Development and production of smokeless military propellants in France, 1884-1918

Thesis submitted for the degree

Doctor of philosophy

By

Yoel Bergman

Submitted to the Senate of Tel-Aviv University

May 2008

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This dissertation was written under the guidance of

Doctor Ido Yavetz

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Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Dr. Ido Yavetz for his guidance in forming the historical questions, Prof. Leo

Corry for providing academic support, Prof. Rivka Feldhay for proposing French historical

armament as a topic and Prof. Alon Gany, Technion, for his recommendation for approving

the study.

Dr. Brenda J. Buchanan, from Bath University U.K, active in the Powders and Explosives

History group of ICOHTEC, deserves many thanks for her initial encouragement and help in

contacting researchers. Dr. Partice Bret in France provided invaluable guidance on the

political-administrative background and on key references, so necessary for this type of work

Dr. Yaron Schneebaum, an old colleague, helped in finding scarce historical references. Dr.

Igal Belsky, and Dr. Daniel Teitel, both colleagues of long standings, helped with the

formalization of the study. Judith Lavie and Tuvia Wizel, volunteered their assistance in the

search for long forgotten sources.

My wife Gali and my family bore with heroism the tribulations, which accompanied the

writing of this dissertation. Many, many thanks.

I would like to thank Mr. Shimon Yariv for guiding me in the technology and to honor the

memory of the late Menashe Cohen who also instructed me on the matter.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this work in commemoration of the late Assaf Gilad, whose

dedication and career progression until its end were in some ways similar to those of early

and known powders engineers, named in this work.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms CP Coton-Poudre

DB Double Base Powder

LCP Laboratoire Central des Poudres et Salpêtres

MP Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres

NC Nitrocellulose

NG Nitroglycerine

PB Poudre B

SD Sans Dissolvant

SB Single Base Powder

SDP Service des Poudres et Salpêtres

WW I World War I

Notes about terms, authors and citations The term "poudre B" used in the next chapters denotes all types of poudre B. Specific types

are denoted with an additional letter to B, as explained in the relevant paragraphs.

Some of the authors’ names in studies published in the early MPs and other professional

periodicals were named only by their family names.

Original texts or terms in French were marked in italics to distinguish from their translated

English versions.

Remarks were inserted in parenthesis, in different texts and citations, whether original or

translated, for clarification purposes. A special note is given where remarks in parenthesis

originate from cited texts.

Introduction Poudre B, one of the earliest military smokeless powder for propelling small and large

projectiles, was developed in France, and approved for use in 1885. The composition was

soon termed “single base” since it included only one energetic component, nitrocellulose.

Some of the compositions which were approved shortly afterwards by other countries were

termed “double base” owing to the inclusion of nitroglycerine, in addition to nitrocellulose.

Production was initiated during 1886-1887 and by 1900 poudre B comprised some 76% of

the yearly powder tonnage delivered to the French military; the rest was still the old black

powder which was less energetic by some 40%. Poudre B yearly percentages remained high

until the eve of World War II, despite the introduction of double base compositions in France

during and after World War I.

This success in meeting military needs over a large time span was underlined by Louis

Vannetzel1 in his work on powders and explosives in the many centuries of production in

France. He examined the compositional, process, and administrative developments and the

study was supervised by Paul Tavernier. Both were members of the Service des Poudres et

Salpêtres (“SDP”), the state organization overlooking the majority of powders and explosives

development and production activities, from the late 19th until the late 20th century.

Vannetzel’s approach is factual, listing major technical and organizational events, but with a

minimal reference to controversial issues and to achievements in other countries. A detailed

review of the formative years until 1914, the extreme hardships of WWI and of the events

which overshadowed poudre B’s achievements, can improve the understanding why poudre

B lasted as a suitable solution. The overshadowing events included the handling of the

stability issue, the decision not to include nitroglycerine and the famed German powder

achievements prior to, and during WWI. When reviewing these points a more favorable

perspective is obtained. A solution for powder storage instability practiced in other countries

was partially adopted before the publicized French ship accident of 1907, occuring in a

period when similar accidents plagued other navies. The decision not to use nitroglycerine

was not exceptional. Russian and American compositions during WWI and before were in

their majority, if not in their entirety, single base. Nitroglycerine was produced in France as

1 Louis Vannetzel, “Le Service des Poudres“, Croix de Guerre, n° spécial (Octobre-Novembre, 1961).

2

early as the mid 1880’s and availability was not an obstacle. The German achievements

before WWI were only marginally better than poudre B. New or improved processes during

WWI were motivated by the need to produce raw materials which could not be delivered by

the blockade. The French side was not required to invent as much. A specific German 1912

powder and process achievement RPC/12 suggested by Urbanski2 as decidedly helpful to the

war efforts, will be claimed to be much less influential.

New cited references and comparisons between major references will serve the purpose of

reviews and assessments. Early major reviews include works by Duchemin (1925)3, an

artillery officer whose works on wartime challenges were not cited by other major sources

before, the work by Pique, a principal reserve chemist (1927)4, and works by Pascal (1905-

1930) 5 a professor from the Sorbonne and Lille who participated in preWWI and wartime

efforts to improve processes. Post WWII general reviews include a 1950 work by Paul

Tavernier6, Vannetzel’s 1961 work, the Picatinny encyclopedia7 and Urbanski8. Special

attention is given to Urbanski whose highly esteemed work from the 1960’s serves as a major

reference for reviewing developments in major countries. His works provide historical-

technological data, relying on numerous primary sources, many of them French. They are

widespread in their English version and readers may rely on these as a major source for

learning about French smokeless powders history. Throughout this study, points raised by

Urbanski are reviewed and contradicted or supported where relevant. The Summary chapter

presents a list of these examined points. Later comprehensive studies are also reviewed.

These include two studies published in the 1980’s and in the 1990’s which examine

American and Russian powder developments, before and during WWI. Insights on the higher

level organizational changes and rivalries until 1918 are provided by Bret in a draft 2002

study 9 and in a 2006 study appearing in Roy Macleod and Jeffery Allan Johnson “Frontline

2 Tadeusz Urbanski, Chemistry and Technology of Explosives, Vol.III (Oxford, 1967), pp.530, 652. 3 Duchemin , “Poudres et Explosifs 1914-1918”, Revue, Militaire Française, 45 (1er Mars 1925), 47 (Suite 1er

Mai 1925), 52 (Suite et fin 1er Octobre 1925). 4 René Pique, La poudre noire et le Service des Poudres, (Paris, 1927) 5 Paul Pascal, Explosifs, Poudres, Gaz de Combat, Ed II, (Paris, 1930) 6 Paul Tavernier, “Évolution Historique des Poudres Sans Fumée”, MP, 32 (1950) 7 Encyclopedia of Explosives and related items, ed. Basil Fedoroff, (Dover N.J 1960-1983) 8 Tadeusz Urbanski, Chemistry and Technology of Explosives, Vol.III (Oxford, 1967) 9 Patrice Bret, “La guerre des laboratoires: Poincaré, Le Chatelier et la Commission scientifique d’étude des poudres de guerre (1907-1908)” (draft version, 2002). All citations from were translated by Yoel Bergman.

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and Factory10. The Mémorial des Poudres et Salpêtres (MP), a periodical review on powders

and explosives developments was published in France from 1882. It serves both as a primary

and as a major source for detailed information, presenting studies and reports, which

illuminate technical challenges, organizational changes, inner debates and powder accidents.

Such ample information today is limited to private or state organizations, although even in

the time of the MPs, the more sensitive information was withheld from immediate

publication. The well-structured and fairly open approach to a complex technological effort

as exhibited in the MPs is one of the evidences for the overall rational approach of the

powder establishment. This establishment consisted of the army, navy, ministry of Navy and

ministry of War (including the SDP). Urbanski widely cited MPs studies and additional ones

are examined in this work. Among the important testimonies are those of Paul Vieille the

famous SDP researcher attributed with the invention of poudre B. According to Vieille’s

account in the 1893 MP (volume), he tested Ballistite and Cordite samples in addition to

poudre B in the manometric (or closed) bomb, during the mid 1880’s. Ballistite was being

developed by Alfred Nobel in Paris at the time and Cordite by Sir Fredrick Abel in Britain.

This indicates that the new poudre B was compared to the other options and that a certain

degree of collaboration existed between Vieille and his major competitors. The manometric

bomb was greatly improved by Vieille and Sarrau who were able to record and analyze

powder samples firings which lasted only few milliseconds. But contrary to Urbanski, Vieille

did not invent the bomb. This is apparent in a eulogy to Vieille in the 1934 MP. Vieille was

the first to recommend amyl alcohol in 1896 and remained confident even when explosions

were occurring in the early 1900’s despite the presence of amyl alcohol. Lheure, Vieille’s

colleague in the SDP did not share this confidence. He pointed to amyl alcohol’s stabilizing

problems and proposed remedies already in a 1903 study. Vieille’s 1908 study provided

stability data on samples stored in France, supporting amyl alcohol, and offering theoretical

explanations. Vieille also noted that powders with 8% of amyl alcohol, added as a stabilizer

to prevent decomposition, were introduced in 1903 in place of powders with 2%, introduced

in 1896. This is at odds with Urbanski and Tavernier who point to 1906 as the year of

introduction. Vieille devised in 1887-1888 a laboratory method for measuring poudre B’s

10 Patrice Bret, “Managing Chemical Expertise: The Laboratories of the French Artillery and the Service des

Poudres”, in Frontline and Factory: Comparative Perspectives on the Chemical Industry at War, 1914-1924,

eds. Roy Mac Leod et Jeffrey Allan Johnson (Dordrecht, Springer,2006), pp 203-219

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stability, the “Vieille method”. According to Vieille’s 1908 MP study his method was

dropped in 1897 and the method of army captain Lépidi’s was accepted as the standard

method by the SDP. Vieille’s original method was only the first phase of Lépidi’s lengthy

method, which was also named “Total Duration” or “Total Resistance”. Total Duration was

the standard test name until 1934 when a commission renamed it as the “Vieille method”.

This revision published in the 1934 MP was most likely homage to Vieille who died before,

in that year. Urbanski presents the 1934 revised method as the “Vieille method” without a

further explanation on the subtleties. The first introduction of flash reduction additive, black

powder was attributed by Urbanski to France following Dautriche’s 1908 reported findings.

Tavernier describes the Germans as being the first in 1902. A post WWI review in the MP

however, describes French efforts in similar periods to the ones in Germany and with similar

materials. The coating technology of powders for small arms to make them more efficient

was known to be advanced in Germany and implemented already in the late 1890’s. But

several MP’s point to a simplified process utilized in France from 1897 approximately, and

that the treated poudre B was less efficient by several percents. Process engineers who wrote

in 1890’s MP’s describe improvements efforts which are still utilized today in the chemical

plants: increasing efficiency by automating manual phases, the eliminations of phases where

possible, improving hygiene and safety. Studies on new laboratory methods for analysis were

also published. Reports on implementations of German and British processes and analytical

methods are commonly found in the MP’s before WWI, pointing to the ease of technological

transfers.

The first chapter of this work presents the general design ambience of poudre B: artillery and

powder developments. Chapters 2 to 5 chronologically address compositional, process and

administrative issues in the formative years until 1914 and during the extreme hardships of

WWI. Chapter 6 examines the continuing problems with nitroglycerine in post WWI

Germany, helping to assess the decision not to use nitroglycerine in poudre B:

Chapter 1: Powder and artillery general developments 1850’s to 1918 Chapter 2: Pre WWI powder developments in France and elsewhere Chapter 3: Powder related developments in France 1913-1918 Chapter 4: Military powders production in Germany during WWI Chapter 5: British, American and Russian WWI challenges Chapter 6: The German postwar problems with nitroglycerine in powders

A chronological exposition of the main issues and findings is presented in the following part

of this Introduction chapter. The chapter ends with the examination of the different sources

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used in the attempt to construct a coherent perspective. A review of similar works and

methodologies is also provided.

The development of modern military powders (“smokeless”) for small arms and guns began

in the mid 19th century. Artillery powders reached their height of strategic importance in

WWI. In this war, artillery was almost the only mean for launching projectiles to long ranges,

and the forces increasingly relied on artillery as the war progressed. The technical challenges

until the end of the 19th century consisted of designing a chemically stable nitrocellulose, in

the search for processes suitable for the production of a stable nitrocellulose and for creating

suitable powder compositions and shapes. These compositions were required to be

ballistically stable, i.e., to burn in a controlled manner in the gun yielding a required

projectile exit velocity within the constraints of maximum allowable pressures. From the

time of the discovery of nitrocellulose and the other main component nitroglycerine in the

mid 19thcentury, research has advanced systematically reaching maturity by the mid 1880s

when it became known that France had successfully developed a dependable composition.

This became official in a note appearing in the 1890 MP. The note, beginning on page 9,

announced that the “French armament has undergone an almost complete transformation in

the last five years, a change which most great continental powers are striving each in their

own turn to realize… The evolution in France from the end of 1884 …consisted in the

employment of powerful organic nitrated explosives in (propelling) charges of arms of all

calibers. These compositions are known for more than 40 years. Their considerable

advantages in arms and mines were appreciated when they first appeared, their effects being

generally equal to those which are produced by the black powder charges weighing three to

four times more”. Citation of the original passage:

“L’armement français a été l’objet, dans les cinq années qui viennent de s’écouler, d’une

transformation, a peu près complète aujourd’hui, que la plupart des grandes puissances

continentales s’efforcent de réaliser à leur tour …L’évolution qui s’est produite en France

dès la fin de l’année 1884 …consiste en l’emploi, pour le chargement des armes de tous

calibres, des explosifs organiques azotés à grande puissance. Ces composés sont connus

depuis plus de quarante ans. On a apprécié, dès leur apparition, l’avantage considérable

qu’ils devaient présenter dans les armes et dans les mines, leurs effets étant généralement

égaux à ceux que produit la poudre noire employée à des charges trois ou quatre fois plus

grandes.”

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Paul Vieille in the MP volume of 1893 presented the details of the laboratory work, which

enabled the 1884 breakthrough.

In 1884, a similar powder was also adopted by Germany, although less uniform in shape and

burning. Britain, Russia followed within a few years. The U.S began in the mid 1890’s.

The period from 1886 to the early 20th century saw changes in the production facilities to

accommodate the new technology. It was the State of France, through its administrative

bodies, which managed these changes by using and improving a framework already created

in the period of black powder11. The State’s monopoly on powder production for the military

was not undermined in the period of 1884 to 1918, despite numerous attempts of the private

industry. The framework underwent a number of changes after the Franco-Prussian war of

1870-1871, which included the separation of development and production activities from the

consumers (army, navy) and subjugating these activities directly under the Minister of War.

The changes continued in accordance to the changing needs - the more noted ones after the

1907 Iéna (navy ship) accident.

In the process of transformation into smokeless powders, consultative committees to the

Minister of War carried top-level guidance while the work of development and production

was carried out mainly by the SDP. It worked under the authority delegated by the Ministry

of War but this was not the only administration to develop and manufacture powders. Navy

and army artillery administrations were also engaged, cooperating (or sometimes in a

dispute) with the SDP.

After some ten years of mass production and storage (1893 approx), new signs of

decomposition of French powders brought about an intensive effort to find a suitable

stabilizing material for powders in long storage. This was more of a French problem since a

more suitable stabilizer, diphenylamine, which was originally proposed by Alfred Nobel, was

utilized in Germany for nitrocellulose-based as poudre B. A stabilizer named amyl alcohol, a

11 Patrice Bret, “The organization of Gunpowder production in France 1775-1830”, in Gunpowder: The History

of an International Technology -22 nd International Symposium of technology –ICOHTEC, ed. Brenda J

Buchanan (Bath University, 1996), pp.261-272.

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liquid solvent, (less volatile than ethyl alcohol and ether, used to dissolve nitrocellulose in the

poudre B process), was recommended in 1896 by the SDP, and was accepted. The percentage

of amyl alcohol in the powder was kept at approximately 2%. Vieille explained in 1896 that

amyl alcohol’s improvement of stability was found by chance. A certain poudre B lot,

accidentally having amyl alcohol by accident, showed improved stability. In a 1908 study,

Vieille provided a hypothesis for the stabilizing mechanism of amyl alcohol: The alcohol

created a lightly dense inner structure of nitrocellulose in the powder, allowing the exit of

decomposition gases and preventing a pressure buildup in the mass, which would only

accelerate decomposition. Ether and ethyl alcohol help in the same mechanism, but after

production, they volatilize from the powder over the years. This leads to a dense structure

and accelerates decomposition further. In laboratory stability tests, the advantage of poudre B

with amyl alcohol, stored during 10 years in France, was clearly manifested. The explanation

for the stabilizing mechanism of diphenylamine, a solid crystalline material dispersed in the

poudre B mass with the help of solvents, was based on the annexation of the decomposition

gases to the diphenylamine molecule; thereby “trapping” them and preventing a pressure

build up.

In addition to chemical instability, ballistic performance variations of poudre B were found in

powders stored in high temperatures, as in the colonies or on ships, towards the end of the

1890’s. These variations yielded inconsistent exit velocities over years and seasons. The navy

worked on a solution with the SDP already in 1901. It was found that the gradual losses of

solvents in the powders increase the pressures in the gun and that powders with amyl alcohol

were less susceptible to these changes. By the end of 1905 the powders were beginning to be

packed in a more hermetic packaging and powders lots underwent a certain “aging” process

to render them more ballistically stable, prior to packaging.12

Vieille in a 1903 work did not see signs of chemical deterioration which may be a reason for

ballistic instability. The reasons are to be found in the loss of solvents and water during

storage. He recommended that powders found to have a high tendency to loose their volatile

solvents at the end of production, were not to be supplied but did not propose measures to

reduce water losses, common in hot temperatures. Giving priority to resolving solvent losses

may have stemmed from Vieille’s inner belief that this can also improve chemical stability.

12 “Sénat-Séance du 21 Novembre 1907”, Journal officiel du 22 Novembre 1907, p1048

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Lheure, another researcher in the SDP, provided experimental results in 1903 which showed

that amyl alcohol could volatilize out of the powder in the high temperatures of ships, and as

a consequence, the chemical stability may deteriorate. He supported hermetic packaging as a

solution. His work may also have been one of the reasons for the navy’s 1903 decision to

increase the amyl alcohol’s percentage in thick powders, from 2% to 8%. This move as

explained by Tavernier was intended to increase chemical stability.13

The army attempted at improving poudre B stability by introducing diphenylamine. Poudre B

samples with diphenylamine were already manufactured in 1896 by the army artillery and

comparative laboratory test were performed with poudre B having amyl alcohol. Results

presented to a high professional commission in 1905 did not persuade this commission to use

diphenylamine. Nevertheless, the army was successful in persuading the Ministry of War to

order the production of poudre B with diphenylamine in two plants, by early 190714. Shortly

afterwards, the navy ship explosion of 1907 (Iéna) took place, which was later attributed to

amyl alcohol’s inability to stabilize. Intensive investigations and comparative tests were then

conducted leading to a final decision by the navy on March 1911 to replace the stabilizer.

Another famous accident took place on September 1911, that of the explosion on the navy

ship Liberté, which was attributed to old poudre B, still having amyl alcohol.

The decision milestones above differ with Urbanski 15 who noted that the 1911 Liberté

explosion induced the decision for stabilizer replacement: “It was believed in France the

diphenylamine was too basic, and liable to hydrolyse nitrocellulose. Nevertheless, in view of

the disaster on the battleship Liberté, the use of diphenylamine as a stabilizer for

nitrocellulose powder was approved in 1911.”

Patrice Bret 16 notes that the development and production structure, which was polarized by

competitions between the SDP and the army artillery, underwent a substantial shakeup after

the 1907 accident leading to better cooperation and renewed confidence in the SDP.

13 Paul Tavernier, “Évolution Historique des Poudres Sans Fumée”, MP, 32 (1950), pp. 249,251 14 “Sénat-Séance du 22 Novembre 1907”, Journal officiel du 23 Novembre 1907, p.1060 15 Tadeusz Urbanski, Chemistry and Technology of Explosives, Vol.III, pp.530, 551,559,644,652. 16 Patrice Bret, “La guerre des laboratoires..” (draft version, 2002), pp 27, 29.

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The sudden increase in poudre B consumption in the 1880’s, led the SDP to the design and

implementation of new processes and installations of raw and intermediate materials, as in

the case of nitric acid. This intermediate material was needed for manufacturing

nitrocellulose. The SDP soon realized that it could not rely on the market, since the used

(spent) acids from the process, were bought by the market at very low prices (this motivated

the construction of acid recycling installations).

Towards the beginning of the 20th century, this “great leap forward” in processes and

compositions had more or less ended and “fine tunings” were beginning to be made. An

exception to this was the late resolution of the stabilizer issue.

The organizational structure of development and production resembled a typical chemical

organization as in the pharmaceutical industry. Production was performed “in-house” for

key materials whereas less important materials were bought from the private industry. The

black powder plants that SDP ran were gradually transformed to nitrocellulose-poudre B

based technology, each one performing one or several phases in the process and supplying

materials for the next phase. Developments efforts were dictated by military needs, as

delegated by the different SDP-Military steering committees. The development efforts were

aimed to meet specified gun requirements and to solve internal analytical and production

problems. There were chemical analytical efforts to find better methods to analyze and

qualify material stability and impurities at the different phases of the process. Improvements

were also made to increase the yield quality, and safety. These applied either to the “wet”

phase (of producing nitrocellulose with acids in large reactors) or to the final and more “dry”

phase where materials were processed from a semi-solid form to a final, solid form (the

powder). A governmental inspection committee performed a comprehensive review of

production facilities in 1910-1911 and finalized a report in 1912, with specific targets for

health improvements.

The developmental efforts were undertaken according to the specialty of the researchers,

more or less according to the professional divisions found today, although some persons were

engaging, at least in the beginning, in researching several areas. These efforts can be typified

as:

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a) Analytical research and development (“Analytical R&D”): Finding new or improved

analytical methods according to the requirements of process and final composition. Ballistic

analysis may also be included here, such as the construction and improvement of laboratory

devices for the prediction of powder performance in the field. The MPs from the 1880’s until

the late 1920’s provide numerous studies on improvements of chemical analytical methods

and analyses of ballistic properties of the powder in the laboratory. The analytical efforts

during WWI, continued with prewar programs, but efforts were also being made to analyze

captured German powders. Patrice Bret 17 examined the overall wartime analytical efforts

and the types of studies performed.

b) “Process R&D”: Design of new chemical processes, scale-ups and on-site process

improvements. Reports on these activities are found mostly in the MPs of 1890’s, but several

important studies are found until the late 1920’s. As in the case of the analytical efforts, the

process improvements studies were continued in WWI. French powder historians, as

Duchemin and René Pique after WWI and Louis Vannetzel in 1960’s, also gave detailed

descriptions of production problems during WWI.

c) “Composition R&D”: Adjustments of compositions and their final geometrical forms to

meet the gun requirements (analogous to the pharmaceuticals term “pharmaceutical R&D”

which is engaged in determining the shape and composition of the tablets and oversees final

product laboratory tests, and trials on animals and humans). The MPs until the 1930’s

provide technical data, on shapes, compositions and ballistic performances.

In WWI, production in France was raised up to 20-fold, testing, under extreme conditions,

the suitability of prewar poudre B compositions, processes and organization. The

compositions and shapes of poudre B were hardly changed. Other compositions were

manufactured in minor quantities. Prewar process installations were scaled up and new plants

were erected, using the same prewar technology but with moderate adaptations. This was

17 Patrice Bret, “Managing Chemical Expertise..” pp. 203-219.

11

possible since France was able to import the needed raw materials most of the time, and

choices were made to continue with proven processes. Some of the needed machinery was

produced with difficulty, tighter process control was required, and the presence of a large

new and unskilled workforce was of a concern. These problems were, however, not

insurmountable, and were resolved with intensive efforts of the personnel involved

Poudre B was not an exceptional composition in the period of 1884 to1918 and afterwards.

Russia and the USA were also employing mostly single base powders before and during

WWI. British and German compositions did include nitroglycerine; an innovative step that

increased powder energy. In the years after WWI, single base compositions comprised the

major share of production tonnage in the USA as in France. During the 1930’s in Germany,

double base powders with nitroglycerine were found to cause high barrel erosions which

could not be overcome due to lack of metal hardening materials in Germany. Nitroglycerine

was replaced with less energetic materials. Thus, one of the original motives for

nitroglycerine, the ability to increase energy, was lost. This does not diminish however, the

importance of developing nitroglycerine based technology which was adapted to the rocket

engines appearing in the 1930’s.

Major references point to an advanced German powder status in the beginning of the 20th

century. The German efforts prior to WWI were innovative, and even more so during WWI -

when new processes had to be used to circumvent raw materials whose import was prevented

because of the blockade. Prior to WWI, the Germans were among the first in the use of

suitable stabilizers to prevent powder decomposition; in the utilization of nitroglycerine

using state of the art processes; in the coating of small arms powders to increase their

efficiency; and in the incorporation of salts to reduce muzzle flash.

The German WWI efforts were typified by the development of raw material processes

relying on locally abundant raw materials, especially non-edible types. Production of alcohol

for nitrocellulose-based powders was attempted from wastes of the paper industry, in place of

edible potatoes and beets. Glycerin, a key raw material for nitroglycerine, was obtained from

candle and soap processes, which consumed animal and vegetable fats. These raw materials,

however, also served the food industry and were mostly imported. The wartime blockade

decreased their import to a large extent and both food and glycerin productions were,

subsequently, greatly reduced. The manufacture of glycerin from sugar, which was imported

12

in large quantities prior to WWI, reduced this shortage. Other highly energetic materials

sometimes replaced nitroglycerine in the compositions. Nitric acid was essential, both to the

manufacture of nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine for powders and the explosive industries.

The production of nitric acid could not rely on prewar imports of the raw material, sodium

nitrate, from Chile. Synthetic processes for nitric acid had to be scaled-up. Cellulose, an

essential material for nitrocellulose manufacture was successfully produced from wood

instead of cotton, which was a scarce commodity.

With regard to the German powder compositional innovations, this work will emphasize that

the only notable French technological gap, having a macro (or strategic) impact, was the

wrong selection of a stabilizer, a problem resolved prior to WWI. Performance advantages

with the highly energetic nitroglycerine-based powders were marginal. The tradeoff from the

increase of energy was the large increase in barrel erosion of guns, and this was the original

reason for French objections. Erosion problems were resolved in Britain and Germany prior

to WWI by lowering nitroglycerine percentage and energy, reducing energy differences with

of poudre B. However, the German and British wartime difficulties with nitroglycerine as a

raw material point to the distinct possibility that, in refraining from its use, the French

avoided a strategic pitfall. Martin Meyer, a professor and chairman of the Department of

Chemistry, Brooklyn College, stated in 1943, that “the United States Army abandoned

nitroglycerine powders as standard in 1906, among other reasons because it was anticipated

that under war conditions a shortage of glycerin might develop, and the European experience

from 1914 to 1918 confirmed this.” 18

With regard to other performance issues related to the final composition of powder, such as

treating small arms powder to make them more efficient, this work will point to marginal

differences between French and German coated powders prior to WWI. This gap was closed

after WWI. The technological knowledge of flash-reducing additives and their applications

were similar in the two countries several years before WWI.

With regard to German innovations in raw material processes, this work will point to a

similar search for new paths in France, although the activities were much less urgent and

18 Martin Meyer, The Science of Explosive, An introduction to their chemistry, production and analysis, (New-

York 1943), pp. 81-82.

13

smaller in scale. These included finding alternatives to cotton and finding synthetic routes to

alcohol and nitric acid. Alternatives for cottons were not manufactured in large scale, since

the stocks of nitrocellulose were sufficient during WWI. The development of synthetic

alcohol began as the submarine war became more threatening at the beginning of 1917 -

yielding a small pilot plant. Large-scale alcohol imports were renewed in early 1918. Nitric

acid was the only raw material for powder and explosives, which warranted manufacture

through a synthetic route, as practiced in Germany, but with much smaller production

capability. Duchemin, a wartime artillery officer writing in cooperation with the SDP, wrote

in 1925 that the Agreement countries (“Entente”) ruled the seas, and could buy the raw

materials in markets around the world. The problem was reduced to the question of

transportation and.. also of bank-notes. This massive raw material importation was, perhaps,

not a brilliant solution from the economical point of view but economical considerations in

time of war take a second place. Citation of the original passage:

“L’Entente, possédant la maîtrise des mers, peut s’approvisionner en matières premières sur

les marchés du monde entier. Le problème se réduit à une question de transport et… aussi de

bank-notes. La solution n’est peut-être pas très brillante du point de vue financier, mais c’est

une considération qui, en temps de guerre, passe au second plan...” 19

Brilliance, from the economic point of view, may have been the development of processes,

which rely on raw materials, found locally, as was done in Germany from a lack of options.

The implied advantage in relying on imports and proven technology was in the avoidance of

adventures and risks at the time when the product was most needed. This also enabled

research and management personnel to commit to prevent chaos in the plants, and to

troubleshoot localized technical problems in the scale up and in daily routine. The potential

for chaos was due to the fact that the plants handled large numbers of poudre B lots (or

batches in a more modern nomenclature) at one time. Such lots have small differences in

their burning rates and in the charge weight needed in the gun. There was always the risk of

accidental mixings between sacks of different lots, and unexpected ballistic performances.

The vast numbers of new, unskilled workers, mostly farm workers, also created an

atmosphere for potential chaos.

19 Duchemin, “Poudres et Explosifs 1914-1918 (Suite et fin)”, Revue Militaire Française, 52 (Octobre 1925), p. 96.

14

The manufacture of explosives was the harder challenge for the SDP, due both to the scarcity

of raw material and to the extent of the scale up. This became a bottleneck at the beginning

of WWI. Of the two chemicals in the shell, powder was thus the more surmountable obstacle.

Tadeusz Urbanski is appreciative of a specific 1912 German compositional and process

innovation, the production of nitroglycerine-nitrocellulose based composition RPC/12. His

works in general, rely on numerous primary sources and describe the historical evolution of

processes and compositions. RPC/12 was described as having been produced without

requiring the large amounts of volatile solvents (e.g. acetone, alcohol and ether used in

French, British and several German processes) and the subsequent drying process. Since no

solvent was present, no drying (which takes a few days to over a week) was required and no

solvents needed to be produced. Urbanski 20 writes:

“The powder (RPC/12) was used extensively during World War I since it could be produced

much more quickly than nitrocellulose powder. The manufacture of this powder contributed

largely to the long resistance of the Central Powers..”. “.. The rapid manufacture of RPC/12

powder was one of the reasons for the protracted resistance of the Central Powers during

World War I. The lack of acetone suffered by the Central powers at the time had no effect on

the production capacity of the German factories..”. “.. The manufacture of this powder was

kept a secret and not disclosed until after World War I.”

If the RPC/12 contribution was considerable then the French exclusion of nitroglycerine may

have prevented the possibility of such an improvement. One postwar study, points to the fact

that RPC/12 use was considerably less widespread in WWI than might be gathered from

Urbanski’s remarks, and limited to large calibers, mostly in the navy. The saving in drying

time provided by RPC/12 was significantly offset by a specific RPC/12 phase requirement,

that of two weeks of “ripening” (according to Urbanski). Furthermore, a large portion of

German powders, were similar in composition and processes to those of the French, requiring

large quantities of solvents as in France. RPC/12 did not relieve or greatly reduce the scale of

the solvent problem on the German side.

Nitroglycerine was in very short supply in Germany during WWI, and RPC/12 needs for

nitroglycerine apparently aggravated the shortage. In certain times, RPC/12 production

20 Tadeusz Urbanski, Chemistry and Technology of Explosives, Vol.III (Oxford, 1967), pp.530, 652.

15

utilized trinitrotoluene as an unfavorable replacement of nitroglycerine which was in short

supply. In addition, the principles of the RPC/12 process were well known through a series of

patents issued beginning 1910, in Britain, Germany, Switzerland and elsewhere.

Furthermore, a certain degree of French knowledge about RPC/12 during WWI seems

plausible from a French postwar report.

The examination of numerous references in this work serve to illuminate some less quoted

sources, to present differing dates and data from various sources and to construct an

historical perspective on poudre B as a suitable technology. This work cites the extensive

postwar works of Duchemin (1925), which were not referred to by contemporaries or later

powder historians (perhaps because he wrote in the French Military Review while most

powder issues were addressed in the MP and Artillery Review). Duchemin gives a most

detailed review of the macro problems in manufacture during WWI, the dates, and the

production data, both for France and Germany. He also reviews explosive supply problems.

The problems described can help to evaluate the maturity of the French prewar production

processes. Using this data, comparisons can be made with other sources on production, such

as the MP studies and Vannetzel. The reasons for not following the German paths in

innovations can also be learned from Duchemin, as well as details on feasibility studies,

which were carried out.

Vannetzel described the major manufacturing developments in each plant during 1886 to

1914. This work will present a more detailed focus by also reviewing MP studies, presenting

detailed obstacles, the open approach to foreign technology and the use of economical and

military considerations. The 1912 hygienic, safety and general technological status in the

plants will be presented, based on a lengthy official report published in the 1911-1912 MP

volume.

An historical perspective on poudre B and nitrocellulose-nitroglycerine-based powders in

France is achieved by citing several sources, each one presenting a different part of the story.

One French reference, points to intensive activities by the Sevran-Livry plant of the SDP in

1885 in development of Ballistite (containing some 49.5% nitroglycerine and 49.5%

nitrocellulose). This was done in parallel with Alfred Nobel who was working nearby. Nobel

patented the Ballistite in 1888 and the French efforts are generally overlooked since the work

16

was discontinued because of concern for erosion. In WWI, the Army Artillery Service

decided to use Ballistite for trench mortars. The SDP acted quickly, relying on the 1880’s

experiments and Italian experience. Paul Vieille also wrote on his experiments with Ballistite

and Cordite-like samples in the mid 1880’s, seemingly with a certain degree of cooperation

with Fredrick Abel and Alfred Nobel. The Picatinny Arsenal encyclopedia describes the

Russians and the Americans as using only nitrocellulose-based powders in WWI, as in

France (other sources support this claim). Pre-war problems with high-energy double base

are also described in the Picatinny encyclopedia and by Tavernier. Duchemin describes in

detail the German wartime problems with nitroglycerine. Vannetzel presents data on the wide

use of poudre B in postwar France despite the new double base compositions. The Picatinny

encyclopedia describes the postwar German problems with nitroglycerine pointing to

continual problems with the historic and innovative decision.

The claim that prewar French small arms poudre B performance was marginally behind

Germany will be supported by a postwar study in the MP, and by citations from Pascal and

Tavernier. The French method relied on the partial dissolution of the outer powder layer with

alcohol, rendering it phlegmatic, while the German method relied on coating the outer layer

of the powder with a more phlegmatic material.

Tavernier, Urbanski and Bret addressed the poudre B stability issues. Patrice Bret relies on

the 1907 Iéna senate inquiry commission report and senatorial debates following the report.

Tavernier also provides a detailed account on the progression of the stability issues and

debates within the French establishment21 although he does not provide specific references

for his citations on stability. He most probably relied on the same sources as Bret, since most

of the citations were found in a partial review of the Senate debate proceedings22. Tavernier

citations point to overconfidence on the part of Berthelot and Vieille regarding stability,

when the army began to suspect that poudre B was unstable already in the 1880’s. The heads

of the 1907 Iéna senate inquiry commission presented these citations during the debate on the

finding, to counter documents presented by Vieille’s supporters, intended to show that Vieille

warned against overconfidence. Vieille’s supporters also tried to discredit the hypothesis of

the commission that the accident was caused by self-inflammation of poudre B. They pointed

to several other possible causes, as inflammation of black powder, radio waves or even

21 Paul Tavernier, “Évolution Historique des Poudres Sans Fumée”, MP, 32 (1950), pp. 247-250,253 22 “Sénat-Séance du 26 Novembre 1907”, Journal officiel du 27 Novembre 1907, pp.1076,1077

17

malicious sabotage23,24. This work will cite from the above-mentioned references, and will

add additional insights on the stability thinking of SDP developers, as Vieille, Lheure, Patart,

Marqueyrol and Koehler. Some works point to the disagreement in the SDP before the Iéna,

on the reliability of amyl alcohol and despite the official confidence of the SDP, expressed by

“triad of specialists”25, Berthelot, Sarrau and Vieille.

There is usually less focus on the nitrocellulose stability testing method issue. This work will

present debates on an SDP initiative to adopt foreign methods for testing nitrocellulose

stability in 1913 and 1914 (published in the MP). The initiative may point to a lessening

confidence, after the Iéna, in methods, which originated in the SDP. It is interesting to note

how two SDP researchers Marqueyrol and Kœhler write openly against the decision of their

management to adopt the Abel stability method. Bret described the two as the new and

primary forces, who led to the needed changes in the LCP and SDP after the Iéna. 26

Louis Vannetzel reviewed the dates and acts of administrative changes. Patrice Bret provides

a profound review on the struggles between the different institutions and persons at the time.

This work will cite these references and provide additional insight into two administrative

acts, which demonstrate an open and methodical approach: The inauguration of the MP in

1882 and the works of the Commission for Explosive Substances, beginning 1878.

Sandra Lee Norman 27 presented in 1988 a similar study in topic and scope: American

nitrocellulose and gunpowder developments over a period of 80 years. The methodology was

similar, relying on professional textbooks, technological and scientific periodicals, and

commission hearings.

The continuing study by Patrice Bret on the pre Iéna rivalries between the different

laboratories and the post Iéna Scientific Commission on Military Powders involving Henri

Poincaré and Henry Le Chatelier, relies on a similar methodology, and also examines

personal correspondences between Poincaré and Le Chatelier.

23 “Sénat-Séance du 22 Novembre 1907”, Journal officiel du 23 Novembre 1907, pp.1057-1062 24 Sénat-Séance du 21 Novembre 1907”, Journal officiel du 22 Novembre 1907, pp.1041-1047 25 Patrice Bret, “La guerre des laboratoires..” pp.10-12. 26 Patrice Bret, “Managing Chemical Expertise..”, p.207. 27 Sandra Lee Norman, Guncotton to smokeless power: the development of Nitrocellulose military explosive, 1845-1929, (PhD Thesis, Brown University, 1988) pp.94 and pp.110-113.