Dr.laila Professional Responsibilty

8/7/2019 Dr.laila Professional Responsibilty

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CPIS 428Professional Computing Ethics

Dr. Laila Nassef

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Student Responsibilities

Getting up, getting dressed, and eating

breakfast in order to leave for college on time being dependable in carrying out

obligations and duties

Being committed to activeinvolvement in your community

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Professional Responsibility

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Recall Responsibilities from

IEEE - Code of Ethics

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Engineers Responsibility

Engineers are expected to exhibit the higheststandards of

Honesty

Integrity Impartiality

Fairness

Equity Must be dedicated to the protection of the

public health, safety , and welfare

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IEEE - Code of Ethics Engineers are committed to conduct the highest ethical and

professional manner and agree to: accept responsibility in making decisions consistent with

safety, health, and welfare of the public

avoid real or perceived conflicts of interest

be honest and realistic in stating claims or estimates

reject bribery in all forms

improve understanding of technology, its application, and

potential consequences maintain and improve our technical competence and

undertake technological tasks for others only if qualified

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IEEE - Code of Ethics

seek, accept, and offer honest criticism oftechnical work

acknowledge and correct errors

credit properly the contributions of others

treat all persons fairly regardless of race, religion,gender, disability, age, or national origin

avoid injuring others, their property, reputation,

or employment by false or malicious action assist colleagues and co-workers in their

professional development and to support them infollowing this code of ethics

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Employer to employee Based on contract

Employee agree to carry out assigned jobs Employer agree to pay compensation

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Employer to employee

Employer provides appropriate tools and safework environment

Employer avoids asking the employee to do

anything illegal

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Employer to employee Employee must be honest about his

qualification and experience

Employee should be loyal to employer Instructions are followed conscientiously

Work done diligently and cooperatively Company trade secretes are not revealed

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Professional to Professional Team member must cooperate with each other

to provide helpful advice and assistance

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Professional to Client Fiduciary

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Professional to user

Accepting jobs only if one is competent toperform them, exercising proper care and

diligence ,through testing the finalproduct before delivering it to consumer

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Professional to Society Take responsibility for the impact of their

products and services not just upon humanbeings but actually upon the whole earth

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Employee Loyalty

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Do Employees Have a Special

Obligation to Employers? Some believe we have a prima facie

obligation ofloyalty in employment contexts.

In other words, all things being equal, anemployee should be loyal to his or her employerand visa versa.

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Does employee loyalty still make sense in thecontext of a large computer corporation?

Duska (1991) argues that in employmentcontexts, loyalty only arises in specialrelationships based on a notion that he calls"mutual enrichment ."

So in relationships in which parties are

pursuing their self-interests, the notion of loyalty would not be applicable.

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DuskasA

rgument Duska believes that employer-employee relationships

at least where corporations are concerned are

based on self-interest and not on mutual enrichment. He concludes that employees should not necessarilyfeel any sense of obligation of loyalty to corporateemployers.

Corporations like employees to believe that they have

an obligation of loyalty to their employers becausebelieving that serves the corporations interests.

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Ladds Criticism of Employee Loyalty

Ladd also believes that in the context of corporations,loyalty can only be in one direction.

He argues that a corporation cannot be loyal to anemployee in the same sense that employees aresupposed to be loyal to it.

A corporation's goals are competitively linked to the

benefits employees bring to the corporaion. A corporation can be good to employees only because

it is good for business, i.e., it is in the company's ownself interest.

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Ladds and Duskas Criticisms Both Duska and Ladd cite corporate self-interest as

an obstacle for a balanced employer-employee

relationship that is required for mutual loyalty. Consider that corporations often go through

downsizing phases in which loyalemployees who have served a company faithfully forseveral years are dismissed as part of restructuring plans.

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Sometimes Employers Have Been Loyal

Consider a case in which an employercontinues tokeep an employee on the payroll even though that

employee has a chronic illness, which causes her tomiss several months of work.

Also consider a case in which several employees arekept on by a company despite the fact that their

medical conditions have caused the corporation'shealth insurance costs to increase significantly,thereby reducing the company's overall earnings.

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Employer Loyalty Consider a recent case involving the owner of

Malden Mills, whose physical plant in

Massachusetts was destroyed by fire. The mill's proprietor, Aaron Feurestein, could have

chosen to rebuild his facility in a different state orcountry where employees would work for lower

wages. Instead, Feurestein continued to pay and provide

benefits for his employees while a new facility wasbeing built in Mass.

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Whistle-blowing

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:

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Corruption :

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(Transparency International)

1995

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2004133 43 4.6

6.32.2

6.12.3

5.62.6

5.33

3

3.3

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13-4-1432

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:

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Six types of sanctions

for misconduct Blame Social and professional ostracism and

boycott

Public or private reprimands from professionalsocieties

Exclusion form membership in a professional

society Lawsuit

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Whistle-blowing Bowie (1982) defines whistle-blowing as "the act of

an employee informing the public on the immoral or

illegal behavior of an employee or supervisor." Bok (1997) defines whistle blowing as an act in

which one "makes revelations meant to callattention to negligence , abuses , or dangers that threaten the public interest."

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Whistle-blowing Whistle-blowing situations can arise in cases

of overt wrongdoing (i.e., involvingspecific acts that are either illegal or immoral).

They can also arise in instances of

negligence where one or moreindividuals have failed to act.

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whistle blowing

A call for public attention, including

and especially that of a higherauthority such as a government

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Motives of Whistleblowers People become whistleblowers for different

reasons

Morality of action may depend on motives Good motive

Desire to help the public

Questionable motives Retaliation Avoiding punishment

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Be prepared to live with the results

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If you believe that knowledge of unethical practices

would cause a change in the practices: Reality check (make sure you are right)

The goal is to get management to recognize andremedy problem with minimal conflict.

Take problem outside the organization as last resortand act as an individual, not an employee.

Be prepared to live with the results.

Document everything.

Be on your best behavior.

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Corporate Response to Whistleblowing

Whistleblowing has many harms

Bad publicity

Disruption of organizations social fabric Makes it hard for people to work as team

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DeGeorges Whistleblowing Richard DeGeorges questions for whistleblowing

1. Is serious harm to the public at stake ?2. Have you told your manager?

3. Have you tried every possible inside channel?

4. Do you have persuasive documented evidence ?

5. Are you sure whistleblowing will work?

Under what conditions must you blow the whistle?

DeGeorge: If all five conditions are met

Others: If conditions 1-3 are met

Still others: Whistleblowing is nevermorally required

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When an Engineer is Permittedto

Blow the Whistle 1) The harm that will be done by the product to

the public is serious and considerable .

2) The engineers (or employees) have made theirconcerns known to their superiors.

3) The engineers (or employees) have received nosatisfaction from their immediate supervisors andthey have exhausted the channels availablewithin the corporation, includinggoing to the board of directors .

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When an Engineer is Requiredto

Blow the Whistle De George claims that two additional criteria are

needed for requiring an engineer to blow the

whistle. 4) The engineer has documented evidence that

would convince a reasonable, impartial observer that his/her view of the situation is

correct and the company policy wrong.

5) There is strong evidence that making theinformation public will in fact prevent thethreatened serious harm.

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Evaluating De Georges Criteria James (1991) believes that De George's conditions

are too lenient .

An individual has a moral obligation to blow thewhistle when the first three conditions are met, aswell.

We have a prima facie obligation to "disclose

organizational wrongdoing" that we are unable toprevent, which could also occur when De George'sfirst three conditions are satisfied.

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James Critique of De Georges Criteria For James, the degree of the obligation depends

on the extent to which we are capable of

foreseeing the severity and the consequences of the wrongdoing. He worries that De George's model leaves us with

no guidance when we are confronted with cases

involving sexual harassment , violations ofprivacy, industrial espionage , and soforth.

Also there is a problem with the word harm.

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Alperns Criticism of De Georges Criteria Alpern (1991) argues that De George's model lets

engineers off too easily from their whistle-

blowing responsibilities. Alpern believes that engineers must be willing to

make greater sacrifices than othersbecause they are in a greater position to do

certain kinds of social harm.

He believes that these obligations come from afundamental principle of "ordinary morality" viz., we must do no harm.

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An Alternative Strategy De George and Ladd seem correct in

claiming that engineers should not berequired to be moral heroes or saints.

James and Alpern also seem to be correctin noting that engineers, because of the

positions of responsibility they hold, shouldbe expected to make greater sacrifices.

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A Compromise View McFarland (1991) argues that, collectively,

engineers might be held to a higher standard of

social responsibility than ordinary individuals. However, the onus of responsibility

should not fall directly on engineers as individualengineers.

Rather, it should be shouldered byengineers as members of the engineeringprofession.

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McFarlands Argument The analogy for engineers, McFarland draws from

the Genovese case is that when no other sources of

help are available, engineers should takeresponsibility by banning together. If engineers act as individuals, they might not

always have the ability to help.

If they act collectively , however, they mightbe able to accomplish goals that would otherwisenot be possible.

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McFarlands Argument McFarland believes that an engineer's work must be

seen in a wider social context , i.e., in

its relation to society. Without that context, an adequate account of moral

responsibility for engineers cant be given.

Unless engineers work collaboratively on ethicalmatters , they will not beable to meet all of their responsibilities.

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McFarlands Argument McFarland's model encourages engineers

to shift their thinking about responsibility

issues from:

the level of individual responsibility, toresponsibility at the broader level of the

profession itself

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Involve all the things for which an individual isconsidered to be accountable

Role Responsibility (duties of anindividual) The individual obligations to behave in a proper

manner

Produce computer systems according tointernational standards

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Casual Responsibility Casual chain (a sequence of factors leading to

a final effect)

Difficult to determine which factor is realcause of an event

Database error may be due user entry error orsoftware developer inadequate verifications ofdata entry procedures

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Professional Responsibility Blameworthiness

A person may be the cause of an event but notblameworthy for the situation

A doctor who uses a medical computer system

approved by the hospital is not blameworthy if treatment suggested by the system is wrong.

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Professional Responsibility A person could be held responsible even if he or

she did not intend the outcome.

Robert Morris, who launched the "Internet worm"in 1988, claimed that he did not intend for theInternet to be brought to a standstill .

Morris was held responsible for the outcomecausedby his act of unleashing thecomputer worm.

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Professional Responsibility Persons can also be held responsible when they intend

for something to happen, even if they ultimately fail to

cause (or bring about) the intended outcome. Suppose a disgruntled student intends to blow up a

computer lab, but is discovered at the last minute andprevented from doing so.

Even though the student failed to carry out his objective,we hold the student morally culpable because ofhis intentions .

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Liability Liability is the legal obligation of an entity

that extends beyond criminal or contract

law to include the legal obligation to makerestitution, or to compensate, for wrongfulacts .

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Liability Liability refer to accountability

of an individual for an action or event

Computer engineer who releases a robot tothe market is strictly liable for the productand responsible for any problems caused to

the end user including physical harms or property damage

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If an employee, acting with or without the

authorization of the organization, performs anillegal or unethical act that causes some degreeof harm, the organization can be heldfinancially liable for that action.

An organization increases its liability if itrefuses to take strong measures, known as duecare, to make sure that every employee knows

what is acceptable or unacceptable behavior,and knows the consequences of illegal orunethical actions.

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Due diligence requires that anorganization make a valid effort to protect

others and continually maintain this levelof effort.

With the global impact of the Internet,

those who could be potentially injured orwronged by an organizations memberscould be anywhere, in any state or any

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Liability vs. Responsibility

Liability is a legal concept It is sometimes used in the narrow sense of

"strict liability."

To be strictly liable for harm is to be liable tocompensate for it even though one did notnecessarily bring it about through faulty action(e.g., when a someone is injured on a persons

property). The moral notion of "blame" may be left out.

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Accountability (vs. Liability and Responsibility

Responsibility is only part of what is covered by thenotion ofaccountability . (Nissenbaum)

Accountability means that someone, or some group ofindividuals, or perhaps even an entire organization isanswerable.

there will be someone, or several people to answernot only for malfunctions in life-critical systemsthat cause or risk grave injuries and causeinfrastructure and large monetary losses, but evenfor the malfunctions that cause individual losses oftime, convenience, and contentment.

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R ibilit Li bilit d A t bilit


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Responsibility, Liability, and Accountability

Moral Responsibility Legal Liability Accountability

Attributes of blame (orpraise) to individuals.

________________________Usua

lly attributed to individualsrather than "collectivities"or groups.

___________________

Notions of guilt and shame

apply, but no legalpunishment orcompensation need result.

Does not attribute blame orfault to those held liable.

___________________

Typically applies in the caseof corporations andproperty owners.

___________________

Compensation can berequired even when

responsibility in a formalsense is not admitted.

Does not necessarilyattribute blame (in a moralsense).

___________________

Can apply to individuals,groups of individuals, andcorporations.

_____________________________

Someone or some group isanswerable (I.e., it goes

beyond mere liability).

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The Problem of Many Hands in a computing Context

Computer systems are the products of engineeringteams or of corporations, as opposed to the products

of a single programmer working in isolation. So "many hands" are involved in their development.

It is difficult to determine who exactly is accountablewhenever one of these safety-critical systems results

in personal injury or harm to individuals.

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The Problem of Many Hands Two problems for assigning accountability

(e.g., Therac 25 Case):

(a) we tend to think of responsibility assomething that applies to individuals butnot to groups (or collectivities);

(b) we tend to think of responsibility inexclusionary terms: If X is responsible,then Y is not, and vice versa.

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Two forms of responsibilities

regarding computer reliability Responsibilities concerning the computer

professionals including engineers, developers ,

designers, manufactures, and vendors(hardware malfunction, software defects orcommunication failure)

Responsibilities concerning individuals whouse the computer system including consumersand end users (malpractice, misuse or negligence)

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Computer Professional Responsibilities


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Computer Professional Responsibilities computer professionals responsibilities towards their

employers and their clients; proper documentation of software by designers and

developers;

propertesting of software by designers and developers;

handover of systems to clients; providing maximum security of software to clients;

computer professionals honouring the proprietary issuesrelating to the algorithms, procedures and data;

computer professionals working towards accurate systemswith the aim of complete data integrity;

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Inadequacies in system life cycle


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Inadequacies in system life cycle

Inadequate system analysis

Inadequate system design

Inadequate system development

Inadequate system testing

Wrong system installation Mismanagement

Lack of service

Malpractice Misuse

Negligence

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Computer Reliability

Ability of a computer to perform its

required functions for a given periodof time.

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ComputerReliability


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Co pute e ab ty

It involves

Hardware Reliability, ability to perform its mechanicaloperations without errors

Software Reliability, ability to deliver its usableservices according to design when those services aredemanded

Data Reliability, include the following:

Data security; confidential, safe, private

Data privacy; only authorized personsData consistency; correctness of data duringprocessing

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Computer Reliability Depends on both computer professional and user

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Solution to the computer reliability problem

Computer professional should provide faulttolerant computer systems capable of

providing

fail-safe (full functionality of a computer systemdespite the occurrence of a single fault or

fail-soft (reduced functionality of a computersystem despite the occurrence of a single fault)

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Solution to the computer reliability problem

Well designed liability laws that can enhancecomputer systems consistency and safety.

Responsibility of computer manufactured hasto be underscored by particular standards(rules, regulations, warranties)

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Failures and Errors in Computer Systems

Most computer applications are so complex itis virtually impossible to produce programswith no errors

The cause of failure is often more than onefactor

Computer professionals must study failures tolearn how to avoid them

Computer professionals must study failures tounderstand the impacts of poor work

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Example

Inaccurate and misinterpreted data in databases

Large population where people may share

names Automated processing may not be able to

recognize special cases

Overconfidence in the accuracy of data Errors in data entry

Lack of accountability for errors

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High-level Causes of Computer-System Failures


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g p y

Lack of clear, well thought out goals andspecifications Poor management and poor communication

among customers, designers, programmers, etc.

Pressures that encourage unrealistically lowbids, low budget requests, and underestimates oftime requirements

Use of very new technology, with unknown

reliability and problems Refusal to recognize or admit a project is in

trouble

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Safety-Critical Applications

"fly-by-the-wire" airplanes (many systems arecontrolled by computers and not directly by thepilots) Between 1988-1992 four planes crashed

Air traffic control is extremely complex, andincludes computers on the ground at airports,devices in thousands of airplanes, radar,databases, communications, and so on - all of

which must work in real time, tracking airplanesthat move very fast In spite of problems, computers and other

technologies have made air travel safer

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Whistle Blowing

Case Studies

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Cases Where Whistle-blowing

Could Have Saved Lives

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Case 1: September 11 Colleen Rowley, an FBI employee, came forth to

describe the way in which critical messages hadfailed to be sent up theFederal Bureau's chain of command in the daysimmediately preceding the tragic events of September11, 2001.

Was it appropriate for this individual to blow thewhistle on her supervisor?

Was she also possibly being disloyal to her supervisorand fellow employees in doing so?

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Case 2: retirement savings Should individuals in positions of authority in

corporations such as Enron and WorldCom have

blown the corporate whistle about the illegalaccounting practices in thosefirms?

One could argue that failing to blow the whistle in the

Enron case resulted in thousands of individuals losingtheir retirement savings )( ,and in some cases their entire life savings.

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Case 3The David LaMacchia Case

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The main thrust of digital technology is tomake it easy to copy and manipulate

information. Thats what computers are for. But it turns out that this benefit doesnt suit the

owners of information. They dont want a free

flow of information.

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Case 5:


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Case 5:

The Therac-25 Accidents

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Therac-25: a computer-controlled radiationtherapy machine, build by Atomic Energy ofCanada Ltd (AECL) used in US and Canadian

hospitals & clinics during the 1980's. The Therac-25 was the successor to the Therac-6

and Therac-20 models.

Unlike its predecessors the Therac-25 reliedmore on software control mechanisms

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Therac-25 delivers two kinds ofelectron beams:low energy and high energy.

A raw high energy beam is dangerous to living

tissue so magnets are used to spread the beamenergy so as to produce a safe therapeuticconcentration.

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g p pable to set are the beam energy levels & beam

modes. The latter effects the setting of themagnets.

Operators have two ways of setting the system

parameters: data entry procedure

screen based editing

Aproblem arose when the values established viathe data entry procedure are edited during themagnet set-up phase, i.e. screen display did notreflect actual settings.

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This problem resulted in high-powered electron

beams striking patients with 100 times (approx)the intended dose of radiation

Several patients showed the symptoms of

radiation poisoning, 3 patients died later fromradiation poisoning

Aside: (Therac-25 excluded the possibility of

software defects since extensive testing hadbeen undertaken!)

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The Therac 25 a computerized radiation therapy


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The Therac-25, a computerized radiation therapymachine, massively overdosedpatients at least six

time between June 1985 and January 1987.

Each overdose was several times the normaltherapeutic dose and resulted in the patients

severe injury or even death.

Overdoses primarily occurred because of errorsin the Therac-25s software and because the

manufacturer did not follow proper softwareengineering practices.

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Poor, unsafe software design.

Overconfidence in the softwares abilities.

Unrealistic risk assessments.

Unacceptable follow-through onaccident reports.

Misconceptions in themanufacturers attitude

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For safety-critical software design,rigorous testing and failure analyses

are essential and trained softwareengineers, not simply any reasonablyexperienced engineers, should

implement the software design.

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Massive overdoses of radiation were given; themachine said no dose had been administered at

all

Caused severe and painful injuries and the

death of three patients Important to study to avoid repeating errors

Manufacturer, computer programmer, and

hospitals/clinics all have some responsibility

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Software and Design problems:

Re-used software from older systems, unawareof bugs in previous software Weaknesses in design ofoperator interface Inadequate test plan Bugs in software

Allowed beam to deploy when table not inproper position

Ignored changes and corrections operatorsmade at console

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Why So Many Incidents?

Hospitals had never seen such massive overdosesbefore, were unsure of the cause

Manufacturer said the machine could not havecaused the overdoses and no other incidents had

been reported (which was untrue) The manufacturer made changes to the turntable

and claimed they had improved safety after the

second accident. The changes did not correct anyof the causes identified later

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Observations and Perspective:


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Observations and Perspective: Minor design and implementation errors usually

occur in complex systems; they are to beexpected

The problems in the Therac-25 case were notminor and suggest irresponsibility

Accidents occurred on other radiation treatmentequipment without computer controls when thetechnicians: Left a patient after treatment started to

attend a party Did not properly measure the radioactive

drugs

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Case 6:


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Case 6:Hughes Aircraft Whistle blowing

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Between 1985 and 1987, theMicroelectronic Circuits Division of Hughes

Aircraft shipped hybrid microelectronics to

every branch of the U.S. military withoutcompleting various environmental chiptesting processes required by contract.

This is a whistle-blower case where the

allegations against Hughes Aircraftresulted in a criminal case and a civil case.

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No matter how secure the technicalpart of a system is, there is no

security if the personnel cannot betrusted.

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Case 6: Hughes Aircraft Factory for military-grade hybrid chips


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Factory for military grade hybrid chips

Some defective chips being approved

Ruth Goodearl reported incidents to uppermanagement

Consequences for Goodearl

Harassed Fired

Unemployment

Bankruptcy Divorce

Goodearl and Ruth Aldred sued Hughes AircraftunderFalse Claims Act and won

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Case 7System Failure of DenverAirport

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DenverAirport:

Baggage system failed due to real world problems,

problems in other systems and software errors Main causes:

Time allowed for development was insufficient

Denver made significant changes in specifications

after the project began

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Case 8 Ariane 5 Ariane 5: European Expendable Launch

System - designed to deliver payloads into orbitaround the Earth

Manufactured by the European SpaceAgency

SupersedesAriane 4, and developed overa 10year period at a cost $7 billion

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In 1996 onthemaidenflight of Ariane 5, just 39seconds into itsmaidenflight Ariane 5 exploded

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Ariane 5 was running Ariane 4 software,however, underlying hardware architectureswere different

Ariane 5 guidance system tried to convert a64-bit number (velocity data) into a 16-bitformat - resulting in an overflow error

Ariane 5 interpreted the result ofthe overflow

as evidence that it was out of control andinitiated a self-destruction operation!

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Questions?5/1/2011 132


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Thank you!

Dr.laila Professional Responsibilty

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