Discussing the durability of peace: will it prevail in ...1187363/FULLTEXT01.pdf · war between the...

MasterThesis

Discussingthedurabilityofpeace:willitprevailinColombia?M.A.PeaceandDevelopmentStudies

(4FU42E)

Author:DavidBroo

Tutor:ManuelaNilsson

Date2017-08-18

2

Abstract

Thisthesiscontributestothedebateonwhatmakespeacedurablebydevelopingan

analyticaltoolthat,basedonthecurrentresearchstatusonwhatmakespeace

agreementslast,intendstoevaluatepeaceagreementsontheircapacitytomaintain

peace.Theresearchwasdonethroughaqualitativedeskstudy,usingtheColombian

peaceagreementwhichwassignedin2016.Theagreement,asitisfinallynegotiated,is

accordingtotheanalyticalframeworkestimatedtohaveareasonablygoodchanceto

beingdurable.

Keywords:Peacedurability,Peaceagreements,Colombia,Casestudy

Wordcount:18241

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Acknowledgements

IwillthankmysupervisorManuelaNilssonforverygoodsupportduringtheworkwith

thethesis,andtheinstitutionofPeace&DevelopmentatLinnaeusUniversityfora

reallyinterestingyear.

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ListofAnnexes

Annex:MapofColombia………………………………………………………………………………………………70

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ListofAbbreviations

ACC AutodefensasCampesinasdeCórdobayUrabá/TheSelf-Defencegroupsof

CórdobaandUrabá

AUC AutodefensasUnidasdeColombia/UnitedSelf-DefenceForcesofColombia

CELAC ComunidaddeEstadosLatinoamericanosyCaribeños/CommunityofLatinand

CaribbeanStates

CFHBDCesealFuegodeHostilidadesBilateralYDefinite/BilateralandDefinite

CeasefireandcessationofHostilities

CNR ConsejoNacionaldeReincorporation/aNationalreincorporationcouncil

CSVR Comisiondeimplementacion,seguimientoyverificaciondelacuerdofinaldepaz

ylaresoluciondediferencias/ACommissionforfollow-up,verificationandadispute

resolutioncommissionforthefinalagreement

DA Dejaciondearmas/Deportationofweapons

ELN EjércitodeLiberaciónNacional/NationalLiberationArmy

EPL EjércitoPopularLiberación/PopularLiberationArmy

EU TheEuropeanUnion

FARC FuerzasArmadasRevolucionariasdeColombia/RevolutionaryArmedForcesof

Colombia

MAS MuerteaSecuestradores/DeathtoKidnappers

MM&VMechanismodeMonitoreoyVerificacion/Mechanismsofmonitoringand

verification

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M-19 Movimiento19deAbril/19AprilMovement

OASOrganizationofAmericanStates

UNASURUnióndeNacionesSuramericanas/UnionofSouthAmericanNations

UKTheUnitedKingdom

UN TheUnitedNations

PDETProgramasdeDesarrolloconEnfoqueTerritorial/DevelopmentProgramswitha

TerritorialApproach

PND PlanNacionaldeDesarrollo/Thenationaldevelopmentplan

PNIS ProgramaNacionalIntegraldeSubstituciondeCultivosdeUsoIllicito/

NationalComprehensiveProgramforSubstitutionofIllicitCropCrops

PTN PuntosTransitoriosdeNormalizacion/TransientPointsofNormalization

RRI ReformaRuralIntegral/IntegralRuralReform

UNHCRUnitedNationsCommissiononHumanRights

WOLATheWashingtonOfficeOnLatinAmerica

ZRCZonasdeReservaCampesina/Farmerenterprisezones

ZVTNZonasVeredalesTransitoriasdeNormalizacion/TransitionalStandardizationZones

UNASURUnióndeNacionesSuramericanas/UnionofSouthAmericanNations

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ListofContent

1.Introduction……………………….………………………………………………………………………………..10

1.1 Researchproblemandrelevance.…………………….………..….………………..………………10

1.2 Researchobjectiveandquestions……………………………………………..………………….…11

1.3 Colombiaasacasestudy…………………………………………………………………………………11

1.4Methods………….…….…….…….…….…….…….…….…….…….…………………….….…….………12

1.5AnalyticalandTheoreticalFramework……………………………………….…………….………12

1.6Thesisstructure…………….…….…….…….…….…….…………………….……..…….…….…….…12

2.Analyticalframework………….…………………………………………..…….…………………..……..…13

2.1Factorsforsustainablepeace:Thestateoftheliterature…..……………………………14

2.1.1NaturalResources……………….…………………………………..…….…………………………13-14

2.1.2Spoilers…….……………………………………..…….……….………….……………………..………….14

2.1.3Power-sharing…..………………………………………………………….….……..………….……15-16

2.1.4InclusionvsExclusion……..………………………………………………………….…..….…….……16

2.1.5Informationasymmetries……………………….………..…………………………..…….…………17

2.1.6Thirdpartyinvolvementanddisarmament……………………….…….…….…..…….17-18

2.1.7Democratizationandinstitutionaldesign………….………………………….……….…18-19

2.1.8Outcome,causes,intensityanddurationoftheconflict……..……………………19-20

2.2Theanalyticalframework:Factorsneededfordurablepeace…..…………..…………20

2.2.1Politicalfactors……..…………………………..……..…….………………….…………………………21

2.2.2Securityfactors……..…………………………………..………….………………………………………21

2.2.3Justicefactors……..……………..…………………..…….………………………………………………22

2.2.4Historicalfactors……..…………………………………..…….………….………………………………22

3.Methodologicalframework………………...……………………………………………………………….23

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3.1Casestudy………….…….………………………….………………………………………………………..…23

3.2Textanalysis………….…….………………………………………..……………………………….……23-24

3.3Sources…….…….……………………………………….……………….………………………..….……24-25

3.4Limitationsanddelimitations………………….……………………………..…………………...……25

3.5Ethicalconsiderations………………………………………………………………….……………………25

4.BackgroundtothecaseoftheColombianconflict…………………………………………………26

4.1Historyandoriginsoftheconflict……………………………….……………..……..……..…26-27

4.2Theprocesstowardspeace50sto00s………………………………………………………………27

4.2.1LaViolencia………………………………………………………….……………………………..…………27

4.2.2Theemergenceofleft-wingguerrilla……………..………………………………….….….……28

4.2.3Drugtrafficking………………………………………………………….……………………..……………29

4.2.4Lackofinstitutionaltrust…………………………………….…………………………………………29

4.2.5Thegrowthofright-wingparamilitaries……………….………………………..………………30

4.2.6Attemptsofpeacetalkswiththeguerrillas………….………………………………..………31

4.2.7Peacetalkswiththeguerrillas………………………………..…………………………..……31-32

4.2.8Disarmamentofparamilitaries……………………………………………………….……..………32

4.2.9TheUribeera……………………………………………………….……………………………..……32-33

4.3TheSantoserabegin……………………………………………..………..……………….........………33

4.4.Thecurrentpeaceprocess…………………..…………………………….…………………….…34-35

4.5 Thelastmonthsofthepeaceprocesses…………..………………………………………….35-36

4.6 Thecriticlaunchedagainsttheagreement………….……………………………………………37

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5.Findings………………………..…………………………………………..………………………………….………38

5.1SummaryoftheAugustpeaceagreement..………….……………………………………..……40

5.1.1Item1-Rurallandreform………….……………………………….……………………………39-40

5.1.2Item2-PoliticalparticipationbyformerFARCrebels………………….……………40-41

5.1.3Item3-CeasefireandDisarmamenttoendviolence……................…………..41-43

5.1.4Item4-Combatingdrug-traffickingandreducingillicitdrugs………..….…..…43-44

5.1.5Item5-Justiceforvictimsoftheconflict…….……………………………………………44-45

5.1.6Item6-Implementationandverification.……………………..………………………………45

5.2Thereferendum………………………………………………………………..…………………..……48-49

5.4ComparisonbetweentheAugustandNovemberagreements..…..………………47-48

5.4.1Item1-Rurallandreform………….……………………………….…………………………………48

5.4.2Item2-PoliticalparticipationbyformerFARCrebels………………….………...……..48

5.4.3Item3-CeasefireandDisarmamenttoendofviolence……......................……..48

5.4.4Item4-Combatingdrug-traffickingandreducingillicitdrugs………………………..49

5.4.5Item5-Justiceforvictimsoftheconflict…….………………………………..….………..…49

5.4.6Item6-Implementationandverification.……………………..…………………..………….50

5.5Item6–Thecurrentstatusonimplementationofthefinalagreement………..….50

6.Analysis…………………………………………..……………………………………................................51

6.1.Politicalfactors….……………………………………..………………………..……….………….….51-54

6.2Securityfactors……………..…………………………….………………………….…………..….…..54-56

6.3Justicefactors…………..…………………………………………………………………..……..……..56-58

6.4Historicalfactors…………..…………………………………………………………………………..…58-59

6.5ComparisonondurabilityoftheAugustandNovemberagreements.......……59-60

6.5ThedurabilityofthefinalColombianpeaceagreement……………………….…..………60

7.Conclusionandrecommendationsforfurtherstudies……………………………………..……61

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………………62-69

Annex:MapofColombia…………………………………….………………………………………….........70

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1.Introduction

1.1Researchproblemandrelevance

Achievingdurablepeaceinpostwarenvironmentsischallenging,andmanyagreements

relapseintoviolence,particularlyinthecaseofnegotiatedagreementsintendedtoend

intra-stateconflicts.Of125intra-stateconflictsthatoccurredbetween1945and2005,

almosthalfofthemreturnedtowar(Druckman&Wagner,2016).Borjaetal(2012)also

arguethattherearemanyhistoricalexamplesoffailurestomakepeacedurable.Walter

(1999)claimsthat17of41civilwarsthatoccurredinthe19thcenturywassolved

throughpeacenegotiations,but9ofthoseconflictsrelapsedintoviolenceagain.

Thissituationhastriggeredanumberofresearcherstolookintoconditionsthatfurther

orobstaculizesustainablepeace.However,DruckmanandWagner(2016)claimthatthe

durabilityofpeaceagreementsishardtomeasure.Albin&Druckman(2011)alsoargue

thatdespiteanincreasedinterestinthesubjectinrecentyears,thereisnoclear

definitionofwhatconstitutesadurableagreement,althoughthereareseveralfactors

thatseemtocontributetoincreasingthechances.Hartzelletal.(2001)pointoutthat

hypothesesregardingthelong-rundeterminantsofpostconflictpeaceawaitfurther

testing.Thus,thereisnoconsensusonwhatworksandwhatdoesnotwork,andthusa

potentialgaptoevaluatefurther.Investigatingthenotionofdurabilitywillassisttothe

debateonwhatmakespeacedurablebyprovidingananalyticaltoolthatisbasedonthe

currentstatusofresearchonpeaceagreementsandmightbeabletobeusedinfuture

researchtopredictifpeaceagreementsfulfilthenecessarybasicconditionstolaythe

basisfordurablepeace.Thismeansthesavingoflives,moneyandlesssuffering,

contributingtoworldpeace.Iftheabilityisgiventopointouttheweaknessesinpeace

agreementsinadvance,thosepartscanbeadjustedmakingagreementsmoredurable.

SincetheColombianagreementhadarenegotiationitisanidealcaseforthe

developmentofananalyticalframework.

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1.2Researchobjectiveandquestions

Theobjectiveofthisresearchistocontributetothediscussionondurabilityofpeace

agreementsbycreatingananalyticalframeworkofwhathasbeendonesofarregarding

whatmakespeacedurable,andthenapplyingthattothecaseoftheColombianpeace

agreement.Ihavethenchosenthefollowingresearchquestion:

Discussingthedurabilityofpeace:willitprevailinColombia?

1.3Colombiaasacasestudy

ThebackgroundofthecivilwarinColombiaisoverfivedecadesoldwithmanydifferent

peaceprocessesdevelopedovertime(Crisisgroup,2017).Theconflictwasgoingonfor

almost50yearswithmorethan45,000deathsand3milliondisplacedasaresultofthe

warbetweenthearmy,left-wingguerrillas,right-wingparamilitaries,drugcartelsand

criminalgangs(MSB,2016).In2016after52yearsofconflicttheColombian

governmentandthebiggestguerrillagroupFARCreachedanhistoricalagreement

(HRW,2016).Thefinalagreementconsistsof310pageswithsixkeypointsregarding

Ceasefire,Disarmament,Justiceforvictims,DrugTrade,Formerrebelsinpoliticsand

Landreform(FARC-EP,2017).ThechallengeforColombiaisnowtomakesurethatthe

newbornpeacegetsdurable(DN,2016).TheColombianexampleisseenasanewand

inclusivewaytodopeacenegotiations,andcanthenbestatedasapotentialforerunner

forfurtherpeaceagreements(McAlevey,2016).

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1.4Methods

Thisresearchisaqualitativedeskstudy.Thetopicistreatedasasinglecasestudy,since

itisthengiventheopportunitytogetadeepunderstandingofthespecifictopicin

formsoftheColombianpeaceagreement.Themethodologicaltoolusedintheanalysis

istextanalysis,andmaterialconsultedaresecondarysourcesaswellastheoriginal

peaceagreementdocumentinitstwodifferentversions.Regardingresearchethics,

thereisnoethicalissuestobeforeseen.

1.5Analyticalandtheoreticalframework

Themainframeworkforthisstudyisconstructedfromtheliteraturethatoutlines

differentfactorsofwhatmakespeaceagreementsdurable.Theresearchwillbe

operationalizedthroughalookintotheexistingliteratureregardingpolitical,security,

justiceandhistoricalfactorsfordurability,andthenseeiftheColombianagreement

fulfilsthosecriteria.

1.6Thesisstructure

Following this introductory chapter, the discussion regarding the durability of peace

agreementsisintroducedinchaptertwo.Thechapterconsistsofamorein-depthreview

oftheexistingliteratureregardingthedebateconcerningdurabilityofpeaceagreements,

tosketchoutofwhathassofarbeendeterminedbydifferentresearcherstomakepeace

durable.Thecircumstancesforthisresearchprescribeaqualitativedeskstudywiththe

methodoftextanalysis,whichisfurtherdescribedinthemethodschapterthree.Chapter

fourconsistsofthehistoryandbackgroundoftheColombiancase.Chapterfivepresents

the findings. In the analysis chapter it will be investigated factor by factor if the

Colombianagreementfulfilthecriteriaofwhatmakespeacedurable,accordingtothe

developed analytical framework. The last chapter presents conclusions and

recommendationsforfurtherstudies.

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2.Analyticalframework

2.1Factorsforsustainablepeace:Thestateoftheliterature

Whatmakespeacedurableandhowshouldanagreementlookliketoincreasethe

possibilitiesfordurablepeace?Theliteraturereviewbelowconsistsofadiscussion

regardingthedebateconcerningdurabilityofpeaceagreements,tosketchoutwhat

makespeacedurable.Thiswillprovideananalyticalframework,tobeappliedinthe

analysistoevaluateiftheColombianagreementfulfilsthosecriteria.Thefollowing

sectionoutlinesthemajorfactorsoutlinedinthecurrentliteratureasinfluentialforthe

durabilityofpeaceagreements.Theselectionofauthorswasmadecarefully,withfocus

onnewerarticlesfromwell-knownscientificsources.Thestateoftheliteraturedoes

notaimtoproveiftheyarerightorwrong,butinsteadtohelpestablishacommon

platformfordiscussion.Thissincetherearesomanydifferentfactorsoutlinedinthe

literature,andjustthemajoroneswerechosen.

2.1.1Naturalresources

Naturalresourceshighlyaffectthedurabilityofpeacenegatively.Druckman&Wagner

(2016)pointoutthatthedistributionofincomesfromnaturalresourceshavetobe

equallydistributed,otherwiseitaffectsdurabilityinanegativeway.Accordingto

Stedman(2001)implementationofpeaceagreementsbecomesmoredifficultifwarring

partieshaveaccesstodisposablenaturalresources,sincethoseresourcesprovide

armieswithameansforcontinuedfighting,becometherewardagainstwhichthey

weighthebenefitsofpeaceandemboldenspoilerbehaviour.Whenitinoppositeisa

lackofaccesstosuchresources,itiseffectivelylimitedthebenefitsofreturningtowar

fortheparties.Ross(2004)claimsthatnaturalresourcesandcivilwararehighly

correlated.Oil,nonfuelminerals,anddrugsarecausallylinkedtoconflict,butlegal

agriculturalcommoditiesarenot.Binningsbø&Rustad(2012)arguethatnatural

resourcesinformsofoilanddiamondsincreasetheconflictrisk,prolongcivilwar,and

negativelyaffectpeaceprocessesanddurability.AccordingtoUNEP(2017)40%ofall

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intrastateconflictsthatoccurredforthelast60yearswerelinkedtonaturalresources,

anditalsodoublestheriskofaconflictrelapseinthefirstfiveyears.

2.1.2Spoilers

Implementersofpeaceagreementshavetolookcarefullyatthethreatsforpeacein

termsofspoilersofthepeaceprocess.AccordingtoStedman(1997)thedifference

betweensuccessfulandunsuccessfulimplementationofapeaceagreementcanbethe

strategyofaggressivemanagementofspoilers,sincethereareusuallyspoilerproblems

inthepeaceafterapeaceagreementisreached.Thesituationisoftenvulnerableand

citizens,internationalactorsandpeacemakershavetolookcarefullyatthethreatsfor

peaceintermsofspoilers.Guardiansofpeacemustconstantlyseektheintentionsof

thewarringpartiestoreachagreementandsearchforevidencetoensurethatthe

signatoriestothepeaceagreementaresincereintheircommitment,andtoseekand

takeadvantageoftheintelligenceofthewarringpartiesobjectives,strategiesand

tactics.Custodiansshouldjudgewhatisright,justandfairinthepeaceprocess.Thiscan

bedoneeitherexpresslyorthroughinternationalconsensusonwhatisappropriatefor

thewarringparties,orbynottakingthemeasuresinviewoftheviolentattacksand

spoilerbehaviour.Furthermore,Stedman(1994)underlinethatsomecivilwarscannot

endthroughnegotiations,sincesomepartieswillusenegotiationsasatactictodefeat

theopponents.Thereisalwaysariskofspoilersusingceasefirestrengthenthemselves

toprepareforreturntowar.Regardingmoralconcernstheconcernforsavinglives

musttakepriorityoverthemoralconcernregardingjusticeforvictims.Ifnegotiation

cansucceed,accountabilityforwarcrimeswillhavetobeabandoned.

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2.1.3Power-sharing

Agreementsbasedonpower-sharingseemtoincreasethedurabilityofpeace

agreements,butitdifferswhichformofpower-sharingisused.AccordingtoSimonset

al.(2013)researchershavequestionedwhetherpower-sharingisaneffectivetoolof

conflictmanagement,andifitsgrowingpopularityisjustifiedbytheresults.Joshi&

Mason(2011)arguethatthelargerthesizeofthegoverningcoalition,thegreaterthe

opportunitiesareforanyonegrouptobecomeapartofagoverningcoalition.Thiswill

theninfluencethepolicyprocessinwaysthatenhanceitsinterests,whichincreasethe

chancesfordurablepeace.Alargergoverningcoalitionismorelikelytoemerge

followingnegotiatedagreements.Ontheotherhand,peaceismorelikelytofailwhere

thegoverningcoalitionissmaller,andexcludedgroupsthenhavelittletolosefrom

resumingtoconflict.Termsofpower-sharingagreementsbetweenformerrivals

structurethecompositionofthegoverningcoalitioninthepost–civilwarstateandthe

rulesofthegamebywhichthosegroupspursuetheirowninterests.Especially

territorialpower-sharingexpandingthegoverningcoalition,positivelyaffectingthe

durability.Expandingthesizeofthegoverningcoalitioncreatesstrongerincentivesfor

formerrivalstosustainthepeacebecausetheycanpursuetheirpoliticalobjectives

throughmeansthatarelesscostlyandlessriskythanreturningintoarmedconflict.

Furthermore,Nilsson(2012)arguesthatpeaceagreementsthatcontainahigherdegree

ofprovisionsforpower-sharingaremorelikelytogetsustainablepeace,independently

iftheagreementcontainsmilitary,territorialorpoliticalformsofpower-sharing.Albin&

Druckman(2011)pointoutthatpeaceagreementsbasedonmilitaryandterritorial

power-sharingprobablyincreasedurability.Joshi&Mason(2011)arguethatdurable

peacecanbeestablished,ifformerrivalsagreetoformalizedpoliticalandterritorial

power-sharingarrangementsinanegotiatedsettlement.Hartzelletal.(2001)claimthat

power-sharingistorecommend,sincetheabilityofterritorialautonomyandthird-party

assurancestomitigateopponent’ssecurityconcernsmaybeweakensovertime.Simons,

etal(2013)arguethatthereishardlyanyevidencetoclaimthatincludinglocalpower-

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sharinginnationalagreementsincreasedurabilityofpeace,atleastinashort-term

perspective.Theimportanceofthesub-nationallevelisoftenoverestimated,sinceit

mightevenmakethepeaceprocessweaker,andcanactuallyleadtorenewedconflict

insteadofamelioratingthesituation.Issuesthatinsteadneedtobeconsideredarethe

historyofspatial-politicallinks,thecentralisedpoliticsofcaringabouttheperipheryas

wellastheestablishmentoflocalbalancesormonopoliesofpower.AnIssuesthatneed

tobetakenintoaccountarethehistoryofspatial-politicalrelations,thecentralized

policytotakecareoftheperipheryandtheestablishmentoflocalbalancesormonopoly

power.

2.1.4Inclusionvs.exclusion

Thereisadebateifinclusionorexclusionistopreferinapeaceagreement.Nilsson

(2012)pointsoutthattheinclusionofcivilsocietyactorsinpeaceagreementsaremost

importantforpositiveeffectsonthedurationofpeaceagreements.Paffenholz(2014)

agrees,butalsounderlinethatitneedstobetakenintoaccounthowandunderwhat

circumstancesitcanbeaccomplishedmosteffectively.Civilsocietyshouldthereforebe

seenasanownactorintheprocess.However,itisalsoimportanttolookatother

potentiallyexcludedactorssuchasforexamplepoliticalpartiesandbusiness

organizations,aswellasthecontextoftheconflict.Civilsocietyisgenerallyseenasan

importantactorinpeaceprocessesandmostresearchersarguethatcivil

societyparticipationmakestheprocessmoresustainableanddemocratic.However,itin

thesameturnmakesitmoredifficulttoreachanagreement.Analysisofthesemodels

suggeststhatitwillbepossibletobroadentheparticipationofcivilsocietyinpeace

negotiationswithoutdecreasingthenegotiations.

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2.1.5Informationasymmetries

Thereisadebateamongauthorsregardinghowinformationaffectthewarringparts

andchancesforcreatingastableagreement.Informationsymmetrieshavetobeavoid,

andtransparencyistoprefertoincreasethedurabilityofapeaceagreement.Joshi&

Mason(2011)arguethatwhenbothsidesknowtheirrivalhasthesameincentive,they

cannottrusttheothersidescommitmenttodisarmanddemobilizeunderthetermsofa

settlement.Mattes&Savun(2010)claimthatpeaceagreementsthatincludes

provisionstorevealinformationaboutthedifferentfighter’smilitaryresources,

increasesthelikelihoodfordurability.Therefore,avoidingofinformationasymmetries

canplayanimportantroleinpeaceagreementswhereuncertaintybetweenpartshave

tobereduced.Furthermore,theriskofarenewedcivilwarsignificantlycanbereduced,

whenfightingpartiesreporttheirmilitaryinformationtothirdparties,forsecurity

guarantees.Reachingasettlementinacivilwarandestablishingpeaceimplythatrebels

havetobedisarmedwhichcanbehardtomanage,wheninformationasymmetries

betweenformerdisputantsregardingmilitarycapabilitiesmaystillpersist.This

especiallyifthecivilwarendedinanegotiatedsettlementratherthanamilitaryvictory.

Themoreuncertainty-reducingprovisionsincluded,thebetterchancesfordurable

peace.Commitmentproblemsareviewedastheleadingrationalisttheoretical

explanationforcivilwarespeciallyinlongdurationcivilwars,althoughcertaintypesof

informationasymmetriesalsoplayarole(Blattman&Miguel,2010).

2.1.6Thirdpartyinvolvementanddisarmament

Thirdpartyinvolvementseemstobeimportantforthedurabilityofpeace.Walter

(1999)statesthatoutsidehelpbyathirdpartythathasthepoliticalwilltoverifyand

enforcethedemobilizationmakethechancesfordurablepeacebetter.Hartzell,etal

(2001)arguethatthirdpartysecurityassurances,suchasstatesorregionalor

internationalorganizations,haveastabilizingeffectsincetheyoffersecurityassurances

topartiesaspartofthenegotiatedagreement.Ifthirdpartiesinterveneearlyintoa

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conflictthatservestoreducethecasualtyrate,italsomaycontributetoamoredurable

peace.Furthermore,Nilsson(2012)claimsthatthirdpartiesoftenspendalotof

resourcesandeffortinpeaceprocesses,inordertocreatesustainablesolutionstocivil

warsbyprovidingsupporttovariousactors.Joshi&Mason(2011)pointoutthatwhen

thirdpartiessuchasUNprovidesecurityguaranteesduringthedisarmingand

demobilizingphase,peaceagreementsaremorelikelytobedurable.

2.1.7Democratizationandinstitutionaldesign

Therearedifferentviewsbetweenauthorsintheexistingdebateregardingthe

correlationbetweendemocratizationandthedurabilityofpeaceagreements.However,

stateswithademocracytraditionhaveeasiertoreachsustainablepeaceaftercivilwar,

thanthosewithnotraditionofdemocracy.Senese(1997)underlinethatthereis

inconclusiveevidenceregardingregimetypeandnationalconflictinvolvement.Walter

(1999)arguesthatstatesemergingfromcivilwarshallbecarefulintheir

democratizationprocess,whenpromisingfreeandfairelectionsasameansto

introducedemocracy.Furthermore,combatantsthatarelikelytobecomeinsecureas

theydemobilize,cangainasenseofsafetyiftheyarenotforcedtodisarmfully,

especiallybeforethepoliticaltermsofanagreementhavebeenfulfilled.Animportant

deterrentagainstattemptsbysomeofthegroupstoestablishdictatorialrule,isby

offeringgroupscarrotssuchasterritorialautonomy,openborders,andasylum

provisions.Militaryforcemightberequiredfordemobilization,buttheinstitutional

designmattersmoreforthesustainabilityofthepeace.Nilsson(2012)arguesthat

inclusionofcivilsocietyactorsinpeaceagreementsincreasesthedurabilityofpeace,

butthatit`salsodependsifthecountryisdemocraticornot.Incombinationwith

democraticpoliticalparties,thepeaceagreementsgetevenbetterchancestobe

durable.Civilsocietyactorssuchaswomen’sorganizationsandreligiousactorsare

preferablytobegivenaroleinpeacesettlements.Forbuildinglegitimacytothepeace

process,peacemakersshouldalsostrivetoinvolveactorsfromawidespectrumofthe

societyaspossible.Thissinceit,whenawiderspectrumofsocietybecomesinvolveina

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peaceprocess,itincreasesthelegitimacyoftheprocess,whichinturncontributeto

durability.Hartzell,etal(2001)addsthatdurabilityseemstobepositivelyaffectedby

peaceagreementsthatconcernstatesinwhichthepreviousstableregimewasa

democracy.Furthermore,itispositiveifthepeaceagreementincludesprovisionsfor

theterritorialautonomyofthreatenedgroups.Thedesignofnewinstitutional

arrangementsforthemanagementoftheconflictalsoseemstosignificantlystabilizing

thepeace.Ontheotherhand,civilwarresolutionsforstateswithalackofdemocracy

experiencenegativelyaffectingthedurability.Itisalsoworthwhiletofocusonthe

securityconcernsofcivilwaradversaries.Devisinginstitutionalmeanstoenhancethe

securityofformeropponentsmayproveamoreproductiveandstabilizingpeacethan

attemptingtoidentifyandaddresscomplexoriginsofdisputes.Blattman&Miguel

(2010)arguethattheextensionofnationalcontroldowntothecommunitylevelare

essentialstateresponsibilitiesforincreasingofpeacedurabilitysincesuccessfulstates

doso,includingtheuseofforce.

2.1.8Outcome,causes,intensityanddurationoftheconflict

Conflictswithhighintensitythatoccurredforalongtime,negativelyaffectthechances

fordurablepeace.However,itisnotclearifapeaceagreementbetweentwopartsis

actuallytobepreferred,comparedtoamilitaryvictorybyonesidewhenitcomesto

durabilityofpeace.Joshi&Mason(2011)arguethatthedurabilityofpeaceaftercivil

wardependsontheconflictoutcome,whetheritendedbyadecisivemilitaryvictoryor

anegotiatedagreement.However,someresearchstatesthatmilitaryvictoryincreases

thechancesfordurablepeace,comparedtopeacethroughanagreement.Nilsson

(2012)alsoclaimsthatthecharacteristicsoftheconflictaffectthedurabilityofpeace.

Forexample,theconflictissue,intensityanddurationoftheconflict.Hartzell,etal

(2001)pointoutthatItispositiveforthepossibilitiesofsustainabilityiftheagreement

concludescivilconflictsoflowintensity,whichhavelastforextendedperiodsoftime.In

oppositesettlementsareleastlikelytoendure,whentheyfollowintenselyviolent

conflicts.Albin&Druckman(2011)alsounderlinethatchancesfordurablepeace

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dependsoftheconflictintensity,sincehighintenseconflictstendtonegativelyaffect

thedurability.

Furthermore,thememoryofhistoricalviolenceoftheconflictanditscauseshavetobe

addressedinthepeaceprocess,sincethisplaysacentralroleinanationoranethnic

group’sculturalidentity.Tojustforgetaboutthepastdoesnotworkasasolutionfor

peaceandhistoricaldialoguehastobecomepartofpeacebuildingandconflict

resolution.TheColombianexperiencemayprovideaninsightregardingtheprocessof

validatingpluralisticnarrativesandmultipleperspectivescontributingdirectlyto

confidencebuildinginthepeacenegotiationstohavepotentialrepresentingagrowing

nationalpoliticalculture.Similartohumanrightsadvocacy,thereisnoreasontoexpect

aquicksolutionthroughhistoricaldialogue,butitcanstillprovideaframeworkfor

cooperation,aspartofresolvingitstensionwithconflictresolution.Thereisaneedto

dealwiththepastandtreathistoryaspartofthepoliticalagendaduringconflict

resolution.Itisalsopreferabletoincorporateitasanintegralpartintopeace

negotiationsandpostconflictinstitutions(Barkan,2016).

2.2Theanalyticalframework:Factorsneededfordurablepeace

Whencomparingthefactorsneededfordurablepeace,researcherscomeupwithmany

points,butdonotnecessarilyagree.Theframeworkbelowsummarizesandcategorizes

thefactorsoutlinedintheliteraturedebateonfactorsthatinfluencesustainablepeace

agreements and is used as an analytical framework for this research. When factors

overlappingeachother,theyareputintheboxwheretheymakemostsense.Thefactors

willbeusedforresearchandaredividedintofourcategories.However,itwasnoteasy

tocategorize,sincemanyfactorsareoverlappingeachother.Ashortexplanationisgiven

forall four categorieshowdefining thedifferent factorsandwhy thoseare choosing.

Somefactorsoverlap,othersactuallydisagree.Thereisnoconsensusbelongallauthors

fornofactor.

21

Thegraphbelowiscreatedbytheauthor,fromtheaboveliteraturereview.

Politicalfactors Securityfactors

Justicefactors Historical

factors

Institutional

Design

Third

Parties

Power

Sharing

Outcome

Democratization Spoilers

Justice Causes

Inclusion Information

Asymmetries

Natural

Resources

Intensity

Exclusion Disarmament Victim

Policy

Duration

2.2.1Politicalfactors

Politicalfactorsaredefinedasfactorsrelatedtogovernmentpolicies,suchas

institutionaldesign,democratisationandinclusionorexclusionofpoliticalactors.Those

factorsarechosen,sincetheyarehighlyimportantforstableconditionsinthebuilding

ofastate.Regardingdemocracy,itcanalsobeseenasahistoricalfactor,affecting

durabilityofpeacebutitmademostsensetoputthisfactorinthisbox.Institutional

designisofcoursealsoimportantforsecurity,andoverlappingthatboxaswell.

2.2.2Securityfactors

Securityfactorsaredefinedasfactorsneededforastableandsecureenvironmentsuch

asthird-partyinvolvementbyotherorganisationsorstates,whichalsooverlappingthe

boxofpoliticalfactors.Regardingtheavoidingofinformationasymmetriesandspoilers

theycouldalsobeseenaspoliticalfactors.Theimportanceofdisarmamentbythefighting

partieswascleartoputinthesecurityfactorbox,sinceithighlyaffectingsecurity.

22

2.2.3Justicefactors

Justice factors are defined as power sharing, justice, equal distribution of natural

resourcesandvictimpolicy.Regardingnaturalresources,itcouldofcoursehavebeenput

inaseparateboxofeconomicfactors.Itishoweverputintheboxofjustice,sincethe

relationtoequaldistributionofresources.Powersharingalsofitsintheboxpoliticalor

securityfactors,butmakemoresenseasafactorforjustice.Victimpolicyalsooverlapping

thesecurityfactorbox.Naturalresourcesareanotherfactorhighlyaffectingsecurityas

well.

2.2.4Historicalfactors

Historicalfactorsaredefinedasfactorsconcerningconflicthistorysuchasoutcome,

causes,intensityanddurationoftheconflict.Thoseactuallyalsooverlappingwith

justiceandpoliticalfactors,butaremostlycorrelatedtothehistoryandthenput

togetherintheboxofhistoricalfactors.

23

3.Methodologicalframework

3.1Casestudy

Aclassiccasestudyconsistsofanin-depthinquiryintoaphenomenonthatiscomplex

andspecificinitsreal-worldcontext.Itshouldexaminethelikelyinteractionwhenthe

caseisinitscontext(Yin,2013).Thebasiccasestudyentailsthedetailedandintensive

analysisofasinglecaseorevent,andoftenfavourqualitativemethods(Bryman,2012).

Thecircumstancesforthisresearchprescribeaqualitativedeskstudyoverafieldstudy.

Itisqualitativesincetheresearchstrategyusedemphasizewordsratherthan

quantification.Adeskstudyfitsbest,sincetheaimisatheoreticalcontributionofan

analyticalframework,andthereisthennoneedgoingintothefield.Ijustapplyittoa

case.ThisiswhyIdoadesk,andnotafieldstudy.Thetopicistreatedasasinglecase

study,sinceitisthengiventheopportunitytogetadeepunderstandingofthespecific

topic,comparedlookingintomanycases.Itcouldhavebeenanideadoingso,butthen

ithadnotbeenpossiblegoingintodepthonallthecases.ThechoiceoftheColombian

peaceagreementasasinglecasemakesense,sinceitisthenewest,highly

transparentlysignedagreementgivenmuchattentionrecently.Furthermore,Colombia

isademocracy,andalotofinternationaladvisorswereincludedintheprocess.Ithen

assumethattheagreementwasmadebypeoplethatwereconsultingaboutthepeace

agreement,andwhoactuallyknowaboutthedebate.Itisalsothemostpossible

advancedcase,withanAugustandNovemberagreementandarenegotiation.

3.2Textanalysis

Themethodologicaltoolusedtoprocesstheinformationfromthesourcesistext

analysis.Frey,etal(1999)definetextanalysisasamethodtodescribeandinterpretthe

characteristicsofamessage,withthepurposetodescribethecontent,structure,and

functionsofthemessagescontainedintexts.Theselectionoftextstobestudied,

acquiringappropriatetexts,anddeterminingwhichparticularapproachtoemployin

24

analysingthemhavetobeconsideredwhenusingtextualanalysisasamethod.McKee

(2003)definetextanalysisasaway,methodologyanddatagatheringprocessfor

researcherstogatherinformationhowotherhumanbeingsmakesenseoftheworld.

Blattman&Miguel(2010)arguethatcasestudiesarecrucialtodecipherwar’scauses,

conduct,andconsequences.

3.3Sources

ApartfromtheAugustandNovemberPeaceagreementsitselfinSpanish,AcuerdoFinal

andAcuerdoNuevoFinal,therearenotanyprimarysourcesused.Thematerial

consultedarerelevantliterature,electronicsources,variouspress,journalsand

newspapers.Thechoiceofthosesecondarysourcesfocusedonthosestakeholderswho

wereinvolvedduringthepeaceprocess,suchastheColombianGovernment,WOLAand

CrisisGroup,thelatterwhichitspolicyrecommendationswereusedbybothFARCand

theColombianGovernment.ReportsfromCrisisGroup(2016)named“Reassembling

Colombia`srejectedpeacedeal”,“IntheshadowofNoPeaceafterColombia`s

plebiscite”and“Colombia`sFARCendits53-yearinsurgency”andfromWOLA(2016)

“Keychangestothenewpeaceaccord”contributedwithimportantbackground

information.Furthermore,factsregardingtheColombianconflictwereprovidedfrom

thecrediblesourcesofUppsalaConflictDataProgram,UCDP(2016)andtheSwedish

CivilProtectionandPreparednessAuthority,MSB(2016)aswell.Reportsfrom

internationalorganizationsHRW(2017)“Worldreport2017:Colombia”andUN(2016,

2017)named“AgreementontheBilateralfromPeacetoDemocratization:Lessonsfrom

CentralAmerica,andDefinitiveCeasefireandCessationofHostilities,andtheLaydown

ofWeaponsbetweentheNationalGovernmentandtheFARC-EP”and“Buildingsolid

FoundationforPeaceinColombiaand“Conflictandresources”Regardingsourcesinthe

debateondurability,thatservedasgroundfortheanalyticalframeworkdevelopedin

thisthesis,thosefocusedonpeer-reviewed,scientificarticlesbyprominent,

internationalauthors,PhD`sandprofessorsinthefieldofinternationalrelations,

negotiationsandpeaceandconflictresearchasfollowing:Albin&Druckman(2011),

25

Barkan(2016),Beharetal(1989),Borja(2012),Blattman&Miguel(2010),Druckman&

Wagner(2016),Freyetal(1999),González(2004),Gray(2008),Hartzell(2001),Joshi&

Mason(2011),Mattes&Savun(2010),Nilsson(2012),Paffenholz(2014),Pinzon(2017),

Rozema(2008),Rustad&Binningsbø(2012),Senese(1997),Simonsetal(2013),

Stedman(1994,1997,2001)andWalter(1999).Allthosesourcestogetherbroughta

solidgroundfortheresearch.

3.4Limitationsanddelimitations

SincealargepartofthematerialontheColombianpeaceagreementiswrittenin

Spanish,thelanguagebarrierisaweaknessandrisk.However,thearticlesusedinthe

debateregardingwhatmakespeacedurableareallwritteninEnglish,whichgetasolid

base.Thecircumstancesprescribeadeskstudywhenoperationalisingtheresearch.

However,usingjustthesingleColombiancaseisadelimitation,andalimitationinterms

ofgeneralizabilityoftheresults,butitisthengiventhepossibilitytogomorein-depth.

Furthermore,assaidoneobviouslimitationinthisresearchisthelanguagebarrier,

sincethepeaceagreementsiswritteninSpanishandmymothertongueisSwedish.

However,theagreementistranslatedbutitisanywayarisktodonotgettheright

context.Thiswillbebalancedthroughagoodtheoreticalandin-depthunderstandingon

thedebateondurabilityofpeaceagreementsasthemaincontributionoftheresearch.

SincewecannotactuallyseeifpeacewillprevailinColombia,thisthesisislimitedto

providingananalyticalframehatcanhelptoprovidethatservice.Wecannottoday

reallyprovethefactorsasrightorwrongondifferentcasesonforehandeither.

However,thiscanbedoneandevaluatedbyfutureresearch.Theotherauthors,those

whocameupwiththefactorsinthefirstplace,usedpeaceagreementsinorderto

providetheirfactors.Basedonthatthisthesisprovideapredictivetool.

3.5Ethicalconsiderations

Regardingresearchethics,thereisnoethicalissuestobeforeseenwhencarryingout

thisdeskstudyresearch.Thereisnotanypersonalinterviewsorethnographicstudies.

26

4.BackgroundtothecaseoftheColombianconflict

4.1Historyandoriginsoftheconflict

Thecolonizationofpresent-dayColombiabeganat1525.ThenamewasGranColombia

andincludedtodaysEcuador,VenezuelaandPanamauntil1819whentheygot

independencefromSpain(Gonzales,2004).ThenorthernpartofSouthAmerica

constitutedtheformerSpanishColonyNewGranada.In1830itcollapsedintothestates

ofColombia(Panamaincludeduntil1903)VenezuelaandEcuador.Therehassincethen

beenclashesbetweentheoppositepoliticalpartiesinColombia,theconservativesand

theliberals(UCDP,2017).Colombiagotit`snamein1886.TheConservativeandLiberal

partieslaunchedit`spoliticalprogramsin1848and1849,andtheConservatives

dominatedthepoliticsfrom1885to1930.Inthe1930stheLiberalPartylaunched

social,economicandpoliticalreformsaimedtomodernisethesociety.Buttheresult

wentouttheoppositeway,sincethosereformsinsteadcreatedanatmosphereof

polarisationthatpreparedthewayfortheexplosionoflaterviolenceinColombia.

DespiteitsdurationthereisnoconsensusonthecausesofthecomplexColombian

conflict,sinceithaschangedovertimeandarenotjustabouttwoopposingpartsora

singleissue.Theconflictinvolvesanumberoflocal,regionalandnationaldynamics,

differenthistoricalprocesses,structuralfactorssuchaspoliticalexclusionandsocio-

economicinequality,landsettlement,statebuilding,geographicdifferencesandthe

cocaproduction.Furthermore,twohistoricalphenomenaarefundamentalto

understandingtheColombianconflictwhichbothhavetheirrootsinthehistoryofthe

settlementofthecountryfromcolonialtimestillnowadays.Thefirstisthesocalled

campesinocolonisationofotherareas,whereColombiafailedtoimplementagrarian

reformtoredistributelandownership.Thepresenceofthecentralstate'sinstitutions

andinteractionwiththerestofsociety,andthenationaleconomywasthenminimal.

Secondly,thisdynamicwasreflectedinagradualstate-buildingprocess,wheredelayed

transpositionofterritoriesandpopulationsresultedinanunequalstatepresencein

27

theseregions.Sincethebeginningofthe16thcentury,itisthemostisolatedand

unavailableterritoriesweresettledbymarginalisedgroupsandtheorganisationof

socialrelationsthenwaslefttoindividualsandsocialgroups,sincethestatelackedto

makeit.Thecombinationofthecolonisationprocesswithit`sdependencyonlocal

powersmadetheintegrationofrecentlysettledterritoriesintotherestofthecountry

highlyconflictual.FromtheendofSpanishruleuntiltheconsolidationoftodays

Colombia,manyoftheruralandpoliticalstructuralproblemsthatcamefromfromthe

yearsofSpanishcolonydeepened(Gonzáles,2004).Therehavebeensomekeyfactors

thathavebeenfuellingtheviolentconflictinColombiasuchaseconomicforces,state

weakness,U.S.policies,long-durationandspin-offviolence,andmaliciousopportunism

bynon-combatants(Gray,2008).

4.2Theprocesstowardspeace50sto00s

4.2.1LaViolencia

WhenliberalleaderandpresidentaspirantJorgeEliécerGaitánwasassassinatedin

1948,violentfightingbrokeout.Theclashedwerebetweenthetwomajorpolitical

parties,theConservativesandtheLiberalsinparticular,butdifferentnon-statearmed

groups,socialists,privatearmiesoflandowners,bandit’speasantorganizations,and

liberalself-defencegroupsaswell(UCDP,2017).Intheperiodfrom1946to1953Itis

estimatedthat200,000werekilled,whichbecameknownasLaViolencia.Colombia

thengotaperiodofmilitaryrule,whengeneralGustavoRojasPinillatookpowerin

1953.HisgovernmenttriedtopacifythecountrythroughanamnestyfortheLiberal

fighters,butitsanti-communistattitudeinsteaddrewitintoconfrontationwiththe

guerrillas(Gonzales,2004).In1958ConservativesandLiberalsagreedonasystemof

powersharing,andaJointBoardnametheNationalFrontwasestablished.Butthe

powerdivisioncreatedpoliticalproblems,sinceallothergroupswereexcludedandthe

twomajorpoliticalpartiesnolongerneededtocompeteforpower.(MSB,2016).

28

4.2.2Theemergenceofleft-wingguerrilla

Theneedtoendtheconflictandthemilitarydictatorshipthatledtoanagreement

betweenthetwotraditionalparties,theConservativesandLiberals,wasfollowedby16

yearsofpowersharingtogether.Colombiathengotaperiodofstability,buttheprice

washigh.Thissincethepoliticalexpressionofnewlocalpowerswasprevented,which

ledtomoretensionsandtheappearanceofleft-wingguerrillamovementsinthe1960s

(Gonzales,2004).Thedifferentguerrillagroupsexpresseddemandsforsocialreforms,

andstartedarmedstruggleagainstthestate.(UCDP,2017).Theself-defencegroups

influencedbytheCommunistPartyinouterareasofcampesinocolonisation,werein

1966transformedintotheleft-wingFARCguerrillagroup(Gonzalez,2004)FARCwasthe

largestguerrillagroup,developedfromtheself-defencegroupsinruralareasunderthe

periodofLaViolencia.Theguerrillawithit`sheMarxist-Leninistideology,wereearly

supportedbytheCommunistregimeinMoscow.ThegoalofFARCwastooverthrowthe

regime,limitUSinfluenceinthecountryandimplementreformsintheagricultural

sector.However,itwasnotuntilthe1980sthatFARCwasconsideredaseriousthreat,

withstrengthenedmilitarycapabilitiesandabiggerrecruitment.Afterthefallofthe

SovietUnionin1991,FARC'sideologicalmotivationincreasinglydiminished(MSB,

2016).Duringthe1990sthesupportforFARCeroded,andmoreofthegroup'sfinances

werecomingfromthecocasectorandkidnapping(Gray,2008).Otherleft-wingguerrilla

groupsemergedinthe60`swereELN,foundedin1965,withitsoriginsinthegroupof

radicaliseduniversityInspiredbytheRevolutioninCubaandannouncingitsgoalof

overthrowingtheregime(MSB,2016).TheMaoist-influencedEPLwascreatedasthe

armedwingoftheLeninistCommunistPartyin1967.In1972,themoreurbanM-19was

formedinreactiontoperceivedelectoralfraudinthe1970elections.(Gonzales,2004).

29

4.2.3Drugtrafficking

ThemagnitudeofdrugcartelshasacentralroleinColombia'sviolenthistory.Alreadyin

thelate1960s,ColombiawasanimportantsupplierofmarijuanausedintheUnited

States.Thecentreofmarijuanaproduction,however,wasduringthistimeinMexico.

Duringthe1970sColombiatookoverMexico’sexportofMarijuanawith70%of

marijuanasmuggledtotheUnitedStates.WhenUSdemandforCocaineincreasedthe

tradedramaticallychangedthedrugindustry.Duringthe1980sand1990stherewere

twomajorassociationsofdrugcartelsinColombia,inMedellinandCali.Thecartelsalso

declaredwaronthegovernmentandthousandsofpeoplelosetheirlivesinthefighting.

OneofthemostnoticedattackswaswhentheMedellincartelbombedapassenger

planeintheairoverthecapitalBogotáinNovember1989killingall107passengers

(MSB,2016).Thecartelsweredefeatedinthemid-1990sbytheColombiangovernment,

withUSmilitarysupport.

4.2.4Lackofinstitutionaltrust

Theexpansionofillicitcropsinthe80`sledtothetransformationoftherelationship

betweentheguerrillasanddrugtrafficking.Somearguethattheviolenceafter1980

representsafundamentalrupturewithpreviousviolence.FARCwaslatercontrollingthe

productionandtraffickingofcocaandtheincomederivedfromillicitcropsincreased

theFARC’sautonomy,whichnolongerdependedonitsintegrationintotherural

communities.Atthesametime,thepenetrationofdrug-traffickinginColombiansociety

hascontributedtowidespreadcorruption.Theinfiltrationofthedrugtradefurther

deepenedthefragmentationofstatepowerandthecrisisoflegitimacy.Intheabsence

ofthestatetheconflictwasfurtherdevelopedandthepopulationwereleftwithouta

fixedsystemofinstitutionalreferences.Theythereforeresorttotheuseofterrorin

ordertoensuretheloyaltyofthecivilianpopulationandtodenytheadversarysupport.

TheColombianconflictcanthenbedescribedasawarthroughthirdparties,and

characterisedasawaragainstthecivilianpopulation(Gonzales,2004).

30

4.2.5Thegrowthofright-wingparamilitaries

Intheearly80`stheleft-wingguerrillasbegantoexpandtowardsricherareasmore

integratedintonationaleconomicandpoliticalstructures,andincreasedtheuseof

kidnappingandextortionasoneofit`smainfinancing.Inthisenvironmentright-wing

paramilitarygroupsemerged,inoppositetotheguerrillas(Gonzales,2004).The

Paramilitaryforceswerecreatedbylargelandownersanddruglordsinprotection

againsttheguerrillas.Tosomeextent,thosegroupsreceivedsupportfromlocal

politiciansandpeoplefromthearmy.(UCDP,2017).Theparamilitariesquickly

strengthenedtheirpowerandgotcontroloverincreasinglandsincentralColombia.

Frombeingaloosenetworkparamilitariesbegantogatherintoacommonorganization

inthe1990sandin1997,theColombianunitedself-defence,AUC,wasformed(MSB,

2016).TheaimwithAUCwasasanumbrellagroupforparamilitariesacrossColombia

(Gonzales,2004).Withinthedrugindustry,therewasalotofmoneyandtheAUCgrew

frombeinganorganizationwith850membersin1992toanarmedgroupwithmore

than8000membersin2001andwithpresenceinalmostallofColombia.TheAUChas

longbeenanimportantpartoftheconflictandwasresponsibleforalargepartofthe

violenceagainstcivilians(MSB,2016).AUCattackedandtriedtoaffectthethe

government,especiallyinthecaseofnotextraditingdruglordstoUSA.(UCDP,2017)

However,therehavebeenallegationsandstrongsuspicionsthat,infact,theysupported

theAUCandtheirstruggleagainsttheleft-handerssinceitwasfoundthatanumberof

politicians,policeandmilitaryworkerscollaboratedwiththeAUC(MSB,2016).Another

groupofparamilitariescreatedin1982,inresponsetoguerrillakidnappings,wasthe

groupnamedMAS.Itwascreatedbylandowners,politicians,militarypersonnel,

ranchers,businessmenandalargeoil-company.Thephenomenonofparamilitary

groupsbegantoextendacrossthecountryafter1984whenothergroupswerecreated

suchastheACCU(Gonzales,2004).Duringthe90´sparamilitarygroupsrose

dramatically.Theirobjectivesweretocontrolbusinesseswheretheycouldextractlarge

rents,andtodenytheleft-wingguerrillasaccesstothesameareas,targetingtheoil

refineryindustry,bananaexportandtheagriculturalbusiness(Gray,2008).

31

4.2.6Attemptsofpeacetalkswiththeguerrillas

Intheearly1980s,thegovernmentattemptedtonegotiatepeacetalkswiththe

guerrillagroupsinColombia(MSB,2016).ThisbytheformerColombianpresidents

AlfonsoLopezMichelsen(1974-1978)andJulioCesarTurbayAyala(1978-1982).

However,whenguerrillaattacksintensified,thelackofcredibilityofPresidentTurbay`s

effortsmadeanymeaningfulprogressimpossible.OnlyafterBelisarioBetancur(1982-

1986)wontheelection,comprehensivepeaceeffortswereundertaken,atatimewhen

thelegitimacyofthegovernmenthadsufferedseriously(Behar,etal,1989).However,

theinterestinceasefirewascoolamongtherebelgroupsandaseriousbacklashcame

in1985whentheM-19groupattackedthehighestcourtinBogotaandtookabout300

peoplehostage.Dramaendedsincethemilitaryintervenedandover100peoplelost

theirlives.Amongthedeadwere11prominentjudges.Thesmallerguerrillagroups

concludedpeacetalkswiththegovernmentintheearly1990s,buttheconflictescalated

yetuncontrolled.FARCandELNdidnotsignedanagreementandinsteadtheygrew

stronger.Atthesametime,theylosttheirmotivationinpeacetalkswhentheysaw

whathappenedtothearound5,000rebelsfromotherorganizationsdemobilizedinthe

early1990s.Thepoliticalpartiesformedfromthedemobilizedguerrillagroupshad

difficultyinreceivingsupportandthedisarmedrebelsbecametargetsforparamilitaries.

HundredsofdisarmedmembersfromColombianminorguerrillagroupswerekilledin

the1990s(MSB,2016).

4.2.7Peacetalkswiththeguerrillas

WhenAndrewPastranawaselectedPresidentof1998,hewasconvincedthathewould

resolvetheconflictinColombia,sincehealreadyhadestablishedgoodcontactswith

FARCleaderMarulandabeforehewaselectedaspresident.Anewperiodofpeacetalks

thenbetweenleadersofFARCandPastrana.Althoughthepeacetalksbetweenthe

FARCandthegovernmentweremorecomprehensivethanever,violencecontinuedto

increasesharplyinColombia,andtherewerealsobattlesbetweentheparamilitaryAUC

32

andFARC.Thereweremassacresofciviliansbybothgroups(MSB,2016).Political

violenceinColombiatookthousandsoflife’sandleavedmillionsdisplaced,andinthe

1990`sthetermcivilwarwereused(Gray,2008).Apeaceagreementwassignedby

presidentPastranaandFARCinJanuary2002,supervisedbyformerUNGeneral

SecretaryKofiAnnan.However,itsooncollapsedsincethepromisedstopof

kidnappingsandceasefireremained.PastranaaccusedFARCofbeingaterrorist

organizationandwithhelpfromthearmyhetookcontroloverthedemilitarizedzone

thatwereearlierestablishedduringthepeaceprocess.TheELNthenalsoleftthe

negotiations.(MSB,2016)TowardtheendofthePastranaadministrationin2002the

negotiationpositionprevailed,andtalkswiththeFARCwereended(Gray,2008).

4.2.8Disarmamentofparamilitaries

In2003,theAUCsignedanagreementwiththegovernmentwheretheypromisedtolay

downtheirweapons.Duringthethreeyearsofthedisarmamentprocess,about30,000

paramilitariesweredemobilized(MSB,2016).

4.2.9TheUribeera

ColombiagotanewpresidentwhenAlvaroUribewasvotedinthe2002election,with

promisestomakingwaragainstFARCtoimprovenationalsecurity.Aftersixyearsof

Uribe'shardlinerpoliciesitseemedthatthestrategysucceeded,sincetheFARCwere

weakerandsecurityimproved(Gray,2008).In2003UribeinitiatedaDDR-processwith

theparamilitaries,whichwasanewdeal,sincenegotiationsinthepastwereheldonly

withguerrillagroups(Rozema,2008).Uribepromisedthatthefightagainsttheguerrilla

wouldbeintensified,andasecuritytaxwasintroducedtofinanceit.Butparallelwith

thebattleagainsttheguerrilla,thegovernmentcontinuedtonegotiateasolution.A

prerequisitefornegotiationswasthatthegroupspromisedceasefire.(MSB,2016).

EveryColombianpresidentsince1982hasattemptedtoreachapeaceaccordwith

FARC.In2002Uribeinitiatedaseriesofoffensivemilitaryactionsthatledtoarecovery

ofterritorialcontrol,andarebuilttrustofcitizensintheirPublicForcesacrossColombia

33

(Pinzon,2017).TheAUCjoinedaceasefireinDecember2002andagreedtoto

demobilizein2003.However,FARCdidnotseemedtobeinterestedinnegotiations

withtheUribegovernment.AftertheAUCdemobilized,thenumberofdeadclearly

decreasedevenifsomemembersinsteadjoinedcriminalgangsdoingbusinessindrug

traffickingandoilsmuggling.InMay2004JanEgelandfromUNdescribedthesituation

inColombiaasthelargesthumanitariandisasterintheWesternHemisphere,since

manyofthedeathvictimsintheconflictcontinuedtobecivilians.Bothleft-wingersand

paramilitariesalsolargelyusedchildsoldiers,accordingtoreportsfromHumanRights

Watch.WhenColombiaexpandeditsmilitarycooperationwiththeUnitedStatesduring

thesummerof2009,itcontributedtoincreasedtensionsintheregion.Venezuelan's

formerPresidentHugoChavezsaidthatthepresenceoftheUnitedStatescouldleadto

warintheregion.TherewerestrugglesintheVenezuelanandEcuadorianborder

territory.ChavezwasinturnaccusedbyColombiaandUSAinautumn2009of

supportingFARCandrebuilditsmilitarycapacitybyimportingmilitarymaterialfrom

Russia.TheUnitedStatesgaveitssupporttotheColombiangovernmentthrough

millionsofdollarsinmilitaryaidtocombatdrugtrafficking(MSB,2016).

4.3TheSantoserabegin

WhenColombianpopulationreturnedtopresidentialelectionsin2010,thethreatof

waragainstChavezwasheavy.TheformerColombianministerofdefenceJuanManuel

SantoswontheelectionsandtookuphispresidencyinAugustthesameyear.Thefirst

actionwastodealwiththecurrentcrisiswithVenezuela.Hesolvedthecrisisthrough

negotiations,entrustedbyUNASUR.Thecountriesagreedtopeaceandinsteadwork

togethertoreduceFARC'spresence.However,theColombiangovernmentwerestill

fightingwiththeguerrillas,butwithreducedregionalpressurehecouldfocuson

domesticproblems.Inorderfornegotiationstobegin,thegovernmenthasmaintained

thatFARChastoreleasekidnappedprisoners.Anewmilitarystrategywasalsousedby

theColombiangovernment,whichaimedateliminateFARCleadersonmiddlelevel,

ratherthanaspreviouslylookingforseniorleaders.Thisledtothedeathofseveral

FARCleaders.Inaddition,FARCreleasedsomeprisonersfromthehostage(MSB,2016).

34

4.4Thecurrentpeaceprocess

AfterFARCforaperiodoftimesignallingtothegovernmentthattheywerewillingto

initiatepeacetalks,itbecamepublicinSeptember2012thatsecretnegotiationswere

takingplacebetweengovernmentandFARC.Afirstroundofnegotiationswas

establishedinOslo,Norway(MSB,2016).

In2012presidentSantosannouncedthatFARChadformallyagreedtonegotiatea

peacedealbasedonfivepoints:

• Rurallandreform

• PoliticalparticipationbyFARC

• Drugtraffickingandillicitdrugs

• Victim’srights

• Endoftheinternalarmedconflict

ThenegotiationswereholdinHavana,Cuba(Pinzon,2017).

Inlate2012thepeaceprocessisaccelerating,sinceitbecamepublicthatsecret

negotiationshadtakenplacebetweenthegovernmentandFARCinSeptember2012.

FollowingafirstroundofnegotiationsinOslo,theyweremovedtoHavana.InMay2013

itwasannouncedthatthenegotiationshadledtoabreakthrough,alandreform

agreement.InNovember2013,thenextsuccesscamewhenthepartiesagreedon

FARC'spoliticalrepresentation.Thenegotiationscontinuedin2014withtheissueof

illegaldrugtrafficking.Aspartoftheongoingnegotiations,FARCcalledforaone-sided

ceasefireinDecember2014.Inthebeginningof2015itresultedinreducedviolence

(MSB,2016).WhentheColombiangovernmentstruckarebelbaseinMay2015,FARC

declaredthattheceasefirewasbroken.Thisledtotheresumptionofbattlesbetween

thepartiesforafewmonths,untilanewceasefirewasestablishedinJulythesame

year.SantoswaselectedaspresidentforasecondruninJune2014,stillstrugglingfora

peaceagreementwithFARC.Duringthistimepreparatorytalksalsowereheldwiththe

left-wingguerrillagroupofELN,toagreeonanagendaforthesenegotiations.In2016,

35

thetalksfinallyledtoanagreementbetweenthepartiesonanagendaforfuture

negotiations.FurthernegotiationsbetweenthegovernmentandtheFARCinthe

autumnof2015ledtotheconclusionoftwoagreements.Oneonhowthejudicial

reviewofthoseinvolvedintheconflictisgoingtotakeplace,andanotherregarding

compensationofvictims.AdeadlinewasthensetforthefinalagreementuntilMarch

23,2016(MSB,2016).However,ittookuntil23June2016theColombiangovernment

andFARCannouncedaplantogather15.000formerFARCfighterstoaceasefire,

disarmingandbeingdemocraticintegratedinthesociety.Apeaceagreementwasthen

presentedonAugust242016,whichresolvedtherecentdisputesandintroduced

agreementspreviouslyestablishedtolaunchanambitioustransitionalsystem.It

addressedtoreduceareasinruralColombiafrominequalities,tofurtheropenupthe

country’sdemocracyand,withFARChelp,beginaprogramtoreplacecocawithlegal

crops.AnotheragreementbetweenFARCandtheColombiangovernmentwaslaunched

inOctober2016butitfailed.Anewandfinalagreementwasthenannouncedon12

November2016,includingnumerouschangesbasedonoppositionproposals.Contrary

totheoppositionchanges,therevisionswerebeyondcosmetic.However,numerous

implementationproposalswereadded,includingtheaccord’sfinancialstability,the

equalrightsbetweenmenandwomenandexplicitrespectforreligiousliberty.The

governmentandFARCarguedtheymadechangesto56ofthediscussed57topicswith

theopposition,excepttheFARCpoliticalparticipation.Afterfivedecadesofconflict

withmanydifferentpeaceprocessestheColombiangovernmentandtheformerFARC

guerrillasfinallysignedanagreement(Crisisgroup,2017).

4.5Thelastmonthsofthepeaceprocesses

InJanuary2016FARCwasaskingEUtoberemovedfromthelistofterroristgroups.

Colombia’scongressunanimouslyvotedinfavourofthecreationofspecialareaswhere

FARCguerrillascouldconcentrateintheeventofdemobilization,andUSthen

guaranteedprotection.TheFARCalsoinvitedColombia’sformerpresidentAlvaroUribe

36

tojointhepeacetalks.Publicsupportforapendingpeacedealhavecontinuedtogrow.

ColombianpresidentSantosandFARCleaderTimochenkosignedthedefinitebilateral

ceasefire,effectivelyending52yearsofhostilities.US,UNSecretaryGeneralBan-Ki

MoonandfiveLatinAmericanpresidentsattendedtheceremony.Colombianmilitary

thenbeguntakingcontroloftraditionalFARCterritoryintheareasaroundthecamps

wheretheguerrillaswereexpectedtodemobilizeanddisarm.InJuly2016multiplepolls

indicatedthatColombianswerevote“Yes”totheFARCpeacedeal.Thegovernmentand

theFARCkickedofapilotprojectthataimingtosettingthestandardforthecrop

substitutionprograms.InAugust2016presidentSantosandthegovernmentcoalition

formallykickedofthe“Yes”campaign.Ex-presidentUribeandhisDemocraticCentre

partyinthesametimelaunchedtheir”No”campaign.However,thefirstpollreleased

byDatexconowindicatedthatamajorityofColombianswereagainstthepeacedeal

withtheFARC.TheceasefirebetweenthestateandtheFARCthateffectivelytookeffect

oninJune,formallycameintoforce,whichwasmarkedtheformalendofhostilities

betweenthewarringparties.InSeptemberPresidentSantosannouncedthattheformal

signingofthepeaceaccordshouldbeonSeptember26inCartagena.Apollreleasedby

DatexcorevealedthatacomfortablemajorityofColombiansagainwerelikelytosay

“Yes”tothepeacedealintheOctober2referendum.Santosformallyhandedinthe

peaceagreementwiththeFARCtoUNsecretaryGeneralBanKi-mooninNewYork.

Worldleadersfromaroundtheglobecometogethertowitnessthesigningpfpeace

betweenthestateandtheFARCbyPresidentJuanManuelSantosandTimochenko,who

fromthencouldbecalledbyhisrealname,RodrigoLondoño(Colombiareports,2016).

37

4.6Thecriticlaunchedagainsttheagreement

The“No”-sideledbyColombianformerpresidentUribe,complainedaboutnothaving

anopportunitytoweighinmoreonthenewNovemberversionofthepeaceagreement.

TheSantosgovernmentarguedthatitwasnecessarytoquicklygettheun-demobilized

FARC-membersoutoftheirlegallimbo(WOLA,2016).The“No”supportersledbyUribe

accusedtheColombiangovernmentofgivingawaytoomanyrightstoFARC(The

WashingtonPost,2016).ThemaincriticismfromUribeandthe“No”-sidewerethe

impunityandpolitical-participationbyformerFARC-rebels,whoinmanycaseshave

committedseriouscrimesinthewar,butdespitethisfromnowonbeingabletositon

thesametable.TherewerealsocriticizedthatFARCwouldgettoomuchcontrolover

statelawsinColombia,andifitisreallyfeasiblemakingjusticeforvictimsanddisplaced

persons,sincetherearetoomanyofthemaffectedbythislongdurationconflict

(HuffingtonPost,2016).Furthermore,Uribe`sexpressedcriticsthatthepeaceaccord

wouldhurttheprivatesector,andwarnedaboutthattheamnestyofFARC-members

couldleadtothetakingoverofthecountrybyMarxistrebels(NewYorkTimes,2016).

38

5.FindingsThefollowingchapterconsistsofthekeypointsfromthe297-pageAugustPeace

AgreementnamedAcuerdoFinal(FinalAccord)andthemainchangesinthe310-page,

FinalNovemberAgreementNuevoAcuerdoFinal(NewFinalAccord).Summariesin

EnglishfromtheColombianGovernment,theindependentorganizationWOLAand

citationsfromtherealpeaceagreementtextswritteninSpanisharepresented.

5.1Summaryoftheaugustpeaceagreement

AccordingtotheFARC-EP(2017)thepeaceagreementwillledto“theterminationofthe

conflict,andtheconstructionofastableandlastingpeace”consistingofsixkeypoints.

• Item1:Rurallandreform

(AcuerdoFinal,2016,8-29).

• Item2:PoliticalparticipationbyformerFARCrebels

(AcuerdoFinal2016,30-49).

• Item3:CeasefireandDisarmamenttoendofviolence


• Item4:CombatingNarcho-traffickingandreducingillicitdrugs


• Item5:Justiceforvictimsoftheconflict


• Item6:Implementationandverification


39

5.1.1Item1-Rurallandreform

TheComprehensiveruralreformaimsatstrengtheningtheColombiancountrysideand

isnamedReformaRuralIntegral(RRI)andanagreementtoprovideland,loansand

basicservicestoruralpoorpopulation.Itincludesthreemillionhectaresoflandduring

thefirsttenyearsofcreation(AcuerdoFinal,2016:1.1.1,12).Itseekstoassurestate

presenceacrossthecountryandclosethegapbetweenthecountrysideandtheurban

areas.Furthermore,itwillimprovetheagriculturalindustry,protectenvironmentand

ensurefood.Thelandreformwillbeundertakennationwide,andcoverallruralareas,

butwithpriorityonzoneswithhigherpovertylevels,institutionalweaknessand

presenceofillicitcrops.Thespecifiedareasmainlytargetedisasbelow.

Landaccessanduse,creatingalandfundwith3millionhectaresoflanddisposalfora

10-yearfreedistributionforruralpeoplewithoutland,prioritizingruralwomen’s,

femaleheadsofhouseholdsanddisplacedpersons.(Colombiangovernment,2016).It

alsogivesanimprovedaccessforcredits,includesaplanforlandregistrationto

formalize7millionhectaresofland(AcuerdoFinal,2016:1.1.5,13).Furthermore,it

includesalandaccessprogrammewithroadways,healthcare,education,marketaccess

andhousing.Theprogrammewillalsopromotecitizenstoparticipateinthecreationof

territorialregulations(Colombiangovernment,2016).Farmerenterprisezonesnamed

ZonasdeReservaCampesina(ZRC)willstrengthenruraleconomyandfamily-run

business(AcuerdoFinal,2016:1.1.10,17).Alandregistrywillbeputinplace,for

productiveuseofland.Citizenparticipationwillbepromotedinthecreationof

territorialregulations.(Colombiangovernment,2016).Furthermore,itincludes

Territorial-baseddevelopmentprogrammesnamedProgramasdeDesarrollocon

EnfoqueTerritorial(PDET)willbeestablishedinareasthataremostaffectedbythe

conflictanddrugtrafficking,aimingtostrengtheninstitutions(AcuerdoFinal,2016:

1.2.1,17).ItalsoincludesNationalplansthatwillbeimplementedtoeradicating

extremepovertyandreduceruralpovertyby50%.Italsoaimstoreducingoverall

inequalitywithin10years(AcuerdoFinal,2016:1.3,19).Socialdevelopmentisalso

takenintoaccount,suchasinvestmentsininfrastructure,reconstructingoftherural

40

roadnetwork,powerandinternetservices,education,drinkingwaterservicesand

housing.Itaimingagreaterruralinclusioninthenationaleconomy(AcuerdoFinal,

2016:1.3.1,20).Aspecialisedsystemontherighttofoodfortheruralpopulation,

aimingstrengtheninglocalproductionandmarketsarealsointheagreement

(Colombiangovernment,2016).

5.1.2Item2-PoliticalparticipationbyformerFARCrebels

ThereintegrationofformerFARCrebelsinpoliticsaimstobuildpeaceandrequiresthe

democraticopportunitytostrengthenpluralismandpromotecitizenparticipationto

outlawviolenceasapoliticaltool.Acommissionwillbecreatedtodefineguidelinesfor

politicalpartiesormovementsinopposition.Furthermore,acomprehensivesecurity

systemfortheexerciseofpoliticswillbeestablishedforpreventionandprotection

measures.Anationalforumwillalsobecreatedtodiscussguidelinesforcitizen

participationinforexamplecommunityradioprojects,andguaranteesforsocial

protestsanddemonstrationsaswell.Anationalcouncilforreconciliationand

coexistenceWillaassistthegovernmentintheimplementationphaseoftheagreement

andforpublictransparency.Citizenparticipationwillbeexpandedthroughthe

compositionofterritorialplanningcouncils.Electoralparticipationandtransparencywill

alsobemeasuredwiththeaimtogreaterelectionparticipationandtransparency.

Finally,16new,temporarilyelectoraldistrictswillbeestablished,forthehouseof

representatives’elections,tomakesurethatzoneshardlyaffectedbytheconflictwill

getbetterparticipationwithstrengtheninstitutionalpresence.Insummary,thekey

pointsareasbelow(Colombiangovernment,2016).Guaranteesandrightsforexercising

politicaloppositionaregiven,withthepurposedefiningguidelinesforpoliticalparties

ormovementsinopposition.Promotionofpoliticalpluralism(AcuerdoFinal,2016:

2.3.1,44).TherearealsoSecuritywarrantiesfortheexerciseofpolitics,withregulatory

andinstitutionalamendments,measuringandfollow-up(Colombiangovernment,

2016).Furthermore,Democraticmechanismsthatpromotingparticipationofcitizens,

withguaranteesforparticipationinsocialprotestsanddemonstrationsareconsidered

41

(AcuerdoFinal,2016:2.3.5,47).Transparencywillbepromoted,andeffectivemeasures

forgreaterpoliticalparticipation,enhancingeducationalprogrammesanddemocracy

(AcuerdoFinal,2016:2.3.3,45).

5.1.3 Item3-CeasefireandDisarmamenttoendviolence

Theagreementonthebilateralanddefinitiveceasefire,cessationofhostilesandlaying

downofarmsconsistsofsevenkeypointsandisnamedCesealFuegodeHostilidades

BilateralYDefinite(CFHBD)ydejaciondearmas(DA).Thepurposeistoensurenational

securityandprepareforinstitutionalframeworkandreintegrationofformerFARC

rebelsintocivilianlife.TheDAprocedurewillbetransparentandcertificatedbyUN,

whichwillreceivetheweaponsfromformerFARCrebelsandthosewillinturnbeused

toconstructpeaceinColombia.WhenitisneededUNHCRwillalsocontributeon

securityissues.Furthermore,20transitionallocalzonesfornormalisationbeing

establishednamedZonasVeredalesTransitoriasdeNormalizacion(ZVTN)and6

transitionallocalpointsfornormalisationnamedPuntosTransitoriosdeNormalizacion

(PTN).Themainpointsareasbelow(Colombiangovernment,2016).

Atimelineofeventsduringthe180dayCFHBD&DAprocesseswithnecessarylogistics

andpersonneladjustmentswillbeestablished(AcuerdoFinal,2016:3.1,51).

RuleswillbewrittenforthegoverningofCFHBD&DAtoavoidsituationsjeopardisethe

fulfilmentoftheagreements,andensurethatthecivilianpopulationnotareaffected.

Furthermore,theagreementpointsoutMechanismsofmonitoringandverification,

namedtheMechanismodeMonitoreoyVerificacion(MM&V)aimingtofollow-up

compliancewiththeagreementonCFHBD,DAandverifythelayingdownofarms.Itis

constitutedthroughtheruleoflawandtheoperationofstateinstitutionsacross

Colombia(AcuerdoFinal,2016:3.1.1,51).Anothersecurityissueintheagreementisthe

deploymentsinthefieldandprocedureofmovementsofFARCunitstotheZVTNand

PTNzones,duringa180-dayperiod.Italsoincludescontrolofweapon,ammunitionand

explosives,settingupsectionstoensurethatnecessarysecurityconditionsare

consideredduringtheCFHBDandDAprocesses.Issusoflogisticsarealsotakeninto

42

account,accordingtotheZVTN,PTNandMM&VproceduresduringtheCFHBD&DA

(AcuerdoFinal,2016:3.1.6,58).ThelayingdownofarmsinthesocalledDAprocess,

willbeverifiedbyUNinatransparentprocess,aimingafinaldisposalofalltheFARC`s

weaponsinacompletedisarmament.ReincorporationofformerFARCmembersinto

societywillbedone,inaccordancewiththeirinterestsineconomic,politicalandsocial

matters.ThisaimingstrengthenthesocialfabricandlocaldemocracyacrossColombia.

Furthermore,theapproachwillbeequity-based,inagenderperspectiveemphasizing

women’srights(AcuerdoFinal,2016:3.2,61).FormerFARCmemberswillbe

reincorporatedandtransitionedintolegalpoliticallifeandstatus(AcuerdoFinal,2016:

3.2.1,61).Anannualallowanceforoperationalexpenseswillbegivenbetween2018

and2016with10%omthefundsforpoliticalpartiesandmovementsandanannual5%

allowanceforthedisclosureanddisseminationofitsplatformtill2022(AcuerdoFinal,

2016:3.2.1.1,63).Regardingtheissueofsocialsecurity,formerFARCmembersthat

fulfilthecriteriaoflayingdownofarmsandtransitionintocivilianlife,willreceive

economichelpfromtheColombiangovernmentbasedonthelistsubmittedbyFARC.

Thisprocessofeconomicandsocialreincorporationincludesafinancialsupportpackage

tostartasocially-productiveproject,withaconditionalmonthlysalaryfor2years.It

alsogivesaccesstotheColombiansocialsecuritysystem(AcuerdoFinal,2016:3.2.2.7,

67).Whenthefinalagreementissigned,twomembersfromtheColombiangovernment

andtwofromFARCwillconstituteaNationalreincorporationcouncilnamedConsejo

NacionaldeReincorporation(CNR)(AcuerdoFinal,2016:3.2,61,2016).Therearealso

agreementsonsecuritywarrantiesandagainstcriminalorganisations,suchasthose

criminalorganisationslabelledassuccessorstoparamilitaries(AcuerdoFinal,2016:3.4,

69).ANationalcommissionregardingsecuritywarrantieswillbeestablished,anda

specialjudicialunitandelitenationalpoliceaswell.Itwillalsobeacomprehensive

securitysystemforexerciseofpoliticsincludinginstitutionalamendment’sincluding

membersofthenewpoliticalmovementemergedfromFARC.Otherfactorsaiming

securityandprotectionacrossthecountryaremeasuringandpreventioninstruments

(ColombianGovernment,2016).TherewillalsobeInstrumentsofinstitutional

43

verification,controlandtransparency,forterritorialsupervisionandpreventing

measuresagainstcorruption(AcuerdoFinal,2016:3.4.11.1,86).

5.1.4 Item4-Combatingdrug-traffickingandreducingillicitdrugs

IntheagreementFARChadcommittedthedefinitestopregardingdrugproductionin

areasundertheircontrol,andfarmerswillbehelpedtoearnalivingfromlegalcrops

insteadofillicit.AcommitmentbetweentheColombiangovernmentandFARCtowards

thehistoricalclarificationoftherelationshipbetweenthearmedconflictandillicitdrugs

havethemainpointsasbelow(ColombianGovernment,2016).Firstly,asolutiontothe

problemofcropsmadeforillicitdrugproductionwillbeestablishedthroughthe

creationofaprogramnamedProgramaNacionalIntegraldeSubstituciondeCultivosde

UsoIllicito(PNIS)asachaptertotheRRI(AcuerdoFinal,2016:4.1.1,92).Furthermore,it

includessubstitutionandnon-replantingagreementstargetingruralfarmerscommitto

cropsubstitution,nonreplantingandnotengaginginanydrug-traffickingactivities.The

Colombiangovernmentwillimplementalternativesforgrowers,collectorsand

sharecroppersinanImmediateresponseplannamedPlandeAtencionImmediate

formulatedthroughaprocessofpublicconsultationnamedPlanesIntegralesde

SubstiticuionyDesarrolloAlternativo(PISDA)(AcuerdoFinal,2016:4.1.3.5,98).Small

growerswillbegivenalternativestoillicitdrugs,throughthearrangingoflegal

alternativesforandprioritizepropertyregistrationinareaswherePNISwillbeoperating

andalsoconductingade-miningprocess(AcuerdoFinal,2016:4.1.3.6,103).The

agreementalsoincludesevaluationandfollow-upofactionsforpublichealthtakenin

theareaofconsumptionofillicitdrugs,basedonahumanrightsapproachaimingpublic

awarenessthroughanewnationalprogramforcomprehensiveinterventionintodrug

use.Theprogramimplementsthestatepolicyagainstillicitdrugsonlocallevel(Acuerdo

Final,2016:4.2.1.2-3,106-107).Thefightwillbeintensifiedagainstcriminalsandasset

launderingatbothnationalandlocallevel,inasolutionagainstproductionand

commercialisationofillicitdrugs(AcuerdoFinal,2016:4.3,108).Withintheframework

ofUNandthroughregionaldialoguesincludingOAS,UNASURandCELACitsupportthe

44

undertakenofaninternationalconferenceandobjectiveevaluationandconsensusof

whatisneededregardingcounternarcoticpolicies.Thisaimingstrongercontrolbythe

stateregardingchemicalsusedfordrugproduction(AcuerdoFinal,2016:4.3.5,111).

5.1.5 Item5-Justiceforvictimsoftheconflict

Crimescommittedduringtheconflictwillbeaddressedinspecialcourts,andamnesty

willbegrantedforminoroffenses,butnotofmassacres,rapeandtorture.The

agreementregardingjusticeforvictimsismadeupfromjudicialandextra-judicial

mechanismsaimingachievemaximumrealisationofvictimsrights.Italsoaimstoensure

accountabilitywhathappenedintheconflict,facilitatingguaranteesfornon-repetition.

Comprehensiveness,Conditionality,UniversalityandParticipationarekeywords,where

victimswillparticipateinallprocesses.Thekeypointsareasbelow(Colombian

Government,2016).AComprehensivesystemwillbecreatedfortruth,justicenon-

repetitionandreparation,namedSistemaIntegraldeverdad,justicia,reparacionyno

repeticion(AcuerdoFinal,2016:5.1,115).Themechanismsofthesystemwillpromote

truth,coexistenceandnon-repetitionthroughacommission.Itwillhaveaterritorial-

basedapproach,seekingtherealisationandrecognitionofvictimsrights,ina

coexistenceacrossColombia.Itobjectivetocontributingtowardsthehistorical

clarificationofwhathappened(AcuerdoFinal,2016:5.1,117).Itpromotingcoexistence

acrossColombia,objectivesearchformissingindividuals,andrealisationoftruthand

rightsforvictims(ColombianGovernment,2016).Furthermore,aspecialjurisdictionfor

peacewillbeestablishednamedJurisdiccionEspecialparalaPaz(JEP)whichwill

exercisejudicialfunctionsfulfillingthedutyoftheColombianstateagainstcrimes

committedduringtheconflict(AcuerdoFinal,2016:5.1.2,131).Itisclaimedinthe

agreementthattherewillnotbeanypardonforcrimesagainsthumanity,genocide,

seriouswarcrimes,kidnappings,torture,recruitmentofminors,sexualviolence,etc.

Sanctionswillbereceivedforthosewhodecisivelyparticipatedinthemostserious

crimesandrecognisetheirresponsibilityobligatedtocarryoutpublicworksand

reparationefforts.TheJEPwillbecreatedbymagistrateschosenbyacommitteeof

45

delegatesrepresentingthecriminalchamberoftheColombiansupremecourtofjustice,

UN,theinternationalcentrefortransitionaljusticeandthepresidentoftheEuropean

courtofhumanrightsandthestateuniversitysystem.Comprehensivereparation

measuresforpeacebuildingpurposeswillbeestablishedbythestatethroughthe

Comprehensivevictimreparationprogramme.Italsoaimstostrengtheningtheprocess

ofcollectivereparationwithterritorial-baseddevelopmentprogrammes,land

restitutionprocessesandsocialcarepromotingsocialcoexistence.Commitments

regardingissuesofhumanrightsisdutybytheColombiangovernment,andFARCas

wellintheirtransitiontolegalpoliticallifeinapeacefulsocialcoexistenceacross

Colombia(Colombiangovernment,2016).

5.1.6Item6-Implementationandverification

Inordertoguaranteeimplementationandverificationoftheagreementmechanisms

areestablishedforproperimplementation,monitoring,measuringandverifyingof

compliancethroughthepointsasbelow(Colombiangovernment,2016).Itwillbea

ImplementationandmonitoringCommission,forfollow-up,verificationandadispute

resolutioncommissionforthefinalagreementnamedComisiondeimplementacion,

seguimientoyverificaciondelacuerdofinaldepazylaresoluciondediferencias(CSVR)

(AcuerdoFinal,2016:6.1.3,173).IntheCSVRprocess3memberseachfromthe

ColombiangovernmentandFARCwillcontribute.Itwillorganiseasystemofterritorial

andthematiccommissionswithbroadcitizenparticipation(AcuerdoFinal,2016:6.1.7,

175).TheCSVRcouncilwillalsoestablishaframeworkplanfortheimplementationof

theagreement,runningfor10yearsaddressingspecificneedsforwomanandapplying

anethnic-sensitiveapproach.Four-yearplansforimplementationofthefinalagreement

willbeincludedinthenationaldevelopmentplan,PlanNacionaldeDesarrollo(PND)

preparedovertwopresidentialperiods(AcuerdoFinal,2016:6.1.1,172).

46

5.2.Thereferendum

OnJuly18,2016theConstitutionalCourtinColombiaapprovedtheholdingofa

nationalplebiscitetovalidatethepeaceagreement(ElTiempo,2016).Thefirst

agreementbetweenColombiangovernmentandFARCweresignedonAugust24(Crisis

group,2016).Inaugust2016theColombiangovernmentrevealsthequestionaskedin

thereferendumthatseeksratificationoftheFARCpeacedeal:“Doyousupportthefinal

agreementtoendtheconflictandtheconstructionofastableandlong-lastingpeace?”

(Colombiareports,2016).Theaimofthevotewastogetadirectapprovalorrejection

byvotersoftheagreementssignedSeptember27,2016betweentheColombian

governmentandtheFARC(ElComercio,2016).TheColombianpeaceplebiscitewasheld

onOctober2,2016toratifythefinalagreementontheterminationoftheColombian

conflictbetweentheColombiangovernmentandtheFARCguerrillas(Elmundo,2016).

50.2%werevotingagainstitand49.8%votinginfavourfortheagreement(BBC,2016).

Theoutcomeoftheplebisciteon2Octoberclearlystrengthenedtheopposition,with

ex-presidentUribeasthefrontperson.Manyexplanationsweregivenforthevote.One

explanationwasthatUribebackersingeneralweremoreinclinedtovotethanother

groups,andthattheplebiscitewasidealformobilisinghisright-wingcommittedbase,

fearsColombiaturningintoaleft-wingruledstatelikeVenezuela.Votersconcerned

aboutthegenderideology,werealsoingeneralvotedagainsttheagreement.However,

inareaswithhigherconcentrationsofvictims,highpovertyrates,andinruralareas,the

“yes”votewerestronger.Butinbig,formerlyconflict-affectedcitiessuchasMedellin

andBucaramanga,amonginhigher-incomebracketsthe“No”sidegotvotes,sinceit

irritatedpeoplethatmembersofanillegalarmedgroupwouldreceiveoverlygenerous

benefits.TheyalsofearthatthecountrywouldbehandedovertoFARC.However,the

opposition’svictoryinthereferendummeantitsproposalsforanewagreementhadto

beseriouslytakenintoaccount,iftheprocessshouldhavethepossibilitiestogofurther,

despitetheresult.Politicalandsocialactorswhoactivelyopposedtheoriginal

agreementhandedintheirproposedchanges,shortlyaftertheplebiscite.Afterthatit

asthreerenegotiations,onthreenegotiationprocesses.Thefirstwasbetweenthe

47

oppositionandgovernment,thesecondwithcivilsocietysupportersofthepeace

agreementandthegovernmentandthethirdnegotiationwasbetweenthegovernment

andtheFARC.Thesecondandfinalagreementwasannouncedon12November

includedalotofchanges,whichwerebasedonoppositionproposals(CrisisGroup,

2016).

5.4ComparisonbetweentheAugustandNovemberagreements

AftertheresultsoftheOctoberplebiscite,theColombiangovernmentheldanumberof

meetingswithrepresentativesfromthesectorsof”No”-votersinsocietytakinginto

accounttheirconcernsonthePeaceAgreement.However,thegovernmentalsohelda

lotofmeetingswithsupportersfromthe”Yes”sideoftheagreement,includingvictims

oftheconflict,indigenouscommunities,organizationsandpeoplefromtheprivate

business.FARCalsohadaseveralmeetingswithdelegationsinHavana.Thosemeetings

resultedinanumberofimportantchanges,adjustmentsandprecisionsinthetextof

theoriginalAugustPeaceagreementtothesigningofthenewandfinalNovember

Agreement.TheColombiangovernmentbelievesthatthechanges,adjustmentsand

precisionsmadestrengthenthePeaceagreementsignificantlyandthebasetobuilda

stableandlastingpeace(Colombiangovernment,2017).

Thenewpeaceagreementwasproducedonly41daysaftertheOctober2plebiscite,by

Colombia’sgovernmentandtheFARC,releasedonNovember15,2016.The

governmentand“No”supportersledbyformerpresidentUribecameupwitha

documentoutliningmorethan500proposedchangesontheoriginal297-pagepeace

accord.Belowisasummaryofsomekeychangesinthenew310-pageagreement.

Firstly,duetoColombia’scurrentfinancialsituation,thenewaccordextendsby5years

from10to15yearsfortheruraldevelopmentplan.Therearealsochangesregarding

thecreationofspecialcongressionaldistricts,whicharenowmeanttobeoccupiedby

representativesofvictimsinsteadofformerFARCmembers.Italsoreducescampaign

financeassistancetotheex-FARCpoliticalparty.Changesregardingdrug-trafficking

48

chargesagainstformerFARCmembersarealsomade.Thosewillinthenewagreement

willbedecidedcasebycasedependinghowthemoneyearnedwerespent.

Furthermore,penaltiesforthosefoundguiltyofwarcrimesarespecifiedmoreclearlyin

thelatteragreement.Finally,theFARChadsuggestedtheaccordtobeviewedasequal

totheColombia’sconstitution.ThishadinlegaltermsworkedasaguaranteeforFARC,

thatitcouldnotbeingchangedbythegovernment.However,thefinalagreementwill

notbeapartoftheColombianinstitution,whichmeansthatFARChavetotrustthe

Colombiangovernmentholdontoitscommitment(WOLA,2016).

5.4.1Item1-Rurallandreform

Thenewaccordextendsby5yearsfrom10to15yearsasthetimetableforinvestments

inruraldevelopmentprograms(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,23).Italsospecifiesthat

thesocalledcadaster,anationwidemappingoflandholdingsforeseenintheaccord,

willhavenoeffectonpropertyvaluationsusedtocollecttaxeswhichwasanissuefor

rurallandownersinthefirstagreement(WOLA,2016).

5.4.2Item2-PoliticalparticipationbyformerFARCrebels

Changesweremaderegardingthecreationofspecialcongressionaldistrictsforzones

thatwerehithardestbytheconflict(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,54).Ex-FARCmembers

maynotrunascandidatesfortheseatsinthenewrecord,whichareinsteadmeantto

beoccupiedbyrepresentativesofvictimsandsocialmovements(WOLA,2016).

5.4.3Item3-Ceasefireanddisarmamenttoendofviolence

Thenewaccordreducescampaignfinanceassistancetotheex-FARCpoliticalparty.

(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,69).Itisreducedfrom10percentofpubliccampaign

fundingbetween2018and2026inthefirstaccord,totheaverageamountgivento

partiesandpoliticalmovementsinthelatteragreement(WOLA,2016).

49

5.4.4Item4-Combattingdrug-traffickingandreducingillicitdrugs

Alldemobilizingguerrillasmustinthenewaccordprovidedetailedinformationabout

thegroup’srelationshiptothedrugtrade(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,101).However,

thiscanputthemindangerandbeingtargetedasso-calledsnitchersbycriminals

(WOLA,2016).Chargesagainstex-FARCmembers,willinthenewaccordbedecided

casebycase,todeterminewhethertheproceedstrulywenttotheguerrillawarefforts

ornot(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,190).Thenewaccordclaimsthatifthedrug-trade

onlypaidforguns,food,andsimilarneeds,participationmaybeamnestied,butifitin

oppositeisevidenceofpersonalenrichment,itwillbesubjecttocriminalprosecution

(WOLA,2016).

5.4.5Item5-Justiceforvictimsoftheconflict

Penaltiesforthosefoundguiltyofwarcrimesarespecifiedmoreclearlyinthefinal

agreement(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,164-5).TheJEPsetuptotrywarcrimeswillbe

alittlereduced.Itwillnowhave10yearstooperate,withthepossibilityofadding5

moreyears(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,145).AnothersmallchangeisthatItwillhave

noforeignjudgesamongits38magistratesand13auxiliaries,comparedwith10foreign

legalexpertsasobserversintheAugustagreement(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,016,167-9).

Thetribunaljudge’srulingscannowbeappealedtoColombia’sConstitutionalCourt

(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,160-1).Thenewaccordtightensuptheconceptof

responsibilityforwarcrimes(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,151-2).Thenewagreement

holdsresponsibleforwarcrimesallcommanderswhoshouldhaveknownaboutthe

crimes,giventhepositionheorshehad.Thenewaccordalsoexcludesfromtransitional

justicethosewhocommittedwarcrimesforpersonalbenefits(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,

2016,149).Militarypersonnelinvolvedinsocalledfalsepositivekillings,wheretheygot

bonusesforkillinginnocentpeoplethattheyfalseclaimedasguerrillas,willthroughthe

changeinthenewaccordnotgetshortersentences.Thosepersonsshouldinsteadstay

inColombia’sregularjusticesystem(WOLA,2016).Thenewaccordsharpensup

languageongenderequity(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,192).

50

5.4.6Item6-Implementationandverification

AnotherchangeisthattheNovemberaccordwillnotbecomeapartofColombia’s

constitution(NuevoAcuerdoFinal,2016,277-8).Theoriginalaccordcontemplatedits

gainingconstitutionalstatusviaaninternational-lawmanoeuvre.Proponentsofthe

“No”voteviewedthefirstagreementasa297-pageback-doorconstitutional

amendment.Therevisedaccordinsteadonlygivesconstitutionalstatustopartson

humanrightsandinternationalhumanitarianlaw.TheFARChadfirstlysuggestedthe

accordtobeviewedasequaltoColombia’sconstitution,asaguaranteeforits

commitment.(WOLA,2016).

5.5Thecurrentstatusonimplementationofthefinalpeaceagreement

TheFARChasinthemiddleof2017finishedthehandoverofover7,100weaponstothe

UNMission,makinganimportantstepintheimplementationofthepeaceagreement.

However,majorchallengesstillremain.Accordingtotheagreementthedestructionof

remotearmsdumpsshouldbedonebefore1:stofSeptember.Anotherissueisthe

reintegrationofex-combatants,andpeaceprocesseswithotherarmedgroupssuchas

ELN.Thenextstepistoensuresecurity,andthereintegrationofformerFARC

combatantsintocivilianlife.TheFARC’sproposalthatitsfightersremaininareasof

Colombiacharacterisedbypoverty,badinfrastructureandlackofmarkets.Finally,the

peaceagreementstillfacesseriouspoliticalresistance,andwiththeelectionsscheduled

nextyear,theycouldsoonhavetheopportunitytochangetheircase.Furthermore,

currenttrendsregardingcocaproductionwitnessingrecord-highcocacultivationlevels,

whichcriticstothepeaceagreementhavelinkedtothepeaceprocess.Theagreement

insteadaimedsubstitutionofillicitcropsforlegal.Thetransitionaljusticemechanismin

thesocalledSPJ-processneedstodemonstrateitismakingadifferenceandenforcing

accountability.Theupcoming2018electionswillalsoaffecttheimplementation,inone

wayoranotherdependingontheresult.Thecrisisintheneighbouringcountryof

VenezuelaisalsoariskfornegativeimpactonColombia(CrisisGroup,2017).

51

6. AnalysisIntheanalysischaptertheanalyticalframeworkisused,analysinghowthepolitical,

security,justiceandhistoricalfactorsactuallyapplytotheagreementornot.Hereitwill

begivenananswertothemainquestion:iftheColombianpeaceagreement,asitwas

finallynegotiatedinNovember,haspromisetobedurable,basedonthosefactors.It

willbeinvestigatedfactorbyfactoriftheColombianagreementaredurable,according

totheanalyticalframework.

6.1Politicalfactors

Institutional

Design

Democratization

Inclusion

Exclusion

Basedontheanalyticalframework,theinstitutionaldesigninColombiaislikelytoaffect

theconditionsfordurabilityontheColombianagreementnegatively,whilethe

democracytradition,andmanagementof,includedandexcludedactorsinthe

agreementtalksinfavourfordurability.

RegardingDemocratization,theDemocracytraditionwaspointedoutbyresearchersas

apositivefactorfordurability.Colombiahasatraditionofdemocracy,exceptofashort

periodoftime.Therewasareferendumandrenegotiation.Thisispositivefordurability.

Manyoftheoppositionsconcernswereincludedinthefinalagreementinademocratic

process.Thisispositiveforthedurabilityoftheagreement,sincetensionsprobably

decreasedthankstotherenegotiations.ThereincorporationofformerFARCmembers

intosocietyaimsatstrengtheningthesocialfabricandinstitutionsacrossColombiaand

contributetolocaldemocracy.EventhoughthepoliticalparticipationbyFARCisnot

52

popularbytheopposition,thisaccordingtotheanalyticalframeworkalsoincreasingthe

chancesfordurability.Furthermore,theinstitutionaldesignaffectsthechancesfor

durability.Governmentcontroldowntocommunitylevelistoprefer.Weakinstitutions

makeithardtoimplementanagreementandgetitsustainable.Whenlookingatthe

ColombianagreementtheRRIRurallandreformseekstomakestatespresenceacross

thecountryandclosethegapbetweenthecountrysideandtheurbanareas,and

conceivesvariouscommunitiesacrossColombiatoplayaleadingroleinthereform.Itis

apriorityonzoneswithhigherpovertylevels,institutionalweaknessandpresenceof

illicitcrops.Anotherexampleisthenew,temporaryelectoraldistrictswhichwillensure

betterparticipationwithstrengtheninstitutionalpresence.Researchersalsopointedout

thatinclusionofalargespectraofthesociety,andcivilsocietyactorssuchaswomen’s

organizationswillpreferablybegivenaroleinpeacesettlements.Thisissatisfyingfor

durabilitysincetheColombianagreementinmanypartsfocusingonwomen’srightsand

empowerment,althoughthefirstversionoftheagreementfocusedevenmore.The

empowermentofwomenhavesucceededinmanyotherpoor,conflictpartsinthe

world,soprobablyitwillinColombiaaswellifitworkasintendedintheagreement.

Therurallandreform,forexample,prioritizesruralwomen,femaleheadsofhouseholds

anddisplacedpersons.Furthermore,thereincorporationofformerFARCmembersinto

societywillhaveanequity-based,genderperspective,emphasizingwomen’srights.

Thedebateamongresearchersalsopointoutthatthereisimportanttolookatexclusion

ofactors.IntheColombiancasethiscouldbeotherguerrillagroupssuchasELNandthe

stillexistingparamilitarygroups,whichshouldbehandledcarefullynottakingover

areaspreviouslyruledbyFARC.Especiallyregardingdrugproduction,thereisariskthat

thevacuumcreatedwhenFARChopefullyquititsengagement,willleadtoviolence

amongother,excludedgroups.However,thereintegrationofformerFARCrebelsin

politicsstrengthenspluralismandpromotecitizenparticipationtooutlawviolenceasa

politicaltool.DiscussionswithELNisforexamplealsocurrentlyongoing.Inthe

Colombianagreement,acommissionwillbecreatedtodefiningguidelinesforpolitical

partiesormovementsinopposition.Thisisalsosatisfyingfordurability,sinceaconcern

53

fromtheoppositionwerethatFARCwillgrewtoostrongandtakingcontrolover

Colombia.Thenationalforumwillalsobecreatedtodiscussguidelinesforcitizen

participation,andguaranteesforsocialprotestsanddemonstration.Whenlookinginto

Colombia’shistorythisisalsosatisfying,sothesamemistakeasinthe60`swhenthe

politicaloppositionwasexcluded,tensionsincreasedandguerrillagroupsemerged,is

notrepeated.Summarizingthepoliticalfactors,thefinalpeaceagreementclearly

includescivilsocietyactors,onalocallevel.Thankstotherenegotiationtheconcerns

fromtheoppositionalsowhereseriouslytakenintoaccountaswellinthenew

agreement.TheColombiangovernmentwillprovideeconomicandsocialhelpaimedat

reincorporatingformerFARC-membersintosociety.Ifworkedasaimeditmightbe

predictedtoachievethosegoals,whichinthatcasepossiblywillhaveastabilizing

effect,strengthentheinstitutionsandthendurability,basedontheanalytical

frameworkused.However,itwillbeveryhardtoimplement,especiallyinhard-

accessible,poorruralareaswithlowstatecontrolandtrust.TheRurallandreform

includesalandaccessprogrammewithroadways,healthcare,education,marketaccess

andhousing,whichalsowillstrengtheninstitutions,ifitsucceeds.Itmightbepredicted

toachievethosegoals,basedontheanalyticalframework,butweactuallydonotknow

yet.

Thedifferentprogramsinthefinalagreementaimingstrengthentheinstitutionsin

Colombiaareprobablyverydifficulttoestablish,sinceColombia`shistorywithlackof

institutionaltrustinmanyareas.Thereisthenariskforfurtherinstitutional

weaknesses.Thisisnotgoodforthedurabilityoftheagreement.Citizenparticipation

willbepromotedinthelandregistryandcreationofterritorialregulations.The

territorial-basedPDETdevelopmentprogrammes,aimingtostrengtheninstitutions,will

contributetothedurabilityifitsucceeds,buttheimplementationwillnotbeeasy.

Thereareworriesifthisisreallygoingtowork,inforexampleruralareaswithlowstate

controlandtrust,whereformerFARCguerrillassometimeshaveruledfordecades.Even

thoughColombiainmoderntimemostlyhasahistoryofdemocracy,thecentral

54

governmentandinstitutionshasbeenweak.Tosumuptheaimingofstrengthenthe

institutionaldesignisintheagreement,butitwillbehardtoimplementinreality.This

canpossibleaffectthedurabilitynegatively.Ifthecentralgovernmentcannotgivequick

andconcreteresultsintheRurallandreforminformsofofjobs,betterinfrastructure,

economichelpandprofitablecocasubstitutioncrops,thedurabilitycouldbeonthinice

sinceitthencontributestofurtherinstitutionalweakness.Therurallandreformhasto

makequickresultsforthedurabilityoftheagreement,whichnotwillbeeasy.The2018

Colombianelectionwillbeimportantforhowthepoliticalfactorsaffectthedurabilityof

theagreement,andhowtheimplementationoftheagreementrunswillinoppositealso

affectthepoliticalfactors.Thereisalsoariskofapossiblespill-overeffectfromthe

chaosinVenezuela,affectingtheimplementationoftheColombianpeaceaccord

regardingboththepoliticalandsecurityfactors.Thecountrieshaveacommonhistory.

6.2Securityfactors

Thirdparties

Spoilers

Information

Asymmetries

Disarmament

Theinvolvementofthirdparties,suchasUN,inthedisarmamentprocessandthe

transparencyofthefinalpeaceagreementandthepeaceprocessitself,talksinfavour

fordurability.Inoppositethespoilerbehaviourfromtheoppositiontalksagainst,since

itislikelytoaffecttheimplementation,andthendurability,ofthepeaceaccord

negatively.

Researcherspointedoutthatmanagementofspoilersareessentialfordurability.The

Colombianagreementandpeaceprocesshavedifferentkindsofspoilers.Themost

prominentisthe“No”-voter’soppositionledbyex-presidentUribe.However,sincethe

renegotiatedagreementtakesintoaccountmanyoftheconcernsfromthespoilers,it

55

mustnotbebadforthefinalagreementsdurability.Itmayevenbesaidthatthe

renegotiated,finalagreementisstrongerthanthefirstone,thankstothespoilers.

However,itdecreasesthechancesfordurabilitywhenspoilersareinvolved,sincethere

isariskthatSpoilersnegativelyaffecttheimplementationoftheagreement,andthen

durability.Furthermore,Naturalresourcesemboldenspoilerbehaviour,whichisalsoa

riskintheColombianagreement.Anothersecurityfactorpointedoutbyresearchers

affectingdurabilityistheinvolvementofthirdpartiesgivingastabilizingeffect,helping

toverifyandenforcethedemobilization.Thisespeciallywhenthirdpartiesprovide

securityguaranteesduringthedisarmamentprocessanddemobilizingphase.When

lookingattheColombianagreementthisissatisfying,sincethefinalagreementinclude

muchofbothlocal,regionalandinternationalthird-partyinvolvement.Themost

prominentexampleofinternationalthird-partyactorinclusionisintheCHFBDandDA

agreementsonthebilateralanddefinitiveceasefire,cessationofhostilesandlaying

downofarms.ThisaimingafinaldisposalofalltheFARC`sweaponsinacomplete

disarmament,withthepurposetoensurenationalsecurityandpreparingfor

institutionalframeworkandreintegrationofformerFARCrebelsintocivilianlife.Itis

verifiedbyUN,inatransparentprocess.Despitesomedelays,thisprocesshasworked

outwell.AnotheristhehelpwithsecurityissuesfromUNHCR.TheJEPsystemforjustice

alsoincludethird-partyinvolvementfromUNandtheinternationalcentrefor

transitionaljustice,makingpressureontheimplementation,andthenpositivelyimpact

thedurabilityoftheagreement.Thehighinvolvementofinternational,thirdpartiesis

satisfyingfordurabilityoftheagreement.Researchersalsoarguethatcombatantsshall

disarmfully.ThedisarmamentofFARCisagoodexampleandthenpositivefor

durabilityoftheColombianagreement.Anothersecurityfactorthatresearcher’spoint

outasimportantfordurabilityistheavoidingofinformationasymmetriesbetweenthe

previouscombatantsoftheconflict.WhenlookingattheColombianagreementthisis

consideredsincetransparencyisakeywordusedinthefinalagreement.Forexample,

willanationalcouncilforreconciliationandcoexistencebeestablishedforpublic

transparency.Anotherexampleisthatelectoralparticipationandtransparencywillbe

56

promotedandmeasured.TheDAprocedureistransparentaswell,andcertificatedby

UN.Thisissatisfyingfordurability.

6.3Justicefactors

Powersharing

Justice

Natural

Resources

Victim

Policy

Basedontheanalyticalframework,Colombia`sbigassetsofNaturalresourcesinforms

ofillicitcropsforcocaproduction,riskstojeopardisethedurabilityofthepeaceaccord,

Inoppositethevictimpolicy,justiceandpowersharingagreementsinthefinalaccord

talksinfavourfordurability.

Researcherspointedoutthatpolitical,territorialandmilitaryformsofPower-sharing

positivelyaffectdurability.Thelargersizeofthegoverningcoalition,thegreater

chancesforpeacetobedurable.Expandingthesizeofthegoverningcoalitioncreates

strongerincentivesforformerrivalstosustainpeace,sinceitisthentoocostlyandrisky

returningintoarmedconflictagain.WhenlookingatthefinalColombianaccordthisis

promisingdurability,sinceoneofthesixcornerstonesisthepower-sharingagreement

betweentheColombiangovernmentandFARC.Italsoincludesterritorialpower-

sharing,informsofdecentralizedgovernanceinmanyways.Forexample,regardingthe

socalledCSVRprocessintheimplementationphaseoftheagreement.Anotherexample

isthePDETdevelopmentprogrammesintheRRIRuralReform.Citizenparticipationwill

alsobepromotedinthecreationofterritorialregulations.Furthermore,Justiceand

Victimpolicyareotherfactorspointedoutbyresearchersasimportantfordurabilityof

peace.OneofthesixkeypointsintheColombianagreementistheJusticeforvictims.

57

Thefinalpeaceagreementincludesjusticefactorsasoneofthesixcornerstonesinthe

so-calledJEPprocess,wherecrimescommittedduringtheconflictwillbeaddressed

throughacommissioninspecialcourts,aimingachievemaximumrealisationofvictims’

rights.ItpromotingcoexistenceacrossColombia,objectivesearchformissing

individuals,andrealisationoftruthandrightsforvictims.Italsosharpensthesentences

forwarcrimesandpersonsinvolvedindrugtradeforpersonnelenrichmentand

militariesinvolvedsocalledfalsepositivekillings.Allthosefactorstogetherare

satisfyingregardingthedurabilityoftheagreement.Thecriticsfromtheopposition

regardingthatformerFARC-membersthatcommittedseriouscrimeswillgetimpunity

tooeasily,musthoweverseriouslybeingtakentoaccountduringthejusticeprocess,in

ordernottocreatefurthertensions.Itcanalsobequestionedregardingthepossibility

ofcreatingafairjustice,sincetherearetoomanyvictims.Furthermore,researchers

pointedoutthatthereisanegativecorrelationbetweenNaturalresourcesand

durability.ThisisabigchallengefortheColombianaccord,sinceColombiahasalarge

amountofnaturalresourcesinformsofcropsusedforillicitdrugs,mainlycoca

production.FARChaveintheagreementcommittedthedefinitestopregardingdrug

productioninareasundertheircontrol.ASolutiontotheproblemofcropsmadefor

illicitdrugproductionisalsoestablishedinthesocalledPNISprogram,asachapterto

theRRIRuralReform.Substitutionandnon-replantingagreementstargetingrural

farmerscommittocropsubstitution,non-replantingandnotengaginginanydrug-

traffickingactivitiesisintheagreementinthePISDAresponseplan.Despiteallthese

plans,andwithintheframeworkofthird-partyactors,itwillbeveryhardtoimplement

andcontrolbythestateorbytheFARC.Ifpreviousgrowersofillicitcropsdonotsee

quickresults,thereisahugeriskthattheygointodrugbusinessagain,ifthereisno

betteroption.Itshallalsobetakenintoaccountthatthereisnosignsthattheworld

demandforcocadecrease.Aslongasitisademandforthisdrug,themarketwillbe

there,andwithhugeamountofdollarsinvolvedcomestheviolence,sincethereisa

priceworthfightingfor.TheColombianconflictwasoriginallynotcreatedbythedrug

trade,butithasclearlyaffected,fuelledandprolongedtheconflict.IfFARCleavesdrug

58

businessasintendedaccordingtoitscommitmentintheagreement,othergroupswill

takeover.Tosummarize,Colombia`sNaturalresourcesinformsofillicitdrugsarehighly

negativeforthedurabilityofthepeaceagreement,andalsoaffectthesecurity

negatively.Finally,theColombianhistorytalksagainstthisreformtosucceed.Avery

controversialproposalcouldmaybebesomeformoflegalisation,aimingbetterstate

control,taxincomesandlessviolence,sinceallpreviousattemptshavefailed.

6.4Historicalfactors

Outcome

Causes

Intensity

Duration

Sincethefinalagreementaimistobringuphistoricalfactorstothetable,thistalksin

favourfordurability,butthe52-yearlongdurationoftheconflictinoppositetalks

againstsustainablepeaceinColombia,basedontheanalyticaltool.

ResearcherspointoutthathistoricalfactorssuchastheOutcomeandCausesofthe

conflicthavetobebroughtupifapeaceagreementshouldbesustainable.When

lookingattheColombianagreementthisissatisfying,forexampleintheJEP-process,

withtheobjectivecontributingtowardsthehistoricalclarificationofwhathappenedin

theconflict.AnotherexampleisthecommitmentbetweentheColombiangovernment

andFARCtowardsthehistoricalclarificationoftherelationshipbetweenthearmed

conflictandillicitdrugs.Thatthehistoricalfactorsaretakenseriouslyispositivefor

durability.Itprobablyalsodecreasestensionsbetweenparts,ifthoseguiltyofwar

crimesgottheirsentences.However,itisalsoariskfortheoppositewhensomeformer

FARCguerrillasonlowerlevelsinsteadgetbenefitsfromthestates.Itisthengoodthat

thisisinvestigatedcasebycaseinthefinalagreement.RegardingtheIntensityand

Durationoftheconflict,researcherspointedoutthatashortandlowintensityconflict

59

affectthechancesfordurabilitypositively.WhenlookingattheColombianagreement

thisisbothsatisfyingandnot,sincetheconflicthasafive-decadelongdurationwhichis

negativelycorrelatedtodurability,butwithmostlythecharacteroflowintensitywhich

areinopposite.However,itispositivefordurabilitythatthehistoricalfactorsare

broughtuptothetable,sincejusticeforvictimsareoneofthesixkeypointsinthe

agreement.Colombiahasalonghistoryofviolenceandstrugglewithguerrillas,

paramilitaries,druglordsandothercriminalgroups.Tomakeafinaldealwiththepastis

thencrucialtocreateabetterfuture,decreasetensionsandcreatesustainablepeace.

6.5ComparisonondurabilityoftheAugustandNovemberagreements

WhencomparingtheAugustandNovemberagreementtheconclusionisthatthelatter

ismoredurablethantheformer.Thissincetheopponent’sconcernswereincludedin

thenewagreement.Thebroaderinclusion,thebetterchancesforpeacedurability.

Despiteconcernsregardingweakinstitutionaltrust,spoilers,drugtradeandtheviolent

Colombianhistory,thefinalagreementisestimatedtohavelargerchancesthanthefirst

forbeingdurable,accordingtotheanalyticalframework,asshowninthegraphbelow.

Thefinalpeaceagreementismoresustainable,accordingtotheanalyticalframework,

sinceitincludeschanges,adjustmentsandprecisionsthatstrengthenthechancesfor

durabilityintermsofgreaterinclusion,power-sharingandjustice.Theconcernsfrom

theoppositionweretakenseriously,includingvictimsoftheconflict,indigenous

communities,organizationsandpeoplefromtheprivatebusiness.Forexample,

regardingvictimsoftheconflictthenewcongressionaldistricts,arenowmeanttobe

occupiedbyrepresentativesofvictims,insteadofformerFARCmembers.Thecampaign

financeassistancetotheex-FARCpoliticalpartywerereducedinthefinalagreement,

whichotherwisecouldhaveledtofurthertensionsfromtheopponents.Changes

regardingpenaltiesforthosefoundguiltyofwarcrimesarespecifiedmoreclearlyinthe

latteragreement,whichmeansgreaterchancesforjustice.Anotherpositivechange

regardingfairjusticeisthatchargesagainstex-FARCmemberswillinthenewaccordbe

decidedcasebycase.However,thefinalagreementcouldmaybehavebeeneven

60

strongerifit,asFARChadsuggested,beingapartoftheColombianinstitution.Nowit

partlycanbechangeddependingontheresultintheupcoming2018elections.

6.6ThedurabilityofthefinalColombianpeaceagreement

Thegreenboxesincludefactorsthatarepositiveforthedurabilityofthefinal

Colombianagreement.TheRedboxesinoppositeincludefactorsthatarenegativefor

durabilityinthefinalColombianagreement.Tosummarize,12ofthe16factorschosen

arepositivefordurabilityofthefinalagreement.

Politicalfactors Securityfactors

Justicefactors Historical

factors

Institutional

Design

Third

Parties

Power

Sharing

Outcome

Democratization

Spoilers Justice Causes

Inclusion Information

Asymmetries

Natural

Resources

Intensity

Exclusion Disarmament Victim

Policy

Duration

61

7. Conclusions and recommendations for furtherstudies

Thisresearchhascontributedtothedevelopmentofananalyticaltool,thatpossiblecan

beusedbyotherresearcherswhenevaluatingdurabilityofpeaceagreements.The

ColombianPeaceAgreement,asitisfinallynegotiated,areaccordingtotheanalytical

frameworkestimatedhavingagreatchancetobeingdurable.Despitethistherearefour

issuesthathavetobetakenseriously,accordingtotheanalyticalframework,andthat

talksagainsttheagreement.Firstly,thedurationoftheconflictwhichgoesbackover

fivedecadesinhistory.Secondly,thelackofinstitutionaltrustandlowcontrolbythe

state,especiallyinpoor,ruralareashighlyaffectedbytheconflict.Thirdly,the

Colombianagreementandpeaceprocesshavebeenaffectedbyspoilers,mainlythe

“No”-voter’sopposition,whichalsoinfluencetoharmtheimplementationand

durabilityoftheagreement.Theresultintheupcoming2018electionsisthencrucialfor

thefurtherimplementationoftheaccord.Fourthly,naturalresourcesinformsofillicit

drugsandmainlyCoca,havebeenlinkedtoandfuelled,theconflictforalongtime.This

alsoreallychallengingtheprospectsforasustainablepeace.However,Ifpeacefailsin

Colombia,futureresearcherscanlookintothoseweaknessesthroughthisanalytical

frameworkandcheckwhichfactorsthatfailed.Futureresearchersarealsosuggested

lookingintoafewmorecases,andthentestthisanalyticalframeworkfurtherona

numberofpeaceagreements.Itwouldalsobeinterestingtoevaluatehowthis

analyticaltoolworksindifferentcontexts,forexampleinformernon-democratic

countries,andoninterstateconflictsaswell.Anotherideaforfutureresearchcouldbe

ifareferendumistopreferornot,onhighlyimportantissueslikepeaceagreements.An

interestingtopicwouldalsobetofurtherevaluatehowtheroleofwomenaffectedthe

Colombianpeaceprocessandagreement.Tosumup,thisanalyticaltoolisusefulfor

manydifferentkindsoffuturepeaceanddevelopmentresearch,preventingofconflicts

andcontributemakethechancesfordurablepeacebetter,inthisworldofuncertainty.

62

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Appendix

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