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Domination, Language and Popular Resistance in Egypt: A critical reflection

on the current revolution

By Danny Jacobs

Independent Study

John Raines

Religion Department

Temple University

March 29, 2011

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In the past few months, the world has witnessed a string of revolutions in

North Africa and the Middle East that has shattered both Western misconceptions of

the region’s “values” and spread a feeling of revolutionary possibility that has

reverberated around the world. At the time of this writing, popular uprisings in

Tunisia and Egypt have led to increasingly escalating protests in Yemen, Libya,

Bahrain and Gabon. To many in the “West,” these events have seemed either

unexpected because the ruling hegemony appeared stable by Western norms1or

purposely instigated by radical, religious sects to establish an authoritarian

theocracy.2 What we have missed in our assumptions has been the “hidden”

transcripts of those who have been oppressed. Behind the public formalities of the

subordinate class has been a buried dialogue of resistance and organization. What

we are witnessing now has been rehearsed in the minds and private dialogue of the

oppressed for quite some time.3 For the people of these countries, these protests

aren’t new or inspired by a political elite but the public expression of the aggregate

of individual struggles and stories. To analyze this exciting time, I am calling on the

theories of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and political theorist James Scott to explain

both the processes of acquiescence & restraint as well as domination & resistance.

Each concludes that no matter how objective and impenetrable an image of power

presents of itself, the ability to overcome prevails because the ultimate source of

power presides in us. This does not imply that structural constraints don’t play a

role in limiting or influencing agency. Instead, both scholars seek to transcend the

traditional structure vs. agency debate, towards a more fluid concept where a

1 Mazel, Zvi. “Tunisia – First Popular Uprising in Arab World.” Jerusalem Post. 17 January 2011. Web. 18 February 2011. <http://www.jpost.com/>. 2 Wheeler, Scott. “One Nation Under Islam.” Big Peace. 19 February 2011. Web. 20 February 2011. <http://bigpeace.com>.

3 Scott, James C. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. Print. 8

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structure exists but is voluntarily indoctrinated; Bourdieu calls this the

“internalization of externality.”4

I will begin by detailing their schemas of human interaction and then apply

them to the modern history of Egypt, going back as far as Napoleon’s colonization of

Egypt. The goal of this paper is to achieve more than simply post-hoc analysis of the

current wave of revolutions in the Middle-East but to try to answer or at least

improve our comprehension of much broader questions: Why do revolutions take

place? What social and linguistic structures create the authority needed to rule? Can

these be resisted? And finally, why did the “Western” world – specifically

bureaucrats in Washington - miss the revolutionary atmosphere boiling in the

region? My approach is to synthesize both these methods, incomplete by

themselves, to provide a fuller understanding of why and where domination

happens and, how constraints are imposed that appear invisible to the eye of the

outside spectator. I conclude that it is the marginalization of people in more than

one space – economic, political, cultural, etc– that allows power to create a

hyperbolized image of its strength and authenticity to hide its true dependency on

subordination. Finally, I explore the way in which a popular democracy could be

used to both to break free from self-oppression and to establish a new identity.

Bourdieu and Markets

How can years of small, daily resistance – “infrapolitics”5– so effectively avoid

sending the signals of impending revolution? World focus on other issues (the

Recession) could be argued to have drawn attention away from the case at hand but

even had someone observed the Middle-East for several months leading up to the

revolution, it would be very possible that this could still go unnoticed. A country

4 Bourdieu, Pierre. The Logic of Practice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990. Print. 45 5 Scott. Domination and the Arts of Resistance. 19

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assessment report by from September 2010 stated that despite tension over who

would succeed Mubarak, there was no threat present that could “seriously

destabilize” the regime and that the ruling party would continue to hold power in

face of what was considered legitimate oppostion.6 Credit for this veil does not lie

entirely in the ability Egypt’s leaders to control their subordinates but also in the

subordinates’ tendency to censor themselves. It is here that Pierre Bourdieu’s

analysis can explain this phenomenon.

Bourdieu’s system of language and interaction is analogous to that of an

economic market. As we interact, we produce ideas, using our stock of

social/cultural capital and then “sell” them on the market of dialogue for “profit.” In

the same way that markets set prices by the forces of supply and demand, the

situation and audience present during our speech sets the value of our spoken word.

Speech that is favored in those conditions because of its social value, its correct use

of dialect and/or the prestige that it carries, is valued highly on the “market.” That

which steps outside of its bounds, tries too hard or violates any of the standards of

the market is chastised, the producer being disciplined by suffering a “symbolic”

loss – one of respect in the eyes of others. The totality of these effects creates the

habitus7 of a speaker, a sort of feeling and understanding of the market that guides

what we say and how we say it, shaped by both past experiences and anticipated

“profit.”8 Thus, we learn when we can speak up and when we must restrain

ourselves. Those whose habitus most accurately aligns with the market possess a

power because they can more freely express themselves. In the eyes of those who

struggle in the field, this appears inherent.9 The effect of this is exponential; those

6 Economist Intelligence Unit. "Outlook for 2010-11: Political outlook." Country Report. Egypt (2010): 4-5. Business Source Premier. Web. 27 March 2011.7 Bourdieu, Pierre. Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. Print. 1238 Ibid. 76. For an analogy, think how an experienced investor buys stock – they appear to possess a “sixth sense” that guides their choices. 9Ibid. 94

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with lots of cultural capital speak/act in a way that is more valued and therefore,

accumulate reputation or “symbolic capital” amongst the public.10 Yet, because they

gain more respect, their words hold more validity, so they can make even more

“profit” in the field.

This new factor – “symbolic capital”- acts as a multiplier on the effectiveness

of the language used. The problem is that those who lack prestige – such as the

lower-class population- often experience a negative multiplier effect when they

attempt to use more advanced language, barring them from the ability to move

themselves up in the social hierarchy. Bourdieu terms those who step outside of

their social place as “petit bourgeois” and describes their appearance as hyper-

corrective and anxious.11 The consequence of this is that those who do not possess

the appropriate grasp of the dominant way of speaking can be minimized or even

shut off from certain markets (silenced), and stripped of their ability to participate

in a democracy.12 As one can now infer, control over the “market trends” is a locus

for an exploration into what institutes domination.

For Bourdieu, this control involves more than what is just said but also what

is not said. Boundaries are situated not just by what positively confirms an identity

but also what negates the same thing – something that is “unnameable” in the sense

that it isn’t spoken of in a formal setting but is still tacitly recognized in the absence

of its voice.13 The act of speaking about circumcision embodies this concept.

Circumcisions do not divide groups between males that have had one and males that

have yet to go through the procedure so much as they divide males as a sex from

10 Bourdieu. Language and Symbolic Power. 1411 Bourdieu. Language and Symbolic Power 2412 Ibid. 9713 McCumber, John. Philosophy and Freedom: Derrida, Rorty, Habermas, Foucault. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. Print. 38

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women, something that is felt but suppressed through the enunciation of the act

because it does not characterize their identity.14

However, I believe Bourdieu leaves something out. We can only signify

something else if the other concept has a way of being located in the lexicon of the

“market.” Otherwise, we will most likely confuse our audience and possibly look

insane. Even when someone introduces new meanings for old vocabulary like a

Richard Rorty ironist, they still define the form of the new proposal through familiar

language.15 Didi Khayatt has written about her experience searching for a “lesbian”

in Egypt. What she finds is that there is a significant difference in behavior between

lesbians from the upper class and lower classes, because of their access to certain

language. Amongst the lower classes, who only speak colloquial Arabic, there

doesn’t exist a word for “lesbian” (at least not as a value-free “identity” – she

mentions that there is a derogatory word similar to “faggot” that is used), and thus,

the development of this sexual identity and the confidence to have this sexuality has

been subdued as perverted in this lower-class.16 This is in stark contrast with Didi’s

meeting with a group of women from the upper-class of Egypt who spoke classical

Arabic (and many spoke English or French), which does include a neutral word for

lesbian, mussahaqah.17 By having a word which could explain their feelings as an

identity, the women felt that they “belonged to the same ‘group’” and felt permitted

to openly engage in intimate behaviors.18

Still, we may ask – how do these “markets” arise? It is here where James

Scott’s brilliant concepts of power can be utilized.

Scott and Resistance

14 Bourdieu. Language and Symbolic Power. 11815 McCumber. Philosophy and Freedom. 6616 Khayatt, Didi. “Terms of Desire: Are there any Lesbians in Egypt?” Language and Socialization in Bilingual and Multilingual Societies. Eds. Robert Bayley and Sandra R. Schecter. Bristol, UK: Multilingual Matters, 2003. Print. 218-219 17 Ibid. 22318 Ibid. 228

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James Scott analysis of domination and resistance focuses on the gap

between what is said and done in public (hegemonic) settings versus what actors

say while in settings that allow them to speak their mind more freely (private).

Contrary to Bourdieu’s, Scott specifically mentions how both those who hold power

and those who are subordinate must act or “perform” in public – essentially, even

the most powerful are dominated by the nature of their relations, which force them

to uphold an image of finesse. Thus, the image of a perfectly in-tuned habitus might

be a façade. As Scott shows, much of the elite choreograph their “performances” in

public and in doing so, impose speech markets in favor of their behavior and

accent.19 While Scott’s description of interaction might seem conflicting at first

because of its claim that sociological relations are divided only between the “hidden

vs public transcript” as opposed to “markets,”20 the spectrum of open

communication can still be applied to this analysis. In fact, Scott’s contribution

shows how the “markets” are created. The best way of adapting his system to

Bourdieu’s is to view it as the difference between “markets” inhabited by hegemonic

powers and those by the underclass. Often that which is said by people of similar

ranking holds more candor than more heterogeneous spaces of interaction. The

difference in openness between these two transcripts, in a way, can be a

quantitative measure of oppression. The more those dominated have to hide,

correct or euphemize, the more burdensome the public transcript has become on

their lives, leaving them to plan retaliation in their hidden transcripts. Borrowing

once again from economic terminology, we can say that the discursive “black

market” is indicative of the level of repression.

One of Scott’s most useful contributions is his explanation of how

revolutions come about. Usually, the first sign of an uprising comes in the tendency

19 Scott. Domination and the Arts of Resistance. 1220 Ibid. 5

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for rebels to test the limits of public sphere.21 Such actions can include things such as

making a back-handed compliment, grumbling under one’s breath or using

symbolism in arts to make political statements. Furthermore, if any of these actions

appears suspicious, use of strategic naivety – basically pretending to be a fool who

couldn’t possibly be planning something more sinister – to deflect attention is often

utilized. Acts that are seen as dangerous to the hierarchy are immediately attacked

and made an example of to the public.22 These public statements, if they succeed, act

as de facto proof that such actions are acceptable and an escalation of tests soon

begins. It is possible that one of the determining factors for why the revolutions in

the Maghreb were so successful was because it was commonly believed that such

uprisings would never happen in that region and thus, signs that could have been

taken as warning signs were disregarded; power blinds itself by its own myth.

Scott’s system differs from Bourdieu’s also in his rejection of hegemony. For

Scott, if hegemony existed, meaning that the elite class owns the “material basis of

production… [And] the means of symbolic production,” then it becomes impossible

for a revolution from below to happen without any external tremor.23 Violent

revolution can still happen within the dominant ideology, however, it remains

narrow in its scope. Scott mentions the peasant’s of the French revolution never

expressed a wish to abolish the Monarchy but simply their wish for reforms within

the system.24 Still this begs the question – is amelioration of material and political

conditions enough to set one free? In his critique of Nietzsche’s concept of freedom,

Heidegger claims that Nietzsche fails to really go anywhere because he is trapped in

the “inheritances” of his German language – ultimately, his ideas must conform to

hegemonic tools of expression and thus, his thoughts as well.25 One may change

21 Ibid. 19222 Ibid. 19723 Scott. Domination and the Arts of Resistance. 7824 Ibid. 7725 McCumber. Philosophy and Freedom. 6.

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their position in the field but remain confined by the same fence. Egypt’s history

too displays this trap. Despite eventually reaching physical independence, they

continued to oppress themselves with traces of colonial thought even when they

control the means of cultural and symbolic production.

Egypt: Desire for the Other Through Mimicry and Language

When Napoleon first colonized Egypt in the 18th century, he handed out

pamphlets declaring that he was a servant of God and an admirer of the “prophet

Mohammed.”26 While clearly trying to win over the people of Cairo so that they

should accept him as a liberator who freed them from the Ottomans, his plan

embarrassingly backfired. A local cleric, Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, mocked the

pamphlet for his poor grammar and obvious lack of stylistic norms.27 The pamphlets

were dismissed as cartoonish and Napoleon became enraged. Echoing the

importance of controlling the dominant style of speech, we see here how even those

with physical power can fall victim to linguistic pitfalls.28 Despite their quick

expulsion, the French did manage to establish a prominent influence on Egypt. The

judiciary soon adopted Napoleonic code as well as French legal thought.29 The

judicial system also became characterized as possessing a large amount of French

lawyers. It is here that we begin to see the creation of Egypt’s elite class and the

lingering effect of Western thought on Egypt. The upper-educated elite of Egypt

went to France (and later England) to study law and were highly influenced

European Classical liberalism. During the 19th century, especially under Muhammad

Ali (1805-1848) and Khedive Ismail (1863-1879), the government repeatedly 26 Maghraoui, Abdeslam M. Liberalism without Democracy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006. Print. 3927 Cole, Juan. Napoleon’s Egypt: Invading the Middle East. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Print. 32. 28

29 Sonbol, Amira El Azhary. The New Mamluks: Egyptian Society and Modern Feudalism. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. Print. 69

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pushed through reforms that mimicked the structure of European countries.30

Peasants were uprooted and their communal land privatized,31 while religious

institutions were centralized and purged of their traditional behavior.32 The reason

behind this was articulated as removing leftover Turkish influence but it is quite

clear that they wished to be recognized and praised by Europe as a modern

country.33 The European influence was also exhibited by the new rulers in their

dress – a change to the frock-coats characteristic of Western European rulers. This

change happened without any foreign, aggressive pressure; as E.W. Lane wrote

about the reforms, “the ‘march’ of European innovation… [Had] become a gallop.”34

In 1879, now under British rule, we begin to see one of the first public

expressions of peasant resistance to this foreign imperialism during what came to

be known as the Urabi Revolt (named after the soldier Urabi Pasha who led the

resistance).35 The peasant support for this revolution did not come out of nowhere;

incidents of “vandalism, cattle poisoning and murder” existed prior to the revolt but

because they were done by individual peasants, they lacked both the legitimacy of

elite resistance and enough organization to scare those on top.36 Still, the

atmosphere created by these escalating acts had the ability to effectively unite those

who were previously independent of one another.37 What is particularly interesting

is how the rise in the feeling of resentment that a colonizer feels is often balanced by

an increase in displays of complacency by the subordination. The use of a “tactical

30 Maghraoui. Liberalism without Democracy. 4331 Sonbol. The New Mamluks. 93. 32 Maghraoui. Liberalism without Democracy. 4233 Abu-Lughoud, Ibrahim. “The Transformation of the Egyptian Elite: Prelude to the Urabi Revolt.” The Middle East Journal. Vol. 21, No. 3., 1997: 328. Web. 19 February 2011. 34 Rodenbeck, John. “Dressing Native” Unfolding the Orient :Travellers in Egypt and the Near East. Eds. Paul and Janet Starkey. Reading: Ithaca, 2001. 84. Print. This is taken from Rodenbeck quoting E.W Lane. 35 Sonbol. The New Mamluks. 9136 Brown, Nathan. “The Conspiracy of Silence and the Atomistic Political Activity of the Egyptian Peasantry, 1882-1952.” Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance.Ed. Forest D. Colburn. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989. 94. Print. 37 Scott. Domination and the Arts of Resistance. 222

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smile” has become the preferred method of deference by many of the soon-to-revolt

population hoping to calm the nerves of their ever anxious superiors.38 In an article

by the Manchester Times from 1882, an unknown journalist illuminates their

experience with this phenomenon during the Urabi Revolt:

We may be justified in denying to the passions of the multitude the name of patriotism but a multitude of facts have made plain to us that neither the peasants of Egypt nor the Bedouins regard our presence in the country with great complacency. They may smile approvingly with festivities with which we celebrate our victories in Alexandria or Cairo…but although their words may be softer than butter, the poison of the asps in their hearts.39

Despite popular support for Urabi Pasha, which included peasants giving what little

money they had to the rebels, the leaders of the Urabi revolt held remarkably

different views than that of the peasants. The revolting elite, made up of officers in

the Egyptian army, were more concerned with receiving equal pay and privilege as

the foreign members in the same service.40 This would not be the first time that the

peasant class is betrayed by a bourgeois revolution.

Nearly four decades later, another revolt breaks out in 1919. Under pressure

by Saad Zaghul and members of the nationalist Wafd party, the British granted

independence to Egypt but only under the condition that British help write the

constitution and that the Zaghul and his followers not gain power.41 Despite

claiming sovereignty, the new khassa (the ruling class who promoted Egypt’s new

European liberalism), sought to purge themselves of their “Orient” image and create

a new one that was much closer to the Europeans. Much like how Martin Heidegger

favored “nearness” as the requirement for authenticity,42 the Egyptian intelligentsia 38 Ibid. 339 “Summary of the Week.” Manchester Times 1288 (September 16, 1882): 4. 19th Century British Library Newspapers. Web. 28 March 2011. 40 Sonbol. 91-9241 Maghraoui. 5442 McCumber, Philosophy and Freedom. 20. Nearness does not literally mean which is physically near to but that which is near to our true character. Thus, the Egyptians, by using revisionist science and history,

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sought to establish themselves as closer to the Europeans than to that of the Arab-

Oriental character. Of course, while striving for this individuality and demarcation

from the Arab world, they only ended up conforming themselves to Western

norms. The binary of West/Orient, embraced by the Egyptian elite, imprisoned them

in the narratives of Europe and in doing so, suppressed “other non-Western

narratives” of identity and development;43 the false dilemma created by the

intellectuals of the time concerning what Egypt can and cannot be, blocked any

chance to establish an original identity.

Comparing Egypt to an infant, Abdeslam Maghraoui reads this situation

through the lens of Jacques Lacan. According to Lacan, as an infant develops its

identity, it comes to a stage of tension between it and its Father, still unable to

disconnect its body from that of its Mother.44 It is here that the child can to do one of

two things: either they can accept their Father’s presence and the law that comes

with it (i.e. incest taboo) and be accepted into the social order or, they can reject the

father (and the norms) due to its desire to be with the Mother and fail to assimilate

into society.45 For Lacan, this is the definition of a sociopath, meaning one who

cannot understand social norms by themselves and instead, acts simply acts by

logical calculation.46 To use the extended metaphor, Maghraoui contends that

Egyptians wanted to be European so badly that they rejected the Father (in this

case, indigenous Egyptian culture) in favor of becoming part of Europe, its former

tried to prove that the European or “Greek” heritage was closer to their true being than the Arab character. 43 Chowdhury, Savvina A. Everyday Economic Practices: The “Hidden Transcripts” of Egyptian Voices. New York, NY: Routledge Press, 2007. Print. 544 This is the classic Oedipal Drama, where a boy infant seeks to be with his mother and kill his father (For more, see Sigmund Freud. The Interpretation of Dreams. New York, NY: Avon publishing, 1980. Print.). 45 Maghraoui. Liberalism without Democracy. 34. 46 Zizek, Slavoj. “Empty Gestures and Performatives: Lacan Confronts the CIA Plot.” How to Read Lacan. New York, NY: W & W Norton, 2007. Print.

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Mother.47 Their denial of their inability to ever become fully European only pushed

the elite of Egypt to the point that they tried to destroy any trace of their true self.

For example, the late 19th century and early 20th century is known as the

period of the Pharaonic revival movement in Egypt. In 1928, Salama Musa published

an archeological report claiming to prove that that “ancient Egyptians and ancient

British” shared similar bone structure and thus, shared the same ancestry.48 Relics

of Ancient Egypt were also re-examined to determine their “true nature” by the

Western-influenced elite to prove that Egyptians were in fact, European. Far from

being rejected as ludicrous, this “scientific proof” was widely accepted and further

encouraged by those on top.49 At first, this revival appears to be a celebration of

Egypt’s rich cultural history but upon further inspection, the meaning becomes

clear. The revival of Ancient Egyptian culture worked not just because it linked

Egypt to Europe but because it distanced them from the Arab/Islamic culture at the

time; Ancient Egyptians were considered “Greek” and were also not Muslim.50 The

intellectuals of the time continued their conquering of the Egyptian identity, both by

denouncing local activities antagonistic to European culture, such as mawalids or

traditional celebrations, as ”social illness”51 or, declaring the historical boundaries of

Egypt, so as to homogenize all the ethnic groups found within the borders as

Egyptian.52

In 1952, during a streak of economic crisis and political instability, Gamal

Nasser comes to power under a coup d’etat promising change.53 Like the revolutions

prior, popular support for the revolution came from the anti-colonial protests that

47 Maghraoui. Liberalism without Democracy. 3648 Ibid. 7849 Ibid. 8050 Ibid. 7551 Ibid. 9852 Ibid. 6953 Bier, Laura. “’The Family is a Factory’: Gender, Citizenship and the Regulation of Reproduction in Postwar Egypt.” Feminist Studies Vol 36, No.2, 2010: 404-432. Print.

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had preceded Nasser’s insurgency, from peasants that were once again rejecting

what they saw as the unfair imposition of an outside influence. Nasser’s period in

time is interesting because it appears to break itself from European influence; for

example, public intellectuals began to refer to themselves as “Eastern,” different

from American and European citizens.54 Still, this new feeling of Pan-Arabism

inspired only a superficial demarcation and really signified the Soviet Union’s

temporary influence. The same “backwardness” that was criticized by earlier

intellectuals was attacked by Nasser’s regime, all in the name of creating “modern

citizenry.”55 The cultural hierarchy was transformed only in image and language but

retained its same values. When President Nasser spoke to the elite-intellectual

crowd, the khassa, he spoke using “fusha” or classical Arabic. When he would speak

to the amma, he changed his dialect to “ammiya” or the colloquial slang used by the

working class.56 The divisions had not only remained but where further deepened.

What we see in the 20th century is the elite class of Egyptians seeking to claim three

characteristics over Egypt’s “Being”– its physical boundaries, disposition (control

over its boundary), and initiative (who and what is legitimate).57 What the

privileged leaders of Egypt did in this era was seek to validate their view of the

“Being” of Egypt to the point that they, above the lower classes, knew its true

essence. They set the boundaries of the country (territory – both physical and

cultural), established the law (disposition) and determined who voices counted

(initiative).

This third factor was determined by the structures of Egyptian language. Like

most former colonies, Egypt’s class structure has been reinforced by its use of

language. Up until Nasser, the language spoken by the elites of Egypt was either

54 Maghraoui. Liberalism without Democracy. 415-41655 Ibid. 40656 Sonbol. The New Mamluks 21757 McCumber. Philosophy and Freedom. 7-8. This is based on Aristotle’s theory of being.

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French, which they considered “the language of prestige and sophistication”58 or

English, which was favored by universities and entrepreneurs.59Arabic was seen as a

coarse and crude language only used by the underclass. By mastering these foreign

languages, Egyptians could receive higher-education, make military connections or

grasp the arts and culture of the Western world. Yet access to this education was

only available to a few. Borrowing from economics à la Bourdieu, one can say that

this requirement to speak acceptable French/English was a barrier to entry into the

dominant market and thus, excluded those who did not have the privilege to attain

such ability. This divergence can and has been exploited to maintain hegemony; that

which is signified through the use of a specific dialect can be used to neutralize

resistance and retain hegemony.

Indeed, the recently ousted President Hosani Mubarak was praised by many

of the working class for his grasp of the peasant language, a fact that he flaunted.60

This skill wasn’t something mastered by Mubarak to show his cultural knowledge –

it is instead an approach to reification that Bourdieu calls the “strategies of

condescension.”61 When the common press lauded Mubarak’s use of these “popular”

idioms, they didn’t just end up praising Mubarak but also “tacitly recognized” their

position in the country’s hierarchy. By acknowledging that Mubarak was using their

common dialect, the amma made it clear that they were not dominant, because the

dominant dialect did not appear. Instead, by pretending to negate the hierarchy

through the use of common language – a “symbolic negation” – Mubarak actually got

the public to acquiesce to the structure of relations. In effect, Mubarak is

symbolically speaking down to them. It is important to realize that the praise for

knowledge of the dialect of the underclass would not have been given had a peasant

58 Sonbol. The New Mamluks. 21659 Ibid. 9060 Ibid. 21861 Bourdieu. Language and Symbolic Power. 68

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worker got on TV and made a speech in “ammiya” – they would be ridiculed for lack

of sophistication or just ignored. Even more so, a reversal of this class privilege

would not be possible- relationships of power do not necessarily open up the

avenue for the lower-class.62 If a member of the lower class attempted to speak

classical Arabic, they would most likely be chastised as a “petit bourgeois” or try-

hard because they lack the years of training that the khassa posses.63 Fear of this

sanction alone limits many attempts to learn the dominant dialect; the expected loss

of misspeaking outweighs the expected profit. This distinction between those who

can speak freely and those who are silent becomes so great that the dominant’s

ability to make returns on the market seems to be “based on the qualities of the

person alone,” rather than the underlying social relations. 64

Control over who gets credit is powerful and Bourdieu expands upon this by

introducing the idea of “Political Fetishism”65. Power, he argues, isn’t one party

dominating the other but is in fact a product of a constant circular relationship – one

is dominated by both an authority and themselves. People who submit to power do

so because they believe it exists; however, leaders only exist because of a group

treating them as dominant figures.66 By delegating one individual to the position of

authority, a group endows the person with a symbolic Skeptron, allowing the whole

group to be legitimized and heard in political or formal situations. This relationship

becomes full-circle when we realize that it is in this act, the act of speaking for a

group, that the group is named and created.67 Essentially, the group produces its

own symbolic capital and, exploits itself for its own symbolic profit.

62 A peasant speaking “fusha” might appear as superficial. 63 Bourdieu. Language and Symbolic Power. 62. Formal and informal education. 64Ibid . 7265 Ibid. 20266 Ibid. 19267 Ibid. 207

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The performance of power – one individual representing the feelings of an

amount of people that would be physically impossible, unless granted – gives the

Skeptron a magical property, that launches them to the a celebrity-like standing in

front of the group and gives them credit for great outcomes. Since individuals fail to

recognize their role in creating a power, it appears to them as objective and

external, and ergo, positions of power are explained by features that appear internal

to the dominator i.e they possess great enthusiasm, sharp wit, etc. Any attribute can

be hyperbolized to justify the relationship. Mubarak, a former military man,

maintained the nickname “holder of the wilaya,”68 meaning guardian. In this case, it

was his military background that was used as defense of his role. Interestingly,

during the recent uprisings, Mubarak referred to himself as the “father” whose

children wanted to become “orphans” – in other words, the revolutionaries are

misbehaving and should listen to their moral but compassionate superior.69

Unfortunately, cultural and symbolic barriers do not just show themselves in

antagonistic situations, but in mutual ones as well. Looking at recent history we see

that there have been several attempts to revolt in Egypt in the last 7 years alone.

Specifically, in 2004 there was the start of the Kefeya Movement in Egypt (means

“enough”), a group made up of radical socialists and Nasserites – basically university

intellectuals who come from middle-class backgrounds. One of the biggest criticisms

of the movement was its inability to connect with those outside of its own circle,

leading critics to label it as “a group of intellectuals screaming and shouting in public

forums and magazines.”70 The lack of connection is the result of a huge cultural

chasm between the classes – the use of intellectual, Marxist language like “class

consciousness” and “commodity fetishism” simply does not spark interest in the

68 Sonbol. The New Mamluks. 19069 Hitchens, Christopher. “What I don’t see at the Revolution.” Slate. March 2011.Web. 11 March 2011. <http://www.vanityfair.com/>. 70 Osman, Tarek. “Egypt’s Phantom Messiah.” Open Democracy. 12 July 2006. Web. 18 March 2011. <http://www.opendemocracy.net/>.

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minds of rural peasants. This group essentially isolated itself off from lower classes

with lower cultural capital, even though it shared a similar objective. In fact, there is

a difference in their word for culture; the intellectual crowd has been known to use

the word “thaqafa” or high culture, whereas rural peasants tend to resort to saying

“turath [or] adat” or heritage and customs.71

While those with resources have an advantage, pressure from the

bottom still has the ability to chip away at those norms under the noses of the elites.

Egypt in particular has had a history of being dominated by multiple colonizers but

also a history of resistance. What we are witnessing now is a cumulative

representation of the hidden angst held by the Egyptian people over the last century

and a half, something one could call the “safety-valve” breaking.72 While it is unwise

to point to specific events as being the final catalysts for a revolution, we can point

to conditions that tend to incentivize action. One of these circumstances can be a

general feeling of frustration, as Fouad Ajami points out:

Dreams of national power and deliverance visited Egypt no less than four times in its recent history and they all ended in frustration…This is part of the country’s self-image. To rule Egypt is to rule against the background of these expectations and disappointments…Egyptians are not blind to what has befallen their country. They can see the booming lands in Asia, countries that were once poorer than Egypt, digging out of the poverty of the past...The dreams of liberal reform, the hopes for revolution from above, the socialist bid of Nasser [have] all withered away.73

Take heed of Ajami’s use of the word disappointment; one does not feel this

emotion when encountering the failures of those we see as oppressors but instead,

something felt when one sees the letdowns of those we identify with ourselves.

While the Egyptians, kicked out foreign rule, they often failed to realize that their

71 Scott. Domination and the Arts of Resistance. xxiii72 Ibid. 17873 Ajami, Fouad. “The Sorrows of Egypt.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 5, 1995: 72-88. Pg. 83-84. Web. 18 March 2011.

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own fiascos were the result of their tendency to “[embrace] colonial culture” and

subject themselves to the norms of the West.”74 In an optimistic sense, the

implication for all of this is that domination is just as much a product of the “slave”

as it is the “master.” This is something of which is aggressively concealed as

knowledge of this can prove hostile to dominant hegemony. One might argue

that coercive action (violence, imprisonment) has the ability to force an objective

truth upon the subordinate, but in reality, the subordinate must still come to the

conclusion by themselves. Extraneous direct oppression is not only futile but often

counter-productive to establishing dominant hegemony. The force at which a group

of people can strike back with is extraordinary when they are pushed to their

emotional edge.

From Mimicry to Revolution

Several theories behind what causes the start of revolutions exist and their

still is probably plenty missing if we were to combine all of them. For one, Theda

Skocpol influential theory from her seminal piece “State and Revolution” states that

the prerequisites for a successful revolution are internal economic inequality and

external pressure from stronger countries.75 Without economic problems,

populations will often acquiesce to political repression in order to maintain their

living standards. On the other hand, if international bonds remain strong, any

rebellion can easily be put down with help from outside military forces. For Kusha

Sefat, this is reminiscent of Egypt. Egypt, as discussed, possesses both a defined

class gap and a large dependency on foreign influence.76 Sefat argues that the recent

74 Maghraoui. Liberalism without Democracy. 5

75 Skocpol, Theda. “State and Revolution.” Theory and Society, Vol. 7, No.2, 1979: 7-95. 8. Web. 15 March 2011.76 Sefat, Kusha. “Kusha: Iran vs. Egypt: Qualitative Differences in Capabilities.” Informed Comment. 1 March 2011. Web. 11 March 2011. <http://www.juancole.com/>.

Jacobs 20

recession in the United States limited its ability to step in and control the uprising

and that this only irritated the social chasm. Yet, if this was the case, then wouldn’t

one would expect revolutions in many other countries outside of the immediate

region?77 Skocpol’s argument is strong but incomplete. Instead, we must add our

insights from both Bourdieu and Scott to understand, as I argue, that because

domination happens along multiple spaces, it is also resisted and overthrown along

multiple avenues. Revolt is not the product of simply material domination, but also

an attempt to restore “autonomy and dignity.”78 The problem is many times this

second objective is only acquired by those who gain power, leading to the

despondency that has plagued Egypt. I will support my theory that certain

conditions strongly influenced the outbreak of this revolt through various examples;

However, do not take these events as final causes in their own but more as cases of

larger antagonisms showing themselves. As the days of the revolution continue, I am

sure we will learn of more events that changed the momentum and do not want to

limit the scope.

Humiliation

A general feeling of cynicism amongst populations has been subtly

encouraged by those seeking to retain status-quo throughout history, but it is a

tactic that is used only to distract the population, rather than provoke a pronounced

responses. It is not enough merely to evoke distrust, as one can just choose to not

participate and live tolerably. What set’s something off is the instance an individual

decides they are willing to die to maintain their dignity. Humiliation, which has

played an important role in most histories of authoritarian oppression, is the

77 Egypt’s economic condition is comparable to other countries, like Vietnam, that also are facing international pressure. (For an example, see Carl Robinson. “Why Vietnam Won’t Fall.” World Policy Blog. 7 March 2011. Web. 13 March 2011. <http://www.worldpolicy.org/>.) 78 Scott. Domination and the Arts of Resistance. XI

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ingredient which is often combined with this misery to produce open displays of

struggle. On its own, it is perhaps not enough because if one accepts a system, then

they will shift the blame to themselves. Dominant figures who denigrate often do so

in a manner that situates them but still convinces them their interests lie in

maintaining the hierarchy. While examples of Egyptian intellectuals belittling the

poor and rural of Egypt have already been mentioned, a very recent example of

state-instituted degradation illuminates the view of the recently ousted Egyptian

government on its own people.

In the past few decades, the Southern part of Egypt has developed an

extensive tourism industry. Surprisingly, this area is called “Upper Egypt,” a relic of

the Pharaohs who named that area after the direction in which The Nile flowed as

well as a way of distinguishing their hierarchical order; today, it is home to some of

the poorest population of Egypt. Since the liberalization of the tourist industry

under Sadat, the villages surrounding the historical sites of Ancient Egypt have

become booming tourism industries. In fact, tourism is the largest source of foreign

income in Egypt and an economic heavyweight for Egypt.79 Yet, beneath this gain

has been a policy of resentment towards the local people, to the extent that they

treat them almost like animals. For years, the tourism industry of Egypt, with help

from the Mubarak regime, has relocated the people living around the historical

landmarks of Ancient Egypt from their houses so that the industry could expand.80

In a narrative similar to that taken by the liberals of the early 20th century, Egyptian

authorities claimed that the residents of the area were destroying valuable artifacts

that did not belong to them, but to “world heritage.”81 The tourism industry of Egypt

79 Gray, Matthew. “Economic Reform, Privatization and Tourism in Egypt.” Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 34, No. 2, 1998: 91-112. Web. 14 March 2011.

80 Chowdhury. Everyday Economic Practices. 8981 Abu-Laghoud, Lila. “Television and The Virtues of Education: Upper Egyptian Encounters with State Culture” Directions of Change in Rural Egypt. Nicholas S. Hopkins, ed. Cairo: The American University Press. 162. Print.

Jacobs 22

has also emphasized Western-influenced narratives and silenced others. Modern

Egyptian resorts and tour packages repeatedly stress Pharoanic imagery in their

advertising, emphasizing Egypt as the land of “royal tombs, golden pyramids and

rich treasures” rather than of the amma culture that surrounds the pyramids in

towns like Luxor.82 Even after all this modernization, what remains a legitimate

object of culture is what appeals to Western desires and tastes.

As the economy has boomed in the area, the indigenous residents have

received very little of the gains. Due to this, when tourists visit the local towns, they

are often approached by beggars looking to receive something of what had been

excluded from them. The tourism industry has responded to this, under the

guidance of the World Bank, by creating separate transportation pathways –

everything from bus routes to walkways – for the tourists to protect them from the

indigenous masses.83 For the people of these communities, they have become

dominated not only by lacking a voice or presence in the political and economic

realms but by being treated like animals. Such a factor, more so than even

conditions of economic depression, creates the circumstances for opposition. To

resist this, the members of the community have created an informal tourism sector,

where they offer tours of their local houses and neighborhoods, in contrast to the

artificial tour routes that are set-up by the resorts.84

Probably the most accurate indicator of wide-spread denigration is the

presence of public suicide, specifically in the form of self-immolation or self-

mutilation. Sandy Cornish, a former slave, became famous for “mutilating himself

with a knife” in public to protest his slave-owner.85 Cornish did not do this because

82 Bryce, Derek. “Repacking Orientalism: Discourse in Egypt and Turkey on British outbound tourism.” Tourist Studies Vol. 7, No.2: 165-191. 175. Print. He is quoting a brochure from Sovereign Holidays. 83 Chowdhury. Everyday Economic Practices. 11284 Ibid. 11885 Kachun, Mitch. Festivals of Freedom: Memory and Meaning in African American Emancipation Celebrations 1808-1905. Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006. 107. Print.

Jacobs 23

he wanted a higher wage; he did this because he didn’t want to be treated as

property. Self-harm protests domination because it expresses a sense of control.

After being stripped of ownership of everything in their life, the self-harming

protestor seeks to reaffirm themselves as the final causes of their existence, even if

it means hurting themselves. Within several days of Mohammed Bouzazi self-

immolation in Tunisia, several individuals from Egypt followed suit.86 The burning of

one’s body signaled the ultimate defiance of authority – if I can’t own my body,

nobody can!

Technological and Generational Change

Besides the factor of humiliation, Skocpol and other material theories miss

the influence of both generational and technological change, things that can happen

independently of outside pressure or rampant inequality. It is well known in the

field of economics that the power of adopting a new productive technology gives an

entrepreneur a head-start until the innovation diffuses throughout the market;87 the

same holds true for technology in opening opportunities for revolutions. Oppressive

regimes often encounter a series of “critical junctures”88 during their reigns; these

can consist of anything from a military challenge to power, to a technological

change. A ruler’s image and policy is put under public scrutiny during such a trial-

by-fire and it is up to them to prove that they still possess their mythical being,

whether that is one of infallibility or omnipresence. Scott borrows from George

86 Zayed, Dina. “Egyptians set themselves ablaze after Tunisia unrest.” Reuters. 18 January 2011. Web. 11

March 2011. <http://www.reuters.com/>.

87 Chang, Ha-Joon. “Windows 98 in 1997: Is it wrong to borrow ideas?” Bad Samaritans: The Secret History of Capitalism. London, UK: Bloomsbury Press, 2007. Print. 88 Rutherford, Bruce K. Egypt After Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam and Democracy in the Arab World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. 24. Print.

Jacobs 24

Orwell's essay “Shooting an Elephant” to explain this phenomenon. In the essay,

Orwell relates an experience from his time as a colonizer in Burma, during which

the local Burmese asked him to shoot an elephant that had killed several members

of the tribe. When Orwell finally confronts the elephant, he realizes that he not only

has to kill the frightening elephant to avoid ridicule, but that he must play the role of

power that he projects upon his subordinates; he must live up to his own name.89 It

is not clear whether or not Orwell's audience, the Burmese villagers, would have

behaved differently if he did not kill the elephant but their presence alone is

enough to check his behavior.

Philosopher Slavoj Zizek metaphor for powers ability to fall describes a

cartoon character walking off a cliff; it is only once the cartoon looks down and

realizes that it is walking on air that it falls down.90 Leaders too, have the ability to

overstep their reality and fall into catastrophe but their arrogance to realize they

have lost their base often proves fatal. Anything that gives the impression of

weakness or naivety cracks the image of complete domination and invites large-

scale resistance. For the leaders of the Middle-East, it was their failure to control the

explosion of social networking, something that exploited their word against them.

The new technology opened the door for the hidden transcript but it did so, because

it trapped the dictators under their own words. Both Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali

in Tunisia attempted to block social networking but eventually backed off because

they thought that “banning it would cause more problems.”91 Mubarak, as well as

other dictators in the region, stressed during their reign that they were for

liberalizing their countries both politically and economically but their promises

ended up biting back.92 Despite power knowing that it is in the position of

89 Scott. 1190 Zizek, Slavoj. The Parallax View. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. 236. Print.91 Beaumont, Peter. “The Truth about Twitter, Facebook and the uprisings in the Arab world.” The Guardian. 25 February 2011. Web. 11 March 2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/>. 92 Chowdhury. Everyday Economic Practices. 72

Jacobs 25

dominance, it will often try to dilute its public image of oppression so as to convince

the general public that they have more freedom than they have in reality.

While it was mentioned earlier as a failed movement, Kefaya is an example of

something that Mubarak would later regret. Kefaya helped to bring the hidden

transcript to the public transcript. A “declared refusal to comply” is one of the key

turning points in overthrow of a power relationship, because it dispels the myth of

underclass fear of authority and becomes the first instance which alerts many

outsiders. Kefaya was not the only group to do so but part of a larger instance of

Egyptians “testing” the public transcript. Following this step foward, Egypt faced a

series of labor strikes in 2006, 2007 and 2008 over wages in its industrial cities,

eventually leading to an estimated 800 labor strikes alone in the period of 2008-

2009.93 In early 2008, textile workers in El-Mahalla el-Kubra began striking in

protest of the working conditions in the city. In itself, such an event would appear

insignificant but it energized the Egyptian youth so much, that they decided to

participate in solidarity with the workers. On April 6, 2008, members of the future

Egyptian Youth Movement created a Facebook page calling for all workers of Egypt

to skip work for the day, in support of the striking workers in El-Mahalla el-Kubra.94

The immediate result was an increase in the minimum wage but more importantly,

the event disclosed that challenging this authority and winning reform was possible.

What blooms from this and other incidences is another important factor in

influencing revolutions: generational change. In science, as Simon Singh argues,

generational change often coincides with paradigm shifts because older scientists

93 Jay, Paul. “Roots of the Revolutionary Egyptian Moment.” Real News. 29 January 2011. Web. 11 March 2011. <http://www.youtube.com/>.

94 Efrat, Yacov Ben. “Egypt: The distance between democracy and social justice.” Challenge Magazine. 7 February 2011. Web. 11 March 2011. <http://challengemag.com/>.

Jacobs 26

tend to have a more realist or conservative approach to new theories. They have

seen new ideas come and go, and thus, are perhaps more cynical of so called

revolutionary ideas.95 In a similar vein, the memory of past failures has haunted the

older demographic of Egypt but for the younger generation, of which make up

around 65% of the population in the Middle-East,96 much of their life has been met

with escalating success. To sum it up, Time itself is often the enemy of power, as it

continues it exposes more and more holes in the phantom of power’s “objectivity.”

An individual’s attitude towards power can play a partial but important role in its

existence and as they come in contact with these gaps or exposures to freedom, they

become hungry. Power relies on the people it dominates to hold it up, like pillars to

the roof of a building. Subordination is essentially a learned characteristic but one

that works the best when we feel that we are hardly secondary. Frederick Douglass

described the power of this effect, using his own experience as an example:

I was kept in a perpetual wind of excitement, I could think of nothing, scarcely, but my life; and in thinking of my life I almost forgot my liberty. I have

observed this in my experience of slavery, - that whenever my condition was improved, instead of increasing my contentment, it only increased my desire

to be free, and set me thinking of my plans to gain my freedom.97

95 Singh, Simon. Big Bang: Origin of the Universe. New York, NY: Fourth Estate, 2008. 328. Print. 96 Laquer, Walter. “Will Egypt’s Youth Meet History’s Challenge?” CBSNews. 17 March 2011. Web. 18 March 2011. <http://www.cbsnews.com/>. 97 Douglass, Frederick, and Angela Y. Davis. Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave, Written by Himself: A New Critical Edition. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2010. 99. Print.

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What can be done?

For this to be a successful revolution, it is important that the people of the

Middle-East achieve their goals, one of which I believe is the creation of democracy

in both the political and economic realms. These protests weren’t just responses to

the authoritarian political rule but to the neo-liberal reforms that began in the,

which both marginalized a large portion of the population and deepened the tension

between the classes. The most recent events at the time of writing confirm the urge

to reform all aspects of life. The workers in El-Mahalla el-Kubra, the same ones who

went on strike for a rise in wages in 2008, have now replaced the former state-

sponsored unions that existed at their factories. The protesters clearly see the

98 Schorr, Bil. “March 11, 2011.” Cagle Cartoons. 11 March 2011. Web. 12 March 2011. <http://cagle.com/news/>.

Jacobs 28

structural flaws that oppress them, rather than put the blame on an individual. As

one Egyptian worker put it, “we want an overthrow of this whole system, not just

the removal of one person.”99 The marginalization of the majority of citizens in

Egypt has not just been the result of actions by the ruling government but the

behavior of the opposition as well. The three strongest oppositions to Mubarak’s –

the Judge’s Club, the Egyptian Businessmen’s Association and the Muslim

Brotherhood – have expressed anti-popular politics for some time now, despite

pushing for various political reforms. Both the Judge’s Club and the EBA have been

supporters of neo-liberal reform, for different reasons. The EBA was concerned with

creating an attractive market for foreign investment and competition,100 whereas

the Judge’s Club is a relic of early 20th century elite liberalism. The colonial influence

clearly remains today. James Scott calls this the “Mark of Oppression.”101 They have

accepted the Western model of development as “the only viable…form of economy,”

even when they claim opposition to the West and in the process, discredit

alternative forms of development.102

The Muslim Brotherhood is an even better example of this contradiction,

especially because they often criticize Western culture and claim some sort of

populism. For strategic motives, they are for general public participation in elections

but this is simply because it is their best route for attaining power.103 Despite their

vocal support for participatory politics, the MB has criticized democratic means as

possessing the ability to quickly cause mass disorder amongst the public and hold

99 Gopal, Anand. “Egypt’s Cauldron of Revolt.” Foreign Policy Magazine. 16 February 2011. Web. 18 March 2011. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/>.

100 Rutherford. 210101 Scott . Domination and the Arts of Resistance. 32

102 Gibson-Graham, J.K. and Ruccio, D. “After Development: Re-imagining Economy and Class” Re/Presenting Class: Essays in Postmodern Marxism. Eds. J.K Graham-Gibson, Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001. Print.103 Rutherford 2008, 176.

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the potential of disobeying “the ethical precepts of Islam.”104 The position they take

has become one where democracy is good if it elects their leaders but “mob rule” if

it elects the opposition. In reality, their political values are more in line with the

ruling NDP than that of the public. In fact, if we look at why the MB and some of its

militant followers have become generally popular, we see that it is the symptom of

state policy. As the Structural Adjustment Plan,105 was introduced under Mubarak, a

wave of mass migrations into the urban cities of Egypt sprung up as small-farmers

lost various social expenditures and common land (shared by multiple farmers) was

bought up by larger, agribusinesses.106 One of the outcomes of these policies was the

creation of large, dense Sh’abi quarters or neighborhood slums of extreme poverty

within cities like Cairo.107 In effect, the Egyptian government had created the

conditions for mass resistance and it was here that the Muslim Brotherhood, seeing

the opportunity to gain support, stepped into these neighborhoods. The MB quickly

offered social services through local mosques to fill the gaps that were created

during the liberalization period. As the Egyptian state saw the MB gain popular

support, they cracked down on mosques and replaced the Imams with “state-

sanctioned clerics.”108 The problem with this is that it backfired and made the

Muslim Brotherhood and its followers more militant. Once again, when power

expresses derisive oppression, it tends to push the oppressed to the point that they

are willing to lose their life.109

104 Ibid, 235105 This is a neo-liberal economic development program strongly recommended by the IMF/World Bank as a condition of receiving a short or long term loan. The program recommends many free-market reforms such as balancing the state budget, privatization of public services, deregulation and floating of the country’s currency. (See Ha-Joon Chang. Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capital. London, UK: Bloomsbury Press, 2008). 106 Chowdhury. Everyday Economic Practices. 127 107 Ibid, 126. 108 Ibid. 84109 Scott. Domination and the Arts of Resistance. 37

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What I believe is needed in Egypt is not simply a new leader but a change in

social relations towards something of a local, participatory democracy. This will not

only mobilize the marginalized citizens of Egypt but might be the best hope for

preventing another authoritarian State government. Christopher Hitchens recently

wrote that he didn’t believe Egypt had the chance of truly overcoming a tyrannical

government because Egypt has yet to have anything that resembles “a genuine

opposition leader” and those groups that claim to represent the opposition are

nothing but “emancipated hulks.”110 I basically agree with Hitchens; to us in the

West there doesn’t appear to be a genuine opposition leader but that is because we

are considering only that which fits our norms of legitimate. Frankly, it is very rare

for changes in history to be caused by the people rather than by a change in the

composition of the elite but this is perhaps an expression of our beliefs of what is

suitable.111 In contrast to this, the “Jasmine Revolution” is important as it stands as a

strong expression of popular opinion (both positively and negatively). However,

one may ask – is that even necessary for a successful revolution? Should the

Egyptian people need to put their future in the hands of one person? If Bourdieu is

right, that power ultimately resides in the persons who elevate a selected individual

to something that transcends the common mortal, than it should be true that the

resources necessary to effectively govern do not need a hierarchical figure.112 This

hypothesis, that a hierarchy is not essential to governance, can be argued but only

under conditions in which resource disparities do not hinder the attainment of the

110 Hitchens, Christopher. “What I don’t see at the Revolution.” Slate.

111 Ferguson, Thomas. "Party Realignment and American Industrial Structure: The Investment Theory of Political Parties in Historical Perspective."Research in Political Economy. Ed. Paul Zarembka. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1995. Print. Ferguson’s research shows how the issues that make up the discourse of elections are usually the result of differences and/or splits in the business sector.

112 Bourdieu. Language and Symbolic Power. 202

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symbolic or cultural capital needed for every individual’s opinion to be accepted as

meaningful. This does not imply that only under a Habermasian “ideal speech

situation,” or one of perfect equality, can this be achieved but that people should not

be effectively silenced by structural or economic constraints that have prevented

them from being able to establish themselves in their communities.113 As John

Plamenatz explains, that what makes a choice reasonable is not because the actor

can give a “satisfactory explanation” for why they made it but because “if [he/she]

could give an explanation, it would be satisfactory”114 In sum, the average individual

has the ability to give answers that are deemed rational and reasonable if they

possessed the means (whether knowledge, verbal or economic) necessary to

produce these credible statements. However, the very creation of these “markets”

that exclude, came about not in a democratic manner but as the result of

stratification of access to the necessary cultural, language and symbolic capital

needed to engage with one’s neighbor.115

Of course, some might argue that without a dominant power, there is no

order or, that a direct democracy will devolve into “mob rule.” Great thinkers from

Plato to Joseph Schumpeter have argued that democracy is inherently unstable and

will most likely end in an invasion on individual rights. The only solution, they

argue, is to establish an elite class who can maintain order and subdue the

irrationality of the masses.116 What is interesting is the basis for most of this political

thought or political realism, comes from an account of another revolt relayed by

113Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990. 86. Print.114 Bachrach, Peter. The Theory of Democratic Elitism. Washington, D.C: University Press of America, 1980. Print.

115 Schwartz, Joseph. The Future of Democratic Equality: Rebuilding Social Solidarity in a Fragmented America. New York, NY: Routledge Publishing, 1997. 55. Print. 116 For more on this view see either Plato The Republic or Joseph Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper, 1950. Print/

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Greek historian Thucydides.117 In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides

remarks how order dissolved upon the Corycians war breaking out, and was instead

replaced by irrational mobs of citizens who carried out violence, simply because

they could not control their violent human nature.118 Following the outbreak of riots

in Cairo, echoing this realist viewpoint, news media almost immediately expressed

concern over predicted ethnic conflict in the region in a similar manner.119

The current revolution, at least in Egypt, appears to contradict this theory. In

fact, cooperation between groups that have been conventionally thought as

permanently hostile towards one another (Muslims and Coptic Christians) has

become a feature that has defined this revolution. Stories of Copts protecting

praying Muslims and vice-versa flooded the blogs during the beginning of the

revolution but were ignored in many mainstream news outlets. Images of this new

unity such as the pictures of Imam’s and Priests rallying together to chant “We are

one hand” have defined this revolution as not just revolting against an authoritarian

117 Sahlins, Marshall. 2008. The Western Illusion of Human Nature. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Print. The Revolution that is alluded to is the Corcyra Revolt.

118 Thucydides writes “In the confusion into which life was now thrown in the cities, human nature, always rebelling against the law and now its master, gladly showed itself ungoverned in passion, above respect for justice, and the enemy of all superiority; since revenge would not have been set above religion, and gain above justice, had it not been for the fatal power of envy. Indeed men too often take upon themselves in the prosecution of their revenge to set the example of doing away with those general laws to which all alike can look for salvation in adversity, instead of allowing them to subsist against the day of danger when their aid may be required.” (See Thucydides. The History of the Peloponnesian War. Trans. Richard Winn Livingstone, and Richard Crawley. London, UK: G. Cumberlege, 1946. Book 3.82-85. Print.).

119 Champion, Marc. 2011. “Coptic Christians Worried About Future Without Mubarak.”Wall Street Journal. February 1, 2011. Web. 12 March 2011 <http://online.wsj.com/ >. The Pew Research center also published a report at the beginning of the uprising, showing that the use of words like “theocracy” or “extremism” were often used more frequently than other words like “democracy” (Also see Marc, Jurkowitz. “The Fall of Mubarak and the Media.” Pew Research Center. 7 February 2011. Web. 13 March 2011. <http://www.journalism.org/>.)

Jacobs 33

government, but against prejudices of the West.120 In fact, many of the incidences of

sectarian conflict in Egypt are being examined, as they contain the marks of

instigation by Mubarak loyalists, perhaps as a way to break up the unity of the

revolutionary forces.121 This mutual aid shouldn’t come as a surprise but the idea

that cultural diversity leads to conflict has become so ingrained in modern thought

that it dominates our assumptions. India, a country much more diverse than Egypt

and with a similar colonial past, was predicted to devolve into “totalitarianism”

upon the introduction of popular democracy because of the belief that competing

ethnicities would seek to destroy the opposition.122 Instead, it regularly shifts

between different ethnicities holding power with no dissolution of the State. What

many political theorists fail to realize is that instead of reducing to irrational mob

rule, Democracy has the ability to push individuals to collaborate and encourage

non-violent, sensible discourse.123 In fact, contrary to the expectations of political

theorists about India at the time, Democracy appears to have acted as a pacifier for

ethnic conflict by allowing groups to mobilize from within a system rather than

attacking it from the outside.124 Returning to the factors that influence revolutions,

one can deduce that ethnic conflicts are often the result of situations where one

lacks a voice, rather than during cases where one has a voice but perhaps does not

get along with others. 120 Cole, Juan. “Christians, Muslims ‘One Hand’ in Egypt’s Youth Revolution.” Informed Comment. February 7, 2011. Web. 13 March 2011. <http://www.juancole.com>. 121 Afify, Heba. “In Atfeeh, sectarian clashes might be a conspiracy.” Al-Masry-Al-Youm. 10 March 2011. Web. 13 March 2011. <http://www.almasryalyoum.com>.

122 Harrison, Selig. India: The Most Dangerous Decades, New Delhi: Oxord Press, 1960. 338-339. Print.

123 Bachrach. The Theory of Democratic Elitism. 103

124 Das Gupta, Jyotirindra. “Ethnicity, Democracy and Development in India: Assam in a General Perspective” Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia. Eds. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Lintz and Seymour Lipset. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishing, 1989. 167. Print. Empirical evidence also appears to support the idea that Democracy reduces the chance of a terrorist attack within a country (see Quan Li “Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?” Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 48, No.2, 2005:278-297. Print.)

Jacobs 34

Even if one doesn’t accept the belief that diversity will lead to conflict, they

might still harbor the view that hierarchy is still needed in order to run something

efficiently. Many might hold semi-technocratic views, insisting that complicated

tasks like finance or engineering remain in the hands of those who hold university

degrees in order to maximize success. It is definitely wise to rely on those with

expert skill to complete a task but talents can be developed in many different

situations. Egypt has a history of hidden resistance that not only challenges this

view, but introduces a whole series of variables that are usually not considered as a

traditional economic indicator. For Egyptian women, it is one of the several informal

125 Zyglis, Adam. “February 12, 2011.” The Buffalo News. 12 February 2011. Web. 14 March 2011. <http://blogs.buffalonews.com/adam-zyglis/>.

Jacobs 35

credit associations or gam’iya that allows them to maintain valuable family

occasions (like weddings or funerals) and keep money within communities.126

Despite never receiving formal training by banking institutions, many of these

community credit organizations operate extremely effectively, often circulating

large amounts of money around at extremely low transaction costs while still

possessing a very high repayment percentage!127 A superficial reading of this

outcome would praise only the economic effectiveness of the gam’iyas but the real

victory is the autonomy and meaning given to these associations. They build trust,

they provide formerly excluded resources, they invest in that which is valuable to

the locales – they become tools for the construction of identities. Instead of following

the development path already forged out, they become the force of their own

creation. It is empowerment which should be stressed, especially when it comes to

the question of breaking free from cultural domination.

Thus, our final question: how can the Egyptians find their own identity in

language and rid themselves of their colonial past? Several philosophers, such as

Richard Rorty or Jacques Derrida, have tried to answer this question of language

and semiotic hegemony. Their conclusions often range from resisting the traditional

ranking of the word128 to simply the creation of a new vocabulary and meanings.129

Bourdieu mentions that there is a tendency for language that meant one thing

amongst the old rule to become transformed into something with a new meaning

during revolutions but he doesn’t explain how.130 It is due to this that I reject these

options as solutions on their own because they approach the problem as one that

126 Chowdhury, Everyday Economic Practices. 127-129.127 Ibid. 21 & 124. 128 McCumber. Philosophy and Freedom 23. In this manner, Egyptians of the ammiya could reject the cultural binary between “thaqafa” and “turath” or the difference in the words used for culture by the different classes in Egypt. Derrida suggest the hierarchy between the words be flipped and then synthesized in a new word. 129 Ibid. 63. 130 Bourdieu. Language and Symbolic Power. 47.

Jacobs 36

can be solved simply through “exit” mechanisms rather than through one’s which

empower the voice of Egyptians. While these tools may be useful in overcoming

language barriers as a group, individually they self-censor. As Scott says, “The

hidden transcript never becomes a language apart” but retains mutual intelligibility

with that of the dominant transcript, as if it was itself a former colony of the public

transcript.131 There is no doubt that the hidden transcript is important in both

providing a platform for airing of anger and establishing group cohesion but simply

choosing to drop out of dominant transcripts and create new meanings for

traditional words fails to overcome the power structures propagate the transcript.

No matter how many words are reinvented, as long as the dominant lingual markets

exist, unequal relationships will continue to establish material and social inequality

amongst populations.

Pensively, I approach this question with apprehension. Often attempts to

help give “voice” or create identities lead to the same homogenization that one was

trying to prevent – I am not Egyptian and do not know their individual experiences.

What constitutes their distinctness should ultimately be a product of their own will.

One of the great critiques of modern postcolonial theory, by Gayatri Spivak, is the

tendency for outside intellectuals to imply complete comprehension of the

subaltern’s experience or “the persistent constitution of the Other as the Self’s

shadow.”132 Our predisposition towards truth often causes us to speak for

individuals and suppress them in the same manner that colonialism originally

functioned. This is even more apparent when we consider the symbolic and cultural

capital gap between a Western scholar and a baladi peasant.133 Instead, we must

speak to the people of Egypt, so that we may listen to them and show that their

131 Scott. Domination and the Arts of Resistance. 135.132 Spivak, Gayatri C. “Can the Subaltern Speak?” The Post-Colonial Studies Reader. Eds. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. London; New York: Routledge, 2006. 24. Print. 133 Baladi means local. (See Khayatt. “Terms of Desire: Are there Lesbians in Egypt?” 219).

Jacobs 37

voices are valued. What is needed is an organization where voices are felt equally,

free from the restrictions of the “markets” or suppressive transcripts, where people

do not feel they need to possess any sort of cultural or capital to participate and are

free from any kind of intimidation (intellectual, power, etc). The best starting point

for overcoming this, even if it is still incomplete, would again be the creation of a

more inclusive form of democracy (rather than just a liberal democracy), where

individual’s voices hold equal weight and are not significantly constrained by any

economic, political, cultural or symbolic factor.

The very act of establishing a more direct democracy will decentralize power

but this does not imply a fall into anarchy or dissolution similar to Yugoslavia.

Instead, one can adopt what already appears to be happening (for example, the

democratization of the factories in El-Mahalla El-Kubra) and apply it to a new, more

inclusive form of governance through the use of democracy in the workplace. Since

corporate institutions already play a big role in a citizen’s life both through

economic control and social authority,134 as well as possess perhaps the biggest

influence on the outcome of elections,135 it would be only fair that Egyptians be

given the right to greater democratic control over their jobs. This could be anything

from something as radical as worker cooperatives to simply a vote in which

candidate their place of work supports during an election, either through finance or

endorsement. When direct democracies exist, they confront individuals to operate

“cooperatively in the solution of concrete problems affecting [themselves]” instead

of weakly through representations created by stronger interests (or not at all).

Regardless of this more popular approach, one need not fear that this will

undoubtedly lead to homogenization of opinion.136 I strongly believe that as

134 Bachrach. The Theory of Democratic Elitism. 69135 For more see (Ferguson. "Party Realignment and American Industrial Structure: The Investment Theory of Political Parties in Historical Perspective."). 136 Bachrach. The Theory of Democratic Elitism. 103

Jacobs 38

discourse happens, differences will naturally occur and inspire reevaluation of one’s

position or perhaps, investigation into further evidence of their position.137 Either

way, such a process reveres the innovation of new conceptions, a goal of which our

vocabularies play a role in creating.138 Thus, it is under these conditions of open

debate and cooperation, demarcated from the barriers to entry, that linguistic and

semiotic freedom can be sought as expressed by the previously mentioned post-

structuralism thinkers. It is now clear why a democracy can serve as a means of

breaking free from past-language constructions. Under general equality, each

individual becomes a possible producer of legitimate language but still retains a

need for camaraderie with others; a unity of solidarity and pluralism.

Conclusion

In conclusion, what is not seen or even hides itself plays equally an important

role as that which flaunts itself on the public stage. Domination works on multiple

spectrums to project an image greater than itself, often as a deterrent from its real

weaknesses. It is our responsibility to avoid jumping to hasty generalizations,

especially now that we understand there that we me consider a whole multitude of

transcripts that we do not see. I cannot claim to know what Egyptians want but if

their history is any indication, than a direct democracy could not only work but

flourish in the region. Ultimately, our role should not be to sit back and analyze the

situation through our scholarly lens but to respond and support Egypt as members

our world’s family. Perhaps the biggest finding I learned from this series of event is

that power is a two-way street and that relationships of power are never

permanently set. Such revelation is not only optimistic but also empowering – if the

protests in Yemen and Bahrian (and soon to be transitioning Libya) are any

137 “Difference of opinion leads to enquiry and enquiry to truth” –Thomas Jefferson. (See Thomas Jefferson and John P. Foley. The Jeffersonian Cyclopedia. New York: Russell & Russell, 1967. 660. Print.) 138 McCumber. Philosophy and Freedom. 71

Jacobs 39

indication, it is that the actions by just ordinary people in one country can change

the world. The “Jasmine Revolution” should provide motivation to the world’s

oppressed that their ability to overcome is not something fictional but a very real

and a very possible now.

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