Don’t hate me because I’m beautiful: Self-enhancing …defends their ego (e.g., I’m a better...

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2007) xxx–xxx

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Don’t hate me because I’m beautiful: Self-enhancing biases in threat appraisal

Tanya Menon a,¤, Leigh Thompson b,1

a The University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637, USAb Kellogg School of Management, Donald P. Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2001, USA

Received 5 April 2006

Abstract

We compare people’s intuitive judgments about how the self and others respond to threat. We propose that people hold a self-enhancing belief in ”threat immunity,” i.e., they see themselves as more secure than other people in the face of threat. In Study 1, peo-ple assumed that they threatened others more than others threatened them. In Study 2, people on project teams estimated that boththey and their teammates provoked roughly equal levels of threat in others, although they experienced less threat than did other peo-ple. Study 3 experimentally manipulated threat perceptions in an interactive context and revealed that when people held self-enhanc-ing threat appraisals, those with whom they interacted experienced lower satisfaction with the outcome and relationship. Finally,Study 4 demonstrated that, as compared to people who aYrmed themselves and thus focused on the self, people who aYrmedanother person displayed lower threat immunity. The self-enhancing nature of these threat appraisals reveals how competition andenvy emerge in organizations—or at least, how people imagine they emerge.© 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Self-enhancement; AYrmation; Threat; Envy

UNCORREConsider Donald Trump’s protégé, Carolyn Kepcher,

who rapidly rose in his organization, even earning a seatnext to Trump in the boardroom of “The Apprentice.”She wrote a business book and accepted various speak-ing engagements, and began to create a brand of her own(Stowe, 2006). However, just as she was stepping outfrom under Trump’s shadow, he Wred her. Kepchermight Wnd comfort in the interpretation that she simplygrew “too big for the boss (Stowe, 2006, p. 1).” Peoplefacing hostile bosses or co-workers often reach the con-clusion that those others are beset with threat, and holdtheir own beauty, brains, successes, and other admirablequalities responsible (Exline & Lobel, 1999, 2001;

* Corresponding author. Fax: +1 773 702 0458.E-mail addresses: [email protected] (T. Menon), leighthompson

@kellogg.northwestern.edu (L. Thompson).1 Fax: +1 847 467 5700.

0749-5978/$ - see front matter © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.10.007

Please cite this article in press as: Menon, T., & Thompson, L., threat appraisal, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Pro

Vecchio, 2005). This inference is captured in the insultingcomeback, “Don’t hate me because I am beautiful, hateme because I am young.”

Although people are sensitive to the threats that oth-ers experience (Exline & Lobel, 1999, 2001; Vecchio,2005), they may not acknowledge their own experienceof threat so readily. For his part, Trump denied thatthreat played any role in this turn of events, saying, “Ilike Carolyn. What I did was for her own good (Stowe,2006, p. 2).” He also maintained that she was lax in herjob and had failed to complete various projects (Stowe,2006). People who face potentially threatening rivalsquickly profess that they do not resent them becausethey are so beautiful or talented, but for their less Xatter-ing attributes. People dislike those who threaten them(Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004), subtly criticize them (Four-nier, Moskowitz, & ZuroV, 2002), avoid their good ideas(Menon, Thompson, & Choi, 2006), gossip about them,

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This research was funded by the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business and the Kellogg School of Management. We would like to thank our Associate Editor, our reviewers, Paul Goodman, Liz Ghini, and Reid Hastie for their helpful comments.

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give them “back-handed” compliments, and even “over-help” them to undercut how others perceive their com-petence (Gilbert & Silvera, 1996). It is diYcult for peopleto admit that someone else threatens them (Schoeck,1959) because, to do so, they must acknowledge theother person’s talents, their own failures by comparison,and their socially undesirable response (Johnson, 1987;Vecchio, 2000; Wilson & Dunn, 2004).

Despite the vast literature on social comparison, onetopic that has been largely overlooked is people’s intui-tive judgments about how the self and others experiencepotentially threatening social comparisons. In contrastto prior research that suggests that people underestimatetheir own capacity to cope with threat (Gilbert, Pinel,Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998), the examplesabove suggest that people readily attribute threat to oth-ers, but overestimate their own ability to withstandthreat. We label this tendency to see the self as moresecure in the face of threat than other people threatimmunity. Self-enhancement thus aVects the social com-parison process in two ways: not only who people com-pare themselves to (Taylor, 1983; Thompson & Crocker,1990; Wills, 1981), but also how people interpret thethreats that follow from comparisons.

People’s intuitive assessments about the state of theirown and others’ egos matter because they trigger a vari-ety of interpersonal implications. People who see them-selves as uniquely immune from threat eVectively aYrmtheir own resilience, and thus may be especially capableof coping with otherwise upsetting social comparisons(Spencer, Fein, & Lomore, 2001). However, the self-enhancing nature of these attributions also conveysone’s sense of superiority and distrust of others’ motives.These beliefs can inadvertently undermine relationshipsand contribute to a competitive, indeed paranoid, atmo-sphere within organizations (Edmondson, 1999; Kramer,1998; Vecchio, 2005). We suggest that these basic andself-enhancing perceptions reveal how competition andenvy emerge in organizations (Schaubroeck & Lam,2004; Vecchio, 2000)—or at least, how people imaginethey emerge.

Threat immunity: Self-enhancing judgments in threat appraisal

When people appraise threat, they make a cognitiveand aVective judgment regarding another person’smotives towards the self (Andersen, Glassman, & Gold,1998; Kramer, 1998; Menon & Blount, 2003; Srull &Wyer, 1989). Although other people can pose manykinds of threat (e.g., being physically dangerous oruntrustworthy), we focus on the threats that people posebecause of their exemplary attributes, i.e., their skills, tal-ents, and abilities. These threats aVect one’s self imageand can breed a variety of negative responses, e.g., envy,


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frustration, helplessness, and stress (Schaubroeck &Lam, 2004; Tesser, 1988; Vecchio, 2000).

We examine systematic patterns in people’s self-assessments about the threats that they and other peopleexperience. In contrast to recent research that suggeststhat people are unaware of and underestimate their psy-chological defenses (Gilbert et al., 1998), we propose thatself-aYrmation and ultimately self-enhancement leadpeople to see themselves as more resilient to threat thanother people. Additionally, we consider how this self-enhancing bias in threat appraisal aVects interpersonalinteraction.

Two pains of social comparison: Being a threat vs. being threatened

When people make upward comparisons, i.e., compari-sons to people who outperform the self (Brickman &Bulman, 1977; Wood, 1989), they experience one kind ofpain associated with social comparison. SpeciWcally, theyexperience threat—negative aVect, distress, defensivenessas they consider their relative inadequacies (Tesser, 1988;Wills, 1981), which can develop into frustration, help-lessness, or envy (Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004; Vecchio,2000).

The superior performer experiences a second kind ofpain associated with social comparison, i.e., they worrythat they may elicit envy, resentment, and anger in thosewho have been outdone (Exline & Lobel, 1999, 2001).This discomfort has been documented in a variety ofcontexts (see Exline & Lobel, 1999), notably among peo-ple involved in close relationships (Tesser, 1988); womenwho fear others’ resentment of their superior perfor-mance (Berg, Stephan, & Dodson, 1981; Heatherington,Crown, Wagner, & Rigby, 1989) and minorities who fearoutperforming the in-group (Arroyo & Zigler, 1995).

Intuitive assessments of own vs. others’ threat

Fortunately, the Wrst kind of pain, which derives frommaking an upward comparison, is often not as bother-some as one might expect (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997).This is because people use their aYrmational resources(Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993) and psychologicaldefenses to reconstrue the threatening implications ofthe upward comparison and thus blunt its impact on theself (Gilbert et al., 1998). For instance, people who iden-tify a potentially damaging comparison (e.g., a rival out-performs the self at work) may resolve it in a way thatdefends their ego (e.g., I’m a better athlete than my rival).

This capacity for self-protection reveals that peoplepossess a “psychological immune system,” i.e., a “systemof cognitive mechanisms that ameliorates their experi-ence of negative aVect (Gilbert et al., 1998, p. 617).”However, people also display immune neglect, i.e., theyfail to appreciate the workings of their psychological

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immune system and underestimate their ability torebound from threats (Gilbert et al., 1998). People over-predict their aVective responses (e.g., they predict thatnegative events such as not getting tenure or just missingthe train will be more distressing than they actuallyprove to be (Gilbert et al., 1998). Although peopleexhibit a particular blindness to how their own psycho-logical immune system operates, Gilbert and colleaguesnote that they shrewdly detected other people’s attemptsat self-protection (e.g., quickly concluding that a manwhose girlfriend has just dumped him only fools himselfwhen he says afterwards that he actually wasn’t inter-ested).

Whereas these authors emphasize the aspects of thepsychological immune system that have to do withdefense mechanisms and rationalization, one’s aYrma-tional resources are an aspect of the psychologicalimmune system that reXects more favorably on one’sself. Indeed, we predict that people will be well aware ofthe power of their own, as compared to others’, aYrma-tional resources to render them immune from threat:

Hypothesis 1. People exhibit threat immunity, i.e., theysee the self as less vulnerable to threat than other people.

Interpersonal consequences of threat immunity perceptions

Prior research characterizes people’s sensitivity to thethreats they provoke in others as an empathic response(Exline & Lobel, 1999). Relational concerns drive thisphenomenon, and it is correlated with interdependence,empathy, fear of success, and sociotropy (the desire toplease and win approval of others), and can result in pat-terns of self-presentation in which people minimize theirachievements (Exline & Lobel, 1999, 2001). Additionally,the phenomenon can arise from self-protective concerns,e.g., fearing that outperformed people will respond withenvy, hostility, and retaliation (Exline & Lobel, 1999).

The current paper complements this adaptive andempathic characterization of these threat appraisals(Exline & Lobel, 2001) by emphasizing their more dys-functional features. The processes by which peopledetect and infer threat involve, not just empathy, butalso egocentrism, which complicates attempts torespond adaptively. In particular, we hypothesize thatan inappropriate (and self-enhancing) concern aboutthe threats that the self evokes in others—coupled withother people’s likely (self-enhancing) denials of thosethreats—leads to a self-fulWlling prophecy. Peoplesense when others interpret their motives negatively,and thus come to harbor ill-will against the actor, nega-tive reactions that the actor readily codes as conWrma-tion of their initial threat appraisal. Thus, in contrast towhat might be expected from an empathic response, wepredict:


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Hypothesis 2. People experience greater interpersonaldiscomfort when they interact with people who exhibitthreat immunity, as opposed to people who do not holdthese assumptions.

These basic perceptions about one’s own and others’motives potentially instigate negative aVect at minimum,and even more problematically, organizational competi-tion, envy, and paranoia.

Overview of studies

In four studies, we systematically compare people’sintuitive assessments about the threats they evoke inothers with the threats they experience following com-parisons with competent others. We examine (a) people’sperceptions about the level of threat that they and othersexperience, (b) the underlying egocentric process, (c)their interpersonal implications, and (d) a strategy toattenuate this pattern of inference.

In Study 1, we test Hypothesis 1, and establish thebasic threat immunity eVect. Participants recalled situa-tions in which they either were the target of a threaten-ing upward comparison or made such a comparisonthemselves. People believed that they threatened othersmore than others threatened them. Further, when peoplebelieved they were threatening, they self-minimized; incontrast, they self-enhanced when they were threatened.

Study 2 replicates the threat immunity eVect in aninteractive context and introduces third-party ratings ofthreat to begin examining underlying causal mecha-nisms. We examine two potential explanations about theegocentric process involved. First, given that peopleoverestimate the degree to which the social spotlightshines on the self (Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000),they may overestimate the extent to which others com-pare themselves to the self (Lassiter & Munhall, 2001).Thus, people may expect others to experience morethreat because they simply assume that others comparemore with the self than the self compares with others.We label this form of egocentrism, “Self as Standard forComparison.”

Alternatively, given that people tend to overestimatetheir contributions (Ross & Sicoly, 1979) and presumethat they are more skilled than they really are (Alicke,1985; Kruger & Dunning, 1999), people may imaginethat their performance is substantially better, and hencemore threatening than it actually is. This suggests a moreself-aggrandizing asymmetry: speciWcally, people assumethat the self threatens a given person more than a thirdparty would threaten that person. We label this self-enhancing alternative the “Threat Capital” explanation,i.e., people overestimate their own capacity to provokethreat in others. We do not Wnd support for either ofthese mechanisms: people did not overestimate the

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However, people may appreciate different aspects of their own versus others’ psychological immune systems. Gilbert et. al. (1998) emphasize aspects of the psychological immune system that have to do with defense mechanisms and rationalization, and indeed, people are more willing and able to recognize other’s coping strategies as defense mechanisms as compared to their own (Gilbert et. al., 1998, Pronin, Lin, & L. Ross, 2002). By contrast, people’s affirmational resources (i.e., their talents and values) are an element of the psychological immune system that reflects more favorably on the self. Thus, we predict that people’s affirmational resources are more readily available to the self than others, and that people will be well aware their capacity to render the self immune from threat.




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degree to which others focused on the self in social com-parisons, and further did not see the self as more threat-ening than third parties.

To examine Hypothesis 2, which predicts that threatimmunity produces negative interpersonal consequences,Study 3 experimentally manipulates threat perceptions inan interactive context. SpeciWcally, we created an intensiveone-on-one conXict simulation in which we randomlyassigned participants to one of two roles: employee orboss. In the “threatening” condition, employees believedthat we had matched them, based on their responses to apersonality test, with someone whose weaknesses weretheir personal strengths—and who they therefore mightthreaten. By contrast, bosses were either in a control con-dition or were “threatened,” i.e., told that we had matchedthem with someone whose strengths were their personalweaknesses—and who they were unlikely to threaten. Weexpected that parties with greater asymmetries in threatappraisal would experience more negative interactions.

Our fourth study further examines mechanisms. WeWrst consider the “Self-Defense” explanation. Perhapspeople deny the threats that they experience to salvagetheir bruised egos. It is often diYcult to admit that some-one else is threatening; therefore people may prefer todeny that others threaten them to protect the ego fromthe painful recognition that they have been outper-formed (Vecchio, 2000).

Alternatively, we consider the “Immunity Salience”explanation. People often hold more charitable viewsabout the self than others (Epley & Dunning, 2000;Jones & Nisbett, 1972) because of availability biases(Ross & Sicoly, 1979). Because other people’s sources ofimmunity—their values, talents, and skills—are notreadily available, people may underestimate others’ abil-ities to recover from threat—unless these sources of aYr-mation become salient.

Given prior research that indicates that self-aYrmationreduces defensiveness (Spencer et al., 2001), self-aYrma-tion should mitigate the bias if it is a defense mechanism.Alternatively, if the bias results because one’s own sourcesof immunity are more salient than others,’ then self aYr-mation, which increases the focus on the self, should exac-erbate the bias relative to “other-aYrmation,” whichhighlights other people’s positive qualities. We Wnd sup-port for this Immunity Salience explanation.

Operationalization of key construct: Threat immunity

Threat immunity encompasses several perceptions;intrapersonally, it involves assessments about (1) one’sown experience of threat and (2) one’s perception of oth-ers’ experiences of threat. When threat immunity occursin an interpersonal context, it also involves other people’sassessments about these same variables, i.e., (3) their ownexperience of threat, and (4) their perceptions of theself’s experience of threat. As a result, multiple asymme-


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tries arise and the four studies in this paper reXect sev-eral ways to conceptualize their self-enhancing nature. InStudy 1, we view threat immunity as a within-personasymmetry, and show that people perceive themselves tobe more resilient to threat than they perceive others to be(1 vs. 2). In Study 2, we add between-person evaluationsand show that people also perceive themselves to be lessthreatened than their interaction partners perceive them(1 vs. 4). Study 3 experimentally manipulates the inter-personal aspect of this bias. We lead people to see them-selves as threatening or not, and to interact with peoplewho expect to be threatened or not (2 vs. 3). In additionto manipulating threat perceptions in Study 3, we alsomeasure the magnitude of the bias as the degree to whichpeople perceive a gap between their own and others’threat levels (1–2). Studies 3 and 4 both use this diVer-ence score and thus conceptualize threat immunity as acontinuous variable. Given statistical concerns arounddiVerence scores (Edwards, 2001; Edwards & Parry,1993), we also report analyses that do not rely on thediVerence measures. While the asymmetries in threatappraisal take various forms, we believe that they eachcapture the same basic ideas: i.e., we see ourselves as lessthreatened than we see others and we see ourselves lessthreatened than they see us.

Study 1: The self as threat vs. the threatened self: Asymmetrical perceptions

In Study 1, we compare people’s perceptions of thethreats they evoke in others versus the threats theyexperience. As predicted by Hypothesis 1, we expectedthat people would believe that they had threat immu-nity, i.e., they would be more likely to presume thatthey threatened others than to admit that a competentother threatened the self. Further, given that peopleoften try to minimize their positive qualities if they sus-pect that they threaten others (Arroyo & Zigler, 1995;Daubman, Heatherington, & Ahn, 1992; Heathering-ton et al., 1989; cited in Exline & Lobel, 1999) we pre-dicted that when people infer that they threaten others,they would be more likely to self-minimize.

Methods

ParticipantsForty management students (MBAs) (56% men) par-

ticipated in the study as part of a seminar on organiza-tional behavior.

Procedure and materialsWe randomly assigned the participants to one of two

conditions: “self as a threat” or “self as threatened.” Weasked them to think about either people who they hadthreatened due to their performance and qualiWcations,

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or, in the second condition, people who had threatenedthem for those same reasons. SpeciWcally, they read thefollowing prompt in the “Self as threat” condition:

Please think about people who are in your network atwork. Of this network, please consider the people whoare somewhat threatened by you—your performanceand/or your qualiWcations. Please think about the peoplewho might be competitive with you because they aresomewhat jealous of you.2

In the “Self as threatened” condition, they read thefollowing prompt:

Please think about people in your network at work. Ofthis network, please consider the people whose perfor-mance and/or qualiWcations make you feel a bit threat-ened, i.e., please think about the people who you mightget a little competitive with because you are somewhatjealous of their progress in the organization.

Participants then answered several questions aboutboth kinds of situations. We asked them to rate, on aseven-point Likert scale, how often they experiencedsuch a reaction at work (1Dhardly ever, 7D veryfrequently). We next asked them to recall a speciWc per-son towards whom they exhibited threat/who exhibitedthreat, and participants rated how threatened they felt/the other person felt (1Dhardly threatened, 7D verythreatened). They described their strategies to dealwith the person, and rated, on a seven-point Likert scale,the extent to which they tried to minimize their ownaccomplishments and strengths; build up the other per-

2 We developed our questions about threat following a series of pilotstudies. First, we found that people’s reports of how threatened, intim-idated, and how much they compared themselves with the other partywere highly correlated with one another, and the reliability was .80.The reliability for the items that considered how much the other per-son seemed to be threatened, intimidated, and comparing was .75. Wedid not form a scale because of the theoretical diVerences betweensome of these items (e.g., compare vs. threaten). In another pilot, weconsidered the variety of diVerent kinds of threats people might pose.For instance we asked people how threatened they were versus otherswere due to intellectual abilities, interpersonal skills, beauty, and socialnetworks. We only found the threat immunity eVect for the internalqualities-intellect and interpersonal skills in particular. Given the pre-test results, we constrained our questions about threat by (a) providinga detailed description of what we meant by threat and (b) limiting ourquestions to threats that concerned one’s own abilities and talents.These domains may have emerged as relevant because they were espe-cially salient to our study population, i.e., MBA students who valuetheir own intellect and interpersonal talents. As our Associate Editorsuggested, people may be especially likely to make erroneous threat ap-praisals because they fail to recognize that diVerent domains are salientto diVerent people (e.g., an excellent golfer may be especially likely toimagine that a friend envies them—whereas that friend may care moreabout tennis). Further, domain relevance may determine whether inter-personal strategies such as humility are eVective or not: i.e., if peoplecare about a common domain (e.g., intellect), humility may eVectivelydiVuse threats; if they do not, (e.g., golf) it may be unnecessary (Tesser,1988).


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son’s accomplishments and strengths; draw attention totheir own accomplishments; or draw attention to the otherperson’s weaknesses (1Dnot at all, 7Dto a great extent).

Results

As predicted, managers believed that they had greaterthreat immunity than did others. SpeciWcally, theybelieved that they threatened others more than othersthreatened the self (MD 4.75, SDD 1.36 vs. MD3.26,SDD 1.41; F(1,40)D 8.43, p < 0.01).

Further, managers also used diVerent strategies whendealing with the situations. As predicted, they were morelikely to minimize their strengths when they dealt withsomeone who they thought perceived them as a threat(MD3.11, SDD1.90 vs. MD2.14, SDD1.08;F(1,40)D4.14, p <0.05) but drew attention to their ownaccomplishments when someone threatened them(MD4.64, SDD1.22 vs. MD3.39, SDD1.61;F(1,40)D7.77, p< 0.01). Indeed, the more people inferredthat the self threatened the other person, the more theyminimized their strengths, r(38)D0.57, pD0.05.

Discussion

This study supports Hypothesis 1, revealing the basicself-enhancing asymmetry associated with threat immu-nity: managers believe that their colleagues threatenthem less than they threaten their colleagues. Further, incontrast to what one might expect from a self-enhancinginference, this phenomenon is associated with a self-min-imizing behavioral response. Participants who thoughtthat they threatened someone else played down theirown strengths, at least according to their own self-reports. This suggests that managers believed that self-minimizing strategies were a normatively appropriateresponse to avoid antagonizing a threatened businessassociate. How the supposedly threatened manager per-ceives these strategies and whether such strategies indeedeVectively smooth social relations is another issue—par-ticularly if others deny that they are actually threatened.

We have yet to identify the reasons why peopleassume that they experience fewer threats than do oth-ers. One explanation is that people assume that the self isthe standard that other people use to make social com-parisons (Lassiter & Munhall, 2001). We therefore exam-ine whether a parallel asymmetry exists with respect tosocial comparisons, i.e., do people believe others com-pare more with the self than the self compares with oth-ers? Alternatively, people might assume that eventhough they compare themselves to others about asmuch as others compare themselves to the self, thesecomparisons simply bother the self less.

Another explanation is that people are particularlylikely to assume that the self threatens others. Given thatpeople overestimate their own skills and abilities relative

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to others (Alicke, 1985; Kruger & Dunning, 1999), peo-ple could imagine that the self is especially likely tointimidate others, as compared to third parties.

Further, an alternative explanation for these Wndingsis that they are an artifact of the study’s recall methodol-ogy. SpeciWcally, participants possibly recalled peopleand situations that were qualitatively diVerent in the twosituations. Rather than measure only one manager’s per-ceptions, we could address this potential concern bystudying how people in a relationship make inferencesabout the threats they perceive and experience in a giveninteraction. To further understand the sources of thisasymmetry, we examine work teams.

Study 2: Threat appraisal on project teams

Researchers have characterized self-enhancementbiases in two ways (Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, & Rob-ins, 2004). Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954)suggests that self-enhancers perceive themselves morepositively than they perceive others whereas self-insighttheory (Allport, 1937) argues that self-enhancers per-ceive themselves more positively than others perceivethem. Study one indicates the intra-person asymmetry inthreat appraisal, i.e., people perceive themselves to bemore resilient to threat than they perceive others to be.In Study 2, we add an inter-person asymmetry, i.e., weexamine whether people also perceive their responses tothreat more favorably than their interaction partnersperceive them. To better understand the self enhancingnature of this egocentric bias, we examine threatappraisals in teams and compare how people evaluate(a) the threats that they evoke in others, (b) the threatsthat others evoke in them, and (c) the threats that otherteammates evoke in one another.

Methods

ParticipantsA total of 117 MBA students, 62% male, participated

as part of a class exercise. First, the students formed 2–6person, self-selected project teams that worked togetheron their Wnal projects for an entire quarter. After10 weeks, we surveyed people about the relationshipswithin the team.

Procedure and materialsThe Wrst part of the survey asked team members to

describe their relationship to each of the other partici-pants on the team. They answered these questions on aseven-point Likert scale (1Dnot at all, 7D to a greatextent):

To what extent did this person compare him/herself withyou during this project?


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To what extent was this person threatened by you duringthis project?

Next, they answered parallel questions about howthey reacted to each group member:

To what extent did you compare yourself with this per-son during this project?

To what extent did you feel threatened by this personduring this project?

Participants then assessed the level of threat betweenall group members, excluding themselves:

Think about the relationships between the other mem-bers of your group (not including you). Write their ini-tials and evaluate the degree to which each person feltthreatened by the other person.

ResultsWe summed managers’ ratings of the self, other, and

third parties and used paired samples t-tests to comparethem. We replicated Study 1 and found the predicteddiVerences in threat perception whereby people believedthat they threatened others (MD2.0, SDD1.2) morethan others threatened them (MD1.7, SDD .9),t(109)D 2.9, p < .01. We then tested the “Threat Capital”explanation, i.e., whether people expected the self to beespecially likely to threaten others. We did not Wnd evi-dence for the Threat Capital explanation: peoplebelieved that the self threatened others (MD2.0,SDD1.2) as much as other teammates threatened them(MD2.0, SDD1.0), t(98)D¡.9, pD .38, n.s. However,people did assume that the self was more immune tothreat than others: they assumed that others threatenedthe self signiWcantly less (MD1.7, SDD .9) t(96)D¡3.5,p < .01 than the self threatened other people (MD 2.0SDD1.2) and other teammates threatened them(MD2.0, SDD 1.0).

Next, we examined whether the eVect arose becausepeople assumed that others saw the “Self as a Standardfor Social Comparison” (Lassiter & Munhall, 2001). Wedid not Wnd an asymmetry with respect to social com-parison. People reported that they compared themselveswith others (MD3.2, SDD 1.4) only as often as theyexpected others to compare themselves with the self(MD3.1, SDD 1.4), t(107)D¡.68, pD .49, n.s.3

3 Given the importance of this study for ruling out alternative expla-nations, we replicated it, this time with 3–4 person groups in which werandomly assigned people to groups. We replicated each of the pat-terns with respect to threat perception that we found in Study 2. Theonly pattern that diVered from Study 2 was that people assumed thatthey were comparing themselves to their teammates more (M D 3.10,SD D 1.40) than their teammates compared themselves to the self(M D 2.65, SD D 1.36) t(98) D 3.83, p < .01, which suggests that peoplesee the self comparing as much if not more with others—yet simplyfeeling less bothered by these comparisons than others.

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DiscussionStudy 2 tentatively eliminates several alternative

explanations for asymmetries in threat perception. First,we do not Wnd support for the Threat Capital explana-tion that people believe that the self has unique attri-butes that particularly threaten others; indeed, peopleassumed that the self threatened others as much as otherpeople threaten them. Second, given that people were nomore likely to believe that others compare themselves tothe self than they themselves compare with others, theasymmetry does not arise from the egocentric notionthat the self is the center of other people’s social compar-isons. However, people do consider the self to beuniquely immune from threat. Thus, people report lessthreat than they observe in other people, both whenthose people interact with the self and with third parties.

Further, the eVect is unlikely to be either an artifact ofStudy 1’s recall methodology or even simply isolated toone’s rivals. Indeed, the eVect occurs even among peoplewho presumably liked and respected one anotherenough to choose to work together on a class project.However, we have so far only surveyed people about thenatural processes by which these inferences occur. Toeliminate various artifacts around how people areselected and to fully understand the consequences ofthese perceptions for social interactions, we randomlyassign people to interaction partners, experimentallymanipulate their tendencies to make these inferences,and examine how these threat perceptions aVect thequality of social relationships.

Study 3: Implications of threat immunity for interpersonal outcomes

Study 3 placed threat appraisals in an interactive,interpersonal context and examines the social-organi-zational consequences. We experimentally manipu-lated employees’ propensity to infer that their skillsthreaten their boss. When employees believe that theythreaten a boss, they can conveniently explain awaythe boss’ negative feedback or resistance to their pro-posals. However, Hypothesis 2 predicts that this infer-ence also undermines the quality of the resultingrelationship. An employee who experiences threatimmunity assumes that the boss possesses a suspiciousulterior motive and further, implies that the employeeis in fact more skilled than the boss, which challengesthe status hierarchy.

In addition to experimentally manipulating employ-ees’ propensity to infer that they threaten their bosses,we also manipulate the boss’ expectations that they dealwith a high performer who potentially threatens them.We developed these manipulations in two steps. Prior tothe experiment, the MBA students completed a batteryof assessments, including Myers–Briggs.


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People in the employee role were either in a controlcondition or in a condition in which they believed that,based on the Myers–Briggs, their strengths were theboss’ weaknesses and they were likely to threaten theirbosses. The bosses, in turn, were in either a control con-dition or a condition in which they believed that, basedon the assessments, their weaknesses were the employ-ees’ strengths, and their employees were unlikely to Wndthem threatening.

The design was a 2£2:(control/employee threatening)£ (control/boss threatened). The four resulting condi-tions were: (1) full control: neither the boss nor theemployee had any preconceived notions about eachother, (2) threatened boss: the employee had no precon-ceived notions about the boss, but the boss had informa-tion that they dealt with an employee who mightthreaten them, (3) threatening employee: the employeebelieved that they threatened the boss but the boss hadno preconceived notion that the employee couldthreaten them, and (4) threatened boss + threateningemployee: the employee believed that they threatenedthe boss and the boss believed that the employee couldthreaten them. One of the conditions (employee believedthat they threatened the boss but the boss was notthreatened) replicates the asymmetry identiWed in theprevious two studies whereby one party presumes theythreaten a counterpart, who does not experience threator denies it. In this condition, and whenever peopleoverattributed threat to their counterparts, we expectedparticularly negative interactions because such asymme-tries reXect a misinterpretation of the other party’smotives, appear self-enhancing, and fail to respond totheir underlying concerns. Additionally, we measurethreat immunity as a continuous variable and predictthat the greater one’s threat immunity perceptions, themore negative the interaction will be from the otherside’s perspective.

Methods

ParticipantsNinty-eight MBA students (69% men) participated as

part of a class exercise.

Procedure and materialsWe randomly paired the students, and placed in them

in the role of either a senior brand manager (boss) or anassistant brand manager (employee). The participantslearned that the employee had identiWed an importantnew technology for their company and had already man-aged to convince the boss to acquire it. For employees,the goal of this conversation was to convince the boss togive them responsibility for the project:

Now, you are hoping that she/he will put you in chargeof leading the new team that develops this initiative.

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You wonder how he/she would react to your proposal.It is a great opportunity for the company—andyourself. But the decision is up to the senior marketingmanager.

On the other hand, the bosses had other interests:

Ideally, you would like to maintain control over thesenew ventures. New ventures are an important meansby which you could increase your inXuence in theorganization.

We created the manipulations based on two steps.Earlier in the course, participants completed theMyers–Briggs inventory. Given that the MBAs held theMyers–Briggs in high regard, our manipulations hadhigh face validity:

Control: there was no indication of threat in the rela-tionship.

“Threatening employee” condition: employees read thefollowing in their packet:

Note. For the purpose of this exercise, we have pairedyou with someone whose weaknesses are your strengthsbased upon your self-reported MBTI and TKIresponses. Therefore, it is possible that they may feelsomewhat threatened by your skills and abilities whenthey interact with you. Please do not share this informa-tionƒ

Further, bosses were in one of two conditions:

Control: no information about threat.

“Threatened boss” condition: bosses read the followingnote in the packet:

Note. For the purpose of this exercise, we have pairedyou with someone whose strengths are your weaknessesbased upon your self-reported MBTI and TKIresponses. Therefore, they are unlikely to feel threat-ened by your skills and abilities. Please do not sharethis information.

Participants then discussed the situation for 20–30 minand completed a survey. In the Wrst part of the survey,they assessed, on a seven-point Likert scale (1 D not atall, 7 D to a great extent), the degree to which theircounterpart was likable, competent, threatened, self-promoting, self-eVacing, compared themselves withthe self, and was interested in a personal relationshipwith the self. Then participants answered parallelquestions about themselves including: the degree towhich the self was comparing, threatened, self-pro-moting, and self-eVacing. Finally, they rated thedegree to which they felt satisWed with the manage-ment structure of the project and with their relation-ship to the other party. We debriefed participantsduring an in-class lecture.


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Results

Manipulation checkAs expected, employees in the “threatening” condi-

tion were more likely to assume that they threatenedtheir bosses than the control, regardless of the bosses’condition (MD3.44 SDD1.61 vs. MD 2.43, SDD 1.40),F(3, 95)D4.96, p < .05. An egocentric misperceptionoccurred when bosses interpreted the behavior of these“threatening” employees. Bosses were more likely toassume that their own skills and abilities threatenedthese employees (MD3.3, SDD 1.3), as compared to thecontrol (MD2.4, SDD1.4), F(3,9˙5)D5.4,pD .03, when the employees in fact assumed the oppo-site, i.e., that they threatened the boss. Bosses in thethreatened conditions, however, were as reluctant as thecontrol to admit that the employees actually threatenedthem.

Asymmetries in threat perceptionReplicating Studies 1 and 2, we found both an intra-

and interpersonal threat asymmetry. First, across condi-tions, bosses (MD3.0, SDD1.4 vs. MD 2.45, SDD1.4),t(52)D2.4, pD .02 and employees (MD 3.0, SDD1.6 vs.MD2.4, SDD 1.3), t(53)D 3.2, p < .01 were more likely tothink that the self threatened the other person than theother person threatened the self. Second, bosses(MD2.9, SDD 1.4 vs. MD 2.3, SDD 1.3), t(48)D2.5,pD .02 and employees (MD 3.0, SDD1.6 vs. MD 2.45,SDD1.2), t(48)D¡2.5, pD .02 assumed that the otherperson experienced more threat than that person admit-ted they experienced.

As in Study 2, these asymmetries were restricted tothreat perception. Bosses reported that they comparedthemselves more with the employee than they thoughtthat the employee compared with the self (MD3.7,SDD1.9 vs. MD 3.1, SDD1.7), t(51)D¡2.7, p < .01, i.e.,opposite to the above pattern with respect to threat per-ceptions. Employees were also somewhat more likely tothink that they compared themselves to the boss thanvice versa, though these diVerences were not signiWcant(MD3.7, SDD 1.7 vs. MD 3.4, SDD 1.8), t(53)D¡1.4,pD .17, n.s.

We next consider how these threat appraisals impactinterpersonal relationships.

Perceptions of the other partyEmployees who thought that they threatened their

bosses rated their bosses as less competent (MD5.3,SDD1.0 vs. MD 5.9, SDD .8), F(3, 45)D 4.6, pD .04 andmarginally less likable (MD 5.3, SDD1.2 vs. MD5.9,SDD .7), F(3, 45)D3.0, pD .09 than did employees in thecontrol condition. Bosses perceived these employees asless likable than employees in the control, although thesediVerences missed signiWcance (MD5.4, SDD1.2 vs.MD5.9, SDD .9), (F(3, 45)D3.0, pD .11, n.s.). Further,

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bosses perceived the employees to be marginally morecompetent in the two congruent conditions, i.e., threat-ened boss + threatening employee (MD 5.8, SDD1.0),and full control (MD5.6, SDD .8), as compared to theasymmetrical conditions (i.e., the “threatened boss” con-dition (MD 5.2, SDD .7), or the “threatening employee”condition, (MD5.2, SDD1.2), F(3,45)D 3.1, pD .08.

StrategiesBosses viewed the employees who thought that they

were a threat as more self-promoting (MD 5.2, SDD1.2)than the control (MD4.1, SDD1.9), F(3,45)D 6.0,pD .02, and as marginally less self-eVacing, (MD 2.2,SDD 1.4 vs. MD3.0, SDD 1.5), F(3,45)D 3.1, pD .09.However, subordinates did not report diVerences in thestrategies they used across conditions.

Interpersonal outcomesEmployees who thought that they threatened their

bosses were less satisWed with their relationship to theirbosses (MD5.0, SDD1.8 vs. MD6.0, SDD1.0),F(3,45)D 3.1, pD .03, but did not diVer in their satisfac-tion with the management structure across the condi-tions. Bosses who dealt with employees who sawthemselves as a threat were also less satisWed with theirrelationship to them (MD5.0, SDD 1.6), as compared tothe control (MD6.0, SDD .9), F(3, 45)D5.0, pD .03. Fur-ther, they were least satisWed with the managementstructure of the project in the “threatening employee”condition, i.e., when the employee assumed that theythreatened the boss and when the boss lacked precon-ceived notions that led them to feel threatened (MD 4.6,SDD 2.0), relative to all three other cells—the full con-trol (MD 6.0, SDD1.1), F(1, 22)D4.1, pD .06; “threat-ened boss + threatening employee” (MD6.0, SDD .7),F(1,23)D 5.2, pD .03; and the “threatened boss” condi-tion (MD 6.1, SDD .8), F(1,20)D 4.5, p < .05.

Whereas these manipulations capture the interper-sonal asymmetry (one’s own belief that the self threatensothers versus the counterpart’s preconceived notionsabout threat) we next examine how intrapersonal threatimmunity predicted relationship satisfaction. We com-puted intraperson threat immunity scores (Appraisal ofthe other person’s threat¡Appraisal of own threat), andincluded both the employees’ and bosses’ scores ascovariates in the regressions reported in Table 1. Thedependent variables were composite variables createdfrom the two outcome measures, satisfaction with themanagement structure and with the relationship, whichboth employees, r(47)D .80, p < .01, and bosses,r(51)D .78, p < .01, rated. The independent variables werethe manipulations (employee threatening/control; bossthreatened/control). The bosses’ threat immunity pre-dicted employees’ satisfaction with the outcome, �D .5,p < .01, whereas their own level of threat immunity wasnot signiWcant. Replicating the pattern, employees’


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threat immunity predicted the bosses’ satisfaction,�D .32, p < .01, while their own level of threat immunitywas not signiWcant. Simply put, the greater one’s threatimmunity, the more dissatisWed one’s partner was fol-lowing the interaction, suggesting that when we see our-selves as threatening, others do not enjoy interactingwith us.4

Discussion

The results reveal two striking patterns. First, insupport of Hypothesis 2, people who regard themselves

4 Given the mathematical concerns around diVerence scores (Edwards,2001; Edwards & Parry, 1993) we used polynomial regression to ana-lyze the two dependent variables (boss and employee satisfaction) withthe components of the diVerence scores entered as predictors. The ma-nipulations were not signiWcant in either of these models so wedropped them. Our eVects paralleled the analyses reported above witha few notable diVerences.

We Wrst examine boss satisfaction. Only one component of thediVerence score approached signiWcance: boss’ satisfaction was nega-tively associated with the employees’ perception that they threatenedthem, �D¡.51, t(36)D¡1.65, p < .11. However, two interaction termswere signiWcant. First, supporting a “congruence model”, boss’ satis-faction was higher when they attributed threat to the other party andthe employee in turn admitted they felt threatened, �D .23,t(36)D 2.59, p < .01. Second, when both employees and bosses attribut-ed threat to one another, boss’ satisfaction decreased, �D¡.22,t(36)D¡3.24, p < .01.

No multiplicative eVects emerged with respect to the employees’ sat-isfaction, suggesting that a linear model is appropriate. Employees’ sat-isfaction was negatively associated with the boss’ attribution of threatto the employee, �D¡.51, t(36) D¡2.97, p < .01 and the employees’ at-tribution of threat to the boss, �D¡.35, t(36) D¡2.24, p < .05. Finally,the employees’ satisfaction was positively associated with the boss’ ad-mission of threat, �D .43, t(36)D 2.04, p < .05. These results, in both theemployee and boss ratings, supplement and support the analyses thatresult using the diVerence score.

Table 1Employee’s threat immunitya predicts boss’ satisfaction and boss’threat immunity predicts employee’s satisfaction following a conXict(Study 3)

a The asymmetry is calculated as: appraisal of the other person’sthreat¡ appraisal of own threat. Thus, larger numbers indicate moreegocentric perceptions, i.e., the self experiences less threat than theother person.¤¤ p < .01.

ND 44 Bosssatisfaction

Employeesatisfaction

Employee threat immunity score ¡.32(.11)¤¤ ¡.11(.15)Boss threat immunity score ¡.20(.13) ¡.50(.17) ¤¤

Employee threatening/control .19(.5) .75(.66)Boss threatened/control ¡.55(.48) ¡.26(.63)Employee threatening/not

threatening£ Boss threatened/not threatened

.53(.69) ¡.43(.91)

Intercept 5.94(.33)¤¤ 5.26(.44)¤¤

R2 .38 .27

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as threatening elicit less favorable reactions from acounterpart and lower satisfaction with the interaction.Even though people rarely communicate these percep-tions about threat to one another explicitly, interactionpartners clearly sensed them. Most powerfully, for bothbosses and employees, the counterpart’s threat immu-nity perceptions better predicted their satisfaction thaneven their own inferences about threat! Second,whereas Study 1 revealed that people try to engage inself-minimizing strategies when they threaten others,Study 3 indicates that their counterparts perceive themas self-promoting—given the self-enhancing assump-tions that underlie their actions.

These patterns of threat appraisal can pose prob-lems for social–organizational interaction; thus, wenow consider how to attenuate them. On one hand,these processes could reXect “Self-defense”. Becausepeople are motivated to protect the self, they deny thatthey experience threat. Alternatively, according to the“Immunity Salience” explanation, one’s own aYrma-tional resources could simply be more salient thanother people’s aYrmational resources, and peopletherefore fail to realize that others are as secure as theself. We test these two alternative explanations and usethis understanding of process to both exacerbate andattenuate this phenomenon.

Study 4: “Other-aYrmation” attenuates threat immunity relative to self-aYrmation

Does the asymmetry in threat appraisal resultbecause people under-represent the threats that the selfexperiences (as a “Self-defense”) or because peopleoverestimate the threats that others experience (due to“Immunity salience”)? Prior research indicates thatpeople who have aYrmed themselves exhibit fewerbehaviors associated with defensiveness (Fein & Spencer,1997). For instance they make more comparisons tosuperior performers (Spencer et al., 2001) and are alsomore likely to learn from internal rivals (Menon et al.,2006). If people’s defensive denials cause this biasedinference, self-aYrmation should attenuate it. How-ever, if people’s focus on the self instead causes thisbias, then self-aYrmation should exacerbate, or at leastperpetuate, the eVect. In contrast, “other-aYrmation,”in which people focus on others’ valued qualities,would remind people that others also possess the aYr-mational resources to remain secure. We thereforehypothesize:

Hypothesis 3. People who have aYrmed themselves willbe more likely to exhibit threat immunity, relative topeople who aYrm the other person.

As in Study 3, we measure threat immunity as a con-tinuous variable.


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Methods

ParticipantsOne hundred and Wfty-three MBAs (74% men) partic-

ipated as part of a class exercise.

Materials and procedureThe study involved a 2(self as threat, self as

threatened)£4(control condition (i.e., aYrming a thirdparty); self-aYrmation; other aYrmation (aYrming aquality that is personally relevant to the self); and other-nonrelevant aYrmation (aYrming a quality that isunimportant to the self).

First, participants read a prompt in which theyrecalled a person from their organizational experiencewho either the self threatened or who threatened the self:

We’ve all been in situations where we deal with peers atwork. Please think of a real person, from your own man-agement experience, who was of roughly equal status toyou. We would like you to think about someone whosehigh performance/reputation/qualiWcations in the orga-nization made you feel a bit threatened/[who was a bitthreatened by your high performance/reputation/qualiW-cations in the organization].

Participants noted whether they selected a real or animaginary person, brieXy described the person, and as amanipulation check, rated how much the other personthreatened the self/the self threatened the other personon a seven-point Likert scale. Participants thenresponded to one of four randomly assigned aYrmationmanipulations. The Wrst two aYrmation conditions rep-licated manipulations used in several other studies(Fein & Spencer, 1997; Steele, 1988; Steele & Liu, 1983).

Non-aYrmation (control). Below is a list of characteris-tics and values, some of which may be important to you,some of which may be unimportant. Please think aboutthe value on this list that is least personally important toyou. Write 2–3 sentences about why this value is impor-tant to another person.

Self-aYrmation. Below is a list of characteristics and val-ues, some of which may be important to you, some ofwhich may be unimportant. Please think about the valueon this list that is most personally important to you.Write 2–3 sentences about why this value is important toyou.

The next two conditions were two versions of “other”aYrmation. In the Wrst, participants aYrmed the otherperson on a dimension that the self valued. In the sec-ond, they aYrmed the person on a dimension that theself did not value, and which therefore did not threatenthe self. The attractiveness of an aYrmation depends onits domain, such that if people aYrm the self with respectto a domain that is under threat, they could further

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highlight their inadequacies (Aronson, Blanton, & Coo-per, 1995). We diVerentiated between these two “other-aYrmation” conditions because, if the bias was theproduct of a defensive reaction, aYrming the other per-son on a personally valued dimension could exacerbateit further. On the other hand, if the bias is due to thesalience of others’ aYrmational resources, there shouldbe no diVerences between these two conditions, both ofwhich highlight these resources.

Other-aYrmation (personally relevant dimension). Belowis a list of characteristics and values, some of which maybe important to you, some of which may be unimpor-tant. Please think about the value on this list that is mostpersonally important to the person you have justthought about. Write 2–3 sentences about why this valueis important to them.

Other-aYrmation (non-relevant dimension). Below is alist of characteristics and values, some of which may beimportant to you, some of which may be unimportant.Please think about the value on this list that is least per-sonally important to you and most personally importantto the person you have just thought about. Write 2–3sentences about why this value is important to them.

After participants wrote about a quality from a list ofvalues (e.g., artistic skills/aesthetic appreciation, sense ofhumor, relations with friends/family, spontaneity/livinglife in the moment social skills), they answered two ques-tions on a seven-point Likert scale where 1Donly a littleand 7D a lot: How much did you feel threatened? Howthreatened do you suspect that this person felt by you?Participants then answered several questions about howthey would deal with the situation.

Results

The manipulation checks worked: people whothought about someone who threatened them felt thatthe other party threatened them more (MD 3.9,SDD 1.5) than they threatened the other party (MD 3.1,SDD 1.5), F(1, 151)D11.7, p < .01. In contrast, peoplewho thought about someone who they threatenedbelieved that the other person would feel more threat-ened than the self, (MD5.1, SDD 1.3 vs. MD 3.8,SDD 1.7), F(1, 151)D26.5, pD .01.

To examine the eVect of aYrmation condition, weused the diVerence measure to capture threat immunity(appraisal of the other person’s threat¡ appraisal ofown threat) and compared it across the eight conditions.Thus, the higher values in Fig. 1 reXect more biasedassumptions that the other is threatened whereas the selfis immune.

First, participants exhibited higher immunity tothreats when they thought about situations in which theself threatened others as compared to when others


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threatened the self, F(1,151)D 43.1, p < .01. Further, aYr-mation condition was signiWcant, F(3, 149)D3.4, pD .02.SpeciWcally, although the four aYrmation conditions didnot diVer from one another in the “self as threatened”condition, people’s threat appraisals varied in the “selfas threat” condition. People in the two “other-aYrma-tion” conditions exhibited less threat immunity than didpeople in the self-aYrmation and the non-aYrmation(control) conditions. Thus, people in the other-aYrma-tion (personally relevant dimension) condition were sig-niWcantly less likely to experience threat immunityrelative to the self-aYrmation condition, F(3, 149)D 5.5,pD .02, and marginally less likely relative to the non-aYrmation control, F(3, 149)D 3.3, pD .07. Likewise,people in the other-aYrmation (non-relevant dimension)condition were signiWcantly less likely to display threatimmunity relative to both the self-aYrmation condition,F(3,149)D 6.8, pD .01, and the non-aYrmation control,F(3,149)D 4.5, pD .04.5

Discussion

In support of Hypothesis 3, we found that other-aYr-mation signiWcantly reduced threat immunity percep-tions relative to “self-aYrmation”. Whereas currentresearch characterizes self aYrmation as recourse fromthe defensive and self-protective mechanisms that thethreatened self employs (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Steeleet al., 1993; Steele & Liu, 1983), self-aYrmation may

5 Given the issues associated with diVerence scores, we once again re-port supplementary analyses. First, we examined the correlation be-tween the two components of the diVerence score (ratings of own andothers’ threat) and found a lack of correlation between these measures,r(153) D .06, n.s., which alleviates some concerns around the reliabilityof the diVerence measure (Edwards, 2001). Next, we performed two re-gressions using both the two component measures of the diVerencescore as dependent variables. Whereas aYrmation was associated withboth of these variables, one’s own self-report of threat, F(3, 149) D 1.94,pD .13, and attribution of threat to others, F(3, 149)D 1.00, p D .39, nei-ther was signiWcant on its own.

Fig. 1. AYrmation aVects the magnitude of threat immunity percep-tions (Study 4). Threat immunity is caluclated as: Appraisal of theother person’s threat ¡ Appraisal of own threat. Thus, larger numbersindicate more egocentric perceptions, i.e., the self sexperiences lessthreat than the others.

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contain a potential contradiction. Although enhancedperceptions of threat immunity may increase one’s abil-ity to learn from an otherwise threatening target, morenegative side eVects can result as well. Relative to other-aYrmation, people who aYrm themselves are signiW-cantly more likely to view themselves as less threatenedthan others, which can set stage for lowered rapport.Indeed, self-aYrmation could have similar implicationsfor other self-serving biases.

We proposed “other aYrmation” as a means to atten-uate the bias. In contrast to perspective taking (Moore &Kim, 2003), in other-aYrmation, the self does notattempt to understand the other person—the focus isfully directed to the other person and his/ her aYrmingqualities. “Other-aYrmation” demonstrates that otherselves possess the same resilience and defenses as one’sown self. It is thus a powerful means by which to reversethe intuitive assumption that our own good qualitiesintensely threaten others, while other people’s positivequalities provide a paltry defense from threat and envy.

General discussions

Across four studies that used multiple methods, thisresearch addresses: (1) how people assess the threats thatthe self and others experience, (2) what causes diVerencesbetween these assessments, (3) how threat appraisalsaVect social interactions, and (4) how these diVerencescan be attenuated (see Fig. 2). Managers held a belief intheir own threat immunity, which we characterized asself-enhancing in multiple ways. One way to view it is asan intra-personal asymmetry: i.e., people believe that theself experiences lower levels of threat than other peopleexperience (Studies 1–4). A complementary view is theinter-person asymmetry, i.e., people think that theythreaten others more than others report is actually thecase (Studies 2 and 3).


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Study 1 used a recall methodology and comparedparticipants who considered either someone who theythreatened or someone who threatened them. Partici-pants believed that the self threatened other people morethan others threatened the self. Further, participantswere more likely to use self-minimizing strategies whenthey dealt with someone who they had threatened.

Study 2 replicated Study 1’s Wndings in actual workteams and eliminated three alternative explanations.First, we ruled out the possibility that Study 1’s Wnd-ings were simply due to qualitative diVerences in thetype of threat situations that people recalled. Second,people believed that, although they made comparisonswith others just as frequently, these comparisons sim-ply did not threaten the self. Finally, people did notbelieve that the self possessed any special “threat capi-tal.” In fact, they assumed that the self and other team-mates threatened other people equally. Thus, the keyasymmetry that diVerentiated the self from others wasits unique capacity to remain unthreatened, relative toothers.

The third study, in which we manipulated people’spropensities to infer that they threatened another party,revealed that asymmetries in threat appraisal strainedsocial interactions during a conXict situation. People inthe role of employees were either in a control conditionor had a preconceived notion that they threatened theirboss. People in the role of their bosses were also either ina control condition or told that their subordinates mightthreaten them. When people dealt with counterpartswho had higher threat immunity perceptions, theytended to experience more negative outcomes andrelationships.

In Study 4, we experimentally manipulated self- andother-aYrmation to attenuate the threat immunity eVect.In particular, we found that other-aYrmation, whichmade other people’s aYrmational resources salient,attenuated threat immunity relative to self-aYrmation.

UNCOPossible Antecedents of Asymmetries in Consequences of Threat Immunity Threat Immunity Threat Immunity Perception Perception Perception

Supported mechanism: Within the self: “Tuning the volume of Salience/ availability of own Seeing the self as less the self”: Self-minimizing affirmational resources is threatened than the self attempts greater than salience of others’ perceives others to be Negative views of the sources of immunity. Between people: counterpart’s motives Other mechanisms: Failure to admit threat: Negative interactions with 1) Self-aggrandizing view that Seeing self as less threatened the counterpart. self has more “threat capital” than others see self. Counterpart sees self than others. Overattribution of threat: negatively. 2) Egocentric view that self is Seeing others as more Confirmation of initial standard of others’ social threatened than they see negative threat appraisal. comparison.3) Self-defense: Denying the threats others pose to protect the ego.

themselves.

Fig. 2. Model of Threat immunity antecedents and consequences.

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However, these studies also reXect several limits.First, although we have identiWed one key mechanism,the salience of the self’s vs. other’s aYrmationalresources, and tentatively eliminated several others, weacknowledge that this asymmetry is possibly multiplydetermined and shaped by motivational factors as well.For instance, perhaps threat immunity beliefs representan illusion of control (Langer, 1975), whereby the selfoverestimates its ability to cope with and control itsresponses, relative to others. Perhaps people who feelthreatened may be particularly motivated to experiencecontrol and to see the other person through a self-enhancing lens. One hint of this eVect was that bossesin Study 3 who dealt with a “threatening” employeeactually inferred that their positive qualities threatenedthe employee—even though the employee had just theopposite thought in mind.

Further, although we have examined people who wererivals (Studies 1 and 4), friends (Study 2), and randomlyassigned partners (Study 3), perhaps the type of personparticipants think about (Johnson, 1987), for instance,close friends versus competitors, moderates the eVect.Relatedly, individual diVerences (e.g., empathy (Exline &Lobel, 1999) or Machiavellianism (Vecchio, 2000) or cul-tural variables (e.g., independence–interdependence)aVect people’s threat appraisals. SpeciWcally, gender,organizational culture, and national culture aVect thesocial costs people incur when they evoke envy (Exline &Lobel, 1999) and thus shape people’s strategic responses.In collectivistic cultures such as Japan, which emphasizeharmonious interpersonal relationships (Markus &Kitayama, 1991), people who inspire envy incur greatercosts (Schoeck, 1969). As a result, these cultures incul-cate values such as “modesty” and regard self-minimiz-ing behaviors more positively than do members ofindividualistic cultures (Heine, Lehman, Markus, &Kitayama, 1999).

Finally, as one reviewer suggested, these studies onlyconsider the interpersonal aspects of threat immunity.Further research might consider threat immunity in anintergroup context. Especially when people are mem-bers of high status groups, they may regard themselvesas victims of collective envy. For example, Americanscoming to terms with the motivations of the 9/11attackers often settled on the explanation that peoplein the Middle East were fundamentally envious ofAmerica’s freedom, wealth, and power. In his article,“Why do terrorists hate us?” Fareed Zakaria enumer-ated these commonly heard explanations: “We standfor freedom and they hate it. We are rich and they envyus. We are strong and they resent this (2001, p. 20),” aswell as his own more nuanced explanations. While envycertainly underlies many intergroup stereotypes (Glick &Fiske, 1996), further research should examine whenand how threat immunity extends to group-level pro-cesses.


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Theoretical implications of threat immunity

Social comparisonPeople can reconstrue, rationalize, and aYrm them-

selves, and thereby reinterpret the consequences of anotherwise threatening social comparison. As peopledeploy their defenses, however, a variety of self-enhanc-ing biases naturally emerge. Beyond traditional self-enhancing biases that direct with whom the self choosesto compare (Taylor, 1983), threat immunity is anotherway in which self-enhancement shapes the social com-parison process. In deWning threat immunity as egocen-tric, we note that the concept also involves a variety ofparadoxes that make it complicated to interpret asfavoring the self. On one hand, threat immunity is a self-enhancing bias that paradoxically can lead people tominimize the self, rather than to adopt a more self-pro-moting style of presentation. Further, these asymmetri-cal threat perceptions do not appear to necessarily favorthe self given that they involve the assumption that oth-ers negatively appraise the self. However, this assump-tion is egocentric Wrst, because it is a positiveinterpretation of a negative appraisal of the self. That is,people assume that their good qualities bother others—rather than their more undesirable qualities. Second, ifthe bias is egocentric, the asymmetry should decreasefollowing manipulations that reduce focus on the self, aswe Wnd in Study 4.

The egocentric nature of this bias is critical to under-stand how “mind reading” (Ames, 2004; Jones & Nisbett,1972) occurs in social comparison. This research high-lights the fact that people do not just make social com-parisons, they also try to discern how others make socialcomparisons as well. However, the systematic biases thatpervade our intuitive threat appraisals can interfere withour ability to deal with threatened people more eVec-tively. We may indeed threaten people and make themenvious, but (a) perhaps not as much as we think and (b)even if we threaten people, they probably will not admitit. Thus, it may be dangerous to act on intuitive interpre-tations of other people’s social comparisons, andnecessary to reconsider the strategies we use with peoplewho we suspect Wnd our talents and achievementsthreatening.

Self-aYrmation and the perils of over-aYrmationWhereas prior research has considered the conse-

quences of threat, aYrmation, and other processes ofself-maintenance (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Menon et al.,2006), little research has considered people’s implicitjudgments about their own and others’ aYrmational“accounts.” People have a rosy view of their own aYr-mational accounts (seeing their own ego as stable, resil-ient, and well-balanced) whereas they are more likely toinfer that other people’s accounts are closer to ego deple-tion (and hence, less capable of withstanding threat).

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These results build on prior research that compares self and social perception (see Pronin, Gilovich, & L. Ross, 2004). People are naïve realists: They imagine that they see the world objectively, but recognize that others are encumbered by various biases (L. Ross & Ward, 1995). Indeed, people exhibit a “bias blindspot,” they assume that others are more prone to bias than the self (Pronin, et. al., 2002). The threat immunity results extend on this prior research. When people deny that they experience threat, they disavow that that they even have the motives that are the preconditions that may lead them to be biased in their perceptions and interactions with others. By contrast, they view others as teeming with possible motives that set the stage for bias. Interestingly, in spite of the fact that we have ample introspective information about our own reactions to other people, we are less likely to recognize them and more readily jump to conclusions about others’ private thoughts, motives, and reactions. We may reject and conceal aspects of our introspection that fail to offer us comforting views of our faculties and competence in the environment, and further, simulate other people’s mental worlds so that they reflect favorably on our own (Gilbert et. al., 1998; Pronin et. al., 2004; Wilson & Dunn, 2004).




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Additionally, whereas prior research has demon-strated the beneWts of self-aYrmation in reducing peo-ple’s propensities to engage in defensive behaviors (Fein& Spencer, 1997), we identify a dark side of self-aYrma-tion. SpeciWcally, self-aYrmation naturally increases thesalience of the self, and, as such, perpetuates threatimmunity perceptions—along with, possibly, a host ofother biases that derive from an over-focus on the self,its values, and its perspectives. Indeed, given thatdecades of research have characterized people as self-serving and self-aggrandizing, research on over-aYrma-tion may be a promising research area. As we discovered,other-aYrmation is one remedy for this over-focus onthe self and its positive qualities.

Threat immunity vs. immune neglectFinally, consider research on aVective forecasting and

in particular, immune neglect, which suggests that peo-ple underestimate their “psychological immune systems”(Gilbert et al., 1998). Although Gilbert et al.’s (1998)Wndings seem to contradict to our argument that peopleare well aware of their own immunity to threat, ourresearch in fact builds on their work. First, we have mea-sured people’s reports about their past or current statesrather than their predictions about their future states. Asa result, people who describe their threat level may havealready engaged in the psychological work that enablesthem to defend against and mitigate those threats. Bycontrast, they are unable (and also possibly unmoti-vated) to perform this same kind of psychological workfor another person.

Second, we suspect that these two streams of researchemphasize two distinct operations that the psychologicalimmune system performs. Whereas Gilbert and col-leagues emphasize psychological work that employsdefensiveness and rationalization, this paper focuses onpsychological work that relies on self-aYrmation. AsGilbert et. al. (1998) observe, one’s own rationalizationand defensiveness are invisible to the self but clearlytransparent to others. By contrast, the Wndings on threatimmunity predict that people’s aYrmational resourcesare salient to the self but hidden to others. Thus, whenpeople intuitively compare how the self and othersachieve their resilience, they may Wnd diVerent mecha-nisms responsible: the self copes by virtue of its aYrma-tional resources; others use rationalizations and defensemechanisms to achieve a more “fake” recovery. Theimplication here is that we attend to and neglect diVerentaspects of the self’s and others’ psychological immunesystems.

Organizational implications of threat immunity

One of the fundamental principles of eVective man-agement and leadership is vigilance. To avoid unpleasantsurprises, managers must “watch their backs” against


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rivals who play politics and carefully monitor the activi-ties of rivals in other companies. When managers detectthreats in others, they identify rivals who harbor nega-tive motives and thus protect themselves (Exline &Lobel, 1999). Further, these appraisals enable managersto articulate the talents and skills that they believe theypossess, which enhances their sense of control in theenvironment. When people see the self as resilient, theyconWdently assert themselves; defend the self from nega-tive feelings associated with rivalry and social compari-son; and perhaps can even learn from threatening rivals(Menon et al., 2006; Spencer et al., 2001). Moreover,when people infer that others experience threat, thismight even connote a certain degree of empathy forthem (Exline & Lobel, 1999). These arguments suggestthat, rather than eliminating the bias by under-predict-ing the degree to which others experience threat, manag-ers should infer—and even over-predict—that theythreaten others.

A second way to eliminate the bias may be to morereadily admit that other people threaten the self. Thisprescription also seems inappropriate in the era of thelearning organization. People should open-mindedlytransfer and accept good ideas wherever they Wndthem—and admitting one’s threats, rivalries, and agen-das certainly interferes with this process.

Given these considerations, we do not argue thatthreats are illusory and that people should ignore poten-tial threats in the environment. Instead, managers shouldrecognize the degree to which their threat appraisalscontain egocentric biases that complicate relationships.Thus, even though over-attributing threat to others isoften appropriate and accurate, these self-enhancingasymmetries produce biases and create a variety of man-agement problems.

For instance, threat appraisals can serve as acognitive cue to “Wne tune the volume of the self.”“Fine-tuning” refers to people’s attempts to control the“volume” of the self—i.e., its potential to impinge on,bother, and threaten other selves. When people overes-timate the threats that they provoke in others, theymay lower the volume too much. They may overesti-mate the fragility of others and thus be unwilling topursue conXicts directly or provide them with honest,critical feedback. Further, although the self-minimizingtendencies we observed in Study 1 could function as adiplomatic response to an awkward situation or a sig-nal that a manager does not desire to engage in a battleof egos, these strategies also inhibit knowledge transferin organizations. If managers privately believe thatthey threaten others, they may censor their ideas andpersonal opinions out of fear that potentially threat-ened people will respond to them in a hostile manner.Knowledge transfer often requires that people act aschampions who publicize good ideas; however, themanager who fears that they threaten others may be

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less willing to assume this self-promoting role. If man-agers recognize their propensity to over-attributethreat to others, perhaps they will be more willing toshare good ideas with one another and tout their bene-Wts in organizations. As these examples suggest,although the self’s impact may indeed be too great inmany situations—in many other situations, it may behighly functional for the self to raise its volume.

Second, although people are indeed frequently envi-ous of one another (Salovey, 1991; Schaubroeck & Lam,2004; Vecchio, 2000), invoking these dynamics too read-ily can cause unnecessary friction in organizations.Study 3 shows how this inference causes social relation-ships to noticeably deteriorate. How we perceive threatimmunity predicts an interaction partner’s satisfactionwith the outcomes of the conXict—indeed, even morethan their own assumptions about threat. Theseappraisals create a self-fulWlling prophecy in the inter-action—people perceive threat where none may exist,elicit negative responses from the other person, whichthen conWrm the belief that they harbor negativemotives towards the self.

Finally, even though it can be highly uncomfortableto openly acknowledge that another person has outper-formed the self and possesses valued qualities, having theself-knowledge to admit threat could reduce defensive-ness. Thus, if we bring ourselves to admit that a col-league who has been promoted more quickly threatensus, we can understand more clearly why we seem toautomatically dislike most of the ideas she proposes.When we admit threat, we can move on and engage withthe other person in a more self-aware and less defensiveway.

Conclusion

According to Festinger (1954), a primary reason whypeople make social comparisons is their drive to evaluatetheir talents, abilities, and skills. However, we proposethat social comparisons are social in another sense: peo-ple are also driven to evaluate how others respond totheir own qualities. In the process, they often discoverthat, in comparison to the self, who is secure, resilient,and thoroughly comfortable when it encounters talentedpeople, others tend to be more threatened. In sum, werealize that although we are unfazed by all the richer,smarter, and more attractive people of the world, otherpeople may hate us simply because we are beautiful—aprospect that is simultaneously alarming and also rathergratifying too.

Uncited references

Lazarus & Folkman (1984) and McClam (2003).


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Don’t hate me because I’m beautiful: Self-enhancing …defends their ego (e.g., I’m a better...

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