DNSSEC Brought to you by ISC-BIND, SUNYCT, and: Nick Merante – SUNYIT Comp Sci SysAdmin Nick...
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Transcript of DNSSEC Brought to you by ISC-BIND, SUNYCT, and: Nick Merante – SUNYIT Comp Sci SysAdmin Nick...
DNSSECBrought to you by ISC-BIND, SUNYCT, and:
Nick Merante – SUNYIT Comp Sci SysAdmin
Nick Gasparovich – SUNYIT Campus SysAdmin
Paul Brennan – SUNYIT Student Assistant SysAdmin
Selective Timeline of DNSSEC• 1987 – DNS Ratified to replace hosts.txt• 1990 – DNS Security Flaws Found• 1997 – First try at DNSSEC - RFC2065• 1999 – Second try at DNSSEC - RFC2535
BIND9 is first DNSSEC capable implementation• 2005 – Finalized RFCs Published• July 2008 – Kaminsky exploit announced• July 2010 – Root signed• August 2010 – .edu TLD is signed• March 2011 – .com TLD is signed
ARIN signed for Reverse DNS
DNS Records• DNS comprised of various resource record (RR) types• Primary types:
• A – map hostnames to IP addresses• MX – map a host or domain to a list of mail servers• CNAME – specifies an alias for a host• PTR – map a IP address to a host name• NS – Specifies authoritative name servers for a zone• SOA – Specifies authoritative information about a zone
• Primary name server• Domain administrator email• Serial number• Timers related to refreshing the zone
• DNSSEC will introduce several new record types
DNS Security Issues• Original DNS specifications did not account for security• DNS Spoofing
• No data integrity checks• Anyone can answer a request intended for another name server• Attacks against query ID numbers
• Cache Poisoning• A result of DNS spoofing• Trick a DNS server into caching false information• Nodes querying this name server will obtain false cached data
• Consequences:• Clients misdirected to alternate locations• Compromise host-based authentication systems
4 Security Objectives of DNSSEC
1. Key Distribution
2. Origin Authentication
3. Data Integrity
4. Authenticated Denial of Existence
New Record Types• DNSKEY
• Public side of Private/Public Keyset• Key Signing Key• Zone Signing Key
• RRSIG• Signed Validation of Resource Record Set
• DS• Delegation Signer• Builds Chain of Trust
• NSEC/NSEC3• Certified Non-existence record
Traditional DNS Lookup (un-cached)
Recursive DNS
Server
Client looking for:fang.cs.sunyct.edu
Iterative calls
edu
sunyct
cs
fangcs
sunyct
edu
root
1
8
DNS Lookup Under Attack
Recursive DNS
Server
Client looking for:fang.cs.sunyct.edu
Targeted bycache poisoning
Iterative calls
edu
sunyct
cs
fangcs
sunyct
edu
root
1
8
Keys• Public/Private Keyset
• Private Key used to sign records• Should be kept in a secure location (not on live DNS servers)
• Public Key used to check signatures• Must be 512 to 4096 bits for DNSSEC• Several Algorithms available
• Zone Signing Key used to sign zones• Key Signing Key used to sign ZSK record
• Generally larger & more secure
• Cryptographic Digest of KSK is sent upstream• DS Record• Verifies Authority of KSK
Key Flow
DS
KSK
ZSK
ampere
nagios
logit
(sunyct.edu)
DS
KSK
ZSK
fang
yoshi
spuds
(cs.sunyct.edu)
DS
KSK
ZSK
maryann
gilligan
professor
(island.sunyct.edu)
(edu)
Chain of Trust / Tower of Authority
Recursive DNS
Server
Client looking for:fang.cs.sunyct.edu
Targeted bycache poisoning
Iterative calls
edu
sunyct
cs
fangcs
sunyct
edu
rootCrushes youwhen yourdata is bad1
8
Key Rollover• Changing ZSK:
• Recommended monthly to quarterly
• Changing KSK• Recommended annually
• Why Rollover• Reduced window of key exposure• ZSKs sign many records• Keys become more vulnerable with use
What’s all this RRSIG stuff?
Key tag of signing key
Date of signing
Signature expirationAlgorithm
Starting TTL
The signature
itself
Gotchas• DoS Danger• Load Increase• Signed zone can be 4x LARGER than unsigned• Bigger record size = more network traffic• Key Security• Dynamic DNS = fail
(Have to keep private keys loaded to resign, no support for that)
• Network Gear must support EDNS0 for UDP packets
Performance!
Our Test Environment
3 VM’s running OEL (sunyct.edu)
3 Hosts running FreeBSD (cs.sunyct.edu)
BIND 9.8.0-P2
BIND Versions/Restrictions• We recommend using the most up-to-date version of your
preferred DNS software• Updates often pertain to security issues
• Preliminary DNSSEC support introduced in BIND 8.2• Recommended version of BIND 9.7 for all capabilities• Windows Server 2003 has preliminary support
• Slave support only• Must be activated in Registry
• Windows Server 2008 R2 has full support
Key Generation
Specifies Key Type
Algorithm
Key Size
Name Type
Zone Name
ZSK is default
Smaller Key Size
Key tag added
named.conf Edits – Authoritative Servers
• Add “dnssec-enable yes” to the options section• For your first time signing, make sure you increment your
serial number!• After signing your zones, point to the new signed zones
• Same names as your old zone files, but with “.signed” appended
named.conf Edits – Recursive Servers
To start validating results add: “dnssec-validation yes”
You also need to get the KSK for root into your config.As of this presentation, it would look like this forBIND >= 9.7:
managed-keys { "." initial-key 257 3 8 "AwEAAagAIKlVZrpC6Ia7gEzahOR+9W29euxhJhVVLOyQbSEW0O8gcCjF FVQUTf6v58fLjwBd0YI0EzrAcQqBGCzh/RStIoO8g0NfnfL2MTJRkxoX bfDaUeVPQuYEhg37NZWAJQ9VnMVDxP/VHL496M/QZxkjf5/Efucp2gaD X6RS6CXpoY68LsvPVjR0ZSwzz1apAzvN9dlzEheX7ICJBBtuA6G3LQpz W5hOA2hzCTMjJPJ8LbqF6dsV6DoBQzgul0sGIcGOYl7OyQdXfZ57relS Qageu+ipAdTTJ25AsRTAoub8ONGcLmqrAmRLKBP1dfwhYB4N7knNnulq QxA+Uk1ihz0=";};
Determine Your DS Info
Domain Digest
Key Tag
Algorithm and Digest Type Fields
Key FileSpecify
SHA1 Hash
Key rotation - ZSK
1. Generate and publish new ZSK one TTL before planned rotation, but don’t sign the zone with it!
2. After TTL expiration, sign with new ZSK1. Leave old DNSKEY record in zone for 1 TTL cycle
2. Allows cached signed records to be verified(Signatures created with old key need time to expire)
Here’s one option:• Have 3 ZSK’s in your zone. The previous, current and next.
Your zones will always contain the necessary keys.
Key rotation - KSK
1. Generate and publish new KSK at least one TTL before planned rotation and sign ZSK records with both the old and the new keys.
2. Make sure you send your new DS record upstream!
3. After TTL expiration, remove the old DS record from your upstream provider and remove the old KSK from your zone files
dig – Points of Interest
DNS Server Name
DNSSEC Enabled Search
Host to query forRecord Type
ad flag = authenticated data(this means it’s been confirmed valid)
dig – Points of Interest
aa flag = authoritative answer(if you’re querying the authoritative server,you won’t see the ad flag, just the aa flag)
References• 7 Things You Should Know About DNSSEC• Microsoft DNSSEC Deployment Guide• DNSSEC Debugger – Verisign Labs• DNSViz – DNS Visualization Tool• Firefox DNSSEC Validator Plugin• DNSSEC for Beginners• DNSSEC Zone Key Tool• DNSSEC in 6 Minutes• DNSSEC Reference Card• ISC Steps for setting up a validating server