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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDJanuary 8, 2004Event: Secretary of T ransportation Norm an Y. MinetaType: MeetingSpecial-Access Issues: NoneTeam: Front Office, Team 7 & 8Prepared by: Sam BrinkleyLocation: Secretary's Conference Room, Department of TransporatationParticipants: (non-Commission) Secretary Mineta, Lindy Knapp, John Flaherty,KirkVan TineParticipants: (Comm ission) Vice Chairman Hamilton, Chris Kojm, Dana Hyde (Team 8),Sam Brinkley (Team 7)The purpose of this meeting with Secretary was to follow-up on his testimony presentedto the Commission on May 23, 2003. Chris Kojm was the primary questioner for theCom mission. The response to each question is summarized and based upon the notestaken at the time of the me eting. The m eeting was not recorded and no transcript hasbeen made.The questioning was divided into three parts: (1) Prior to September 11, 2001, (2) Eventson September 11, 2001, and (3) Post September 11, 2001Prior to September 11. 2001Questions: When you became the Secretary of Transportation, what was yourassessment of the Aviation Security System and its effectiveness? By what means andwhat criteria did the department and you measure the effectiveness?Prior to 9-11 the Aviation Security System was a combination of roles andresponsibilities shared among the FAA , airlines, and airports. How did you view thisarrangement? What did you see as the Department's and your role in managing thatarrangement? Was there anything in your inbox on aviation security?

Prior to 9-11, there were other issues impacting the "effectiveness" of thecomm ercial aviation system, e.g., air space man agem ent, passenger b ill of rights, andothers. On the other hand, over the summer of 2001, the intelligence buildup forterrorism was significant with the FAA issuing a number of Information Circulars an dSecurity Directives and also, the FAA pub lished on July 17, 2001, the Final Rules onAircraft O perator Security and A irport Security that described the terrorist threat level inthe United States, "...over the nex t decade w ill rema in at least as high as it is at present

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and, and indeed, w ill probably rise." What were you focused on over the summer of2001? Did you receive intelligence briefings over the summer? If so, by whom and howoften? Did you see any relationship betw een the publication of the final rule and theintelligence buildup over the summer of 2001?

Answ er: Prior to confirm ation, the Secretary's preparation was focused on dealing withthe capacity of the transportation system. In his view, the principle role of theDepartmen t (DOT) is safety; DO T's role was oversight vice direct involvem ent. Securitywas a contracted responsibility of the air carriers. The Secretary's focus was on capacityconstraints and congestion, not on security matters. The summ er of 2000 was called"The Summer of Hell" because of cancelled flights, delays, and customer dissatisfaction.The Secretary was trying to avert a repeat in 2001. The Secretary had no recollection ofany security matters in his "inbox" but would have dealt with the Adm inistrator of theFederal Aviation Administration on such issues. As for the Final Ru le issued by the FAAon July 12, 2001, in the Federal Register, the Secretary was aware of the rule; however,the rule was issued because of general concern, not because of a specific threat. Thestatements on the threat were a prognostication of the future, not threat specific. TheSecretary had/ha s a high interest in intelligence because of his background . He didreceive intelligence briefing often over the summer of 2001 and these were d one by theCIA or S-60. He kn ew there was "a lot of chatter" but no specificity or credibility as itpertained to aviation. He did ask the CIA, after September 11th, to go back and look atthe "dots" to see if they had missed som ething. He saw no linkage between the FinalRule of July 17 th and the increase in intelligence chatter.Question: A number of the persons w e have interviewed have mad e two statements that Iwould like to get your response. First, "The aviation security system was built to stopcrazies, criminals, but not dedicated terrorists." Second, "We thought we had thehijacking problem w on." At the same time, the Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation,Year 200 Review, published by the FAA 's Office of Civil Aviation Security indicatedthat the num ber of worldw ide civil aviation incidents, 42, were the most recorded in thefive-year period, with 20 (none against U.S.-flagged aircraft) of those incidents recordedas hijacking. During the five-year period, 64 hijackings were recorded world wide. Thereport also states that there is every reason to believe that civil aviation wo uld continue tobe an attractive target for terrorist groups. Add itionally, the GAO, DO T IG , and FAARed Team, over the previous years, had consistently evaluated the aviation securitysystem as wan ting for effectiveness. Your views on this, please.Answer: The Secretary was not familiar with the Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviationreport. His view was that hijackings were an overseas problem, not a domestic one. Onthe other hand, he understood that if a hijacking did occur, the philosophy w as tocooperate with the hijackers and get the aircraft on the ground where law enforcementwould deal with the situation. The flight crew as not to fight or attempt to thwart thehijackers but w as trained to best control the environment around the hijackers.

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Events on September 11, 2001Dana, I have some notes, but I thought yo u could put your notes here, first.Question: W hat weapons do you believe the 9/11 hijackers used, and how do you believethe weapons got on board the aircraft? Do you think there was a gun onboard any of thehijacked aircraft?What information did you have that any other hijackings may have been planned for thatday or later? As the system was ground ed, what steps did you direct to screen otherflights on that day for potential hijackers?Answer: Th e Secretary believes that boxcutters were the weapons used aboard theaircraft. He does not/not believe that a gun was onboard.The Secretary did not order any "reverse" screening of passengers for the groundedaircraft. Pertaining to other hijackings/hijackers that might have been planned, he onlyknew of the St. Louis passengers that were later arrested by the FB I on a train.Post September 11.2001Question: Was there an After Action Report done by the Department or FAA following9/11? There were a series of announcements, post 9/11, of when the comm ercial aviationsystem w ould begin to resume operations. What did you see as the fundam ental issue(s)associated w ith the resumption of operations? W hat role did you play in determiningwhen the system would begin to fly again?Answer: There was no formal After Action Report of which the Secretary know s. Therewere a lot of discussions early-on with the President asking, "When can we get theairplanes back up?" The Secretary in itially answered that the next afternoon was possiblebut the system needed some additional security measures in place. The air carriers wereauthorized to fly aircraft on Friday, 15th. The fundamental considerations were "securityof the airplanes and airports." By Saturday/Sunday, the 16 th the air carriers began to flyagain, and by M onday the Rapid Response Teams were working around the clock. Onthe final decision to begin operations again, the NSC had to clear on the decision. TheSecret Service, because of Reagan N ational Airport, had significant input on the GeneralAviation restrictions.Questions: Awards/Punishments? Decommissioning radars? Other ATC changes?Answer:Question: Du ring the Fall, 2001, the Congress began to draft legislation to establish theTransportation Security Agency. What levels of participation did you and the Departmenthave in the drafting of the legislation? Had you conducted any studies or received anyAfter Action Reports on how the aviation security system had failed that influenced the

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drafting of the legislation or how the Department viewed the structure of the ISA? Howdid you view the formulation of TSA? What planning g uidance did you give on thedesign, priorities, and im plementation of the new agency?There was and continues to be significant criticism on the effectiveness of the TSA. Isthat criticism fair? If not, why? If so, where should improvements be made?Finally, DOT continues to have regulatory responsibilities for the transportation system.How do you view the Depa rtmen t's roles and responsibilities? How do you make thiswork with DHS/TSA?Answer: During the Fall, 2001, the White House asked for a policy paper on a SecurityAdministration, in competition were Justice, Treasury, and Transportation. The policypaper went to the W H in early October. The decision was then made to give TSA toDOT. As the legislation was written on the Hill, there wa s a difference between the WHan d Congress. DOT wan ted the agency to regulators with contractors implementing.Congress changed "Agency" to "Administration" and wrote the bill to have Federalemployees vice contractors. The bill was signed on Nov. 19 th. As for criticisms, thoseshould be answered by the TSA, but TSA was a "startup" and had ma ny challenges tomeet. Additionally, it is starved fo r financial resources an d Congress limited the numberof employees w hich severely limits the agency to do the job. The Secretary'sresponsibility, in the end, wa s to turn over to the Departmen t of Hom eland Security afully functioning TSA, having met 36 mandates by 1 March 03. Of note, the Congressfunded only the aviation part of the Act, not the other transportation modes. The TSAmet the Nov 19 th deadline fo r screeners and the Dec 31, 2002, deadline fo r ExplosiveDetection System deployment (several waivers were granted) for 424 airports.DOT continues to have regulatory requirements for the safety of the transportationsystem. The Secretary described that the need to interface with DHS was significant andbecause safety and security are so intertwined, there was the possibility of coordinationproblems between DOT and DHS. In addition to having the need for a close process fo raction officer cooperation, e.g., M OU 's, an d working d aily together, the personalrelationship between Secretary's, providing close attention at the Secretary-level (HSC)is needed.

Recommendations:For DOT, data fusion and information sharing has the #1 priority. The issue is how tofuse available information into something usable. Informa tion on aviation an dcontainers, to include manifests an d watchlists, is important for DOT to have. DOT alsohas significant interests on air carriers and the arrang ements with international countries.As for TTIC, is it forward looking enough to have credibility fo r action? The Secretary isnot sure if we have g otten to the point of "connecting" the dots. W e have a very high barto cross, "Terrorists only have to get it right once; we have to get it right every time."