Donegal and the Joint I.R.A. Northern Offensive, May-November 1922

Irish Historical Studies Publications Ltd

Donegal and the Joint I.R.A. Northern Offensive, May-November 1922Author(s): Robert LynchSource: Irish Historical Studies, Vol. 35, No. 138 (Nov., 2006), pp. 184-199Published by: Irish Historical Studies Publications LtdStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20547428 .

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trisk Historical Studies, vt*v, no. UM (Nov. 2006)

Donegal and the joint-LR.A, northern offensive, May-November 1922

The study of the Irish Civil War has undergone enormous changes in recent

years, especially in terms of a new appreciation of the role played by mirrorities and localities in shaping the conflict, However, despite these new

perspectives, the war continues to be defined almost solely with reference to its effects on the Free State.1 This is to ignore one of the most important military and

political initiatives of the period: the combined LR. A.-campaign against partition which took place in the first six months of 1922 and persisted into the early stages of the Civil War, The northern issue was to play a key role in broader efforts to avoid armed confrontation in the south, and the aftermath and undoing of this secret war defined southern and northern policy for generations,2 In order to understand the origins and dynamics of the Civil War in an all-Ireland context, one county's experience of the conflict stands out as unique: Donegal Its civil war would see the final collapse of these strenuous efforts to ensure LR, A. unity by means of combined attacks on the newly established state of Northern Ireland, This article explores both the origins and workings of these conspiratorial attacks and the complex reasons for their complete and total failure.

1 For an interesting discussion of the limitations of current definitions of the revolutionary period see Peter Hart, 'Definition: defining the Irish Revolution' in Joost Augusteijn (ed.), The Irish Revolution, 1913-1923 (Dublin, 1996). For diese new perspectives see, for example, Peter Hart, The LRA. and its enemies: violence and

communiry in Cork* 1M6-1923 (Oxford, 1998); Michael Farry, The aftermath of revolution: Sligo 1921-23 (Dublin, 2000); Joost Augusteijn, From public defiance to guerrilla warfare (Dublin? 1996); Marie Coleman, County Longford and the Irish Revolution, 1910-1923 (Dublin, 2002). See also David Fitzpatrick's seminal study of County Clare, Politics and Irish life, 1913-1921: provincial experience of war and revolution (Dublin, 1977); and? more recently, idem, Harry Bolands Irish Revolution, /8S7-/92Z (Cork, 2003).

.a Indeed, it is arguable that the events of the revolutionary period in the north-east of Ireland have themselves been similarly underplayed despite the fact that by any measure they constituted a serious, if not defining, aspect of the conflict. Even a cursory examination of the period demonstrates that the subject of Ulster's role in the Irish Revolution is far more than an historical curiosity. In the two years from June 1920 to June 1922 what became the province of Northern Ireland was engulfed in brutal and vicious sectarian violence, most of it confined to Belfast. It is estimated that around 550 people lost their lives in this short period as a result of politically inspired violence, with Belfast suffering a proportionally higher loss of life than even the most violent counties in

Munster. Figures from Freeman's Journal, Belfast News-Letter, Irish Times; G. B. Kenna [Ft John Hassan), Facts and figures ofthe Belfast pogrom (Dublin, 1922), pp 101-42; see also Hart, LR A. ? its enemies, p. 50.

184



Lynch ? Donegal and the joint-LRA. northern offensive, 1922 185

I

Before 1922 Donegal had played a peripheral role in the Irish Revolution. During the War of independence its northern geographical position sat uneasily with its southern political affiliation, and its proximity to the new border with Northern Ireland forced on ?he county a preoccupation with the realities of

partition. Local factors, such as the remarkably high level of seasonal migration, also robbed many areas of LR.A. Volunteers for lengthy periods each year: as one local RJ.C man commented, "There was a lot of them used to go to Scotland, you see? for the harvest as labourers. Everybody went. They stopped then till the

potatoes were done, and then they came back and whatever money they had they usually drank it.*3 Added to this were the constant incursions by the Ulster

Special Constabulary and the presence of a large Protestant population in east

Donegal; in the words of one LR.A, commander. The Specials at that time were

right almost up to Letterkenny.'4 These difficulties meant that I.R.A. activity during the War of Independence was sporadic and marred both by leadership squabbles and G.H.Q.'s decision to discourage Volunteer activity in Deny city, now under the control of the new northern government.5 However, while the reluctance of the Dublin leadership to focus on overcoming partition had a detrimental effect on LR.A. activity in Donegal during the War of Independence, it was obvious that the county would play a crucial role in any proposed future

operations against the new northern state ? as indeed occurred in the early summer of 1922. The reason why Donegal moved from the periphery to the centre of Irish

politics in 1922, and why the northern issue played such an important part in the search for ?.R.A. unity, can only.be understood with reference to the spiralling sectarian violence that threatened to submerge the province during the first three months of the year. By March the situation in Northern Ireland had deteriorated to such an extent that it appeared far more likely that civil war would erupt in the north rather than the south; in that month alone 53 people were killed in Belfast, 37 of them Catholics. Much of the instability in Northern Ireland had been caused by the ambiguous

way in which partition had been dealt with in.the Anglo-Irish treaty. Indeed, it can be argued that the implications of this document led to civil wars on both sides of the new border during 1922. The signing of the treaty in early December 1921, following hard on the heels of the Government of Ireland Act which established Northern Ireland, added further uncertainty to the already volatile situation which had existed in Belfast since the infamous shipyard expulsions of July 1920. The inclusion in the agreement of a mechanism for defining the extent of partition in the shape of a Boundary Commission was ill-defined and would prove wholly unworkable* with Article 12 stating vaguely that the border would only be

* William Britton, quoted in John Brewer? The Roval Irish Constabulary (Belfast, 1990), p. .34.

4 Sean Lehane to Military Pensions Board, 7 Mar. 1935 (N.L.I., O'Donoghue papers,

MS 31340). For a rather idealised but still informative description of I.R.?. activity in Donegal in 1917-21 see Joe Sweeney, 'Donegal and the War of Independence

' in

Capuchin Annual (1970) pp 425-45. 5 For a detailed account of the events in Derry city see Michael Sheerin statement (N.AJ., Bureau of Military History (henceforth B.MJHL), WS 803),



186 Irish Historical Studies

adjusted % accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as many be

compatible with economic and geographic conditions'.6 This imprecise phraseology and the lack of a definite timetable made it almost the ideal document to cause further conflict and uncertainty in the north between and within both communities, raising as it did the hopes of many nationalists while at the same time causing further alarm in an already paranoid Protestant population. furthermore, the failure to place a limit on the amount of territory that would be involved in any handover allowed both sides to place radically differing interpretations on what the shape of any future settlement would be and increased the likelihood of further violent outbreaks in the first six months of 19227 While the vagueness of the boundary clause in the treaty made violent

confrontation more likely, equally crucial in understanding the increased involvement of southern nationalists in the north was the document's inherent

implication that the new Provisional Government in Dublin, and Michael Collins in particular? were the acknowledged representatives of the northern Catholic

minority. It was this implication that would shape the dynamics of the northern conflict between January and August 1922, and Collins, more than any other Irish

politician? would take on the role as unofficial leader of the northern Catholic

minority. While his Provisional Government colleagues continued along the familiar road of non-recognition and civil disobedience, Collinses policy followed a divergent path, more in keeping with his conspiratorial nature. It was based on a strategy of propaganda, direct negotiation with James Craig, the northern premier, and the sponsorship of selective LR.A. attacks along the border

ma in Belfast. While these moves did much to cement Collins's personal control of Provisional Government policy on the north, the immediate results were disastrous. Direct negotiation, in the shape of the abortive Craig-Collins pacts of

January and March 1922, proved unrealistic; and the employment of LR,A. intimidation was almost wholly counterproductive, leading to brutal reprisal killings in Belfast, including the horrific MacMahon murders of March. Although this policy of armed propaganda failed either to weaken unionist resolve or stem the tide of violence, die growing perception that an organised pogrom was being carried out against the Catholic minority did much to unite the otherwise bitterly divided LR,A? south of the border and ensure the predominance of purely military solutions to the northern crisis.8

The demand for some kind of unified offensive policy against the north was, moreover, decided by the attitude and canny exploitation of these feelings by the

fe 'Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland' (National Museum of Ireland). 7 For the British perspective on the border issue see Kevin Matthews, 'The Irish boundary crisis and the re-shaping of British politics, 1910-1925' (Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics, 2000); Ronan Fanning* 'Anglo-Irish relations: partition and the British dimension in historical perspective* in Irish Studies in International Affairs, ii> no. 1 0982) pp 132-49, s See M, A* Hopkinson, 'The Craig-Coliins pacts of 1922: two attempted reforms of the

Northern Ireland government* in./J/.SU.xxvii, no. 106 (Nov.. 1990), pp 145-58. The 'dichotomy between, the policy of Collins and his Provisional Government colleagues is dealt with k Ernest BlyuVs '-Memo on north-east Ulster, 1922-26* (U.C.D.A., Blythe papers, P24/554). Evidence of the planning of offensive I.R.A. activity in January is given



Lynch ? Donegal and the joint-I.R A, northern offensive, 1922 187

I.R. A. in Northern Ireland, who were to play a key role in fostering the necessary links between the two sides. For the Catholic population in Northern Ireland, it

was the issue of partition rather than constitutional matters such as the oath that was the overriding concern, and the I.R.A. in the north were desperate to encourage any moves which would place partition at the top of the nationalist

agenda; as John McCoy, an Armagh I.R A. leader, later stated, 'It was very clear to most Northern Republicans that the Treaty was the last straw as far as they were concerned and any rumpus that might break up the Treaty position was good policy for them.*9

The treaty split had affected the LR.A. in Ulster as no other part of the organisation in Ireland. National unity was a vital component of the struggle in the north, and any wavering in the extent of southern support would prove disastrous for the beleaguered Volunteers in such places as Belfast and east Ulster. Accordingly? the northern LR.A.'s experience in the spring and early summer of 1922 would directly reflect events in the south. As their primary concern lay in undermining the increasing permanency of partition, they welcomed support from whichever side of the treaty divide seemed most able to

accomplish this end. As one contemporary observer remarked, "The LR.A, in the six-counties are all anti-Treaty almost to a man. They, however, are out against partition rather than the Treaty. They feel they have been let down.'10 John Grant, an LR.A. officer from Armagh, later explained his particularly northern

perspective on the treaty: As a Northerner and Six-Counties man I could not willingly accept partition. 1 do not

mention this as an excuse for my attitude to the Treaty as my comrades were entitled to

object on the same grounds if they so decided. The only difference, if any, is that in my case I did not have to ponder over the arguments used in the heavy Treaty debates ... to

decide the difference between tweedledum and tweedledee. My reason for rejecting the Treaty ('partition') was all too evident at home.11

This pragmatic attitude was demonstrated graphically in late March when several leading northern LR.A. officers attended the banned Army Convention in Dublin. Again it was the issue of which side was most committed to overcoming partition that decided the northern LR.A.'s allegiance. Roger McCorley, O/C of the Belfast Brigade, later confided that 'Unless G.H.Q. would make at least as

good an offer of supplies as had been made by the Executive ... I would have no

option but to advise the Belfast Brigades that they should support the Executive/12 After assessing the bid from the LR.A* Executive, McCorley made

in *I.HS. report on 1921 Northern developments relating to claims for pensions' (cited in M. A. Hopkinson, Green against green: the Irish Civil War (Dublin, 1988), p. 288; this item was available in the FitzGerald family papers before they were reorganised, but is no longer in U.C.D.A.). See also the recollections of Mayo LR.A. man Tom Ketierick

(U.C.DA., O'Malley papers, P17b95); file on kidnappings in Tyrone and Fermanagh (RR.O.N.L, Ministry of Home Affairs files, HA/5/175).

9 John McCoy statement (N.A.L, B.M.H., WS 492), 10 Patrick McCartan to Sean Maloney, 31 Mar, 1922, quoted in Enda Staunton, The

nationalists of Northern Ireland} 1918-1973 (Dublin, 2001), p, 53. 11

John Grant statement (N.A.L, B.M.H., WS 658). n

Roger McCorley statement (ibid,, WS 389).



IBS Irish Historical Studies

his way to the Provisional Government army headquarters at Beggar's Bush

barracks, where he met Eoin O'Duffy:

I Informed him [O'Duffy] that since we had been offered arms and ammunition by the Executive that ? intended to support them and would advise Belfast accordingly. He told me that G.H.Q. would be better placed to provide the arms which we required than the Executive would be. He said that they [G.H.Q.] had the markets of the world open to them. ? told him that I understood this was so but that so far G.H.Q. had not been very generous with supplies, 1 told him also that as far as 1 was concerned I was in the market for the first time and that my support would go to the people who would help us honour our

obligations to the Nationalists in Belfast. He then made a definite promise that G.H.Q. would provide all the supplies necessary within a short space of time. ? told him that if that were ao I would be in a'position to advise the Belfast Brigade to support G.H.Q.13

After this visit many other northern officers made their way south to meet

0*Duffy, from whom they received similar promises to those given to McCorley. On their return, meetings were held across Northern Ireland to discuss the situation, with a majority of officers deciding to remain under G.H.Q. on the

proviso that operations were forthcoming.14 While the anti-treaty LR.A. had failed to persuade northern ?.R.A. units to switch sides, their offers of support and commitment to this proposed offensive were genuine. The Republicans had already shown a keen interest in focusing on the north and had assisted in a number of attacks inside the border, including successful raids on Pomeroy, Maghera and Belcoo barracks in March.15 Since that month the anti-treaty LR.A. leadership in the Four Courts had also taken

responsibility for aiding northern refugees fleeing the violence in Belfast, commandeering the headquarters of the Orange Order in Dublin, among other

buildings, as a temporary shelter.16 The place of leading northern LR.A. figures on the anti-treaty Executive, such as the new chief of staff, Joe McKelvey, was also crucial in reshaping Republican policy, and at his insistence the Executive renewed th? Belfast boycott, which had been cancelled by Collins in January. Beyond Dublin, Republican anger at the perceived murder policy of the Unionist r?gime in Belfast was also expressed in a number of vicious reprisal attacks in Cork against local "unionists.-17- In a broader sense, it also became obvious that even after the military split the ending of partition was the only issue on which t?tere was substantive agreement between both sides of the treaty divide, far more so than for Tom Barry's plan to attack the British garrison in Ireland or Dick Barrett's call for a bombing campaign in England,18 In these circumstances, the northern issue presented an obvious target for LR.A. operations, and one which satisfied both the pragmatic and idealistic demands of the organisation.

"Ibid," 14 Ibid. 15 For detailed accounts of these attacks and other ?.R.A, operations along the border see

file on Belcoo barracks attack (PJR.O.NX, HA/5/196); R.LC. bi-monthly report, 31 Mar. 1922 (ibid,, HA/5/152); file on Pomeroy barracks attack (ibid., HA/5/179); Belfast News Letter, 24 Nov. 1925; file on Maghera barracks attack (RR.O.N.L, HA/5/179); file on kidnappings in Tyrone and Fermanagh (ibid., HA/5/175). 16 For details of anti-treaty I.R.A. policy see EmieO'Malley, The singing flame (Dublin, 1978), p. 67,

17 For an account of these attacks see Hart, I.RA. & its enemies, pp 273-92. 18 Florence 0*Donoghue, No other law (Dublin, 1954), p. 249; Hopkinson, Green

against green, pp 96-7.



Lynch ? Donegal and the joint-I.RA. northern offensive, 1922 189

The key organisation which fostered the practical links necessary for LR.A. unity was the Irish Republican Brotherhood. The organisation, which one historian has characterised as Collins *s 'extended family \ had provided a crucial framework for controlling provincial LR.A. units during the War of

Independence.19 As such it was the only body still functioning which retained sufficient loyalty to bridge the treaty divide. Collins's position as president of the

Supreme Council also allowed him to exploitais final tenuous links with anti treaty LR.A. leaders such as Liam Lynch, Rory O'Connor and Joe McKelvey. His own close confidants, Eoin Q'Duffy and Richard Mulcahy* who had already played an important part in organising the border attacks in February and March? would also be key players in these discussions, and the many covert meetings of the LR.B. Supreme Council held during the spring of 1922 presented a ready forum for these secret debates, Florence O'Donoghue, who attended many of these gatherings, later confided that preparations for an offensive against the north were being laid as early as the first Army Convention in March.20

II

These various concerns and solutions coalesced in March and April into a

general policy. The policy had two aims: overtly it was to aid the beleaguered northern minority, although how was rather unclear; the second, unspoken, aim was to avert a divisive war in the south by instigating a unifying one in the north, which would define the practicalities and extent of the offensive/The planned attacks, referred to by I.R.A. members variously as the 'May Operations* or the

'Rising', were to be a co-ordinated offensive by LR>A. units on both sides of the border. Along with a general offensive in Northern Ireland itself, Donegal was chosen as the base for a new force made up of both pro- and anti-treaty LR.A. units. While it was the former who would be largely responsible for supplying the arms and equipment for the attacks, the latter would provide the leadership. It was left to the IJLA. in Ulster to supply the majority of the actual manpower to

carry out the offensive. One of the principal leaders of this new 'Army of the North'21 was to be Sean Lefaane, an LR.A. veteran fimn Cork, who had been O/C of the Schull Battalion and a member of the flying column of the 1st Cork

Brigade during the War of Independence, He was also a close colleague of liam

Lynch, who had nominated him for his new appointment, and a longstanding member of the LR.B., as were many of the officers he took with him from Munstern Lehane was appointed O/G of the 1st and 2nd Northern Divisions

covering Donegal, Tyrone and County Londonderry The integrated nature of this new force was further demonstrated by Richard Mulcahy's acceptance of Charlie

Daly, whom only weeks before he had removed from his Ulster command for

19 Michael Hopkinson, The Irish War of Independence (Dublin, 2002), p. It 20 O'Donoghue, No other lm> p, 249, n C. S, Andrews, Dublin madame (Dublin, 1979), p. 23&.

-.? Sean O'Diiseoll to Florence Q'Do^oghueyll Apr, 19& $WU MS ?P01 I9J)? other senior officers were aE^^Co^M? included t?^ Donegan, Sean .-Fitzgerald m? S?mu^ Gotter. The junior r^nfe w^.A^-ifey;-?^ Gaivinfrom &^ Qon^lty; penis Q'X^aiy at? B% Q-iuttiv^n ftotn Bantry, Tom Mulling from ?nsafe ?m? Mm&^>mmmM &ip?gwway.




attending the banned Army Convention in Dublin, as Lehane's second-in command. Mossy Donegan, one of Lehane's principal lieutenants, left an account of the origins and stated aims of the policy:

We were ordered to the north by the Division or through the Division may be more correct ... We left in May 1922, going by lorry to Dublin and reported to the Four Courts. While there one day Lehane and I at any rate ? were briefed by Liam Lynch, in I think

McKelvies [sic] office. It was explained to us that our mission was to make war on the

Crown Forces in the North on and inside the border, starting on the Donegal-Derry area

and using Donegal as a base. We were to get co-operation from the Pro-Treaty forces in

Donegal and were therefore to be careful to avoid any 'incidents* with them which might militate against success in that direction.23

However, owing to the heterogeneous nature of the forces involved, Donegal would be inundated with strangers in the shape of LR.A. Volunteers seeking either to attack Northern Ireland or to escape from it; and despite Donegan's instructions, it was friction between these outsiders and native LR.A. units which

would be crucial in compromising the offensive.

Despite the involvement of so many LR.A. leaders in the conspiracy, the central role of the Provisional Government army leadership was to be kept secret for fear of compromising their already strained relationship with the British

government. Supplies for the offensive involved large-scale swapping of arms, with anti-treaty units in Cork being issued with new rifles from aie Provisional Government's supply from the British. Most of the weapons did indeed come from Cork, although others were acquired from various LR.A. units in Munster. The exchange of arms, however, was a delicate operation to undertake, and

friction between the mutually suspicious parties began to occur almost

immediately. Eoin O'Duffy and Liam Lynch had bitter arguments over the speed and efficiency of each other's representatives in arranging the exchanges, and while numerous transfers of arms were carried out, with a large number arriving as planned, others fell foul of the undercurrent of mistrust between pro- and anti

treaty units. This mistrust, an ominous sign for the prospects of the offensive, led to constant delays, and in these circumstances a large proportion of the material sent to the north came directly from the British government's supply of rifles to the new Provisional Government army. Some of the arms were transported to the north in oil tankers, while others were taken by sea and landed at selected spots on the Ulster coast.24 Patrick Casey, an Armagh LR.A. man, remembered 'the tremendous activity in and about Dundalk. Thousands of rifles, sub-machine

guns, grenades, boxes of ammunition, land mines, detonators etc. were passed over the border by various routes and dispersed through the six counties.'25 While a steady supply of arms found its way into Ulster, preparations for the

first phase of the offensive in Northern Ireland were well under way. Planning had begun in the early spring when a number of meetings of the five northern

23 Donegan to O'Donoghue, 27 Aug. 1950 (N.L.L, MS 31423 [6]).

24 Roger McCorley statement (N.A.I., B.M.H., WS 389). For details of the tense

atmosphere surrounding these arms exchanges see Martin Walton, quoted in Kenneth Griffith and Timothy E. O'Grady (eds), Curious journey: an oral history of Ireland's

unfinished revolution (Cork, 1998), p. 275; John Joe Philben, quoted in Uinseann Mac Eoin (ed.), Survivors: the story of Ireland's struggle ... (Dublin, 1980), p. 467.

25 Patrick Casey statement (N.AL, B.M.R, WS 1148).




divisional commandants were held. The most important of these occurred at Clones workhouse on 21 April. Each of the leaders outlined the equipment they needed, and the G.H.Q. representatives assured them that it would be made available immediately. A date, which appears to have been 2 May, was agreed for the start of operations, allowing almost a fortnight for the transport of arms to various LR.A. units in Northern Ireland.26 Despite this extensive planning, the offensive in Northern Ireland would prove a disastrous failure. After all manner of procrastination and delay, operations began in Tyrone in early May, followed a few weeks later by widespread operations in Belfast and east Ulster. However, a combination of poor co-ordination, ill-defined aims and the failure of pro-treaty border divisions to act left the LR.A. in Northern Ireland extremely vulnerable. Added to this was the harsh response of the Belfast government in the shape of internment, which was introduced on 22 May after the LR.A. shot dead Unionist

M.P. William Twaddell in Belfast. Hundreds of LR.A. and Sinn Fein members were quickly rounded up or fled over the border to safety, and the offensive, which had lasted barely two weeks, began to disintegrate.27 While the Donegal part of the plan would also eventually suffer the same fate

as the offensive in Northern Ireland, from the start it had always followed a

divergent path. Lehane and his fellow Cork officers only left for Dublin in May, by which time the offensive in Northern Ireland had already begun to fall apart.28 Its failure would have far more to do with its central importance to the goal of LR.A. unity; and as the likelihood of confrontation in the south increased in June, so also did the material and psychological investment of the organisation in the

proposed Donegal offensive. The Donegal part of the plan was very important in

peace negotiations right up to the start of fighting in Dublin which signalled the

beginning of the Civil War. The day before the Four Courts were attacked the unified northern offensive was still the great hope to avert confrontation. Moss

Twomey recalled Dick Barrett returning to the Four Courts in the early hours of 28 June and *his joyful reaction to the news that the breach was being healed, and to give a push for full support of Lehane and the others who were ready to leave'.

According to Twomey, the debates on the offensive had stalled, although a final

agreement was reached that very night: T recalled they (the two Liams [Deasy and Mellows]) saying that everything would now be fixed up again ... 1 believe that agreement revolved around a common policy of war on the British in the Six Counties.'29 However, the bombardment of the Four Courts would begin only a few hours later. One of the great ironies of this event was that the huge explosion that destroyed the building soon after the attack was launched was caused, at least in part, by the igniting of lorries filled with mines preparing to head north to

Donegal.30 The start of the Civil War plunged the joint-LR.A. pians into confusion and, for

26 S?amus Woods to Richard Mulcahy, 27 July 1922 (U.C.D.A., Mulcahy papers, P7/B/77). 27 For the course of the offensive in Northern Ireland see Robert Lynch, The northern LR.A. and the early years of partition, 1920-22' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Stirling,

2004). For events in Belfast see Jim McDermott, Northern divisions: the Old LRA. and the Belfast pogroms, 1920-22 (Belfast, 2001). 28

Donegan to O'Donoghue, 27 Aug. 1950 (NX.L, MS 31423 [6]}. 29 Twomey to CT Donoghue, 5 July 1952 (ibid.), 30 Donegan to Lehane, 15 Aug. 1950 (ibid., MS 31423).




many, irrelevance, In Donegal itself those units which had already arrived were

totally unprepared for the full-scale offensive now launched against them by the

large number of Provisional Government troops in the county under the command of Joe Sweeney, Lehane's constant visits to Dublin had assured him thai the war could be avoided; as he subsequently stated, 'the expectation of a

satisfactory settlement prevented active organisationV1 Indeed, the fact that Lchane and his divisional staff were still in the south when the Civil War started meant that many of his officers were arrested by Provisional Government army units as they made their way north, The undercurrent of mistrust which had

jeopardised the planning of the offensive had already been much in evidence in the county. Even before the outbreak of the Civil War tensions in Donegal had been running high and members of Lehane's forces were constantly harried and arrested by Provisional Government troops.32 The fact that the offensive had

collapsed in Northern Ireland long before the Civil War had begun also meant that its divisive effects would be felt worst in the Donegal operation, the only part of the plan that remained with any cohesion.

Ill

The opening of hostilities in Donegal reduced the already limited fighting capacity of the joint-LR.A. even further, and it quickly buckled under a full-scale offensive from the Provisional Government forces. In many ways the war in

Donegal followed a similar pattern to that in other counties. As elsewhere, the

Republicans' failure to hold major population centres left them with little option but to revert to their old guerrilla warfare tactics. Before the attack on the Four Courts the joint-LR.A. units had control of large areas of the Donegal border, with contingents at Castlefin, Lifford, Raphoe, St Johnston, Buncrana, Carndonagh and Carrigans, which became the base for those Volunteers who had fled west from Tyrone and Londonderry and also contained most of the swapped arms. As one Volunteer from the 2nd Northern Division stated, *We had controlled much of Donegal before that, but now the stators rolled over us and

occupied the country. Our old tactics were no match for them.'33 On 29 June Provisional Government troops took over Daly's headquarters at Baliymacool House, Buncrana and Carndonagh were also occupied the following day. Lehane ordered the joint-LR.A, garrisons at Castlefin and Lifford to retreat to Raphoe in

preparation for a large-scale withdrawal to a new headquarters at Glenveagh Castle in the mountains of west Donegal. The men from Deny were also withdrawn from Skeog and St Johnston to Inch fort, with only five men being left to guard the post at Carrigans, The defensive fighting and long retreat which followed? so typical of Republican strategy during the war, meant that the conflict rapidly collapsed into a sporadic guerrilla war.

Peculiarly, however, Lehane and his officers, despite having witnessed the attack on the Four Courts at first hand, would continue with the plan to the bitter end. Much of this has to do with Lehane's faith in the possibility of a successful

,l 1st Northern Division report, 19.Sept 1922 (U.C.D.A., O'Malley papers, P17a63)< n Lehane to Military Pensions Board, 7 Mar, 1935 (N.L.L, O'Donoghue papers, MS 31340). B Neil Gillespie, quoted in Mac Eoin (ed.), Survivors* p. 163.




peace initiative being developed. He had been an important participant in the truce discussions at the Four Courts, and he was forced to travel repeatedly between Donegal and Dublin in order to ease growing tensions and obtain the final go-ahead. His involvement in these truce debates left him with the

impression that the fighting in Dublin was only a temporary setback, and that if he could sustain the offensive in the north, it would represent a symbolic focus for the LR.A, throughout the country. The Republicans" reluctance to abandon the

joint-LR.A. policy, or to revert to the same sectional loyalties as the Provisional Government troops, doomed their efforts to organise an effective defence. Lehane showed a constant reluctance to engage with the Provisional Government forces or to abandon the idealistic hopes of the combined attacks; 'Ourselves,

having come North for the sole puipose of lighting the "Specials", wished to do

everything in our power, even to the verge of what might appear weakness, to avoid such a calamity/34 He was to persist in his efforts to secure some kind of reconciliation throughout the war, and attended the famous meeting of anti-treaty leaders with de Valera, Liam Deasy and Gibbs Ross at B?al na mBi?th, held

ironically only a few days before the most important advocate of joint-LR.A. co

operation, Michael Collins, was killed at the same location,35 This emotional attachment to the offensive in Donegal also had much to do

with the success of the policy before 28 June, Despite the delays, and the absence of key figures for long periods in the south, many attacks had already been launched. The early signs for the joint-LRA. offensive seemed promising. The

most notable of these successes occurred around the small border villages of Belleek and Pettigo. The area had become a base for those Volunteers fleeing internment in Northern Ireland. After five days of sporadic gun battles, between 27 May and 3 June, the LR.A. was forced to retreat after the British launched a

heavy artillery bombardment of Pettigo. The British use of artillery proved decisive, with three LR.A. men dying in the attack. A number of Provisional Government soldiers who had moved in to occupy Bell?ek fort were also shelled out of their positions. The northerners, around fifty of whom were forced to surrender, had little choice but to evacuate the area and escape into Donegal*36

In purely military terms, the Belleek-Pettigo incident was the closest the joint LR.A, came to engaging in a pitched battle with regular British soldiers. In itself, while having its dramatic moments, it was little more than a local skirmish: as Moss Twomey later wryly observed, 'There were quite a few "invasions" of

Fermanagh,*37 The incident was, however, significant for a number of reasons. It was the first time since the summer of 1920 that the British army had become

directly involved in providing security for the government of Northern Ireland. It also increased tensions between London and Dublin dramatically, with Lloyd George writing to Churchill: *Our Ulster case is not a.good one' and warning his

colleague: 'Let us keep on the high ground of the Treaty ? the Crown, the

u Ht Northern Division report, 19 Sept. 1922 (U.CDA, O'Malley papers, P17a63). iS

Sean MacBride, quoted in Mac Eoin (ed.), Survivors, p. 257, 36 Details of the Belleek-Pettigo fighting can be found in John Cunningham, 'The struggle for the Belleek-Fettigo salient, 1922* in Donegal Annual, xxxiv (1982), pp 68-81 ; Nicholas Smyth statement (NAL, B.M.H., WS 721); see also the joint account of the affair by John Travers, James Scollan, Nicholas Smyth, Denis Monaghan and Felix

McCabe (ibid, WS 711). 37 Tworney to O'Donoghw, 10 Sept. 1953 .(NJUL-, MS 31421).




Empire. There we are unassailable. But if you come down from that height and

fight in the swamps of Lough Erne you will be overwhelmed/38 Mossy Donegan later indicated that the Bellcek-Pettigo affair was exactly the kind of incident that the joint-LR.A. policy had been set up to provoke.39 As such, and despite the start of the Civil War and-the fact that most of the fighting after the Beileek-Pfettigo incident appears to have consisted of attacks on railways and communications and sniping at military posts across the border, which fell far short of the virtual invasion of the north that was for some implicit in the aims of the offensive, it did keep the northern situation on the boil and, theoretically at least, provided a

rallying-point for the two bitterly divided wings of the LR.A. Another reason which explains the Republicans* reluctance to abandon the

spirit of the combined attacks had much to with the heterogeneous nature of the forces umkr their control and the constant need to focus on a unifying goal with which all could identify. Even without the Civil War, the joint?LR,A. alliance was a difficult coalition to maintain, made up as it was of southern anti-treaty elements and Ulster LR.A. units from both sides of the border. Lehane had

brought with him a staff of officers and other Volunteers from Munster

numbering at most one hundred. Added to this were the remnants of the 2nd Northern Division who had fled west after their May offensive collapsed, to

escape internment in Northern Ireland. The majority of these men appear to have come from the anti-treaty 1st Brigade, who joined up with Lehane and Daly at their headquarters in McGarry\s Hotel, Letterkenny, A split in Tyrone had led to the amicable dividing of the remaining arms and equipment between both LR.A. sections, with the anti-treaty element under William Kelly, Archie McDonnell and John Ogle heading to Donegal to fight with Daly.40 The joint-LR.A. forces were completed by a number of local Donegal LR, A. men who had remained out of the Provisional Government army.

The need to appease these various factions, which did so much to restrict

Republican strategy, was especially true of the Volunteers from Northern Ireland, who made up the largest proportion of men under Lehane's control. Desperate efforts were made to revive the offensive in August even though the military situation seemed hopeless. The last attempt to reinvigorate the policy occurred late in the month when the Unionist government threatened to send platoons of the Ulster Special Constabulary over the border to occupy Lifford if the attacks

made by Lehane's men on the local railways did not cease. In what seemed like a final hope for LR.A. unity, pro-treaty forces under Thomas Morris declared their intention to hold the town against any such offensive, and Lehane seized on this opportunity to stud a contingent of his own men to aid the defence, However,

Morris immediately demanded their withdrawal, Lehane later noted bitterly: * Despite his assurance of neutrality he later co-operated with the Staters and also seduced our men at into joining up with him.'41 In a last desperate effort to avoid confrontation with Provisional Government troops, Lehane sent a force under one of his Cork officers, Searnus Cotter, over the border to attack the Specials at

w Quoted in Hopkinson, Green against green, p. 86, For an insight into the dramatic

effects of the crisis on the relationship between London and Dublin see The Times, 1 June 1922. ?

Donegan to Lehane, 15 Sept. 1950 (N.LX, MS 31423 [6]). <? Sean Corr statement (?.A.L, B.M.H., WS 458). 41 1st Northern Division report, 19 Sept 1922 (U.CD.A., O'Mailey papers, P17a63).



Lynch ? Donegal and the joint-LR.A. northern offensive, 1922 195

Strabane and Clady, although they were quickly surrounded and forced to withdraw. These attacks had been largely dictated by the attitude of the men

under his command, being 'decided by the reluctance of a good many of our

forces especially those from the "six Go's" who formed the majority, to become involved in a fight against the Free State Forces'. Indeed, one flying column of Volunteers from Northern Ireland originally sent to fight away from the border in west Donegal, ditched their arms and disbanded soon after the Civil War began.42 As with so many of the northern LR.A. men, they had shown little stomach for what to them was an irrelevant conflict. One of these mm, Nicholas Smyth, later

expressed their frustration, stating: "We made a plan to go back to the north and collect some rifles and revolvers which had been dumped. It is very difficult now to visualise what our intentions really were in going to procure the arms in the north. Our sympathies were with the republicans in their fight in the south, but our keenest interest was our own job in the north.'43 Lehane himself reported frankly: *It must be admitted that most of the prisoners, both armed and unarmed, didn't show much fight or much inclination to avoid arrest/44 The ability to hold these heterogeneous forces together was also restricted by

the fact that the aims of the offensive had never been well defined, indeed, the dramatic collapse of the attacks in Donegal showed the policy to be one born

largely out of expediency, rather than a sincere wish to aid the northern Catholic

minority. It was more symbolic than real, and its limited aims were as one dimensional as the people who had planned it. The only instruction that Lehane ever received was to 'assist the present General Aiken ... in war against Crown Forces along the border and further inland in the Six Counties1.45 Yet there is no evidence that Lehane ever corresponded with Aiken, let alone met him. Because of the dominant role played by Republicans in the leadership of the offensive, this support could only have come from the anti-treaty LR.A. However, whereas Provisional Government policy had shown a ruthless ability to accept the real

implications of civil war, the Republicans never managed to develop a coherent northern policy throughout the war. Ernie O'JVlaliey was appointed head of a north-eastern command in August, although he later admitted that this title had little real meaning or gave him any practical control over the activities of LR.A. units in Ulster. In September he was forced to ask Liam Lynch for a definition of their northern policy, a question to which he appears never to have received a sufficient answer. Even after Frank Aiken joined the Republican side the Armagh commander offered little help to the mm in Donegal or the interior of Northern Ireland.46 Indeed, one of the characteristics of the Republican effort in Donegal was their complete isolation from their comrades during the entire war. Moss

Twomey later blamed Republican failures to evolve a co-ordinated northern

strategy on the 'confusion and lack of a general plan, when the Four Courts were attacked. Aid after that could only be supplied through 3rd Western Division

(Pilkington). I am sure that Liam [Mellows] did urge Pilkington ... to send him

42 Ibid. 43

Nicholas Smyth statement (N.AL, B.M.H., WS 721 ). 441st Northern Division report, 19 Sept 1922 (U.C.D.A, 0*Mailey papers, P17a63). 45 Lehane to Military Pensions Board, 7 Mar, 1935 (RLX, MS 31340). 46 D/Org to C/S, 22 Dec. 1922 (U.CD.A, Twomey papers, P69/13 [80]); Liam Lynch

memo, 31 Dec. 1922 (ibid,, P69/13 [76]).




[Lehane] supplies but they were so full up of their own local war, that, true to tradition, they were loath to spare supplies or stint themselves.'47

Where Republican policy was vague and incoherent, Provisional Government

policy was decisive, and showed little of the romantic notions that Lehane held about the search for LR.A. unity. The start of the Civil War finally clarified the attitude of the Dublin government to the north and gave practical grounds to those calling for an end to violent opposition to the Northern Ireland government. Even before the war began a committee of five ministers had been set up by the Provisional Government to consider its future northern strategy, and a 'peace policy* was subsequently adopted officially in August. This, however, was

merely the final act in what had been a steady period of southern disengagement alreidy under way many months before. As early as 3 June it was decided that a

policy of ^peaceful obstruction should be adopted towards the Belfast Government and that no troops from the twenty-six counties, either those under official control or attached to the Executive, should be permitted to invade the

six-county area'.48

This dramatic change in southern policy was further clarified with the death of Michael Collins in August, The conspiratorial nature of southern control over the LR.A. in Northern Ireland meant that northern Volunteers had little option but to

appeal directly to Collins and his I.R.B. clique for support. With his death their

plans would receive little sympathy from those in the Provisional Government

calling for a peace policy, who were now very much in the ascendant; as S?amus Woods, the commandant of the 3rd Northern Division, later wrote to Mulcahy, 'The attitude of the present Government towards its followers in the Six Counties is not that of the late General Collins.'49 Roger McCorley confided many years later:

* When Collins was killed the Northern element gave up all hope/50

However, despite Collins's undoubted importance, it was obvious that southern

policy was already changing long before his death. His sudden demise merely helped to accelerate the process, and those pushing for an aggressive policy in Ulster lost the one sympathetic supporter they had in the Provisional Government

IV

By the time the realities of this changed political situation had dawned on Lehane and the Republican forces in Donegal they had lost any chance of taking the military initiative. By October it was found impossible to keep flying columns of any sixe supplied, and Lehane split his remaining men into small groups travelling only by night. Daly went to west Donegal, and Lehane moved into the east of the county. Although it was now obvious that he had suffered a crushing defeat, Lehane felt a duty to remain and fight. He wrote to O'Malley: 1 don't like the idea of leaving Donegal myself and most of the fellows don't, but at the

47 Twomey to O'Donoghue, 17 July 1922 (U.C.D.A., MS 31421). 48 Minutes of Provisional Government meeting, 3 June 1922 (N.A.L, DT S18?1A). 4* Woods to Mulcahy, 29 Sept, 1922 (ibid.). 50 Roger McCoriey interview with Ernie O'Malley, 1950s (U.C.D A., O'Malley papers, PI7b98).



Lynch ? Donegal and the joint-LR.A. northern offensive, 1922 197

same time we are only part of an army and in my opinion we are only faking fight here and stealing about from place to place like criminals. ? suppose it is only a matter of time until we are rounded up or more probably put out of action ... 1 wish those others from the South were somewhere else also. I honestly don't care to be responsible for their massacre some fine morning soon.51

The once mighty 'Army of the North' was by now a shadow of its former self and consisted of little more than a small group in the north-west under Daly and around twenty men with Lehane in the south. These units were made up almost entirely of southern Volunteers along with a few local diehards loyal to Daly, who, Lehane reported, 'except for the destruction of communications is able to do little more than avoid capture. This with the exception of a small section in the East and a few scattered riflemen in North Donegal is the only body of men

operating in the Division/ His only pathetic hope was that wthe Bflack] and T[an] methods of the Free Staters1 would help turn the situation in their favour.52

One of the principal reasons why the reversion to guerrilla warfare had foiled so miserably for the Republicans in Donegal, when elsewhere it had allowed

Republicans to continue resistance and prolong the fight, was to be found in the bitter hostility that these southern Republicans inspired in the local population. One aspect of this virulent opposition was straightforward political disagreement. Lehane reported in September: The Civilian population here is practically 90 per cent Free State.453 He added a month later: 'We have left no stone unturned ... but the people don't want a Republic. They want money and ease/ Such feelings were enhanced by a distinct local hostility to the presence of these troublesome

strangers, and, as Lehane reported, 'our southern accents sell us'. He was led to

conclude: There is not a fighting chance as the people are out of sympathy with us because we are strangers ,.. and they have friends they would help in the barracks rather than us.'54 The church appeared to be one of the prime instigators of this local opposition. Lehane asked O'Malley in October: *What does G.H.Q. decide on for dealing with the priests. I had a note from Daly ... in which he states that the confessionals are used for getting information ... In East Donegal (where we are at present) the Protestants are by far our best friends, the reason

being I suppose that they are free from church tyranny." Medical assistance for his stricken men was also impossible to find, and he was led to report bleakly: There is no doctor going to lose his job for me. We set up a sort of hospital first but it was raided and wrecked and the patients made prisoners and the nurses

badly abused/55 This hostility from the local civilian population was also expressed by

members of the Donegal LR.A, itself, In the whole county Lehane could only find seven men who were prepared to join his column. The local units appeared to resent the presence of Lehane and his officers, and some refused to take their orders or provide them with any assistance: 'In South Donegal for instance they broke up the best Company we had by arresting the Captain and 1st Lieutenant. The others absolutely refused to help us or scout for us when we came back; as

51 Report from 1st and 2nd Northern Division field H.Q., 15 Oct. 1922 (ibid., P17a?5),

52 1st Northern Division report, 19 Sept 1922 (ibid., P17a63). 53 ibid. 34 Report from 1st and 2nd Northern Division field H.Q., 15 Oct. 1922 (Ibid., Pi7a65),

55 Ibid.



m Irish Historical Studies

a matter of fact, one of them went over to the enemy.' The local LR.A. were not

only unfriendly but also apparently incompetent:

Last week the last batch of Donegal men I sent to their native place for protection and in Older that they might keep barracks sniped in West Donegal, were taken two days after I saw them last Perhaps they were not to be blamed but what can I do with them, I cannot

keep a column as you see, and when ? send them to the areas they know, they are rounded

yp always in 2 or 3 days.

Indeed, by October the Republican units in Donegal were composed almost

wholly of men from outside the county,56 In November 1922 the anti-treaty G.H.Q. finally accepted the failure of the

joint-LR.A. policy and ordered Lehane and his officers to leave Donegal. The situation had become impossible, especially after Liam Deasy ordered Mossy Donegan to return to Munster. Lehane wrote a last communication to his second

in-command, Charlie Daly: M have received an order from E. ? Maille

[CTMalley] [advising] us to leave Donegal at once and withdraw our men. I believe our work here is impossible. We have to steal about here like criminals at

night and it gets on ones nerves.'57 Daly, however, proved more optimistic than

Lehane, and decided to remain with his small band of followers in west Donegal With the departure of Lehane, this group of five or six diehards was all that remained of the joint-LR.A. offensive. Lehane and his officers made their way south via the midlands, eventually arriving back in Munster, where ironically they were captured and imprisoned alongside O'Malley in Mountjoy jail. The final tragic act of the joint-LR.A. policy came in March 1923, with the

capture and execution of Charlie Daly and three other members of his column.58 Joe Sweeney, the bane of the joint-LR.A. operations for so long, would be

responsible for the executions. Many years later he described the events

surrounding the executions:

[Then] we captured Charlie Daly, who was 0,C. of the Republicans in my area of Donegal, and I remember there wasn't a shot fired in this operation. The terrible thing was

that Daly had to be executed. We had received word from Dublin that anyone captured carrying arms was to be court-martialled and sentenced to death. I had to do the job myself, to order a firing party for the execution, and it was particularly difficult because Daly and 1 had been very friendly when we were students, and it is an awful thing to kill a man you know in cold blood, if you're on level terms with him ... I wasn't present at the execution myself, but to make sure there was no foul-up the firing party were all picked men? and they were told that they were to put them out of pain as quickly as possible .., I didn*t agree with it, but they were orders and you had to do it59

Hie decision to shoot the Republican prisoners was taken after an attempted ambush at JUttermacaward in. west. Donegal earlier in the month, the last attempt the Republicans made to put up resistance in Donegal60 The four men who were executed were ironically not from Donegal, showing perhaps something of the

56 Ibid. w

Lehane to Daly, 10 Nov. 1922 (U.C.D.A., Mulcahy papers, P7/B/86). 58 For an account of Daly's capture see S?amus McCann to O'Donoghue, n.d. (N.L.I.,

MS 31315). 59 Joe Sweeney, quoted in Griffith 8c O'Grady (eds), Curious journey, p. 306. 60 Peadar 0*Donnell later claimed that Dan MacGee, a Free State soldier, made an

unsuccessful attempt to rescue Daly (O'Donnell, The gates flew open (Cork, 1965), p. 160).



Lynch ? Donegal and the joint-LRA, northern offensive, 1922 199

nature of the unusual coalition that had formed the joinM.R.A. offensive in

Donegal and, as Daly's sister would later argue, some of the local hostility to

strangers which had so dogged their efforts.61

V

The story of the collapse of the joint-LR.A. offensive in Donegal has an air of

tragic inevitability. While hopes of reconciliation between LR.A. units on both sides of the treaty split remained, unified action in the north was a viable alternative to civil war. Indeed, more than any other issue it provided a repository for the hopes of those wishing to avert confrontation in the south. However, when the feared confrontation eventually began, the joinM.R.A, policy became an irrelevance virtually overnight, destroying the idealistic hopes of those seeking to overcome partition. Conversely, for the government of Northern Ireland the onset of hostilities south of the border was a godsend, effectively letting them off the hook and ending any chances of British interference or the renegotiation of the Government of Ireland Act. The events in Donegal are also important as they demonstrate that the northern offensive's primary aim was the preservation of LR.A. unity rather than a sincere attempt to help the northern Catholic minority. This is highlighted by the fact that not only was Donegal not treated as a special case and no local truce was agreed, but also by the brutal nature of the war in the

county itself. Viewed in this light, Donegal's experience of civil war demonstrates both the peculiar position played by the county in the Irish Revolution and, more important, the process by which the issue of the treaty rather than partition came to define the nature of conflict in Ireland in the aftermath of the Irish Revolution.62

Robert Lynch

Hertford College, Oxford

61 In addition to Charlie Daly, the three others were Dan Enright and Tim Sullivan, both

Kerrymen like Daly himself, and Sean Larkin, O/C of the South Deny Brigade from

Magherafelt, Daly's sister later aired her suspicions of this bias against outsiders:''General

Joe Sweeney, himself a Donegal man, saw to it that they were not from that county/ (May D?laigh, quoted in Mac Eoin (ed.), Survivors, p. 369).

621 should like to acknowledge the support of both the Departments of History at the

University of Stirling and University of Warwick and the valuable advice and help of Michael Hopkinson, Roy Foster and Jim Smyth.



Donegal and the Joint I.R.A. Northern Offensive, May-November 1922

Documents

Transcript of Donegal and the Joint I.R.A. Northern Offensive, May-November 1922