was

"paralyzed." In early July, demonstrations against the tax

in Tabacundo and Cayambe required the nilitia to face streetcrowds once again. In Otavalo, the PoliticaL Justice report-ed an effective boycott by both Indians and whites and re-quested authority to use the nilitia to enforce collection.Reports from Quito and its attendant villages noted a lack ofcooperation by both races, .to the point that some comunities

were almost deserted as the men fled to the woods rather than

register to pay.. In Late June, Intendant Larrea reported to

the Secretary of the Treasury that 'ri.nvincible obstacles"

prevented the collection of the capitacidn which was viewed

as a 'rnotorious injusticet' by the connnon peopL..30

The S:apitacio/n never gained in popuLarity and remained

almost impossible to colLect. Throughout the year, officialsreported active and passive resistance. The Political Justice

of Latacunga observed that 200 years of tradition had forged

within uhe Indians and whites a sense of "a Law or llunicipal

t9s

d.ghtrr against such a form of financial burden, The movenent,

'pcruitment, and provisioning of troops aggravated the situa-nt"sn. One Political Justice noted that another reason why

utcizens did not register for the tax was a fear that they

mild be seized for military duty. Gapturing the sense ofrnilbaos growing in the south, the Politica]. Justice of Riobamba

ryorted to the Intendant that, t'the fanilies are exasperated;

M najor businesses are abandoned; the poor are suffocated

d,..everyone, everyone, is touched with the feeling of ge-

npal upheaval. "31

The one great hope toward which all of the citizens oftilb south Looked was that of a constitutional convention.

lbther to institute the Bolivian constitution, appoint the

lffiherator as dictator, create a nerv federal union or sinplym rdify some of the current legislation, the convention

r;pnared as a potential elixir to cure all ills. The author-

hcion for a convention rested with the Congress of L827.

lbing from llay through September, the Congress did, final-ly,ruborize a nationa]. constitutional convention to be held innda, New Granada, in March 1828. Prior to this decision,

rb Gongress also sanctioned'two acts which directly affected

tfll south and foreshadowed the politics of the Ocafia meeting.

llh lrte June, Congress annulled the Liberatorts exercise of

reaordinary faculties and declared a general amnesty to the

ffisus quo of April 1827. This effectively ended the author-

lffi of the Superior Chief of the South and, as noted, pro-

q!ffir

196

longed the confrontation at Guayaquil. Congress also approved

of Vice-President Santanderts reversal of Bol{varts effortsto suppress the three provinces of the south. 0n1y fivemonths from their disnantling, the provinces of Manab{, Chiur-

borazo, and Imbabura functioned once again, returning theirexpenses.to the burden of their departments. Some Local pol-

iticians wel-comed their return, as evidenced by a statement

from the municipaLity of lbarra to the executive office.Nevertheless, these actions underscored the tenuous nature ofthe government. They also highlighted a growing tension be-

tween the supporters of Bol{var and Santander that eventually

doomed the convention of Ocafia. Wtren the convention opened

its sessions on April 9, 1828, the southern departments, char-

acteristically,. were under-represented. Only three of the

allotted tvrenty-two delegates rrere in attendance. Calling

the attention of the assemb'ly to this fact, a representaEive

from Guayaquil requested'a further delay of deliberations.He was promptly ruled out of order. That inauspicious begin-

ning reflected the ultimate reLationship of the convention to

the south.33

The assenbl,ed politicians quickl-y fell into partisan

quarreling, dividing sharply between support for Bolfvar and

a centralist form of government, and that for Santander and a

federalist state. Even before these strains brought it to an

early demise, the convention was already an exercise in fu-tility for the south. General Flores, who influenced and

L97

often directed the prevailing opinions in those departments,

had dismj-ssed the value of the convention before it began.

Sensing, correctly, that the meeting would onLy become a par-

tisan struggle, Flores concluded in a letter to Bol{var,

rritten in late February, that the election of so many San-

tander delegates was a "public calamity." Tnro weeks later,he confided to Bol{var that he had no hope for the ouccome of

the convention. In April and May he repeated this therne.34

If General Flores felt confident of his predictions, itras because he was part of the reason for the convention's

demise. A supporter of the Liberator himself, he insured

that the el.ections in Guayaquil, Ecuador, and Azuay went only

to candidates favoring golivar, thus adding to the partisan

nature of the convention. On May 1, L828, Colonel" Ledn de

febrds Cordero presented a formaL representation to the con-

vention from the ttarmy of the south. rr The docunent condeunred

the deLegates for their capricious spirit of poLitics. Ituarned of the grave Lessons Learned frorn the past -- a thinlyveiled reference to federalisn -- and proclaiured support forthe Liberator. The message was predictable. It was signed

b5l General Flores and most of the officers in the southern

departments. .hlrj.tten by GeneraL Flores in early March, two

Dnths before its presentation, the representation dernonstrat-

cd that the GeneraL was conyinced very early of the futiJ-ityof the convention. More iuportantly, the representati-on r^ras

cvidenee of a new and almost autonomous politicaL eleuent,

qllllllu

198

the "army of the south.r' Ttre military LeadershiP of the south,

led by General Flores, perceiyed itself as an entity equal to,

if not yet separate fron, the governnent, accountable only to

the Liber"tot.35

The growth of the role of the military in all of the af-

fairs of the southern clepartments Lay behind this perception.

Ttre strength of General Flores' personal.ity and leadership

added to the growing militarism. In correspondence with Bo-

lfvar from February through M.y, 1828, Flores reflected his

own strong sense of the unity and unique identity of the mil-itary in the south. It is also clear that the General eonsid-

ered the urilitary of the south personaLly coruritted to his

Leadership. Therefore, without consideration for governmental

structure and coumrand, he could offer its support to the Lib-

erator as an ally in domestic political battles.36

On June 5, 1828, the Ocafia convention ended in failure.Fearing, correctly, that the more numerous Santander delegates

urcnld force a federalist refonr bil"l through the cornrention, the slpporters

of BoL{var abandoned the associaticnx. Ihey inchrded irr thei-r rarks all"

eigfrt of the southern delegates. I,rlith the ccnventicn dissolved, even tlte

pretense of negotiated reforzrs disappeared. Or June 13, the un-rricipality

of Bogot/ called a cabil4o abierto tdaich i-n ttrrn disavored the conventicn

and called rpon Bol{var to asstue personal c@nand of the gwenuent.3T

trftten n€rds of the nogotd declaration reactred Qnils, the reactiorraas slfift

and in ccrrylete accord. Ibcm July i0 *rrot€h July 24, 1828, Quito, G\nya-

quil, Ibarra, Clenca, Portoulejo, and loja alL issued pr:blic acts disavcry-

ing the convention and calling upon the Liberator to assume

L99

dlctatorial authority as,the Superior Chief of the nation.

!6e reaction was not as spontaneous as it appeared. Many mil-

:.tary and civil-ian official-s had labored toward this end

rince the pronouncenents of August L826. The Act of the Can-

mn of Daule was evidence of this. Siurilar to the other acts,

the Daule statement condernned the convention and called for

Uol{var to direct the nation, The Act of Daule, however, rtas

t"ssued on IIay 24, 1828,38

Ttre pronouncenents of L826 caLled for Bol{var to assume

dictatorial powers. They called for fiscaL refor:ns and a

constitutional convention. Those changes did occur. Unfor-

nnately, they brought not peace bur further turmoil to Gua-

yaquil, Ecuador, and Azuay. The invasion by the Third Divi-

trion, the popular resistance to the capitacidn, and the fail-"@e at Ocafia pLaced strains upon the southern deparcments

Ehat severely damaged their.ties to the central governnent.

&ese events permitted the growth of the role of the military,end of the leadership of General Flores. The foLlowing years

puld bring even further chalJ-enges, enhancing the leadership

of General Flores and, finally, casting him in the fole of

rtate-maker.

illliltillrl

CHAPTER 11

THE KNOT UNTIED: THE END OF GRAN COLOIIBIA AND THEEMERGENCE OT EI{E REPUBTIC OF ECUADOR ].828-1830

On August 27, L828, Simdn Bol{var forurally abolished the

Constitution of CJcuta and declared himself dictator of Colom-

bia. For the Southern Departments, this act fu1fiLled the

wishes expressed in their various pronouncements. The legit-irnacy of the legislature in Bogotd naa always been tenuous.

I^Iith little southern representation, congressional authority

appeared arbitrary and out of touch with the issues of con-

cern to the south. With a personal charisma that bound the

confidence of the southern leadership, the Liberator r,ras now

the undisputed syrrbol of the legitimacy of the state of Co-

lombia. Throughout 1828 and L829, the citizens of Ecuador,

Azuay, and Guayaquil experienced a series of reforms that

responded to their particular concerns. Ironically, the re-

forms underscored the distinct nature of the south. empha-

sized the widespread disenchantment ltith the dream of Gran Co-

Iombia. l

I,Ihil"e announcing his dictatorship in August, the Libera-

tor actually ruled the nation without a congress from Febru-

aty L828. At that time, he deelared the exercise of his ex-

traordinary faculties to cover first the Venezuelan provinces

and then aLl of the nation, exeept for the city of Ocafia.

200

20t

Following the deurise of the convention, Bol-{var waited untilthe majority of the Colombian clties echoed nogotJ to an-',nounce his new authority,

During the months from February through August, BoL/var

directl-y addressed some of the problems of the south. He au-

thorized the establishnent of a coepany in Quito to oversee

construction of the Esmeraldas road. Typically, the decree

promised tax privileges and grants of Land for devel-opment

h'ut these and other benefj.t,s could be realized only after the

road came into existence. The government offered no advance

@Dstruction funds" Addressing the issue of the high priceqf salt in the highlands, Bolivar offered the hope of poten-

t-ia1 relief, but litt1e iuunediate aid. A separate decree

IEruitted the free importation of saLt through Esnreraldas

'ddle upholding the current Guayaquil salt rnonopol-y as an es-

mtial source of income for the nilit'ary. Recognizing the

nd.despread opposition of the head tax, he finally abolished-"-t levy in late May. Shortly thereafter, he reversed

mtirer unpopular measure by ordering the reestablishnent of

d[,L ninor convents which had been suppressed by the Congress

rmf Gdcuta in 1821.

The Liberator also issued decrees designed to enhance

tlb general economy of the nation. Resorting again to ele-

rFEs of the coloniaL system, he reestabLished the aguardiente

rtpnly and reimposed the gedia anata and mesada eclesia'stico

tq@ioyment taxes. Debtors to the state rilere warned to settle

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202

their accounts or face the confiscation and aucti.on of theirgoods and property. Finally, rilary of the arrival of Spanish

troops in Cuba and the continuing hostility of the Peruvian

government, Bol{var ordered an increase in the standing anny

from L0,000 to 40,000 men.3

In addition to naming Bolfvar dictaror, the decree ofAugust 27 re<iesigned the administration of the govrirnment.

TVo councils norf, served to advise the Liberator-President.

The Council of ltlinisters, composed of the cabinet ministers

of Justice, War, Navy, Treasury, and Foreign Affairs, assumed

direct responsibility for the administration of the regirne.

The office of Vice-President was abolished. The President ofthe Council now fulfilled the executive duties during the Lib-

erator's illness or absense. In lieu of a congress, the

Council of State was designed to inform the Liberator of re-gional concerns. Conposed.of one representative from each

departuent, the council thus included three members from the

South. Bolfvar named two past Intendants of Quito, Jose/

i'Iodesto Larrea and Josd Felix Valdivieso, to represent Ecua-

dor and Azvay. He selected the ex-President of Guayaquil,

Josd Joaqufn de Olmedo, to represent that department. Pend-

ing Olnedo's return from overseas diplonatic duty, Mart/n

Santiago de Icaza served in his place. Both lcaza and Val-

divieso rrere present in Bogott after having participated inthe 0cafia conventior.4

On the regional- level, departmental Intendants $rere re-

Qp,

203

Dalled I'Prefects, " I change more of synbol than substance as

their duties remained identical. Later amendnents passed by

the Council of l'linisters further authorized the appointment

of t'Prefects GeneraL" who rrere empowered to exercise authority

over more than one departmenL and over other Prefects. Boli-yiar concluded his declaration with the promise of a future

constitutional convention. The Council of State later estab-

Lished the date of January 2, L830, for its convocation.

fil.ection of delegates was scheduled to occur in July L829.

In the final months of L828 Bol{var exercised hi-s new

othority by dictating three further changes for the South.

@e Supreme Court of Justice, which had virtually eeased tofrrrrctlon under the pressures of political turmoil and econom-

i.c hardship, uras reorganized as the Southern DisEriet Court

of Appeals with newly appointed officials and government prom-

t,ses of secure wages. Once again facing the Ecuadorian pro-

'mrcts over inf lated saLt prices, Bol{var ordered the Intend-

@s, now Prefects, to insure safe transportation of sal-t

:filnents and to exercise vigilance in prohibiting price

lryrng. In a move to satisfy both the requests of the land-

, ES of Ecuador and Azuay and to assist the ailing state

@Bsury, Bolfvar again turned altay from the fundamenraLs ofrffi 1821 constitution by restoring the systen of Indian trib-uln. All IndLans from eighteen through fifty years of age

r=r! arpected to pay a personal tax of three pesos, four

mles per year, collected in instatlments every June and

l

[4

'r-lllltill,

2A4

December. Aside from those pa)rments, Indians remained free

from all other national or local taxes and, theoretically,they couLd not be sumrarily drafted for nilitary "ervice.6

The preceding reforns did not comand the Liberatorrscomplete attention. He aLso faced problems in Peru where the

government, now led by General La Mar, continued its hostil-ity toward Golombia. Following the debacle of the Third Di-vision, Peruvian leaders began their or"rn designs to capital-ize upon Colombia's dclmestic weakness in order to annex Gua-

yaquil and possibly all of the Southern Departments. The Re-

public of Bolivia also antagonized the leaders in Lima. They

condemned the fledgling nation as dn artificial state created

by the infamous Bol{var and Ied by General Antonio Josd de

Sucre as an effort to contain Peru.7

In November of L827 General FLores reported to Bol{var

that the Peruvians were arresting Bolivian and Colombian of-ficials in Lima and Callao. in addition, over 1,000 Peruvian

troops !ilere being moved to the port of Piura near the CoLom-

bian border. General Flores reacted sharply to the Peruvian

actions and proposed that he be given permission to invade.

Although he did not recei-ve the Liberator's sanction to ad-

vance, Flores anxiously anticipated a war and began prepara-

tions to recruit men and suppLies.S

Relations between the two nations continued to deterio-rate throughout the first half of 1828. Ttre Colombian govern-

nent protested Peruvian aid given to the Third Division. It

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grotested the uiltarranted expulsion of Colonbian public agents

from Peru and the inprisolrment of some Col-ombian citizens.Peru had also failed to begin paynent on its debt to Colombia

for the aurciliary forces that aided its independence. Colom-

bia also condemned the massing of Peruvian troops on the bor-

der of Azuay. In February, a Peruvi.an diplomat, Jose'Villa,srived in Bogota'ostensibLy to answer these chatges, How-

{rer, during his four Bonth stay in the capit,al, Villa of-firred only elaborate stateuents which avoided or denied the

rGolombian accusatior," . 9

In the South. General Flores continued to favor an in-qesion of Piura before Peru could increase the nuurber of

Eroops there. He also suggested that General Sucre, now the

Eresident of Bolivia, coordinate an attack on Peruts eastern

[hrrder to assure victory. On April 18 Flores issued a public

UEonouncement condemning the Peruvians for their ingratitude.

& promised that the Liberator would t"avel to the South to

Erstigace them and defend the national hooot.10

Ironically, on the same day that Flores issued his pro-

l@mcement, another \ras proclaimed in Bolivia when .a barracks

ubellion required General Sucrets presence. Under the pre-

tqt of Liberating the Upper Peruvians from Bolivarian-im-

illed tyramty the Peruvian General Agustin Gamarra used the bar-

rmls revolt as his opportunity to invade Bolivia. In the

nfocess of suppressing the skirmish, General Sucre's rightrr ras seriously vrounded and subsequentl-y required amputa-

It

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206

tion. With Sucre abseot from conqand, his council of govern-

ment failed to halt the invaders. The capitulation which

soon followed included Sucrets resignation and departure forGuayaquil.1l

BoLstered by this success, the Peruvian eongress con-

vrened in lby and authorized the conscription of more men and mon-

ey to invade Colombia. President La Mar was comnissioned to

accompany another detachment of troops sent to Piura and to

personally lead the advar,"..12 In Bogotd, Bol{var responded

to Peruts obvious hostil.ity. On JuLy 20, 1828, he issued aformal declaration of war against Peru" Well aware that Co-

lombia was ill-prepared economically and politically to sus-

tain a rnajor confrontation, Bolfvar avoided the bombastic

language typical of such documents. Almost apologetic, the

decree proclaimed:

The government of Colombia undertakes this waragainst its will: it does not wish a victorybathed in Americarr blood; it will avoid combatas long as it is possible, and it wiLl alwaysbe ready to hear propositions of peace compati;ble with the honor and decornn of the nation.rf

Bolivar followed this declaration by conrmissioning his aide,

Colonel Daniel F, O'Leary, to serve as his personal'envoy to

Peru, Bolivar instructed Otleary to negotiate a suspension

of hostilities and begin preliminary peace negotiatioo".14

0n Septeuber 14, General Flores and General Illingrotmet with Colone1 O'Leary and decided that in spite of the

above incident, Otleary must continue his trip to Lima.

207

Flores hoped to gain precious time to prepare for battLe.

His forces rrere ilI-prepared for war. In addition, 1ittLesentiment for further hostilities existed in the South. De-

scribing their situation to Bolfvar, General" Illingrot admit-

ted that while the officers rrere eager to demonstrate theirability, the landovrners, professionals, and almost ai.I class-

es of people in the South wanted to avoid another r.t.16In the midst of the turmoil of pronouncements, decrees,

dietatorship, and declaraLions of war, life in the South be-

came increasingly precarious. Resistance to the head taxcontinued unabated throughout the first half of 1828, Reports

from Ibarra to Cuenca complained that the levy was irnpossible

to collect. Indians and whites alike fled their villages toavoid payment. I{hen they did not leave, they intimidated rhe

collectors with knives and clubs. Ultimately, the uriliuiacontinued to resolve the latter confrontations. Even when

the government agents arrested resisters, che problems re-inained. The giotiticaL.jqdge of Tr.mbaco reported, typical-ly, thatthe LocaL jaiL was fulL of those refusing to pay, and thatwhen their goods rrere presented at auct,ion to cover theirdebts, Do one would offer a bid. Local officials g1adLy com-

plied with the execuEive decree ending the tax.17

The various pronouncements from BogotJ offered some hope

but littLe imediate relief for the ilLs of the Sourh. The

establishment of the Esmeraldas company drew a note of thanks

frou its new director but the coupany and the road remained

"T

208

but a dream. The reestablishment of the ninor conyents re-

furbished the image of the Liberator, if not the government,

as a defender of the faith. Aside from sone question as to

the status of the Colegio in lbarra, housed in an old monas-

tery, the convents quietly returned to church control. The

return to Indian tribute promised to add an eLement of finan-

cial stability to the highland economy, but its implementa-

tion remained almost a year avray. Ttre emplolment taxes also

faiLed to provide real assistance to the treasury. Most em-

ployees of the state received only a small portion of any oftheir monthly wages. Military salaries comnanded the firstpriority for paylrent and even those were more in arrears than

nor.18

Reports from department lntendants unifornly despaited

over the economic crisis in their midst. Ecuador and Azuay,

although potentially abundant in agriculturaL goods, lacked

the markets, manpower, and money for a healthy economy.

General Flores complained to the tiberator that the serious

lack of specie in circulation not only undermined civilianenterprise but seriousLy dininished the tax revenues and made

it difficult to provide wages and essential materials for the

army. In Guayaquil the revenues fron cacao sales declined

precipitously. In addition to the disruptions caused by the

invasion of the Third Division and hostilites with Peru, Ehe

province suffered from unusually harsh weather, General Il-llngrot reported cacao exports at onl"y one quarter of their

i

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209

normal levels.19

The l-ack of coinage prevented the owners of, the textilefactories from fulfilling military contracts for uniforns and

bLankets. The provinciaL junta of Pichincha petitioned the

Liberator to establish a mint in Quito to preserve their 1o-

cal industry. Producers could not afford to pay rrages or

purchase supplies. Contractors Lacked the funds to pay forthe clothes that lvere available. Faced with demands beyond

their means, Local officials often found themseLves caught inadministrative struggles over the lirnited funds that did

exist. In March L828 the Intendant of Ecuador ordered the

political judge of Otavalo to transfer whatever cagttacidn

funds he had to the Quito treasury. The Governor of Imbabura

inrurediately countermanded the order, instructing the local

official to send the funds to lbarra. Following the exchange

of harshly worded notes, the matter nas sent to the Minister

of Finance to be decided. Ultimately, the Intendant received

a sharp rebuke for his actions. In the interim, the funds

were confiscated by the coumanding officer of a battal-ion, inorder that he night pay his troopr.2o

The leadership of the Arrny of the South continued to dom-

inate the administration of the Southern DepartmenLs. A11

of the Intendants were military men: General Juan ll"lingrotin Guayaquil.. GeneraL Vicente Gonz{Lez in Azuay, and Colonel

Ignacio Torres in Ecuador. AlL of these officers Looked fordirection in both clvilian and niLitary affairs from GeneraL

iiII

)

i,

ll

i!

."[

2L0

Juan .losd Flores, the Conuranding General of the Arrry of the

South. General Flores, in turn, looked excusiveLy to Bol/-2Lvar.

The civilian leaders of Quito, Guayaqui.l, and Cuenca al-so acknowledged the Liberator as the ultimate source of

authority throughout the South, but the strains of the econ-

omy and war threaLened to damage even that relationship.

Writing to Bol/var with encouraging words for the dictator-ship, JosdModesto Larrea continued to warn hiur of "the grave

fault that Lhose charges with the cornnrand of the South are

counritting when, upon requiring ordinary or extraordinary re-

sources from the people, they threaten them with the person

of Your Excellency and not with the punishments that the laws

impose ."22

From Ibarra, Otavalo, Quito, and Ambato, citizens com-

plained of soldiers confiscating their livestock and agricul-

tural goods. As the various coumuniti-es faced the burden of

supplying the many battalions and sguadrons in transit, theirresources dininished. Eventually, the next unit to arrive

found even the basLc requests for salt and potatoes. unavaila-

ble. Citizens also feared forced recruitment. The Provin-

cial Junta of Plchl.neba .trsrrtce lodged for:ural Protests with the

Intendant that men with farnilies, Protected Indians, and even

personal servants !,rere being forced to serve in. the ranks.

Nunerous protests of threatening behavior along with the de-

stnrction of property were also recorded. The rector of the

2ttCentral University in Quito complained that an artiLlerybattalion demolished the wall of a classroom in order toclaim the space for extra barracks.23

On September 19, L828, another voice of caution was

heard in the South. On that date, General Sucre arrived at

Guayaquil. FolLowing his return journey to Quito, Sucre re-ported to Bolivar that the preparations for war were produc-

ing a "general disgust" with the rnilitary authorities and

threatened to further undernine local allegianee to Colombia:

These people retain respect and admiration for you;-they greatLy respect the authority you exercise,but if in the place of benefits they only suffercontinuously more exacting and violbnt dbmands, wewilL yet l-ose the hope th-t^you wiLl be rhe knorthat ties them to ColombLa.z4

General Sucre even found hinself the victim of these

abuses. Wtrile in Guayaquil, Sucre discovered that some live-stock from his wife's hacienda had been confiscated by localmilitary officials as payme.nt for part of a general contribu-tion ordered by General- Flores. Once in Quito, Sucre protest-ed to the Intendant that the action \f,as unwarranted and vio-lated the sanctity of property guaranteed by Colourbian law.

He vowed to take whatever steps rf,ere necessary to protect hisproperty from future unjust

"ei"rrre".25GeneraL Flores reacted sharpl.y to these remarks. Pre-

senting his corrplaints to the Liberator, Flores argued thatthe state of war clearLy peruritted such extraordinary measures.

Flores protested that sucre was using the issue to challenge

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Fl-ores' authority in the South. Using such terxqs as I'public

f.iberties," finviolability of Propert|," and the nrights of

citizens,rr Sucre denonstrated, in General Flores' opinion, a

"crioinal egoism" that was encouraging the landowners of Qui-

to to resist many of the necessary Deasures to supply the25army.

In his appeal to Ehe Liberator, Sucre denied Flores'

charges. His principal concern nas that of honor and respect

for his family. Sucre noted that he had already ceded aLl ofhis wages to the national treasury and had never withheld

funds for a required contribution, Final-ly, far fron desj.r-

ing to replace Flores, Sucre wished to retire from publicservice. Demonstrating this resolve, Sucre decided to pla-cate General Flores' fears. Foll-owing a quixotic offer by

Flores to depart, for Europe if no accouodation could be

reached, Sucre invited the General to his home. There Sucre

pledged his support to Flores and, more importantly, assured

him that he had no desire to lead the army or serve as a

Superior Chief for the South.27

In the midst of this conttoversl, word arrived in Quito

of two dramatic events. The first rrotice, from Bogotd, an-

nounced that the vital link to the CoLombian nation was al-most broken on September 25, L828. Ttrat evening as BoL/var

lay sleeping, a band of assassins attempted to take his life.Alerted at the last monent, the Liberator managed to escape

unharmed, The conspirators were ultiuafely apprehended.

2L3

Included among their ranks was the ex-Vice-President Francisco

de Pau1a Santander, who was charged with aiding in the pLan-

ning of the attempt, As dramatic as this event rras, its iur-

pact in the South was minimal-. hlord of the assassination

atLempt arrived in conjunction with assurances of Bol{var'ssafety. 28

Of more iurnrediate concern was news from Guayaquil thatthe city was under attack. On the afternoon of Novembet 22

the Peruvian fleet, under the command of AdrniraL Jorge Guisse,

entered the harbor and proceeded to bombard the city. The

attack continued from sunrise to sunset the following day.

At daybreak on llovember 24 the Admiral accompanied the

shelling with an attexilpt to land his troops at the city'smain docks. General lllingrot, cosunanding the defense, antlc-ipated the move and was able to repuLse the Launches.

Illingrot again gained an advantage when lucky shot from a

shore battery hit the Peruvian flag ship and mortally wounded

Admiral Guisse. The fleet ended the bombardment but continued

to threaten the por:t.zg

I,Ihile General Illingrot and the few forces at.his com-

mand prevented the irnmediate invasion of Guayaquil, their sit-uation remained grave. In the following weeks, the Peruvian

forces and their s)rlpathizers gained control of a number oftordns along the river thus cutti-ng coumuni-cations with Ecuador

and Azuay and removing the hope for mil.itary reinforcements.

Facing the threat of encircLement and a resrrnrption of bombard-

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2L4

ment, General Illingrot agreed to the terms of a conditional

surrender on January 19, L829. In Late December, General La

Mar had foLlowed the action of the Peruyian fl-eet by invading

the department of Azuay and occupying the city of Loja. Both

sides at Guayaquil awaited nelrs of the success or failure of

La Mar's advance. By the te:ms of the conditional surrender,

if within ten days no word arri.ved on the outcome of a battl-e

in Azuay, Guayaquil would be evacuated. 0n February 4, Gen-

eral Illingrot and his forces officially relinquished control

of the clty to Peruvian officials. They then retreated up

river to the town of Dau1e.30

In Quito, General Sucre uraintained his assurances to

Flores that he did not wish to comnand the army of the South.

hlhen word arrived in earLy November that Bol/var had indeed

named Sucre Superior Chief of the South with full authorityto negotiate with the Peruvians, Sucre refused the appoint-

ment. Following the invasion of Azuay, Sucre then reversed

his decision with the encouragement of General FLores. Aware

of the increasingly poLitical dimensions of military cormland,

Sucre again assured Flores thaE, he had no desire to vie forthe loyalty of the officer corp., Wtrile directing the general

strategy, Sucre allowed Flores the prominent role in the

field. 31

At the time of the evacuation of Guayaquil-, the opposing

armies of La Mar and Sucre were maneuvering for position on

the plains of Tarqui just south of Cuenca. Following an

2L5

abortive attenpt by Sucre to oPen negotiations., the two

forces finalLy clashed on Februaxy 27, L829. ALthough the

Peruvian arny of 8,000 outnuobered the 5,000 Colmbians,

Lheir advantage in numbers was offset by a failure in leader-

ship. The Peruvian army suffered a crushing defe4t. Nearly

one half of the ranks were killed, wounded, or taken prisoner.

The List of captives included General La Mar and his staff.32On the folLowing day, General Sucre dictated the ter:sls

of a moderate peace treaty. Rather than inposing a settle-ment of the issues of the cormlon boundary and the Peruvian

debt to Colombia, the treaty called for future joint comris-

sions to reach those decisions. Basically, the treaty sinply

calLed for the removal of all Peruvian troops from Colombian

soil within twenty days. General La l[ar had littLe choice

but to accept the document and to comply with its terms. By

mid-I'Iarch, the reunants of the Peruvian army departed from

the territory of Azuay returning to the port of Piura in Peru.

Nevertheless, the hosti!.ites rilere not yet orr"t.33

Huniliated by his defeat, General La Mar requested fresh

troops from Lima and ordered the conrranding officer at Guaya-

quil to retain control of the port. In the following three

months, La Mar continually charged that the Colombians \f,ere

violating various points of the treaty and mistreating Peru-

vian prisoners, thus justifying his dispatch of more troops

to Guayaqrril.34 The continued occupation of Guayaquil proved

counter-productive to Peruvian interests. The initial born-

2L6

bardment of the city had shocked the citizenry and disilLu-sioneti many Peruvian supporters. As General Flores marreuvered

his forces in preparation to retake the city, the Peruvian

conrmander demanded forced loans from the populace and threat-

ened to bring further destruction to Guayaquil-. As the sup-

plies in the city grew scarce and as tensions increased,

treatment of the citizens greril harsh. Many of the Leading

citizens rilere jailed under the suspicion of conspiracy.

General Flores.reported that the Peruvians were rapidlylosing support, that they were being openly condemned in the

streets, and that he was receiving daily appeals from various

citizens to liberate the "ity.35The impasse \'.7as finally broken in mid-June when word

arrived of a change in government in Lima. Weary of General

La Mar's futile and costl-y policies against Colourbia, General'

Gamarra and LaFuente ousted. him from the Presidency. With a

ehange in the officer corps in Guayaguil, the new administra-

tion opened negotiations to evacuate the city. On July 10,

L829, 8rl agreenent was reached. Eleven days later, the Peru-

vians withdrew, and General Florest troops entered Guayaquil.35

In addition t.o the usual hardships, the war proved sig-

nificant to the South in three ways. The defeat of Peru

eliminated the threat of invasion and secured the border of

Azuay. The bombardnent and occupation of Guayaquil- ended

the remaining support in that city for annexation to Peru.

Finally, the hostilities and General Sucrers initiaL refusal

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2L7

to serve as Superior Chief focused Bol/varfs attention on the

South and prompted his arrival in Quito on llareh J-7, 1829.37

The Liberator arrived in the South prirnarily to oversee

the course of the war and to take a personal role in deter-

mining the terms of a peace treaty. Once in Quito, he aLso

resolved to use his authority to cure the uryriad of ilIsaffecting the three departnents. Voicing an unwarranted op-

timisro, Bolfvar assured his ministers that he expected to

reLurn to the eapitaL within five or six weeks, Ultimately,it was seven months before Bol{var crossed the Charchi River

in route to Bogot i.38As he waited for the Colombian forces to close in on Gua-

yaquil, Bolfvar turned to his domestic tasks. Ordering a

general review of a1l- outstanding debts to the state, the Lib-

erator warned property o$rners to meet their obligations or

face the confiscation and auction of their goods and land.

To alleviate the problems created by the lack of specie incirculation, foreign coi.nage could now be used for all pur-

chases, conLracts, and payments. To facilitate the eollec-

tion of Indian tribuce, Bolivar turned once again to the

colonial system reestablishing the office of corregidor, r€-

sponsible for the control of Indian labor and taxes. Finally,before departing for Guayaquil- and turning his attention tomilitary affairs, Bol/var authorized and instaLl-ed a Provi-

sional Junta of the District to advise hirn upon furthertrforrn".39

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The DistrLct Junta met from mid-April ttrrough Late July

1828. Composed of two representatives from each province and

assigned the task of dealing excusiveLy hxith the problems of

the South, the Junta in effect became a separate Southern

congress Lacking onLy the independent authorLty to legislate.The Junta confined its discussions t.o the economic iLLs ofthe regi6n. In particular, the del-egates condenned the hann-

ful effects of Colombiars free trade laws. Representatives

of the highlands continued to point out that the easy impor-

tation of foreign cloth undermined the hope of a revival ofthe textile industry in Ecuador and Azuay. Many agriculturalgoods, abundant in Azuay, rrere also cheaper to inport than totransport to the coast, In the midst of the hardship of a

poor cacao crop, the representatives of Guayaquil joined

those fron the highland in criticisms of the CoLombian policyof free trade. In addition to a poor harvest, the gror,rers

faced the obstacle of prohibitive tariffs placed on theirproduet by Bngland and Holland, llithout the leverage of

reciprocal measures, the Guayaqui} grorilets and their conmer-

cial agents remained defenseless. In addition, the fLow of

unregulated foreign trade drained almost all of the gold and

silver coinage from the departnents, and this in turn created

another problem. Property ordners facing reguLar censos loan

pa)tnents lacked the currency to fulfill their obligations.

The Junta requested refornn of the censos system to per:urit

payments in kind. With the representatives of Guayaguil

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joining their Quito and Cuenca counterparts, the Junta also

requested the prohibition of further importation of foreigncloth.4o

The deLegates of the District Junta received significantsupport from General Sucre. Al-though a native of Venezuela,

Sucre adopted Quito as his home, the General had married a

quitefia and established close ties with the Aguirre family inQuito and the Roca fanily in Guayaquil. He exhibited a ma-

ture understanding of the economic difficulties facing the

South. He also understood the poLitical ramifications ofeconomic policy. soon after his return to Quito, sucre dem-

onstrated this insight. writing to Bol{var, sucre advised hiur

to abandon the theories of free trade and particularly to end

the importation of foreign cloth. In addition to the harm

done to the economies of Ecuador and Azuay, Sucre warned the

Liberator of the politicaL consequences: "As personar preser-

vation ls the first obLigation of uan, they (the citizens ofthe South) have an indisputable right to separate from a

government that threatens to destroy them."41

Sucre repeated his assertions on behalf of the Junta.

Reporting to Colonel O'Leary the substance of his advice tothe Liberator, Sucre condemned the use of foreign economic

theories as counterproductive:

It is crazy to wish to subject these unhappy peopleto the chimerical essays of these books; everyoneknows thar, for as weLi as they are vrriiten, lteirpractice, has ruined Colombia. It is one thing tomodify the harsh col.onial taxes and laws and inother

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to give protection to the introduction of foreign.gooti agiinsi the best interests of the countryl4?

Responding to the requests of the Junta and General

Sucrets advice, Bol{var finally issued a decree prohibiting

the irnportation of forei.gn cloth into the Sorrth. He also de-

creed that for the foLlowing decade, interest on loans could

be paid in produce rather than in specie. In addition tomeeting these specific requests, Bolivar issued further re-

forms. Unminted gold could circulate for currency at the ex-

change rate of seventeen pesos per ounce. The city of Loja

received permission to conduct another annual trade fair.Answering the requests of the GuayaquiL merchants, Bol{var

authorized the creation of an expanded commerciaL tribunalwith jurisdiction over the entire district to regulate trade

and serve as a conrnercial court of appea1".43

These decrees foLlowed within a month after the DistrictJunta ended its meetings. .Undoubtedly the deLegates were

pleased to see their major requests fulfilled, but the meet-

ing i-tself had ended on a discordant note which reflected the

increasingly arbitrary nature of the government, Following

the close of its sessions, many representati.ves confided to

General Sucre that they \rere disillusioned by the experience.

After lengthy debates on various projects, the members often

found that the response of the Liberatorfs Secretary to theirpresentations was a casual assurance that everything was

being attended to and that proper action would be taken in

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due course. Such bureacratic defleetion lilas exPected from

the past Congress and admini.stration in Bogot/, but not from

the Liberatorrs Secretary, especiaLLy when the slmboL of au-

thority was so close at hand. The delegates aLso discovered

that the arbitrary nature of the dictatorship could work

against them. In one instance, following lengthy debates

which concluded with the Junta requesting Bol,ivar to secular-

ize the Franciscan Colegio, the representatives were shocked

to find their work sr:umarily dismissed when informed thatBoLivar had already granted an audience to the Franciscans

and promised to protect their ptop.rty.44

As soon as the Junta disbanded, the Liberator called forthe delegates to reassemble. General Torres, the Prefect ofEcuador, had resigned his position due to ill health. With

tire occupation of Guayaquil and Torredl: resignation, the Pre-

fectures of Ecuador and Guayaquil were open for nominations.

The Junta reconnended Guillermo Valdivieso or Manuel Matheu

for Ecuador and Josd Joaqu{n de Olmedo or Mart/n de Tcaza forGuayaquil, A11 four rrrere civilians, native sons, and from

important families. Once again the delegates faced delay and

disappointment. Wtren the appointments rirrere announced, none

of those reconmended were chosen. Colonel Josd ll,ar{a Sdenz

becane the Prefect and Couranding General of both Ecuador and

Azvay. General Ledn Febrds de Cordero became the prefect and

Cormanding General of Guayaquil, and General Flores rilas named

the Prefect General of the South.45

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On July 1, L829, another representative body gathered in

Quito. Conforming to the electoral laws decreed by the Coun-

cil of Ministers, electoral assemblies met in Quito, Guaya-

guil, and Cuenea to select representatives for a constitu-

ti.onal convention scheduled for January 1"830. The selection

of delegates proceeded without probLems and both Flores and

Sucre assured BoLfvar that those chosen lrere loyal subjects.

That loyalty was reserved for the Liberator. Thus, when itappeared that the peace negotiations in Guayaguil could

prevenL his return to Bogotd for the convention, most of the

delegates Lost any enthusiasm for their mission. In a series

of letters to Bol{var, Josd Modesto Larrea argued that the

convention would be meaningless without the presence and

sanction of the Liberator. Reflecting a srnal-l d.egree offlattery and a larger degree of poLiticaL reality, Larrea

lamented: "It is not from the Congress that we ought to hope

for the organLzati.on of the Republic, but from Your Excel-

lency, who should draw the course that the Representatives ofthe Nation ought to folLow in this terribLe storm."45

The Liberator responded to that concern in a ful1-y un-

expected manner. On August 31 he issued a decree calLing forthe electoral assemblies co return for a special session inorder to issue specific instructions to their convention

delegates. The order rilas not welL received in Quito. Gen-

eraL Sucre and Larrea both complained that the delegates now

felt completely useless and discouraged, Without the freedom

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to act independently, many delegates Proposed abandoning

their trip in favor of mailing the instructions to Bogot/.

Josd llodesto Larrea, the president of the el"ectoral assembl-y,

resigned the office rather than issue the recaLl notice.

General Sucre agreed that the decree rdas a disappointment and

confided to ColoneL O'Leary that, "the Liberator has added a

terrible uistake to our calamiti.s."47

Explaining this negative reaction to Bol{var, Sucre re-ported that the crder for instructions was seen as an invita-tion for politicaL chaos. Many considered it a strategy tocontinue the dictatorship. The pronouncements of 1825 and

1828 called for a dictatorship to serve as an interim mecha-

nism to establish order which would then allow for a major

restructuring of government. The prospect of an unlirnited

dictatorship promised only continued uncertainty. For many

citizens, this called into.question their loyalty to the

Liberator, Warning Bolfvar of this undercurrent, General

Sucre depicted the possible consequences of his deeree:

You must see that this beginning of a lack ofrespect for the person that forms the tie ofunion for Colombia is, in this circumstance,a positive evil that canpgt be offset by any-thing the assemblies do.ao

tlhiLe Sucre and Larrea anguished over the recall of the

assemblies, GeneraL Fl-ores in Guayaquil calmly assured Bol{-

var that he would die with sword in hand defending the glory

of the Liberator. Once the assemblies met, Flores demon-

strated this comrittment. In late September and early

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Novenber, the assemblies of Manab{ and Guayaquil issued theirinstructions. Both documents condemned frequent elections,

turbulent political factions, and "popular disorder.rr tlhilecasually referring to the separation of powers and to a vague

concept of 'rnational representation, " the instructions ca1led

for a permanent senate and a monarchical for-n of governnent

with Bolfvar as king. Flores proudly reported to the Liber-

ator that he had written most of the Guayaquil d."r"".49The asseurbly of Pichincha province, in Quito, issued its

instructions in mi<i-October. In contrast to those of Guaya-

quil, the quitefrog called for a liberal republican state with

equally divided pohrers and regular elections. Sti1l the com-

mon link, the Liberator received unanimous support to exer-

cise executive authority.50

In earLy November 1829 Bolfvar crossed the Carchi River

which separated the Southern District from the ancient juris-diction of New Granada, He was followed a week later by

General Sucre who led the Southern delegation to the consti-

tutional convention. With the war behind him, and having

decreed reforms for the South, BoL/var left a distrLct pre-

pared for independence. The victory over Peru left a confi-

dent military comand which eontrolled the domestic affairsof the South, The reforms granted virtual adsrinistrative

autonomy to the South and tied it to Colombia only by the

person of the Liberator. The faiLure of the Ocafia convention

and the ensulng dictatorship dissol-ved any remaini.ng faith in

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the ability of a Colombian congress to deal effectivel-y withthe Southrs particul-ar problems. The years of war and sacrl-fice without a compensating sense of political order prevent-

ed the establishuent of a truly Colombian nationaL idencityin the South. The citizens of the South considered them-

selves as sonething apart from "the Colombianst'whonn they

identified as anyone coming from north of the Carchi River.SlSoon after his return to Quito, GeneraL sucre lamented

in a letter to Bol{var that, t'it is certain and well known

that there is no enthusiasm [anal that the spirit for Co].om-

bia is extinguished"" During the war, captured docr.rsrents in-dicated that GeneraL La Mar was planning to follow up the in-vasion of the Soutir by calling a congress in Quito to estab-

lish a client state to be designated the Republic of Ecuador.

The docr.ments indicated that many citizens of Loj a responded

favorably to the propo"rl.52

General Sucrefs military expertise insured the futilityof those designs. Nevertheless, Sucre felt pessimistic about

the fate of the Sourthern departments. In late t.lay 1829 he

confided to Colonel O'Leary:

I very much fear the dissolution of the Republicand a.s I have calculated for guite awhile ifthere is no syslem of grder and guarantees; EheSouth is Lost, I eitherJ by forming itsg[f into afederated state, o! becoming Peruvian.)J

Generals ILlingrot and Flores also acknowledged a perva-

sive sense of uncertainty about the future of the South.

I{riting to Colonel OrLeary, General lll-ingrot expressed the

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fear that once the peace treaty was signed and the Liberator

departed for BogotJ, the factions in the army night provoke

chaos in the Southern Departmeot".54 As if to confirn ll,tin-grotrs concern, General- FLores !ilrote to the Liberator that itwould be impossible for the army to support any other indi-vidual in the Presi-den"y.55

Flores r,ras aware that Bol/var fel-t weary of the burdens

of public office and planned on resigning the Presidency.

Over the years, the Liberator often had ceremoniously ten-

dered his resignation. Noiv in poor health and disillusionedwith politics, he coumitted himself to the decision. At the

opening of the constitutional convention on January 20, 1830,

Bol{var announced his retirement. The delegates then pre-

vailed upon hirn to re.main in office until the signing of the

ner,r constitution, His health continued to decline, however,

and on l{arch t he retired to a country estate outside of Bo-

gotd. General Domingo Caicedo, the President of the Council

of liinisters then attended to the affairs of the government,

On April 29, the convention sanctioned a new constitution forGran Colombia, Bolivar remained firm in his decision to re-

sign. A week later the new congress elected Joaqrrin Mosquera

for President and chose Domingo Caicedo Vice-President of

Colombia. On May 8, Bolfvar departed Bogoti with plans to

retire in Europ".56

As the Liberator began his journey, it was already clear

that the CoLombian union had come to an end. Even before he

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announced his reti.renent, the Venezuelans declared theirdeparture from the state. The August decree recal-ling the

electoraL assemblies reached Venezuela in mid-November 1829

and provided those leaders their opportunity to secede, Soon

thereafter, Puerto CabeLlo, Valencia, and Caracas called forVenezuelan independence. On January L3, 1830, General Josen

Antonio Ptez officially decreed the separation of Venezuela

from Colombia and calLed a future congress to establish the

new sEat ".57

As word of the events of Caracas and trogotd reaehed Qui-to and Guayaquil, the fragile ties binding the South to Colom-

bia quickly became unraveled. There was l-ittle support forthe new eonstitution particularly without the Liberator atits heLrn. General Flores reflected this disdain when he ex-

plained his personal reaction to the constitution in a letterto Bol{var:

I am liberal by charadter and sentiment; but I amnot a friend of the masses nor of license.... Ifear what the legislature will give to the Sourh,because they are going to introduce J-icense, dis-order,

"nd ievotufionl all in the name of ttre Law.58

In fact, one of the first. actions of the new administration

rf,as the suspension of the office of Prefect General. In nid-ApriL, President-elect Mosquera, then visiting Popaya/n, in-formed Vice-President Caicedo of rumors that General Flores

lras preparing to separate the South from Colonbia. Soon

thereafter Caicedo decreed the end of the Prefects General

and issued a series of appointments replacing the military

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governors and Prefects in the South with civilian oorir""".59Ttre scheduled changes never took effect. On AIay L2, the

Procurador General of the Quito municipality initiated a

carefull.y designed movement to announce the independence ofthe South. The municipality requested the Prefect of Ecuador

to call a cabildo abierto to discuss the events in the North.

Ttre Prefect, Colonel Sa'enz, and members of the cabildo then

visited General Flores who was resting at his hacienda out-

side of the city. Receiving the General's assurances that he

would not oppose the citizens of Ecuador freely stating theiropinions, the municipality and Prefect scheduLed a publie

meeting for the following day. On May 13, 1830, the congre-

gated public officials, churchmen, and corporate and famiLy

representatives declared the Southern District a free and

independent state under the civil and mil-itary leadership ofGeneral Juan Jose'Flores. Within trdo weeks, Guayaquil, Cuen-

cB, and the other comunities of the South sanctioned the50Quito decree.*

From August l-0 through Septenber 28, 1830, delegates to

the first constitutional convention of the Republ,ic of Ecua-

dor created a basic charter for the new state. Copying the

republ,ican format of the decreased Colombian confederation,

the delegates sanctioned a president, a unicamerai congress

and a judiciary, The District of the South becane the "Stateof Ecuador'r composed qf the departments of Azvay, Guayas, and

Quito within the territorial limits of the "ancient kingdom

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of Quito." The city of Quito became rrirrevocably and always"

the capital of the nation. A11 of the decrees and special

Legislation issued by past congresses and the Liberator were

incorporated into Ecuadorlan law.

The deLegates aLso proclaimed Bolfvar the protector of

the new nation and decLared that Ecuador was willing to con-

federate with New Granada and Venezuela in some loose associa-

tion which nright retain the name of Colombia. Ttrese propos-

a1s, however, rf,ere siurply final gestures of respect to Bolf-var and his now vanished dream of Gran Coiourbia.6l In earlyllovember 1830 Bol{var lrrote to General Flores. He offeredFlores a word of advice whiLe acknowledging Ecuador's inde-pendence:

GaLl forth the will of the South and fulfill theirwishes. Those people are in possession of theirsovereignty and they can make of it a co?rse clothor a fine tunic, whichever they p1ease.62

The Liberator did not survive to witness the preference ofthe Ecuadorians. Simdn Bol{var died on December 1-7, 1830 inthe Colombian coastal town of Santa Marta. Ihe ensuing years

for the Republic of Ecuador encompassed all of the turnoilinherent in a young nation. The heritage of Gran Colombia

added to some of that turmoil- but in a larger sense, the era

of Gran Colombia wove an incomparable quality into the fabricof Ecuadorian history.

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CHAPTER 12

CONCLUSION

The history of Ecuador under Gran Colombia is nore than

an account of the reasons for the failure of Bol{varrs dream

of a confederated Latin Arnerica, The events of 1820 to 1830

do demonstrate the difficulties of statemaking in the earlypost-colonial years. The obstacles of regionalism, Iocalism,

and legitimacy did combine to weaken the regime of Gran Colom-

bia, but at the same time these elements also aided in the

fo:mation of an incipient Ecuadorian .nationalism

In his famous Jarnaica letter, Bolt'var did not acknowl-

edge the audiencia of Quito as a district region of South

America. This was in keeping with the Liberator's dete::urina-

tion to use the boundaries of the Viceroyalty of New Granada

to establish the borders of the Colombian republic, Never-

theless, the geography, population, and economy of the audien-

cia distinguished that area from New Granada and Venezuela"

Despite the Liberator's inltial oversight, that distinctionwas reeognized from the very beginning of Gran CoLombia. The

Fundamental Law, the Constitution of Angostura, and the Cons-

titution of Cricuta all- acknowledgeci the audiencia as a land

and people distinguishable from the rest of the nation.Following his entrance into Quito, even Bol{var spoke of the

differences of the South frour Lhe rest of the nation. Ttre

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Liberator underscored this separate nature of the South

through the exercise of his extraordinary faculties and the

creation of the office of a Superior Chief. Wtlen the nation-

aI administration was finally extended to include the depart-

ments of Ecuador, Azuay, and GuayaquiL, the government proved

ineffective in deal-ing with the local problems within the re-gion, The difficulties of travel and corrrunieation rrrith Bo-

gota/, the lack of representation in Congress, and the conse-

quent Lack of attention paid to grievances from Quito and her

sister cities maintained the separate character of the dis-

trict of the South. The audiencia of Quito did not lose itsidentity under the aegis of Gran CoLombia. BoLfvar's vice-

regal view of the territorial boundaries of Gran CoLombia

even worked in favor of the region to maintain the territo-riaL integrity of the audiencia and thus, that of the Repub-

lic of Ecuador.

The 1ocal identity and initiative of Guayaquil aLso

added to the growth of Ecuadorian nationalism. The twenty-

three months of autonomy proved significant in two lrays,

Under the adept leadership of Josd Joaqu{n Olmedo, Guayaquil

pLayed a crucial role in assuring the liberation of the

audiencia. The loca1 pride engendered by the brief existenee

of the Republic of Guayaquil compensated for the city's past

failure to aid Quito in the revolts of 1809 and 1810. ItaLso created a patriotie mythology for Guayaquil that coul,d

rival, and yet be compatible wi-th, that of Quito.

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Ecuador under Gran Colombia existed in a quasi-colonial

state, a condition which its citizens of all cLasses ulti-mately preferred over the liberalisrn of Colornbia. The rnore

innediate nature of authority under the extraordinary facuL-

ties, and later under the dictatorship, proved to be more

acceptable to the citizens of the Southern district than the

lengthy processes of fogot/. Over the decade, the Liberator

became the embodiment of the legitiuacy of Gran Coloubia.

Ironically, he exercised that authority in such a manner so

as tc ultimately solidify a separate identity for the South-

ern Departments. By granting local and regional dispensa-

tions for coumercial tribunal-s, continuing colonial taxes,

authorizing regional assemblies, and provoking politicalchallenges to the administrat,ion in Bogota', BoL{var created

a centralist administration in the district of the South

separate fronn that of the national government.

The era of Gran CoLombia was also a period of nineteenth-

century romanticism for Ecuador. It was an era of heroes and

glorious deeds. Bolfvar, Sucre, Olmedo, and even Flores, are

h:ninaries in Ecuador's pantbeon of great tDen. The indepen-

dence of Guayaqull, the battles of Yaguachi and Pichincha,

the Conference of Guayaquil, and the battle of Tarqu{ are

moments of national pride for contemporary Ecuador.

The history of Ecuador under Gran CoLombia encompasses

the frustrations, the failures, and the unexpected successes

of the dynamcis of statecraft and embryonic nationalism in

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PREFACE NOTES

lAd.r Szaszdi, "TLre llistoriography of the Republicof Ecuado!, " Ilispan-ic Amgrlean Historical_$eview, 44, Iilo. 40r Ecuaclotr" Hlspanlc Anerlean Hastorlcal Kevielv, 44, I{o. 4(1964). pp: 50 iarch in theNational Period," in Research Guide to Andean History:Bolivia, Chile, Ecuad e

zSzaszdL, p. 504.

3Osvaldo Hurtado, Political Power in Ecuador, Trans.Nick D. Mills, Jf,. (Albuquelque, 1980)-, F-{0.

234

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CHAPTER 1 - NOTES

lDuring the period of its existence, the Republ-ic ofColonbia as erected by the constitutions of Angostuta andCdcuta was known simpiy as Colombia. Ttre desi[nation "Gran"Colombia was introduced by journaLists and historians todistinguish the Republic of 1819-L830 from the larer govern-ments of New Granada which retained the nane Colonbia.

2For rhethese events inLoss of America

GarboneII, Psicopatolog{g_de Bolfvar (Caracas, 1965) andGerhard Mas rque, 1969).

4For detaiLs of Miranda's life and his activiti-es asa precursor to independence see: !'Iillian Spence Robertson,precursoE to independence see: !'Iillialll Spence Robertson

e Life of Miranda, 2 voLs. (Chapel Hill, 1929); see alsoTtre Life of Miranda, 2Robertson' s Francisco de Miranda and the RevoLutionizine ofSpanish AnerG-1ffi cardo Secerra,ida de Don Francisco de Miranda, 2 vo1s. (Madrid, 1918).

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-!tlatest and one of the best examinations of

9p?i" gee Tiqgthy E. Anna, Slginan1|Jbg(Lincoln, L983). t

3Th" voLumes written about Bol{varts life and careerare too numerous to review. For a sound bioeraphical intro-duct-ion to the man and his ti-rnes see: losd dE ri cruz Herrera,Bolfvar: Forjador de la Lilerrad (Caracai , Tgij>;-difvaaot

1952) ; waido rriirt<, Birrhof a Worldi BoTIfEFTn Terms. of His peoples (Bosron; -I95TJ-;iento poiftico deIa revolucio-n hispanoame_ricana (l"tadrid, 1959) ; Diegoifvar (caracai. rgo5l and

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5Fot a discussion of the development of the idea ofGran Colonbia by Miranda and its adoptibn by Bol-(var andSantander see: Enri.que Otero DrCosta, "Fundacidn de la GranColombia,rr Curso supericr de historia de Colombia. Tomo II(Bogotd, lg olivarianade La Gran Colombia" in his text Ellgpqeso ideoldgi.co de laemangipacidn (Tunj a , 197 4), pp . 43F?,4fi-

6vicenteL92g), T., 35-46,

Lecuna, ed., Cartas del Libertador (Caracas,Cartagena, Decffi

7lbid., 18L-205, Kingston, Septembet 6, 1815,8S"" Alfred Hasbrouck,

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ation of Spanish South Amei

236

' 9M"rruel Antonio Pombg and Joset Joaqu{n Guerra, Consti-rucio,4es de_gofgnble (Bogotd, 1951), Tomo irf-rv, 35-39:-

lOFor general information and statistics on the au-diencia in th6 coloni^al era see: Josd Manuel Restrepo, His-toria de 1a Revolucidn de Colombia (6 vols. Boeot/.' 1969--

_EgUa{ordqlg4ge 14 qolp4ae (Quito, ; !'ranclsco vestre, Des-

(Panana, 1927); , .se-cretas de AmdricaYepes, Sintesi.s histcirica951);Fffi

o de Santa Fe de Bo

Jorge Luna(Madrid,de La Re Li9_q1te1 Ecuqd_o{ (7 vols,

dal-ffiEE?Eadof , xt, 206-2L0.Cartas

l2Fot a detalled discussion of the L809 and 1812revolts and a substantial amount of docunentati-on of theseevents see: AJ.fredo Ponce Ribadeneira, to: 1809-18L2Sesdn los docurnentos deL Archivo Naciona

v'LazJ) iatru fr(Quito, L973),

anclsco storia

l1For a review of the jurisdictional dispute over Gua-yaquil see: Carl-os ManueL Larrea, La Rea!_Audiencia de__Qgilgv du territorio .(Quito, 1963): .Joiemso.su territorio , (Quito, 1963) ; ,Jorge -fiI.

ffid;i;;;; i;-RAi,6iiE; li.ir E""'aoi- cCorno-l,scoso,

uayaqull, anscrr-Pfions o e offiiEiel- docunents

Quito , -LF'geograrl-a

are presented in Oscar Efren Reyes, Breve_historiA generaldel _bcuador (Quiro , L977) , Ir. +O-af

IYOU); JorRe Salvador Lara, LA patrllianuei Maria Borrero. ta r6v6trEtTFn-1962); Josd Gabriel NaffiAgosto de 1809 (Quito , L962) anf,Earlos 6Iqe_volq:1dp-de Quito del L0 de Aeosto de L809

l3R*,iro Borj a y(I'ladrid, 1951) . p. 9-23.

Borja, !,49_ constituciones de! Ecq4dor

ilcl ecl ., 4 vols. (ga-rl.s,, Historia del Peqti ind

),iente:

primer perioio 1819-1822 (LffiE (Iiadri6, Lg78i; Neptalf

endient6 (Quito. 1!t68) :E (Madrid, 1978) ; Neptali ZirfiLea, His-

(Quito, f'gOS) ; GarniioEOrra oe LaEacunga, rnoepenolenEe (qur"uo, ryoo); uanaro(Guayaquil,

1.9 L3) .

CHAPTER 2 - NOTES

Temas ecuatorianos (ffilticioh de octuble

1tAurelio Espinosa Po1it, t'Oluatorianos (Quito, L954), p.

Polit, t'Olmedo, e1 hombre prib&blico, "98; Camilo Destruge,

a Libertadora de

=1

=.T

:I

I.:

1

=1

--'

I.

I

I=I

=I--'1

=1

=l

=1

=1

:I

=I

=I

-Francisco Alejandro Vargas, Guayaquil y sus liberta-dores (Caracas, L970>, pp. 74-75; GabHllForia del Ecuador (Cirbnca, 1964), p. 263; l4anuel Antonioffitdricos: colomirii v Perd: 18f9-I826(BbgotS

3vi1lami1,acidn de LaEmanci

may4v

capi t_

tros cli.as yaqul.l,Elffi-de La revoluci

ricos, p.5P"dto Ferm/n Ceballos,

EcqeQe1q (Puebla, 1959), p. 26L;

6Th" cabildo abierto was the connnon meehanism used tomake changes @d political affairs or to makeextraordinary pronouncemenLs. It was composed of the regularmembership of the t.own council. augmented by representativesfrom the cLergy, military, nobility, artisans and leadingfamiLies of the comunity.

TAurelio Noboa,

illamil, Resefra, pp. L8:2O; L6pez,22; Encina, Emancipacioir, p. 38.

Resefia, pp. L2, I_5-16;s:ldencia de to

ntiago, ,P.

pp. 4183.

Francisco A. Encina,L Virreinato de

Recuerdos histd-

Resumen de la historia del

ta nues-

8yill-arnil, Resefia, p. 28; Destruge, Historia de Ia'#revolucidn, p. 19i;-GEfTo Destruge, pioErafffi

6fr-te-ffi-?e Febrd); uamrlo Destruge. Biocratl-a del General's Corderq (Guaya{uLL

f i6 6 ri -a ao r a- de 1-!eEd

(Guayaquil, L924)e4 lb

(uuayagur-r, Lt/.t+) , P . IU; vargas . uuayaqual. pp. z I -26; Josedqnu!!-psi1_ero,' $iiigrii ae ia ieV6ilffi-ie' boromuia' (Bogo-td, 1959), rV, 24T-TTT

237

-

238

gtdp"r, Recuerdos histdr.icos, p. 43i Reyes, Breve

. II. 202 Gevallos Gar.'cfa. Historia.. o - 263:-NEot

eorffi'; i,. 64i giblioieEa--fuiffi; hspinosa poliE,'FiTil-ft8s(1818-1820), San ltliguel, ILiobamba, November 28, L820. Information from the Espinosa Polft collection of oriei-na1 docu-mation from the Espino ft coil-ection of oiiginal docu-

d as t'EsDinosa Politt' with fiLmmati.on from the Espinosa Po1it collection of or-iginal docu-ments will hereafter be cited as "Espinosa Polit" with fiLunuuiber following.

l0Nobo", Coleccidn, pp. 259-263; Bernard Moses, SouthAmerica on the ETE@clilgtion (New York, 1965), pp-.-TF-

1lvil1.ril, .Resefia, p. ix;L4; Noboa, @'zsg-zos.

historia , II, 20; Gevallos Gar-Ia, toria,. p,' 26 3 ; -T-p-taf iNepta

968) ,II, 1uci6n ecuiio-riana-(Buenos-Aires, L976), p. struge, ur-I en

, L820. Infor-

Reyes, Breve historia, II,

Epistolario (Puebla, L960),t 5v-v.

15v"tg"", 9gg.S,gil, p. 29; Ferro, San ltartfn, p. LZ4.

pP. 29-San

12vi11ari1 , Reseffa, p. 29 ; Siurdn B. o'Leary, ed. , Ue-morias del GeneraL O-lFrv (Caracas, L879) , )ffiVIIi-, L4B-4Tfrlln"pinosa Polft, rt0lmedo,r' passim.; Cesar E. Arroyo,

"Olmedo,'r Inter-Amdrica (New york, i9l-8), I, 3; Abel Romeocast-illo, tG:Fm-iaTluredo, " cuadernos

- de-hiitoria y arqueo-logfa, (Guayaquil, D,d.), Afro XILautaro ltodges htere secret societies of American patriotsorganLzed to promote the cause of independence fron Spain.For a slrnpathetic treatment see: - Antonio R. Z:difiLea, La losialaucaro v 1a independencia de Amdrica (Buenos Air6s , gttr

14Jo*d Joaqu{n de o}medo,pp. 335-336, Guayaquil. November

l_6--*"Vargas, Guayaquil, p. 2L; Villarnil, Resefia,

i,1;.?:lt;:r:i . GualEr6ifiE-n. li caniafia, p. 73 ;-rffi;

l7Vttt"rit. Resefia. pD. 54.60: Destruse. Guavaouil enla campafia, p. 73; !.EE6] sirir ttariin, pp. $-44, II{, T49--T5lt.18tr'"rro , rbid.l9B.rtolord Mitr", llistoria de San Martfn y de la eman-

cjpacio'n sudame'rica (Bueno ,@2.20---Ferro, Ibid

239

21o1t.do, Episgg}er:lg, pp. 335-338, Guayaguil, Novem-

ber 22, L820

2lYlrtt". Historia. III. 582-583: Destruse, Febre's Cor-dero, p. 20; 16r@, p. 46,-EspinosE PoTiffi-7 , Aymerich, Quit6llffiEr 24, 1820.

23- . ^ -/.uspLnosa pol{t, Film 7285, MiLitary reports, rGtraran-da, November 22, 30, 1820; Olmedo, Episqolgglc, PP. 339, Gua-yaquil, November 27, 1820; o'Leary,TI@@{IX, 11-12,Feb-re6 Cordero, Guayaquil, Decemb-er ffAU;:, 553-554, Leta-mendi, Huacho, April 2L, 182L.

i='l

.l

I*I=1

:1

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-qI

-q!

qi!

!

-

ll

I

-

-

=,

=e

L944)ria,Gfo, P. 26.

25olo,"d3 , L82L; Noboa? ' cH3#l,'*i .p?rl'Z}s.-

356 ' Guavaquil ' Januarv

26!̂;splnosa10, 1821; Reyes,p. 60.

Pol/t, Filrn 7285,Breve Historia, II,

Aynerich, Quito, Jangary2Lt Ferro, San Martfn,

CTTAPTER 3 - NOTES

lVitlasril.,Resefrg, p.31; O'Leary, Uqnqrlas, XIx, g-9,Escobedo,Guayaqui1lTffibei13,1820;oineffiio1ario'p. 344-345, cg?y?quil, December L5, 1820, p. 3sTiTilmfi,December 26, 1820.

2Restrepo, Historia, IV, Lg6-Lgl, 207.3Roberto QortdzaE, €d., Correspondencia dirieida al

9eneEal SEBtandlrr (8,o9o16, 1964) ,San Crist6bal, December 2L and 22, 1820.

. 4O'Leary, Memorias , XVIII, 1 8, B.ol/var, Bogotd,January 1, L82L, 1GT7J-T6'L{var,.Bogotd,, January I0, Lg2L.

sortegqy, Memorias, VIII, 19, Bol/var, Bogotd,January 11, L82L; Re-5EEF6', Hisr6ria, fV, ZLS-ZZL:

6R."rrepo, Historia, IV, 2t2; OLmedo, Epistqlario,p: 3i4, Guayaquil, Jmuary 3, 1821; Ferro, SinittTEidTT-'133,Olmedo, Guayaquil, Februaty 23, 1821.

7Nobo",^goleccidn, p. 269-271, General Mires, Guaya-quil, February 25,-tF7F8o1nedo, EpistoLario, p, 360, Guayaquil, February 27,

1821.9tbid., p. 36L-g62.

-Iool,r"do, _Epistolario, p. 364, Guayaquil, March 5,162Ii (j,ortd,zar. Corresoondencia, IX, 425, Junta, Guayaquil,March L7, L82L:

-

llo'L"rry, -Uggi€, XIX, L7 , Mires , March l- , 1g21 ,2L-22, Junta, DlafE-'d'flAEord, Guayiquil, April IZ',' LB2L.'

, IzNopo", goleccidn, p. 280-281. Junta, Guayaquil,4p-til 26, I82I, fmFZ$4, Junra, Guayaquil, aprif '2g,' 1g21;o'Leqry, Memorias, XIX, 27, Olmedo to Mires, Guayaquil,April 26,Tn .

-1ttilty Library, MS, Oluredo ro San Martln, Guayaquit,4ptil^11, 1821; ohnedb, Ep$fgIig, p. 316, Guayaquii, 'apritL4, 1821.

240

lr

24L

l4For basic biographical material on Antonio Jose/ deSucre see: John P..Iloover, ,trans. by Francisco Rivera itrans. by Francisco Rivera a univer-Lrall$. oy .r r.rrtgru(-(J ril-vgra \uulllalra: Ilg'ttc,ILaI ge Ia uuJ-vesidad de Oriente, 1975); Laureano Viallanueva,' Vida de DonAntonio Jose'de Sucre. Gran MariscaL de

rerr.a rael Abel de Andri-ca (@: Pagdbola ecuatbriaL (Quit6:

Cultura nc -6pei Contreras, Sucre,14 Cultura Ec Epez Contreras , IS{ntesis de su Vida miiitar,'3rd ed. (Cira""s, udiroiiE'fi-Sintesis de su vida militarGecj.lio Acosta, L946) .

15o'L.rry, MenqEr-as, xvIII, 31-35, Bol{var, Instruc-tions , Bogotd, JanilEEl2ll 1821. ,

L6Cottd.r^t, Correspondencia, VIII , 23g-242, Morales,Guayaquil, May 1, l@:!gs,.JfIl!., 34-37, Sucre,Guayaqui1,MayL2,].821.;Restrepo@,"Iv,240.

May

17o'L..ry,15, 1821.

Vicente lecula,

l,Iemorias, XIX, 40-42, Acuerdo, Guayaquil,

p. 384, Junta, Guayaquil. MayXIX, 44-45, Sucre, Guayaquil,15,

DIay

18o1medo, E

1821; O'Learyl15,1821.

19John Lynch, The Spanish American Revo1uti.ons. 1808-!-9- (Neq York ,' L973)San Martin, Guayaquil, llay 10, l-82L; O'Leary, Memoq_lqg, XIX,29-32, Sucre, Guayaquil, May J.2, 182L; Vicente-Tffi ed."Docutrlentos," BoLetfn de la Academia Nacional de Historia(Caracas: Oct. ,Guayaquil, May 13, L82L (Hereafter cited as BAMI).

2oR""tr.po, Historiq, IV, p. 237; O'Leary, Dleqrorias,xlx, 38-39, Melbhor@h, Quilo, lt,ay L2, 1Sucre, Guayaquil, May 15, l82Li portd.zar, CorrXIII , 87, General Torres, Popay{n, June 23-tl

Quito , l{ay L2, 182i ,TF:4C!ggt", _Guayaquil, May- 15, l82Li -CorLdzaT, C6rresp6ndencl131,XrIr .'87. berierai Tolres. pooa.ldn. June 23lTti'2T-^Trfearv.rrlr, 61, (ieneral rorres, ropayan, June zJ, L6zL, u'Leary,Memorias, XIX, 56-58, Sucre, Guayaquil, June 12, I82L, .iffi."i;;o;" riiial l-; ; :, -iliiiii ^i"i i'ia ii' ( il;; ia',19t-5), VI,'337, $rrcre to Santander, C'uayaquil, July 24, L82L;(llereafter cited as Archivo ; Restrepo, Historia, IV, 2t+0-243;

(lb'r llbrk,'1950),JuIy 4, L82L.

2\estrepo, Ilistoria,T25-L26; Iopz, Recuerdos, p.Jr:ly L8, L821.

W, 242-243; Lecure, Grpaige razonada,Ill'44; lOlredo, istol;;i@l,

I

PauI Qllendorf,f , 1897); Miguel P{ez Formoso, Sucre,de Amdrica (Mont6video:-Impiesora Uruguaya, ig41$)-;

-

mAn-ucre:'Pardbola ecuatbriaL (Quit6t hait. Casi de

istolario,Menorfas,

2oL*do, gpistoLafio , p. t+Lo't'q,L, GBiaquil, July L7, L82L'

July 24, I8ZI.23Archivo

$A!rtan4er,

242

VI, 336-338, Sucre, Guayaquil,

AugustGuayaquil,

Historia, IV,

4Restrepo , Itistori.a, . IV , -?4L; O'teary, Memorias , I,20 , Sucre , Guaylquif;:tffiF14, i821 .

25BANH, xxv, n. 100, 396-398, Junt'a'de Guerra, Babaho-yo, August 6, 1821.

26oh.do, Epistol-ario, p. 43L-4L4, Guayaquil,L4, 1812; Arcbi+olE6Eqat',Vir. 102-106, Moiales, 'August 30,m

- z7Lotp"r, Recuerdos, p. 45-46; Restrepo,

303- 304.280lr.do, Epistolafio, p. 4L6-4L7, Junta, Guayaqui-l,

August L4, L82L; p:-4TtJGiraiaiuil, Auguit 15, ieZf ,-p, 422-423, Junta, Guayaqgil, August 16, 1821; Lilly Library, l{S,Olmedo to San Martin, Guayaquil, August L9, 1821.

29nemt, )0(V, n, 100, 400-403, Boletfn de La divisidndel Sur, July 15 - August 19, 1821; Restrepo, gqgtog1a, IV,304; olmedo, EpietoLaiio, p, 428, Guayaquil, SEflEEfrffi 1, 1821.

30-Espr-nosa Polit, 73L4 (Olrnedo), Guayaquil-, August 2!,L8L2; Archivo Santander, VII , 97--98, Tornesa, Guayaquil,August 29, 1821; Noboa, Coleccidn, p. 265-266.

3lArchivo santandel-, vII, 102-106, Morales, Guayaquil,August 30F

32Nobo", CoLeccidn, p. 288-2gL. Act and proceedings ofAyuntamien.toof@I,August31,1821;oavidJ.Cubrtt,"La A.rexici4 de la provincia de Guayaguil , L822: Estudio^ deLestilo pol{tico boiivariano," Reviitd de'historia de Andrlca(July -- Decenber, 1978), n. 86

33---Lecuna, Cfdqi-qe_EeEoned4, III, 130-131; Restrepo,Historia , IV, 306 19, 11 , 293 ,30240r

I

CHAPTER 4 - NOTES

l_-Lecuna. Crohica razonada. III. 133: Olmedo. Erristo-lario, p. 433, Guffi6r 15. L82L; CortdzailGffiipondencia, Ii, '431; oliredo, Guayaquil, Septemb er' 26 ,ffi, uoiares, Guayaquil, befteurtier 22, 182L;

1

Archivo Santander, VII, L42, Sucre, Babahoyo, September 18.ffi. 100, 4oi-408, sucre, cirayaquiL, septemb

v'-,

rchivo Santander,

26, 1921., September

3nenH, XXV, ro. 100 , 4L5-4!6, Jose'Leal, Monte Chris-ti, October 1?, 182L; Olmedo, Epistolario, p. 444, Guayaquil,October 18, 1821; Restrepo, HisioF;Tf -

fbg.40]f,""gy,, Memorias, V,334-335, Heres, Lima, Septem-

ber 25, 1821, 338-56f,ffie, Babhoyo,.October 1l , LSZL-: BANH,XXV, n. 1p0, 414-415, Sucre, Babahoyo, October 19, 1821; Le-cuna, CIdnlca rqzcnada, III, 140; The Nr:mancia battalion hadbeen dffirgentina, Peru and Chilean units. Theofficers and troops resented this treatment and hoped to bereconstituted as a battalion under General- Sucre's leadershipin Guayaquil. BANH, XXV. n. 100, 423, Cochrane, Guayaquil,October 30, 1821; O'Leary, Memorias, XIX, 73-74, Olmedo, Gua-yaquiL, October 28, L82L, 75--76-dcre, Babahoy6, November 6,182L.

so'L".ry, Uengriqs, xlx, 68-69, Sucre,r 25 , L:}zLrer ;E , Correspondencia,

zRestrepo, HiqlFqria, IV, 305;da, III, 131, 133; E?lfrIlSrres Lanza,rica (Madrid, L912), V, 347 .

Tlouis Bertrand andof Spain (New York, L97L),History o,f Spain (New York,

Lecuna, Grohic a tazona-Indepenffi

1

1{

XIX, 68-69, Sucre, Guayagui'l,vrrr, 250-252,September 25,Morales, Guayaquil, September ZT,

6nnun, xl(v, n. 100, 4L7-42L, sucre, Babahoyo, october23, 1821. Patria Boba refers to the period from 18'10 to l-815in New Granada when various republican factions carried on acivil war for poLitical dominance which weakened the abilityto resist the Spanish and resulted in defeat for all of them.Godo is a derogatory term applied to Spaniards and Spanishffiathizers.

t t

a?Sir Charles Petrie, Ttre Figl_orp. 3L2, Harold Livermor-el1968) , p. 364-367 .

243

-

i-

244

SEspioosa Po1{r, Film 72s5 (1821) , GonzlLez, Quito,November 6, 1821

gEspirrosa pol{t, Film TzBs (l82l), Tolr{ Riobamba,November 4, L821; Restrepo, Historia, IV, 31L-312, 318; BAlilH,XXV, o. 100, 432-*33, tllingrdE;ffiborondon, Novdmb er 23,L821; Lecuna, Crohica razonada, III, 134.

t0Ottni,O Santdnder, VII , 220, Morales, Guayaquil,November ffi, Hiitorii, rv, 3L2; Galeda d6Colombia, No. L6 , tri. I, febiuTT!$ L822

Archj.vo Santander, VII , 240-243, Sucre, Guayaquil,December T-WZT:

12ruia.

l3Cortdr"r, Correspondencia, VIII , 253, Morales, Gua-yaquil, November i ,TJl-lZT140lr.do, Epistolario, p, 45g, Guayaquil, Deceuber 13,

l-821; Restrepo , -HfGE]lIEilffi, gfO .

lsnamt, xxv, r. 100, 439-444, porto viejo, December 16,1821.

16geMr, xxv, n. 100, 446, Josd. Antonio l"larcos, paLen-gue, -December 18, t-821 , 45L, Ilario A'lvarez, Guayaquil,December 24, 1821

l7nemt, xxv, n. ro0, 4s2, sucre, Guayaquir, December27-, L82L, 456, Calildo, Porto Viejo, Decenber-24, L82L; LillyLibrary, MS-, Ohnedo to Salazar, GuaLecuna, Crdnica razonada, III, L44.Lecuna,

Olrnedo to Salazar, Guayaquil, December 29, L82L;

1801rudo, Epistolario, p. 467, Guayaquil, December 27,L82L; Lecuna, Cro'ni-ca razonada; III , L44,

19r,itty Library, MS, Sucre to olmedo, Guayaquil,December 26, L82L, Olmedo to Sucre, Guayaquil, December 28,1821.

2orbid.

21BRNH, xxv, n. 1oo,October 15, 1821; 0lmedo, E

4L2-4L3, Cabildo, Porto Viejo,istolario, pp. 448-450, Guayaquil,

November 1, L82l; Lilly Liyaquil, Decembet 29, L821,

rary,-fS,-OLmedo to Salazar, Gua-

11

22ArchLvo Santander, VII, 263, Sucre, Guayaquil,

hl :

24s

Deeember L7, L82L; O'Leary, Memorias, XIX, 102-103, Sucre,Guayaquil, December L4, 1821;-1ffiTTT, I25; Restrepo, Histo-ria, IV, 32L.

z3o'L."ty, Ugqqgigg, XIX, IO4, Sucre, GuayaquiL,

December L4 , 1821 ; TftEffi Sant4nder, VIr , 236-237, Sucre,Guayaquil, December@, n. 100, 460-461,Sarrta Gruz, Piura, Januar! 6, L822.

243."tr"po, Historia, IV, 330; Espinosa po1{t, Film73L4 (Bol{var aira'sil;ATOTTggre; . Qugygtuir, Jangary_ -2o, ,L822;Lecuna, Cronica razonada, III, J.49-151; Ferro, 9goIgglig,p. 76.

25o'L""ty, lLerqllqq, XIx, L46-L47, Bol{var, Popayt'n,February 1, L822; It-ditl.T. de la Rosa, Firnas del Ciclo

E

II

i

Herdico-: Documentos ineditos Dara22"

26o'L.^ty, Memorias, xIX, !L2, Bolfvar, Cali, January; Vicente Lecuna, ed., Cartas de1 Libertador (Caracas,2, L82Z; VicentL'L6Tiffid. , Cartas

L929>, XI, zLL, Cali, January27 rara.2QM"ri"rra Felipe Paz Soldin. Historiat,e: pri.mer oel(odo. 1819-162rc

del Perri inde-pendiente: prj.mer perfodo, 1819-182fGlma,

, zgL".una, Carcas del Libertador, XI,I"lartin, Lima, Marffi-3lTETZ.

3ogANH. xxv, n. 1oo: 4g7, Monteagudo,

1866) , p. ;l59 ,

2L4-2L5, San

Lima, llarch 3 ,L822.

3lrbid.32Oh"do, Epistolario, p. 47g , Guayaquil, Febraury 22 ,

L822.33R""tt"po, Historia, IV, 327-328.34l""rrrr", Cronica razonada, III , L46; Gaceta.d-g Cglgm-. -24, tri. 2. March 31. L822: BANH, XXV, n. I00, 496,bia, No. ,24, ttL. 2, ; BANH, lUW, n. I00 , 496,

pendiente, March L2, L822.35o" la Rosa, Ilqnqs, pp. 353-354, Act of Purchase,

Guayaquil , March L7 , TI'zF}Ln-eao, Epistolario, p . 482 , Gua-yaqirii, March 2L, tbzz; Ttromas co;h#E-oTDuirdonal,

=l

=

-

!-

i

246

Memorias de Lord Cgchrane (Madrid, n.d.), Pp. 174'175.36D" Ia Rosa, Fir^mas, pp. 363-365, Sucre, Cuenca,

March 30, L822, 37L-372, Santa Cruz, Cuenea, March 31, L822,400-401, Sucre, Cuenca, April 5, L822,

37o' L"qryr,Wigg, xrx, 284-386, ^Sucre,, R:i-obauba,April 23 , . L822; hil@friacunia, II , 309 ; JosJ RobertoTbafiez s/nchez . canoini mffi' L822: Bombona-PichincILafrezsfnct'e"'c"*pinimffi,L82i:gr5nbona-Pichincha(Boeord. t972):(Bogord, 1972), pp.

39nuy.", Breve Historia, II, 22, Lecuna, Crdnica razo-nada, rrr, i74-1@enoria", xrx, 284-ffiffiSffihez, campa?Ia del sur, pp.2TT45.

3gJorg. til. Villacres Moscoso, Historia dila Repdblica-del Ecuador (Guayaquil,O'Ieary, MerrqEreq; XIX, 287-289, Art

lur.r , Lyo I ) , PP. zLL- /.L) i, Articles of Surrender, Quito,

l{.ay 25-, LW

43cottd,zax, Correspqndencia, VIII, 275-279, ltosquera,Guayaquil, March 25,

44ol*.do, EpistoLario,, pp. 485-488, Guayaquil, April2, L822.

45nt Patriota de Guayaquil, June 5, L822; June 15,L822 cite quest of-Guayaquil,,"pp. 6LI-5L2.

4001*.do, EpistoLar.io, p. 47g , Guayaquil, February 22,t822.

4loh"do, Eoistolario, p. 442, Guayaquil, october L2,L821.

42G^."t" de sobierno de Lima independiente, Extra-ordinaEioGnqffiof Guayaquil, " Hispanic American- HistoricaL Review,XXVII, n. 4 (November, L947),609. -

CHAPTER 5 - NOTES

lo'L".ty, Memorias, XXVIII, !46.TzdX:,g^, k4ggg, II. 320; Paz Solda/n, Ilistoria,

p. 298.3Gaceta de Coljrnbia, No. 4!, tri. 3, July 28, 1822.

- 4Restrepo, HislpEla, IV, 361 I L6p-ez, Recuerdos, p.91;Cotx{zar, Correiponffivl, 206, Gonzdlez,@ro;-fin^e 16 ;L822

scacetq-jq Colqmlia, No. 40, tri. 3, July 21, 1822;I,lo. 4L, tffi22; No. 47, tri.-4, SLpterirber 8;1822; Arlhive_,_Egnteplter, VIII , 278-279, Sucre, Quito, June2L, fA , IV, 362i Ezeqqiel Mf,rquez, "ElCoroneL Don Andr6s deFanta Cruz en Cuenca," BANH, VIII, n.18, 292-3L3,

---6Nobo", Coleccidq, pp. 300-301, Bol{var, Quito, June18, L822.

7gmm, xxv, Do. 100, 4go-4gL, Bol/var, Quito, June22, L822.

8ruia

9l,""rrrr., Cro/nica razonada, III, 190; El Patriota deGuavaqui!, June ZWi Grey, "Bo1@'p. 612.

l0oh"do to Peruvian delegation, Guayaqui-I, June 24,L822, BAIilH, XXV, n. L00, 59.

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i2uspe3o, San Uart{n y Bo1{ , p. 35; Gaceta de Go-bierno de Liurq, No;-[4] touro tEiEero.

l3Nobo., Coleccidn, p. 305-306, Representacidn, Guaya-July \2,'Lffiieio, Historia, IV, 365; Gerhard

-

Simoh Bolfvat (A1buquerqffil9?i8), p. 331.

llGaceta de Colombia, No. 46, tri. 4, September 1,L822; Gacffi Lima, No, L4, toruo tercero.

qui1,Masur,

liti

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-

=

247

248

l4Nobo", Coleccioir, pp. 310-314, ProceediDBS, Guaya-qui1, Jul-y L3, 18zt;--eilffitt, - "La anexion, " p. 202.

I5Nobo", Colqcp-lein, p. 308, Salon, Guayaquil, July 13,L822; pp . 309-310;gA6' cirayaquil, JuLy L3,' L622.'

l6cacetqjle Qe-loubie, No. 46, tri. 4t, September 1,

L822I7Nobo", Colecci-Jn, p. 310, Merino, Guayaquil-, July 13,

t822.18ruia.

1gF"tto,III, L97.

20-- Lecuna,JvLy 22, 1822.

. 2ln"strepo, Historla., IV, 3qz:36q; Ferro, San Mart{{r,pp . 10 L- 1-02 ; esii;1oFflP6lfiE, riirn 7 285 (1822), rffi-16':quil, July 27, 1822.

22--uspejo, San Mart{n v BolfvaE, pp. 72-8L.231h" conference of Guayaquil, highlighted by the pri-

vate talks between the trilo most illustrious leaders of theera, has gerrerated extensive study and debate. In additionto the issues of Guayaquil and Colombian military assistancefor Peru, the contrast of the personalities and vision of thetwo men has drawn much attention. Ttre focus of the latterissue centers around the particular question of the authen-ticity of the "Lafond letter.rr Appearing in the memoirs oftlle French,Captain, Gabriel Lafon{, the letter from San Mar-tin to Bolivar depicts a vain Bol{var selfishly denying sub-stantial aid to Peru unLess he is assured absolute authority.The defenders of the tiberator, primarily Col-ombian,Ecuadorian, and Venezuelan scholars dismiss the -Letter as aforgery. those upholding the honor of San Martfn, primarilyArgentine and Chilean historians, accept the docr,rnent asauthentic. For an excellent review of both sides of theargument see: Gerhard Masur, "The Conference of Guayaquil,"HAIIR, 3I:2 (May, 195L) , L89-229. For the rdorst contribrutionE5-ttr. debate i6"r ''Coionbres Marmol. San I'Iartin v Bolrvaren ra enErevasEa qe Guavaqulr a ra ruzffis

eIater proven to be forgeri.es. For the most exhaustive studyof the issue and the prevailing scholarly trend see: VicenteLecuna. La entrevista de Guayaquil: RestabLecimiento de laverdaO'h 2).

tSan Martin, p" 101; Lecuna,

Cartas del Liberqador, III,

Crdnica razonada,

53, Guayaquil,

I

Other worksentrevista

on the conference include: Cameloe Bol{var v San Marcfn en Guavaquil

249

de 'La carta

Destruge, La(Guayaquil,

IYfU); tu.car-do Levede San Martfn a Bo1 var de

AIw osto de LE22

entrevista(Buenosde Gua

Fin del Protectoradosco A. tsncana,v defuncioh de

Un]-Ie (SanElago, IY)J);_ Ioffifonci de-San Martfn a

quiL z L822 (Buenoffires, -TBcueidos histo'ricos : CoLonbiaand .Hr-o JarMartfn v eIy eI rsecretor de Guay4quil,

1 de llistoria v Museo Unico.

varaoo,

uel AnEonLo LoDez. r(e-jql_g:Igaq (nqlot/, -T8'z a)

---a'

sta de Bol{.var y San

Nacional de _Ili.sloria y l,fuseo Unico,193D.-" ,Anales de1 Archivqtiffiito,

24_uspejo, San Martin v Bol{var, pp, 81-82, Upon hisreturn to Lima, Gm announced his resignationfrom public office, He named a tripartite comrission togovern Peru and departed from the country. He ultimatelysettled in Boul-oBD€, France where he died in 1850.

25A"r"", Guayaquil, July 30, 1822, orl,eary, Memoriag,xrx, 351-.

26oh"do, Epigglar,&, p. 4gg , Guayaquil, July 29 ,L822.

27g'Leary,@,xIx,349.352,Co1egio,Guayaqui1,July 30, L822.

28tbid., xrx, 352-353, coregio, Guayaquil, Jury 31,t822.

29rbid,, xrx, , 354, PJrez, Guayaquil, July 31, 1822.30- (Ltl]'S Robalino DaviLa, del- Ecuador de ho

Nacimiento s afios de la , -)Histori4, II, 150o'Leary, lleEoffi;Txvrlr, p. L47.

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CHAPTER 6 - NOTES

1^BushnelL, SanEander Regime, p. 14.at

'Ibid., pp. 17-18, William M. Gibson, Itr€ Congt:llLu-tions of Colornb:Ll-CDUrhan, 1948) , pp. 4L-66; 'MffiiGT-Iiffi@u{n Guerra. Coirltituciones de Col-ornbia(Bogotd,. 1951), Ir; 60-103.

3th" population of600,000 people and it wasdepartment.

4Bushnell, Santander Regime, pp. 2A-2L.5Articles 55 and 128 of the eonstitution established

the basis for the exercise of extraordinary faculties by thepresident. Congress was to grant the extension of the extra-ordinary authority and determine their period of operation.the president was emporrered to invoke the powers on his olininitiative when Congress was out of session. He was to seelttheir authorization once the legislature reconvened. In fact,Bolivar interpreted the law in the broadest of terms, exer-cising the extraordinary faculties with only the slighCestacknowledgement of responsibility to Congress. Ttris type ofconstitutional trump card for the executive defined in varioustemrs as a provision to preserve internal security has beconea hallmark of aLL Latin American constitutions.

6BushnelL, Santander Regime, pp. 77, 79,168, L82,217.

7p!-o Jarq'nillo Alvarado, Historia de Loia v su pro-Juito. f955). DD. 290. 30vincia (Quito, 1955), pp. 290, 306l

the audiencia was estinated atinitially assumed it would form one

rre.ro,eilEt ' eri Pichincha (Cirbnca, L92Z), pp, 37L, 386; Andrds E.rcd_el cicl-o trerdiioi tos i

ra la histofia C3, PP.ebruary , Bando, Cuenca, March 2, 1822; 342-

344, Bando, Cuenca,Riobamba, April 28,

March 10, 1822; BANH, III, 26A-26I, Bando,L822: Reyes, Breve historia, II, 29.

250

D

25r

III, 47, Quito, June8l,."rrrrt,'Cartas deL Li.bertador,2L, L822.

9rbid., 48.

13c"""tr d"- colq-grbia, No. 56, tri, 4, November 10,L822; Lec@ertador, III , 67, Guayaquil,

f:8lll , Ll33: rx ' tos-iotn' b"cree i cua-

-1

1I

I

I t

l4Aurelio Noboa,tul-aci6nes

€d.,armis

conven- -

i(Guayaquil, 1901), p. 331, Proclana, Guayaquil, August 31,LB22; Lecuna, Cartas del Lib_geggfler, III , 48, Quito, June 21,1822; Lilty Li to, August 22., L822; J.G.Pcixez, Cuenca, September 2L, 1822; Espinosa Polit, Film 73L4,Pcixez, Cuenca, September 2L, 1822; Espinosa Polit, Fi-lm 73L4,Sucre, Qu.ito, Atrgust 22, L822; Film 7285 (L822>, ,Loja,ocrober 19,, L822; Fllrn 7340 (1820-1,823), Quiro, October 27,L822. BoLivar transferred Lieutenant Colonel lgnacio Artetafrom the go;rernorship of Loj a to the off iee of Treasurer ofCue4ca. Pfo Valdivieso was named the new Governor of Loja.Bol/var also turned over to the Loja rnunicipal"icy the proper-ties of the old Jesuit order for the estabLishrnent of asecondary school.

15nanx, Afio I, no. 1, L40-14L, Sucre, Quito, JuIy 21,L822; BANH, III , 265, Cordero, Riobamba, May 13, L822; ,Jaxa-millo Alvarado, @, p. 3A7; Espinosa Po1it,

-

l0R."at.oo, H:istoria, IV, 362; Archivo Nacional deHistoria/Quito, - tomo-6031-E'do L822, volume II, folios L70-L7 6,

Cart4s del l,rberlg{er, III , 65 , Guayaquil,

1

I:

-;I

,

r-:

1'

caones

Appointments, June 3 - December 6, L822 (here after alldocr:ments will be cited AMI/Q, t,, ano, V., fol.) Gaceta deCol-ombia, No, 40, tri. .3, July 21. L822; No. 4L, tri. 3, JuIy28, 18.22,; Espinosa Pol{t, Filn 495 CLPZ2), .l_gfv I , L922. The lifristers bftl:e Slorse bourt r^rere: Dr. Josd Ferriahdez S5lvadcir. Ilr. Josd Fdlix Valdi-tJle Stproe were: ur. .losd Fenifnciei'Sdlvidor, Ilr. Josd rdlix Valdi-

fn, Salva{or.}trgueytio and Eidel- Quijanc': Frcurvieso,-Bernardo lgp,acio'de Le61, Salva{or.}trgueytio and Eidel- Quijanc': Ethe early seventeenth century the merchanLs of Quico promotedvarious pf,ograms to open a road from Quito to the northerncoastal area of Esmeraldas. For a synopsis of the colonialhistory of the Esmeraldas road projects, see John L. Phelan,"The Road to Esmeraldas: The Fbilure of a Spanish Conquestin the Seventeenth Centur1r," in Heinz Bluhm, €d., Essays inHistorv and Literature (C[ricago, 1965), pp.'91-107:-

1lO'L."ry, Memorias, xlx, 359-361-, Cornrnission Report,Guayaquil, Augu-s E ru

L2_Lecuna,August 3, L822.

Film 7285 (1822), Ibarra, July 23, L8221 Guaranda, JulyL822; Anbato, July 25, L822; Filn 7318 (1822), Otavalo,

Guaranda, July

252

31,L822; Anbato, July 25, L822; Filn 7318 (LAZZ; Anbato, July Z5,. LUZZ; .h'lllD lJl6 UUzz).. UEavaIo'Septem!.er L7, L822; Latacunga, September 28, L822; ANH/Q,601. afro L822. v.6. fol. 27. Quito. Julv 10, 1822.;oI;;fi;' fi2i., -;:-6

, T;i;*i7, 'Q"iio ,],'ry ro , LBzz ,

l6Archivo Santander, IX, .p. 59, BoL{var, Cuenca,SeptemberW

171'I"rq.r.", ttEl Coronel Don Andrds de Santa Cruz, "p. 303; Archivo Santander, IX, 9, Sucre, Quito, August 21,LB22; VIffi Guayaquil, August 13, L822; Espino-sa Polir, FiLm 7286 (L823-1824), June 2L, 1822, July 9, L822.

lSArchivo Santander, IX, III, Sucre, Quito, October 2L,L822

19---Lecuna, ,August 2L, L822

20l."rrrr., Q4ltas-dgl LibertaL822; 72, Gua@Il59. Bolfvar. Cuenca.

, 2; Archivo Santander,182]_59, Bol-fvar, Cuenca, September 23,

21thi* general review of the colonial economy of theaudiencia and its status at the time of independence is drawnfrom the fo.llowing sources: Restrepo, Historia, I, xiv, xxir,;Emelio Uzcdtegui, Historia del Ecuado_r (Quito, 1955), I; JoseEmelio Uzcdtegui, Historia del Ecuador rcultoLeGouhir y Roiias, m-dmlE ica de1L937), T; Michael fffi gcorra socaaLa antisua rovincia de Gua ayaqu ,

in a New !{orld:sonthe

Audiencia of Quito: Indian Population and the TextileIndustry 1-600-1800," Diss. University of California, 1976; R.A. Hurnphreys, ed., British Conqular Reports on the Tra4e andPolitics of Latin Am:ffi

L.

III, 75, Guayaquil,

III, 48, Quito, June2t,IX,

(Quito,ca de

Andean Trade: The Experienee of Quito Merchants, 1580-L610,Journal of Latin American Studies, 222, 265-28L; Michael- L.

endence: Urban DevelopmenEin a ColoniaL- System,tt410; Nicholas P. Cushner,the Development of Y,

22coo*.rrting upon Lhescarcity of curreDclr Robson

sociaJ.:eamificattons of . thisTyrer states in his study of the

an Tribute in Ecuador,"Hispanic American Historical Review (August, 1981), 51:3,

and Profit in' the Early.

hL

253

audiencia economy (p. 97) t

"It is critica-ify i.dportant to realize the roLe ofspecie to a Spaniard in a non-mining area. -Itaione gave hin contact with the trbnsatlantictrade ind the metropolis. He either had to gen-erate a cash lncome or li-ve a Life of completeprovinciality, rcalttry only in grain, livestockind home-nad-e comrodities. Money was the differ-ence bet\f,een living the l-ife of a Spaniard, thegente decente, or i montafies, a term which in@ meanffi-untain man, usuallyapptr-ying to a mestizo but incLuding poor whites aswe1l. Specie was Quito's only defense against atotally provincial existence. The quigeEogrealizLd'this and coveted it accordln-ff-ff

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23A="hi.ro s"tt"td*, IX. 59, golivar, Cuenca, SePtem-ber 23, L822.

24RA3N, Afro. r. no. 1, L26, Sucre, Quito, June 5, L822;135, Sucre, Quito, July 9, L822; L34-L37, Sucre, Quito, July9, L822; Espinosa Polit, Film 7285 (L822), Loja, Septembet 3,1822; Lilly-Library, MS, Sucre, ,Quito, September q, L82l;Hamerly. Historia social y econcimica, PF. t-32-133; AMi/Q, t.600, afro s-, Qirito, June 5, L822.

25nRgN, Aio, n.19, 22, L822.

1, 153-154, Pdrez, GuaYaquil, JulY

25Archivo Santander, Ix, L22, Sucre, Quito, OcLober2L, t822

2TArchi.ro S"otarrder, IX, 9, Sucre, Quito, August 9,L822; 3118ffi3, ?€rez, GuayaquiL, JuIy 31-, L822iEspinosa Po1ft, Film 7?34 (Salour), Guqyaquil, September 29,L822; AMI/Q, r. 601, afio 1822, v.6, fol. 4i valdivieso,Quito, July 3L, L822; Julio Tobar Donoso,_La iglesia ecuato-riana en el sislo XIX (Quito, 1934), P. 153.

28Fot a synopsis of Bishop Cuero y Caicedo'b role inthe .1809 and L810 jirntas see Jorle Salvailor Lara, Lg--P@-herdica (Quito, 1961), pp. 133-135; L45-L47.

29Dorro"o, @, p.5L0.3Olbid., pp. 153-L54. General Sucrets proposal call-ed

for a collecti6n--of 55,529 pesos. Bishop Santander's alter-naEe proposaL lowered the t6ta1. to 43,408 Pesos and_ distrib-uted ihe'burden in such a lilay that th6se ciergy with royalistsympathies paid substantially less.

3lawn/Q, r. 601, ^Xo

LB2z, v. 6, fql. 7 ,cabildo, Quito, July 3, 1822; ArchivoSucre. Ouiro. JuLv 21. 1822: Lffi

Santafider,Cartas del Libertador,

L55-156; BspinosaLecuna, Ibid.167-170.

Cuenca, DIay 18 ,Barrero, Cuenca

sus infortunarios

2s4

EcclesiasticalYIII, 377,

tIt

til

'I:I

ItI

Sucre, Quito, JuLy 21, 1822; Lecuna,III, 65, Guayaquil, August 3, 1822.

32Dorro"o. Ielesia ecuatoriana. DD.+'^^Polit, FiIm 73L4, Quito, October 8, L822,a2"Donoso, Lglesia ecuatoriana, pp.34Nobo", Coleccidn, p. 346, Cabildo, Ouito, June 21,

L822: Gacera de e61ffiETfr ttb. 50. tri. 4, september 29, L822.35O' L""ry , I'Iemorias , V. Lg6 , Heres ,

L822; 198-199, ilerffica, May 22, L822;en Pichincha, pp. 382-383.

36geNH, Afio r, n. 1, z7g-zilo; Espinosa pollt, FiLm7?.32 (Independence II), September 11, 1822; ANH/Q, t. 501,affo L822, v. 6, fols. 12-13, Larrea y Villavicencio, Riobamba,July 7-9, L822.

37O'L""ty, Memoqias, XIX. 372-374, P€rez, Cuenca,September 22, L822-

38Bo1Lr.r'" declaration establishing Guayaqui] as aseparate department took iuunediate effect in administrat,iveand nilitary terms. I"Iith regard to the elections, it wasdetermined to await congressional action to enlarge therepresentation from the south. Thus, all of the delegatesmet in Quito to select congressmen and senators from the onedepartment of Quito

39Arrtorrio Narifio (1765-LS 23) , the Precursor of Colom-bian independence, .had originally supported a strong centraL-ist folm of government. His experiences and the passing oftime mellowed his opinion. Narifio now adopted a criticalattitude toward the administration and argued that althoughcentralLsm !ilas necessary during the course of the war,eventually a broader federaList form of governnent'would bestserve the public. For a geperaL di-scussion of the centraList-federalist-debate in BogoEd see: Bushnell, Sgntapder Reeing

58-64 and thetd see: Bushnell, santander Regl.mg,iate chapters in Mois6s Baronpp. )u-o4 ano fne aPproprr.aEe cnapEers an uorses saron

Wilches, El- sino trSgico de Antonio Narifio (Sucaramanga, L969)and Jorge Ricardo Veiarana,su talli histdrica (Eogotai,

4oAr"hirro Santander, IX, 79-80; Sucre, Quito, October6, L822; 9@qui1, october 14, L822; @getg deCoLonbia, ilo . 56 , tri , 4,

- Ndvember 10 , L822i tlo . 70,t

1823; o'Leary, Memorias, rII, L02-103, Santander,

lrL t

1

255

Bogotd, June 6 , 1"823. .TLre three congressmen identified asfederalists were .loaqufn Ghiriboga hnd Jose'Guerrero ofQuico and Antonio l"larcos of Guayaquil.

4lGaceta de Colosibia, No. 74, tri. 3, August 4, L822.42-'-Lecuna, 9artas deL Libertador, III, 65, Guayaquil,

August 3, L822

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CHAPTER 7 - NOTES

lArchivo Santander, IX, 4L, Cuenca, September 13,lB22; 125@1 29, L822; R. 8lanbo-Fomboa, €d.,ca_rras de nolivar, 1823-L824-1825 (l.tadrid, 1921) p. 402,

3, 1822.

Husares. The Paya and I'Iagdalena were combined to forn thePichincha battali-on. llhe Yaguachi was the onLy battalionrr-cnr-ncha DaEEaIr-on. 'Ihe Yaguachi vras the only battalroncomposed entirely of troops from the south, It was courposedof various companies of Guayaquil recruits and had partici-of various companies of Guayaquil recru,its and had partici-pated in the bittLe of Pichindha. Jose'Roberto lbafrgz S{n-Lhez, Campana deL sug:_ L8_22i, Bomba-Pichincha (BogotJ, L972)pated in the battLe of Pichincha. Josd n-

PP. 2375i;;il ;-i"-iii";;e-;.i";;il (ilEil},B4S,Celq4bfa en__!e Ii-bergad del Perrl (69 , 75.

3tu"rrr,", Cartas del Libertador, III , 36, Pasto, June9, L822. AL the Pasto had'a popuiationof approximately 23,340 citizens. It is estimated that-L2,300 were Indians', 740 were pardos, 7,700 trere mont4feses(mgstizos,andPoor-whites)and-2,600wereSpaniar{FffiioElias Ortiz, Agustfn Agualongo y su tiempo (Bogotri, 1958),p. 26.

VenezuelanQuito with the

company of Captain General- Mourgeon. Agualongo was a mestizoborn in Pasto in L780. He gained some notoriety as a paintbefore ioinine the royal rnilitia and risins in the ranks to

e notor!-ety as a par-nterrising in the ranks to

5Ortiz, $gu4f9gg9, p. 448; Lecuna,

III, 23/',; Franiiffi-ffi3-Vicuta, Las GuerLeLL- rc,ZJ r D.lrlLJ.agu, L7+V ) t pp . J9O-J97 .

s a mateinii nepf,ew'bf che venecaudillo Tour/s Rodr{guez Boves. He ariived in Quito u

before Joining the royal,rnilitia and rising in the ranLieutenant ColoneL. Ortiz, Agualongo, pp. 14-L9, 448.

6}tt{t, Agualoogo, p. 455; O'Leary, }Iemorias, XIX,4LL--4L2, 4L5-4L8;-Feilauito, December 31, llffispinosaPollt, Film 7340 (L820-18?3), Quito, November 8, 1823; Lil1ytibrary, MS, Sucre, Tulca'n, November 15 , L822; ANH/Q, t. 603,

4nRgIrI, Atlo I, n. 1, !32, Sucre, Quito, June L4, L822.

256

bi

trl

257

af,o L822, y. 8, fol. 10, Quito, November Ll , 1,822; fol. 33,Latacu,nga, November 16, L822. General Salom was unhappy withhis administrative obligations as Intendant and petitioiredBolivar to be replaced. On 0ctober 5, L822, the Liberatornamed Colonel Juan Illingrot to repLace Sa1om. Cormrentingupon this appointment in-a letter to Santander Bolfvar oblserved:

He has a great knowledge of the country and peopLeand has married a rich lroman from there; he hastalent and- honor, is very Colombian and Lt appearshis British character will not hinder his abi,lityto comand.

Lecu:ra, Cartas del Libertador, III. 109, Cuenca, October 27,L822. I reer in s-erviee to Colombia arechronicled in Camilo Destruge, Biograffa del Gral. Don JuanIllingworrh (Guayaquil, 1915) :

Tr,rtty Library, MS, Sucre, Tuquerres, November 29,)52?i -Q'Leqryl Mesroriii, xix, 403-40+,

-sucre, q"iio, -becember

8, L822; 420-42re, Quito, December 3l ,'LiZZ.80' t""ry, !4gslglies, XXVIII, 183.gO'L""ty,

Memorias, XIX, 4O4, Heres, Quito, December31, L822, Rivas-vi@, pp. 316-i7L; AEglr-ivoSantander, Ix, 204, goliiAii|Tiffi'Jinuary 8, 182f-

10o'L".ry, Memorias, xlx, 43L-432, Bando, pasto,January 13, L823;434, Pelrez, Pasto, January 14, 1823; QrtLz,AgualonAo, pp. 457-459; Archivo Santander-, IX, 205, Bolivar,@ueiy 4,.L823: @ers'granied landwere General Jesds Barreto, Colonel Arturo Saniies, ColonelLucas Garvajal and Lieutenant Colonel Juan Josd Flores.

llO'L..ty. Memorias , )HVIII . 186 : OrELz. Aeualonso .-46L; A.

- J.ffiuzmdn, obando-1795-1j6f-ffi4;,ppr - 46A-46L; A. J.-Eeuos-Tuzmdn, Obando 1795-!86I-TFfpyd1959), p. 76; Archivo Santander, IX, zLL, Bolivar, Pasto,

q

q

i

E

January L4, 18U3.

dlri*."L2--KesErepo, Historia,

afras de aSanELago,2,77-78.

425; GonzdLez Bul-nes,IV, 368,ndencia

t

ll

-13_--Lecuna, Crdnica tazonada, III,

der, IX, 232, Sucffiy 30,GT f.tbertador, LII , 168- 169 , Guaylquii ,@' Pgrticipacidn, t, bZjAA.'

239; Archivo Santan-L823;-LE?tiil-ffiApril 15, L82E-

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l4At"hito Smt"rrd"r,IX, 2L4, Sucre, Quito, January 2i-,1823; z43@bruary 6, L823; Lecuna, larta! delI,_fbgqlgdq, III , L44, Guaranda, February 3 , 1823; Affi7$f607rc-[823, v. 1, fol. 231, Arando, Guaranda, February 16,L823; fol. L37, Ponce, Ibarra, January 29, 1823; foL. 204,Villegas, Esmeraldas, February L3, L823.

IsBnL,rr"", dltim"s caq[t*fias-, pp. 105-116; cortds VargasParticipacidn, i,]tr5T6-

160'L""ry, Memorias, XIX, 509, Espinar, Guayaquil,1823; ArihiVo-Eantander, IX, 268, Sucre, Qui.to,25. lgzffiavaquil. i'ebruarv ig. rs, 162m;yaquil, Februari ig, 1923.

l7cortd"

March 15,February

Santander, IX,ffiEFibosa

Gus-di-

ca-rieidos por las autoridacles de rtamento

Guayaqui.l, Apri-I ?1, \9??; O'Leary, &morias, XIX,Guayaquil, March 14, 1823.

Eetez,466, Pdrez

lSArchivo Santander, IX, 25g, Sucre, Quito, Feb.ruary2O,1823;@i,Lm-7286'(1823-iai+1,Farfdn,l65aMarch 8, 1823; O'Leary, Memorias, XIX, 466, Pdrez, Guayaquil,March 14, )qry; Chiribog6]l.@idr,, p. 73, Aguirre, Quito,.l,larch 25, L823; f gO-f f Zi SuffiFffio ,'March 25, 1,823 . '

l9l."".rrr", Cartas de1 Liberta4or, III, L82, Guayaquil,May L4, 1,823; X, 3, 1823. 'i'tre tirodeparting veteran units were the Rifles and Bogota'battal-ions

20-r:.spl.nosa Pol{t, Film 7340 (1820-1823), rndex ofappointments, April 25, L823; El-ias Laso, "Juan Jose'Flores,"RABN, Affo I, n. 1 (1937), pp. 169-183.

2lat"ni.ro S"rrt.rra"r, IX, 2gg, Sucre, Quiuo, t"larch 21,L823; 2591--Sucre, aulEo,-Tebruary 20, 1823; Le Ghouir, Histo-ria de1 Ecuador,@

p. ffO ; Lecuna, - Carias dei Liberrador,E

prLL 29, L823; 1 L2,p. 110; Lecuna, Cartas del

Aoril 29. L823: 15ffiL823.

22---Lecuna, Cartas del. Libertador, III, 168-169, Guaya-quil, April L5,'1 dged rhat the'majolityof the recruits from the south were married men with childrenwhich he explained as an unavoLdable consequence of the Localfavor for early marriage.

23o'L""ry, Memorias, xx, 33-34 , PJrez, Guayaquil, llayL7, 1823, 86-88, Pdte.z, Guayaquil, June 5, L823; BJ-anco-Fomboa, Cartas, p. 16, Salom, Guayaguil, llay 21, 1823; LecunaCrdnica razonlda, III , 248-2t+9.

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Z4ottir, Agualongo, pp. 467-469; Rivas Vicufia, ,LasGuerreq,. pp. a6g:![f-Elficb--Fomboa, Cir'tas, p. 37 , SuEEffiJirire 21, 1823.

25n"pir,osa pot{r, Film 72g6 (L8?3-1824)Quito, June-21, 1823; ANtt/Q, t. 609, afro 1823,Aguirre, June 19, L823; Otleary, Memorias., )O(,A[uirre, Quito, june 2i., L823.-'

Cartas del Libertador. III.obambi,

259

, Aguirre,v. 3, fol. 148,140-141,

219-220, Sucre,June 25, 1823.

26L""rrr,",Garzal, june 21,

31o' L""ry,July 23, 1823.

z7o'L""ry,l{elqqr.1qs, Xx, L42-L43, Salou, Quito, June-23, L823; 159-160,8ffi7, Quiro, June'28, L8i3 i tl+, gof{-var, Quiuo, JuLy 4, 1823; L69-L70, Demarquet, Quito, July 3,L823; 202-203, Demarquet, San Pablo, July 16, L823.

28O'L.rry, Memorias, IV , 376-377, Olmedo, Quito., July!4, L823; Bulnei,. UTEliilEiliarneifias , pp. 'L88-198; iortds Var-Bas, PariicipaciJnfTl-I6'fiGE

29O'L".ty, Mernorias, xx , 2L8-2Lg, Bol,{var, Ibarra,July 18, L823; 222, DemErquet, Quito, July 22, 1-823.

30O'L..ty, Memorias, xX, 182-L83, Demarquet, otavalo,July 8, 1823; 21.0,-D6'd@et, Ibarra, July 18, -1823; 223-224,Demarquet, Quito, JuLy 22, L823; Polit, Film 7286 (L823-1824)Demarquet, Quito, July 23, 1823.

ltemorias, XX, 225-227, Demarquet, Quito,

32l.""rrr,., Cartas del Libertjrdor, X, 426, Santander,

t ryt ---, ev- rv-

Restrepo, I[i9!gl!g, V, 94. Bol{var's continuation of a Sup-erior Chief for the south, exercising the extraordinary

Quito, JuIy 21, 16lI;33o'L".ry, Memor XX, 245-248, P6,rez, Guayaquil,

ica razonada, III. 302-303:August 3, 1823; Lecuna, @, III, 302-303;

faculties by proxy nas a highly questi-onable nanuever whicheven the Minister of the Interior, and historian, Restrepodescribed as a t'complex irregularity" leaving the nationaladministration with only the sual,lest role in an importantarea.

34R."tr"po, Historia, V, g1-g7; Ordz, Agualongo, pp.478-479; o'Leary,

-t'lenoE-u, 385-387, SalornfQffil

September 25, 1i]23:-

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35o'L."ry, Meqlrrias, Jo(l , 442, Espinar, Pativilca,February4,L824;ffigua1'ongo,PP.480-481,487;Res;rrepo, f{i"ioria,'v, 113-11f,13ffi12j' ct iriboge, coliccil{n,p . 37 , AiGffo,-epteuber 1.5 , 1823 ; Espinosa Pol,ft ,:TililT5z(Independencia I), Morales, Quito, July 1L, 1824.

36B1trr"o-Fomboa, Gartas, p. 45, Crespp, Lima, Septem-ber 10, L823; O'Leary, MffiE'q,-XX, 368, Pdrez, Lina,September 23, 1823; Gacffitlfrolombia, No. 132, tri. 10 ,apiir 25, L824; g,tln@, pp. 267-276; corcdsVirgas, Participacidn,'Ima,-bartas, IIt, 289-292, Salom, Pallasca, Deceuiber 8, L823.

37B1.rr"o-Fomboa, CarJe€, p. 169, Salom, Pativilca,February I0, 1824; O'Learl:jffimq-Ell4s , Xl(I , 538 , Espinar,pativilla. Februaiv 14 . r624:-ffia. carias a6t liberte.t'ebruary lu, L6z4; u - Leary, Memoraas , JlJtr, )JU,parivilta, February 14 , I824;ffia, Gartas del tador,IV, L04, Salom, Trujillo, March 14, LIZT,

3Sertrn/Q, t. 618, afro !824, v. 5, foI. 89, Chillogallo,March L8, L824; fol. 82, Cutacuchi, March L8, L824; fol. 196,Cotacochi, March 3L, L824i t.. 619, afio 1824, v. 6, fol. 67,Otavalg, May 18, L824; fol . L25, Cuenca, AIay 29, L824; t,.620, aio 1824, v, 7, fol. 186, Tinajero, Anbato, August 3,L824; fol. L76, Morales, Quito, August 2, L824; t.. 622, afioL824, v. 9, fol. l-81, Riobanrba, December 17, L824.

39Cortd" Vargas, Participacidn, II, 9-16, 57-5g, 81-82.over 900 men under Ehe cffiral Jose'Mar{a Co'r<iobadeparted Guayaquil for Peru in late February, L824. In MayGuayaquil received the ZuLLa battalion and the Dragonessquadron from Venezuela, totaling 940 men. This number wasincreased ro L,957 with the addition of recruits from thesouth. On YIay 25, L824 this group departed for Peru. OnJune 5, L824 over 160 nen of the Guias squadron saiLedsouthward. A further departure in early October includedL43 Venezuelan Lancers and 164 recrui.ts from Quito, Cuencaand Guayaquil.

- 4Or"pinosa Pol{t, Film 7344, Bogotd, June 15, L824;Corte-s Vargas, SaqticrpgcE-o'n,, III , 2L0-2LL, Bogot{, }4ay I-1,L824;2LL-2L2,@,L824i2L2-2L3,Bogotd,il'ay28,1824; Gaceta de Colornbia, No, L36, tri. 10, l{,ay 23, L824.

4lcottd" Vargas, Participacidn, III, 79, 92,95-98;Resrrepo, Historia ,

-V, ltrt;I[NE7QTE 62L , afio L824 , v . 8 ,fol. L26, CeGTai', Quito, September 13, L824; t. 622, a?rol-824, v. 9, fol. 11, Contador General, San Roque, Octobet 2,L824.

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. 42R."trepo, Histoti4, V, L89; Cortds Vargas, Partici-oacidn. Ir . 27 4-: Buffiiifrimas ca.upafras . DD . 5+o-s63-5ru2i:6T; nipinosa p6rit, Fiimmd'3ucre), sucre,Andalusia, December 23, L824; ANH/Q, t. 625, afio J.825, v. 3,fol. 19, Borrero, Ibarra, January 10, 1825; Orl,eary, {elqorig€,IV, 362-363, Castillo, Guayaquil, January L5, L825-,

43}tt!", Agualongo, p. 495; Restrepo, Historia, v,375; corrds v.ie@, ru, 3b8i m'ZE-'. 6Lz,aifo 1823, v. 6 ,

-folsl-9FfOffioria departarnentai, Quito,December 31, L824.

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leun7q, a. Gol, afro 1823, v. 1, fo1. 19, ponce, Lata-cunga, January 4, 1823; t. 608, aflo 1823, v. 2, fol. 134,Araujo, Guaranda, March 17, L823; fol. L32, Ayuntamiento,Guaranda, Ilarch J,7, 1823; t. 6L9, afio 1824,. v. 6, fol. 67,Zambrano, Otavalo, May 18, L824; t. 620, afio L824, v. 7, foL.L76, Moral-es, Quito, August 2, L824.

n'Bushnell. Sar:tander Reeime. pp. 30-3L. Bushnellnotes that both ttrelffih?EE-6'ItTficli and the functionsthe municipalities were sharply curtailed by the republicangovernment:

"If they were not actually complaining abouttheir election to municipal office, which wasno longer a favorite outlet for creole ambi-tions, they were f-ikel-y to be assailing theencroachment of new fangled national officialson their own prerogatives.r' (p. 31)

3gmt/Q, p. 607, afio 1823, v. 1, for. 26)-, ort{2,Tumaco, February 18, 1823; Archivo Santan5ler, IX,2I3, Roca,Guayaquil, Januaiy 15, L823;@, No. 46, tri.7, Aufusr-17, Lg23; BANH, 2i,-ffie, Qui-ro,January 30, L823; Lecuna, 9a1:las ,{q!_Llbertadog, III , 144,Guaranda, February 3, L823-

44.rtfqrr"z B: nli6cer, $(Quito, L945), pp. 17-18, Sucre,

CHAPTER 8 - NOTES

gqchlyo,_Sarrtanjgg, IX, 2L6, SucArcnlvo Sancander, IX, zLb, liucre, qu@ the Vice-President:

ito: rel-ieario de Sucreuerres,

of

a

"The depqties have given excuses fior not attendingcongresfl , che papefs, oL letters ,'-of San Miguelhave gained devotees Land there is a party offederal-ists who l-ook to see the independence ofQuito. r'

5AM1/Q, t. 6L3, afio 1823, v. ? , fol. L-2, Municipaliry,Quito, January 7, L823.- ,The membets of the cabildo $tere:ManueL de la- Pefra, Jost! Alvares, Ignacio Ventemilla, JuanAntqnio Terdn, Ramdn Aguirre, MinuEl G6mez Po1anco,-JosdPol{t, Domingo de1 Matzo, Antonio Pifieda, Ignacio Zaldumbide,Pable Bascones, Ignacio Ochoa, Feliciano ChEca, and JosdMar{a de Salazar.

262

l*,L,

263

6Bushne11, Santbndbr Reeine, pp. 315-316; Lecuna,e1 Libertacln-, IIL 'l4l; Quito, January 31, L823;

Espinosa PoLit, FiLm 7301- (1825-1828) Borja y Borja, Quito,

ll1

TNovember 26, L82.5. Angel Isaac Chiriboga N., ".81 CoronelDon Carlos Montrifar y f,arrea, el hdroe ids autdntico y vene-rado de lq patria ecuatoriana,"hispanoamdr^ica, 4 vols. (caraias,ffi. rg4.- Bolf-var told Santander that Aeuirre was a leader of the "ancientvar told Santandeq that Aguirre was a leader of the "ancientparty of the Montrifars. " "I'he L823 financial statement of theSan Lorenzo Hospital noted that the hacienda Chillo oncebelonging to the }[arque's de Selva ALegre rtas .no!r the propertyof Vicen-e Aguirre. Aguirre also married Dolta Rosa l4ontffar,the daughter of the Marquds.

/AM{/Q, t. 613, af,o J.823, v. 7, fol. L-2, MunicipaLi-tI, Quito, Janrrary 7, L823

Sang/Q, t. 613, afio L823, v. 7, for. 3-4, Aguirre,Quito, January 9, L823.

9ruia.

l0Alvtt/Q, t. 613, afro L823, v. r, fol. 5, Aguirre,Quito, January 10, 1823; fol. 6, Municipality, Quito, JanuaryL4, 1823; foL. 7, Aguirre, Quito, January 15, 1823; fol". 8,llunlcipality, Quito, January L7, 1823.

llaNH/Q, t. 613, afio 1823, v. 7, for. Lz, Borrero,Quito, January 18, 1823.

12ruia.

l3l,tgH/Q, t. 613, afio 1823, v, 7, fol. 13, Municipariry,Quito, January 19,_ L823. The arrested qernbers were: Ram6nAguirre, Manull G6mez Polanco, Josd Polft, Domingo del Ylatzoand Antonio Pineda,

I4lbid,, Lecuna, Cartas det Libertqdor, III, 14L,Quito, January 30, L823; 0, Sucre, Quito,January 30, L823

15ANII/Q, ,. 609, afio 1823, v. 1, fol. z7s, Municipali-ty, Quito, February 2L, 1823; t.608, aflo 1823, v. 2, fol. 86,I"Iunicipality, Quito, March 14, L823; fol. 158, Municipality,Quito, March 21, L823; foL. 166, Municipelity, Quito, l'larch 23,L823; foL. 62, Corte Superior, Quito, D1arch 11, 1823; foL.155, Corte Superior, Quito, March 21. 1823; Chiriboga,Coleccidn, p. 65, Aguirre, Quito, February L2, J-823; p. 59,&ffiauito,FebruaryL9,L823;p.75,Aguirre,Quito,March 21, L823; p. 77, Aguirre, Quito, March 5, 1823.

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16corr"r.t, Correspondenciq,

264

II, 380, Bol{var, Guaya-quil, April 29, L82

l7R.pt""entative Josd Joaqu{n Chiriboga introduced thecharges into the house of Representatives. Doctor lgnacioHerrera Vergara served as prosecutor before the Senate.

Ll(;ottdr^t, Congreso de -1Q!-1;

Actas, pp. 28L, 2g2-2g3,333, 478, 532 556,

_I9^gmr/Q, r. 60g, afio 1823, v. 3, fot. 15g, Bogot|, ,June 2L, L823. The three represFntatives stere Josd JoaquinGhiriboga, Mariano Mifro and Josd Guerrero.

20O'L."ry, Memorias, XxI, 508-509, Maya, Qulto,February 9, L824; 5T0ffi ltunicipality,.Quito, August 20,1823.

2letw/Q, r. 605, af,o LBZ2, v. 10, fol. 7g-gz, Aguirre,Quito, December 3, t822; L. 607, afio 1823, v. 1, fol. 220,L6pez, Quito, February 14, L823; t. 611, afio L823, V..5, foL.183, Aguirre, Quito, December 10, L823; Espinosa PoLft, Film73,40 (1820-1823), Index, l'larch 29, 1823; Restrepo, Diario Po-litico, I, 247-248. In December 1823 Aguirre receiveil re-pEFthat counciluran Josd Polit had coiducted "suspicious"-conversations with Lieutenant Joaquin Villavicencio- of theGufas squadron. In February 1823 a report to the Intendantclaimed that Pineda and Ante in company with thre.e otherquitefros, Josd Canisares, Camilo Caiaa-s, and JoSd Bosmediano,ffiedthegovernmentbychargingthatCo1ombianru1ewasmore despotic than that of the Spaniards and expressed hopesfor independence for Quitoi

22---Lecuna, -0e_E!4_g _del_L_ibeEqdql, IV, 23, Pativilca,

January 15, L'824; y 16, L824; O'Leary,llemorias, I. L23, Bol{var, Huanuco, January 28, L824; X)iI,57I, Pdiez, Pativilca, February 20, L824,

23BL.r,"o-Fomboa. Cartas. DD. I16-118. Pativilca,January 9, L824; erchivo-ffindli, Xr , 2n:245 , Pdrez',Pativilca, Januarf 9; TgZ6t Lecuna, Cartas del Libertadof , IV,11-12, Pativilea, January 9, L824.

24Autt/Q, r. 6J,g, afro !824, v, 6, foL. 1,13, Quiro, May26, L824.

2s_Esplnosa pollt, Film 7334 (Satour), Salom, Quito, May26, 1824; O'Leary, Jul,emorias, XXI, 507-509, Corte Superior,Quito, February 7-91-13'24f-StS, Aguirre, Quito, Febluary L0,L824; X)(II, 274-279, Aguirre, Quito, May ?, L824i 279-282,

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265

Hidalgo, Quito, May ?, L824; 401-403, Hidalgo, Quito, June ?,L824.

26o'L."ry, Memorias, xxII , 396-397, Salon, Quito, June8,L824;4o4,Cbrt@or,Quito,June28,LB24;ANtl/Q,t.6L7, afio 1824, v. 4, fol. 7, Larrea, Quito, January 2, L824;Blanco-Fomboa, Cartas, p. L62, Pativilca, February 4, L824;AIIH/Q, t. 518, EfiilfBZal v. 5, fot. 26, Municipallty, March9, L824; x. 620, afio 1824, v. 7, fol. L2, Itunicipality, July2, L824; t. 62L, afro L824;. v. '8,. fol. 139, Municipality.,September !4.,']8?4. .. The members of the 1824municipa.fiiy wEre: Josd llaria de Arteta, Manuel Mufioz, Ju-dnAnge, iosd ie Vivanco-,_ Josd M. Vergara,.Nicol6 Echevarrfa,Lufs Salvador, Pedro M. Quifiones, iufs'de Sda, JosdMariaSdenz, Camilo Caldas, and Josd I'Ianuel Larrea, the Marquds deSan J6sd

zTcaceta de colgmbia, No. I42, tri. 11, July 4, L824.2B_--Lecuna, C@, IV. 288-289, Bogotd,

llarch.21, lsryi.301@ 1824; Restrepo, Diariop9llEico, I,25!+.

29Cort{zat, Gongreso de 1823: Actas, pp. 306-307,Restrepo , Historia, d-o- Garaicoa,Sino'psis deL dgrechq _te4rltqrie! qcuatorj4nq (Guayaquil,

clared dhe prov-inces of Pasto, Popaydn, and Buenaventura to be the Depart-ment of Pasto. The national law of territorial divisionredefined the area. Pasto, Popaydn, and Buenaventura werethen annexed to the Department of Cauca.

30-. t.spr.nosa PoI{t, Film 7286 (1823-1824), Restrepo,Bogotd, January 2L, 1824.

1

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3lcottd,r"t. coneI

CorFd,zar, Bd., Congresoeso de l-823: Actas, p.

tas3O7, Roberto(Bogota', 1931)

pp. 2L3, 2L6, zTq August

Actas (BogotJ, IV,295-30i, Eogoid, aprit^ 10, :-3z4; Alvarid@,TTT-3IL, Bogotrf, April 10, L824; Alvarado Gaiaicoa, Sinopsisp. L24-L25.- Th; liw of territorial division estabiiE'h€three departmerrts and eighr provinces for the south. I'hedepartments were Ecuador, Azuay, and Guayaquil. Their cap-iraL cities ldere Quito, Cuenca, and GuayaquiL. Ecuadorencompassed the provinces of Inbabura, Pichincha and Chinbo-tazo. The provincial capitals were Ibarra, Quito, and Rio-bamba. Azuay encompassed the provinces of Cuenca, Loja, andJaez or Jaen de Bracamoros. Jaen felL within disputed terri-tory between Peru and Colombia and remained under Peruvian

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controL. The towns of Cuenca and Loja seryed as provincialcapitals., Guayaquil encompassed the provinces of Guayaquiland Manabi with Guayaquil and Portoviejo the provinciirLcapitals.

a(t"Espinosa Pol{t , 73OL (.L825-L828), Junta Provincial,

Quito, Oct,ober 11., L825; p4ceta de Colombia, No. 178, tri. L4,l{arch 13, 1825; No. 185; @25; No. 2L8, tri.L8, December 18, L825; No.227, tri. J-9, February 19, 1826;ANH/Q, t. 622, afio L824, v. 9, fol. 91, Borrero,- Ibarra,November L6, -I824i t.623, ailo 1825, v. 1, fol. 118-L25, Res-trepo, Bogotd, May 6, 1825; t. 624, afio 1825, v. 2, fol. 83-88, Riobanba, November 1, 1825; t. 626, afio 1-825, v. 4, fol.31, Guaranda, April L7,1825; t. 628, afio L825; v. 6, foL.88,Quito, November 11, 1825; t. 630, afro L826, v. 2, fo1. l-56,Quito, Jtrne 10, 1826

33a,mt/Q, t. 626, afio 1825, v. 4, fol. 32, Nava, Esme-raldas, May 31, 1825; Gaceta de Colqmbie, No.L78, rri. L4,March 13, 1,825; No. 18m LBZI; Roberto Corrd-zar and Lufs Aueust,o Cuervo. eds.. Conereso de 1-825: Senado:zar and Lufs August,o Cuervo, eds., Congreso de L825: Senado:Actas (Bogord, 1952), pp. 27L-272.

34get{H/Q, rrr , 286, Quito, June zs, LB2z; Gacera deColombia, No.47, tri. 4, September 8, L822; RABIfJffino. 1,_ 165 \d\9?, Gulyaquil, {uly 31, L822; O'Leary, Memo-,qias, XX, 1"6L-162, Bolivar, July 1, 1823.

3str"pir,osa Pol{t, Filpr 7340 (1820-1823), Index, April1, 1823; Chiriboga, Col"eccidn, p. 267., Valdivieso, Quito,{rlg 15, L824; BLMI/Q;ffi89; Bol{var, Quito, Juiy Z7',tE23; O'Leary, Ugggr:lgg, XX, 56L-562, Ortega, Quito,-NovemberL2, L823; )ili; 8fffi-;lvador, Quito, DecEmbei O , LB23 iAiItt/Q, t. _ 607, ?ffo 1823, v. L, foL. 2L2, ViLlegas , Esmeraldas,February 13, 1823; t. 6L7, atlo L824, v. 4, foL-146, SociedadEcondmica, Quito, February L824; t.. 524, afio L825, v. 2, fo1.56, Junta Provincial-, Quito, October 21, L825; Gaceta deColourbia, No . 2L8, tri .- 18 , December 18 , L825 i N-o-39;tri .19, Aoplil 2, L826; No. 237, tri. 19, April 30, L826..

36-ssprnosa Polit, Film 730. (1820-L824), Bogotd,December 21, L824,

37Bushne11,so de L823: Actas,

Regime, p. 29; Coxtd.zat, Gongre-

3SE"pioosa Po,l{t, Film 7300 (Appendix 1824), Bogotd,lftay 29 , L824; Bogotd, July 15, L824; Gaceta de Qolomb'',,", No.206, t;i. !7', seftern6er 25, tbz::i; N6.-ffiirber2, L825; I,lo . 22L, tri . 18, January 8, L826; No . 235, tri . L9 ,April L6, L826; No. 240 , tr:L. 20 , May 2L, 1826, No. 243, trl.

Santander

267

20, June 11, L826i No.245, tri.20, June 25, 1826, No. 252,tri. 20, August I-3, L826.

Ge:mans

Botero de(Bogotd,

1971), pp.

4zcottdr^r,I78-L79, 445-446,Cuervo, eds.,

Flores, Quito, Novemberpp. 226-227.

Conereso .de L825: Senado.4reso de'1825: Cf,mara de Re

pp . L3-3- 138, 168,and Lufs Augustopresentantes:

14Oaun/Q, t. 624, a{o 1825, v. z, fcL. 84, expediente,

Riobanba, Guaranda, Al-ausf, November L, L825; t. 626, afioL825, v. 4, fol. 31, tlerena, Guaranda, April LT, L825; t.631-, afio L826, v. 3, fol. 84, Ldpez y Escbvar; Quito,FebruaryL7,1826;t.632,afio].825;v.4,Fol.18,Borrero, Ibarra, April 8, 1826; t. 633, a6o 1826, v. 5, fol.L18, Borrero, Ibarra, May 30, L826; fol. 15, Viteri, Latacun-Ba, June 4, L826; Qaceta de Colonbia, l{o- 218, tri. 18, Decem-ber 18, 1825; Bush , p.82.

4L^'-Anuario colombiano de historia social v de la cuLtu-ga (Bogot .

rl

, tri.624, , fol. 73,1825. Bushnell, Santander Regime,

43cottd,r^t, so de 1825:Humphreys, €d. , BriEEePolitic-s of Latii-'rffiffi

ularSenado. o.rts on the

445; Robert A.Trade and

aleeele--de Colo-lqbia, No. 208, tri. L7 , October 9,L825; No.ffiember 4, iezS; AuttiQ, t. 624, afr.o1-825, v. 2, fols. 56-62, Provincial Junta, October 2l-Novem-ber 6, L825.

4s}ort!."ar, Gongreso de 1825: Senado, p. 590. Onl,larch 25, 6 iresented aproposal to the full senate proposing to assist the nationalliquor and wine industry bv prohibiting the importation offoreign-made aguardiente. The president of the Senate ledthe rnajority debate opposing the proposaL. He specificaLlynoted that accepting the move could be a dangerous precedentwhich could lead to the type of protectionism advocated byQuito. The measure was defeated.

;-

268

46n"pirrosa- Polit, Film 7332 (Independence II)rSoublette, Bogotd, l.larch 24, 1826. lbe Minister of War,CarLos Soubl-ette, reported to the Quito uunicipality thatmilitary uniforms produced in England cost twenty pesos eachwtrile those produced in Quito cost forty to forty-four pesos.Soublette told the council that while the government lrasprepared to accept an eight to twelve percent increase incost for the local product, the L00 percent difference deur-onstrated that the quitefio suppliers rrere engaging Ln spec-ulation and did notffie g6vernnent suppoitl

47 cortiz"t, Correspondencia, VI, 479-480, Municipality,Quito, May 5, 1826

48Bushne11, S@ /bp. 2L7, 219; Botero delos Rios; congfes6 d;W6'-242, 303-346, 324-336,345-347 , 677-679.

49-'-Gee@ No. L24, tri. 10, February 29,L824; Bus p.

- 200 ; auHi Q, r . 633 , atlo

1825, v. 5, fo1. 72, Escudero, Latacunga, June l-9, 1826;Donoso, Iglesia ecuatoTiana, pp. 228-229.

50Dorro"o, Iglesia Ecuatoriana, FD.193-195; ANH/Q, t.629, afio L826, v.ffiio-,'Ibarra, iune g,'nZO;t. 633, affo L826, v.5, fo1. 101, Municipality, Otavalo, June23, L826; Bushnell, Santandgr Regime, p. 2L7.

5lDorro.o, Iglesia ecuatorlana, pp. L95, 245t Gaceta decolombia, No. 2i6m'12, LgZ6r no.'2I6;ffii8, December 4, 1825; ANH/Q, t. 624, afio 1,825, v. 2, fols.56-62, Provincial Junta, Quito, Octobey 2L to November 6,L8?6; Espinosa Polit, Film 730L (l-825-1828), Provincial" Junra,Quito, October 13, 16, 18, L825; Fil"u 7286 (1826-1827), Flores,Quito, Jaiuary ??, L826; O'Leary, Memorias, IV, 5-6, Flores,Quito, l4ay 7, L826.

52Rntt/Q, r. 607, afio 1823, v. 1, fol. 2g3, Romo, sanMiguel-, Februaty 25, L823; t. 608, aflo 1823, !,- 2, fo1. I-04,Romo, San Miguel, March 15, L823; Espinosa Polit, Film 7286(L823-L,824), Quito; October 27 - November 15, 1823; Luis Roba-lino Ddvila, _Orfgenes del gcuador de ho.y_(Puebla, 1967), I,99; ANiI/Q, t,. g, Romo, Ibarra,August L4, L825i t. 628, afro 1825, v. 6, foI. 99, Romo, Lata-cunga, Novembeq 14, 1825; foL. 108, Sal.vador, Quito, November18, 1825; Cortdzar, Congreso de 1823; Actas, pp, 456-458;Gaceta de Colombia, No:-gf,f-f,- FpEnT'er-1, 1823.@stances to Bogotd from the departnentalcapitals are: Quito, 700 miles, Guayaquil, 875 uiles, Cuenca988 miles.

h

269

53Bushne11, Santander Regime, p. 52; Gaceta de Colom-. 80. rri.6ffi, iqo. 84.ffi

gg9aaa.9a-t ysragg..se: r\bh-srbt ya J-l vs9vgg 9v

bia, No. 80, tri. 6, April 27, 1823; No. 84, tri. 6, l{.ay 25,_ble, No. UU, UrL. O, APrLI ll, LAZJ; No. 64, tfa. O, yLay 2

T82g; No: _zl\r ^!ri_._ L8, . JanuaTy 9r 1-826; _No. -???, tri . .18,January 15, L826; No; 24L, tri. 20, I"lav 28, 18261 CortdzatJanuary 15, L826; No;ebo de L824: Re

resentantes, p,

congressmen the debt assigned to southern congressmen lras

PP. _1 , 2-3, 31, 49i Senado,ted fines for absent

andconsiderabLe. Following the 1824 congress, it totaled L2,992pesos for eighteen absent members, In L826, four contsinualLyabsent representatives alone garnered 9,500 pesos in penalties.

54}ottdrrt, Congreso de 1824: Senado, pp. 326-327.55Restrepo, @qg5!e, v. 401.

CHAPTER 9 - NOTES

lBushnell, Santander Regine., pp. 323-328; Restrepo,Historia, V, 249-26-

2l"dto Grases, Estudios bqliyarlaIros (Caracas, 1981)pp. 401-403, 42L-446.

-, 3Bushnell, Santander Regime, p. 332; Destruge, Biogra-

fia lEinsnroEEh, _p. , IV , 607", ffaffQuito, June 26, L826.

O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, L7-20, Guayaquil, July 6,Lq?6;40-4L, QuitoJffir4, L826;57-5g, Culnda, August li,1826; Gaceta de Cglombia: Supl-enento, No. 254, Augus- 27, L826.

so'L."ry, llemorias, IX , 440-44!, Valdds, GuayaguiL,July 8, L826.

6Restrepo, Hi.storia, V, 284i O'Leary, Memorias, IX,183-188,Mosqueia,@1,August19,L826;-TofrFdipr.ianode llosquera, Memoria sobre la vida deI General Simcjn Bolfvar:Llbertaglpr de . ,

8Otl""ry, Memo.rias, XXIV, 57-58, Cuenca, August 1,1826; IV, 454, Tor-es,-Tuenca, August 29, 1826; ANH/Q, t. 634,afio l-825, v. 6, fols. 18-L9, CuenEa, August 4, L826.

-

TCottdr^t, Correspondencia, V, 445-447, Flores, Quito,July 21, 1826; o'Le@rrl, 643; t(xrv, 40-4L,l.Iurlueytio, Quito, July : 409-4L1. Mureuevtio. Ouitl.Iurgueytio, Quito, JuIy fAlJuly 18, L826.

; 409-4LL, Murgueytio, Quito,

Portoviejo, July 16,L826; No, 257, September L7,L826; ANIIL7, L826;

o1. 64, Guayaquil, July

2, fols. l.Quito, July 20,

Guayaquil-. July 19, L826.LB26; t. 6g0,

-1fr;-14i6, -;1

loct.""",56-57, BoL{var,August 3, L826;August 8, L826.

Estudios, p. 415; Orl"eary, Memorias, J(XIV,Lfna, August L, L826; 62-63, Bolivar, Lima,Lecuna, Cartas del Libertador, VI, 43, Lima,

27A

27L

llo'L""ty, Memorias, IV, 45L-454, Torres, Cuenca, August29,L826;Ix,74-77@era,Guayaqui1,August15,L826.

l2rbid., rx, 442, Guayaquir, August J-0, 1826.l3caceta de colbmbia, No.

TII-Tctober257, tri. 2L, September 17,

8, 1826; No. 26L, tri. 2L,L826; No . -U6-.0;-EiE;October 15, 1826.

14o'Lu"r", Memorias,September 5, 1826;@ CoLombia, No.October 1, L826.

October 1, L826,

ru(rv, 101-105,

l5cacete de Colonbi.e: Suplemento, No. 254, August 27,1826; O'L 5.

160'L"u,r", Memorias ,Septembet 5, L826;@4e

xxrv, 101-105, Restrepo, Bogotd,259, tri. 21,

Restrepo, BogotJ,259, tri. 21,Cqlqubia, No.

LTCott!""t, Cartas lr mensajes, VI, 404, Bogotd, August20, 1826; 405, Boeo@26; iirry'Libiary, Ms;Santander to J. F. Salvador, Bogotd, September 21,, L826.

l8Mo"qrr"r", Memorias, I. 564-565; 0'Leary, Memorias,xII,323-324;DemarQ!ET]lQ6ito,September7,L826;ffiT11,Flores, Quito, Septenber 7, 'J,826; 364, Larrea, Quito, Septem-ber 7, L826i 458-459, Valdivieso, Quito, Septembex 7, L826;46I-462, Salvador, Quito, .septembex 7, L826; Josd Le Gouhir yRodas, Historia de La Reprlblica d-el Ecuador (Quito , L925) , 3vols. , filf

Guayaquil, Alg0'L""ry, Memorias, t(xlv, 9L-95, Act ofil. Aueuii Tffii caceia de Colombia.

Municipality,No. 26L, tri.22, L826,Septenber 13,

Guayaquil, August 28, L826; Gaceta de Colombia,2L,-oitober 15, 1826; no. 26ffiAllH/q, t. 634, afio L826, v. 6 , fol . 161, Cuenca,L826.

20caceta de coLombia, No. 26L, tri. 2L, oct-ober 15,L826; Cor , Vi, 444, n6gotd; october15, L826.

21eun/Q, r. 630, aio 1826, v.September L2, 1826; Corxdzar, CorresUr(ufj o , Ibarra, S€pteurber L2 ,TE

22rai-a.

23 cor t dz ar, cgr!egp-qq4e4c-1 e,

2, fol. LzL, Ibarra,285-288,

Quito, Septeriber 19;VIII, 492-493, Murgueytio,

272

z4o'L"^ty, Memori4-q, xxIV, 47J,-472, Quito, November 5,L826. on Augusi zffia colusm of the Araure battalion,for:ned mainLy from Peruvian troops, rebelLed in Quito.Ordered to tiavel to Bogotd frorn-Guayaquil, the unit stoppedin Quito due to lack of resources. Lacking food, equipment,and pay, the troops revoLted. The uprising was subdued byCoLonel Flores afrer a fierce struggle that cost the iives ofat Least thirty of the rebels. Details are presented inO'Leary, Memorias, IV, B-9, Flores, Quito, August 22, L826;Espir_rosa Poltt, I:,h 723,4 (Fl.ores), Quito,_Aqgust 23-, L826;Camilo Dstruge, Biografia del Ge_4_e-r-al 4qn_-Ledn de lebrdsgordero (cuafaqu

25Qotti.r"t, Correspondencia, VIII , 2g2-2g3, Popaya/n,ocrober 29, L826;-4mi1, ociober 1, 1AZO.

260'L."ty, Memorias, XXIV, 415-416, Guayaquil, Septem-ber 13, L826, MosquEra,-@srigs., I, 567; ANH/Q, t. 634, afioL826 , v. 6 , fol. 206 , An6'aEoTEprember L826 . '

27 O'L"uty, Memorias, I(XIV, 4I7-4L8, Pdrez, Guayaquil.September 16, 1826; TV;-46'5-466, Barrero, Cuenca, Novlmber 14,L826; Restrepo, Historia, V. pp. 305-307.

zStitty Library, MS, Flores to Santander, Quito,septeuiber tg,' $26. -oli""iy, Memosiis,

-)Hiv, 4tL-4ti,- i$t"r,Quito, October I, 1826; 432-455llElEo, October 6, L826;lecuna, Cartas_ael Libertador, VT,. 77, Quito, 0ctober 2, L826;91, Ibat eo*&qy, iorreipondencia, III,114, Bo1{var, Pasto, October L4, 1826. -

29Gaceta de Colombia, No . 265, .tri . 2L, November 13,L826; o'L@rv, 42L, pdtez, Quiro, ocrober i,l826;Cortd'z7r'@,Ii,479-48i,oyirbide,Quiio,October 26, 1826ffi Manrique, Qqito, December 6,L826; Archivo Santander, XVI, 37-39, Bogotf, Deeember 6, L82L826; ^{rchivo Santagde.r, XVI , 37-39, , Deeember 6, L826.Oyarbide also appealed to Santander for assistance and inview of the nature of his crime fu1Ly expected support fromthe Vlce-President. The l-uckless author received a typicalSantander letter wherein the Vice-President waxed eloquentabout the nobility of law and political principles andoffered no practical assistance.

3o0'L""ry, Memolias, xxIV, 4J,7-4ltg, Pdrez, Guayaquier !6, 1i!26flT;f5-15, Fiores, cuenca, oirober 2g,""O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 417-419, Pdrez, Guayaquil,

September L6, 1826; IV;-I3-15, Flores, Cuenca, October 29,L826: Archivo Santa.nder. XV- 306- Alwarado- Grrawaorril - Oef-ot)q26; -ArcEivo Santander, XV, 306, Alvarado, Guayaquil, October25, l8ffiantander, Bogotd, D6cesrbLr'6, LB26;iii; ' L4s:Iir: ilil;;, d'i.;;;, '

OcLober 29;-Tg16.

3lcottdr^t, Gorlrespondenciq, III, 108, Bolfvar, Guaya-eotember 19.ffiCartas del Libertador, VI.quiL,

81-85,September L9,etrLbuyb-

^t,Lbarra, October 8, 1826.del Libertador, VI,

273

Cartas y mensajes, VI, 444, Bogota', October

32gmt/Q, r. 666,,Restrepo rr, fol. 100, Bogotd, Novem-ber 24, L826; t. 637, affo L827,. v. 2, fol. 57, tatacunga,January L7, L827; Espinosa Polit, Film 7286 (L826-L827),Bandos, November 24, L826; Film 7334 (Cuenca), Bandos, Novem-ber 24, L826; Gaceta de Colomb{a, No. 269, tri. 22, December10, L826; Suplmi. 22, December 17, L826;O'Leary, MEmorias, )(XIV, 504-527, Bogotd, November 23-24, L826.

33o'L""ry, Memorias, IV, 45g, Valdivieso, Quito,December 6, L826, 468-Eu-irre, Quito, December 6,- L826; 466-468, Espantoso, Guayaquil, November 25, L826; V, 447-448,P€rez, Quito, December 2L, 1826; IX, 77-78, Mosquera, Guaya-quil. October L8, L826; 79-80, Mosquera, GuayaquiL, November25, t826. Ttre expectation of some form of constitutionalchange was sufficiently apparent to the Intendant of Guayaquilfor him to withhold tsravel funds from the departmentrs con-gressmen viewing their journey to Bogotd. as noril unnecessary.

34corE{.zar,15, L826.

35o'L".ry, ltemorias, IV, 16, Cuenca, November 14 , L826.

CTIAPTER 10 - NOTES

'trt{illiam R. Manning, lomatic Corres ce of€d., Dihe IndEthe United State o n

amerr-can NaElons, J vols. (New Yorlc, Iffi-181, Reracio'n, Herez, GuayaquiL, I

January 28,February

; XffV, 94-96, Santa Cruz, Lima, L827, VIII,370-373, Cdrdova.

20'L""ry, Ibi-d.; XX\l, 51-53, Bustamante, Lima, January28, T827; Ezequiel Ma'rquez, "sublevacicin de La Tercera Divi--.sioh del EjdrCito de Coloubia, Auxiliar del Perd en Lima, 26de Enero de L827, y la contf,arevolucio'n en Cuenca," Revistadel Centro de-lglud:.qlllisloricos V Geoerdficos, VI,_ni6T-Zf

i, 29 . TtreThird Division was composed of 2-,728G-Ta?ning the vence-dores, Rif1es, Caracas, and Araure baf,talions aid fourthsquadrons of the Husares de A.yacucho.

3Cottd."?r, Cgrrespondencia, VIII, 437 -43g, l"losquera,Guayaquil, March, 1 , XXV, Zbt-205, pdrez,pglyaquil, March 19, Lg27i 2L4-, rT;5'ffiuayaqui1, March 2g,L821i 4i',IH1q, t. ^639,_3fio L827, v. 4, fol. 54, -Torres,

Cuenca,April- 6, L927; fol . 82, Pallares, Quito, April 9, 1827.;llosquera, Ms:moria, I, 589 .

- 4Gacetq de Colotbia: Estlaordinar-io, Nlay 23, ,L827 ;No. zgs, Sub1lvaci6n,"

pp. 34-35, Qarrici4,,Loja, April 15, L827; pp. 19-20, Torres,999!"", April 3, L827; pp. 2A-2L, Torres, Cuenca, April 8,L827; Restrepo, Historia, VII , 4'L.

sGaceta 4e-Coaombia, Ibid.; Suplemento-, No. Zg5, June10, I827;ffio 1827,.vfffilll-i0o, pdreL, Gua-

Igguil,- April lL, L827: O'Leary, Memorias., XXV, 232-235,Elizalde, Ilontecristi, April 6-, LTtr-

6D"rat,rg", Illingrdorrh', p- L22; Cortlzar, Correspon-dencia, vr, 4fi: La-ffiffi]Equil, January 1g, igu-t-esrre-po, Hiqtoftg, VII, 37; Sara Hamann de Cisneros. Josd de laLt?r,TfETfiEeca Hombres del Per$,. xxlv (Lina, LgFS]|f,.-7-52; O'Leary, Memorias, V, 45L, Pdrez, Atacamas, April- 24, LBZ7.

70'L""ry, I-bid.; 187-1,89, Heres, Gartagena, Ylay 27,L827; Espinosa Pol{t, Film .7286 (L822-L827), P{rez, Esmeraldas,April 24, L827. General, Pd,rez disembarked at Esmeraldas and

tt'

I

274

rb

275

returned to Quito. Generals Valdds and Heres continued on toCartagena to report to Bol{var. I,lhile. I'losguera disenibarkedat BuEnaventura and traveled to Bogotd.

8G"""a" de Colonrbia: Estraordinaria , VIay 23, L827 ;O'Leary, uii, Airil 16,L827.

gGaqg-ta de Colombia: Suplemento, No. 2g5, June 10,1827; O'L ity of Guayaquil,'April 20, L827.

l0ntu/Q, r. 639, afio LBZI, v. 4, fol. 16r., Larrea,Quito, ApriL ZL, L827; t..643, affo 1827, v.8, fol. 133,Larrea, Quito, April 22, 1827. Interestingly, during Larrea'sabsenee Dr. Antonio Ante, once an outspoken critic of Colom-bian rule, served an interim Intendant.

lleuH/Q,Quito, April 22,Ilarch 14, L827 ;L827.

afr,o .1827, v. 8,Cortdzar, EES,de Colombie, ft:

foI. L34, Flores, ,VII, 79-80, Bogotd,285, tri. 23, April 1,

r. 543,L827;

Gaceta

l2Autt/Q, r. 643, afio L827, v. 8, fol. L43, Flores,Riobamba, May 7, L827; Gaceta de Colornbia: Suplemento, No.296, June L7, L827; Mos

estrepo,_ Historia, VII , 45 t ANH/Q, t . 643 , afto 1827 ,163, Pdrez, Chimbo, June 3, L827; llosquera, Ibid. ,

13

v. 8, fo1.604.

Guayaquil, June 7, L827.lsatw/Q, r. 643, afio LBZ7, v.8, fol

Bodegas, June -22, )q27, O'Leary, Memorias,i\uibaLo, .Iuly 26, L827 ,

L6 cortdzar ,Guayaquil, July 5,27, L827.

@ III, 448, Bustarante,L827; X, 335-336, Castillo, Guayaquil, June

lTmrn/Q, t. 643, afio L827 , v. B, fol. z!7, Larrea,Quito, JvLy 7, L827; t,. 640, afio L827, v. 5, fol. 2t+5, Miilos,Ambato, Ju)y 2!, )q?7; Orl.eary, Semorias, XKv, 503-504, Flores,Ambato, July 26, L827

LBCortd,""r, Correspondencia, VIII, 4g3-g5, Murgueytio,rbarra, July 1-7, ig , VII , 47; oYl.eiry,-Memo.rias, IV, 3L6, Lllingrot, - Guafrq , JvLy 22, L827 ;

l\torqr.tr, Ibid., 603; Al{H/Q, Ibid.; fol. 165, Obando,

. 191, Rolddn,XXV, 475, Flores,

276

Mosquera, Memoria, I, 605.' 19o'Leary, rbid.

Z0co=ti""=, Corresrrondencia, V. p. 451, Flores, Arubato,JuLy 2,6, 1827; ANH/ffiiepo, v. II; fol. 2zo,Bogota, September 12, L827; Restrepo, Hj-st_or!q, VII , 49:Gaceta de Colombia, No. 308, tri.25,55!ffi5-er 9, I827i@ xxv, 479, Flores, ambito, Jul-y 26, tbzliDestruge,@, 86-87.

2lRestrepo, Historia, VII , 48; O'Leary, ltemorias, IV,318-319, Illingiot,-Cffin-?, Augusr 7 , 1827;

- )fiVT24T25,Municipality, Santa Elena, August 5, L827.

z?Cortd.r"t, Correspondencia, III , 44g, Bustamante,Guayaquil, August L7llF,gm

3Destruge, Illingworth, L27; O'Leary, llemorias. IV,21-22, Flores, Quit[-56[fe-tFi 5, LgzT ; 3L9; TIffiE;6r,$!gqana, August 7, 1827i 23, Flores, Ambato, Septem6er 22,t827.

,24AMI/Q, a. 644, afio Lg27, v. g, fot. 319, Borrero,Popaydn, October 30, 1827; Gaceta de Colombia, No. 3L7, tri.26, Novenber 11, 1827; Mosq@-IGii6;ffi66; O'Leary,Memorias, IV, 26-28, Flores, GuayEffiOetober 17, LBZT .

25o'L""ry,October 6, L826.

26emr/Q, r.

I'lemorias, XXIV, 434-435, Bol{var, Quito,

634, afio'L827, v. 8, foL. L9, Pallares,L827i t,637, afio L827, v.2, fol. L28,

January 26, L827; fol. L44, Escudero,27, 1827; fol. 189, ChiriboBa, Guaranda,

Ibarra, January 24,De la Pefra, Quito,Latacunga, JanuaryJanuary 21, L827.

27amt/Q, r. 643, afio LBZ1, v. 8, fo1. zL, De Ia vega,Otavalo, January 27, L827; t. 637,.4fr.o L827, v. 2,.fol. I44,Escudero, Latacunga, January 30, L827; fol. L7L, Larrea,Arabato, January 30 , L827 .

28emr/Q, r.Riobanba, JanuaryJanuary 30, L827;L827.

L827, v.2. fols. 153-154, AlbJn,fol. L64, Ddvalos, Riobanba,Donoso, Riobamba, January 3L,

637, afio29, L827;fo1. L86,

29o'L.."y, Memorias, V, 448-450, Pdtez, Quito, January2L, L827; AM{/Q;'tl-6571-Tfio L821 , v'. 2, fot,.'2d1 , posse,Ibarra, January 31, L827; fol, 246, Quifiones, Quito, February

,/-ab,

277

6, L827'; fol. 268, De la Vega, Otavalo, February 9, L827,30emt1q, r. 637 , affo l-827, v. z, fol. zL3, posse,

Ibarra, Februar]' 1, L827; t, 638, afio 1827, v. 3, fol. 17,Posse, Ibarra, February 16, L827; fol, 26, Santa Cruz, Ibarra,February 16 , 1-827 ; fo1 . 114, Salvador, Ibarra, l,larch 3 , L827 ;foI. 199, VentimiLla, Qulto, March 17, L827; t.639, afio L827,v. 4, fo1. 107, De la Torre, Ibarra, April 16, L827; fol. L24,De la Vega, Otaval,o, April L7, L827; fol . 66, Guerrero, Quito,April 7, 1827; t. 540, afio L827, v. 5, fotr. 58, Casnar,Tabacundo, June 18, L827 t fol . L32, PaLlares, Cayauibe, Ju1y5',L-827; foL.L62, Pallares. Ibarra, Jr:ly 11,'1827; t. 543,-fro.'I827, V. 8,foL. 43, De la Vega, Otavalo, Febnrary I, t827; fol.196, Iarrea,'Quito,Ju:e 28, 1827; toL.202,'De la Torre, Quito, July 2, L827.

3lauH/Q, t. 638, afro !827, v.3, for. 189. Ddvaros,Riobamba, Iularch L7, L827; E.639, L827 v.4, foI. 138, Lana,Ambato, April L7, L827; t.640, L827, v.5, fol. 111, Maldo-nado, Latacunga, July 2, 1827; t.64L, afio L827, v.6, fol.69, Lana, Ambito, Aulust 18, L827; t,643, afio L827, v. 8,fol. 4L, Maldonado, Latacunga, February 1, L827; fol. 105,representacidn, Chimbo, Mardh 21, L827-.

32eun/Q, t. 643, affo L827, v. 8, for. zr7, Larrea,Quito, July 7, L827; t. 640, afio L827, v. 5, fol. LLz, Ante,Quito, July 2, 1827; t.64L, afio 1827, v. 6, foI. 13, Posse,Ibarra, August 1, L827; fol. 160, De la Vega, Otavalo,Septeuber L7, L827; Restrepo, Historia, VII, 60; Gaceta !eColombia: Suplemenio, No. ZOZ,:JET}-Z9, L827

33Alrn/Q, r. 64L, afio L827, v. b, fo}. 160, De la vega,Otavalo, September 17, L827; t. 647, afio 1828, v. 3, fol". 62,Urquiso, Ibarra, January 16, L8281 Gaceta de Colombia, No.334, tri. 27, March 9, 1828; O'Learffi 131,138-139, Ocafra, April 9-10, 18^28; Fbq A-iIEEiTed analysis ofthe Ocana convention, see iosd J6aquin Guerra, La Corlirencidnde ocafia (Bogord, L908).

34o'L..ry, Memorias, IV, 46-49, Flores, Quito,January 6, 1828; 57-58, Flores, Guayaquil, February 2L, L828;60-62, Flores, Guayaquil, March 6, 1828; 80-81, Flores, Gua-yaquil, April 28, 1828; 82-84, Flores, Guayaquil, l(ay 6, L828;84-87, Flores, Guayaquil, I"lay 13, 1828.

35O'L""ry, Memorias, Iv, 66-69, Representacidn; XXVI,145-148, Represent,aciiln. -

360'L."ty, Memorias, rV, 46-87, Flores January-l{ay,1,828, passim.

278

370'L."ry, Ilemorias , )oiVI , 313-315 , Ocafia, June 6 ,1828; Gaceta de CoT6EEiliT Suplemento, No. 351, June 15,1828; o1. 198, Merino, LaCruz, June 20, 1828. A11 of the delegates from the southabandoned the convention. They were: J. F. Val"divieso,J. Matias Orellana, J. Ferm{n Villavicencia, Manuel AviLes,Francisco -Montrifar, M. Santiago de lcaza, Pablo llerino andVicente Ldpez Merino.

380'L."ry, llqmqgras, VIII, 550-551, Torres, Quito,July 1L, L828, LilT-ilil[FiEry, Mendel Co]-lection MS, Act,Quito, July L0, L828; qaqeta de Colombia:_ Suplemento, No. 368,dri. 29 , August 24, f.8 r 14,1828; No.375, tri. 30, October 2, 1828; No.365, tri. 29,Augusr 3, 1828; Espinosa Polft, Film 7287 .3 (1823-1829), Loja,JuLy 24, 1828.

ItI]I

Itil

tT

ItT

tIIIIII

CHAPTER 11 - NOTES

lcaceta de CoLonbia, No. 37O, tri. 30, August 31,1828.

, 2rbid., No. 382, tri. 29, July 24, ]828; EspinosaPol{t, FiLm 73i5 (Eolfvar and Sucre) bogotd, Februaty 13,1828; ANH/Q, t. 649, afio L828, v. 5, foL. 128, Quito, Ju1-y L6,L828; fol. 204, Quilo, August L2, L828; t. 652, afio 1828, v.8, fol. 102, Bogotd, July 8, 1828.

3Espinosa Pol{t, Film 7318 (1828), Bogotd, March L7,1828; ANH/Q, t.550, afio 1828, v. 6, fol.19, Ibarra, August19, 1828; Gacet4 de CgloLnbla, No. 336" tri. 27, March 23, 1828;o'Leary, M@-362, Bolivar, Bogotd, August 7,1828. The media anata and mesada eclesidstico lrere one timetaxes chargEE6-o:FfiEe hot@ at one yearssalary payable in instalLments during their tenure in office.

4caceta de Qol,oqbi4, No. 370, tri. 30, August 31, L828;No. 37L. ffi-2, 1829.'

Srbid., No. 396, tri, 32, December 23, 1828; No. 400,tri. 32, February 15, L829; No. 401, tri. 32, tebruaty 22,L829; ANH/Q, t.650, afro 1828, v.6, fo1.163, Quito, Septem-ber 26, L828.

6Gr".r" de Col-ombia, No. 390, tri. 32L, December 14,L828; No.reber 19, 1828; No. 383, tri. 31,November 2, L828; ANH/Q, t, 652, afio 1828, v. 8, fol. 115,Bogota, September 25, 1828; fol. 168, Qulto, October L5, 1828.

TRestrepo, Historia, VI,136r O'Leary, Memgrias, IV,332, Illingrot, - cuap@Ifjune 6 , L828 .

8o'L".ry, llemorias, IV, 27-28, FLores, Guayaquil,October L7, L827: 56:-57, Flores, Guayaquil, November 15, L827;43-46, Flores, Guayaquil, December 6, L827i 3L9-324, Illingrot,Guayaquil, November 4, L827t 324-325, Ill-ingrot, Guayaquil,December 14, L827.

9RestrePo, Hisleri-L)owr , L65-277, viiri-friffin,1828.

VI, L32-L34i O'Leary, Memorias-December 27, L827 - I'tay 3L,

279

l0R."ttepo, Histori-a, VI, I42; OtLeary, Meuorias, IV,54-55, Flores, buiyallTill-Tebruary 14, 1828;

- 5!r60lE[6res,Guayaquil, February 29, L828; 77-79, Flores, Guayaquil, April20, 1828.

llR""tr.po, Ibid.LzO'L"^ty, Memorias, )O(VI , L64-L65, Lima, l.{ay 20, 1"828.

I3G"""t" de Colombia, No. 361, tri. 29, JuIy 20, 1828.14C"""t" de CoLombia: Suplemento, No. 356,

L828; 0'L otd, Julylso'L".ty, Memorias, XXVI, 360, Illingrot, Guayaquil,

4erit_1, 1826; Gacetal[e eolonbia, No. 378, tri. 30, OctoberL6, 1828.

160'L."ry, Memorias, IV, 136-L39, Flores, Guayaquil,September 15, 1828;-Jlf-l1ingrot, Guayaquil., Septefober L4,L828.

lTErpirrosa Pol/t, Film 7287.3 (1828-LS29) , Gonzt\ez,Cuenca, January 9, 1-828; ANH/Q, t. 647, afio L828, v. 3, fol.79, Latacunga, January 18, 1828; fol. 94, Ibarra, January 24,1828; t. 648, afio 1828, v. 4, foI. 46, Ibarra, Dtarch 8, 1828;fol. 109, Quito, April 1, L828; fol. 1L0, Guaranda, April 11,1828; fol. 148, Otavalo, April L7, 1828; fol. 151, Tumbaco,April 19, 1828

18o'L""ry, Memorias, IV, 377, Illingrot, Guayaquil,Seprember 6, 1828;Tffi-8,-t. 652, afio 18281 v. 8, fol. 56,Larrea, Quito, l{arch 18, 1828; fol . 9L, Sandes, Guayaquil,June 11, L828; t. 647, afio 1828, v. 3, foL. 52, Castro,Otavalo, January 11, 1828; t. 646, afio 1828, v. 2, foL. L42-L47, Ante, Quito, March L9, 1828; t. 651, afio 1828, v. 7,fo1. 29, Echanique, Quito, October 23, L828,

19o'L""ry, Memorias, rV, 3Lg-324, Illingrot, Guayaquil,November 4, L827; 376--TIT lllingrot, Guayaquil, Februaqy L4,L828; 88-9L, Flores, Quito, May 30, 1828; 479-48L, GonzaLez,Cuenca, July 14, 1828.

2OANH/Q, t. 648, afro J.828, v. 4, foL. 15, Aguirre,Quito, March 1, 1828; t. 649, afio L828, v. 5, fol. 181-, Lana,Ambato, August 3, L828; t. 65L, afro 1828, v. 7, fol. 11,Sdnchez, Arrbato, October 18, 1828; t. 652, afio L828, v. 8,fo1.125, Lanta, Arnbato, August 9, 1828; t. 65L, afio 1828, v. 7,fo1. 29, Echanique, Quito, October 23, 1828; t. 652, afio L828,v. 8, fol. 40,Orquizo, Ibarra, lilarch 1, 1828; fol.58-59,

280

Jul-y 4,31, 1,828.

EL

28L

Orquizo, Ibarra, March 23, 1828; fol. 48, Torres, Quito,February 29, L828; fol. 49, Echanique, Quito, March 7, 1828;fol-. 50, Castro, Guaragui, March 12, 1828; t. 648, affo 1828,v. 4, foI. 67, Utquizo, Ibarra, March. 17, 1828; EspinosaPol{t, Film 7318 (1828) Tanoe, Bogord, April 14, 1828.

21G"""t"Gaceta de__Qqlombie, No. 325 , tri. 26 , January 6,1828; AM{re28, v. 3, foL. 119, Carridn, QuLto,February- 1, L828; 0'Leary, Memorias , IV, 1,49-150, Flores ,GuayaquiL, october L4, 1[]28'.

z2o'L""ty, Memorias, IV, 365-365, Quito, August 13,1828.

23Rm/Q, t. 649, afro 1828, v. 5, for.. L37, Lana,Ambato, July 18, 1828; t. 652, aflo 1828, v. 8, fol. 6, Urquizo,Ibarra, January 3, 1828; fol. 88, Castro, Otavalo, June 1,1828; fol.87, Urquizo, Ibarra, June 6, 1828; t. 650, afiol9?8, t. 6, fol. 119, Berrazueta, Latacunga, September L4,1828; fol. L45, Lana, Ambato, September 18, L828; t. 65L, afio1828, v. 7, fo1. 2, Caldas, Quito, October L6,.1828; fol. L10,4l!g!ar Quito, November L9, 1828; Espinosa Polit, Film 7287.3(1828-L829), Valdivieso, Quito, October 13, 1828; November 19,1828.

?4O'L""ty, Memorias, I, 504-505, Quito, October 6,1828.

zso'L"^ty, Memorias, IV, 153-L54, Quito, October 9,1828.

260'L"rry, Mq4ngr;Lqs.,' IV, L5O-153, Flores, Guayaquil,

october 21, l,82El; T60:T6f,'F1ores, Riobiuba, Novembel iZ,1828.

27OtL""ty, Memorias, IV, 154-155, Sucre, Guayaquil,October 21, 1828; T,-TT6:630, Sucre, Quito, October 2i, 1828;510-511, Sucre, Quito, November 17, 1828.

2SGaceta de C-olourbig, suplenento, No. 374, dri. 30,September Uo. 396,.tri. 32,-January 18, L829: Re@r, L23-L32.

29o'L"^ty, Memorias, XXVI , 523-524, Illingrot, Guaya-quil, Novembet Z4,-If2ffTaceta de Colombia, No.-398, tri. 32,February 1, 1829; Jorge P@quil durante lacampafra de Tarquf, 1q28-1829," Anales del.Archivo Nacionalde Historia y Musgq !1r1c9 (Quit

282

300'L".ry, Memorias, IV, 4g7-4g8, Illingrot, Guayaquil,January 23, L829; @a-de Colombi-a, Ne . 407 ,

- tri. 32 , - April

5, Lgzg; Eipinos; molivar and Sucre),Illingrot, Guayaquil, January 31, L829; Concha, Ibid., pp.72-73.

310'Lr.ry, Memorias, )HVI, 405, Bogotd, October 8,1828iIV,275-276,@mbato,November19,].828;163-L64, FLores, Quito, November 2o, 1828; I, 630-634, Sucre,Quito, December 18, 1828.

320;L"*ry, Memorias, I, 52L-522, Sucre, Cuenca, March3, L829; IV, L66-16$,-T'ib?es, Cuenca, January 11 . L829; Ga-ceta de Colonb_iellqpleme4to, No. 405, Ylarch- 22, L829; GEGEa-

tlo . 406 ,'March 30 , ' 1829 ;

'GEffi-33, April 26, L829.'

33G...t" de Colonbia: Extraordinario, No. 406, March

3krl333' onvenio de Giro',n,

3acr""t" a. Colorbi", No. 4L3, tri. 33, May 17, L829;No. 4L2, @829.

350'L".ry, Memgrlas, IV, !65-L66, Flores, Riobanba,December 1, 18211; Ffl-E[6res, Samborondon, April 22, L829i2A2-203, Flores, Baba, June 5, L829. Lecuna, Cartas del Liber-tador, VIII, 355, Samborondon, June 20, 1829.

36G"""t" de Colombia, No. 423, tri. 34No. 428, @, L829.

37amt/Q, t. G3z, afio 1826, v. 4, fol. z, Ddvalos, Rio-bamba, April 1, L829; Lecuna, Cartas del Libertador, VIII,l98,,Bogotd, January 6, L829; ff+(Bo1ivar and Sucre), Sucre, Quito, March L8, L829; Restrepo,Hisg-oria, VI, 189.

38---Lecuna, Cartas del Libertador, VIII, 258-259, Quito,March 19, L829; 2 L829

39BAMI,

1 1, 1829; L67, Rumipamba, April 4, L829; ANH/Q, t. 655,L829, v,2, fol. 80, Torres, Quito, May L2, L829; Gacetao1ombia. No. 4L3. tri. 33. l,Iav L7. L829: Lecuna. Cartas{e Cg}gmbia,, No. 4L3, !T1. 33, May L7,,Lq?9;_!ecuna, .CartasEE'do{, vrrr , 296, Quiro,

- ApriJ. 22,' L82g ,

7315 (Bolfvar and Sucre),O'Leary, Ug!g, I, 636,

-i

I

, July 26, 1829;

-'BAMI, Afro II, No. 3-4, L64-L65, Espinosa, Runipamba,April 1, 1829; L67, Rumipamba, April 4, L829; ANH/Q, t. 655,afio L829, v,2. fol. 80. Torres. Ouito. May L2. L829: Gaceta

I

I

II

4oE"pinosa Po1{t, FilmSalvador, Quito, May 27 , L829;Sucre, Quito, June L2, L829.

283

41O'L""ry, Mernorias, I.5L6--5f7. Sucre, Quito, Novem-ber 28., 1828. GenEral-Etonio Josd de Sucre was born inCnmand, Venezuela in 1793. During his initial stay in Quitoand Guayaquil, he became friends with Vicente Aguitre andVicente Ram<in Roca. Both men later exercised power ofattorney for Sucre during his stay in Peru and Bolivia. On

er 2Q, 1828, with Aguirre serving as his proxy, SucreMaria Carceldn y Larrea, the Marquesa de Solanda, inOn July 10, 1829, she gave birth to their only child,

ter named Teresa. For details of Sucrets life see:

SeptembmarriedQuito.a daughJohn P.. Hoover, Sucre: Soldado y RevolucLon4_Lio (Cumana,1957); Laureano ffi-losd de sGran Mariseal de Ayacucho (Pe

cdrrLs, L69t),Antonio Josd de Sucre

L. Unart-(Quito,

t952> .o84,9s2)

1 829.42o'L"^ty, Memorias, I. 636, Sucre, Quito, June 12,

43-^- -g..tB1.nga po1{r, Film 7301 (Lgzg), Bolfvar, Guayaquil,

{gfy_?Q. t829; Gacera de Colombia, No. 431, rri. 34, Seprdrnber20, L829! No. 4ffier 4, ].BZg; No. 434, rli. 35,Oclober 11, 1829; ANH/Q, t. 655, afio 1829, v. 4, fo1. l_65,Co'rdorra, Quito, August 19, 1829; t. 657, afio L829, v. 5, fo1.2, Torres, Ibarra, September 1, 1829.

"i"' 44o'L..ry, Memorias, I, 54, Sucre, Quito, July 21, LBZ!,.45O'L""ry, Memorias, I, 543, Sucre, Quito, JvLy 22,

L829; Iv, 37L, Lari6Z'ir0Giro, Augusr L4, LSig; 2Ll-212, Fiores,Guayaquil, October 28, L829; 2L5, Flores, Guayaquil, Novernber7, L829

46Gaceta de colombia, No . 247,. tri . 34, August 23,L829i _ryo.@st 30, L82g; 0'Leary,-Memoriis.,IV, 368, Larrea, Quito, JuIy 7, L829i 369-370, Larrea, Quito,JuLy 22, L829; 370-37L, Larrea, Quito, AugusL L4, 1829.

47 O'L"^ty , Meuror:lgg, I , 552 , Sucre , Qui.to, SeptemberL7, 1829; _IV, 113,-SucielQuito, September 20, L829;-AI{H/Q,t: 657, afio 1829, v. 5, fol. 59, Larrea, Quito, Septeuiber 16,L829

48o'L.rry, Memorias, I, 556, Sucre, Quito, October l,1829; XLI , 326,

- Dem-a@-Quito, Septemb 6r'22, LBZ} .

4gE"pirrosa pol{t, Film 7301 (L829), Et voro de Manabf;Oll,gary, Memorias, IV, zLL, Flores, Guayaquil, October 28,L829; 215fTT6ffi, Guayaquil, November i , -LBZ9; Gacerq deColombia, No. 445, tri. 35, December 27, L829; Nffiri.SfJEn[ary 3, 1830.

50cr"et" de Colombia, No. 445,

284

Tri. 35, December 27,L829.

slo'L..ry, ltemoriag, V, 27L, lleres, Loja, May 30, 1828.52l"".rr,", Cartas del Libqltador, VIII , 286, Quito,April L2, L829.

Caamafro, Docrlsl 0.

53o'L."ry,'Menorias, IV, 502., Sucre, Quito, May 27,L'829.

54O'L""ry, Memorleq, IV, 50g, I1Lingrot., Guayaquil.August 13, LSZ}'.

55o'L""r", Memorias, Iv, 23L, Flores, Guayaquil,December 28, L829

56- i -.r .--Lecuna, Cartas del Libertador, IX, 307, Popayan,December 5, 1829; f'fo. 4gg , irj.. ^ 36,January 24, 1830; @, vr, 311, 324, 331-334,362, 439; Gibson, gonstituti6iffiE-Tolombia, pp. 71-105

57R""tr.po, Historia, VI, 274, 2gA.580'L""ry, I'Iemorias , IV, 250, Guayaquil , February 28 ,

1830.59Dorioeo Caicedo, Archivo espistolar de1 General Do-

mingo Caycedo (nogotd, 19affi;o'Leary,Memorias,IV,259-260,F1oreb,'Gua-yaquil , June 29 , 1830; geE@{qqolqnbia, No . 463 , tri . 37 ,l{ay 2, 1830; No. 466, tm30. The appointmentsltere: Governor of Loja, Manuel Carrion; Governo-r of lrlbabura,Josd Mario de Arteta;-Prefect of Guayaquil, Josd Joaqu{n Olure-dg; Prefect of Ecuador, ManueL ltatheu; Ptefect of Aztay, Mar-tin Santiago de lcaza.

60Gaceta de Colombia, No. 4'iL, tri. 37, June 27, 1830;No. 473, @ig:o; Nob6a, coleccldn, pp.'229-23L; O'Leary, Memoria-s , IV, 258-259 , Floiesl--Ponasqui ,, May L3 ,1830; ZttfrLga, Histo{ia dq lataeunga, II , 357-36O; Jijcin y

61G.".t. de Colonbi-4, No. 473, tri. 38, July 11, 1830;Aurelio Nffi de Leyes-del Ecuadorr Lonsiitu-ciones (Quito,

62Corr."pondencia del. Libertador con el General JuanJosd rl.or

, -1930

Tb

BIBLIOGMPHIC NOTE

Primary research for this dissertation was conducted at

Ehe Lilly Library on the campus of Indiana University, at the

Vatican FiLur Library located in the Pius XII Memorial Library

at Saint Louis University, and in the National Archives of

Ecuador located in the Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana in Quito,Ecuador. At the LiLLy Library correspondence of 0lmedo, Su-

cre, Bol/var, Santander, and others rdas drawn from the

Ecuadorian and Colorrbian sections of the Latin Anerican manu-

scripts colLection and from the Mutis Daza collection.Individual" documents are located by author and location. No

docr.rment identification numbering system is used. At the

Vatican Film Library I examined the BibLioteca Ecuatoriana

"Aure1io Espinosa Pol/t." This is an excellent collection of

original documents and printed materials Cealing with nine-

teenth-century Ecuador. The actual documents, conpiled by

the Ecuadorian historian Aurelio Espinosa Pol-it, S. J., are

located in Cotocallao, Ecuador. They lilere microfiLmed intheir entirety by the Vatican Film Library at Saint Louis

University. Comprising 92 reels of microfilm, this collectionranges ehronoLogically from L762 to 1895. Ttre reels are

consecutivel-y numbered from 7283 to 7352 with decimal numbers

designating supplemental reels. Documents are grouped by

28s

286

reel number and general categories. There are no frane num-

bers or docr:ment identification nr:mbers. Following ny

research at Saint Louis University the Uriiversity of Arizona

library purchased a complete copy of this microfilm archive.

The Gran Colombian section of the National Archive in Quiro

contains 74 tomos of documents covering the decade 1820

through 1830. Each year's docunents are bound into muLtiple

volumes with each volume bearing a separate tomo ntuber.

Additional tomos of rriscellaneous material are noted under

the headings Josd Manuel Restrepo, Juan Josd Flores, and

Feliciano Checa.

I

I

I

I

I

Iil

rb

BIBLIOGMPHY

Manuscript Sources

Archivo Nacional de Hlstoria. Seccidn Gran Colombia. Tomos596 through 664. Miscellaneous material in touros 665through 670.

Lil-Ly Library. Manuscripts .

Latin American CoLLection: ColombiaLatin American Collection: EcuadorMutis Daza Collection

Vatican Film Library. Pius XII Memorial LibrarySaint Louis University. Biblioteca Eeuatoriana"Aurelio Espinosa Pollt." Film 7283 through 7352.

National Archives. l,lashington, D. C.Dispatches from United States Ministers ir'' Coloribiat1820-L832. Microfilm NAMP T33.

Primarv Sources - Published

Blanco-Fombona, R.Madrid: Ed.

Blanco, Josd rdtixhistoria de

ed. Cartas de Bolivar: L823-L524-L825.Ame

and Ramdn Azpurtfa, eds. Documentos para lala vida priblica del Libffi

. II - III.Boulton, Alfredo. ed. Correspondencia del Libertador: 1819 -

L829. Caracas: Fundacion Vicente Lecuna y'81 Banco?ilenezueLa, L974.

Camargo Pdrez, Gabriel. Archivo y otCoronel SaLvador ova. Bogot6: Ed. I1as, 1955.

Caycedo, Domingo. Archjlvo epistolar del Gral. Dgmingo Caycedo.3 vols. Bogotd: Edicion ABC, L943, L946, L947.

Chiribogs N., Angel Isaac. ed. Docqmentog de la guerqa de-1828:L825. Quiro: Tip.

287

288

Chiribogs C., Gustavo, ed. _Qoleccidn de ofici,o,s y docqmentosdirieidos las autor ttement,o

toalc

L977 .

"Gorrespondencia de la secre_taria-general deL Libertador Si--mdn Bolfvar." Bolet{n del Lrchivo Nacional de Histo-fia. Afio I, No

"Correspondencia de 1a secretaria-general del Libertador."Revista de1 Archivo de la Bibliotee_a N4qio_441. Affo I,

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