Di Palma - Self-regarding virtues in Dialogues

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French Studies, Vol. LVIII, No. ,

Society for French Studies

UN SOIN QUE JE ME DOIS: SELF-REGARDING VIRTUES INROUSSEAUS DIALOGUES

MAR CO DI PAL MA

Abstract

The article sets itself three interconnected tasks: first, to provide a freshinterpretation of the ethical and political status and meaning of Rousseaus Dialogues,both independently and in the light of Rousseaus other writings; second, to offer arevisionary commentary on Jean Starobinskis reading of the same text, which itholds to be fundamentally misconceived; third, to show how the quest for a privategood in the context of Stoic and Epicurean horizons defines that works moral

possibilities. The Dialogues convey no aesthetic retreat from Rousseaus earlierphilosophy, as Starobinski argues, but rather its vindication as an ongoing task formoral liberty. Through his principal alter ego, Jean-Jacques, Rousseau practises arationally disciplined spiritual hygienics for personal autonomy, one advanced by thecultivation of marked dispositions through the virtues appropriate to his condition.Wisdom, justice, simplicity, temperance, and prudence are exercised in the pursuitof the vie simple et laborieuse by which Jean-Jacques services the purity ofintention that wills according to a Providential order.

I

There has never been a shortage of commentators to remind us of the internalinconsistencies of Rousseaus writings, although the question often turns on aproblem more apparent than real. The visions of the good life offered in LaNouvelle Hlose, mile, Du Contrat socialand the autobiographies will indeedappear to conflict if we abstract the substantive ideals Rousseaus textspromote from the framework of questions in which they arise. To avoidmisreadings, the wider social and political contexts of the good or moral life I use these terms interchangeably according to Rousseaus philosophy

need to be reinstated.Identifying these contexts is nowhere more necessary than in Rousseauslate problematical autobiography, Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques, Dialogues. One ofthe most powerful refutations of the internal coherence of Rousseausthinking coincides with a reading of the Dialogues that conceals thesocio-political status of that works preoccupations and meaning. Aban-doning every attempt to face the problems of modernity head on, theregressive primitivism of the Dialogues heralds nothing less than therepudiation of Rousseaus mature doctrine. Or so we learn from the widely


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1 I shall limit myself toJean-Jacques Rousseau: La Transparence et lobstacle suivi de sept essais sur Rousseau(Paris,Gallimard, []) at the expense of such subsequent studies as Jean-Jacques Rousseau et le pril de larflexion (Lil vivant: essai(Paris, Gallimard, ), pp. ), and Le remde dans le mal: la pense deRousseau (Le Remde dans le mal: critique et lgitimation de lartifice lage des Lumires(Paris, Gallimard, ), pp.), which build on its principal theses. All references to La Transparence et lobstaclewill beincorporated in the text.

2 Marco Di Palma, Self and Agency: A Prolegomenon to Rousseaus Dialogues,Modern Language Review, (), .

influential interpretation advanced by Jean Starobinski.1 Subtending Starobin-skis position in La Transparence et lobstacle is the argument that the laterautobiographies overturn the developmental moral philosophy set out in

mile(pp. ). Rousseau, it turns out, remains a thinker seduced by anelemental nostalgia for the lost Arcadia commemorated in the Discours surlingalit, one that Jean-Jacques, Rousseaus principal alter ego in theDialogues, strives unsucessfully to recapture. Isolated from human relation-ships and their moral claims and responsibilities, Jean-Jacques hides behind adeterministic world moved solely by necessity and aesthetic immediacy.Rousseaus quest for personal innocence, Starobinski believes, motivates thisautobiographical self-projection. Fearful lest every action be misconstrued byothers and turned to unintended consequences against him, Jean-Jacques

prefers the safe, inconsequential discharge of his energies and an absolutepassivity that nullifies his ethical will and freedom (pp. , , , ).Few would deny that Starobinskis contributions have come to characterize

Rousseau studies to a significant degree over the years. Yet his evaluations ofthe Dialogues stand in need of revision if we are not to miss an importantcontinuity in the Rousseauian corpus. Drawing on a framework of re-descriptions set out in a previous study, this essay represents a contribution toestablishing that continuity, namely, the profound internalization by the writerof the Dialogues of his own ethical and political construct.2 In contrast toStarobinskis Rousseau, a figure devoted solely to inaction and whose actsbear no ethical intentionality, it is possible to identify a markedly differentpresentation of self and agency from a close reading of the second Dialogue.Reporting on the personality of Jean-Jacques, this Dialogueconveys not aretreat from Rousseaus earlier philosophical project, but its personalvindication expressed as an ongoing task for emancipation and autonomy.The Dialogues offer a version of the good life conceived in terms ofdiscriminations consistent with the framework of values elaborated in thedoctrinal works that precede them. The practical outcome may be put asfollows: in the absence of a benign, encompassing community and legitimate

political institutions, the Dialogues attest that the moral life must therebyconsist in the quest for an essentially private, self-regarding ethics sustainedthrough the subjective will alone. The substantive content of this moral lifewill emerge more clearly once we establish the wider background toRousseaus intentions.


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3

References to Rousseau are from the uvres compltes, edited by Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond,vols (Paris, Gallimard, ); those to Rousseaus correspondence from the Correspondance complte,edited by Ralph A. Leigh, vols (Oxford, Voltaire Foundation, ), hereafter abbreviated as CC.Allquotations will be given with modernized spelling by volume and page number incorporated in the text.

II

With the unique exception of the Dialogues, Rousseaus autobiographicalwritings characteristically deliver an account by which the self comes to

embody its truth through self-transformation. The story of this progressiveembodiment explicitly appears with the rforme personnelle mentioned inBook of the Confessions(I, ).3The third Promenade of the Rveriesoffers afurther account of this reform, establishing a continuity between the systemelaborated in the doctrinal works and the moral identity exhibited in theDialogueswhich those works inform. Rousseaus reform begins with aprofound self-examination in which the articulation of intellectual and moraltruths precedes their assimilation into principles of right thought and action(Fixons une bonne fois mes opinions, mes principes, et soyons pour le reste

de ma vie ce que jaurais trouv devoir tre aprs y avoir bien pens, I, ). Areform of opinions and values (rforme intellectuelle et morale), needed toestablish the foundations of morality in Providence and those of justice in theimmortality of the soul, provides a secure basis for a reform of living (rformeexterne et matrielle, I, ). Illumination leads to imitation. Rousseaussystem is re-subjectivized, the self merges with its truth, and life seeks toapproximate to the ideal of the writings.

Construed by Starobinski as a false ascesis that issues into a total divestmentof the will (p. ), the personal reform signifies, on the contrary, a sustained

effort to recover a twofold liberty. Throwing off external constraints foundedon social inequality to achieve an independence akin to natural libertyillustrates Rousseaus recovery of negative freedom. A positive version restingon the possibility of self-enslavement, meanwhile, defines the pursuit of moralliberty or autonomy. The Dialogues inherit the legacy of the reformscommitments and the challenges that face the individual who strives toovercome spiritual dissonance in a hostile, morally disintegrated world. Ofcentral importance to the reform is the need, fulfilled by a progressivewithdrawal from society, to remove the competitive antagonism that

generates amour-propreand those unforgiving dispositions hardened by thespectacle of human foibles and iniquities (Quand je ne vis plus les hommes, jecessai de les mpriser: quand je ne vis plus les mchants je cessai de les har, I,). Yet, in accepting a final renunciation of life in society, Rousseau alsodenies his moral self opportunities for its necessary expression and continuedsurvival. The virtuous circle described by the sixth Lettre morale betweensocial participation and private recollection, or the practice of good actionsand the interior satisfactions of a good conscience that recalls them (IV,


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) finds no parallel in this solitary condition. Rousseau relinquishesles douceurs de la socit humaine (I, ), but human flourishing isnecessarily embedded in a community, as he acknowledges: notre plus

douce existence est relative et collective, et notre vrai moinest pas tout entieren nous (I, ).Two questions naturally arise at this juncture. First, what kind of self

subsists in retreat from society; and, second, what kind of ethics can itpractise? The reply to the second question provides the framework foranswering the first. It can be shown that the moral possibilities of the Dialoguesderive from modified Stoic and Epicurean horizons. Useless to the worldbecause he is unable to act with justice in a public arena, Rousseau concernshimself with a private good for which virtue denotes the effectiveness and

success, not of explicit action as such, but of action directed towards servicingthe purity of intention that wills according to the Providential order of things.Rousseaus ethics consists, in other words, in living according to nature. Butthe Dialogues also appear concerned with what we may recognize asappropriate intellectual and moral virtues (wisdom, justice, simplicity,temperance, prudence) or forms of excellence needed to advance this ethic.As for the self, this designates the well-spring of moral character (thos), anurtured reservoir of normative impulses or a set of marked dispositionswhich the second Dialogue locates in moral sensibility (sensibilit active et

morale, I, ) and, chiefly, the heart (le cur). This resonant term alsosymbolizes conscience (I, ) and, elsewhere in Rousseaus writings, thedeepest awareness of ones authentic identity (I, ), the organ of moralintuition (sixime sens, sens moral, I, ), and the ethical will (IV, ).Defining the self and its good, the central ethical intention of the Dialoguesto disposer lame la bienveillance (I, ) and nurture a moral psychology atthe furthest remove from disruptive and disordered amour-propre coincideswith the self-management expressed by Rousseaus personal reform.Responding to the restrictions and risks posed by the condition of social

isolation and exclusion, the Dialoguesoutline an art of living to shield fromdissolution and renew moral dispositions, making the will and imaginationdepend on conscious purposes and reasons, rather than on spontaneousexternal forces or the dominating will of others.

III

Within the setting of these wider ambitions, Starobinskis conclusions aboutRousseaus attitude to agency, immediacy, necessity, reflectivity, and practical

reason appear problematic. The question of the moral life in the Dialoguesundoubtedly presents difficulties, but for reasons other than those identifiedby Starobinski.


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Rousseaus fear of personal guilt, for instance, need not exclude thepossibility of action, since his diffidence focuses not on action as such, but oncontracting dispositions alien to his supreme intentions. One such potential

source of disruption lies in exposure to the surreptitious influence of the noveland the unforeseen. The Dialoguesbegin to convey a preoccupation, emergingmost notably in the soteriological framework of the Rveries, that fortuitousneeds, habits and obligations may adversely transform the will and lead to aloss of freedom and personal integrity (une rencontre fortuite, loccasion, lebesoin du moment, lhabitude trop rapidement prise, ont dtermin tous sesattachements et par eux toute sa destine [. . .] il se trouva toujours subjuguavant davoir eu le temps de choisir, I, ). Far from celebrating immediacy,Rousseau is wary of spontaneity and contingency, and their tendency to

generate a supervening counter-will that progressively dissolves establishedreasons and motives for action. Present events have a force and influence onwho I might become, just as much as deliberated choices in the past that havecontributed to my habits and character. Rousseau remains alert to thepossibility that the first might conflict with, or even overthrow, the second.

So too, in considering the claim that Jean-Jacquess behaviour stems fromthe impulses of temperament and necessity (I, ), we need not concludewith Starobinski that Rousseau shuns freedom for the sake of innocence, northat he inconsistently accepts, as a standard for his own conduct, theoreticalpositions he finds reprehensible in the materialists (p. ; I, ). In each case,a necessity of a particular kind offers the possibility for the practice offreedom continuous with the ends of the reform. Instead of the immersion offreedom, embracing necessity may convert a constraint into a new effective-ness. Rousseau conveys such a willed appropriation in connection with thegiven of his own selfhood: Il dpendait de moi, non de me faire un autretemprament ni un autre caractre, mais de tirer parti du mien, pour me rendrebon moi-mme, et nullement mchant aux autres (I, ; CC, X, ). Butthe necessity subtending Rousseaus stance here belongs to a differentuniverse (literally speaking) from that of the materialists. Those inclinations

and desires privileged by the Dialoguesderive their value from a cosmologicalthinking which reveals them to be normative only because, as propensitiesdisciplined by rational insight into the harmonious scheme of things, they areintegral to what is right and ordered in nature. Atheistic philosophesfrom LaMettrie to dHolbach, on the other hand, conceived nature as a set ofcompulsive forces or a comprehensive deterministic system both of whichseem to preclude the very possibility of ethics. Rousseaus recognition ofnecessity, by contrast, belongs to a Stoic-cum-Providential vision thatdiscerns an objective, positive and beneficial constraint for the individual who

aligns his particular will to it (O providence! [. . .] celui qui connat vos sainteslois [. . .] sy confie, I, ; jamais mortel ait mieux et plus sincrement dit Dieu, que ta volont soit faite, I, ). Necessity thus understood achieves


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4Nicomachean Ethics, b.

something like the synthesis of nature and freedom at the level of moralityurged bymile(IV, ).

The true problem of the moral life in the Dialogues lies elsewhere: in the

inability of virtuous dispositions to test or improve themselves throughsuitably open deeds. Like activities, Aristotle says, produce like dispositions;we must, therefore, attend to the quality of our activities, since theircharacteristics determine the resulting dispositions.4 The reciprocity ofexercise and disposition, encountered repeatedly inmile, restates this truth.With the vie simple et laborieuse (I, ), the Dialogues, too, acknowledge thatour actions have the power to transform us. Its method, as Rousseau calls it(I, ) to support the ethical self and avoid negative transformations of thewill firmly contradicts the view of Jean-Jacques as unmoved by ethical

demands beyond a desire for quietude and immovability. Defending hisday-to-day routine, Jean-Jacques explains:

en me faisant copiste de musique je nai point prtendu prendre un tat austre et de mortification, maischoisir au contraire une occupation de mon gout [. . .] qui put me fournir les commodits de la vie [. . .] Enrenonant et de grand cur tout ce qui est de luxe et de vanit je nai point renonc aux plaisirs rels, etcest mme pour les gouter dans toute leur puret que jen ai dtach tout ce qui ne tient qu lopinion.Les dissolutions ni les excs nont jamais t de mon gout; mais sans avoir jamais t riche jai toujoursvcu commodment [. . .] Pourquoi voulez-vous que sur mes vieux jours je fasse sans ncessit le durapprentissage dune vie plus que frugale laquelle mon corps nest point accoutum; tandis quun travailqui nest pour moi quun plaisir me procure la continuation de ces mmes commodits dont lhabitude

ma fait un besoin, et qui de toute autre manire seraient moins ma porte ou me couteraient beaucoupplus cher? [. . .] moi qui trouve une jouissance trs douce dans le passage alternatif du travail larcration, par une occupation de mon gout que je mesure ma volont [. . .] je jouis des douceurs dunevie gale et simple autant quil dpend de moi. Un dsuvrement absolu massujettirait lennui, meforcerait peut-tre chercher des amusements toujours couteux, souvent pnibles, rarement innocents,au lieu quaprs le travail le simple repos a son charme, et suffit avec la promenade pour lamusementdont jai besoin. Enfin cest peut-tre un soin que je me dois dans une situation aussi triste dy jeter dumoins tous les agrments qui restent ma porte pour tacher den adoucir lamertume, de peur que lesentiment de mes peines aigri par une vie austre ne fermentat dans mon ame et ny produist desdispositions haineuses et vindicatives, propres me rendre mchant et plus malheureux. Je me suis

toujours bien trouv darmer mon cur contre la haine par toutes les jouissances que jai pu me procurer.Le succs de cette mthode me la rendra toujours chre, et plus ma destine est dplorable, plus jemefforce la parsemer de douceurs, pour me maintenir toujours bon. (I, )

Carrying forward the project for personal reform, these prescriptionsillustrate the intertextuality of the Dialoguesand their continuity with previousdoctrinal works. Jean-Jacques draws on the construct of Natural-Man-living-in-society personified by mile. Both pursue authenticity and self-unity (tresoi-mme et toujours un, IV, ) according to a wisdom and moral libertythat calls on the ideals of self-sufficiency and moderation, and according to the

need for gaining strategic insights into the material foundations of moral


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5 See Andr-Jean Festugire, Personal Religion Among the Greeks(Berkeley, University of California Press,), pp. .

dispositions and for profiting by the ethical value of pleasure. I will say moreabout each of these four attitudes in what follows.

Dependency and moral weakness (la faiblesse de lame, I, ), the

Dialoguesclaim, corrupt and enslave us. Human history has distinguished itselfby the disastrous, unguided development of false needs, spawned by theunchecked expansion of reason and imagination, which continue to solicit thewill long after natural wants have ceased to make themselves felt (III, ).Rousseauian freedom, by contrast, is grounded in the concept of law: natureacts as a legislating force, simultaneously restraining and liberating those whorespect its norms. Jean-Jacques therefore prefers to guarantee himself aplenitude of existence by remaining within the naturally prescribed, normativelimits described inmile(Sois homme; retire ton cur dans les bornes de ta

condition [. . .] quelques troites quelles soient, on nest point malheureux tantquon sy renferme, IV, ). In this sphere, dsirremains commensurate withpouvoir, and the self becomes bien ordonn (IV, ). As the agent of his ownsatisfactions who recognizes and accepts these inescapable, beneficialrestrictions, Jean-Jacques eliminates every rift between desire and grat-ification (dsirer et jouir ne sont pour lui quune mme chose, I, ). Byconcentrating on genuine needs and rejecting imaginary ones based on vanity,those that neither he nor others could ever meet, Jean-Jacques achieves anequilibrium between established needs and the capacity to satisfy them,avoiding equally the superfluities and deprivations that disturb it.

Closely related to this self-sufficiency is the issue, examined by Epicureanand Stoic thinkers, as to the most appropriate means by which the sage oughtto provide himself with the necessities of life.5The Dialoguespropose the idealofmediocritas. Defining himself an artisan music-copier, Jean-Jacques belongsto ltat mdiocre (CC, V, ), a condition that affords relative immunityfrom the corruption and enslavement afflicting both rich (too much wealth)and poor (not enough):

sa situation prsente est du ct de laisance [. . .] Libre des chanes de la fortune, il jouit avec modrationde tous les biens rels quelle donne [. . .] Plus pauvre il sentirait des privations, des souffrances; plus riche

il aurait lembarras des richesses, des soucis, des affaires [. . .] en possdant davantage il jouirait beaucoupmoins (I, ).

Wary of the dangerous paradox identified in the Discours sur les richesses (V,), Jean-Jacques guarantees himself the satisfaction of simple butnecessary needs by acquiring only such means for happiness as do not destroyhis aptitude for it.

With the project forLa Morale sensitive, ou le matrialisme du sage(I, ),Rousseau reminds us that the environment and our physiological organizationshare a vital interest in the destiny of moral dispositions, and that these


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6 Seneca ad Lucilius epistulae morales (Letters to Lucilius), edited and translated by Richard C. Gummere, vols(London, Heinemann, []), II, , .

7 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, X, ; Lives of Eminent Philosophers, translated by R. D. Hicks,vols (Cambridge University Press, ), II, . Kant also recognized an obligation to ones ownhappiness, for discontent with ones condition under pressure from many cares and amid unsatisfied wantscould easily become a great temptation to transgress duties,Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, translatedby Lewis White Beck (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, ), p. .

material conditions may be reinvented to favour the moral order they sofrequently disrupt. A faithful student of this sagacious materialism, Jean-Jacques observes the natural rhythm of work and recreation recommended in

La Nouvelle Hlosefor which cette alternative de peine et de jouissance estnotre vritable vocation (II, ). While prolonged inactivity creates the moralpain of ennui, and an uneasiness that engenders vague demands the will findsdifficult to subdue, the exertion of physical work brings its own relief bystimulating a desire for simple, moderate pleasures within easy reach ofsatisfaction.

Positively, Jean-Jacques states the ethical value of material comforts andpleasure commodits, amusement, plaisirs, agrments, jouissances with someinsistence. Rejecting asceticism and renunciation,mileargues that excessive

practices of self-denial debilitate the body and replicate the effects ofintemperance by an opposite cause, aggravating the passions and generatingresistance to rational self-discipline (IV, ). Also in tune with La Moralesensitive, ou le matrialisme du sage are the iatromechanistic and Cartesianovertones, audible towards the end of the long passage just cited. Rousseau isconcerned about the risk that unaccustomed austerities may fermentnegative psychological states. Similarly, the method of anticipating andreversing the adverse volatility of spirits operates by assembling pleasures asan antidote to present ills. Appreciating the necessary infrastructure of bodilycomforts and external goods for the ethical life the so-called advantages(commoda) acknowledged by Seneca6 Rousseau joins the Epicureans forwhom it is not possible to live prudently, honourably and justly without livingpleasantly.7

Beyond these very tangible, self-regarding ethical commitments, theDialoguesalso question Starobinskis claim about that works reversal of thesynthesis unfolding inmile. Rousseaus masterpiece on education identifiedin conscience a moral spontaneity that sublates the antinomies of naturalimmediacy (instinct) and reflectivity (reason). Starobinski, by contrast, arguesthat the Dialoguesinstate a Manichean vision whereby the conflict between the

aesthetic order of immediate experience and self-conscious reason isaccentuated to the highest possible degree (pp. ). Yet the moral instinct(instinct moral) attributed to Jean-Jacques seems to contradict thesefindings. Defined as la haine de linjustice et de la mchancet (I, ), thismoral instinct recalls the comparison in the Profession de foi(IV, ) of the voiceof conscience to the instinct of the soul, one that is active and capable of


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8

See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity(Cambridge University Press, ),pp. .9Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity(Berkeley, University of California Press, ), p.

.

judgement. Rousseaus choice of terms here proves significant. Instinctprovides a spontaneous know-how pertaining solely to means; a moralinstinct,however, implies an awareness and discrimination of ends in which morality

and inclination would seem to flow in the same direction. Integratingimmediate, non-reflective means and reflective ends, the moral instinct pointsto the very superior synthesis that the Dialoguessupposedly overthrow.

Equally, the meta-ethic that grounds the good life in the Dialoguespoints tothe redemption of rational reflectivity, not its banishment. Reviving but alsomodifying the ancient imperative of living according to nature, the DeistEnlightenment refers the spiritual life back to a cosmic order conceived as aninterlocking design.8 Much like the congruity between the divine order andhuman knowledge in Greek cosmology, the fact that Providence rules the

world harmoniously offers a moral stimulus for humans to adopt the samestandards in their own endeavours.9 Natures uniformity and reliabilityprovides a model, what Rousseau calls a monde physique to which a mondemoral must correspond (CC, XXXVII, ). The rational self-management ofthe Dialogues mirrors natures finality by imitating the benign equilibrium,regularity and protective independence that nature originally bestows on allsentient creatures (III, ). Two activities in particular bring off theconformity between the moral life, and natures design: the disciplinedexcellence of sensibility, and the ranking of goods according to a hierarchy ofworth.

Rousseaus approach to the problem ofdsirandpouvoiralluded to earlierillustrates the first of these. Inequality between infinite desires and given, finitehuman capacities to satisfy them demands the direction of the former by acultivated skill resting on the principle of economy.This principle is definedby Rousseau as plutt le sage mnagement de ce quon a, que des moyensdacqurir ce que lon na pas (III, ). The prudent foresight that reproducesnatures harmonious ordering of means and ends in the interests of humanhappiness, meanwhile, Rousseau calls lart de jouir.

The two ideas surface together in La Nouvelle Hlose. Revisiting Xeno-

phons conomicus, the opening letters in PartV of the novel elaborate lart dejouir as part of a wider, more comprehensive art of living. Wolmars estate isenriched, not by continually accumulated wealth, but by the most productiveuse of available resources (il senrichit en possdant mieux ce quil a, II, ).As Bernard Guyon remarks in his commentary, the text is strewn with termslike maximes,prceptes,principes, as if referring to a systematic body of knowledge(II, ). Other designations like sagesse, rgles(II, ) and, indeed, systme(II, ) confirm this. The methodical administration of the estate (oikos) leads


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10 Cf. Seneca, De ira, III, , , in Moral Essays, translated by John W. Basore, vols (London,Heinemann, ), I, .

to analogous reflections on the self; the principles of domestic economy arebrought to bear on the practice of autonomy. Conceptually, lart de jouirsignals an Epicurean ethics of pleasure (lpicurisme de la raison, II, )

without, of course, its dismal physics. Looking to the reception of experiencerather than to amassing the means for happiness, and stressing the need for acultured finesse attuned to the simple life, lart de jouir consists in privationspassagres et modres, qui conservent la raison son empire, et servantdassaisonnement au plaisir en prviennent le dgout et labus (II, ).Responding blindly to every desire anaesthetizes pleasure. Moderation, bycontrast, renews rather than jades sensibility: a rational mise en valeur of itsresources (lart de gouter le bonheur de la vie sert encore le prolonger, II,) fosters a self-discipline capable of delivering the fullest material

satisfactions possible.The Dialogues summon lart de jouir as the preference for regulatedself-restraint in contradistinction to the search for happiness through materialwealth (I, ). In particular, it serves to illuminate the following trenchantdeclaration, which is apt to mislead commentators: Lhomme sensuel estlhomme de la nature; lhomme rflchi est celui de lopinion (I, ). It wouldbe mistaken to conclude from this comparison that Rousseau restates thesuperiority of aesthetic immediacy over (rational) reflectivity. The reflectiveindividual targeted here indicates the one who places himself in thrall throughunlimited desires of the imagination; the genuine sensuel like Jean-Jacques,meanwhile, is bound by true insight into the possibilities for humanfulfilment. Jean-Jacques and others like him belong to an ideal communitywhose members recognize and advance the design of the universe byaccepting their allotted place within it:

en quelque rang que les ait placs la fortune, ils sagitent peu pour en sortir; ils ne cherchent gure slever, et descendraient sans rpugnance des relations plus de leur gout [. . .] connaissant trop bien lartde jouir pour ignorer que ce nest pas prix dargent que le vrai plaisir sachte [. . . ] Dailleurs aimantencore plus leur libert que leurs aises, ils craindraient de les acheter par la fortune, ne fut-ce qu cause dela dpendance et des embarras attachs au soin de la conserver. (I, )

Like every good Stoic and Epicurean, Jean-Jacques finds his happiness not inan elevated social status for this would force him to embark on aself-defeating quest for means disruptive of the order he loves but in theinterior satisfactions of a good conscience (le sentiment intime, I, ).10Yetthe sensueldoes not repudiate reason. Jean-Jacques and the initiated of thisideal world freely restrict themselves to binding, complementary norms thatnature and reason dictate as appropriate to human aspirations (borns detoutes parts par la nature et par la raison, ils sarrtent, et passent leur vie en


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jouir, I, ). To live according to nature also signifies, then, living accordingto the hegemony of reason.

Expressing goals as rational preferences illustrates the second activity by

which the moral life draws on and imitates the design of nature. Rousseaussimple and productive life already contains the idea. Subordinating goods inAristotelian fashion to an ideal of mediocritas, reason assigns a place in themoral life to the ensemble of physical desires and needs. All genuine goods aregood, but some are higher than others, and a rational hierarchy of goodsranked in order of worth determines the place of those necessarycommodits(I,) and biens rels(I, ). Rousseau now overturns the curse of the first aswell as the second of his Discours.The arts and sciences are to be integratedinto the good life, whose supreme end consists in individual moral excellence

anchored to the collective good:Lesprit, les talents ne sont [. . .] que des ornements du mrite et ne le constituent pas. Ils sont desdveloppements ncessaires dans le progrs des choses et qui ont leurs avantages pour les agrments dela vie mais subordonns aux facults plus prcieuses qui rendent lhomme vraiment sociable et bon et quilui font priser lordre, la justice, la droiture et linnocence au-dessus de tous les autres biens. (I, )

The intellectual and cultural spin-offs of civilization are ranked below thevirtues of sociability and natural goodness. Justice and rectitude (honesty,loyalty, probity, sincerity), along with the virtues of wisdom, simplicity,temperance and prudence required for the simple and productive life, qualify

as intrinsically meritorious. Natural Man need not, then, reject the progress towhich he must attribute his more evolved, but no less natural, wants:Lhomme de la nature clair par la raison a des apptits plus dlicats maisnon moins simples que dans sa premire grossiret (I, ). These have aplace in the infrastructure of the good life. Unlike the false perfectibility(perfectibilit prtendue, III, ) of Rousseaus philosophy of history, thegoods of civilization may be usefully reclaimed in the name of a greaterinheritance of human flourishing in which the accrued joins with, andenriches, the essential.

IV

The Dialoguesconvey no aesthetic retreat from Rousseaus earlier philosophybut, on the contrary, articulate its vindication as a personal discipline for moralliberty. So far, I have considered the autonomy of Jean-Jacques from the sideof the ethical will and practical reason. It remains to be shown how theimagination, that other source of danger and errors, also plays a decisive role.

At stake in the simple life lived according to nature is the possibility ofvirtue, happiness and moral liberty, and the Dialoguesspell out the dual powerof imagination to advance or hinder these moral prospects:

delle [limagination] naissent non seulement les vertus et les vices, mais les biens et les maux de la vie


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humaine, et [. . .] cest principalement la manire dont on sy livre qui rend les hommes bons ou mchants,heureux ou malheureux ici bas. (I, )

By extending the confines of experience, imagination may also multiply our

ills and increase our sensitivity to them (IV, , ), threatening to disperseand alienate the self, to intensify rather than allay its afflictions (I, ). YetNatural Man cannot be at odds with himself, terrorized or distressed byimaginary sufferings and anxieties. The success of Jean-Jacquess self-mastery turns on a vision of human wisdom (la sagesse humaine, IV, )whose principles and practical outcomemilesets out as follows:

. Sentir les vrais rapports de lhomme tant dans lespce que dans lindividu.. Ordonner toutes les affections de lame selon ces rapports. Mais lhomme est-il matre dordonner sesaffections selon tels ou tels rapports? Sans doute, sil est matre de diriger son imagination sur tel ou tel

objet, ou de lui donner telle ou telle habitude (IV, ).

According to the first principle, Rousseau understands himself as lhomme dela nature (I, ) who observes the grande maxime de morale (I, ) byavoiding situations that oppose self-interest to duty. Following this precept toits ultimate conclusion means completely withdrawing from society (I, )and its devastating inner conflicts which few, if any, can bring to a successfulend. A prudential ethic of abstention (morale dabstinence, I, ), that is,voluntarily keeping ones distance as the result of deliberation, not dereliction,represents its practical consequence. The second principle requires fashioninga moral psychology appropriate to such a Natural Man. Since it jeopardizesself-possession as much as it promotes it, Rousseau recognizes the need, inthe first instance, to inure the imagination and re-adapt the self to its original,circumscribed unity. For its part, the simple and productive life generates acondition distinguished by the absence of le mal moral or the self-inflicted illsthat attend the abuse of freedom (IV, ). Stable routine inhibits emotionalresponses by eliminating novelty (ab assuetis non fit passio, IV, ), a usefulmethod for Rousseau who faced genuine persecution fears and, by his ownadmission, had to contend with an imagination always ready to seize on and

magnify tant de mystres et de malheurs (I, ).Accustoming the imagination by directing it towards specific objects,

meanwhile, proves equally necessary. In the absence of a supporting ethicalcommunity, Jean-Jacques fashions one in the imagination. Motivated by thepractical need for fantasy, the mood and attitude of the Dialoguesannounce theRveries. Jean-Jacquess happy fictions (heureuses fictions, I, ) representneither a mere consolation for the loss of human interaction nor, asStarobinski holds, simply simulacra of the external world (p. ). Theirimportance lies in drawing on the positive, cognitive function of illusion.

Natural education makes abundant use of this technique. For instance, thetutor repeatedly projects Emiles imaginative gaze towards a sylphide tocultivate and instil in him a love of virtue in advance of circumstances that will


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ROUSSEAUS DIALOGUES

demand it in practice (IV, ). Much as Emiles carefully-nurtured imagin-ation equips him with a necessary, protective illusion that out-manuvres thecorrupting effects of his immediate environment, Rousseaus imagination

similarly transcends real experience to efface a world hostile to his values.As a facult consolatrice (I, ), fantasy helps to cultivate markeddispositions. The Dialogues express this through various metaphors ofnourishment: providing sustenance for good dispositions, while denying it tobad ones (les sentiments affectueux nourrissent lame, I, ; lamour-propre[. . .] savive et sexalte dans la socit qui la fait natre [. . .] il languit et meurtfaute daliment dans la solitude, I, ). Images of the interlocking cosmicorder, its harmony, beauty and perfection beheld in contemplation,sustain the heart (toutes ces images chries qui remplissent son ame [. . .]

repaissent son cur,I

,

). For up to six hours a day, Jean-Jacques attendsto the ideal society of his dreams:

des socits dlicieuses, composes dhommes justes, vrais, gais, aimables, simples avec de grandeslumires, doux avec de grandes vertus; de femmes charmantes et sages [. . .] nusant de lascendant de leursexe et de lempire de leur charmes que pour nourrir entre les hommes lmulation des grandes choses etle zle de la vertu. (I, )

A dreamt community modelled on the ancient virtues of Rousseaus idealpolity and his fictional creations (mile, Sophie, Saint-Preux, Julie andWolmar) morally inspires its dreamer. In so channelling his imagination to

feed on itself, Jean-Jacques cultivates a self-intensifying love of moral orderand the promise of its future rehabilitation. In a variation ofLa Morale sensitive,imaginatio turns into a sensuous mode ofpercipere.The mnemotechnic aspect ofimagination (le souvenir toujours prsent, I, ) usefully anchors an abstractideal to a concrete scenario rehearsed in the mind, performing for wisdom theoffice of reinstating to immediate consciousness the otherwise intangibletruth and beauty of the monde moral. Like material comforts and regulatedpleasure, imaginative reverie represents a ressource (I, ) of spiritualhygienics. Immunizing mind and body against those dispositions haineuses et

vindicatives (I, ) both nurture and support the virtues appropriate to a mantaking shelter from injustice in this life with a view to preserving theuncorrupted expansive goodness he hopes will vindicate him in the next.

LONDON

Di Palma - Self-regarding virtues in Dialogues

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