Developing Adequate Humanitarian Responses

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Summary: Diverse and dynamic patterns

of internal and cross-border mobility, mi-

gration and displacement are the norm

in most countries affected by chronic

or recurrent humanitarian crises, which

often makes it difcult to distinguish

between forced and voluntary migrants

because different people adopt highly

varied strategies to cope or survive, or

to respond to new opportunities. The

most negative human impacts of climate

change will be reected in sudden and

large-scale forced migration.

Many so-called fragile states already

fail to provide adequate social protection

to poor and vulnerable populations,

so any climate-related deterioration

in human security has the potential to

generate extreme welfare needs that are

far beyond the capacities or willingness

of these states to address. The sheer

scale and complexities of displacement

will continue to stretch and challenge the

normative, institutional and operational

frameworks and capacities of the

international humanitarian system and

national humanitarian actors. Greater

priority needs to be given to exible

humanitarian funding and programming

suited to addressing chronic as well

as acute humanitarian needs and

vulnerability in countries where formal

climate change adaptation policies are

unlikely to be developed. Supercial

climate change adaptation and disaster

risk reduction efforts in countries

affected by complex and interacting

processes including population

growth, economic stagnation, conict,

urbanization and environmental stress,

are unlikely to inuence the deeper

dynamics of vulnerability associated with

distress migration.

1744 R Street NWWashington, DC 20009 1 202 745 3950F 1 202 265 1662E [email protected]

Study Team on Climate-Induced Migration

John Holmes, the United Nations(UN) Under-Secretary-General or

Humanitarian Aairs, has describedrecent climate-related humanitariandisasters as a curtain raiser on theuture, signiying what he terms anew normal,1 reected in a doublingo recorded humanitarian disastersover the past two decades, mosto which have been hydrological,meteorological or climatologicalin nature.2Climate change islikely to add a urther complexdynamic to the drivers o social,

economic and political crisis andsignicantly accelerate an escalation ohumanitarian need in many contexts.It will interact at every level with otherkey trends aecting humanitariancaseloads, including conict, chronicpoverty, poor governance, populationgrowth, ood insecurity, pressure onland and urbanization; the associatedrisks o these interacting trends aregrowing concurrently, particularlyin countries with little in the way ostate-supported social protection.Te risks o humanitarian disastersare thereore set to increase not onlyas a consequence o more requentand intense hazard events connected

with climate change, such as oodsand droughts, but also as a result

o escalating vulnerability to thesehazards.3

With many precarious livelihoodsystems acing multiple stresses ordestruction as a consequence oslow- and sudden-onset disastersand broader social and economictransormations, the ability o manymillions o people to adapt and survive to escape danger, to nd ood,shelter or sanctuary, or to secure a

livelihood will continue to dependto a greater or lesser extent on theirown coping and survival strategies,including migration, and oen onaccess to humanitarian assistance. Temost negative human impacts o theseinteracting trends will continue to bereected in patterns o sudden andlonger-term orced migration.

Climate change thus simultaneouslyrepresents a threat multiplier

in terms o its impacts on humanvulnerability,4 a demand multiplierin its likely impacts on humanitarianneeds and the consequent pressures onthe international humanitarian system

Developing Adequate Humanitarian

Responses

by Sarah Collinson

June 2010

1 John Holmes, The need for collaboration, Forced Migration Review, Issue 31, October 2008: 4.2. Ibid. and Informal Taskforce on Climate Change of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and The International

Strategy for Disaster Reduction, Disaster risk reduction strategies and risk management practices: critical elements

for adaptation to climate change, Submission to the UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative

Action, November 11, 2008.3. Informal Taskforce of the IASC et al., op cit.


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and a scale and complexity multiplier in its associated

impacts on migration, including orced migration.

Dynamics of humanitarian vulnerability in the face of

climate change: implications for migration

Te migration implications o climate change will beintimately connected with the complex interactions oclimate change with broader causes and dynamics o humanvulnerability across dierent countries and social groups,and over time. A number o important observations relatingto these interactions deserve particular attention.

First, national governance structures and the states capacityto provide services and maintain institutions are o keyimportance in inuencing the humanitarian impactso climate change and associated orced and voluntarymigration in dierent contexts.I drought leads to ailurein ood production, or example, the response (or not) ogovernment and other power-holders will largely denewhether this leads to severe ood insecurity, violent struggleor control o contested resources, or large-scale orced orvoluntary migration.

Many developing and middle-income countries that haveexperienced multiple and recurrent climate-related andother natural disasters and associated mass displacementhave the institutional, logistical and nancial resourcesto lead and implement eective humanitarian responseswithout calling or signicant international assistance.Sometimes, however, a governments willingness torequest or allow international help is determined moreby political sensitivities and imperatives than by actualresponse capacities and humanitarian needs on the ground.Governments may be reluctant to declare a disaster orear o appearing weak, they may mistrust the motivations

behind the provision o international assistance, or theymay ear that international actors will usurp their role andchallenge their sovereignty. Te Myanmar government, orinstance, was reluctant to call or international assistanceaer Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and both the Mozambiqueand Pakistan governments resisted international assistanceollowing oods in 2007; China has aced numerous major

natural disasters but the government has rarely sought

or accepted international assistance, and internationalengagement has been closely managed and regulated.5

People will continue to be most exposed to the risks oclimate change and other stresses where ormal governanceinstitutions are particularly weak or distorted, especiallywhere violence and poor governance have already weakenedtheir coping and survival capacities. Many so-called ragilestates already lack legitimacy and ail to provide adequatesocial protection to poor and vulnerable populations, soany climate-related deterioration in human security hasthe potential to generate extreme welare needs that are

ar beyond the capacities or willingness o these states toaddress. Tese state capacities may themselves be directlyundermined by the broader economic and other impactso climate change, urther impeding the provision o evenminimal basic services or any state support o livelihoods.6Tese trends may then create or exacerbate social andpolitical tensions or violence, urther threatening the welareo communities that are already vulnerable to climaticand other shocks and hazards. While there is no way opredicting precisely how climate change might aect conictdynamics, there is little doubt that any substantially negativeimpacts on livelihood security and state eectivenessin ragile states hold the potential to trigger or ampliyviolence that, in turn, is likely to cause displacement.7

Second, diverse and complex patterns o internal and cross-border mobility, migration and displacement are the norm inmost countries aected by chronic or recurrent humanitariancrises. Indeed, in most situations o extreme vulnerability, itis difcult to distinguish orced and voluntary migration asdierent people adopt highly varied and dynamic strategies tosurvive or minimize livelihood risks, or to respond to newopportunities associated with changing circumstances. In

most poor countries, many people and households pursuelivelihoods through economic and social relationships thatstraddle urban and rural spaces with a variety o strategiesand activities, including subsistence arming, pastoralism,cash-cropping, agricultural wage labor, house-building,petty trade, petty manuacture, transport and other wagelabor. Many o these activities depend to a greater or lesser

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4. Jenty Kirsch-Wood, Jacob Korreborg and Anne-Marie Linde, What humanitarians need to do, Forced Migration Review, Issue 31, October 2008: 40-41.5. Paul Harvey, Towards Good Humanitarian Government: The Role of the Affected State in Disaster Response, HPG Report 29, Humanitarian Policy Group (Overseas Development

Institute, London), 2009.6.Jon Barnett and W. Neil Adger, Climate change, human security and violent conict, Political Geography, 26 (2007): 639-655.7. Ibid.


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extent on temporary, cyclical or permanent migration. I

unsuccessul, some livelihood strategies may lead eventuallyto displacement.8 Peoples livelihoods and other coping orsurvival strategies will oen be negative in some respects,either or themselves (e.g. associated with asset depletionor exposure to new risks) or others (e.g. violent, criminal orexploitative livelihoods or protection strategies).9

Tird, deeper processes o marginalization, disempowerment,impoverishment or displacement may make some peopleor groups particularly vulnerable in many countries.Relationships between dierent economic and politicalactors seeking livelihoods at dierent levels involve

complex mixes o exploitation, exclusion, coercion andredistribution.10 A recent Overseas Development Institute(ODI) report on responses to drought in Ethiopia, orexample, observes that while vulnerability to ood insecuritymay be caused most immediately by actors such as landdegradation, recurrent drought, population pressure andlow agricultural productivity, there is evidence that theimpacts o these problems on ood security are underpinnedby economic, social and political dynamics o vulnerability.Marginalized populations, or instance, may have noaccess to basic services, knowledge and inrastructure tohave any eective command over basic necessities andrights (e.g. ailure to protect land rights).11 Tese processesdirectly aect migration dynamics and outcomes. Forexample, shiing power dynamics between social andpolitical groups, reected in land-grabbing and other ormso asset-stripping or exclusion rom key markets, mayexacerbate or ampliy climate-related threats to peopleslives and livelihoods and interact with interconnectedmigration or displacement dynamics. Tus it may not be astraightorward issue o people losing arming land or beingunable to grow crops because o drought: ood insecurity oramine may be intentionally manipulated by power-holders,

and this in turn may result in migration due to changed ordisrupted livelihoods and/or displacement.12

Fourth, context-specifc vulnerability dynamics translate

into pockets o humanitarian need or larger-scale crises towhich national government and/or humanitarian actorsmay not be able or willing to respond eectively. Wherelevels o human insecurity are particularly high and statecapacity and resources weak, international humanitarianresponses have a potentially very important part to playin aecting the patterns, signicance and impacts omigration, and vice-versa. Where interventions havesupported or accelerated urban development and/orimpacted unevenly on rural poverty and vulnerability, orexample, associated rural-urban migration and growth ourban populations may have contributed to the growth

o ever-larger and possibly ever-more vulnerable urbanpopulations exposed to climate-related hazards, such asoods or depleted ood supplies aecting ood prices andaccess to ood. Already, around two-thirds o the worldsmega-cities with populations greater than ve million all atleast partly in low-lying ood-prone areas; possibly a ho the urban populations o the poorest countries live inhazard-prone environments.13 In most situations o large-scale Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and reugee returnboth government and international humanitarian actorsplay a critical role in determining the rate and dynamics opeoples movement and recovery o livelihoods in return

areas; environmental hazards or stress aggravated by climatechange have the potential to signicantly impede prospectso successul or sustainable return o large displacedpopulations, particularly where drought, ood or weathervariations associated with climate change may negativelyaect peoples livelihoods and ood security.14The responsiveness of the international humanitarian

system to climate change and associated migration

Te Inter-Agency Standing Committees (IASC) Inormalaskorce on Climate Change has argued recently thatadapting to climate change or humanitarian actors will

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8. Philippa Bevan, Conceptualising in/security regimes, in Ian Gough and Geof Wood with A. Barrientos, P. Bevan, P. Davis and G. Room (Eds), Insecurity and Welfare Regimes in

Asia, Africa and Latin America , Cambridge University Press (Social Policy in Development Contexts), Cambridge: 2004.9. Sarah Collinson (Ed.) (2003) Power, Livelihoods and Conict: Case Studies in Political Economy Analysis for Humanitarian Action, HPG Report 13, London: Overseas Development

Institute (Humanitarian Policy Group).10. Bevan, op cit., pp.98-99.11. Sara Pantuliano and Mike Wekesa, Improving drought response in pastoral areas of Ethiopia: Somali and Afar Regions and Borena Zone of Oromiya Region, Humanitarian

Policy Group (Overseas Development Institute, London). Prepared for the CORE group (CARE, FAO, Save the Children UK and Save the Children US), January 2008: 10.12. See, e.g.,, David Keen (1994) The Benets of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 19831989, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.13. Informal Taskforce of the IASC et al., op cit.14. David Stone, Asking the right questions, Forced Migration Review, Issue 31, October 2008: 42-43.


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require inter alia more eective vulnerability analysis and

mapping and early warning systems, contingency planning,and other preparedness measures. It will also requirereinorcement o coordination and partnerships betweengovernments and international systems. Innovations will beneeded to secure the additional resources required and toaccount or these extra resources.15

Beyond these technical policy adjustments, however, is theneed or a broader and deeper adjustment in the natureo humanitarian policy engagement and response to thehuman mobility, displacement and other trends associatedwith climate change.Many key normative, institutional,

operational and resource structures and systems within theinternational humanitarian system are poorly equippedor addressing the multiple and complex challenges tohuman security posed by climate change, and continue toundermine the systems global capacities. For example:

Distortions in the relative levels o donor assistanceowing to dierent countries due to competing politicaland strategic considerations means that, at the globallevel, the humanitarian system is already ailing torespond adequately to many displaced and othervulnerable populations on the basis o humanitarian

needs; recent reorms and initiatives designed tostrengthen the needs responsiveness o the system, suchas internationally pooled donor unding and commonagreement o principles to underpin humanitariandonor policies have only achieved partial improvementsin this respect.

Te humanitarian system remains relatively weakin strengthening and supporting civilian protectionalongside material assistance, despite the highervisibility given to IDP protection over the past decade.

Humanitarian programming or displaced populationsis highly concentrated on material relie within campsettings, with urban programming capacities remainingparticularly underdeveloped.

Humanitarian unding and operations continue tomarginalize longer-term or broader-based livelihoods

and recovery programming among displaced

populations, including in mass return programs.

International humanitarian actors coordination andcooperation with government and other national actorsis typically very weak, despite rhetorical recognitionthat local and national actors should play a primary orleading role in humanitarian action.16

More generally, humanitarian assistance that is designedand intended as a short-term instrument or meeting acuteneeds has oen come to represent an inadequate long-terminstrument or meeting chronic needs.17 Although agencies

have oen succeeded in delivering a range o basic servicesin these situations, this assistance has typically done littleto bring about sustainable improvements in humanitarianindicators or any signicant changes in the underlyingconditions causing vulnerability.

Te longer-term engagement o development actors is oenhampered by continuing instability or conict, or weak orillegitimate state institutions. More joined-up and eectiveengagement o humanitarian and development donors isalso negatively aected by tightly dened and risk-aversesystems o unding and engagement. Te preerence or

ood aid, or example, appears to be determined oen bypre-existing earmarking and a preerence or the saeoption, with its well understood mechanisms and expectedshort-term results.18

Although disaster risk reduction (DRR) activities arelargely supported through humanitarian rather thandevelopment unding and institutions, these remaingenerally marginalized within the humanitarian system.Tis is reected in the poor coverage, efcacy andsustainability o much prevention-oriented programming.Tere is a growing debate among humanitarian donors

on how to better mainstream DRR within humanitarianand development assistance rameworks. Key challengesinclude the need or stronger political commitment todisaster preparedness and risk reduction; more explicitlinks between DRR and development eectiveness; strongersupport or building local resilience through broad-basedlivelihoods and rights-based participatory approaches; and

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15. Informal Task Force of the IASC et al., op cit.16. Paul Harvey, op cit.17. Paul Harvey, Rebecca Holmes, Rachel Slater and Ellen Martin, Social protection in fragile states, Overseas Development Institute (London), November 2007: 5.18. Pantuliano and Wekesa, op cit.


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unding cycles that are more sensitive to the realities and

complexities o delivering DRR and humanitarian assistancein difcult and turbulent environments. But uncertaintyand inconsistency in policy priorities seem set to continue.Tese are aggravated by limitations o unding, capacityand overall leverage among key international actors, andby the complexity, scale and scope o the transitions andtransormations needed in many countries that are mostvulnerable to the negative human impacts o climate change.

An increasing recognition in development circles o theneed to address the welare needs o populations in thesedifcult environments, and continuing preoccupation

among humanitarian and development actors with bridgingthe relie-to-development gap reect a long-standingconcern with nding new and more eective mechanismsor international engagement in many ragile states.

Conclusion: the need to adapt the humanitarian system

to climate change and associated migration

Many o the worlds poorest and most crisis-prone countrieswill be disproportionately aected by climate change owingto higher exposure to climate-related hazards such asdroughts and oods, pre-existing human vulnerabilities andweak capacities or risk reduction measures.19 As ormalrameworks o state-led climate change adaptation areunlikely to have much traction here, pressure will continueto mount on the international humanitarian system to helpto prevent disasters, reduce vulnerability and respond tohumanitarian crises in these contexts.

Humanitarian preparedness and response should thereorerepresent a potentially signicant component o the climatechange adaptation agenda, and the latter should sit center-stage in the uture evolution o international humanitarian

policy. However, the mutual importance o humanitarianaction and climate change adaptation has, to date, receivedcomparatively scant attention in both policy arenas: theormer is generally preoccupied with reacting to immediatehumanitarian needs rather than anticipating possibleuture vulnerability dynamics and trends, while the latter isdominated by national adaptation plans which incorporatelittle directly in the way o humanitarian response orcontingency planning.

Big questions and doubts will continue to surround the

basic capacities o the international humanitarian systemto respond sufciently and eectively to the escalatinghumanitarian impacts o climate change in the manycountries where national response systems are weak or non-existent. Many o these countries lack strategic importancein the global political economy and oen ail to attractadequate donor unding to support eective humanitarianand social protection eorts. Frequently, weak or contestedstate legitimacy, high levels o violence, militarization andinsecurity and poor civilian protection make these contextshazardous and difcult environments or humanitarianagencies, severely compromising humanitarian access.

Some o the worlds most vulnerable populations are beyondthe eective reach o the international humanitarian system

In the absence o comprehensive corrective and preventiveaction in these contexts, the prospect or some o theworlds poorest and most crisis-prone countries is a spiralo resource and livelihood insecurity, social and politicaltension and conict, unchecked urbanization, chronicpoverty and complex and large-scale migration anddisplacement. Where social saety nets cannot or will notbe provided by the state or by international humanitarianactors, displacement will be unavoidable, and migration

will continue to represent a primary coping or survivalstrategy, sometimes helping to ameliorate, but oen servingto aggravate the negative impacts o climate change. Evenunder the best-case scenarios or successul implementationo disaster risk reduction, global humanitarian needs areset to escalate substantially as a consequence o climatechange. Te sheer scale and complexities o human mobilityand displacement, and additional problems associatedwith climate change in these environments will continueto stretch and challenge the legal, institutional andoperational rameworks and capacities o both national andinternational humanitarian actors.

Sarah Collinson is a Research Fellow and Program Leader of the Humanitarian Policy

Group, Overseas Development Institute.

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) is Britains leading independent think tank on

international development and humanitarian issues.

PHOTO CREDIT: Floods in Ifo refugee camp, Dadaab,Kenya, UNHCR: B. Bannon, Decem-

ber 2006.

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19. Informal Taskforce of the IASC et al., op cit..


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Key messages or policymakers:

1. Eorts to improve humanitarian vulnerability analysis and strengthen the uture needs responsiveness o theinternational humanitarian system should include explicit recognition that migration can be either a cause o riskand vulnerability to climate-related threats and hazards, or a key strategy in peoples eorts to manage risk andreduce their own vulnerability. Te signicance o migration in exacerbating or ameliorating vulnerability will behighly variable among dierent people and groups, and may change as peoples circumstances change. Policymakersneed to recognize that no direct relationship exists between particular climate-related trends and migration.Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the central role that migration can play in vulnerable communitieseorts to protect livelihoods and adapt to the impacts o climate change. It is likely that a lack o state-supportedsocial protection and high levels o livelihood insecurity are oen associated with relatively high levels o distressmigration.

2. Policymakers in humanitarian and related sectors should recognize and plan or the concurrent growth in bothglobal humanitarian caseloads and in levels and complexity o both orced and voluntary migration due toincreased human vulnerability and wider transormations linked with climate change. Donor governments shouldbe prepared or a substantial increase in global demand or humanitarian unding to meet escalating humanitarianneeds, but they should not expect any increase in humanitarian unding to have a predictable impact on migrationdynamics. In some cases, increasing levels o mobility and migration may signiy positive coping and adaptation ovulnerable populations to the complex threats and hazards associated with climate change.

3. Greater priority needs to be given to exible humanitarian unding and programming suited to addressing chronicas well as acute humanitarian needs and vulnerability in countries with ragile state institutions where ormalclimate change adaptation policies are unlikely to be developed. Addressing widespread and growing needs and

displacement dynamics in many crisis-prone countries most at risk rom hazards associated with climate changewill demand a strengthening o humanitarian programming in urban areas, and strengthened systems or disasterresponse in hostile and difcult political and security environments where close cooperation with the state may notbe possible.

4. Policymakers should recognize that distinctions between voluntary and involuntary migration in many crisis-aected contexts may be arbitrary or difcult to apply in practice; responses to both orced and voluntary migrationin these contexts should be based not on predened categories, but on peoples basic humanitarian and other needs.

5. Supercial climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction eorts in countries aected by complex andinteracting processes including population growth, economic stagnation, conict, urbanization and environmentalstress, are unlikely to inuence the deeper dynamics o vulnerability associated with distress migration that iscaused or aected by climate change.

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Study team members

Susan Martin, Institute or the Study o International Migration, Schoolo Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC (Co-Chair)

Koko Warner, Institute or Environment and Human Security, United

Nations University, Bonn, Germany (Co-Chair)

Jared Banks and Suzanne Sheldon, Bureau or Population, Reugees andMigration, U.S. Department o State, Washington, DC

Regina Bauerochse Barbosa, Economy and Employment Department,Sector Project Migration and Development, German echnicalCooperation (GZ), Eschborn, Germany

Alexander Carius, Moira Feil, and Dennis nzler, Adelphi Research,Berlin, Germany

Joel Charny, Reugees International, Washington, DC

Dimitria Clayton, Ministry or Intergenerational Aairs, Family, Womenand Integration, State o North Rhine-Westphalia, Dsseldor, Germany

Sarah Collinson, Overseas Development Institute, London, UnitedKingdom

Peter Croll, Ruth Vollmer, Andrea Warnecke, Bonn International Centeror Conversion, Bonn, Germany

Frank Laczko, International Organization or Migration, Geneva,Switzerland

Agustin Escobar Latapi, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superioresen Antropologa Social (CIESAS), Guadalajara, Mexico

Michelle Leighton, Center or Law and Global Justice, University o SanFrancisco, San Francisco, Caliornia and Munich Re Foundation-UNUChair in Social Vulnerability

Philip Martin, University o Caliornia, Migration Dialogue, Davis,

Caliornia

Heather McGray, World Resources Institute, Washington, DC

Lorenz Petersen, Climate Change askorce, German echnicalCooperation (GZ), Eschborn, Germany

Aly andian, Groupe dEtudes et de Recherches sur les Migrations(GERMS), Gaston Berger University, Senegal

Agnieszka Weinar, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security,European Commission, Brussels, Belgium

Astrid Ziebarth, German Marshall Fund o the United States, Berlin,Germany.

List of papers

Developing Adequate Humanitarian Responsesby Sarah Collinson

Migration, the Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence

by Frank Laczko

Climate Change and Migration: Key Issues or Legal Protection oMigrants and Displaced Personsby Michelle Leighton

Climate Change, Agricultural Development, and Migrationby Philip Martin

Climate Change and International Migrationby Susan F. Martin

Climate Change, Migration and Adaptationby Susan F. Martin

Climate Change, Migration and Conict: Receiving Communities underPressure?by Andrea Warnecke, Dennis nzler and Ruth Vollmer

Assessing Institutional and Governance Needs Related to Environmental

Change and Human Migrationby Koko Warner

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Transatlantic Study TeamsTe GMF Immigration and Integration Programs ransatlantic Study eams link the transatlantic debate on inter-national migration ows with its consequences or sending and receiving regions. Trough compiling existing data,policy analysis, and dialogue with policymakers, selected study teams gather acts, convene leading opinion leaderson both sides o the Atlantic, promote open dialogue, and help to advance the policy debate. Study teams are chosenby a competitive selection process, based on the overall quality o their proposal, its policy relevance, institutionalstrength, sustainability, and potential or synergies. Te ransatlantic Study eam 2009/2010 is investigating the impacto climate change on migration patterns. Environmental deterioration, including natural disasters, rising sea level,and drought problems in agricultural production, could cause millions o people to leave their homes in the comingdecades. Led by Dr. Susan F. Martin, Georgetown University, and Dr. Koko Warner, UN University, the team consists oscholars, policymakers and practitioners rom the migration and environmental communities.

Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) is a non-partisan American public policy and grantmakinginstitution dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North America and Europe ontransatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlan-tic sphere, by convening leaders and members o the policy and business communities, by contributing research andanalysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to oster renewed commitment to the trans-atlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number o initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972through a gi rom Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presenceon both sides o the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven ofces in Europe: Ber-lin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.

Te Institute or the Study o International Migration is based in the School o Foreign Service at Georgetown Universi-ty. Staed by leading experts on immigration and reugee policy, the Institute draws upon the resources o Georgetown

University aculty working on international migration and related issues on the main campus and in the law center. Itconducts research and convenes workshops and conerences on immigration and reugee law and policies. In addition,the Institute seeks to stimulate more objective and well-documented migration research by convening research sympo-sia and publishing an academic journal that provides an opportunity or the sharing o research in progress as well asnished projects.

Te UN University established by the UN General Assembly in 1973, is an international community o scholars en-gaged in research, advanced training and the dissemination o knowledge related to pressing global problems. Activi-ties ocus mainly on peace and conict resolution, sustainable development and the use o science and technology toadvance human welare. Te Universitys Institute or Environment and Human Security addresses risks and vulner-abilities that are the consequence o complex environmental hazards, including climate change, which may aect sus-tainable development. It aims to improve the in-depth understanding o the cause eect relationships to nd possibleways to reduce risks and vulnerabilities. Te Institute is conceived to support policy and decision makers with authori-tative research and inormation.

Developing Adequate Humanitarian Responses

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