CWS Essay Assignment caa 020712

7/23/2019 CWS Essay Assignment caa 020712

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GOH KENG SWEE

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

43rd COMMAND AND STAFF COURSE

CWS Individual Essay Assignment

Submitted by:

23 pages, including cover page

3835 words (excluding footnotes, endnotes, bibliography)


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Assignment Submission Declaration

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

Name:

Matriculation No: 43037

Title: Individual Essay Assignment

Course and Code: CWS

Lecturer/Tutor: Assoc. Prof. Bernard Loo, Dr. Ong Wei Chong

Submission Date: 02 July 2012

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The Wehrmacht was excellent in the waging of battles and campaigns and

still lost the strategic contest in World War Two. Critically examine the

plausible reasons for this strategy/tactics dichotomy.

In the realm of strategy, the German armed forces, which in two world wars, were

very good at fighting but were heroically incapable of waging war successfully.

- Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (1999)

INTRODUCTION

With the benefit of hindsight, it is perhaps easy to criticise the failings of wartime Germanys

armed forces, the Wehrmacht, consisting of the land force component the Heer, the naval

forces, the Kriegsmarine, and the air force, the Luftwaffe. After all, along with fellow Axis

Powers, it did indeed end up losing the strategic contest in World War II, succumbing

ultimately in a conflict of attrition to the Allies (Newland & Chun, 2011, p. 153).

However, in order to do justice to the examination of the dichotomy between its stunning

tactical victories early on in the war and the final strategic collapse of Nazi Germany with the

fall of Berlin, it must be recognised that the Wehrmachtwas both tactically and strategically

successful in the initial phases of World War II, conquering most of western Europe in a

matter of weeks by out-manoeuvring its enemies tactically while ensuring that its Eastern

flank is secure through the conquest of Poland in a strategic partnership with Russia (Black,

2003).


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This paper will attempt to analyse the possible explanations to the stark contrast between the

Wehrmachts early successes and its eventual strategic failure by firstly providing clarity on

the definitions of strategy and tactics as well as the relationship between the two before

illustrating this strategy/tactics dichotomy through a timeline of the Wehrmachts battles,

chronicling how some of the major operations undertaken in the eastern and western fronts

supported the achievement of Hitlers policy and strategic aims.

It will subsequently investigate the issue at hand using the analysis framework suggested by

Colin Gray by examining some of the dimensions of strategy (Gray, The Dimensions of

Strategy, 1999). By providing justifications using historical examples, the paper will propose

that some of the reasons for this dichotomy were the false assumptions of people and their

national will, the lack of adequate preparation for war in terms of logistics and intelligence,

and the failure of command as well as the inability to manage friction, uncertainty, and

chance during the war proper.

Finally, this paper will conclude by restating the suggested reasons to explain the said

dichotomy that led to the ultimate demise and capitulation of the Wehrmacht and Nazi

Germany.

DEFINITIONS

Before delving into the systematic analysis of the topic proper, it is useful to provide clear

definitions to the terms strategy and tactics used in the context of the question posed.


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In his thesis On War, Clausewitz described three levels in the structure of war, with each

successive dimension taking on an ever broader scope: from tactics, used by units in

positions to attain victory, to strategy, employed by armies during campaigns to achieve

campaign goals and finally to war plans, implemented by nations to fulfil policy aims

(Smith H. , 2004).

Similarly, in modern terms, there exist different realms of conflict within the hierarchy of

military art; comprising of grand strategy being of the top order, followed by military strategy,

operational art and lastly, tactics, with each preceding level setting the aims and objectives of

the following (Gray, The Dimensions of Strategy, 1999, p. 21).

Grand Strategy is defined as the adaptation of domestic and international resources to

achieve security for a state (Rosecrance & Stein, Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand

Strategy, 1993). As suggested by Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, its role, representing more than

just military leadership in war or deterrence in peace, is to coordinate and direct all

resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political objectives of

the warthe goal defined by fundamental policy (Hart, 1967, pp. 335-336). In this context,

the military is but one of the resources, or national powers, at the disposal of a nation to

achieve its grand strategy (or policy) aims, with others such as economic, geographic,

political and national will (Antal, 1992).

At the immediate subordinate level, Military Strategy is defined as the art and science of

employing the armed forces of a nation or an alliance to secure policy objectives by the

application or threat of force (US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM)100-5,

Operations, 1986, p. 9).


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Therefore, there is a need to emphasize the distinction between grand strategy and military

strategy, for it is only too easy to place all the blame for the defeat of the Wehrmachton

Hitlers flawed national policies and political leadership without examining the strategic

fallacies of the armed forces itself; although it can be argued that the Fhrer, as the supreme

commander of the Wehrmacht and chancellor or political head of state (Bullock, 1962, p.

309), was so intertwined in his political and military roles that with the agreement of his

generals (Roberts, 2012), did much to contribute to military strategy planning as well as

direct its execution during the course of the war and that many of the Wehrmachts missteps

can be traced back to national policy failures that it was trying to implement.

Hence, for the purpose of bringing focus to this essay, discussions on strategy will be

confined to the military strategy definition more relevant to the level of where the Wehrmacht

operates (as one of the national powers of Nazi Germany) while any references to grand

strategy of the Nazi regime as a whole will be termed as its policies. However, with

wartime Germanys situation as a martial state in general and Hitlers dominance in all

aspects of policy and strategy formulation in particular (Newland & Chun, 2011, p. 428),

there was bound to be instances of overlap or even reversals where policies were

implemented to achieve military strategic goals.

Within this level of strategy, there exist several dimensions that affect its workings and

applications. Gray has proposed three categories within his seventeen dimensions 1 with

1Specifically, the seventeen are: People, Society, Culture, Politics, Ethics, Economics/Logistics,

Organization, Military Administration, Information and Intelligence, Strategic Theory and Doctrine,Technology, Military Operations, Command, Geography, Friction, Chance and Uncertainty,Adversary and Time.


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which this essay will utilise in its analysis of the question posed: People and Politics,

Preparation for War and War Proper.

Finally, Tactics, at the lowest rung in the hierarchy of the structure of war, can be defined

as the art by which corps and smaller unit commanders translate potential combat power into

victorious battles and engagements (US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM)100-5,

Operations, 1986, p. 41) while William Lind suggests another definition to be the process

of combining two elements, techniques and education, through the search for enemy surfaces

and gaps, and the focus of our own main effort with the object of producing a unique

approach for the specific enemy, time, and place (Lind, 1981).

As described above, tactics is very much concerned with defeating the enemy and achieving

victory on the battlefield using techniques of firepower and movement (Antal, 1992) in order

to fulfil the operational objectives in a campaign.

CHRONOLOGY

By exploring the chronology of the Wehrmachts major operations in World War II, from its

birth in 1935 as the successor the Reichswehruntil its abolition in 1945 following defeat in

the war (Bartov, 1992), one can then juxtapose its initial successes with the subsequent

failures, both tactical and strategic, in order to pin down the possible rationales for this

apparent strategy/tactics disparity.

In the prelude to the war, the Wehrmachtwas allowed to build up its military strength as well

as establish an air force through diplomacy and coercion, all the time avoiding repercussions


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of blatantly contravening the Treaty of Versailles (Blair & Curtis, Great Powers to

Superpowers, 2009, p. 36), signed in the aftermath of World War I to keep its numbers to a

maximum of one hundred thousand men in theHeerand an additional fifteen thousand in the

Kriegsmarine (Treaty of Versailles, 1919).

Along with the increase in manpower, rearmament of the Wehrmachtallowed Germany to

address its economic concerns via the rise in production output and decrease in

unemployment, which in turn permitted Hitler to consolidate his political power base,

allowing him to accomplish his wider agenda in the following years (Blair & Curtis, Great

Powers to Superpowers, 2009, p. 36).

Subsequently, using that same military strength as a direct threat to firstly annex Austria in

theAnschluss of 1938 and then conquer Czechoslovakia in 1939, the Wehrmachtsucceeded

in achieving some aspects of Hitlers ulterior motive of Pan-Germanism, his political idea

hidden behind the justification of supporting self-determination for the ethnic Germans in

Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia (Castano, 1997) as well as securing his southern flank against

any enemy attack.

All this time, the British and French governments practiced an appeasement policy, hoping

that Hitler will be satiated with Germanys ever-increasing territorial conquests (Rosecrance

& Steiner, British Grand Strategy and the Origins of World War II, 1993), allowing the

Wehrmachtto continue with its war preparations uninterrupted.

Then, the opening stages of World War II unfolded with the carving up of Poland in

September 1939 by the Wehrmachtfrom the West and the Red Army from the East. Forming


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a strategic alliance with Russia, Hitlers diplomatic masterstroke in signing a non-aggression

pact with the supposed Bolshevik enemy of his regime secured the eastern flank for the

German army. With both the east and the south now protected, the Wehrmachtwas able to

concentrate on the next phase of the war, the western front (Castano, 1997, p. 1).

In the summer of 1940, waging its own brand of manoeuvre warfare, the Blitzkrieg or

lightning war, the Wehrmacht forced the capitulation of Norway and Denmark in April

(Amundsen, 2005) followed by France and the Low Countries (Netherlands, Belgium and

Luxembourg) in May. In a matter of weeks it had pushed Britain off continental Europe and

to the brink of defeat (Foley, 2011), with only the miraculous evacuations at Dunkirk

preventing the bulk of the British Expeditionary Forces (BEF) from total annihilation

(Anderson, 2011).

The Wehrmachts brilliance at the tactical level through the attainment of victory on the

battlefield was achieved by integrating air power with combined armoured-infantry thrusts

deep into its enemies. In the epitome of this lightning war, it out-manoeuvred the joint Anglo-

French defences, bypassing the supposedly impregnable Maginot Line through the Ardennes

forest in Belgium (Mirzoeff, 1976), effectively isolating the Allies forces in a pocket to the

north of France.

With only Britain in the way of Hitlers dominance in Western Europe, the Wehrmachtset

about strategically isolating British Isles by cutting off its sea lines-of-communication from

the United States (US) and its colonies. From 1939 to the end of the war, the Battle of the

Atlantic was fought by theKriegsmarine to deliver upon the strategic intent of strangling the


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British into submission through the use the U-boat wolf-pack tactics to target merchant

shipping coming across the Atlantic in a naval blockade (Jones, 1996, p. 41).

In conjunction with the naval effort, the air campaign was contested by the Royal Air Force

(RAF) and the Luftwaffe for air supremacy over Britain. The Battle of Britain began on

August 13th, 1940 with the aim of bombing Britain into suing for peace by targeting its

civilian population centres and industrial heartland (Richard, 2011) as part of Hitlers strategy

secure the western front so that he can direct all military efforts towards the east and its

erstwhile ally: Russia.

However, before Operation Barbarossa, the campaign against the Red Army on the eastern

front, could begin in earnest, the Wehrmachthad to divert its attention to rescuing its Italian

allies from defeat in Greece. Invasion of Greece and the Balkans commenced in April, 1941

before German forces advanced eastwards towards Moscow in June (Robinson, 2011).

This was in line with Hitlers policy of the conquest ofagricultural land and living space, or

lebensraum, to relocate ethnic Germans to create a German-dominated Europe (Castano,

1997, p. 2). Operation Barbarossa also marked the turning point of the war for the Wehrmacht;

for, despite initial successes in its drive towards the Russian interior, the advance was bogged

down by logistical issues and the Russian winter. From 1942 onwards, after the Battle of

Stalingrad which was to be Germanys final offensive action on the eastern front, the

Wehrmachtwould be fighting mostly on the defensive for the rest of the war (Rees, 2011).

The D-Day landings in Normandy on Jun 6 th, 1944 (Robinson, 2011) effectively signalled

end of the Wehrmacht, with Allied forces pushing westwards from the Contentin peninsular


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and the Russians advancing from the east in Operation Bagration. In spite of the Wehrmacht

launching its last major offensive of the war, the Battle of the Bulge, Berlin fell and Nazi

Germany surrendered unconditionally on May 8th

, 1945, bringing an end to World War II in

the European theatre of operations (Sheffield, 2011).

TACTICAL SUCCESS

This section will seek to explain thepossible reasons for the Wehrmachts initial tactical, and

to a lesser degree, operational victories and argue in the subsequent segment that based on

historical evidence, tactical triumphs may not eventually translate into strategic success (Gray,

The Dimensions of Strategy, 1999, p. 22).

The first plausible explanation may be an inadvertent effect of the Versailles Treaty

limitations resulting in the Wehrmachtbeing forced to select only the best candidates for its

forces (Smith M. J., 1942). What was intended to ensure that Germany would never again

have an armed force capable to waging another conflict on the scale of World War I, had the

exact opposite effect.

The treaty ensured that the Wehrmacht only accepted high calibre recruits with the most

suitable qualities. Accompanied by Hitlers diplomatic efforts in delaying the onset of war,

the Wehrmacht was given sufficient time to expand and rearm so that by the time of the

outbreak of hostilities, it was already a highly motivated and well-equipped conscript army

led by a skilfully trained and experienced core of professional soldiers (Mitcham, 2008).


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Another major reason for the tactical superiority over its enemies is the employment of

Blitzkrieg manoeuvres, emphasizing on speed, flexibility and initiative, despite being

outnumbered in terms of equipment during the offensive in France in 1940 (Bartov, 1992).

The enabler of these actions was the practice of Auftragstaktik or tactics-based orders

(McAndrew, 1996) espoused by Moltke the Elder; arguably the father of the modern General

Staff system through his reforms in his time as its chief-of-staff of the Wehrmachts

predecessor: the Prussian Army (Grossman, 2007, pp. 219-220). As the inheritors of a proud

Prussian military legacy, this progeny that is the Wehrmachtwould have had a solid tactical

and operational foundation to wage such manoeuvre warfare.

Therefore, coupled with well led and highly motivated troops (Frster, 2003), the Wehrmacht

was able to score spectacular victories against its opponents, especially against the static

French forces along the Maginot Line by outflanking them via Belgium.

On the naval warfront, the Kriegsmarines wolf-pack raiding tactics to blockade British

seaborne trade (Lim, 2003) in the Battle of the Atlantic was also increasingly successful in

the 18 months of the operation, with German U-boats able to sink more ships that the Allied

shipyards could build (Jones, 1996, p. 43).

However, as the battle progressed, especially with the entry to the US into the war, German

tactics could not answer to the change in Allied tactics. The increasing use of protected

convoys instead of unconvoyed shipping made it more difficult for the U-boats to attack them.

Furthermore, in terms of production capacities of both ships and the cargo they were carrying,

the US were much better at replacing the losses than the Germans were at sinking them

(Jones, 1996, p. 44). Therefore, by the end of the war, the strategy of cutting Britains sea


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lines-of-communication ended in failure because of a combination of German tactical

inadaptability and US economic superiority.

STRATEGIC FALLACIES

Having studied some of the tactical and operational efforts to support the strategic goals of

the regime, this section will focus on using the dimensions of strategy as proposed by Gray

(Gray, The Dimensions of Strategy, 1999) to explain the strategic failures that occurred in

spite of the successes at lower echelons.

POLITICS AND PEOPLE

The first reason put forth would be the lack of understanding of the people dimension of

strategy. TheLuftwaffes strategic bombing campaign in the Battle of Britain was premised

on eroding the national will of its people by targeting population and industrial centres

instead of destroying military installations, thereby forcing Churchill to sue for peace. While

the bombings did indeed achieve its tactical aims of destroying large parts of London and

other British cities, the strategic effect did not materialise as Britain fought on through the

war and its people endured under the bombardment (Richard, 2011). If the Luftwaffe had

been used to prepare for a possible land invasion of the British Isles instead, Hitlers aim of

securing the western flank might have just panned out much more differently.

Similarly, during the Russian campaign, the Wehrmachts assumption that they would be

welcomed as liberators and assisted by the oppressed Soviet population under the tyranny of

Stalins regime did not understand that the concept of Total War practiced by the Wehrmacht,


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characterised by the bombing of Soviet cities and the loss of thousands of civilian lives

(Heuser, 2010, p. 194), served only to alienate them more from the Russian people even as

they were initially successful in advancing towards Moscow. From the ethics dimension of

strategy, the Wehrmachtwas heavily influenced by Nazi ideology, which regarded the Slavs

as sub-humans and racially inferior to theAryan master-race. In this sense, it was found to be

morally bankrupt during the campaign as well as in other theatre of operations (Farrell, 2010).

For example, OKW dictated that any abuse committed by the soldiers to Russian peasants

would not be considered a violation of military law but instead be handled at the discretion of

their commanders. Faced with the atrocities committed by the German soldiers, the peasants

chose Stalin over Hitler and their resistance against the invaders never did dissolve.

Furthermore, due to the logistic shortfall caused by poor planning (to be elaborated

subsequently), the Germans had to appropriate supplies from Russian and Ukrainian civilians,

which only served to damage relations even further (Castano, 1997, p. 25).

In the analysis of the social realm, Hitler had managed to achieve initial success to galvanize

the entire German nation into supporting his national policies. Exacerbated by the economic

hardships suffered as a result of the harsh post war settlements and reparations imposed under

the Versailles Treaty, Germany as a country perceived that the punishment was extreme and

unfair. TheFhrerwas able to harness this resentment for the victors of the previous war and

effectively mould German society to become a well-oiled, aggressive war machine. However,

as the war dragged on, manpower resources dwindled and ever-younger male citizens were

drafted as replacements for those that perished in the Russian winter wastelands, resulting in

the war fatigue of the entire German society and the failure of his policy and strategic aims

on the home front.


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PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

The second possible rationale was the inadequate preparation of war. Whereas Hitler

succeeded to provide sufficient supplies to the Wehrmachtto prosecute the war prior to the

invasion of Poland and France, he and the OKW were over-confident in their assessments of

the length of the Russian campaign, predicting it to conclude well before the onset of winter

(Belyakov, 2001, p. 46). Hence, in terms of logistics, the invading troops were not issued

with winter gear nor were the vehicles supplied with the suitable type of fuel (Castano, 1997,

p. 27). Therefore, as the Germans rolled back the Soviet defences in the opening stages of

Barbarossa in the fashion similar to France in 1940, the Russians practiced a scorched-earth

policy to deny them the supplies needed to keep the momentum going. With the lack of

proper winter equipment and dwindling supplies, especially oil for the tanks (Wong, 2010),

by the time winter arrived, the initial advance had ground to a halt.

Intelligence gathering by the Abwehr, the Wehrmachts military intelligence organization, in

the lead-up to Barbarossa also proved to be grossly inadequate. Information collected on

enemy strength left out entire infantry and armoured divisions and the Soviet Union was the

only nation where they were unsuccessful in establishing operatives to undermine the country

from within (Belyakov, 2001, p. 48).

WAR PROPER

In the dimension of the war proper, another proposed explanation may be the inability to

manage Clausewitzs Friction, Uncertainty and Chance. A case in point can be found in the

aftermath of the fall of France where the strategy employed did not provide for further


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exploitation of tactical success, and was therefore, flawed. Months of indecision and inaction

by Hitler and Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmachtor OKW) after

Dunkirk that led to a missed opportunity to secure the western flank and eliminate the

remaining Allied threat, allowing the British army some respite from their reverses in France

and Norway (Cooley Jr, 2004, p. 5).

With no provisions for the faster-than-expected collapse of the Anglo-French defences in

1940, the Wehrmachtchose not to annihilate the BEF at Dunkirk and allowed it to preserve

the majority of its remaining forces to fight subsequently. This failure to manage friction,

handle uncertainty as well as seize the initiative when given the chance, in terms of Grays

dimension of strategy (Gray, The Dimensions of Strategy, 1999, p. 41), would come back and

haunt Hitler later during the Normandy campaign.

Ultimately, command failures on the part of the OKW in general, and Hitler in particular,

would seem to be the main reason for the strategic failure of the Wehrmacht. For instance, his

decision to open another front to the conflict in the form of Operation Barbarossa without

first concluding the campaign in the west eventually over-extended the military resources

available to him by the time of the D-Day landings (Robinson, 2011) and the Red Armys

push westwards in Operation Bagration in 1944 (Jordon, 2006). This strategic blunder

doomed the Wehrmacht to fight a two-front war it could never hope to win. Also, his

indecision in directing the main effort of the advance towards either Moscow or Leningrad in

the midst Barbarossa left the German army stuck in the mud without achieving its strategic

aim of destroying the Russian field army (Castano, 1997, p. 27).


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CONCLUSION

In summary, the paper has provided an analysis of the essay topic through definitions and

historic examples to propose three main explanations to the strategy/tactics dichotomy: (1)

the flawed assumptions of people and their national will, (2) the lack of adequate preparation

for war in terms of logistics and intelligence, and lastly (3) the failure of command as well as

the inability to manage friction, uncertainty, and chance during the war proper.

Finally, this paper will conclude by reiterating that war is an extreme but natural extension of

national policies and that military strategy only serves to fulfil political aims (Paret, Craig, &

Gilbert, 1986). As with Clausewitzs expression goes: War is a continuation of policy by

other means.


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