Dossier #1 - The Legacy of Arab Spring

A comprehensive approach to

understand the complex Spirit of “Arab

Springs”, what happened, what is

happening and what are the future

implications for Mediterranean Basin

The Legacy of Arab Springs

A Regional Point of View

Dossier #1 - Mediterranean Affairs

April 2015

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Mediterranean area. By carrying out extensive researches, the staff studies various issues of

international policy focused on defense and security, regional stability, and transnational

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April 2015

1 The Legacy of Arab Springs

Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 2

External actors’ inconsistent responses to the domestic-driven Arab transition ................ 6

The Arab Spring and the West ............................................................................................... 8

The Arab Spring and regional actors ................................................................................... 12

Looking at the Arab Spring through a Russian lens.......................................................... 13

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 15

The strategic importance of the Mediterranean region for the European Union ............. 16

The EU’s reaction to the Arab spring ................................................................................. 18

Its impact on EU’s policies and the prospects for a revitalization of the relationship 20

Security and Terrorisms: before and after the Arab Spring ............................................... 24

Mission Accomplished, 1st May 2003. ................................................................................. 24

Jihad evolution: from organization to network. ................................................................. 25

Al-Suri's situationist outlook: exploitation or creation of the ideal conditions for a

local jihad ............................................................................................................................................... 25

The relationship of interest between organized crime and phenomena of terrorism

and insurgency. ...................................................................................................................................... 27

Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 30

The Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism, schools of Islamic fundamentalism .................. 31

The Muslim Brotherhood, the History of the Movement in the pre-revolutionary .... 31

The fall of the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring ...................................................... 34

The Salafism ............................................................................................................................ 35

The rise of the Salafist phenomenon ......................................................................................... 36

Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 37

The role of civil society: what animated them; what animate them now, and how they

perceive the change. .......................................................................................................... 39

Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 44

References .......................................................................................................................... 47

Authors ............................................................................................................................... 49

Summary

April 2015

2 Introduction

Introduction

‘‘Spring’. The term has been used to identify the recent turmoils happened in the

Arab world, but it is quite reductive. Indeed, it is wrong. It is now more than four years

since the outbreak of the riots and many experts are debating whether it is an ‘infinite’

spring or, indeed, an ‘icy winter’ for some countries. What is certain is the fact that we

cannot talk about a single ‘season’. It will take a long time before than the Arab

countries, especially those in the Mediterranean region, succeed in achieving the hoped-

for stability. Moreover, the revolutionary processes require a very long time, and every

revolutionary onset is undermined by a counter-revolution tending to become

permanent.

The balance of power among the different levels of sovereignty and geopolitics is

not (and will not be) like that prior to 2011. Of course, the sequences of popular

uprisings have resulted implications of global reach, changing the balance in regional

contexts and the relations with the United States and European countries, with effects

on Israel and Iran.

Generally, in Egypt and Tunisia, the Arab Spring was like a wide and spontaneous

popular movement, with strong capabilities of protest and resistance. The protests

began on 18th December 2010, following the extreme protest of Tunisian Mohamed

Bouazizi, who set himself on fire as a result of ill-treatment by the police. That event

gave birth to the so-called Jasmine Revolution, causing a domino effect in the Arab

world. Because of the continuous uprisings, the Tunisian President Zine El Abidine

Ben Ali escaped, while the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was forced resign from

office after nearly 30 years in power. The cases of Egypt and Tunisia had in common

the use of civil resistance, such as strikes, demonstrations, marches and parades and

sometimes extreme acts such as suicide, better known as self-immolation, and self-

injury among the media. It was also important the use of social networks like Facebook

and Twitter to organize, communicate and disclose certain events. This phenomenon

was widespread and in spite of the attempts of government repression were very strong

it would have not been decisive.

The factors that led to the protests were numerous, such as corruption, lack of

individual freedoms, violation of human rights and bad living conditions, which in

many cases are really close to the extreme poverty. The growth of food prices and the

famine are also considered among the main reasons for being discontent; these factors

have affected a wide section of the population in the Middle East and North Africa

(MENA) region in which there were the protests. In Syria, the demonstrations against

the regime of Bashar al-Assad broke out in March 2011 and were organized through

April 2015


their social networks. Although initially the protests were intended to the resignation

of President and the adoption of new institutional reforms, the clashes radicalized later

by the presence of Salafi groups, interested in establishing sharia in Syria. It is well

known as the affair has degenerated into a civil war that lacerates the country today

causing an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the region. In addition, the offensives

by the Islamic State represent a new front in the battle for the government of al-Assad.

The Syria’s condition because of its strategic position and its international relations,

has involved neighboring countries and the entire international community. It still

seems to be no solutions. The same can be said on the Libyan crisis. Compared with

the other States involved in the protests, the main problem of the Libyan regime of

Muammar Gaddafi was the failure of development projects and liberalization, and then

the growing popular discontent has finally culminated in the revolution that overturned

the entire country. From 17th February 2011 till now, the Libyan people did not have

a moment of respite: the popular uprisings, the military intervention of NATO, the

death of Gaddafi, the elections in 2012 and in 2014, the kidnapping of former Prime

Minister Ali Zeidan, the Operation Dignity led by General Khalifa Haftar, the judgment

of the Supreme Court (5 November 2014), etc. These can be considered the key steps

in the recent history of Libya but, just the Supreme Court decision, cancelling the

retroactive legislative elections dated 25th June 2014, represented a turning point,

accentuating the divisions between the anti-Islamist Government of Tobruk and the

pro-Islamist Government of Tripoli. The Libyan crisis is ever closer to the implosion

due to the severe internal polarization and the persistent increase in violence between

the two rival governments. Moreover, the presence of groups affiliated to the Islamic

State is a further threat to the country. The Islamic State intends to take advantage of

the Libyan instability to expand its influence in the North African region. The situation

in Libya is a source of extreme concern to the Algerian government, especially in terms

of impact on the stability and security. To contrast the transit of jihadist formations,

Algeria is committed to ensuring the safety of its borders, to prevent terrorists entry

from outside and Algerian militants join with those of neighboring countries, such as

Tunisia and Libya. Meanwhile, although the democratic process in Tunisia is a positive

sign, the Tunisian government has to face terrorist attacks and the phenomenon of

foreign fighters. Given the recent attack to the Bardo National Museum in Tunis (18

March 2015), Tunisia has intensified enforcement actions due to terrorist infiltration

especially in the border areas with Libya and Algeria. The fight against terrorism in the

MENA region is of primary interest for the international community, particularly for

Western countries. The European Union and the United States are aware that the

contrast can not be limited exclusively to military operations: it is also necessary to

prevent any fundamentalist form in the MENA region. And among those considered

most dangerous, there is the Salafist movement, already spread along the southern

April 2015

4 Introduction

coasts of the Mediterranean: according to some experts, instead of Arab Spring we

could speak of ‘Salafist Spring’. However, some countries are not frightened by the

spread of fundamentalist movements. In particular, the Moroccan authorities have

been able to take advantage of popular protests to strengthen their consent,

representing a positive exception to the complex evolution of the Arab Spring. In 2011,

the Moroccan government started a process of constitutional reform that has not

undergone significant accidents or violence: in large part, this was also due to the special

relationship between the King and his people because of his spiritual role and his ability

to play positively the reforms. An important constitutional reform was approved by

popular referendum on 1st July 2011. In particular, includes the recognition of Berber

as an official language (alongside Arabic), the constitutionalization of human rights and

the strengthening of the judiciary’s independence. Moreover, in recent years, Morocco

has made progress in the field of civil and human rights, although there are still some

problems in Western Sahara.

Regionally, the current events in neighboring countries have rekindled fears about

the deteriorating security in Algeria because of external pressures from Libya, the

Sahelian countries and partly also from Tunisia. However, Algeria has remained

essentially unrelated to the profound changes that the southern Mediterranean

countries lived during the Arab Spring. To prevent more radical disorders, President

Abdelaziz Bouteflika has tried to respond to the expectations of Algerian people by

launching reforms and measures to improve the socio-economic conditions, especially

the youngest. Perhaps because of his recent and tragic past, Algeria was not involved

in the regional phenomenon of the growth of fundamentalist movements. The latest

presidential elections have confirmed the ‘Algerian exception’: the voters have decided

not to risk destabilization as neighboring countries, re-electing Bouteflika for the fourth

time despite his precarious health.

However, a warning is that recorded at the beginning of 2015: in fact, there were a

number of démarches against the Algerian government regarding the well-known

problems of the country, for example the high level of inflation, the youth

unemployment (more than 28%) and the lack of diversification in the economy, almost

entirely dependent on exports of hydrocarbons. These events were accompanied by

the organization of parallel institutional events in the same protest’s places, with the

clear aim to draw the attention of the people. The demonstrations were held without

incidents, although some protesters have been arrested, and then to be immediately

released from prison. The repression by the Algerian authorities was openly denounced

by Amnesty International during the presentation of the annual report on human rights.

The danger that the situation in Algeria could destabilize does not scare only the

MENA region but the whole international community, given that Algeria has

April 2015


practically assumed a leadership role within the region in security and counterterrorism.

In addition to the problems already mentioned above, the main Algerian party, the

Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), is now in open internal crisis. The party has been

usually characterized by internal conflicts but resolved, however, by a series of

compromises between the different political parties. At the time of the Bouteflika’s

succession the situation will be more complex and the risk of a division within the

party, which can also result in possible splits, should not be excluded.

The Western countries, therefore, have to be very careful to follow closely the

Algeria affairs if they want to avoid a new ‘jihadist battlefield’ in the future and they

intend to preserve its main strategic partner in North Africa for the fight against

terrorism. Moreover, the easy spread of the phenomenon of terrorism in the MENA

region would represent the practical failure of popular uprisings. The main purpose of

this dossier is to analyze the heavy legacy of the Arab Spring and the outlook in the

Mediterranean area. The insights focus on issues that the staff of Mediterranean Affairs

considers essential to better interpret what is happened from 2011 to today: the spread

of Salafist doctrine, the instability of the MENA region in security terms, the role of

civil society in the same area’s countries and that one belonging to the international

community, in particular that one belonging to the European Union.

We do not believe that the meaning of the Arab Spring has been lost. There have

been successful cases: just think of Tunisia’s case, headed toward a rapid process of

democratization, and Morocco’s case, where an institutional revolution was not

necessary to achieve significant reforms in the country. However, in Egypt and Algeria

the forces of the ancient régime still seem quite influential on the people to reach radical

changes. By contrast, the fate of Syria and Libya is very dramatic, locked in civil wars,

with unpredictable outcome but with the certainty that the number of human life loss

is already too high. This framework does not help the experts to define the Arab Spring,

but it is certain that it is still in progress, and what may happen is not at all predictable.

The staff of Mediterranean Affairs has chosen to examine in depth this topic just

to allow its followers to have the necessary keys to understand how much is important

to analyze this phenomenon. In addition to the reasons already mentioned above, we

firmly believe that it is the biggest event happened in the last twenty years in the

Mediterranean region, together with the war in the Balkans in the Nineties. We wish

you a good reading, hoping that you can appreciate the work carried out by the staff

and you can share the content.

Giacomo Morabito

CEO and Founder of Mediterranean Affairs

April 2015

6 External actors’ inconsistent responses to the domestic-driven Arab transition

External actors’ inconsistent responses to the domestic-driven Arab

transition

By Gabriele Quattrocchi

The changes taking place in the MENA offer an outstanding testing ground for the role of external

actors. The Arab Spring has actually proved that the drive for political change comes from within the

region itself but many players have seen the turmoil as a chance to spread out their sway in the region.

External actors, have all made a great effort to find a consistent response to the rapid course of events.

The US and the EU perceived the events in the MENA region as opportunities for democratic change,

at least initially. Regional actors, also recognized new opportunities across the Arab countries in

transition, joining those ones that pursue investments without strong normative agendas.

This contribution leaves the stage to those external actors who pursued inconsistent or, at least,

volatile strategies in the region and it implicitly validates the preeminence of domestic factors in driving

the events. It finally concludes that security concerns bring the external actors’ goals into alignment.

A few years after the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring, those processes of

transition to full democracy, which was expected to blossom over the whole region,

are in a deadlock in many countries. Chaos spread in different countries and the early

belief in the democratization of MENA region has been lost. Although some countries

are going through promising developments, others are still experiencing violent civil

wars. After the approval of a new Constitution, Tunisia has completed its first

parliamentary and presidential elections whereas Libya and Syria seem to be not able

to break the spiral of violence choking their own people and the neighbouring

countries. Egypt is ruled by President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, elected after a coup d’état

against the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān) who governed for a short time.

The Islamic State and the whole new form of international terrorism are additional

destabilizing factors in the regional political landscape (Florensa, 2015).

What emerges from the Arab Spring is the increasing fragmentation of the Arab

world. Where previously widespread authoritarianism allowed analogies and arguable

categorizations, differences have stood out between Arab states and societies. The pace

of events has also affected the capacity of different actors to effectively react. The

April 2015


changes taking

place in the

MENA offer an

outstanding

testing ground

for the role of

external actors

who try to

promote

democracy and

stability and to

guarantee

access to natural

resources or to

widen trade

networks. For the purpose of this dossier, ‘external actors’ are meant as those entities

who are not subject to protests and opposition during the Arab Spring but have the

ability and willingness to act.

Many players have seen the turmoil as a chance to spread out their sway in the

region. Still, only in reaction to the emergence of a credible resistance movement in

Libya, the international community, following the UN Security Council approval, set

up a plan directed and managed by NATO to uphold the uprising. Although eventually

successful in securing the overthrow of Gaddafi, the traditional coalition of the willing,

made up of ‘pro-democracy’ western powers, was reluctant to intervene directly in the

conflict on the ground as in Iraq and Afghanistan (Spencer, 2013).

The US and other powers, especially EU countries, have been dealing with difficult

dilemmas all over the region. Western actors quickly realized that they had to walk on

the edge between their support for human rights and democracy, on the one hand, and

their pursuit for security and stability, on the other. The reliability of the former regimes

was brushed aside by political realities and coherent acts were needed to keep safe

positions in a changing region. Yet, the operations in Libya did not spillover to Syria.

The vetoes of China and Russia resulted in the difficulties of building a sort of

international pattern. It was a piece of evidence that external actors have barely been

capable of grasping the growing interconnectedness of developments in the region.

The Arab Spring has actually proved that the drive for political change comes from

within the region itself. External actors, from the European Union to the United States,

have all made a great effort to find a consistent response to the rapid course of events

(Malmvig and Tassinari, 2011).

April 2015


In terms of multilateral cooperation, under the Deauville Initiative - an effort

launched by the G8 in Deauville, France, in 2011 to support Arab countries engaged

in transitions towards democracy - the international powers pledged $38 billion in

financing to Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan over 2011- 13. International financial

Institutions also played a key role. International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank

offered loans to support the transitions in the Arab countries. The IMF promised $35

billion to countries affected by Arab Spring unrest. The European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development’s mandate has also been reoriented so that it can

play the same role in supporting transitions in the MENA that it played two decades

ago in Eastern Europe. Anyway the funds committed are not adequate to be labelled

as a ‘Marshall plan’, as it was suggested by someone at the beginning of the transitions.

Further, international efforts, such as the Deauville Initiative, are uncoordinated. More

a statement of support than a firm commitment, many of the funds take the form of

investments or loans, rather than grants (Echagüe, 2012).

Further, identifying the best targets for this assistance, as well as engaging in long-

lasting appraisals of each economy’s absorptive capacities, takes time in countries that

remain both skeptical of US and European intentions and internally divided over how

to realize their needs and priorities (Spencer, 2013). In any case, much of the support

provided by external actors is defined by their strategic interests in the area.

The Arab Spring and the West

As we can also see in the next chapter, The European Union responded to the Arab

Spring with a broad range of tools, including humanitarian assistance, revised policy

programmes, sanctions and diplomacy. The programme SPRING (Support for

Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) was put in place to organize additional

financial resources of €350 million for 2011- 2012. The EU has attempted to embed

political reform within broader socio-economic development. It has also established

country task forces to coordinate support by donors (Echagüe, 2012).

In the early days of the uprisings, the EU presented key proposals containing the

creation of mobility partnerships with Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt aiming at

facilitating travel for local students and businesspeople (Malmvig and Tassinari, 2011).

Similarly, it announced €380 million of new funds for the region – over one third of

them for Morocco, whose constitutional reform was praised as a clear commitment to

democracy.

April 2015


Nevertheless, while the circumstances evolved, the EU’s approach to the southern

neighborhood has been criticized for its incapacity to reply to the events. Although the

EU has not fulfilled its ambition to be a normative power, it has enjoyed recognition

by various MENA countries. Among the international and regional actors, it has the

highest legitimacy (IEMed, 2013; Malmvig and Tassinari, 2011). However, despite the

entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, whose key feature was arguably the launch of a

‘more coherent’ foreign policy for the EU, with the establishment of the figure of the

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and of the

European External Action Service (EEAS), the uprisings shed light on the lack of

foreign, security and defence policy coordination within the EU.

Apart from institutional inconsistencies, the Arab unrests have revealed that the

European governments keep on being seen as pursuing heterogeneous interests. As a

result, the EU is typically slow in reacting to foreign policy crises. Its authority in terms

of delegated competences and its autonomy to use them are limited by the

governments’ consensus. This has damaged the capabilities of the EU to plan internally

and embody externally a coherent reaction to the Arab Spring. Against this backdrop,

the EU has been facing enormous challenges. The growing engagement of regional

actors, the increasing interests in the area of international powers, and the US policy

shortcomings, have put the EU in a difficult position (Florensa, 2015).

Brussels has drafted its policies towards MENA, trying to make up for the implicit

backing it granted to the autocratic regimes. It strives for building up relations with

those countries asking for greater commitment with the EU. Similarly, the US has

pursued the same aim during the Tunisian democratic transition, when US Secretary of

State Hillary Clinton and Tunisian Minister for Foreign Affairs Mohammed Mouldi

Kefi met to launch a new framework for bilateral cooperation, the US-Tunisia Joint

Political and Economic Partnership (JPEP). Within this framework, the United States

Source: Compiled by the IEM ed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey (Malmwig and Tassinari, 2011)

April 2015


has pledged $40 million in support of the Tunisian transition process. With these funds,

US meant to support Tunisia’s efforts to lay the basis for responsive, accountable

governance and to prepare for elections. A new ‘Office of Middle East Transitions’ has

been created by the US Department of State to coordinate assistance to transition

countries. The budget request for aid for the Arab Spring countries in the 2013 budget

was $800 million, the larger amount of which was to be addressed towards a new

‘Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund’. External actors had at that point

renounced to try to press on elections or constitutional processes too swiftly. The

Obama administration, like the EU, viewed the uprisings as an opportunity for

democracy without giving up its security interests. The US reaction varied across

countries as well depending on its specific concerns. Indeed, the American responses

to the events have showed the incoherence of US foreign policy in the region as a

whole. It was really active in Egypt by changing its policy frequently: from retreating

support for the Mubarak regime to launching a dialogue with the new President Morsi.

In this case, the US, owing to contingencies, bet on individual actors rather than

supporting the state and its institutions. Eventually, Washington provides direct

support for the military coup under the current President el-Sisi and it is well known

that the persistence of elites, formal institutions, socio-economic networks and political

culture created within previous regimes inevitably results in reform unwillingness.

Furthermore, the Obama administration had to deal with new uncertainties in the

MENA together with the domestic politics characterized by a Republican majority and

the run-up to the elections. Then, the US found itself limited in its action on account

of its alliances with Saudi Arabia - the US did nothing regarding the Saudi-led

repression of the uprising in Bahrain - and with Israel, as the US conditioned its support

to the Ikwān provided that Egypt would commit to the 1979 peace agreement with

Israel (Börzel, Risse and Dandashly, 2015). As a matter of fact, the US arguably pursued

April 2015


the most inconsistent foreign policy toward the MENA region during the Arab Spring.

The active involvement in Libya - without the US military support, the NATO-led

would have probably failed - contributed to eradicate one of the most authoritarian

regimes in North Africa but it also paved the way to a failing state. On the contrary,

the lack of intervention in Syria due to geostrategic constraints resulted in considerable

human rights violations.

Actually, Western pro-democracy actors found themselves in a thorny position

since the war against terrorism and the endorsement of authoritarian regimes brought

about, especially for the US, a deficit of reliability as advocates of democracy. The

unstable security equilibrium in the MENA region remains the chief concern driving

the EU and the US which want to make sure that Egypt and Jordan carry on complying

with existing peace treaties with Israel and that they side with Western positions. As a

result, interim governments have been able to undermine the EU’s newly articulated

criteria of ‘less for less and more for more’ as a measure of democratic transitions. In

Egypt, when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has taken steps in less

than democratic directions, the EU has not imposed sanctions in the lack of US back-

up (Spencer, 2013).

For the Western countries, new approaches to anticipating rather than following

regional developments are needed, especially to keep pace with those external actors,

less bound to normative agendas.

For the traditional assistance partners of the Arab world, the competition for

influence has raised a new set of challenges. “With Western funding being subject to

new forms of pro-democracy conditionality, the evolving situation has made it easier

for external actors who are not driven by normative agendas to stake a claim to the

region’s future. Russia and China’s veto on the failed draft UN resolution condemning

the use of violence against civilians in Syria in early February 2012 was based on an

alternative set of international principles than those invoked by others under the UN’s

‘Responsibility to Protect’ criteria” (Spencer, 2013).

Besides the principle of non-

interference in the domestic affairs

of sovereign states, the Chinese and

Russian agendas are set respectively

by the accessibility to regional

energy supplies and by the

accessibility to port facilities in Syria

besides the need to assert its weight

in the international political arena.

April 2015


Only the US and the EU perceived the events in the MENA region as opportunities

for democratic change, at least initially. The more events evolved, however, the more

the two Western actors prioritized security and stability against the rise of variants of

Islamism which have turned out to be a chief common concern. Even the Turkish

AKP government did not appreciate the rise of Salafist movements in Tunisia and

Egypt, let alone the growing influence of the Islamic State (IS) movement in Syria.

Thus, Western actors based their actions on what was occurring on the field, a kind

of reactive policy that has been, if not original, at least cautious. In spite of it, The EU

and the US are to be considered exceptional actors to the extent to which they

committed to human rights and democracy promotion in reply to the events.

The Arab Spring and regional actors

Western powers are not the only players on the field. Regional actors, also

recognized new opportunities across the Arab countries in transition, joining those

ones that pursue investments without strong normative agendas.

The Gulf countries have remarkably increased their activity in the MENA countries

and have been trying to economically and politically influence the events in the region.

The Gulf states’ interests including keeping political influence, restraining the spread

of the unrest, offsetting Iran’s intrusion. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait have so far

pledged billions of dollars.

Turkey, under the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), for instance, has

in the last decade emerged as a regional power in the MENA region. Instanbul

enhanced trade relations and strongly backed the Palestinian cause, gaining a bright

image in the Arab world.

According to Malmwig and Tassinari (2011), Turkey has been perceived as having

strongly sided with political change, even when this has run counter to Turkish short-

term security and trade interests. Even though the Turkish government held strong

bilateral ties both with the Gaddafi regime in Libya and with Bashar Al Assad in Syria,

Turkey ended up supporting the opposition in both. Yet Turkey’s role has clearly been

most visible with respect to the Syrian crisis. Ahmet Davutoglu, at that time Turkish

Foreign Minister, has warned President Bashar al-Assad in august 2011 that Ankara’s

patience was running out with his regime's brutal crackdown on civilian demonstrators.

Then, Turkey gave shelter to the Syrian opposition in exile and it provided for the

Syrian refugees within Turkey itself.

Comparing Turkey with Saudi Arabia (Malmwig and Tassinari, 2011), it is however

clear that ‘active involvement’ in the Syrian crisis cannot alone explain why Turkey’s

April 2015


policies are viewed favourably whereas Saudi Arabia, together with Qatar, in spite of

having played a very active role in the Syrian crisis, are not viewed positively in the

survey conducted the scholars (72 percent of the respondents giving a negative

assessment). This pinpoints an important issue about regional credibility: any

international actor’s foreign policy needs to be consistent with the kind of policies

pursued at the domestic level. A credible supporter of democratic change cannot be a

repressive government.

Against this background, another contrast emerges: Turkey and Israel. “While

Turkey, saw itself as a transformative power for the region, Israel tried to insulate itself

as a somewhat ‘active bystander’ from the perceived security risks” stemming from the

unrests (Börzel, Risse and Dandashly, 2015). Extremely concerned about thwarting

potential spillover effects, Israel focused on Egypt and Syria to prevent cross-border

movements of fighters or refugees. Conversely, Ankara initially sponsored its model

affected by a mixture of democracy and moderate Islamism, but soon after the

spreading of the civil war in Syria and the rise of radical Islamism the Turkish

government started to prioritize stability and security goals, undermining its value-

based foreign policy.

Iran failed in its original efforts to make the Arab revolts part of an Iranian

revolutionary storyline. “According to the Iranian leadership, the Arab uprisings were

rebellions against western-allied puppet governments. Yet, at the beginning of the

uprisings, Arab protesters resembled Iran’s Green movement of 2009, which had been

so thoroughly crushed by the regime, rather than the 1979 revolution. The subsequent

events in Libya and Syria made the Iranian narrative even more difficult to sustain, as

both Gaddafi and Bashar al Assad were obviously not allies of western powers”

(Malmwig and Tassinari, 2011).

Looking at the Arab Spring through a Russian lens

The unrests in Tunisia and Egypt were at first perceived in Russia as a revolt against

regimes incapable of changing in a changing world. Later, due to the Western growing

intervention in the region, new versions arose involving possible Western plans and

intentions concerning the Arab countries (Zvyagelskaya, 2014).

Unlike the EU or the US, Russia did not have to balance security goals with efforts

to promote human rights and democracy. Nevertheless, there was also little consistency

in its policy towards the MENA region. In the case of Libya, for instance, it put up

with the UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force to pass, while it

remained inflexible that no such outside interference should be legitimized against

April 2015


Assad’s government in Syria.

Unlike for Russia, however, this

inconsistency may challenge the

reliability of the EU and the US

as democracy supporters.

The focus of the Russian

foreign policy has been stability

in the international relations

and the defence of the Russian

companies’ economic concerns.

The Kremlin wants that

Russia’s role as a permanent member of the Security Council and Russian interests are

recognized and respected. In this context, Russia insists on being treated by the

Western powers as an essential partner for reaching the peace in Syria. With Gaddafi

gone and the lack of an effective Libyan government, Moscow has only one remaining

ally in the Middle East. Syria is the only chance to regain influence. But the Kremlin’s

pro-Assad policy has received criticisms, even from Arab world.

What is important for Moscow, it is to prevent regime change and preserve the

Syrian statehood. The negative experience of Libya contributed a great deal to Russian

obstinacy. Further, the prolonged and bloody fighting in Syria has made it clear that

none of the parties involved has been able to achieve a decisive victory.

Russia was also developing contacts with moderate Islamists such as the legally

elected Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. At the same time, however, secular regimes

seem more predictable and reliable. The trip to Moscow in February 2014 of the Field

Marshal Abdul Fattah el-Sisi has to be viewed in a broad political scenario in which

Putin is animated by the desire to renovate Russia’s relations with the new-old regime

in Egypt. “I know that you have made a decision to run for president” Putin on that

occasion said. “That’s a very responsible decision: to undertake such a mission for the

fate of the Egyptian people. On my own part, and on behalf of the Russian people, I

wish you success.”1

1 Spencer R., Vladimir Putin backs Egypt army chief Abdulfattah al-Sisi for president, The Telegraph, February 3rd, 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/10635530/Vladimir-Putin-backs-Egypt-army-chief-Abdulfattah-al-Sisi-for-president.html.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/10635530/Vladimir-Putin-backs-Egypt-army-chief-Abdulfattah-al-Sisi-for-president.html

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/10635530/Vladimir-Putin-backs-Egypt-army-chief-Abdulfattah-al-Sisi-for-president.html

April 2015


Conclusion

The volatility of the MENA region in many ways pinpoints a broader set of

modifications concerning the international political scenario. In the long-run, the

underway transformation affecting Arab countries will spillover in the relations

between international and regional power.

Most of the challenges posed by the uprisings are undermining the already weak

credibility of the Western actors as democracy promoters. Further, Western powers

have to cope with the domestic reluctance in a period when public support for

international commitment is fading away.

The results of the Arab Spring are definitely disappointing from a democratization

perspective. Yet, it proved the wish of millions of people in the MENA region for

democracy and freedom.

The lack of consistent strategies of external actors in reacting to the events validates

the preeminence of domestic factors in shaping the events and processes.

The external support could succeed in its endeavor to influence the transition only

by adapting policies to the peculiar circumstances of each state, by upholding

domestically steered processes, by addressing the needs and demands of stakeholders

outside the political and economic centres in an area where the rural population

represents an important share of the total population and where significant cleavages

between the centre and the periphery endure.

However, the need to balance the desire for stability, on the one hand, and

normative principles, on the other, keeps on shaping the responses of the Western

external actors.

Security concerns finally prevailed bringing the external actors’ goals into alignment.

The first aim became to hold the position in the Mediterranean by getting rid of all the

potential security threats.

April 2015

16 The strategic importance of the Mediterranean region for the European Union

The strategic importance of the Mediterranean region for the European

Union

By Pilar Buzzetti

The overall EU geopolitical interest in the MENA region is well known, not least since the

proximity of the region exposes the EU to Middle Eastern instability. Many documents, such as the

2003 European Security Strategy, have reiterated the EU’s interest in stable and well-governed states

in the Middle East, regional security cooperation and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons1. In

addition, the presence of migrant communities in Europe means that MENA challenges resonate in

more intense ways than in some other external actors, like the US. For example, counter-terrorism

and counter-radicalization are both domestic and foreign policy priorities. The EU also depends on the

region for a significant share of its energy needs. All this makes the MENA region hugely important

for the EU.

As the process of deepening and enlarging made the Union’s external relations more

central to EU policy-making, transformations taking place in the MENA region and its

proximity contributed to raise the interest of the EU policymaking community

towards the region beyond traditional bilateral relations.

The political issues in the wider Mediterranean region have always been high in the

ranking of the agenda of external affairs of the EU. Especially the Arab-Israeli conflict

is a major issue where the EU has attempted to play a role in its resolution, as peace in

the area is considered vital for the relations of the EU with its Mediterranean neighbors.

With the Lisbon Treaty and the reinforcement of the Common Foreign and Security

Policy (CFSP), the EU is given the chance to play a more effective role on the

international scene arena and have a stronger impact. Examples of the EU’s common

foreign policies towards its southern neighbors are the Euro-Mediterranean

Partnership and the European Neighborhood Policy.

As the EU intended to strengthen its relations with the countries of its southern

neighborhood, in November 1995 it introduced the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,

1 European Security Strategy, A secure Europe in a better world, December 12th, 2003.

April 2015


or Barcelona Process. It represented the EU’s desire to have a more comprehensive

policy towards the broader Mediterranean region through multilateral trade and

cooperation agreements. More precisely, it refers to a more comprehensive and more

institutionalized partnership2. It can be divided into three areas of interest: the

economic, the political and the social basket. It is important to mention that the EMP

introduced a new agenda in the relations between the EU and Middle Eastern

countries. The EU aimed through this process to a cooperation that for the first time

would be based on the promotion of democracy and human rights.

The EMP was a very ambitious initiative but it did not manage to live up to the

expectations up to the point that by 2005 it was considered a failure3, as it did not

achieve the goals it aimed for. What was intended to be a partnership between two

blocs of states, ended up as a partnership between the EU and each Mediterranean

Country individually. Due to this failure, in 2003-2004, the EU decided to enhance the

EMP through the introduction of a new tool: the European Neighborhood Policy

(ENP), a foreign relations instrument of the EU to promote security and prosperity.

Whereas the goals of the ENP are similar to the ones of the EMP, what differs is that

the ENP

decreases the

multilateral

partnership and it

gives way to a

unilateral

policymaking4.

ENP focuses

more on the

bilateral relations

of the EU with

each country,

which are

represented by

the Action Plans:

association

agreements

between the EU

2 Council of the European Union, Barcelona Declaration, adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of 27-28 November 1995. 3 Saleh M. Nsouli, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Ten years on: reassessing readiness and prospects, June 23th, 2006. 4 Egmont Paper, An Arab springboard for EU policy making?, January 2012.

Sketch of possible infrastructure for a sustainable supply of power to Europe, the

Middle East and North Africa (EU-MENA) proposed by TREC)

April 2015


and each ENP partner that set the framework of the reforms that need to be made in

the political and economic sphere.

The European Neighborhood Policy has been criticized for many reasons, mainly

for promoting the European interests instead of the European values, and the

economic cooperation instead of the support for democracy and human rights.

In July 2008, thanks to the initiative of French President Nicholas Sarkozy, the

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was re-launched under the name of Union for the

Mediterranean (UfM). The UfM is the southern regional cooperation branch of the

ENP and it aims at economic integration and democratic reforms of the countries in

the southern neighborhood of the EU.

The initiative, first conceived as an alternative to the Barcelona Process and the

ENP, evolved to complement the already existing initiatives and in the end,

incorporated the “Barcelona acquis” as a new phase of the Euro-Mediterranean

partnership.

The EU’s reaction to the Arab spring

The EU reacted quickly to the Arab uprisings. Through a sequence of documents,

it launched a completely new policy approach, which put the issue of democratization

in the Arab countries on top of the agenda. It also re-emphasized a set of policy

measures first formulated into the framework of the EMP, but more or less abandoned

after the introduction of the ENP. Already in March 2011, the European Commission

together with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Catherine Ashton, presented a Joint Communication named “A partnership for

democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”. In the

introduction to this new document,

they emphasized: “we believe that

now is the time for a qualitative step

forward in the relations between the

EU and its Southern neighbors”5.

The document presented

substantive policy proposals in five

headings, which refer to democracy

and institution building, mobility

and migration issues, economic

5 Joint Communication, A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the southern Mediterranean, 8 March 2011.

April 2015


development, trade and investment, as well as sectorial cooperation. The document

pinpoints the EU’s immediate responses to the events, which included humanitarian

aid, facilitation of consular cooperation and evacuation, FRONTEX joint operations,

High-level visits by EU representatives to the region and support for democratic

transitions and border management. Not long after the first proposal for a new policy

approach, the Commission and the HR presented a second communication in May

2011, “A new response to a changing neighborhood”, specifying the need for a review

of the ENP. The new approach promoted by the EU is supposed to be founded on

the principles of differentiation, joint ownership, mutual accountability and shared

commitment to the universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law6.

The EU announced, through these communications, its intention to support the

changes that the Arab Spring would bring, as they are in line with the values and

principles that the EU treasures. The EU, therefore, decided to take an active role

despite the implications and difficulties that are involved in the transition from

authoritarian regimes to democracy in the Arab world. The most spectacular innovation

refers to the adoption of a differentiated approach. It also defines for the first time

rules and procedures for applying negative conditionality: “where a partner country

fails to observe the principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human

rights and fundamental freedoms”7. Although this differentiated approach was already

introduced in 2005 with the establishment of the ENP, it was never really implemented.

The EU is based on the values of democracy, human rights, rule of law, good

governance, social justice and it has traditionally helped countries move from autocracy

to democracy. It puts as well particular emphasis on the role of civil society, as non-

government organizations and civil society organizations can contribute to the

acceleration of the reforms needed. The ENP had then adopted a positive

conditionality based on the

grants offered to the

neighborhood countries along

with negative conditionality

while imposing sanctions on

states that violate human

rights and democracy,

stressing also the importance

of coordination between the

EU and its members

6 Joint Communication, A new response to a changing neighborhood, May 25th, 2011. 7 Ibidem.

April 2015


regarding the aids that are offered to these countries.

In addition, in September 2011 the EU adopted the SPRING Programme, a

complementary programme to the renewed policies introduced by the joint

communications of March and May 2011. The initial goal of this programme was to

provide support, according to the needs of each country and assist them on their

transition to democracy and the challenges they face on the economic and social

sphere8. The EU demonstrated its wish to play an active role in the transition to

democracy of its southern neighbors by enhancing the already existing partnerships

and suggesting a number of ways to help smooth the reforms needed.

Moreover, the EU seemed willing to become more involved in the internal political

systems of its southern neighbors by providing a stronger support to governmental and

non-governmental actors. In this regard, the EU promised to shift away from business

as usual to ensure that support for human rights and democracy will be central to its

policy towards the southern neighborhood. For this purpose, the EU has created two

new tools: a Civil Society Facility and an Endowment for Democracy. On aid and

investment, more money has been made available to support reforms in the Southern

Mediterranean. Finally, the EU took a more flexible approach to migration aimed at

promoting a greater movement of skills and labor between both sides of the

Mediterranean. However, concerns among European member states about the likely

impact of migratory inflows have been hindering the evolution of negotiations on

mobility partnerships between the EU and the MENA.

EU’s stance on the developments of the Arab spring was not received without

criticism. EU’s response revealed once again the existing intra-EU divisions and made

clear the lack of unity there is among the governments of the different EU member

states.

Its impact on EU’s policies and the prospects for a revitalization of the

relationship

The EU’s attitude towards the MENA has been strongly shaped by its quest for

European security and regional stability9. Regional conflict combined with rising

radicalism in the Arab world were explicitly mentioned in the 2008 Report on the

Implementation of the European Security Strategy as factors leading to instability. The

upheavals in the Arab region therefore underlined the need for the EU to revisit its

role as a promoter of human rights, democracy, rule of law, socio-economic equality,

and its contribution to reforming institutions in partner countries. The EU made

8 European Commission Press Release, EU Response to the Arab Spring: the Spring Programme, September 27th, 2011 9 European Security Strategy, A secure Europe in a better world, op. cit.

April 2015


convenient use of the strategic revision of its ENP framework to stress the importance

of human rights and democracy in its neighborhood policies. In fact, the new ENP

approach is more explicitly based on mutual accountability, enhanced commitment to

the universal values of human rights, democracy, and rule of law, and as such builds on

the normative approach the EU has taken for years10. More emphasis is put on

comprehensive implementation. It does so by differentiating levels of assistance,

depending on progress made in building and consolidating human rights. In this

respect, the ENP explicitly aims to address criticism that, although human rights

principles have been integrated into ENP action plans and association agreements, they

are not matched by sufficient and effective instruments adapted to the local context

and needs of the countries and regions concerned11.

In conclusion, it is doubtful whether these renewed ENP framework will have a

significant impact in the Arab region. Despite new rhetoric, in human rights and

democratization policies, the EU has not been distancing itself from old politics and

attitudes. Although it seems to have accepted the idea that no actual tool exists to open

up societies and enhance democratization from the outside, more can be achieved than

what is the case today.

It has become clear, though, that the EU is now assuming an active role in

addressing the needs of the people of the MENA. The EU has chosen to answer the

variety of challenges by adapting its existing instruments. The lack of critical creative

10 Joint Communication, A new response to a changing neighborhood, op. cit. 11 Van Vooren Bart (2012), EU External relations law and the European Neighborhood Policy: a paradigm for coherence, Routledge.

April 2015


thinking about an EU strategy in the MENA hinders the more profound and much

needed regeneration of EU attitudes. High stakes are nevertheless involved: if the EU

fails in the region, this will have an impact on economic, human development, political,

and even geo-strategically conditions. Progress has been made in the EU’s structural

cooperation with states – multilaterally and bilaterally – as well as non-state actors. The

EU also deepened its relations with the Arab League and envisions further cooperation.

It has been announced that in addition to joint crisis-management, collaboration will

also be set up on economic and political themes in the longer term.

The Arab uprisings provided unique opportunities to revise the EU’s relations with

countries in transition in Northern Africa and the Middle East. Caught by surprise at

first, the EU has now embraced security, economic, socioeconomic, political, social,

and diplomatic challenges. The exact impact of the instruments created or modified is

hard to measure, especially since the

region is still in the middle of one of the

greatest changes it has seen in 50 years.

The use of different policy

instruments did not result in the

ambitious creation of a comprehensive

strategy, partly because the EU has not

been successful in prioritizing the

interests it has pursued12. Ultimately,

the EU’s quest for stability in the

MENA region is still reflected in all its

instruments, notwithstanding the reorientation of its programmes towards the

engagement of civil society and the support of democratic aspirations of the people of

the region.

The evolution of Europe’s policies towards the Mediterranean region range from

matters of economic incentives to issues of security, such as controlled immigration,

environmental protection and energy security. Throughout the past twenty years or so,

the EU has played a passive role in the region regarding taking a stance against

authoritarian regimes counter to its main tenets, being the overarching themes of

democracy and human rights that lay in the EU’s framework. It is clear that the

oppressive nature of governments found in the countries involved in the Arab Spring

led to their ultimate demise, with the actions of the people speaking for themselves.

The EU’s choice to look past human rights violations has led to the continuation of

12 Nathalie Tocci (2014), The Neighborhood Policy is dead. What’s next for European Foreign Policy along its arc of instability?, IAI Working Papers, November.

April 2015


the conditions that led these uprisings. Though in the past the EU might have had less

of a role in actually instituting these themes beyond paper, its prospects in promoting

these ideals in practice in a post-Arab Spring Mediterranean are much greater.

Furthermore, though the Arab Spring took the EU by surprise, there is much potential

to interact with the Arab world and the post-revolution Mediterranean partners.

Though much of the development of these reformed societies rests in the hand of civil

society, the EU has the unique opportunity to aid in this development in a political and

economic realm. With the amount of progress made in these countries recuperating

from the revolution, the EU can help and support in building a region with democratic

values and sound human rights practices, which will help to uphold the pillar on which

the EU has built most of its policy: regional stability.

April 2015

24 Security and Terrorisms: before and after the Arab Spring

Security and Terrorisms: before and after the Arab Spring

By Antonio De Bonis

President George W. Bush, who was asked by American people for revenge against an undefinable

enemy – religious terrorism - after the tragic events of 9/11, with a perfect American speech declared

that war was over: mission accomplished! The war of the Iraqi battlefields and of Saddam Hussein as

the primary (and easiest) target was, indeed, over, and the victory achieved through the dynamics of a

classic war fought by modern troops. However, what did it happen next? The failure of state building

policies in Iraq and of the use of democracy as a peace building tool appears very clear given the dramatic

situation in North Africa and the Middle East.

Mission Accomplished, 1st May 2003.

In January 2014, James R. Clapper, the National Intelligence director, declared in

his Statement for the record: : "...instability in the Middle East and North Africa has

accelerated the decentralization of the movement (terrorism) which is increasingly

influenced by local and regional issues...". Nothing had change since 2001 and Islamic

terrorism is increasingly more efficient and insidious, getting more and more dangerous

for the Western world as time goes by.

Clapper claims the instability of societies from the Fertile Crescent to the Atlantis

mountains to be the factor that can bring about the growth and the spread of Islamic

terrorism influenced by local dynamics. Instability is the key to the very existence of

the theoretic, pragmatic and strategic modern jihad according to the Syrian apologist

Mustafa Setmariam Nasr, born and raised in Spain and better known as Abu Mussal al-

Suri.

However, in his speech about one year ago, Clapper did not mention at all the

Islamic State of Iraq and Levante, which remained understated among other radical

groups. After one year, the impossible had become possible, against all analytical

projections. IS is at the moment the crucial factor to be considered in order to

understand what happened before and after the Arab Spring and the climate of

international insecurity which stems from its very existence and action.

April 2015


Jihad evolution: from organization to network.

Nizam, la tanzim: system, not organization. This is the formula where the new

jihadist strategy is grounded. In its pamphlet, “Call for a global Islamic resistance,” al-

Suri claims the need for an operative system, something like a protocol, available for

anyone interested in joining the global jihad, whether alone or within a group of true

companions, instead of an operative organization. The rest of the pamphlet explains

the four guiding lines that represent the foundation of the new jihad:

– Spontaneity;

– situationist outlook;

– decentralization;

– autonomy;

An epochal changing, a strategic revolution which emerges from the acceptance of

the failure of the Bin-Laden-Zawahiri approach and sees in the future a radical fight:

tazim, la tanzim, indeed.

In particular, what more interest us is the situationist outlook, which involves the

exploitation of instability in the Islamic world, whether it is found or provoked through

destabilizing terroristic attacks. In other words, jihadists need to capitalize on local

problems of the Islamic population, presenting themselves as the only valid alternative

to nationalism, as Hezbollah has done in Lebanon.

After this general reflection on the dangers brought about by a new typology of

Islamic war, we need to address its concrete evolution inside a geographical theatre

very closed to our borders, the Maghreb region.

Al-Suri's situationist outlook: exploitation or creation of the ideal

conditions for a local jihad

In order to understand how the situationist

outlook can be exploited, we need to make

room for sociological and anthropological

explanations. Human history is characterized by

certain constants which cyclically repeat

themselves and some of them systemically

determine the evolution of human

communities. Among these constants, on that

has maintained intact its power to change

April 2015


realities is immigration. This key factor is the root of both legal movements and trade

of goods, and an equally remunerative illegal flux of exchange. It is in this context that

flourishes the modern network of smugglers, linked to each other by tribal ties. Tribes

are very strong centres of political power that cannot be outstepped to rule in these

regions. Without the backing up of local tribes it is almost impossible to obtain local

communities' support. Tribes are able to exercise their power across wide and scarcely

populated territories through a network of clans and families, which generate forms of

power that are not always homogeneous but definitely binding. From a sociological

and anthropological point of view these are the people best suited to survive in such

challenging environments, while learning to be strong and proudly hold out against

external subordination. Tribes are always master of their own lands and national

governments need to collaborate with them as the only way to gain consensus due to

the fact the any form of assimilation is impracticable. The entire African continent is

historically shot through by migration

waves and contraband networks

which create the informal market.

Muammar Gaddafi was a strong

supporter of the role of contraband in

the continent, and especially in Libya,

as a crucial economic activity for the

population. It is certainly true that

contraband shapes the lives of many

if not every African man, thanks to

the wide and articulated network of

illegal trafficking of all sorts, from

human trafficking to drugs, from

arms to cigarettes and diamonds to every kind of goods.

The streets where caravans and the other means of transport travel across the

country, and most of all the tribal organizations, are the primary actors of this

primordial type of market. Therefore, who manages to control them controls the

market itself. Criminal organizations, which often intertwine or even overlap with the

tribal organizations, are active throughout the entire continent and manage illegal

traffics with the blessing of national authorities, through a network of informal

relations that flourish upon corruption. This is the main cause of the cyclical revolts

that invest African countries generating the instability that al-Suri described as the ideal

precondition for the penetration of the jihad.

The Maghreb region represents, for obvious geographical reasons, the match point

of both legal and illegal trade across the continent. Western colonialism, its military

Abu Musab al-Suri

April 2015


face during the 19th century and the economic one during the second half of the 20th

century, did not help African people to emerge from the situation of underdevelopment

that still characterize their everyday lives. This, paired with the continuous population

growth, makes up for an explosive mix easily to be exploited by radical movements.

Until the outbreak of the so called Arab Spring, with an unfortunate combination

of questions of all sorts (while in Prague it was national self-determination at stake, in

Maghreb it is the very existence of the people to be in danger) criminal networks did

their job through their usual means. It is undeniable how globalization has changed

these networks as well, allowing criminal organizations to be in direct contact with their

international counterparts and multiplying their ability to provoke harm.

The relationship of interest between organized crime and phenomena of

terrorism and insurgency.

The whole area of Sahel-Sahara is crossed by smuggled products headed up north,

going in the opposite direction in comparison to weapons and subsidiaries goods. In

Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria up to the Egyptian border criminal organizations have the

complete control over the many routes of transit. Sometimes due to the fostering of

governments, such the Gaddafi one which allowed the illegal trafficking of some

Tuareg tribes or more often due to the easy corruption of public officers in order to

facilitate the movement of these goods. In other words, the smuggling of illegal goods

is flourishing and is generating an enormous economic flow which is enriching local

lords, criminal networks, public officers and of course the people in charge. Something

has changed, but not for the better. We need to address this problem by talking about

Syria where the internal chaos is having a crucial role in the evolution of the Islamic

State which, after following the same path of the Assad’s regime, has begun to entertain

numerous relationships with tribes’ leaders involved in smuggling and thus is obtaining

the right support in exchange for the insurance of being left alone. Al-Suri himself

encouraged this kind of relationship with the organized crime which he thought of as

indispensable for the control over the territory, for economic help and to establish new

international relationships. The same situation has taken place in Somalia, Nigeria, Mali,

Libya, Algeria and Tunisia only to name a few. The Somali Shabaab thanks to the use

of the harbours in the Indian ocean, especially the one in Chisimaio, have enriched

their finances with the smuggling of coal towards the Arabic peninsula, with that of

elephants’ fangs from Kenya or even with the blackmailing of Somali pirates that act

in their territory of control. In Nigeria Boko haram deals, in the territories under his

domain, with the smuggling of goods headed north and has declared his affiliations

with the Islamic State. The news is that, whereas in the past organized crime that had

control over the smuggling of illegal goods within the continent acted for its own good

April 2015


by establishing relationships with public officers that tolerated these activities in order

to have an economic gain, now due to the increasing pressure generated by the

dissatisfaction of the lower class and the parallel increase in the African populations

organized crime prefers to be allied with insurgent movements that apparently give

more hopes for the future. Organized crime acts, under a criminology perspective, as a

normal economic business and tends to invest in relationships that will be profitable in

the future. Thus the entire situation is highly explosive, to say the least. It’s the same

way in which the mafia has operated since the beginning, by combining the interests of

politics and the economy and their own. The Mafia model, given its easy

reproducibility, is not typically Italian. But that’s a story for another time. Back to

business, in what measure have these new relationships shaped this scenery? Criminals

and insurgents have found reciprocally profitable to close deals with one another, given

the matching of their interests. In some cases it was such a tight match that no

differences are detectable between these two categories and are to be considerable as a

whole. The primal goal is economic. For organized crime it is about the accumulation

of capital to reinvest in new and even more profitable illegal activities, whereas for the

insurgents it is about fund raising finalized to their affirmation and political

legitimation. In this regard it is imperative for both to gain some kind of control over

the territory because for criminals it means dealing the routes of trafficking whereas for

insurgent it is about involving the local populations, the administration and the

management of primary activities. This whole thing requires many economic resources

from the Islamic State within the caliphate. The control over the commercial routes in

Africa and Maghreb goes through a series of passages across multiple borders of

different States, both thanks to corruption of custom officers and the physical control

of unofficial passages. By reading this hypothetical informal geographic map of the

April 2015


different interests present in Maghreb you’d easily find out about the importance of

peripheral areas between Libya and Egypt, mostly for the management of migrants

directed towards Libya from the Arabic peninsula, and vice-versa, for the flux of

cigarettes headed in the opposite directions. Or about the importance of the Libyan-

Algerian and Libyan-Tunisian borders where Tripolitania is one of the most important

intersection for the different commercial routes. Who is in charge of these important

areas of transit is also in charge of a big economic gain. In Libya, today, different armed

groups, of various features, fight each other for the control over this areas. Who is in

charge manages to have the right relationships with the local organized crime, to thus

gain political power thanks to the control of the territory. Many examples would be

explanatory enough but the most emblematic one would be the one regarding the Zitan

militias who after losing the battle against the forces of Misurata for the control over

the airport of Tripoli, important economic intersection, started revolving around south

by occupying the territories near the city of Gadames (500 km from Oasi and 568 km

southwest of Tripoli. Crossing Azizia, Bir Ghnem, Giosc, Tigi, Nalut, Sinauen, Bir

Zograr up to where the borders of Libya, Tunisia and south Algeria converge), fighting

off the Tuareg tribes, once supported by the regime, in order to substitute them as the

new illegal traffickers of the entire area. Furthermore, Sheba and Kufra are the main

Libyan cities through which the whole illegal smuggling from the entire continent goes

by. They constitute two key points along the human trafficking route and are controlled

by a bunch of local communities made of Berber tribes and Arab ones that are not

prone to recognising one another. Since 2012, right after the fall of the regime, cities

have been the stage of violent fights between local tribes, that of Tubu and Awlad

Sulayman in particular, for the affirmation of their local supremacy. These fights soon

began to move from Sheba to Kufra and demonstrated that the stakes are high and

revolve around different interests and that old equilibriums need to be dealt with again.

April 2015


Conclusions

This particular argument concerns us very much seeing that migrants that land on

our coasts come from those two cities. The DA’s office of Palermo has recently issued

three different international warrants to arrest the people involved in the recent

shipwrecks near the island of Lampedusa. During the investigation a phone call was

intercepted and it clearly testifies the involvement of the Libyan organized crime. In

particular that of a group of militants commanded by someone that seems pleased by

the millions of dollars the organization is gaining thanks to the human trafficking rings.

This phone call describes the perverse and dangerous relationship that entails the

typical form of organized crimes and the armed militias out of control in Libya. Some

of which are already supporters of the Islamic State. In conclusion, answering the

question on top, in regards to the situation ex ante in where the regimes were in fact

able to control organized crimes, now it is not the case anymore. Big local and

transnational criminal networks are looking for new partners reliable enough to

organize illegal activities together. Now, if armed militias, even while bearing the flag

of the Islamic State, will be able to present themselves as a serious partner for the

organized crime, then the decision to collaborate or not will define the final outcome.

April 2015


The Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism, schools of Islamic

fundamentalism

By Federica Fanuli

The Arab Spring has led to a historic turning point in many Muslim countries of North Africa.

The dissolution of corrupt and dictatorial regimes – Mubarak in Egypt, Ben Ali in Tunisia, Gaddafi

in Libya – is a process that, if the West supports the struggle for achieving freedom and democracy, on

the contrary, confirms the assertion of political leaders of Islamic fundamentalism. Democratically

elections held in Egypt ratified the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ennahdha party in Tunisia

and its ambiguous affinity to Salafism. To understand the reasons for this political success, we have

retraced the History of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafism and analyzed their involvement in

the Arab political scene.

The Muslim Brotherhood, the History of the Movement in the pre-

revolutionary

In 1927, the young Egyptian Hassan al-Banna,

completed his studies at the Islamic Al Azhar

University, left Cairo and moved to Ismailia, a

port controlled by the Anglo-French Suez Canal

Company. Hassan wanted taught grammar, but in

a short time he founded the Muslim Brotherhood

(MB, the symbol in the picture). The Movement

began as armed wing against the British rule. It

did not tolerate the influence the West was having

on Egyptian costumes. Its actions started to intensify. The goal was to Islamize the

society and to impose Shari’a. The group’s leader, Hassan was a skilful orator and his

doctrine, a combination of Islam, Egyptian nationalism and attention to the working

classes, worked well. The electorate of the lower middle class was soon conquered.

From a religious and social organization, the Muslim Brotherhood became a political

party. Relations with the government were highly charged, but al-Banna did not sever

ties. The exclusion of the Movement from the Egyptian political life could have limited

April 2015

32 The Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism, schools of Islamic fundamentalism

the activities of propaganda and education promoted by the militants. Anyway, in 1948,

the Brotherhood responded to the various attempts by the government to dissolve the

group killing the Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrāshī.

The organization acquired thickness. The purpose of playing a major role in the

Egyptian political scene seemed to materialize when, after the creation of the Republic1,

the movement coupled with the Free Officers, military and nationalist leaders.

However, relations between the Brotherhood and the military degenerated. MB had

supported the Army in the coup that deposed King Farouk and overturned the English

monarchy. Do ut des, the Brothers planned the establishment of the Islamic State, led

by the Islamic party. On the contrary, the Colonel Nasser, who came to power after

the coup, was working for a secular State. The rivalry was growing and competition

policy too. In 1954, the Colonel escaped an assassination attempt and accused Islamic

activists, including the successor of Hassan, Sayyid Qutb, who would have inspired the

ideological basis of Qutbism. It is one of the various schools of thought developed

inside the Muslim Brotherhood. This current interprets the Quran in political and

revolutionary way. Unlike the extreme fringe, the Brothers who adhered to Qutbism

ideology2 rejected the violence. In the ‘60s, the Salafism and Qutbism replaced the

reformist and traditionalist current. The first has dominated the Twentieth Century,

refused the Turath3 and called for a return to the Quran and the Sunnah. On the contrary,

1 Since 1923 the country’s political life witnessed liberal pluralism, but the British intervention in the affairs of the country and the spread of corruption led to unstable conditions that reached its apex in 1952, when the Revolution of July 23rd, 1952, led by General Mohammed Naguib and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser started. Egypt declared the Republic, on June 18th, 1953. Cfr. http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/InsideEgypt/History/Pages/default.aspx. 2 The Qutbism inspired Sunni Islamic extremist groups, including al-Qaeda and Hamas, creature of the Brotherhood. 3 The Turath is a textual series of the Arabic and Islamic tradition. Cfr. http://daralturath.co.za/Site/.

http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/InsideEgypt/History/Pages/default.aspx

http://daralturath.co.za/Site/

April 2015


the second school was based on the Turath and promoted the concept of the balanced

identity theory, according to which each person belonged to different areas, from the

school of Law and Theology to the order, the birthplace, the job and so on. Overall,

the backbone of the Muslim Brotherhood was made up of members of the professional

middle class. Gradually businessmen accessed to the party and farmers and workers as

well. A pluralist group which pursued different socio-economic interests. It was a dual

role played by the organization. The Brotherhood worked actively as a party and as a

social movement. It was active in many fields of Egyptian society and this duality

nourished an inherent contradiction. On the one hand, the political understanding with

the opposition threatened the existence of the group. On the other hand, the

maintenance of social activities required the approval of the opposition. An

incompatibility of tasks that caused tensions, especially in the late 1980, when the

movement decided to participate in parliamentary election, but the group remained

cohesive.

The Brotherhood had a pyramidal hierarchy – a centralization of decision-making

and decentralized implementation inside the various operative circles – which allowed

it to alleviate the threats of the government and Islam was the totalizing system. The

Brothers accepted democracy, political pluralism and granted support to resistance

movements, struggling foreign occupation. All public and shared values, that permitted

Brothers to succeed in carving out a role in the society. A position strengthened after

the end of social-nationalism of the President Nasser. On 15 May 1971, during the

Revolution of the Readjustment4, the new President Sadat authorized the release of

some of the members of the Brotherhood, in prison since 1965. Islam was the political

identity of the government. Sharia is one of the sources of the Law. The Movement

warmly embraced the official openings of the President, but it was the foreign policy

to weigh on the “ Believer President”5. In 1979, the peace treaty between Israel and

Egypt was interpreted as a deviation from Islam, an unacceptable aberration for the

most extremist currents. In fact, in 1981, members of a new fundamentalist force killed

Sadat. As an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, it was founded al-Jihad faction that

operated in secrecy and did not renounce the armed struggle. Since 1981, the President

Hosni Mubarak has tightened or loosened the grip on the MB, on the basis of the

political needs. Attempts to contain the Muslim Brotherhood have been vain. At the

collapse of the regime, the Brotherhood was the main opposition force and the best

political organized group.

4 An economic reform and structural adjustment program inaugurated in Egypt. 5 Calling himself the Believer President, Sadat introduced sharia law in the constitution, lifted restrictions on Muslim fundamentalist organizations, and permitted the proliferation of the mosques, which escaped the state supervision and control.

April 2015


The fall of the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring

In January 2011, a non-religious youth movement protest against the regime of

Mubarak overwhelmed Egypt. It was the wind that blew from the Arab Spring of

Tunisia. The marches forced Mubarak to step down, paving the way for the rise of the

Muslim Brotherhood policy. The adhesion of the Brothers to the demonstrations has

given impetus to the revolution, increasing the level of social expectations and causing

the crash of the Mubarak regime.

The group founded the Justice and Liberty Party and the elections got more than a

third of the votes. The electoral machine of Brotherhood took nearly 6 million votes

in the first round and more than 13 in the second to the candidate President, Mohamed

Morsi. In June 2012, Morsi was the first elected President of the Egyptian History.

Finally reached power, the Brotherhood has paid the inexperience of government; the

Brothers were not able to govern. It appeared the inability to meet social requirements,

slogans of the Arab Spring. The Muslim Brotherhood had built its reputation on

providing social services, from the delivery of health care to the construction of

mosques, educational institutions and charitable organizations, which have earned

votes distributing human needs among the lower classes. Social actions, called

humanitarian jihad, had made MB the winning party. Also Morsi has shown little

April 2015


inclination to lead the government, poor ability to push for democratic reforms of the

state apparatus, inherited from Mubarak. Egyptians did not know they would be come

back to Tahrir Square to call for the resignation of the first elected President, reluctant

to the democratic process.

The fall of President Morsi is the political failure of the Muslim Brotherhood. The

institutions needed of a political leadership that guided the transition of the country

towards change. The Muslim Brotherhood has not been able to offer alternatives. The

group has forgotten its origins. A movement started against the British occupation of

Egypt, which now has taken the opposite direction: the consolidation of power to

accelerate the process of Islamic transition. The Islamic State as solution that would

have to solve the economic, political and social problem of Egypt. Moreover, the

mistake of the Muslim Brotherhood was to underestimate the strength of the people,

who had given them power, failing to interpret their wills, allowing the military

apparatus to become the great actor of the Egyptian political life once again.

The Salafism

It is the fourth school of thought of the Muslim Brotherhood. The term Salafi

comes from Salafiyyun, which means ancestors, the first three generations of Muslims,

considered the most believers. The priority is the application of Sharia and the

transformation of Egypt into an Islamic State. Until the fall of President Mubarak, the

Salafis did not participate in the political life in Egypt, they condemned democracy and

election, considering them misconceptions. Unlike Egypt, there are not many sources

that prove the existence of Salafism in Tunisia. It seems to be an exported product, but

that has taken root in the social fabric enough to become fundamental part. The Arab

Spring has raised again the distinction between Scientific Salafism, philosophical,

academic, acting within the political system, and the Salafism Jihadism, violent, direct to

impose the Islamic State. In both versions, the Tunisian Salafism is opposed to the

Ennahdha Party, inspired in moderate Islam, which accepts democratic government.

In 1986, militants emerged from the movement and flowed into the Tunisian

Islamic Front (TIF). The group dismembered because of harsh political repression.

Many of those who had acceded to the Front occupied the prisons or were marginalized

by society and the others fled and developed a deep Salafi net abroad. It has been a

contamination of experiences that have trained young Tunisians, who have had a

confrontation with the Salafis escaped to fight the Jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia and

Chechnya, in order to crystallize the Salafi presence in Tunisia and struggle the regime

of President Ben Ali. In 2006, Lassaad Sessi found the jihadist group Jund Asad ibn al-

Furat, predecessor of the Salafist current that operates within the Ansar Ash-Sharia

April 2015


Party, created after the revolution. Thus, the link between religious radicalism and

Jihadism has formed the Tunisian Salafism. Among the distortions about Salafism,

emerges the fusion of the Salafism with the Wahhabism6. The connection to

Wahhabism, with its direct association to the national interests of the Saudi Arabia, is

the accusation of the rivals, especially where the growing Salafi minority could be a

threat. As matter of the fact, even if they are religious scholars, their recent authority

comes from their political positions. Firstly, they are lined up against Bashar al-Assad

in Syria. Moreover, they are fighting in Libyan crisis and they are supervising Iran,

Shiite, in Yemen civil war to try to have much more influence in the Arab Sunni, such

as in Sudan, in Egypt and Lebanon.

The rise of the Salafist phenomenon

After the fall of the Ben Ali regime, the elections of the Constituent Assembly have

seen the triumph of the Ennahdha, Tunisian experiment of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Since the 1980, this Party has been the main form of opposition to power. Despite his

leader, Mohamed Ghannouchi, rejected violence and declared his faith in a pluralistic

democratic system, the party had been frequently subject to coercion, before President

Habib Bourguiba and then Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. At the first elections in the history

of Tunisia Ennahdha won the 40% of the seats and a wide representation in

Constituent Assembly, which would have had the assignment to choose the interim

government and write a new Constitution. One of the most important events in the

post-Arab Spring have been the release of political prisoners. Thus, the release of

Salafis, the return of the jihadist exiles and the new recruits are all aspects that favour

the political rise of Salafism. An unexpected political phenomenon which becomes an

important player on the political scene in Tunisia. In 2011, Abu ‘Ayyad al-Tunisi7

founded the group Ansar Ash-Sharia, a Salafi-jihadist movement. The goal of the Party

was the creation of the Islamic state and the application of Islamic Law in all the range

of life. The group rejected democracy, a principle absolutely unrelated to Islam. It was

characterized by social assistance, the distribution of basic needs destined to the

poorest families in the country. As the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, so Ansar al-

Sharia in Tunisia aimed to fill the social gaps, created by the new political system, and

lead the country towards the straight path of Islam. There are other Salafist movements,

although not openly jihadist. Even if it is hardly possible now to identify the Scientific

or Jihadist current, because they use a dual and parallel mode of action. The groups

operate in Tunisia and promote actions in the rest of the Muslim world. In March 2012,

6 Wahhabism has been Saudi Arabia's dominant faith. It is an austere form of Islam founded by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab that insists on a literal interpretation of the Quran. 7 Abu 'Ayyad al-Tunisi had fought in Afghanistan during the battle of Tora Bora and was arrested in 2003 in Turkey, then he had been extradited to Tunisia charges of international terrorism.

April 2015


the national authorities legalized the first

official Salafist party in Tunisia, Jabhat al-

Islah or Reform Tunisian Islamic Front (the

symbol in the picture). Reformism and

democratic participation in the elections

of 2013 placed the Front inside the

scientific school; foundation is both the

State and the Islamic Sharia. During his

tenure, Ennahdha Party has worked to

promote the politics integration of Salafis, because cooptation could be an electoral

benefit, paying attention to not be so close to Salafist positions and risk to lose the

consensus of the Left, the moderate and non-Islamic voters. The murders of the main

representatives of the National Democratic Union Party, Chokri Belaid and Mohamed

Brahmi, have revealed a deep social malaise, incited by the violence of the Salafists and

jihadists. The Left has accused these groups of belonging to the moderate Islamic party

in office, Ennahdha, which has denied any connection with or to control Salafi. The

increase of Salafi violence has alarmed the country. The protests against the

government lead President Ali Larayedh to resign. In that vacuum of power, violence

was out of control. Thus, even in the case of Tunisia, the Islamic party fails. Ennahdha,

guilty of indulgence towards the jihadi-Salafi movement has not been able to lead the

country towards the economic and social improvement, it was not able to pick up the

legacy of the Jasmine Revolution and Salafists have become more pronounced.

Conclusions

After decades of regime, the political Islam, which had managed to win over the

reins of power in some Muslim countries, has become a victim of the constitutional

process, initiated by itself. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Ennhada Party,

in a condition of ambiguity with Salafi-Jihadism, have failed their government

experience. The main schools of Islamic fundamentalism have disregarded the

expectations of the their people, whose consensus had rewarded them after the riots

of 2011, losing the spirit of the Arab Spring. In Tunisia, the secular middle class town,

heir of a political history marked by westernization wanted by President Bourguiba,

forced Ennhadha to retreat. Although it can be said that Tunisia is the only State that

has passed the movements of the Arab Spring, two factors cannot be excluded. Firstly,

the attack of the Bardo Museum has still exposed the country to the violence of the

Salafists and jihadists, who could operate in synergy with the militia of ISIS in Libya,

considering the deep Salafi net extended to Syria. The second element reinforces the

suspicion that Salafism, unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, is following its upward flight.

April 2015


High number of Tunisian fighters have gone to Iraq and Syria. There is no doubt that

the rise of Salafism poses serious challenges for the democratic transition in Tunisia.

Worse fate was reserved for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The Islamic movement

was banned from power and from public life, was declared a terrorist group and a death

sentence weighs on the head of its leader, the Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie8.

However, it seems that the hegemonic ambitions of some Arab countries are playing

on the Muslim Brotherhood’s destiny. In Yemen, Egyptian Brotherhood’s position is

in line with Yemen’s Brotherhood, which rejects the Houthis and their ally Saleh. This

is the same position of Saudi Arabia. As matter of the fact, the Saudi kingdom has three

regional priorities: Iran, the Islamic State and Yemen. Ryadh needs Brotherhood’s

support to solve all of these problems. Thus, the Saudi Arabia could back pro-

Brotherhood groups to counter the rise of the Houthis, supported by Iran, such as

against ISIS in Libya, in Iraq or with the Free Syrian Army against al-Assad’s regime. It

could be a new chance for Muslim Brotherhood to come up from this actual condition

of weakness.

8 Egyptian court has confirmed the death sentence given to Mohamed Badie, leader of the now-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, and 13 other members of the group for “inciting chaos and violence” in a process for organizing riots in 2013. Cfr. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/egypt-confirms-death-sentence-brotherhood-leaders-150411125719555.html.

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/egypt-confirms-death-sentence-brotherhood-leaders-150411125719555.html

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/egypt-confirms-death-sentence-brotherhood-leaders-150411125719555.html

April 2015


The role of civil society: what animated them; what animate them now,

and how they perceive the change.

By Beatrice Casella

The Arab Spring still lives inside all the civil societies who have fought firmly to defend their rights.

It can be connoted like an immense and resilient revolution that shook the Arab world. It has altered

the geopolitical balances and has changed the social and economic assets of the Arab civilizations. This

strong rebellion occurred mainly in four countries of North Africa stressing the common reason for

which the civil societies protested: the freedom.

The Arab Springs include several protests that hit the Arab world, particularly North

Africa, in 2010. They occurred against a number of reasons like corruption, lack of

freedoms, and violation of human rights. Growth of food prices and malnutrition are

other crucial reasons that caused the strong discontent of civil societies.

In fact, the last conditions affected large sections of the population almost leading

to a crisis comparable to the one during the global food crisis (2007-2008)1.

Growth of food prices and hunger are considered some of the main reasons which

caused a strong discontent among civil societies.

The principle subjects of these acts were the Arab civil societies who began to show

signs of dissatisfaction towards the existing regimes. In particular, the first strong signs

of rebellion put in practice by the

civil society, began in Tunisia

during the month of December.

It happened when a street

vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set

himself on fire to protest against

the policy that led to his goods

being taken into custody.

1 Abdolreza Abbassian, chief economist at the FAO.

April 2015

40 The role of civil society: what animated them; what animate them now, and how they perceive the change.

Bouazizi was a Tunisian activist who became a symbol not only for popular

uprisings that shook the Republic of Tunisia from 2010 to 2011, but also for all the

resentment of disenchantment, pain and misery of civil society against the authoritarian

regimes of the Arab states.

In addition to Tunisia, the other countries most affected by the bloody riots were

Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Analyzing their political leaders, we realize that all had, at that

time, a dictatorship that did not guarantee a fair social and economic development of

their civilizations.

Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali was the second president of the Republic of Tunisia

from 7 November 1987 to 14 January 2011. He was the successor of Habib Bourguiba,

which has carried on his inclination toward dictatorship. In fact, if on one hand the

World Economic Forum recognized the merit of having given to the country a high

economic competitiveness, on the other hand many non-governmental organizations

and media have regularly criticized his political corruption, violation of human rights

and attacks on press freedom.

Muhammad Hosni Sayyid Mubarak Ibrāhīm, (also known as Hosni Mubarak),

was the fourth Egyptian President from 14 October 1981 to 11 February 2011. He had

a brilliant military career which he applied at the political level to give severe and

April 2015


oppressive orders to the Egyptian society. Mubarak limited the freedom of the press

and was strongly accused by the organization Transparency International (TI) due to

the fact that Egypt became one of the most corrupt countries in the world. In fact,

according to the index of political corruption, the Arab Republic of Egypt is in the 70th

place out of 159 nations.

Muammar Gaddafi was, for many years, the highest authority of Libya holding

the position of Guide and Commander of the Revolution of the Socialist People's

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1969-2011), Prime Minister (1970-1972), and President of the

African Union (2009 -2010). Gaddafi was harshly criticized for having established a

bloody dictatorship. Currently, however, there are many different opinions about the

real positivity of his death which occurred on October 20, 2011. Gaddafi appeared to

be a kind of glue between all Libyan tribes.

Bassar Hafiz al-Asad is the Syrian President since July 2000. After several

attempts to better govern a complicated country like Syria from a geographical, social

and economic point of view, he failed because he was not able to not include the Syrian

Arab Republic in the black list of the US "rogue states”2. In doing so, the President

destroyed the fragile equilibriums already created by the Arab Springs. The events

began in Syria on March 15, 2011 with the first public demonstrations; riots which

eventually turned into a real civil war in 2012.

These denote to be four strong regimes that affected the welfare system creating

strong unrest and internal imbalances. They formed a vicious cycle of repression and

discontent without an end.

Therefore, the deterioration of the socio-economic status, along with a regression

on the political front, have helped to exacerbate the frustration and resentment among

the population, giving rise to a large popular mobilization of spontaneous character3.

As of 29 December 2010, the riots are still ongoing. Tunisia undertook to guarantee

the freedom of the press without convincing its own citizens already tired. So, the

demonstrations continued.

On the eve of the Arab Springs, the four countries, although with different intensity

and manner, were crossed by a widespread protest movement, especially for social

motives.

2 G. Mazzocco (2013), Chi è Bashar al-Assad, l’oftalmologo diventato dittatore, September 2nd. Cfr. http://www.polisblog.it/post/148811/chi-e-bashar-al-assad-loftalmologo-diventato-dittatore. 3 Paciello M. C. (2011), La primavera araba: sfide e opportunità economiche e sociali, IAI- Istituto Affari Internazionali, December. Cfr. http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1115.pdf.

http://www.polisblog.it/post/148811/chi-e-bashar-al-assad-loftalmologo-diventato-dittatore

http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1115.pdf

April 2015

42 The role of civil society: what animated them; what animate them now, and how they perceive the change.

The authoritarian contexts have influenced significantly the dynamics and mode of

action of civil societies. Since the mid-eighties, the regimes have preferred to keep them

under control through a variety of repressive strategies. All these factors generated

highly fragmented civil societies unable to form a common front against the regimes in

office.

Hence, in the last twenty years, a complex system of restrictions and coercion has

accompanied the evolution of civil societies in the Middle East. This has surely created

weakness at the social and economic levels by limiting the ability of civil society to

promote a real and profound change for themselves. Despite all the difficulties, the

civil societies did not remain inert.

In the last decade, forms of political and social protests multiplied. There was also

the participation of women and young people; new forms of youth activism took part

out of college campuses. These are currently the most effective. Unlike in the past,

however, they use extensively the new technologies, such as Facebook, websites and

blogs. Thus, they can better

organize protests, share opinions,

and circulate materials on the

various violations and

oppressions implemented cruelly

by the states.

Civil societies challenge the

reform of political systems,

competitive and transparent

elections, and the removal of all

restrictions imposed on freedoms of associations and press. Consequently, the wave

of protests that have taken place in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, did not emerge

from nowhere, but were deeply rooted in socio-economic and political imbalances.

The problem is the creation of a vicious circle: a sharp deterioration of the socio-

economic situation has been accompanied by a hardening of repression and

authoritarianism. The result is a feeling of frustration and exasperation that spread

progressively, expressing itself in many clashes.

Moreover, there is another problem which is unclear, but remains at the base: at the

outbreak of the protests, the Arab populations were already at the limit of strength for

the reality in which they were living. A durable malaise remained closed for too long,

for too many years. Like all the great disasters and major political and social problems,

nothing has been said and prevented. If National Institutions and NGO which

operating in those countries were able to understand the tricky socio-political dynamics,

April 2015


maybe nothing would happened. For instance, probably the number of deaths in Syria

would not be so high4.

At the same time, it is right to recognize the great man's limits, especially in countries

with a particular political-institutional asset like Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Libya.

Moreover, it is essential to underline the persistence of the dictatorial governments to

give and ensure initially an apparent positive image of the context.

It is difficult to find a conclusion for this complicated context. It is sure that the

Arab Springs caused a deep crisis of the welfare system but, at basis of the problem,

the policies of the countries were unsuccessful and ineffective.

In addition, the civil societies are still suffering from numerous internal weaknesses

such as the inability to mobilize a broad consensus among the population and the lack

of internal democracy5.

Henceforward, a tangible political change is an indispensable condition to demolish

imbalances and find a new development strategy that guarantees not only the

improvement of welfare, but also the creation of a shared and transparent process

capable of involving both the political and social forces.

4 UN News Center (2013), Data suggests Syria death toll could be more than 60,000, says UN human rights office, January 2nd, Cfr. http://www.unric.org/it/attualita/28651-siria-piu-di-60000-morti-secondo-il-bilancio-dellalto-commissariato-dellonu-per-i-diritti-umani-i. Now the number of causalities of Syrian Civil War is about 200.000 but we don’t know the exact amount of death toll in Syria. A. Taylor (2014), 200,000 dead? Why Syria’s rising death toll is so divisive, The Washington Post, December 3rd. Cfr. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/12/03/200000-dead-why-syrias-rising-death-toll-is-so-divisive/. 5 Istituto Affari Internazionali, La primavera araba: sfide e opportunità economiche e sociali, op. cit.

http://www.unric.org/it/attualita/28651-siria-piu-di-60000-morti-secondo-il-bilancio-dellalto-commissariato-dellonu-per-i-diritti-umani-i

http://www.unric.org/it/attualita/28651-siria-piu-di-60000-morti-secondo-il-bilancio-dellalto-commissariato-dellonu-per-i-diritti-umani-i

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/12/03/200000-dead-why-syrias-rising-death-toll-is-so-divisive/

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/12/03/200000-dead-why-syrias-rising-death-toll-is-so-divisive/

April 2015

44 Conclusions

Conclusions

According to the previous chapters of this dossier, the dynamics within the Arab

world changed rapidly starting from 2010. The MENA region experienced a period of

unexpected political upheaval, social unrest and demonstrations that rapidly brought

to change the whole balance of power with repercussions at the regional and global

level. This willing of political change, simplistically defined Arab Spring, spread across

Middle East and North Africa. It has been initially considered a positive change towards

democracy and many scholars compared this process to the fall of the communist

regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989, when in a short period of time many different states

geographically concentrated in Eastern Europe faced revolutionary developments.

The uprisings were determined by many different factors, including the discontent

over low living standards, unemployment, increase in youth population without

concrete working possibilities, and the crisis of ideological values related to the

dictatorships. In 2011/2012 the authoritarian regimes that exacerbated social inequality

and hampered the economic growth in North Africa and Middle East were overthrown

by the rise of protests that were mainly spontaneous and not linked to a particular

ideological or political current spread across the region.

Despite the initial purpose of the uprisings, initially caused by t Tunisia is the only

State in the Region that carried out a successful process of democratic transition with

the adoption of a new constitution as well as free and fair parliamentary and presidential

elections in 2014. In Egypt the Islamist Mohammed Morsi elected in 2012 was ousted

by the military forces leaded by the new president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, while Libya and

Syria are experiencing a period of vulnerability and civil wars. In addiction, Algeria

presents a very complex situation whose outcome could destabilize the whole region.

The National Liberation Front (NLF), is living a strong internal crisis. The subtle

manner wherein it had usually appealed to negotiation and compromises in the past let

to stabilize the relationship between different internal currents, however it is possible

to envisage the probable shift of the political landscape once the political elite will have

to decide over the succession of Bouteflika. The party could not survive and a future

division is possible, therefore the West has to consider these particular dynamics due

to Algeria’s principal role in counter-terrorism and security within the region.

Indeed, the security vacuum is one of the most urgent aspects to face. One of the

Arab Springs’ outcomes has been the rise of a vibrant Salafi movement in the Region.

It cannot be considered a united and identified group, as it differs in terms of identity,

April 2015


origin and objectives, with moderate groups being involved in formal politics and

radical group spreading terror and instability through violent attacks, not least the attack

of the Bardo Museum. Economic fragility, regional disparities and unemployment are

important factors that lead thousands of young people to join the extremist side

becoming foreign fighters. In addiction, whether before the Arab Spring, criminal

networks found compromises with authoritarian regimes that tolerated or sometimes

exploited their activities, after the territorial collapse experienced by many North

African States it has become possible for these networks to collaborate with extremist

groups in order to secure their control over strategic areas and pursue their illicit

objectives, determining an increase in illegal trade and human trafficking.

Undoubtedly, the extreme political volatility in the MENA region determined

important changes in the international scenario. The Western understanding of the

MENA region prior to 2010 was focused on supporting authoritarian regimes in order

to maintain security and stability across the Mediterranean. The Arab uprisings forced

the international community to questioning both the previous support for authoritarian

regimes and the measures adopted during the uprisings across the region, whose

inefficiency further weakened the credibility of Western powers as democracy

promoters. In particular, the EU’s response brought to light, once again, significant

intra-EU divisions in terms of foreign policies and the lack of unity among the

European governments, while the US pursued a very inconsistent and incoherent

foreign policy, failing to formulate effective strategies to address the regional

challenges. Western actors must rethink their action across the area, in order to

implement more efficient strategies to support human rights and democratization

policies. The Arab uprisings demonstrated the inutility of attempts aiming at

influencing the transitional process from the outside: to effectively influence the

transition is necessary to adopt ad hoc policies on the basis of national dynamics and

needs. In particular, the elaboration of a strategy to face the terrorist menace and the

wave of instability caused by criminal networks and organizations is a determinant

aspect to ensure stabilization. ISIS represents an immediate and significant threat not

only to the surrounding region, but also to the United States, Europe, and global

security with its thousands of foreign fighters and its abundance of economic and

military resources.

In a globalized world, such menace can only be addressed through international

cooperation and national action: it is important not to consider only the military side

of the strategy, but focusing also on strengthening ties with key countries in the region,

enforcing political dialogues aimed at developing shared plans to ensure the stability in

the whole region. Fighting against radicalization requires a process of law enforcement,

rule of law, criminal justice, security sector reform, as well as border control and all

April 2015

46 Conclusions

these elements can be obtained only through the establishment of transnational support

for those countries whose population in 2010 decided to react in order to change the

economic and political situation in Middle East and North Africa. Without the

participation of national authorities and citizens and their enforcement in terms of

economic growth and political stability it will be impossible for the international

community to face the extremist threat and concretely contribute to the stabilization

of the MENA region, with terrible consequences at the global level.

Althea Cenciarelli

Vice-CEO and Co-Founder of Mediterranean Affairs

April 2015


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April 2015


Authors

Casella Beatrice. Bachelor’s Degree in Economics of International Cooperation

and Development with a thesis about the Infant Mortality Rate in Tanzania. Currently,

she is working for an international company that deals with social finance, social

innovation and third sector. She is finishing the Master’s Degree in International

Relations at Luiss Guido Carli and her final topic will regard the diplomacy of global

health with a case study of AIDS in Kenya. She worked for a research concerning the

unaccompanied minors. Her area of focus are global health, childhood, and

immigration.

De Bonis Antonio. Master’s degree in

Intelligence, security and crisis areas, Master’s

degree in Criminology. CEO of

www.geocrime.org. In service in the Carabinieri since 1981, He holds the role of

Intelligence Analyst dealing with endogenous and exogenous organized crime with

transnational interests. External expert consultant for Europol the European Police

Office. Professor of the “Geopolitical effects of crime” module of the Master’s course

in Geopolitics “Chaos & Powers” organized by the Italian Geopolitics journal Limes

and by the SIOI (Italian society for International Organization).

Fanuli Federica. Master’s Degree in Political Science, European Studies and

International Relations at University of Salento. Contributor Editor of “Rassegna

Stampa Militare”. Contributor of “The Sunday Sentinel”. Contributor Editor of Ce.S.I.

(Italian Centre for International Studies). Editorial Board Member of “Taranto in

Diretta”. Editorial Board Member of Mediterranean Affairs.

Pilar Buzzetti. MA in International Relations at the Luiss Guido Carli University

of Rome; she is currently attending a Master Course in Diplomatic Studies at the SIOI

Institute of Rome. During her studies, she started her research work for Eurasia,

focusing on Defense and Security issues. She works as a Junior Analyst for ASRIE

Association focusing on the MENA Region.

Quattrocchi Gabriele. M.A. student at the University of Catania where he is

currently attending a Master’s degree program in Global Politics and Euro-

Mediterranean Relations. During his Master's studies, he is collaborating with journals

and newspapers. He obtained a Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations and

Political Sciences at the University of Messina. His areas of focus are European politics,

EU foreign policy, Euro-Mediterranean relations and international relations. Co-

Founder of Mediterranean Affairs.

April 2015

50 Authors

Ed. Mediterranean Affairs®.

www.mediterraneanaffairs.com

info. [email protected]

http://www.mediterraneanaffairs.com/

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Dossier #1 - The Legacy of Arab Spring

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