December 16 th, 2009 Ministry of Commerce & Industry (MOCI) Afghanistan SME Development Strategy.
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Transcript of December 16 th, 2009 Ministry of Commerce & Industry (MOCI) Afghanistan SME Development Strategy.
December 16th, 2009
Ministry of Commerce & Industry (MOCI)
Afghanistan SME Development Strategy
2
Contents
Executive summary
SME Strategy details• Priority sectors• Constraints to growth• Formalization• Implementation
Appendix• Project background• Sources
3
Vision for Afghanistan SME Development Strategy
Create a globally competitive and socially responsible SME sector in Afghanistan, in which sustainable and equitable
growth is private-sector led and where government functions to help achieve this goal.
4
Goals and objectives of SME Strategy
Create an SME Development Strategy to help drive the economic prosperity of Afghanistan• SMEs with under 300 employees make up 80-90% of Afghan businesses and nearly all rural businesses• SMEs generate over 50% of GDP and employ ~75% of labor force• Nations such as Pakistan or Singapore have shown that SME development is critical for job creation and poverty
reduction
Define four key roles for government in SME development• Policy maker – Develop a national and regional SME policy which will identify priority sectors for SME development and
address the major needs of each of those sectors, especially in financing, capacity building, and infrastructure• Facilitator – Remove obstacles, bureaucracy and market inefficiencies that inhibit SME growth• Regulator – Ensure that the competitive environment for SME growth remains strong, and that the many forces that
influence their growth (government, SMEs, trading partners, etc.) contribute to that environment• Coordinator – Help align organizations (donors, NGOs, associations, etc.) that are already working to promote SMEs
Pursue SME growth, job creation, and formalization• Because of high unemployment rate (~40% and growing) job-creation and growth must be the strategy’s primary goal• Policies must also reduce costs and increase the benefits of formalization (80% of SMEs currently not formalized)• Increased formalization will help the SME sector grow, improve the quality of service SMEs provide, and increase
government revenues, which in turn should promote further growth
Increase the role of women in SMEs, in particular their role in entrepreneurship• Women already play a major role in Afghan industries, such as agriculture, carpets and embroidery, but typically they
receive a low portion of the benefits. For example, a female weaver receives <20% of the value of a carpet.• Policy thus must prioritize female-intensive sectors (such as carpets and embroidery) and work closely with women’s
associations to improve the benefits women receive from the economy
Create ~1M jobs & ~$3B dollars of GDP by 2016• The targets are ambitious but attainable if the government of Afghanistan agrees to take action• This is an imperative to meet the needs of a growing population
1
2
3
4
5
5
Priority SME sectors and areas of growth
Labor-intensive, natural-resource sectors are priorities
Several sectors must receive national priority based on several factors
• Afghanistan’s competitive advantage• Sector’s ability to create jobs• Sector growth• Afghanistan’s ability to compete across multiple
parts of value chain
In particular, these industries emerge as highly attractive
• Agri-processing (including fresh and dry fruits, nuts and medicinal plants)
• Carpet weaving, cutting, washing and trading• Marble quarrying, cutting, polishing• Gem stones mining, cutting & polishing and jewelry• Livestock and skins• Wood, timber and carpentry
Priority sectors should be reexamined after 1 year, and then every three years thereafter
Export industries must play central role in growth
Exports have grown 3x faster than the overall economy, but still are just 4% of GDP ($550M)
All sectors named are appropriate for export, although in many cases these sectors will serve increasing domestic demand as well
Import substitution (IS) where Afghanistan has competitive advantage
Imports will continue to be key part of economy, but IS should be pursued in low-technology products, such as vegetable oil, dairy and poultry
Substitution of inputs to national industries, such as wool, wood and re-imported marble, also critical
IS should be achieved without excessive trade & tariff intervention, but rather, with coordinated government and donor support for target industries
6
SME constraints for government to address
Three critical challenges for the government to address
Finance
• Still a major constraint in Afghanistan, especially for SMEs in non-trade industries
• Actions will include SME windows in banks, Sharia-compliant products, sector-specific products, and lower interest rates
Infrastructure
• Government must work with donors, AISA and others to obtain investment for sector-specific infrastructure, such as cold storage facilities in certain regions
Capacity building
• Must work with donors and BDS firms to address the capacity building needs in target sectors
• Programs underway, such as National Skills Dev. Program and the National Vocational Education and Training Authority, but efforts must be coordinated with the SME strategy
Other SME constraints where the government can make an impact
Transportation• Improving freight processing in airport and promoting
additional capacity in the transport sector
Market access• Continue to work with EPAA and donors to improve
market access in target sectors
Certification• ANSA must address need for standards and certification
in target sectors, such as testing facilities for marble and quality standards for food exports
Registration & licensing• Continue to improve both the registration & licensing
processes, and provide more benefits for registering
Trade & tariffs• Need clear and well-communicated policy on trade and
tariffs. Must also continue to keep import duties low on inputs to national industries
Safety, land & electricity• Can be addressed in the short-term by continuing to
increase the capacity of industrial parks
7
SME Group in MOCI will lead implementation
SME Group within MOCI will implement strategy
Strategy Group in MOCI will take responsibility for implementing the strategy and delivering results
Group should first reside within MOCI, in the PSSD, then become independent group within 2 – 3 years
The group must include on its board:• Ministers of Commerce & Industry, Finance and
Agriculture, and MRRD• 4 – 6 respected business leaders from around the
country
Commitment of the Cabinet and inter-ministerial coordination is required for success
• Can achieve some coordination by working through the structures of ANDS
• However, as ANDS does not have an SME component, the SME Group will have to fill the gap
Strategy will be rolled out in phases, and cover whole nation by 2016
Development strategy to be rolled out in four regions:• North• South• East• West
Regional strategy must be coordinated with many players, including
• Provincial governments• Community Development Councils• Specific donors• PRTs• Others agencies and organizations working in each
region region
Pilot programs will begin in 4 regions in Q1 2010
Goal is to have all regions covered by 2016
8
Program estimated to cost ~$750M – $1B over 7 yearsPreliminary cost estimate
Cost($M)
Financing – $500M • Financing still one of the critical barriers to SME growth. Total SME financing in Afghanistan
today amounts to only ~$45M, yet the need for SME financing is estimated at ~$7B• Financing is especially scarce in non-trade and agricultural enterprises, and in particular in
the loan-size range of $30K - $300K• Financing for SME Strategy to come from three primary sources
− Donors, in the form of additional SME funds available through credit facilities such as ARIES, ARFC, and other SME-specific financing vehicles
− Banks. Banks have ~$1B of credit outstanding in Afghanistan, but little with SMEs. Goal of SME strategy is to have banks lend greater amount of money to SMEs, both via SME windows and partnerships with donors
Infrastructure – $180M • Infrastructure specific to the target industries, such as cut and wash facilities, cold storage
facilities, improved marble quarrying equipment, etc• Will come from three sources: donors, FDI, and in some cases from government (such as
low-cost leasing of government land to target industries)• Much funding is already going toward infrastructure; key will be better coordination
Capacity building for SMEs – $50M• Skills are still lacking in many SME sectors. However, efforts to build skills much be
coordinated with other efforts underway, in particular:− National Skills Development Program − National Vocational Education and Training Authority− USAID CDP
Program Administration – $20M• Cost of implementing strategy, including establishment of SME development group within
MOCI, which will become independent organization after 2 – 3 years
500
50
20
180
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Source: SME financing data from SME Development Workshop report, ARIES, 2009
9
Targeting growth of > $3B GDP and 1M new jobs
$1,800
$1,000
$500
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
Export growth Import substitution Domestic demand
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200IncrementalGDP, 2016
($M)
Jobs created(K)
Potential GDP and job creation by sector, by 2016
Growth rates are aggressive, but there are already many efforts underway to achieve these results. Important goal of the strategy is to better coordinate the efforts
10
Summary implementation timeline
Government approval of policy
Creation of SME Group in MOCI
First meeting of SME Group
Regional strategies shared with stakeholders (donors, ministries, etc)
Pilots kicked off in each of 4 regions• Address the 3 key areas: financing,
infrastructure, & capacity building
Results from pilots
Revision of strategy based on results
Staffing expansion of SME Group
Funding sources identified
SME Group fully operational, ready to become independent
Activity Feb MarJan April June Q310May Q410 Q211 Q311Q111 Q411 Q112 Q212 Q312 Q412
Short-term (2010) Mid-term Long-term
11
Contents
Executive summary
SME Strategy details• Priority sectors• Constraints to growth• Formalization• Implementation
Appendix• Project background• Sources
12
Path from agriculture to higher-value industrial economy
Export-drivengrowth
Agricultural, resourced-basedLow-tech economy
Labor intensive
Japan
Afghanistan
Link between economic sectors and growth
Manufacturing / ServicesHigh-tech economy
Capital intensive
Reliant onImports
Korea
Importsubstitution
growth
Pakistan
Brazil
Developing economies, especially those in post-conflict situations, are usually agriculture-based, low technology, and experiencing large annual trade deficits
Development generally begins through export growth and import substitution. Asian countries have favored exports, Latin American countries generally have favored import substitution
In practice, a country like Afghanistan will have to do both, but choose industries carefully
1
2
Eventually agriculture become more efficient, less labor intensive, and a greater portion of the workforce moves into manufacturing and services
3
13
Afghanistan will go through these three phases as well
Export-drivengrowth
Agricultural, resource basedLow-tech economy
Labor intensive
Link between economic sectors and growth
Manufacturing / ServicesHigh-tech economy
Capital intensive
Reliant onImports
1
Importsubstitution
growth
1. Where we are today:• Imports of ~$3B, exports of just $0.5B• Exports growing quickly, however
• Low-tech and low-value products• Usually at the commodity end of the
value chain
2. Where we are moving (5 – 10 years)• Increasing exports, especially low technology
exports• Beginning to increase the value of exports – for
example, from fresh fruit to packaged dry fruit• Beginning import substitution, especially in areas
of food security (mainly wheat) but also low-tech products like soap or pipes
3. Where we aim to be (~20 – 30 years)• Agriculture and natural resources will
always be important• However, they will employ a decreasing
portion of workforce as agriculture becomes more sophisticated
• Export of manufactured products will become more important2
3
14
The move toward industry – examples from other countries
0
10
20
30
40
50
1960 1965 1970 1977 1980 1985 1990 2000 2002
% of GDP
Important to look now at specific sectors to understand the situation in Afghanistan
Manufacturing as % of overall GDP, select Asian countries
Korea
Malaysia
Indonesia
Pakistan
Nearly all countries gradually become more industrialized as they develop
The process takes a long time – over 40 years to go from ~10% manufacturing to 30 – 40%
Note the correlation between level of manufacturing and GDP per capita in 2002
• Korea ($6,691)• Malaysia ($4,194)• Indonesia ($839)• Pakistan ($449)
Afghanistan in 2009 earns 16% of GDP from manufacturing
Source: Data in manufacturing from World Development Reports, World Bank. 2002 GDP information from Students of the World and the CIA Fact Book. Afghanistan date from IMF Statistical Appendix
15
Services and industry now make up over 70% of GDPGDP grew at 10% average from 2003-09
2,516
875 105
2,160 44
1,382
1,370
1,362 288472 134
1,333615 12,903
247
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
Cereals Fruits Livestock Mining Mfg. Util. Constrct. Trade /Rest /Hotel
Transp /Comms /Storage
Fin / Realestate /
Bus.
Dw elling Privateservices
Governmtservices
Other Total
Afghanistan GDP breakdown by sector (2009)
2009GDP ($M)
Source: IMF Statistical Appendix, MOCI Internal Data. Excludes opium products Note: 2009 GDP is March 2008 – March 2009
Agriculture 28% of GDP-0.4% CAGR, 03-09
Industry – 29% of GDP16.0% CAGR, 03 - 09
Services – 43% of GDP14.5% CAGR, 03 - 09
03-09 CAGR -1.5 3.3 2.3 24.5 9.8 9.8 29.5 4.2 21.1 26.0 3.8 8.7 21.5 15.3 10.1
16
Four sectors account for nearly all growth since 2003Agriculture lagging and yet it is the largest employment sector
43,817
22,093
21,8555,965
5,7563,874 2,663 1,636 1,412 1,315 719 91
138,732
32,256
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
100,000
110,000
120,000
130,000
140,000
150,000
Transport/Comms /Storage
Constrct. Govtservices
Mfg. Otherservices
Trade /Rest /Hotel
Fin / Realestate
Dw elling Livestock Privateservices
Fruits Mining Utilities Cereals Total
IncrementalGDP, (in constant ’03Afs, millions)
Source: IMF Statistical Appendix, MOCI Internal Data. Excludes opium products
Incremental annual GDP, 2009 vs. 2003
~ 90% of new GDP comesfrom these 4 sectors, driven largely by int’l presence
The growth of all these sectors, including all agricultural sectors, is 0%
Yet, these sectors employ >75% of workforce, and contain many SMEs.
Thus, large portion of population benefits little from GDP growth so far. There has been some job creation, but perhaps not enough to keep with new entrants to workforce
Drought conditions explain some but certainly not all of the low growth in agriculture.
(4,721)
Despite the current strength of these four sectors, Afghan economy over the next 10 years (especially SME sector) will be driven by agriculture and a select few traditional manufactured products.
17
Sector growth parallels public and donor expenditureRelatively low expenditure on agriculture and agricultural industries
34 34
20 22
12 11 42
27
19 20
10
8
11 10
7
11
6 64
5
5 77
10
3 22
6
4 5 3 6
6 5 5 5
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2007 2008 2009 2003-07
Portion of public expenditure, and donor disbursement to external budget
Percent
Infrastructure
Security
Agriculture
Education
Health
Rule of Law
Social projection
Unknown
Econ. Governance
Annual public spend Total donor distrbto external budget
Source: Food for Thought: Analysis of Agriculture Financing in Afghanistan, Economic Literacy and Budget Analysis GroupNote: Other studies, such as one from Oxfam International, suggest that only 2% of international aid has gone toward agricultural sector
18
More growth can come from agriculture and related SMEs
World bank estimates that the agricultural sector needs to grow at ~5% / year in order to meet the needs of poverty reduction
12 - 15% of Afghanistan’s 65M hectares is viable for agriculture, but only 6% currently cultivated
In addition, crop yields in Afghanistan are only half what they are in the rest of the world
• From 2005 - 2007 Afghanistan yielded an average of 1.6 tons of cereal per hectare, versus 3.2 for rest of world, and 2.2 for Pakistan and 2.9 for Uzbekistan
• Fertilizer intensity was 1 kg per hectare in 2001, versus 140 kg for Pakistan and 160 kg for Uzbekistan
Source: Food for Thought: Analysis of Agriculture Financing in Afghanistan, Economic Literacy and Budget Analysis Group; USDA reports; MOCI internal data
Quick analysis suggest a very large potential for growth in agriculture sector:
• Potential to double cultivated land• Potential to double output per hectare of
cultivated land
Result would be a quadrupling of agriculture contribution to GDP
• From ~$4B / year to $16B per year• That additional $12B of GDP represents a
100% increase over 2009 GDP
Question is, how fast and at what cost?
Currently operating well below potential Possibility for at least 3 - 4x growth
19
DomesticDemand
Exports
Import substitution
(IS)
Overview Size Strategy
The backbone of the economy
Will increase as population produces more, which leads to greater consumption, which leads in turn to further production
Currently makes up ~96% of GDP• Overall GDP: $13B• Minus exports: $500M• Equals domestic demand: $12.5B
Within agriculture sector, exports make up greater percentage of GDP ~20%
Domestic demand component increases with import substitution (Imports not part of GDP, but locally-made substitutes are)
Increasing domestic supply and demand is key to strategy
Focus largely on the food sector; ability to meet domestic demand without imports is key to food security
Moving domestic customers to higher value consumption will occur as GDP per capita continues to rise
A critical component of the economy, especially in natural-resource based sectors where Afg. has advantage
Export growth continues to outpace growth of the overall economy
Central to the development strategy of many countries in the Far East
Exports currently are ~$550M, which is approximately 4% of total GDP
However, exports growing at 32% annually, while overall economy growing at 10% – hence a growing priority
Most are agricultural or based on other natural resources, such as marble & gems
Export growth should be primary focus of strategy, especially in short-term:
• Afg has resources and skills already• Demand exists in neighboring countries,
such as India (for fruits & nuts)• Quick impact possible by linking local to
producers to markets (eg, trade fairs)• Additional growth by removing barriers
to exporting (paperwork, transport, etc)• Often involves technology investment to
meet buyer standards
Imports do not count toward GDP, they deplete foreign reserves, and don’t generate profits for population
Hence, IS can be a way to bring profits and production back home
However, IS often involves raising tariffs or manipulating exchange rates – which is generally not beneficial in the long-run
Imports are currently ~$3B / year in 08
Roughly 6x the level of exports, hence the trade deficit which will need to be corrected over time
Roughly 40% of this comes from machinery, equip, petroleum products and metals – which are not likely to be substituted soon
Identify several priority products• Low-tech products• Products where Afg. can be cost
competitive without government price / tariff intervention
Likely areas are food products• Wheat, chicken, eggs, veg oil
Important for establishing food security
Recommend pursuing export-led growth firstSelective import substitution and increase in domestic demand should follow afterwards
3
1
2
20
Export sectors growing 32% annually, but still only ~4% GDP
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
98
Afghanistan exports by sector (2003 - 2009)
Carpets 152 49%
Dried fruit 229 25%
Fresh fruit 37 27%
Skins 13 17%
Other 85 100%
Med. Plants 24 30%
Wool 5 4%
Prod.Exp‘09
‘03-09CAGR
Source: IMF Statistical Appendix, MOCI Internal Data. Excludes opium products
Total 547 32%
135
297
383
416
454
547
$M
21
Adding unofficial exports at least doubles the figures
Note: By unofficial exports, we do not include opium products, only unofficial exports of legal productsSource: IMF Statistical Appendix, EPAA Interviews, Investigation into the Potential of Establishing a New Tannery, Avery Leather Consulting
Several reasons for unofficial exports
Large quantities of legitimate products are exported unofficially overland to neighboring countries
There are several reasons for the trade, despite the fact that Afghanistan does not have export taxes (except on gemstones)
• Many traders seek to avoid import taxes that neighboring countries place on products
• Traders will want to lower annual tax burden, and hence have incentive to hide some transactions
• In particular, there is potential for re-export arbitrage with Pakistan as traders seek to avoid some of the import taxes levied by Pakistan
Estimates of unofficial trade vary by sector, but overall are in the range of 100%, even more in some industries
Example of unofficial trade – skins and hides
In 2006, official exports of bovine, goat and sheep skins and hides estimated at $15.6M
However, interviews with traders in Kunduz suggest that the actual amount of exports could be up to 4x that amount: ~$50 – $60M
Implications
1. Estimates of skin supply, for analysis of a tannery, for example, needs to take this supply into account
2. Much of the unofficial trade could be made official, and more valuable, if we had capability for post-processing – i.e., a tannery
• $15M sector could turn into a $150M sector based on existing supply only
3. Potential to boost value exists in most commodity industries which rely on overland transport
22
Must prioritize export industries based on several criteria
Is the sector growing quickly, or does it have the potential to grow quickly?• For example, carpets, which have grown at ~50% annually, and dried fruit, which grew at 25%• Or marble, which has grown very little so far in Afghanistan, but which is growing ~8% annually worldwide
Are the barriers to entry low?• Raw materials: easy access to input materials, such as raw marble, wood or agricultural products• Skills: the right level of skills in the workforce in order to be competitive in the industry• Technology: low technology requirements, or at least the ability to introduce the technology quickly and cost-effectively
Does the industry have a large concentration of SMEs?• For example, carpet cutting and washing facilities, which usually employ <200 people, and often just 10 - 20
Is the industry labor-intensive?• Because of the importance of job creation, labor-intensive industries must be prioritized, such as carpets, which are
extremely labor-intensive in the weaving phase• When selecting particular technologies to use within each industry, must strike a balance between high-technology and
high job creation– High-technology equipment generally means fewer jobs, but sometimes such equipment is required in order to meet
international standards
Can Afghanistan be competitive in most parts of the industry’s value chain?• Preference should be given to industries where Afghanistan can be competitive across the value chain• For example, the carpet value chain: wool – spinning – weaving – cutting and washing
3
1
2
4
5
23
Job creation is especially important criteriaUnemployment currently 40% and likely to raised based on current demographic skew toward youth
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Population Workforce
People(Millions)
<15 yrs old
14M
15-65 yrs old
17M
>65 yrs old0.75M
60% employed
~10M
40% unemployed
~7M
Each year, ~200K of these people leave the workforce…
…and ~1M of these people enter
New jobs needed each year to hold unemployment levels steady at 40%
Large young population is a massive opportunity or threat – depending on whether jobs are available
Population & workforce breakdown
Source: CIA Statistics; Spotlight on Differing Demographic, World BankNote: World Bank also predicts that the boom in youth demographic will continue in Afghanistan for several decades
Unemployment data is unreliable due to informal employment and child labor, etc, but the fact that 45% of population is under 15 means growing pool of workers will need jobs
24
Focus is on SMEs under 300 employees and $15M in capitalSME definition used by IFC in developing countries and by ACBAR
Micro-enterprises
Smallenterprises
Medium
Large
Number of employees Capital requirement (USD)
>300
51 – 300
11 – 50
1 – 10
>15M
3M – 15M
100K – 3M
0 – 100K
Accounts for
• ~80-90% of businesses
• ~500K businesses overall
• At least 75% of the workforce
By this common definition, SMEs make up the vast majority of business activity in Afghanistan
25
Based on criteria, several attractive value chains emergeIn most cases, industries are based on natural resources and will be export-led
LivestockDairy / meat
Skins LeatherClothing /
leather goods
Wood CarpentryFurniture /
crafts
Marble quarrying
Cutting Finishing
Fresh fruit / plants
Dried fruit / nuts
CementAggre-gates
Construct.
MiningCut /
polishJewelry design
WoolSpinning /
dyingWeaving
Cutting / washing
Concen-trate / Juice
Livestock
Agri-processing
Building
Gemstone
Marble
Wood
Carpet
• Low potential in near-term; technology needed• Tough competition from India and Pakistan• However, raw skins has historically been a major export
• Attractive and very large sector• High brand awareness in certain sectors, such as nuts• Need to address particular sub-sectors individually
• Room for growth and repatriation cut & wash / trading• However, overall market size limited (~$1B)• Still important because it is extremely labor intensive
• Mining generally not SME business• Opportunity in polishing, processing and jewelry• Afghan market potential at least ~$100 – $200M• India gems went from $13M to $13B
• High-potential segment for SME• Quarrying capital intensive; only 10-year lease on mines• World market size ~$3-4B, growing ~9% / year
• High-potential segment, generally overlooked• Government has recently approved a timber policy• Limited reserves in South and SE, sustainability is key
• Construction industry high-growth, driven largely by international presence in country
• Bricks and simple tools attractive for Import Substitution• Potential for cement, but not generally SME business
Value chain Potential
Trading
Medicinal plants
Trading
Important to increase production at the beginning of the value chain, but also to migrate toward the end of the value chain where much of the value is added. Note that is not a complete list of
industries. BDS, for example, is an area that will grow as SME sector becomes more sophisticated
BricksTools, other
supplies
26
Potential for official exports to reach $3.8B by 2016
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Potential exports by sector (2009 - 2016)
Source: IMF Statistical Appendix, MOCI Internal Data, interviews with MOCI, ASMED and Harakat.Note: Excludes opium products
$M
Carpets 950 30%
Dried fruit 1,000 25%
Fresh fruit 230 30%Skins 144 30%
Other 275 20%Med. Plants 410 50%
Wool 25 25%
Prod.
Exp’16(M)
‘09-16CAGR
Total 3.8B 30%
Marble 450 70%
Wood 57 50%Leather 115 50%
Carp C&W 25 60%
Without SME strategy, exports would grow at 20% (2x average GDP growth), as shown by line. This is less than export growth since 2003, as is expected given that early export growth was starting from a very low base.
27
~$1.8B incremental GDP and ~500K new jobs from exportsWill need to set targets for each region and verify estimates
Note: Based on all sector-specific reports, interviews, and ASMED assumptions
$435
$114
$62$25
$6
$100
$262
$57
$324
$409
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
2,000
Marble Carp. Craft Med. Plants Dried fruit Leather Fresh fruit Skins Wood Carp. C&W Wool
IncrementalGDP, 2016
($M)
Potential incremental GDP by sector (2016)
09-16 CAGR - status quo 0% 20% 20% 20% 0% 20% 20% 0% 5% 20%
09-16 CAGR - target
Job potential (K)
70% 30% 50% 25% 50% 30% 30% 25% 60% 25%
15 200 150 100 20 50 20 15 6 2
Approximately $1B in increased domestic demand expected as well, especially in dried and fresh fruits, plants, skins and leather
28
~$500M potential for import substitution as wellNumbers shown here are 2006 – latest available; estimate of $500M based on extrapolation to 2009
101
47
31
29
2518
1313
1010 9 7 0 368
55
0
100
200
300
400
Veg. Oil Sugar Froz.Chicken
Footwear Rice Soap Livechicken
Yarn Eggs Matches Blanket MilkPwdr.
Clothing Salt Total
($M)
Source: ARDEP, “A Competitive Afghanistan” 2006
Afghanistan import substitution potential (2006)
0.3
SME SME SME SME SMESME SME
Other potential income substitution opportunities include grains, flour, fruit juice, and potentially some leather products such as footwear
29
Contents
Executive summary
SME Strategy details• Priority sectors• Constraints to growth• Formalization• Implementation
Appendix• Project background• Sources
30
Four major types of constraints can affect SME growth
Macroeconomic
1. Interest rates
2. Trade & tariff
3. Taxation
4. Inflation
5. Exchange rates
Legal / Regulatory
1. Land
2. Registration & licensing
3. Bankruptcy / closing
4. Labor law
5. Environmental law
6. Patent / IP protect.
Infrastructure
1. Transportation
2. Electricity
3. Sector-specific (e.g., cold storage)
4. Telecom (mobile phone, internet)
5. Water
Business services
1. Finance
2. Capacity building
3. Certification
4. Market access
5. BDS (accounting, consulting, etc.)
6. Associations
1 2 3 4
Only 14% of firms feel that there is consistency in the interpretation of laws and
regulations
Macro-econ environment generally good in
Afghanistan
Many issues here, but generally requires much time and coordination to influence
Many things MOCI can do to lessen these constraints
Source: Afghanistan Investment Climate, 2008, and Doing Business in Afghanistan, 2010 (for information about severity); ASMED interviews (for information about MOCI ability to change constraint)
Businesses cite excess bureaucracy and corruption across almost all areas: taxation, tariffs, regulations, access to infrastructure, etc. Safety and crime are also major issue for most SMEs
31
1. Macroeconomics – significant improvement
1. Interest rates
2. Trade & tariff
3. Taxation
4. Inflation
5. Exchange rates
• Interest rates generally high (~19%) for SMEs• Typical for post-conflict nations where cost of doing business
is high; prohibits many SMEs from taking loans
• Trade and tariffs generally liberal• Potential to selectively increase tariffs for import substitution• Potential to work with neighbors (Pakistan, for example) to
improve customs process – cited as major issue• Need better communications of trade and tariff regulations –
most SMEs have low knowledge about international trade
• Overall tax rates generally not problem, although high BRT makes many low-margin businesses are not viable unless they avoid taxes or simply pass high tax onto consumers
• LTO and MTO have simplified taxes for some payers in last several years, but still many complaints around process
– No consistency or transparency in how tax law is applied
• No major issue – inflation rate has been stabilized
• No major issue – exchange rates have been stabilized
Issue
Source: Afghanistan Investment Climate, 2008, and Doing Business in Afghanistan, 2010 (for information about severity); ASMED interviews (for information about MOCI ability to change constraint)
• DaB, MoF
• MOCI (for trade)• MoF (for tariffs)
• MoF
• DaB, MoF
• DaB, MoF
ResponsibilityConstraint
32
2. Legal and regulatory – better, but must be MOCI priority
1. Land
2. Registration & licensing
3. Bankruptcy / closing
4. Labor law
5. Environmental law
6. Patent / IP protection
Source: Afghanistan Investment Climate, 2008, and Doing Business in Afghanistan, 2010 (for information about severity); ASMED interviews (for information about MOCI ability to change constraint)
• Improving, but still an issue• Difficulty accessing land, obtaining zoning approval, and land
titling – also leads to difficulty of banks to extend credit• Construction permits also very difficult to obtain
• Area shows much improvement with ACBR, etc, but still opportunity to speed registration nationwide, to better communicate the process and the benefits
• No set process for bankruptcy, hence low World Bank ranking• However, not the primary obstacle to growth or financing.• Issue need to be addressed, but not short-term priority for
SME strategy
• Labor law not currently a major issue, but will grow in importance as businesses mature
• Generally not a major issue yet, although law is required in area of wood production, as well as in tanning/leather and mining. Will become increasingly significant issue
• Not yet a major issue, but will become a more significant issue in the next 5 – 10 years as companies advance and FDI increases
Issue
• Ministry of Justice
• MOCI, AISA, municipalities
• MOCI, Ministry of Justice, potentially MoF, too
• Ministry of Labor
• National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA)
• MOCI (has an IP sub-department)
ResponsibilityConstraint
33
3. Infrastructure – big issue, difficult to address in short term
Source: Afghanistan Investment Climate, 2008, and Doing Business in Afghanistan, 2010 (for information about severity); ASMED interviews (for information about MOCI ability to change constraint)
• Road system poor, disconnecting suppliers and customers• Security on roads poor, leading to overall high transport costs• Air transport constrained due to lack of facilities at airport• Leads to overall high cost for SMEs
• Major issue for businesses: lack of access, and poor service leading to higher cost of business
• Many sectors lack specific infrastructure needed for basic operations. For example, cold storage.
• Government might provide help until private sector matures to the point that it can provide for itself
• Constraint for some, but rapidly growing mobile coverage• Internet access generally not cited as a constraint, but that is
due to the fact that most SMEs haven’t had enough access to the internet to realize its importance
• Generally not a major issue, but could affect water-intensive industries, such as the potential for tanneries
Issue
• Ministry of Transport• MOCI
• Ministry of Power and Energy
• MOCI, MAIL, ARDEP, Donors
• Ministry of Communications
• Ministry of Power and Energy
Responsibility
1. Transportation
2. Electricity
3. Sector-specific infrastructure
4. Telcom
5. Water
Constraint
34
4. Business services – MOCI can make large impact
Source: Afghanistan Investment Climate, 2008, and Doing Business in Afghanistan, 2010 (for information about severity); ASMED interviews (for information about MOCI ability to change constraint)
• Shortage of funding, especially for SMEs• ~Only 50% banks assets are lent, and only 3% of total loans
outstanding are SME loans• Access to finance difficult for many reasons: SMEs lack
proper paperwork to prove business, no land titling and collateral, high interest rates, no Islamic finance
• Many sectors require training from donors / associations in order to become more competitive. Technical training is key, as well as training in bookkeeping, accounting, etc.
• An important area as export sectors growth. For example, testing of livestock, dairy products, marble testing, etc.
• Major constraint for export-oriented sectors• Progress made with trade shows, etc, but opportunity for
MOCI to do more
• BDS services increasingly important for businesses as they enter the formal sector
• Not usually cited by SMEs as a constraint to growth, and yet still an important factor in growth
Issue
• MoF, MOCI, MAIL, ARDEP, Banks, Donors
• BDS, MOCI, National Skills Development Program, Donors
• BDS / MoCI – for tech skills• Afg Nat. Standards Agency
(ANSA) and EPPA – for testing
• MOCI, EPPA
• BDS, MOCI
• BDS, MOCI, ACCI
Responsibility
1. Finance
2. Capacity building
3. Certification
4. Market access
5. BDS (accounting, consulting, etc.)
6. Associations
Constraint
35
MOCI should prioritize those where it has most influence
High
Low
How severe isthis constraint?
HighLow Ability of MOCI to change it?
1.4. Inflation
2.1. Land
1.3. Tax
1.2. Trade & tariff
1.5. Exchange rates
2.2. Registration & licensing
2.3. Bankruptcy / Closing
2.4. Labor law
2.5. Environmental
2.6. Patent / IP
3.4. Telcom
3.1. Transport
3.2. Electricity
3.5. Water
Safety / crimecorruption
4.1. Finance
4.2. Capacity building
4.3. Certification
4.5. BDS
4.6. Associations
MOCI priorities
Less important Future priorities
Must work with others
1.1. Interest rates
Source: Afghanistan Investment Climate, 2008, and Doing Business in Afghanistan, 2010 (for information about severity); ASMED interviews (for information about MOCI ability to change constraint)
Typical constraints to SME growth
3.3. Sect. specificinfrastructure
4.4 Market access
36
Three areas for government to prioritizeIn many cases, will need to be address in sector-specific basis
• Gap in SME loans in range of $30K-$300K; MOCI must work with banks and donors to:– Provide sector specific products, especially in ag sectors where payback is longer term– Help to reduce (but not eliminate) interest rates with help of partial donor funding– Provide Sharia-compliant products, potentially including leases– Financing must still be bank-driven, but facilitated with help of government and donors
• See following three pages for additional information
Finance
Sector-specific infrastructure
• MOCI must work with donors and AISA to obtain investment for sector-specific infrastructure• Must be undertaken at a region-specific level, as described under regional strategies• Infrastructure could come in many forms, depending on the industry’s particular need
− E.g. cold storage facilities in certain regions which are producing fruit for further processing
− Tanning facilities in the north to increase the value of skins which are currently exported− Roads to and from quarries, or quarrying equipment
• Goal is not to fully subsidize industries, but rather, to provide starter infrastructure until the sector can provide its own
• In most cases, the government should work with donors to obtain grants for equipment, partially subsidized funding, etc. However, in some cases the government can provide some of the infrastructure directly – such as providing government land at low rental rates
MOCI, MoF, MAIL, AREDP banks, donors
MOCI, AISA, MAIL, AREDP donors
Actions ResponsibilityConstraint
Capacity building
• Additional training needed in most growing SME industries• In many cases, training spans most industries, such as management and accounting training,
which should be done by BDS firms• Sector specific training is needed too – just as gem cutting, jewelry making, and tanning• MOCI should work with donors in each region to develop sector-specific training needs• Programs are underway, such as National Skills Dev. Program and the National Vocational
Education and Training Authority, but these efforts must be coordinated with the SME strategy
MOCI, donors, BDS, National Skills Dev. and other gov’t training programs
37
SME financing gap – especially for non-trade SMEs
0
1,000
Commercial bankloan portfolio
SME portion
($M) $980M ~40M
Trade80%
Service9%
Non-ag prod10%
Agriculture1%
Commercial banking portfolio 2009 SME breakdown
• Trade is majority of SME portfolio• Quick turn-around, profitable for banks• Does not generate high job creation
• Production sectors lagging• Agriculture lagging in particular because
it is a higher-risk sector due to seasonality and need for longer-term payback periods
Source: Challenges and Next Steps in SME Financing, Shorebank; Development of Commercial Banking System in Afghanistan, IMF; MISFA Interviews
Many institutions addressing micro-credit and many commercial banks offering loans to large companies, but SMEs have few options. Strategy must address their lack of credit
Finance
38
Supply and demand reasons for the SME financing gap
Supply: Banks don’t want to lend
SMEs can’t provide proper business documentation• No financial statements• No order books
Insufficient collateral• Banks often demand over 200% collateral• I.e., the only people who get money are those who
don’t need money
Desire for quick payback• Most bank loans go to traders, whose loans are often
repaid within 3 – 6 months• Reluctant to lend to enterprises which require a
longer payback period
Insufficient training of loan officers• Many banks claim they want to lend more, but
currently have enough skilled SME loan officers
No desire to lend in general• Some banks in Afghanistan are simply cash
management services / deposit companies with little intention to lend
Demand: SMEs don’t want to borrow
Interest rates too high and payback period too short• Rates often over 20%• Payback often starts within months, which doesn’t
suit many businesses, such as seasonal agriculture
Lack of Sharia-compliant products• Islamic loan products• Leases
Little information about how to get a loan and what kinds of products are available
No desire to enter the formal economy
Finance
39
Short- and long-term actions to improve financing
Finance
Short-term (<6 months)
Work with 2 – 3 banks to provide loans to SMEs within target sectors
• Likely partners are BRAC, FMFB and AIB• Often, sector-specific products will be needed
– For example, loans to agri-businesses might require more time before first payment (~1 year)
• Coordination between banks & donors is important– Donors can help to identify priority SMEs within
each sector• Interest rates could be partially subsidized
– Can subsidize rates to ~10%, but should not eliminate interest
Work with ARIES to ensure that their SME lending is coordinated SME policy
Mid-term & Long-term (> 6 months)
Drafting appropriate banking law in four areas• Sharia-compliance, secure transactions, leasing and
negotiable instruments
Improved training for bankers, especially loan officers• Will be done as part of the Institute of Banking and Finance
which will be active in 2010
Establishment of credit information bureau to promote commercial lending
Establish a collateral registry to ensure ownership of pledged assets and to ensure that they are not already pledged elsewhere
Work with partner banks to have them open SME windows in branches
• Government can either mandate the opening of SME windows, or provide an incentive to Banks who open them
SME policy should also link closely to upcoming USAID FAIDA project (Financial Access for Investing in the Development of Afghanistan)
40
Additional areas where government can make impact
• MOCI already taking action here (e.g., ACBR, and licensing reform) but still room to do more• Licensing process still not transparent or consistent at MOCI or at municipal level• MOCI must better communicate process and benefits of registration• In addition, must streamline process in MoF to encourage license renewal• Harakat initiative now underway to address many of these issues, both in terms of better
processes and better infrastructure
• Continued creation of industrial parks can solve these issues for targeted groups• Therefore, expanding the industrial parks strategy under MOCI and AISA is imperative
Registration & licensing
Safety / Land / Electric
Trade & tariff• Trade restrictions and tariffs on exports are major point of confusion for SMEs in all regions• Often just better communication is needed – but that must come from MOCI• Should continue to keep import duties low in inputs to national industries
MOCI, AISA, MoF
MOCI, AISA
MOCI, MoF
Actions ResponsibilityConstraint
• Transportation is a key constraint, and MOCI can address this issue in several ways– Improving freight processing facilities at the airport – initiative in progress– Easing the paperwork requirements for shipping overseas – initiative in progress– Encouraging additional competition and capacity in transport sector
• For exports, MOCI must work with ANSA and associations to determine required certification– E.g., with pomegranates and marble, do we need a national testing facility?
• Must ensure that testing is based on customer needs, not government mandates
Transportation
Certification
Market access• MOCI should continue to work with donors to sponsor trade shows, foster links, etc.• Must work to coordinate donors around sector and regional strategies
MOCI, Min. Transport, MoF, donors
MOCI, EPPA, ANSA, donors
MOCI, EPPA, donors
41
Contents
Executive summary
SME Strategy details• Priority sectors• Constraints to growth • Formalization• Implementation
Appendix• Project background• Sources
42
Four typical components to formalizationCurrently focusing on the first three components in Afghanistan
1. Business registration
Business registered with some department of government or agency
For example, registered with ACBR, or a municipality
Business has a license to operate, as granted by AISA or Department of Licenses, for example
Business may be required to have additional licenses and permits, such as an additional license from the Ministry of Public Health for pharmacies
Business has a Tax Identification Number (TIN) and pays taxes to the government
Or, business is registered with municipality and pays municipal taxes
Typically means the business participates in labor programs, provides labor insurance, etc.
Currently less applicable in Afghanistan
2. Business licenses and
permits
3. Tax identification
number
4. Labor / Social
insurance
43
High costs and low benefits to formalization in Afghanistan
High costs
Entry and compliance costs• Registration fees (e.g., up to $1,200 at AISA)• Time spent obtaining licenses and approvals
(improving with AISA & ACBR, but still high)• Difficulty re-registering, especially getting tax
clearance from MoF, leading people to start a new company rather than renew existing registration
Paying tax• Actual cost of the tax itself, especially 20% BRT• Time spent dealing with complex tax system,
Mustoufiats, and additional corruption
Additional reporting – must submit balance sheet annually to the MoF
The costs of corruption• Bribes to officials during the registration process• Bribes to inspectors / officials once business is formal
Loss of existing relationships with customers, suppliers, and others
Fewer benefits
Low level of government services and infrastructure – even for formal business
Shortage of credit, which is one of the typical benefits for formalization
Little benefit of technical training, certification, accreditation, etc.
Fewer regulated markets and other formal sector business to have access to
Limited access to better skilled labor
“Among the companies registered with AISA or the Ministry of Commerce, only 47% were able to identify a benefit from registering.” -- Harakat study
A vicious circle: low SME formalization (20%), leading to low tax revenues (4% GDP), leading to poor government services, which reinforces disincentive to formalize
Source: A Formalization Strategy for Afghanistan, 2008, Market and Business Development Department, PSDD. Reforming Business Licensing in Afghanistan
44
Several opportunities for improvement in registration process
42
13
12
54
6 100
18
0
25
50
75
100
No benefit Avoid tax Don't know how Too expensive Too complicated Bad stories fromothers
Other Total
% of SMEs
Reasons SMEs cite for not registering
Need to better communicatebenefits to registration, and introduce more benefits
Need to better communicate process (90% who did register say process was NOT complicated)
Should lower cost (AISA currently $200 - $1,200)
Source: Afghanistan Investment Climate, 2008, based on 197 respondents
45
But business registration still complex in many areas
SME wants to register
MOCI Licensing Dept.•Provides trade license•Facilitates registration and receipt of TIN
•Offices in 17 provinces•~8K business / year•Official price: 3,500 afs.
Municipality and District• Takes SME paperwork and fee, registers business• Grants municipal and district licenses• Sends paperwork to Kabul for additional license, if
necessary (trading, for example)• Will place business in one of 412 different classifications
based on Soviet methodology• Municipality collects all taxes, which is likely different in
each municipality
AISA•Provides invest license•Facilitates registration and receipt of TIN
•Part of High Comm. on Investment
•Offices in 7 provinces•~8K businesses / year•Charges up to $1,200
If trading co
If investing
If neither of above
Ministry of Finance•Receives paperwork•Sends TIN to ACBR•TIN sub-office usually in the ACBR
•No charge
Other Ministries• Provide sector-
specific licenses• Ministry of
Transport• Ministry of
Communication• Ministry of Public
Health• DAB• etc.
Min. Culture / MoJ•Receive information, publish in official gazette
•Charges 3Afs/letter
ACBR•Collects forms from AISA or Department of Trade
•Registers business•Sends paperwork to MoF for TIN
•Collects and returns to DoT
•Has offices in Mazar and J’bad
•Charges $20
46
Summary timeline of actions to improve formalization
Increasing benefits
Reducing costs
Short-term (< 6 months) Mid-term (6 – 18 month) Long-term (>18 months)
Identify target sector for pilot (same sector as for growth pilot)
Introduce specific formalization benefits• Access to lower-cost financing• Help with preparing financials for loan• Access to technical advice, certification
Communicate benefits to target group• Message should be: here is what the
government is doing in the sector, and what they will do for you if you register
Formalize group
Take findings from group and incorporate into overall plan to improve formalization
Build on success stories from the pilot to better communicate process to other sectors
Work with donors, banks and associations to develop additional benefits to formalization
MOCI should also ensure that benefits are communicated clearly by the many groups, and check to see that the promises are delivered
Continue communicating benefits to formalization
Work with other ministries to better define what benefits they offer
• For example, if an SME needs to register with the Ministry of Communications, what do they get besides just the license?
Plan for better overall communications so that SMEs see that the process is not as complicated as many perceive
• Link with upcoming AISA PR campaign
Reduce cost of registration at MOCI Licensing Department
• High corruption and low transparency
Coordinate with AISA to have them lower their rates if possible
Continue with one-stop registration for exporters at the airport
Communicate more success stories about ease and benefits of registration
Work with MoF, as tax clearance is primary obstacle to renewing license
• As long as tax clearance issues remain, many businesses will not renew
• Hence, AISA formalizes many businesses for one year only
Consider eliminating Trader and Investment licenses all together
• AISA should still provide investment services, but the licenses are not critical
Work with other ministries to remove other licenses
• Many ministry licenses are currently just a form of tax, not a mechanism to protect public safety, as they should be
• In India model, removed all but ~8 licenses
Work with municipalities to consolidate municipal and district registration with national registration
• Remove multiple business classifications at the District level
• Remove duplication of licenses at district and municipal level
• Increase transparency of taxation at municipal level
47
Contents
Executive summary
SME Strategy details• Priority sectors• Formalization• Constraints to growth• Implementation
Appendix• Project background• Sources
48
Implementation will happen in three phases
Long-term (>18 months)
MOCI SME Group continues implementing and monitoring plan
• Plan will need to address exit strategy from foreign aid
Incorporate ongoing findings, communicate to stakeholders
Continue to track metrics of job creation and poverty reduction
Develop pilots of new concepts as needed
Short-term (<6 months)
Gain government buy-in on strategy
Establish SME Group within MOCI
Share strategy with stakeholders
Launch sector-specific pilots and interventions which will
• Test ideas • Create quick impact• Create momentum and buy-in• Build on current programs
SME Group reports pilot results
Mid-term (6 – 18 months)
Modify policy based on pilot results
Communicate updates
Continue successful pilot activities, and expand pilots to new sectors and geographies
Build capacity of SME Group which will manage long-term plan
Prepare rollout of long-term plan
Remember, South East Asia required fifteen years to create a solid base of SMEs
49
SME Group within MOCI should initially drive the strategy
Minister
Deputy MinisterPrivate Sector and Industry
Industrial Affairs Directorate
Private Sector Dev. Directorate
SME Group
Deputy Minister Trade
Deputy Minister Consumer and
Reg.
Group to be part of Private Sector Dev. Directorate
PSD Director
Propose a small team at first which can expand as needed
SME Group also will work closely with other groups within MOCI, and with the other stakeholders (donors, banks)
SpecialistNorth
SpecialistSouth
SpecialistEast
SpecialistWest
SME Financing
Regional specialists should work immediately to prepare pilots and regional strategies
Coordinate with regional entities where possible (ACBR, AISA, ASMED, regional government)
Financing is important enough that person should be dedicated to working with banks / donors to set up financing product
Formalization specialist from MOCI should also be part of the team
Senior-level coordination across ministries is important, so support from Minister, Deputy Minister and Director is key, especially in the first 6 months
Meetings of group should occur at least once per month
Depending on Director’s other responsibilities, might need additional SME strategy leader
50
SME Group can expand over time as neededComplete pilots first, then expand SME Group based on needs
Longer-term group roles – based on SMEDA, Pakistan’s SME Development Association
Potential long-term structure of SME Group – again, based on SMEDA in Pakistan
• Formulate policy to encourage the growth of SMEs and to advise government on issues related to SMEs
• Facilitate BDS Services to SMEs
• Facilitate the development and strengthening of SME representative bodies, associations and chambers
• Conduct sector studies and analysis for sector development strategies
• Facilitate SME financing
• Strengthen SMEs by conducting and facilitating seminars, workshops and training
• Help coordinate donor assistance for programs and projects
• Assist SMEs in getting international certifications, where needed, for their products and processes
• Identify SME service opportunities on the basis of supply/demand gap
CEO
Policy and planningOut-reach BDS Support
Region 1
Region 2
Region 3
Region 4
Fin. Serv
Legal
Tech
Research
Planning
Policy Dev.
Accounts
HR
Admin
MIS
Board should include both the public and private sectors• Minister of Commerce and Industry – Chairman• Ministers or Deputy Ministers of Agriculture, Finance & RRD• Potentially other ministries too (Min. Mines, MOPH)• ~ 4 – 6 industry leaders, at least one from each region
Board of Directors
Communication
Source: ASMED research; Pakistan Small and Medium Enterprise Development Association Group Charter
51
Coordination among multiple stakeholders is key
Government• MOCI
– AISA, EPAA• MAIL• MRRD
– AREDP• MoF• MoT• DAB• ANDS
Coordinated through many inter-ministerial committees
Private sector• Financial institutions
– 17 commercial banks – MFIs and DFIs (inc’d
MISFA, etc.)– BDS firms
– Consulting– Auditing,
accounting– Transportation, etc
Banks coordinated via ABA BDS associations emerging as well
SMEs
Donors / Implementers• USAID (AIRES, ASMED /
EGPSS)• UN / UNIDO / UNDP• World Bank / IFC• GTZ • DFID (Dept. for Intl Dev)• JICA (Japan Int. Coop Ag.)• AKDN (Aga Khan)• Harakat• USDA• ACBAR Associations
• SME associations– ACCI
• Federation of Afghan Crafts and Trades (FACT)
• Afg. Woman’s Bus. Fed.• Afg. Carpet Exporter Guild
& Kabul Carpet Association• Trade organizations• Unions
5
1
2
3
4
52
Government and SME group will have to lead coordinationMuch coordination will need to be done on a regional level, as described next
Government• First step is to gain
commitment at Cabinet level – Min. Commerce and SME Group will lead
• Input critical from MAIL, MoF, MRRD, and MOCI
• Will likely take ~1-2 mo. for first buy-in from all parties
• Ongoing inter-ministerial coordination either through board of SME group, or through a separate SME inter-ministerial committee, as ANDS has an SME gap
Private sector• As with donors, private
sector needs to be aware of SME strategy overall, in particular the banking sector
• Government should work with ABA to communicate high-level strategy
• Then, will work with ABA to select specific partners banks for targeted products and sectors
SMEs
Donors / Implementers• Donors and implementers
should must be informed of strategy and at national level
• Then, donors will work on specific sectors and regions, based on their current operations and areas of interest
Associations• SME development group
will coordinate with associations on a national, regional and sector basis
• Regional & sector basis for specific industries & areas
• National for multi sector issues, such as Women Entrepreneurship
5
1
2
3
4
53
SME strategy needs to be effective at various levelsNational and international activities, as well as regional activities, based on operating conditions
National
Regional
International
•Int’l trade•FDI•Market access
National SME sector policy
Capacity building program
SME financing facility
Customs / transport facilities
• Local facilities• Infrastruct.• Training
Strongat national level
Weakat province level
Strategy enablers• Human capacity• Population density• Private services• Efficiency & cost-
effective delivery• Infrastructure• Security
Province Province
International to provincial levelInternational to provincial level Varying operating conditions at each levelVarying operating conditions at each level
54
Regional strategies will be based on four major regions
West
Herat
FarahGhor
Badghis
1
2
3
Central / East
KabulNangarharKunarBamyan
LaghmanKapisaNuristan
LogarPanjsherParwanWardakGhazniKhostPaktyaPaktika
1
2
3
South
Kandahar
HilmandDaykundi
NimrozUruzganZabul
1
2
3
North
BalkhBadakhshanFaryab
KunduzBaghlanJawzjan
SamanganSari PulTakhar
1
2
3
55
Actions in each region depend on local conditions
Shape
(Hilmand, Paktika)
Clear
(Badakshan)
Hold
(Kunduz)
Build
(Herat, Mazar)
• Extremely difficult local conditions in terms of safety and / or infrastructure
• Can begin to build select SMEs, but widespread SME growth unlikely soon
• Good conditions in terms of both infrastructure and safety
• SME development can take place immediately and progress quickly
Varying operating conditions in each districtVarying operating conditions in each district
• Create strong institutions (associations, etc)• Make significant investment (donor and private sector)• Promote national & international linkage• Create linkage to hold / clear / shape provinces which will
aid in their development
• Provide services, training• Likely less investment• Empower local institutions, like professional associations • Build links to build provinces
– Economic ties across value chains
Types of development actionTypes of development action
• Difficult conditions, will need improvement before development can occur across region
• Conditions generally good, but must prevent backsliding to poor safety situation
• Empower local institutions, like professional associations • Where possible, look to these regions to provide agricultural
inputs to SMEs in neighboring regions until conditions improve
56
Will test and refine strategies with regional pilot programs
Fresh fruit
JuiceConcen-
trateAgri-processing
Marble quarrying
Cutting FinishingMarble
WoolSpinning / dying
WeavingCutting / washing
Carpet Trading
Medical Herbs
Agri-processing
Wood WoodFurniture
/ craftsCarpentry
57
Initial regional strategy: North Strategy will need to be refined and expanded during pilot planning
Provinces (Pop. M)
Balkh 1.1Badakhshan 0.8Faryab 0.9Kunduz 0.9Baghlan 0.8Jawzjan 0.5Samangan 0.3Sari Pul 0.5Takhar 0.9
1
2
3
Industries
• Balkh: carpets, livestock, skins & leather• Badakshan: minerals, medicinal herbs• Faryab: carpet, pistachio (primary national producer), salt, marble• Kunduz: agriculture (grains), livestock, formerly a large cotton producer• Baghlan: grains, vegetables, cement, timber & untapped coal and marble• Jawzjan: little, some agriculture• Samangan: grains, fruits nuts; long-term potential for tourism• Sari Pul: agriculture, mainly cereal and melons• Takhar: cereal, pistachio, untapped coal, gold & salt
MOCI Partners
USAID, EGGI
GTZ, EU
JICA
Priorities
1. Carpet pilot: Recommend a carpet pilot first because of job creation potential. MOCI works with 2 donors in region to remove constraints on industry growth; strategy involves repatriating cut & wash & trade from Pakistan, as well as including more domestic wool in production.
2. Kunduz has high potential for leather industry, given presence of livestock and high number of literate workers; however, water supply and transportation will be issue; requires significant investment.
3. Medical herbs are low-investment potential for Badakhshan.4. Far North East (Badakhshan, Takhar, and Baghlan) are attractive mineral belt in long-term, but mining issues are barrier.
Issues & Infrastructure
• Large numbers of people returning home from northern countries• Good infrastructure in Balkh, especially around Mazar; also good irrigation infrastructure
around Takhar• Large number of literate workers in Kunduz, but separated by poor and mined roads• Other areas undeveloped, such as Jawzjan, and Samangan (no energy infrastructure)
58
Regional strategy: SouthStrategy will need to be refined and expanded during pilot planning
Provinces (Pop. M)
Kandahar1.0
Hilmand0.8
Daykundi0.4
Nimroz0.1
Uruzgan0.3
Zabul0.3
1
2
3
Industries
• Kandahar – agriculture, especially fruit production, currently poppy production as well• Hilmand – agriculture, especially cereal, vegetables, tobacco and cotton, and poppy• Daykundi – agriculture, especially almonds• Nimroz – some agriculture, but susceptible to drought, and with high unemployment• Uruzgan – agriculture, especially grains, apricots, almonds and poppy• Zabul – agriculture, wheat, almonds, grapes, apricots
MOCI Partners
USAID, EGGI
DFID (Helmand)
GTZ (in Uruzgan)
Priorities
As in parts of the East, security is a risk here, which makes high-investment activities difficult. However, given that the high-risk areas have high agricultural output, the goal should be to encourage that output by purchasing products from under-developed areas and processing them in facilities in nearby more developed areas.
• Plan is first to pilot activities around an agricultural product in Kandahar – most likely either pomegranates or almonds.• The area already produces both of these products, but will need to assess the cost of setting up additional processing
facilities for each product and then work at first with the one that will create more job opportunities in the short term.
Issues & Infrastructure
• High security risk and poppy production, especially in Kandahar, Hilmand, and Uruzgan• Whole region generally suffers from low population density, drought, poor infrastructure
59
Regional strategy: WestStrategy will need to be refined and expanded during pilot planning
Provinces (Pop. M)
Herat1.6
Farah 0.5
Ghor 0.6
Badghis0.4
1
2
3
Industries
• Herat: Agriculture (wheat), livestock, tomato, carpet (kilim), marble & trade with Iran• Farah: Agriculture (wheat, barley), embroidery• Ghor: Primarily livestock, with some nuts, fruit and honey as well, embroidery• Badghis: Agriculture (wheat, barley, pistachio), cattle
MOCI Partners
USAID, EGGI
Italy (PRT leaders)
CRS (in Herat and Ghor)
Priorities
1. Marble pilot in Herat. Already a priority among donors, but MOCI can undertake several activities to speed growth, as described under Marble pilot, starting on page 64.
2. Coordinated investment in agriculture processing: many defunct facilities silos & mills for wheat production, cotton (cotton fabrics & oil), shoe mfg. Also, high potential for saffron.
3. Trade & tariff with Iran: traders & SMEs unsure of trade and tariff regulation.4. Skills building for displaced workers: embroidery, higher value farming.
Issues
• Large numbers of displaced people returning to region – in need of skills• Increased unrest and difficulty in Farah, making development work difficult, and water
shortage which affects economic base
Infrastructure
• Roads good in many places, airports and easy access to boarder with Iran• Industrial park in Herat• Electricity outages common, no access to electricity for some industries, such as marble
60
Regional strategy: EastStrategy will need to be refined and expanded during pilot planning
Industries
• Agriculture – as with most parts of Afghanistan, agriculture is the major industry• Minerals – currently a small but high-potential segment, especially along eastern border• Forestry – as with minerals, currently an unexploited sector, but one with high-potential• Manufacturing – large potential for manufacturing, especially around Kabul and J-bad
Priorities
Key to this region will be to develop a strategy that can utilize both the high-infrastructure areas (like Kabul & Jalalabad) while beginning to develop more difficult areas such as Paktya.
• Plan is to first begin a pilot program promoting the wood & furniture sector, which currently is under-developed. First step is to complete assessment of timber supplies in Kunar, as well as assess their carpentry capability. Much of the processing of timber and carpentry work might have to be done in Kabul, especially at first.
• In addition, as part of the North Regional Strategy, more carpet cut and wash facilities will need to be opened in Kabul and around Jalalabad.
• For areas such as Paktya and Paktika, recommendation is to encourage greater production of agricultural raw materials by purchasing them for use in processing facilities which are being developed in nearby developed provinces, such as Kabul.
Issues & Infrastructure
• Many parts of this large region have quite high development potential, but several of the provinces (such as Paktya and Paktika) still suffer from security problems which make development activities in those areas difficult
• Similarly with infrastructure, it is quite good in some areas, but lacking in others, especially in many of the provinces bordering the Pakistan border
Provinces (Pop. M)
Kabul 3.5Nangarhar 1.3Kunar 0.4Bamyan 0.4Laghman 0.4Kapisa 0.4Nuristan 0.1Logar 0.3Panjsher 0.1Parwan 0.6Wardak 0.5Ghazni 1.0Khost 0.5Paktya 0.5Paktika 0.4
1
2
3
MOCI Partners
USAID ASMED, EGGI
USA (Leaders of most PRTs in the region)
61
Carpet example: significant value comes from final steps
24
4
50 24
27 115
4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
Wool Spinning Dying Weaving Transport to Pak Cut & Wash Sell to Wholesaler Total
Significant value from weaving, but extremely labor intensive, and low margin overall
High value from trading, and has the key benefit of access to markets, customer, brand, etc. But currently these final two steps are performed in Pakistan on 85% of carpets
Source: Growth Strategy and Action Plan for Carpet Sector, ACC & On the Frontier; ASMED Carpet Sector Strategy; Carpet Sector Analysis, US Department of Trade
$ / sq. m
Value distribution of typical Chob Rung carpet
Carpet – North / East
62
Cut and wash in Pakistan generates ~$6M in revenue• 1.6M sq. m / year * 85% cut in Pakistan * $4 revenue per m
And employs ~7K people• Based on average facility of 200 people cutting and washing
3,000 sqm / month• Hence, average person cuts and washes 180 sqm / year
Carpet sector can gain ~30% value through repatriation
Source: Growth Strategy and Action Plan for Carpet Sector, ACC & On the Frontier; ASMED Carpet Sector Strategy; Carpet Sector Analysis, US Department of Trade
Overall market information
World market ~$1B; Afg market: ~$150M (15% market share)• National production ~1.6M sq m / year
Price $90 / sq m; output: 1 sq m / person / month• Hence, ~140K full-time weavers could work full time• In practice, there are probably at least twice that many
weavers, working half time or less. Some estimates of up to ~1M people weaving part time
Cut and Wash
Trading Afghan carpets in Pakistan generates $38M• Traders make on average $27 / sq meter
Trading does not employ many people• Given the fact that a single trader trades 1,000s of square
meters / month, while a weaver just weaves 1 sq m / month
But trading would give Afghanistan better control over markets and branding, and keeps margins in country, which could then benefit weavers
Trading
Thus a $150M annual market can become a roughly $200M market
Adds 7K jobs in cut and wash
Gives Afghanistan better control over market and brand, which in turn will lead to higher sales
Question is: what needs to happen now?
Carpet – North / East
63
Several actions in carpet sector for MOCI and othersLand – more land needed for cut and wash, likely in industrial parks – in some cases, MOCI can provide land at low lease rates to attract industry back from Pakistan
Finance – will need to work with banks to provide financing; however, loans <$20K
Environment – increased cut and wash in Afghanistan means NEPA will need to develop a policy to address the environmental impact of cut and wash
Additional incentives – to bring back cut and wash from Pakistan, government will have to offer additional incentives (low or no tax, subsidized shipping out of Afghanistan, land, etc.)
Source: Growth Strategy and Action Plan for Carpet Sector, ACC & On the Frontier; ASMED Carpet Sector Strategy; Carpet Sector Analysis, US Department of Trade
Cut and Wash
Shipping and transportation• Need to increase shipping and handling capacity at the airport• Security issue at airport – carpets are cut and damaged during a post-customs security check
Trade paperwork – most Kabul-based traders still complain of excessive procedures in order to get permission to export
• Others say the process is not difficult, but process is neither consistent nor transparent• One-stop-shop for exporters at the airport will help to address this issue
Financing – Kabul traders will need more access to finance (although finance for traders typically not too difficult to obtain)
Trading
General
Branding – will need to develop a brand for the finished products, including several components• Fair Trade – increases value of brand in the states, but would require government mandate stating
that all carpets are made according to Fair Trade, and then would require Fair Trade organization itself to ensure compliance
• Also need to consider other certifications – handmade vs. machine, natural vs. chemical. Before making these decisions, need to find out what the customer market actually values
Design – Afghanistan will have to spend more time with design• Hence, a design facility might be needed. Could be done as part of a new independent carpet
guild, which would draw from members of the existing carpet associations
Carpet – North / East
64
Marble production taking place in all regionsHerat is good place for pilot: high quality product, some production already; Jalalabad also potential
Source: On the Frontier; ASMED Marble Sector Strategy
Marble - West
Herat
Helmand
• Lashkar Gah• 10 tons / month• White / onyx
Kandahar
• 150 tons / month• But low quality
Jalalabad
• 150 tons / month• White, medium
quality
Kabul
• 300 tons / month• White, black,
green
Mazar
• Some exports, but little market data available
• 300 tons / month• High quality white
marble
65
Most of the value going to neighbors
Source: On the Frontier; ASMED Marble Sector Strategy
30
20
140
30
10
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
225
250
Quarry Tax Shipping to Pak Cutting (Slabs) Final cut, polish
$ / ton
Value distribution of typical metric ton of marble from Afghanistan
Afghanistan captures only $40 per ton from a value chain that is worth approximately $240 / ton, and low quality blasting at the quarry means ~50-80% of marble is wasted
Majority of the value comes from the final two steps, but a significant amount of capital investment is required. Hence, marble pilots should focus on high-quality quarries, such as in Herat
Marble - West
66
Could become ~$450M industry; ~$100M investment needed
Source: On the Frontier; ASMED Marble Sector Strategy
Marble - West
0
100
200
300
400
500
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
USD $M
Potential grown of Afghan Marble
Tiles
Slabs
Blocks
But substantial investment needed
Requires ~$100M in investment in several areas• Road and infrastructure to and from quarries• Equipment within each quarry• Overall, building this type of capacity requires
opening over 200 quarries, and 50 finishing plants
These estimates also rely on several assumptions• World capacity continues to grow at 8% per year,
as it has over last five years• Adding 250K tons of capacity each year between
now and 2016, meaning a total capacity in 2016 of 1.5M tons
• Also assumes an ongoing price of $150/ton for blocks and $300/ton for slabs
• Nearly all production would be exported
Best estimates suggest that output at this level would create 15K jobs
67
But many actions and interventions needed to start industry
Source: On the Frontier; ASMED Marble Sector Strategy
Quarrying
Cutting (slabs)
Advocacy need with Ministry of Mines to encourage investment• Quarrying rights should be awarded based on company’s willingness to invest capital• Quarry owners should be taxed based on profits, not based on a royalty system• Lease lengths need to be increased – current short-terms of lease discourage high capital investment
The industry is unlikely to grow if these mining issues cannot be resolved
Financing required to improve quarrying operations• Organizations such as USAID / ASMED working with OPIC, IFC and others to provide financing• Capital requirements high – up to ~$1M per quarry• MOCI can help to promote the marble cluster and work with banks to provide financing• However, the most important role for MOCI is to help remove roadblocks at Ministry of Mines
Final cut & polish
Afghanistan already has skills in this area• Often Afghanistan re-imports slabs and tiles from Pakistan• However, more training and equipment needed to further raise the standard of local finishing
Other
Infrastructure• Government coordination will be needed to ensure proper infrastructure. For example, improved
roads will be needed to access several major quarries in Heart• Electricity grid might also need to be extended to quarries
Testing• Critical for marble to be tested before selling to international markets. Currently samples are sent out
of the country for testing. Based on test results, quarries for pilot can be identified. However, as industry grows, government will need to support an in-country testing facility
Marble - West
68
Action needed in most of the SME constraint areas
• Financing is critical with marble industry; ~$1M for quarry to be fully effective• Payback time will be slow, at least 1 – 2 years• Will need to work with bank to provide financing, and with donors to provide some capital to
reduce risk to banks and to help lower the effective interest rate
• Most transportation will be overland; roads in region generally good, but in many cases will need to work with donors to provide last stretch of road to quarry
• Testing needed, and must be quarry specific• Donors have helped send samples for overseas testing, but need explore in-country testing
• MOCI already taking action here; should coordinate through new ACBR in Herat
• Electricity is issue in many quarries; usually powered by generator• Final cut and polish can be done in industrial park
Finance
Transportation
Certification
Registration
Safety & crime / Land / Electric
Market access
Sector-specific infrastructure
• Government should continue to work with donors to sponsor trade shows• Trade shows in Italy have been effective in past
• Needed infrastructure are generally roads to quarry and equipment in each quarry• Polishing and final cut facilities can be done near quarries or in industrial park
Capacity building
Trade & tariff• Trade and tariffs are still major point of confusion for SMEs in all regions• Some regulations might need changing, but often just better communication is needed
• Training needed for use of all new equipment in quarries
MOCI, MoF, Banks, donors
MOCI, Min. Transport, donors
MOCI, ANSA, donors
MOCI, donors
MOCI, AISA
MOCI, EPPA donors
MOCI, donors
MOCI, donors, BDS
MOCI, MoF
Issues and actions ResponsibilityConstraint
Marble - West
69
For all target sectors, communication from government is key
Government must determine for each target sector what type of benefits the government can provide to companies• Access to overseas markets via trade shows, customer visits to Afghanistan• Access to technical training or certification, for example, design training in carpets or ISO certification in Agri-processing• Assistance with access to finance via banks or a public-private SME credit facility• Information about donors and access to their programs• Expedited tax and / or registration procedures, and potential tax-reductions• Advice from MOCI, provided SME can show proof that they have registered
Once the benefits have been agreed on for a target sector, MOCI will have to communicate them clearly• Recommend putting together an official MOCI guide to specific sector. Should include:
– Information on the current state of industry: size, dynamics, achievements to date, etc– Details about what MOCI’s plans are for that industry: how much MOCI is investing, how big the industry can
become, what that means in terms of additional profit for companies– What the SME can expect when they formalize: not just the benefits, but also details on taxes, trade regulations,
inspection regulations, etc.• Distribute official guide through multiple existing channels
– Regional governments– ACCI– Sector-specific associations– Donor groups– Banks that are participating in credit programs for that particular sectors
MOCI and other Ministries will have to commit to benefits once they are communicated• E.g., a tax rate and procedure, once communicated, will have to stick• SMEs should be encouraged to call MOCI with complaint if they experience different procedures than those
communicated• Opportunity to contact the Ministry with such issues is a benefit to registration
1
2
3
Will help to promote formalization as well, as the government will only be able to provide these benefits to formalized companies
70
Strategy implementation timeline – overview
Government approval of policy
Creation of SME Group in MOCI
First meeting of SME Group
Regional strategies shared with stakeholders (donors, ministries, etc)
Pilots kicked off in each of 4 regions• Address the 3 key areas: financing,
infrastructure, & capacity building
Results from pilots
Revision of strategy based on results
Staffing expansion of SME Group
Funding sources identified
SME Group fully operational, ready to become independent
Activity Feb MarJan April June Q310May Q410 Q211 Q311Q111 Q411 Q112 Q212 Q312 Q412
Short-term (2010) Mid-term Long-term
71
Summary of tasks for each stakeholder group
MOCI & government
Donors and implementers
Banks and BDS
Associations
Short-term Mid-term Long-term
Gain agreement on overall SME strategy• Agree on sector activities to support strat.• Communicate strategy to all stakeholders
Create SME Group within MOCI
Kick off pilot in particular sector• Likely includes support from donors and
banks (tech skills, subsidized loans, etc)
Incorporate results of pilot into strategy
Prepare additional pilots
Add additional staff to SME Group based on pilot results
• Potentially a communications person to continue promoting MOCI target clusters
Working together with stakeholders• SME Group to have regular sessions
with donors, certain SMEs, and MOCI• MOCI receives recommendations from
SME Group• Through Inter-ministerial mtgs, MOCI
ensures that gov’t meets SME needs
Work through MOCI to ensure that efforts are coordinated at national and regional level
Certain donors should be coordinated in particular for pilot program
Continue dialogue with MOCI & SME Group on results of work
Make recommendations based on their own findings in the field
Continue dialogue with MOCI & SME Group on results of work
Recommendations based on findings
Ensure that capacity over the long term is transferred to permanent institutions
Specific SME-oriented banks will work with MOCI to offer SME product to target sector
• BRAC, FMFB, AIB, for example
Donor support to offer subsidized loans
Specific BDS firms engaged to provide support – for example, in preparing necessary documentation for loans
Specific banks will work with gov’t to open dedicated SME windows in certain locations
• BRAC, FMFB, AIB are all potential partners
Expansion of SME windows
Ongoing program to offer single-digit interest on loans for target industries
Is it possible for regional branches to accelerate formalization right at the SME window?
Associations such as ACCI or FACT will provide important input to pilot
• Names of potential participants• Information on needs of participants
Associations will continue to be consulted as overall strategy is developed
Associations are conduit between SMEs and gov’t / donors
• Help ensure that SME strategy is understood by SMEs and that gov’t understands SME needs
• Should also be able to help promote formalization
Associations gradually take on a larger role as donor transfer more capacity-building responsibility to them
72
Major risk factors
Commitment from
government
Funding
Organizational development
Private sector-failure
Potential Issue What needs to be done
Without government support from multiple Ministries, the SME Policy and Strategy cannot succeed
In particular, government support must come from Cabinet level, additional inter-ministerial level, and the regional level
“Support” is not so much financial or human resources as it is a general agreement and willingness to support the principles of laid out in the SME Policy and Strategy
There is no to way to gain wide-spread buy-in except by working very closely and extensively with all stakeholders at the start of the project
The Minister has proposed inter-ministerial SME meetings 2x/month, at least for first 6 months
Only when this is achieved and all feedback is consolidated can the strategy proceed to a regional level
Funding will be required to further develop and execute plan
In some cases, funding is already being directed to areas consistent with the strategy (such as in carpets)
However, in other areas, such as SME-credit and development of the SME group, additional funding is key
Donor funding needs to be secured at the start of the project, but only after government commitment is achieved
Recommending small donor funding at first, then increasing a project gains momentum
Capacity building will be important at the Ministerial level, particularly within the SME group at MOCI, but also on a regional level
Plan is currently to have a small SME group which reduces immediate capacity building needs, but as group grows in 2011 and beyond, much more capacity is critical
As with donor funding, organizational development must be addressed after government buy-in is achieved
Capacity building needs must be limited at the project outset. Throughout the project, the aim is to do a few things right, and then build, rather than attempting too much too soon
Fundamentally, much of the success for this program involves SMEs building trust in the government so that the government can better serve their needs
However, given current level of SME’s mistrust in government (as evidenced by low levels of formalization), gaining buy-in from our primary stakeholders (SMEs) will be a challenge
Clear and frequent communication between the government and all stakeholders is essential to success, otherwise we expect little buy-in from SMEs
However, before communication can happen, the government must decide what to communicate, leading again to the notion of government commitment
Better no communication than to communicate a promise which is either unclear or not kept
73
Contents
Executive summary
SME Strategy details• Priority sectors• Formalization• Constraints to growth• Implementation
Appendix• Project background• Sources
74
Project background and objectives
Background
His Excellency, Mr. Shahrani, Minister of Commerce and Industry, drafted ambitious 2-year plan for MOCI
Goal to create a “socially responsible market economy in which sustainable and equitable growth is private-sector led”
ASMED to develop SME section of the plan to answer some key questions
• What barriers prevent SMEs from joining the formal economy?
• What should MOCI do to lower barriers and to help to grow the overall SME sector?
• How will other ministries, agencies, etc, help?• What are MOCI’s benchmarks for success?• Given the above, what will be the government’s
overall policy for SME development?
Objectives
Primary deliverable is an SME policy and development plan with three major sections
• Diagnostics− Assessment of current state of SMEs (growth,
barriers to growth, etc)− Overview of what initiatives are underway now− Understanding of gaps
• Policy and Initiative development− Government’s SME policy, based on findings in
the diagnostics− Tasks for MOCI and other government groups− Outline of areas of coordination between
government and other organizations• Implementation planning
− Timing of initiatives and policy rollout− Plan for coordinating all stakeholders− Budget and manpower needs− Estimation of impact
Plan builds on existing research and draws from interviews with ministries, NGOs, donors, banks, etc.
75
Strategy development followed two-month schedule
1. Diagnostics• Overview of current research• Fact-finding with
stakeholders• Synthesizing results
2. Initiative Development• Overview of actions• Analogues from region• First recommendations
3. Implementation Planning• Develop implementation
plan• Validation with stakeholders• Develop metrics to measure• Identify quick wins• Present final plan• Incorporate final feedback
Milestones
Activity Week of
Second reviewwith Minister
Final presentation
Oct 16 Oct 23Oct 9 Oct 30 Nov 13 Nov 20Nov 6
First reviewwith Minister
Nov 27 Dec 4
76
Contents
Executive summary
SME Strategy details• Priority sectors• Formalization• Constraints to growth• Implementation
Appendix• Project background• Sources
77
Incorporated findings from existing studies (I)
Report Source Topic
SME development --best practices from other countries
GC University, Lahore, Office of the Chancellor
Asian Development Bank
Pakistan Development Forum, 2005
Thitapha Wattanapruttipaisan, Senior Officer, Industrial Services, ASEAN
Human and Organizational Potential Development Center, Thailand
Ganeshan Wignaraja, Head of Competitiveness and SME Strategy, Maxwell Stamp
USAID
Overview of SME policy reform in Pakistan and its impact on growth
Constraints and policy recommendations
Data on correlating industrialization with GDP
Assessment of Asian SME development policy, with particular emphasis on trade
Overall policy recommendations for SME development in ASEAN
Initiatives for gov’t, SME associations, & donors to develop SME sector
Navigating the political aspects of SME development & building consensus
Topic
SME Development in Pakistan – Issues and Remedies
SME Development in Pakistan – Analyzing Constraints on Growth
Towards a Prosperous Pakistan – Strategy for Rapid Industrial Growth
Promoting SME Development: Some Issues and Suggestions for Policy Consideration
A Proposed ASEAN Policy Blueprint for SME Development
Promoting SME Exports from Developing Countries
The Political Economy of SME Development Policy in Indonesia
78
Incorporated findings from existing studies (II)
Report Source Topic
SME development --best practices from other countries
GC University, Lahore, Office of the Chancellor
World Bank
Government (?)
Royal Government of Cambodia
SMEDA
SMEDA
Abdul Awal Mintoo
Overview of SME policy reform in Pakistan and its impact on growth
Analysis of local constraints in various African countries
Review of India SME policy
Outline of national framework and policy
How Pakistan developed their leather industry
Operating rules and charter for Pakistan SME development group
Report on what Bangladesh is doing in its SME sector
Topic
SME Development in Pakistan – Issues and Remedies
Formalization of SMEs in Africa
SMEs in India
SME Development Framework, Cambodia, 2005
Leather Industry Development, Pakistan
SMEDA Ordinance
SMEs in Bangladesh
79
Report Source Topic
SME sector analysis
ASMED / Altai Consulting
ASMED / Altai Consulting
Clive Mitchell, Antony Benham, British Geological Survey
ARDEP, Haroon Chakansuri
Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, Saurabh Naithani, MOCI
UN Office on Drugs and Crime
Feasibility study for 6 sectors• Milk and yoghurt• Cashmere• Gemstones• Flour• Industrial bread• Cakes and candies
Market analysis and feasibility study for renewable energy and energy efficiency
Study focussing on the minerals sector
Analysis of constraints to SME development
Issues in promoting SMEs, and governance recommendations
Assessment of viable SME sectors and overview of scope of major donor agencies
Topic
Afghanistan SME Market Analysis – Phase 1
Afghanistan SME Market Analysis – Phase 2
Afghanistan Revival and Redevelopment
ARDEP SME Survey Analysis
The Case for SMEs in Afghanistan
Mapping of Alternative Livelihood Projects in Afghanistan
Incorporating findings from existing studies (III)
80
Report Source Topic
SME sector analysis (cont’d)
Avery Leather Consulting
Mir A. Rahim Yahya
On the Frontier
On the Frontier
The McCord Group
The Macauley Institute & Mercy Corps
Euan Thomson / AREU
ADB
Analysis for potential leather industry in North region, including report on engineering specifications
Analysis of Afghanistan competitive advantage
Sector report done for ASMED
Sector report done for ASMED
As described in title
Focusing on these sectors in North
As described in title
Frameworks and data for agricultural sectors
Topic
Potential for Establishing a New Tannery in Afghanistan, 2009
Afghanistan Marble Industry Competitiveness, 2009
Marble Cluster Analysis
Carpet Cluster Analysis
Analysis of Business Opportunities within Afghanistan’s Carpet Sector, 2007
Production and Marketing of Red Meat, Wool, Skins and Hides, 2005
Overview of the Livestock Sector and Livestock Marketing in Afghanistan
Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Agricultural Sector, 2003
Incorporating findings from existing studies (IV)
81
Report Source Topic
Investment climate for SMEs
Sayed Mahmood, WB Finance and PSD Sector Unit (SASFP)
John Speakman, World Bank, DFID, Altai
IBRD / World Bank
Saurabh Naithani
AREDP
US State Department
World Bank
NATO / OTAN
ARIES
Major impediments to SME development, based on results of SME survey
Major impediments to SME development, based on results of SME survey
Constraints to growth
Overall guide to ANDS (not SME specific)
Business climate for SMEs
Practical facts for investors, including registration procedures, etc.
Good source of overall development data
General, not SME specific
SME constraints and recommendations
Topic
The Investment Climate in Afghanistan, 2005
The Afghan Investment Climate in 2008
Doing Business in Afg, 2010
ACBAR’s Guide to the ANDS
AREDP SME Survey Analysis Results & Presentation
Doing Business in Afghanistan – A Country Commercial Guide for US Companies, 2005
Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth &Reducing Poverty, 2004
Afghanistan Report, 2009
ARIES SME Dev. Workshop Rept.
Incorporating findings from existing studies (V)
82
Report Source Topic
Investment climate for SMEs
IMF
IMF
DFID
ADB
UNDP
World Bank
DFID, World Bank
Matt Waldman / ACBAR
USAID
Update on IMF poverty reduction initiatives
Excellent source of macroeconomic data
Another excellent source of macroeconomic data
Macro-economic data
Good source of macroeconomic data
Excellent macroeconomic data
Analysis of agricultural sectors
Good for aid data
Review of agricultural programs in the East
Topic
Afghanistan Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2008
IMF Statistical Appendix, 2008
Understanding Afghanistan: Growth Diagnostic, 2008
ADB Afghanistan Statistics
Afghanistan National Human Development Report, 2004
Structure of Afghan Economy
Economic Incentives and Development Initiative to Reduce Opium Production, ‘08
Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afg.
Alternative Development Program, East Region, 2005 – 2009
Incorporating findings from existing studies (VI)
83
Report Source Topic
Investment climate for SMEs
Adam Smith / DFID
William Byrd
GFA Consulting Group
Report on issues and solutions
Actions to promote growth
Analysis of issues and constraints, especially in Kunduz and Balkh
Topic
Reforming Business Licensing In Afghanistan, 2008
Afghanistan Needs Pro-Private Sector Growth, 2005
SME Policy Issues, 2008
Incorporating findings from existing studies (VII)
84
Report Source Topic
Access to credit Amjad Arbab, Managing Director, MISFA
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
MRRD and MoF, Afghanistan
Radjeep Sengupta and Craig Aubuchon
Ishrat Husain
On the Frontier
World Bank
IMF
ARIES
Microfinance sector analysis
Assessment of microfinance institutions and credit-seekers, and discussion of barriers to increased lending
Microfinance reviews and recommendations
Overview of Microfinance around the world
Tactics used in Pakistan to increase access to finance
Details on the barriers to financing in Afghanistan
Framework for enhancing SME growth through financing
Academic details on risk and rewards and CAMEL system
Review of efforts
Topic
Facing the Challenge of Scaling up Microfinance in Afghanistan
From Access to Impact: Microcredit and Rural Livelihood in Afghanistan
Midterm Review of the Microfinance Sector and MISFA in Afghanistan
The Microfinance Revolution
Banking Sector Reforms in Pakistan
Finance Cluster: Understanding Investor Needs, 2006
The Link Between Competitiveness and SME Financing, 2006
Development of Commercial Banking System in Afghanistan, 2009
FINCA Progress Review, 2009
Incorporating findings from existing studies (VIII)
85
Report Source Topic
Access to credit
Export promotion versus import substitution
Actionaid
Mennonite Economic Development Associates
Shorebank International
Hakan Yilmazkuday
Debdas Bandyopadhyay
Excellent detail on financing needs in agricultural sector
Excellent data on what is needed in agricultural sector
Constraints to SME financing
General analysis of costs and benefits
Academic framework for analysing benefits in India
Topic
Food for Thought: Analysis of Agricultural Financing in Afghanistan, 2009
Agricultural Market Research for Microfinance and SME Interventions, 2009
Challenges and Next Steps in SME Lending in Afghanistan, 2009
Export Promotion versus Import Substitution
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